Seeking Stability in Post-Maduro Venezuela: The US, Governance, and the Economy

By Michael M. McCarthy

Founder and Executive Director, Caracas Wire

Adjunct Professor, George Washington University

Image of Caracas, Venezuela. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Roughly three months since US special forces forcibly extracted Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, Venezuela seems to have settled into a tense calm. Though the path to stability is not assured, and the critical issue of new Presidential elections is far from view. With Maduro on trial for narco-terrorism charges in New York, President Trump has publicly backed Delcy Rodríguez’s interim Presidency on multiple occasions, including taking the pivotal step of removing personal sanctions he previously placed on the then-Vice President in 2018. The political support for Rodríguez has gone hand in hand with the issuing of licenses for restored commercial relations and the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between the US and Venezuela. 

Crucially, though, diplomatic normalization has thus far not provided Rodríguez’s government the economic stabilization promised in the first stage of Trump’s three-point plan – stabilization, recovery, and transition – for externally rebuilding Venezuela. 

With inflation running at an average of 24 percent a month in January and February of 2026 (compared with a monthly average of 16 percent in 2025), and the comprehensive minimum wage of $160 covering roughly 25 percent of the cost of a basic basket of goods for a family of five, social tensions on the streets remain unalleviated. Moreover, amid headlines about new oil and gas deals signed with Rodríguez’s government and the Iran war oil price shock that has sent prices over $100 a barrel, economic expectations are sky high. Unsurprisingly, average Venezuelans are in instant gratification mode. With May Day approaching, the traditional date for governments to make salary increase announcements, household heads expect Delcy Rodriguez’s government to deliver results via a hike to the core minimum wage, anchored at $0.33 since 2022, not just offers of new one-off bonuses that provide transitory support. 

The problem is that Delcy Rodríguez does not exercise international economic sovereignty over the proceeds from Venezuela’s oil sales, the source of around 90 percent of the economy’s foreign exchange. While President Trump’s January 9, 2026, Executive Order recognized oil sold to the US as Venezuelan, therefore, declaring the proceeds of sales as Venezuelan, too – an important definition at the time because Trump had made false claims that Venezuela “stole oil from US companies” – the US Treasury Department controls the flow of oil export proceeds. This raises questions about whether the US is treating Venezuela as a financial protectorate. 

Consequently, Rodríguez currently has no new policy levers to pull, leaving her government in the awkward position of theoretically having the financial means to authorize spending increases but lacking the operational ability to execute them. It is an open question whether Washington and Caracas will be able to find a fix – perhaps via an agreed-upon external auditor mechanism – to speed up the transfer of funds to the Central Bank of Venezuela in time for Rodríguez to authorize spending before social tensions boil over. Reportedly, several billion dollars have already accrued in the first quarter of 2025. Either way, the transfer of full economic sovereignty back to Caracas seems unlikely to happen this year.

While there is more evidence of tangible political changes, the political environment is also tense, especially the fragile equilibrium within Chavismo. A significant portion of political prisoners have been released (around 40 percent of the recent Maduro-era political prisoner population). Meanwhile, a controversial Amnesty Bill passed by the ruling party-controlled Congress – a body that was not born in full democratic legitimacy but has passed important laws both supported by a small opposition congressional faction and recognized by the Trump administration – has opened the door to pardons for politicians and public figures previously jailed on highly politicized grounds. Some harder line elements of the opposition, which have key parts of their political leadership in exile, have expressed openness to working within the framework of the Amnesty Law. 

Beyond prisoner releases and legislative reforms, the more charged political change has been the shuffling of the cabinet, an overhaul that seems to have the intention of achieving De-Madurification without dismantling Chavismo’s influence over the state. Rodríguez has fired Maduro family members and loyalists, replaced the Defense Minister who had an 11-year tenure and faces an indictment in the US, and orchestrated a slew of cabinet changes that promote economic reformists, a group led by Vice-President for the Economy Calixto Ortega. Delcy’s brother, Jorge Rodríguez, is the President of the National Assembly, where he controls the legislative agenda and operates as a bridge between the economic reformists and old guard elements. Diosdado Cabello, an original Chavista who participated in then-Colonel Hugo Chavez’s failed coup on February 4, 1992, has retained his Interior Minister post and overall influence despite facing an indictment, a decision that probably reflects a cold calculation by Rodríguez and the US that having him on the inside favors governability. The appointment of the new Defense Minister, the architect of repression for six years, as the head of the feared SEBIN intelligence force, is a further illustration of that cold calculation. 

Operating in an atmosphere of fear from the possibility of a new US military attack, and aware that, economically, the country’s future could soon be brighter, the members of the new ruling coalition seem to be superficially getting along in this highly surreal post-Maduro moment for Chavismo. Indeed, with Trump declaring Venezuela is open for business, the pragmatism of ignoring Chavismo’s socialist roots finally holds real economic potential. Overall, then, the sources of regime cohesion have expanded from purely negative reasons – survival and fear of forcible removal by the US military – to include the positive agenda of rebuilding parts of the economy. 

Above and beyond the national scene, the underlying question is what President Trump ultimately wants his Venezuela policy to be about. So far, it is all about securing oil supplies and working with the people who “have the guns today to ultimately move the country to a representative government and a better station,” as Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in January, just days after the commando raid against Maduro. That posture leaves opposition standard-bearer Maria Corina Machado, now in exile but still by far the most popular politician in the country, on the outside. Even if Delcy Rodriguez’s ruling coalition crumbles, one gets the sense that Trump would prefer a more cautious political alternative, such as a national unity government, over convening snap elections. 

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by clalsstaff on April 9, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on April 9, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/04/09/seeking-stability-in-post-maduro-venezuela-the-us-governance-and-the-economy/

Forced Back to Danger: Why Ending TPS for Honduras Is a Humanitarian Failure

By Josse Martinez and Danjha León Martinez

Image Source: https://www.thecaravelgu.com/blog/2021/3/3/central-american-countries-prepare-for-an-increase-in-migrants

When the United States ended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 57,000 Hondurans in July 2025 (effective September 8), the U.S. government framed it as a routine administrative update. But in humanitarian terms, it was something else entirely: the deliberate withdrawal of a critical protection mechanism in the middle of an ongoing emergency. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warned that the decision “withdraws stability, security, and dignity” from families who have depended on TPS for over two decades. 

TPS is often discussed as an immigration category, but it functions more accurately as an emergency humanitarian protection tool deployed when a state cannot safeguard the lives of its own citizens. The TPS termination for Honduras nationals therefore does not simply change legal status; it actively produces a new humanitarian crisis. The move comes as Honduras faces extreme violence, institutional fragility, climate-driven displacement, and femicides. Sending tens of thousands back now is dangerous and morally indefensible. 

A protection mechanism withdrawn at the worst possible moment 

TPS provides temporary legal status and work authorization to people whose home countries face extraordinary and unsafe conditions. The humanitarian purpose is straightforward: people cannot be returned to danger. Yet the United States now argues that “conditions have improved.” Evidence shows the opposite. Honduras continues to be one of the most violent countries in the hemisphere, combining: 

  • widespread gang control and territorial governance 
  • an overburdened and under-resourced justice system 
  • climate-driven food insecurity 
  • and staggering levels of violence against women and girls 

According to the UN Sustainable Development Group, Honduras has long faced another “pandemic” of gender-based violence, registering femicide rates of 6.2 per 100,000 women. Terminating TPS while these conditions persist is a humanitarian miscalculation that potentially places civilians directly in harm’s way. 

A humanitarian crisis manufactured by policy 

Humanitarian frameworks define crisis as a situation in which civilians cannot survive without external protection. Honduras clearly meets this definition: 1.6 million people require humanitarian aid, the state cannot guarantee basic safety, and threats such as gang violence and femicide operate with near-total impunity. Under international norms, especially the principle of non-refoulement, governments must not return people to countries where their lives or freedom are threatened. 

The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warns that ending TPS will “force people deeper into uncertainty and fear,” including individuals who originally fled death threats, extortion, or gender-based violence. In response to the decision, Honduran TPS holders and national advocacy groups have pushed back. The National TPS Alliance, along with the ACLU and other immigrant-rights organizations, filed a federal complaint challenging the termination of TPS for Honduras. The lawsuit argues that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” ignored unmistakable evidence of ongoing danger, and violated the government’s humanitarian obligations. This legal action shows that the crisis caused by ending TPS is so severe that civil society had to mobilize in court simply to protect Hondurans from being returned to life-threatening conditions. 

Femicide: The central context of forced return 

Femicide is not peripheral to TPS; it is one of the main reasons Hondurans fled. In 2023, Honduras reached a femicide rate of 7.2 per 100,000 women, one of the highest in Latin America. Organizations like Cattrachas document how gender-based killings intersect with policing failures, institutional corruption, and gang control. 

Many Honduran women losing TPS originally fled because they were being hunted by abusive partners, traffickers, or armed criminal groups. Ending TPS is therefore not simply deportation. It will force women to return to an environment where they are deliberately targeted and where the state fails to protect them. As the Women’s Refugee Commission notes, gender-based violence is a leading driver of forced migration. Repatriation under these conditions directly increases the risk of femicide. 

Community resilience: Art as resistance 

Even as institutions fail, communities in Honduras have built their own forms of protection. One of the most powerful is art-activism (“artivism”). Public art challenges the normalization of violence and preserves memory in ways formal systems often fail to do. The UN Spotlight Initiative has supported art-based gender-violence prevention in 17 Honduran municipalities, using murals, sculptures, and theater to create community dialogue and challenge harmful norms. 

The feminist graffiti duo Dolls Clan (Mayki Graff Ortega and Suam Fonseca) creates public murals honoring victims of femicide and amplifying feminist resistance. Their work turns public walls into spaces of collective mourning and political demand. Public art is a form of humanitarian response: it educates, resists, and keeps victims’ stories alive when formal justice systems fail. But art cannot replace systemic protection. 

The immediate human cost of ending TPS 

Ending TPS triggers four immediate humanitarian harms: 

  1. Family separation: Thousands of U.S.-born children have Honduran parents with TPS. Families now face the devastating choice between separation or relocating to a country many children have never known. 
  2. Economic instability and re-poverty: TPS holders have spent decades building careers, homes, and businesses in the U.S. Forced return pushes them into an already unstable Honduran economy. 
  3. A rise in irregular migration: History shows that ending legal pathways does not reduce migration; it increases undocumented migration as people seek safety through more dangerous routes. 
  4. Exposure to direct violence: Returnees become immediate targets of gangs, extortion networks, police corruption, and gender-based violence. TPS termination does not fix migration. It makes it deadlier. 

A crisis created by political choice 

Ending TPS for Honduras is not a neutral administrative action, it is a political decision with profound humanitarian consequences. It forces thousands back into a country facing intersecting emergencies: femicide, gang rule, climate disaster, and institutional collapse. While communities fight to maintain dignity and memory, the U.S. is withdrawing one of the only forms of international protection Hondurans have left. It abandons a protection promise the United States upheld for more than two decades. If the United States seeks to honor its humanitarian commitments, it must extend TPS or redesign it as a pathway to long-term stability, not dismantle it. Protection should never depend on political cycles. Lives depend on it. 

Josse Martinez is a Global Governance, Politics, and Security (GGPS) graduate student at American University. He is of Honduran and Guatemalan descent.

Danjha Leon Martinez is a Research Assistant for the Immigration Lab at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. She is a Development Management graduate student at American University with a focus on humanitarian aid and global migration

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by clalsstaff on March 29, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on March 29, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/03/29/forced-back-to-danger-why-ending-tps-for-honduras-is-a-humanitarian-failure/

Testimonies of Sexual Violence while Migrating from Latin America

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/rentman1225/26864902068/

By Maggie McMahon   

Sexual violence during migration journeys is rarely addressed in the current political climate. Yet this issue is rampant for many migrants, especially those making the journey from Latin America to the United States. The personal experiences and testimonies from those who completed this journey provide valuable insight into the dangers that migrants face in this region. This problem demands more attention, as it is one of the many dangers that migrants face while attempting to reach the U.S. 

In her late 20’s and from Ecuador, Verónica details her lengthy and dangerous journey to the United States, where she walked many miles to the US-Mexico border and experienced rough traveling conditions, including falling off a train.

Ay me están esperando llorar. Bueno, sufrí mucho, pasé mucha hambre, dormí en parque—muchas cosas feas…Bueno, después de eso, yo cambié de tren y me subí a otro tren que ese sí era el que me traía, pero ese tren se quedó 3 días en el desierto. Ahí entonces yo como que le daba gracias a Dios de no haberme subido a ese tren porque yo me pude subir, pero me dio miedo y no me subí, pero mucha gente se subió y algunos se cayeron, incluidos niños. Bueno, ese tren me avanzó hasta la frontera, de ahí yo me bajé y camine bastante. Yo llegué a este país con los pies podridos ensangrentados porque yo caminé artístico.[1]

Oh, this is making me want to cry. Well, I suffered a lot. I went very hungry, slept in a park—many ugly things… Well, after that, I changed trains and got on another one, the one that was supposed to bring me here. But that train stayed stranded in the desert for three days. At that point, I felt like thanking God for not getting on the earlier train. I could have boarded it, but I was scared and didn’t. Many people did get on, and some fell off, including children. Well, that train took me to the border, from there I got off and walked a lot. I arrived in this country with rotten feet, bloodied because I walked a tremendous amount. 

When asked if she felt in danger during her trip, Verónica shared her experience in Guatemala:

Uh no yo siempre diré que Guatemala es el peor país que yo pude conocer ahí, así que no te digo. A mi en bus me tocaron los senos, las partes íntimas. Me sacaron todo el dinero.

Oh no, I will always say that Guatemala is the worst country I could have known there, so I tell you. They touched my breasts and private parts on the bus. They took all my money.

After arriving in the United States, Verónica’s friend provided her a place to stay and food for a few weeks. She now works as a delivery driver.

Another woman, Mariana, also shared her experience with sexual violence during her journey. In her fifties and from El Salvador, she has been in the US for over two decades. During her journey from El Salvador, she recalls that:

Fíjese que yo fui víctima de eso. No llegar al acto sexual porque gracias a Dios no me llegaron a violar, pero en el camino para acá si fui tocada por los hombres. Puedo recordar de que no sé si todas percibirán eso, pero yo sí lo viví. Sí. Sería porque yo cuando venía ya venía …, pero yo parecía… yo era bien delgadita, parecía una niña de 14 años. No sé si por eso es que abusaron de mí de esa manera. Pero sí pudeir tocada por más de 2 hombres en el camino. 

I remember that I was a victim of that. Not in a sexual act, thanks to God, they did not rape me, but on the way here I was touched by men. I can remember that I didn’t know if anyone else sees that, but I did experience that…it must have been because when I came…I seemed to be very thin, I looked like a 14-year-old girl. I don’t know if that’s why they abused me in that way. But I was touched by more than 2 men on the way.

Mariana’s story demonstrates how persistent the dangers of migration have been for women over the years. 

These instances of sexual assault are not isolated. Samuel, born in Colombia in the late 1990s, migrated to Venezuela as a child due to political violence and the unfavorable economic situation. He moved to Brazil as a young teen to work in the mines after his parents separated and migrated to the US in 2024. 

While traversing the Darién Gap, a remote thick jungle crossing between Colombia and Panama, David witnessed many violent situations. The Darien Gap is known for its dangerous and difficult conditions, with many people experiencing gang violence, crime, sexual violence, disease, and death. 

David reported that while on the Panamanian side of the Darien Gap, he witnessed a group of Indigenous men rape a woman traversing the crossing. He also saw this group of men shoot the woman’s husband. 

Hay indios que agarraron a una mujer y se la violaron. Y al esposo… viendo que están pasando eso, el esposo se le baten o se levanta, le pegan un tiro. El indio agarró con una escopeta y le pegó el tiro. Puso, se lo pegó aquí… Así, puff, le pegó el tiro aquí …. Ahí quedaron los dos y salieron los indios. Antes habían robado y todo, pero después estaban violando a la mujer ahí ante el grupo. 

There are Indians who grabbed a woman and they raped her. And the husband … seeing that they are going through that, the husband fights him or gets up, they shoot him. The Indian grabbed a shotgun and shot him. He put it, he stuck it here… So, poof, he shot him here…. The two of them laid there and the Indians left…Before, they had robbed and everything, but after they were raping the woman there in front of the group.

Sexual violence is unfortunately a common experience in the Darién Gap. Other migrants we interviewed also reported witnessing instances of it, as with the case of Mauricio. Born in Venezuela, Mauricio migrated to the US four years ago to find better opportunities for his three young children. He traveled to Caracas, Venezuela and then on to Colombia and Peru. During his migration, Mauricio faced many dangerous situations, such as sleeping on the streets and crossing the jungle. As he recounts: 

En Panama fui testigo una violencia que pasó pero eso fue ya entrando en la selva. Violaron una niña y alguna mujer. Entonces yo estuve ahí, o sea, fui vi todo con mis ojos y fui testigo de eso.

In Panama I witnessed violence that happened, but that was already deep in the jungle. They raped a girl and a woman. So, I was there, that is, I saw everything with my eyes and witnessed that. 

Instances of sexual violence were then increasing in the Darién Gap since Panamanian authorities were not monitoring the crossing. Additionally, many instances of sexual violence go unreported due to stigma and shame. With the absence of policing in these remote largely uninhabited areas, armed criminal groups are able to take advantage of vulnerable people traversing the crossing.  Though lately, the Panamanian government has mobilized the army to patrol those areas, as movement north has decreased and now many people are heading south.

Sexual violence have long-term psychological and physical impacts for those who experience and witness it. Victims of rape can suffer sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, and physical trauma. Sexual violence can also cause feelings of depression, anxiety, PTSD, and social isolation, as well as heighten an individual’s risk of substance abuse.

Given the ongoing instability faced by many Latin American countries, migration through the Darién Gap is likely to increase. Panamanian authorities must take further action to closely monitor the dangerous conditions in the crossing and provide support for the vulnerable populations crossing it. Greater support for the physical, psychological, and financial needs of migrants should also be implemented in the United States. 

Maggie McMahon is a research intern at the Immigration Lab. She is a senior majoring in international studies. 

Edited by Elizabeth Angione and Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich

[1] This and the following accounts have been taken from interviews conducted with recent arrivals to the Washington DC-metro region and New York City as part of an ongoing research project of the Immigration Lab in American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. This project received IRB approval. Given the vulnerability of this population, we have taken steps to ensure the human subjects involved are protected, including eliciting the consent of all research subjects, the use of pseudonyms, and elimination of any individually identifying information.

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by clalsstaff on March 17, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on March 17, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/03/17/testimonies-of-sexual-violence-while-migrating-from-latin-america/

Between Giants: How Uruguay Is Expanding Its Global Trade Strategy

Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Juan A. Bogliaccini, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay

This small South American country is seeking new markets and investment while remaining anchored to MERCOSUR and balancing ties with the United States and China.

For more than three decades, Uruguay’s strategy for international economic integration has revolved around the Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR. Founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the bloc emerged at the end of the Cold War with the goal of deepening regional economic integration and strengthening trade among its members. For Uruguay, a small country of just over three million people located between two regional giants, the bloc initially proved highly beneficial. During the 1990s, MERCOSUR became the main engine of Uruguayan exports and foreign investment.

That dynamic began to shift at the end of the decade. Brazil’s currency devaluation in 1998 and Argentina’s financial collapse in 2001 exposed the vulnerabilities of Uruguay’s economic dependence on its neighbors. At the time, a majority of the country’s exports was destined for these two markets, and the crises had profound effects on Uruguay’s economy.

These events triggered a long-running debate within the country’s political and economic elites about the future of Uruguay’s international trade strategy. At the center of the discussion was one of MERCOSUR’s key institutional rules: member states cannot negotiate individual free trade agreements outside the bloc. Critics argued that this constraint limited Uruguay’s ability to diversify its economic partnerships in an increasingly globalized world.

For many years, much of the political center-right advocated a strategy similar to that pursued by Chile—signing bilateral free trade agreements across multiple regions of the world. The center-left generally defended remaining firmly within the regional framework, emphasizing the importance of political and economic integration with neighboring countries.

Over time, however, both sides gradually converged toward a more pragmatic position. Today there is broad consensus that Uruguay should remain in MERCOSUR while pushing for greater flexibility within the bloc allowing for members to pursue complementary trade agreements. In practice, leaving MERCOSUR has never been a realistic option. Brazil and Argentina remain crucial trading partners, particularly for exports linked to regional value chains and cross-border production networks.

At the same time, the bloc itself has increasingly sought to expand outward. In recent years, MERCOSUR has concluded trade agreements with Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. In 2026, after more than twenty-five years of negotiations, MERCOSUR also finalized a landmark trade agreement with the European Union. Across successive governments representing different political parties, Uruguay has consistently supported these negotiations as part of a long-term strategy of gradual trade opening.

Meanwhile, Uruguay’s broader trade relationships have evolved significantly. Over the past two decades, China has become the country’s principal destination for goods exports, particularly agricultural commodities such as soybeans and forestry products like cellulose pulp. At the same time, the United States has become the main market for Uruguay’s rapidly growing service sector, especially software development and business services.

These trends have positioned Uruguay within a complex global landscape shaped by growing geopolitical competition between the world’s two largest economies. Rather than aligning strongly with either side, successive Uruguayan governments have sought to maintain a careful balance between Washington and Beijing while preserving strong ties with their regional partners.

Recent administrations have also attempted to broaden the country’s commercial horizons. During the presidency of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), Uruguay applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), one of the world’s most significant multilateral trade agreements. Although accession negotiations are only beginning, the move signaled Uruguay’s intention to deepen economic ties with Asia-Pacific markets.

The Lacalle Pou government also explored the possibility of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with China. While the initiative ultimately did not move forward—largely because Beijing made clear it preferred negotiations with MERCOSUR as a whole—the effort served an important political purpose. Alongside the negotiations with the CPTPP, it signaled to Uruguay’s regional partners that the country was determined to pursue broader trade opportunities.

The current administration of President Yamandú Orsi has continued this strategy of balanced engagement. Diplomatic outreach to both the United States and China reflects Uruguay’s pragmatic approach in an increasingly multipolar global economy. Promoting exports has become particularly important as the strength of the Uruguayan peso makes international competitiveness more challenging for domestic producers.

Despite these global ambitions, Uruguay’s integration into international value chains remains heavily regional. Much of the country’s participation in global trade occurs through “import-to-export” production models, particularly in agro-industrial sectors that rely on imported inputs and regional processing networks. A large share of these exports continues to be destined for MERCOSUR markets, reflecting the enduring importance of regional economic integration.

This structural reality explains why Uruguay’s leaders have consistently pursued a dual strategy: maintaining strong economic ties with Argentina and Brazil while simultaneously seeking new markets and investment partners around the world.

The recently concluded trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union may represent an important step in that direction. Together with the agreements with Singapore and EFTA—and the expected accession of Bolivia to MERCOSUR—the deal could gradually expand the economic horizons of a country that remains heavily dependent on a limited number of export sectors.

For Uruguay, the stakes are significant. Since the end of the global commodity boom in the early 2010s, economic growth has slowed. As a result, it has become more difficult to reduce a fiscal deficit that hovers around 4 percent of GDP while public debt continues to rise gradually. Expanding exports and attracting foreign investment have therefore become central priorities for policymakers.

Yet Uruguay’s small domestic market inevitably limits its appeal to international investors. The country’s greatest economic asset lies instead in its potential role as a stable regional hub within the much larger South American market. With strong institutions, political stability, and relatively high levels of human capital, Uruguay often presents itself as a reliable gateway for companies seeking access to the region.

Realizing that potential, however, will require more than trade agreements alone. Expanding Uruguay’s global economic presence will depend on developing new productive sectors, increasing productivity in existing industries, and moving gradually toward exports with higher value added.

For a small country navigating between two regional giants and competing global powers, this is no simple task. But Uruguay’s strategy remains clear: maintain its regional anchor while steadily expanding its reach into the global economy.

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by clalsstaff on March 11, 2026  •  Permalink
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Costa Rica 2026: Political Continuity and Signs of Democratic Erosion

Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Ilka Treminio-Sánchez, Political Scientist of the University of Costa Rica.  

The national elections held in Costa Rica on February 1, 2026, marked a turning point in the country’s recent political trajectory. Contrary to expectations of a runoff—common in a highly fragmented party system—the ruling party candidate, Laura Fernández, won in the first round with 48.3 percent of votes counted. This result not only ensured the continuity of the political project championed by President Rodrigo Chaves but also consolidated a deeper transformation of the Costa Rican political system. 

The election saw a 69 percent voter turnout, the highest since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as a sign of civic revitalization, but also as a consequence of growing polarization. During the campaign, two distinct blocs emerged: on one side, the ruling party, organized around Chaves’s personalistic leadership; on the other, a fragmented opposition that, despite its ideological differences, shared concerns about the country’s institutional direction, and which ultimately consolidated most of its votes around the National Liberation Party. In the run up to the election, supporters of traditional and emerging parties came together. Concerned about the country’s democracy, they spontaneously organized various forms of collective action outside event venues. These activities culminated in the so-called “multicolored caravans,” named for the diversity of party flags displayed under the unifying slogan: “Out with Chaves!” But, despite such mobilizations, and in line with poll results, the opposition did not advance to a runoff. 

From an organizational standpoint, the process was impeccable. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal once again demonstrated high standards of transparency and efficiency, reaffirming the technical soundness of the Costa Rican electoral system. However, this procedural strength contrasts sharply with the political tensions that accumulated during Chaves’s presidency, characterized by a confrontational discourse toward oversight bodies and the judiciary. 

The Ruling Party and the Construction of Continuity 

Fernández’s victory cannot be understood without considering the central role of the outgoing president. Although constitutionally barred from immediate reelection, Chaves devised a succession strategy based on personal loyalty and the symbolic transfer of his leadership. The official campaign revolved around the slogan “continuity of change,” presenting Fernández as the custodian of the president’s political mandate and as its guarantor of continued power. 

The electoral vehicle was the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), created after Chaves fell out with the leadership of the Social Democratic Progress Party, with which he rose to power in 2022. The reorganization allowed it to concentrate the vote and achieve not only the presidency, but also 31 of the 57 legislative seats, an absolute majority unprecedented in recent decades. 

This result substantially alters the conditions for governance. While previous administrations had to govern with small and fragmented factions, the new government will have a robust parliamentary group, although of late some friction has emerged among its leaders. Nevertheless, only the National Liberation Party – historically the most dominant political force in Costa Rica – had achieved a similar number of representatives in 1982, during an exceptional economic crisis. 

This legislative majority opens the door to the possibility of far-reaching political reforms. During his presidency, Chaves repeatedly expressed interest in expanding the executive branch’s powers, limiting oversight bodies’ authority, and promoting a transformation of the state that his supporters call the “Third Republic,” a successive step in the destruction of the Second Republic inherited after the 1948 Civil War, whose foundations were laid by the liberationist José Figueres Ferrer. Without a supermajority, such reforms were not feasible. Today, the balance of power looks different. 

During the transition period, two unprecedented decisions were announced. First, the president-elect expressed her intention to appoint Rodrigo Chaves as Minister of the Presidency, the sole responsible for coordinating actions between the executive and legislative branches. Second, the outgoing president appointed Laura Fernández as Minister of the Presidency for the remaining months of the administration. Chaves also stated that, in his future role, he would seek to bring on board members of the National Liberation Party to form the supermajority necessary to approve constitutional reforms.

Populism, Leadership, and Institutional Tensions 

Rodrigo Chaves’s governing style represented a break with traditional Costa Rican political patterns. His confrontational rhetoric, directed against media outlets, public universities, judges, and opposition members of parliament, reinforced an anti-establishment narrative that resonated with sectors disillusioned with the status quo.  His rhetoric fits into the political model followed by other populist presidents on the continent. 

Surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research and Studies (CIEP) at the University of Costa Rica showed that his supporters primarily valued his ability to “impose order” and “produce results.” These attributes reflect a social demand for strong leadership and swift decisions, even if such an approach creates tension with the deliberative procedures inherent in liberal democracy. 

In this sense, the Costa Rican case fits into a broader regional trend. The political and inspirational affinity with Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s influence was evident throughout the campaign, particularly regarding public safety and proposals to toughen the prison system. Likewise, the first congratulatory messages to Fernández came from far-right figures such as Chilean president-elect Antonio Kast, and Mexican media figure Eduardo Verástegui, suggesting the integration of Costa Rica’s new leadership into transnational conservative-right networks. This realignment does not necessarily imply a break with traditional partners, but it does signal an ideological shift that redefines the country’s international standing. 

Security, Social Cohesion, and a Democratic Future 

The new government’s main challenge will be public security. The sustained increase in homicides and expansion of organized crime have eroded Costa Rica’s reputation as a peaceful exception in Central America. Policies implemented so far have been lax and ineffective, to the point that candidates labeled them permissive during the campaign debates. 

Added to this are structural problems: the deterioration of the education system, the strain on the healthcare system, and the weakening of environmental policies that historically formed part of a national consensus. These issues not only affect social well-being but also undermine the legitimacy of a democratic system seemingly unable to improve the situation. 

The 2026 elections do not simply represent a change or continuity of political parties. They reflect a reconfiguration of the political system around a personalistic leadership that combines right-wing populism, social conservatism, an evangelical agenda, and challenges to institutional checks and balances. The electoral strength of the ruling party is undeniable; so too is the broad-based support it received. 

The underlying concern is undoubtedly that the new continuity government could further the trajectory of democratic erosion. When anti-institutional rhetoric is legitimized by those in power and the political concentration of that power is presented as a condition for effective governance, the risk is not an abrupt collapse but rather an incremental erosion. 

For a society with a long tradition of stability and the rule of law, the central challenge will be to rebuild a minimal consensus around respect for horizontal checks and balances and pluralistic deliberation. The continuity of Chaves’s political project opens a new cycle. Its outcome will depend not only on the Executive and its legislative majority, but also on the capacity of the citizenry and institutions to maintain the balances that have historically defined Costa Rican democracy. 

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Re-imagining the Americas Through Culture Amid an Increasingly Fragmented Hemisphere

Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Felipe Rezende, Research Fellow and Visiting Scholar in Residence at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (AU-CLALS), from the University of Brasília (UnB), Brazil. 

In the current context of jingoistic nationalisms and divisive political projects, particularly in the United States, where the current Trump administration has intensified a political agenda anchored in anti-immigration discourse and practices, reflecting upon the challenges and opportunities for re-imagining what people across the America’s might have in common, in terms of identity, culture and shared belong, is at present particularly important. Contemporary cultural developments such as Bad Bunny’s performance at the Super Bowl LX and Brazil’s global awarded film industry illustrate how notions of “American” belonging can also be culturally and politically contentious.

Hemispheric Myths of National Assimilation

At first glance, imagining a unitary cultural identity across the Americas appears challenging. Although Latin American nation-states might share similar colonial and post-colonial histories, their different national and subnational cultural commitments have also been forged in dynamic relation with cultural assets from elsewhere influencing what is now recognized as latino culture. Similarly, the idea of a North American identity does not emerge as an empirically verifiable cultural synthesis, but rather as the contingent result of ongoing symbolic disputes marked by racial hierarchies, power asymmetries, and competing projects of belonging.

Mid-twentieth century notions such as the melting pot in the United and the myth of the so-called cosmic race or mestizaje in Latin America, offer different but comparable assimilationist narratives for the nation, narratives which obscure persistent structural conflicts within post-colonial American societies. Such accounts function largely as ideological constructs aimed at producing one or another sort of unified national identity. In this sense, contemporary debates about pluri- or multiculturalism in the Americas carry an inherent ambiguity: cultural diversity is recognized rhetorically but also regulated through mechanisms that posit and reproduce racial and other social asymmetries.

This multicultural dilemma in the Americas, therefore, derives from the tension between the political recognition of plural identities, on the one hand, and the impulse to preserve national identity as previously imagined, on the other. In this context, artistic and cultural production and its diffusion emerge as privileged arenas of symbolic mediation, contestation of meaning, and negotiation of belonging, which often seek to transcend closed assumptions of national identity. We might understand the hemispheric and global diffusion of national artistic production from Latin American countries as more than just cultural industry content, and as helping to circulate diverse cultural perspectives.

Latin American Pop Culture is Having a Moment

Recently, numerous products of Latin American popular culture have achieved global recognition, potentially serving as pillars for re-imagining a broader and more cohesive sense of identity across the Americas, and in ways increasingly independent from taken-for-granted nationalist mythologies across the continent. Especially in times of growing international fragmentation, authoritarian threats to democratic systems, and dysfunctional global regimes that fail to produce international cooperation the cases below illustrate new opportunities for re-imagining identity, culture, and belonging in the Americas.

In recent years musical artists like the Colombian Karol G and Puerto Rican Bad Bunny have come to exemplify the consolidation of Latin urban pop as a transnational cultural phenomenon, with a strong presence in the global music industry and recurring visibility through numerous nominations and awards in the GRAMMY and Latin GRAMMY circuits. Bad Bunny won the 68th GRAMMY Awards in the following categories: Best Música Urbana Album and Best Album Cover, for DeBÍ TiRAR MáS FotoS, and Best Global Music Performance for EoO. Also, his 2026 Super Bowl LX halftime performance made history as the first solo Latino artist to headline the show, bringing renewed attention to discussions about what it means to be “American.”

Also in music, Liniker, a Black Brazilian trans woman songwriter, won three categories at the 26th Latin GRAMMY Awards: Best Portuguese-Language Contemporary Pop Album, and Portuguese-Language Urban Performance for Caju, as well as Best Portuguese-Language Song for Veludo Marrom. In addition, the album Milton + esperanza (2024), a collaboration between the acclaimed North American jazz artist Esperanza Spalding and the Brazilian master Milton Nascimento, was nominated for the 67th GRAMMY Award in the category Best Jazz Vocal Album.

In cinema, Brazilian audiovisual productions have undeniably entered the global mainstream, particularly through films addressing the memory of political tragedies such as that country’s military dictatorship. “I’m Still Here” (2024) won the 2025 Academy Award for Best International Feature Film, the 2025 Golden Globe for Best Actress in a Motion Picture – Drama (Fernanda Torres), and more than 70 additional international awards. “The Secret Agent”(2025) won Best Director (Kleber Mendonça Filho) and Best Actor (Wagner Moura) at the 2025 Cannes Film Festival, and later won the 2026 Golden Globe for Best Non-English Language Film and Best Actor in a Motion Picture – Drama (Wagner Moura). The film is also nominated for the 2026 Academy Awards in the categories Best Picture, Best Actor, Best International Feature Film, and Achievement in Casting.

In literature, the growing presence of Latin American authors within global circuits of recognition can also be observed through the wider international circulation of their books, increasing number of translations, and their selection for prestigious literary prizes. For example, the Brazilian novelist Itamar Vieira Junior, author of Torto Arado (2019), saw the 2023 English translation shortlisted for the 2024 International Booker Prize.

Each Latin American cultural producer mentioned here successfully transformed historically localized experiences – often addressing political violence, state terrorism, racism, and patriarchy, among other challenging topics – into aesthetically communicable narratives accessible at a transnational scale. But it is important to note that these recent successes in music, film and literature cannot be explained solely by the artistic genius of their creators. Beyond their evident creative excellence, also important has been the existence of public policies supporting the production and diffusion of national cultural assets, which have also contributed to the international success of Latin American popular culture.

Take the case of Brazil, which put in place a set of public policies that directly incentivize and support contributions to the country’s cultural economy. These include the so-called Rouanet Law, providing tax incentives to support the completion and circulation cultural projects. In the audiovisual field specifically, the Audiovisual Sector Fund (FSA) ensures public resources for film production and distribution. They also include the National Aldir Blanc Policy (PNAB), which established a continuous and decentralized state-funding model strengthening cultural infrastructure and expanding access to cultural rights at the local level. The international reach of works such as “I’m Still Here” (2024) and “The Secret Agent” (2025) should also be understood as the result of a public infrastructure that sustains the competitiveness and global insertion of Brazilian audiovisual products.

What Hemispheric Cultural Diplomacy Has to Offer

Whether through voluntary cultural cooperation, institutional support from domestic cultural public policies, or efforts of public and cultural diplomacy, the growing presence of Latin American artistic production in the hemisphere is neither accidental nor merely the result of its exoticization by Global North audiences. Despite long-standing legacies of stereotyping and archetypal representations of Latin American peoples and cultures, contemporary Latin American cultural products, which circulate throughout the hemisphere and beyond, help us to reconfigure the hemisphere’s identity in new and pluricultural ways.

Even amid the challenges posed by a context of fragmentation, competition, and new threats of geopolitical violence, the aesthetic innovations and moral premises foregrounded by contemporary Latin American artists, and informed by expressions of human rights, peaceful coexistence, and American belonging, present rich opportunities for new imaginaries of hemispheric identity and culture. In this sense, imagining what people across the Americas might have in common can cease to be just an idealistic abstraction and become one critical horizon for revitalizing mutual respect and democratic coexistence in the hemisphere.

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The Illusion of Progress? The Rise of Women in Ecuadorian Politics Despite Ongoing Gender Violence in Its Indigenous Communities

(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

By Isabella Serra & S. Shrestha  

On January 24, 2006, Estuardo Remache was criminally charged with domestic violence and removed from his position as head of Ecuador’s Human Rights Commission. The case was brought forward by his wife, Maria Lucrecia Nono, who had spent years seeking justice for the repeated abuse she endured. On numerous occasions Maria’s attempts to report the violence were dismissed, her credibility questioned, and her intentions painted as vindictive.

When Maria first turned to local authorities and Comisarías, state-run women’s centers meant to support survivors of gender-based violence (GBV), she was told her case was a personal matter to be resolved at home. Officials cited Article 191 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which separates the federal and Indigenous legal systems, and told her she must seek justice within her own Kichwa community. 

Gender-based violence, which includes emotional, physical, and sexual harm rooted in gender inequality, is a widespread and deeply structural form of oppression. Maria’s abuse didn’t stop at home; it was reinforced by the very institutions intended to protect her. Each time she sought help, she was met with indifference, disbelief, or outright rejection, despite returning with visible bruises and ongoing emotional trauma. Her story points to a more systemic issue: the absence of female political power in Ecuador to challenge and transform these injustices. 

Maria’s ordeal highlights a troubling paradox: the greater presence of women – particularly Indigenous Kichwa women – in Ecuador’s political sphere, alongside the continued high rates of GBV in their communities. Why, despite growing political representation for women, does gender-based violence remain so entrenched, especially among Indigenous communities?

 Legal and Structural Context 

Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution marked a turning point, officially recognizing the country as plurinational and intercultural, thus legitimizing Indigenous governance structures alongside the national legal system. Yet this dual system has limitations. While intended to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty, in practice it often creates conditions of legal marginality, particularly for Indigenous women. In Maria’s case, the national judiciary abdicated responsibility, claiming the Kichwa system to be the appropriate jurisdiction, while Kichwa authorities sought to silence her to avoid casting their communities in a negative light. 

This tension reflects a broader legal failure: the promotion of state-sponsored multiculturalism but the failure to protect vulnerable populations within specific communities. The burden of representation falls heavily on Indigenous women like Mirian Masaquiza Jerez, a Kichwa woman staffing the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. In an interview, she explained that any missteps are seen not as individual failings, but as reflections on her entire community. Despite these pressures, her greater visibility, along with that of many others, marks a notable shift in the gendered landscape of Ecuadorian politics 

 Gender-Based Violence in Context 

Ecuador has made substantial progress toward increasing women’s political representation, thanks in part to gender quotas implemented since the early 2000s. These measures mandate a minimum number of female candidates in national and local elections, enabling more women to ascend to political leadership. Despite recent infighting and a diminished presence in the national legislature, Ecuador’s Indigenous-led Pachakutik party has played a pivotal role in this shift over the past three decades, advocating for environmental justice and Indigenous rights, including those of women. 

Yet political representation does not always translate to structural change. The existence of women in positions of power can obscure the continued suffering of those on the margins. Indigenous women in rural areas still live under deeply patriarchal norms, face high rates of GBV, and often lack access to justice, health care, or safe housing. Nearly 6 in 10 women in Ecuador report having experienced GBV. The rate rises to 68 percent among Indigenous women, 10 percentage points higher than among their non-indigenous counterparts. These figures expose the intersectional nature of GBV: it disproportionately affects women who are poor, Indigenous, or otherwise marginalized. GBV is not just a personal issue; it is a societal failure sustained by socioeconomic inequality, cultural norms, and weak legal protections. 

In many Indigenous communities, patriarchal expectations remain strong. Divorce and contraceptives are taboo, and women who speak out like Maria risk being ostracized by their families and communities. Maria’s relatives warned her that if she pursued legal action, she might lose custody of her children. And she nearly did: Estuardo Remache was awarded custody of four of their five children before he was convicted. 

Eco-Politics, Exploitation, and Gendered Harm 

The entanglement of environmental exploitation and gender inequality has further exacerbated the issue. Since the 1960s, Ecuador’s adoption of a free-market model encouraged the expansion of oil extraction in the Amazon. While economically beneficial in the short term, these projects have devastated Indigenous lands and polluted vital resources. The resulting health effects, such as increased miscarriages and birth defects, are disproportionately born by women. 

Historically oil companies, empowered by deregulation, offered large financial incentives to communities in exchange for land. Communities that resisted remained poor and resource scarce. Those who accommodated faced social stigma, displacement, and environmental degradation. Both paths potentially deepened indigenous poverty. 

These developments have reshaped gender roles. As men leave to work for the very oil companies that displaced their communities, women are left to manage households, often under increased financial and social stress. This dynamic has continued to entrench patriarchal authority and contributes to higher rates of domestic violence. Workers exposed to exploitative labor, drugs, and alcohol often bring that trauma home. Women, already made vulnerable by poverty and legal liminality, often suffer the consequences. 

While the 2008 Constitution granted new rights, Ecuador’s laws have failed to notably improve conditions for indigenous women, and in some cases, have exacerbated hardships. The continued expansion of extractive industries under new hydrocarbons and related environmental laws, has led to further environmental contamination, social disruption, and increased gendered violence. 

Reassessing “Progress” 

After years of litigation, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court issued a judgment in 2014 finding that María Lucrecia Nono’s constitutional rights had been violated. Yet the ruling did not bring closure: the prolonged process left her struggle for justice fundamentally unresolved.

Maria’s story is often held up as an example of progress, offered as proof that Indigenous women can now access justice. But this interpretation is dangerously reductive. Maria’s case dragged on for years. She endured physical and emotional abuse, not only from her husband but from a system that refused to believe her. Even after winning she paid a steep price: continued violence, loss of custody, and pressure from Indigenous political leaders urging her to remain silent to protect their image. 

Her case exposes the limits of symbolic victory. Representation alone is not enough to dismantle cultures of impunity and deeply rooted systems of oppression. Real justice requires the transformation of legal systems, political norms, and economic structures that continue to marginalize Indigenous women. 

Conclusions  

Ecuador presents a complex landscape: a country lauded for increasing female political representation, yet plagued by high levels of GBV, especially within Indigenous communities. Maria Lucrecia Nono’s case is not a victory; it is a warning. It illustrates how cultural recognition, extractive capitalism, and patriarchal power can conspire to silence women, even when they appear to be gaining political stature. 

The emergence of Indigenous women in Ecuador’s political sphere is long overdue. But without corresponding reforms in legal protections, community norms, and economic structures, political power will remain largely symbolic. True liberation for Indigenous women in Ecuador will require dismantling the intersecting systems that perpetuate gender-based violence, which requires listening to women like Maria not only when they win, but when they are silenced. 

Isabella Serra & S. Shrestha  are Research Assistants at The Immigration Lab

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

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by clalsstaff on February 20, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 20, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/02/20/the-illusion-of-progress-the-rise-of-women-in-ecuadorian-politics-despite-ongoing-gender-violence-in-its-indigenous-communities/

Bendito Benito: The Cultural is Always Political

Image Source: Heute.at

By Ernesto Castañeda

Bad Bunny’s halftime performance showed how much Latinos love America, even if some parts of America do not love them back. Performed mostly in Spanish, it showed the reality that Latinos and Spanish are part of America’s culture: its history, its present, and its future. As the performance’s references to salsa and Ricky Martin’s participation in it reminded us, Latinos’ contributions to U.S. and global culture are not a new phenomenon.

Performances like this weaken MAGA’s ideological project even without any direct references to the current administration. Most importantly, they are a reminder of what most people can see: that Latinos, Asians, and Africans are part of U.S. communities, schools, labs, and the art and music scenes.

That is why most people in the U.S. were against ICE and mass deportations before the Super Bowl halftime show. But the humanization of Puerto Ricans and brown people could have reached and created empathy or even admiration among some people who were on the fence, do not follow the news, or live in areas with few immigrants.

When Bad Bunny was announced, some said they would boycott, that ICE would be present and carry out mass arrests, that people would not watch the show, or that it would go badly. None of that happened. The hate and fearmongering just made Bad Bunny’s performance even more special and powerful.

The performance’s positive message about love and inclusivity is a strong antidote to the fear created by ICE operations and the hatred induced by anti-immigrant, anti-Latino, and anti-black discourse. As a Puerto Rican, Benito Antonio Martínez Ocasio, aka Bad Bunny, is a U.S. citizen. However, like many other minorities, on the street, he is racialized and treated as having fewer rights and valid political claims than white citizens who speak English as their first language.

Trusting his team to catch him after he fell backwards from the roof of the casita is a good metaphor for how he knew that Puerto Ricans, Latinos, immigrants, and Americans would have his back, despite the death threats against him that forced him to wear a bulletproof vest during the Grammys ceremony. The community was able to celebrate with him and through him as they watched the Super Bowl during a challenging time. Thus, in his own eyes, his music, lyrics, and his political statements against colonialism, calling Puerto Rica trash, and the dehumanization of people of color and the risks this entails, are worth it.

The halftime show made Latino kids and teenagers feel proud of who they are. It also made many Latinos and non-Latinos, whether they speak Spanish or not, proud of their musical tastes. Some of their parents or grandparents may not have known Bad Bunny’s music, but his fans are not alone. Bad Bunny recently won the Grammy for Album of the Year. He is the most-streamed artist globally on Spotify and other platforms, and the Super Bowl halftime show was enjoyed by over 130 million live viewers, plus over 80 million replays on the NFL YouTube page. This is as close as any cultural act can come to entering the U.S. and global mainstream. 

That is why the NFL selected the world’s leading artist. Bad Bunny is popular worldwide, singing in Spanish. He has no shame about his native language, accent, lingo, or culture. He is proudly Puerto Rican, which makes him emblematic of this multicultural reality.

MAGA proposes that these types of performances threaten US culture. But the USA is stronger than MAGA thinks. It is strong because of its diversity and its mixing of elements from around the world into new, creative products that sell very well. 

As I told Univision News, soon after Bad Bunny was announced as the performer for Super Bowl LX, and after he had hosted SNL and addressed the controversy the announcement caused, sending ICE to the Super Bowl would not have changed our multicultural reality; though it would have represented the fact that ICE and CBP act as if immigration equals crime. Santa Clara, California, is in the San Francisco Bay Area, where many residents were born abroad and work at Silicon Valley’s corporations. Thus, it would have been very difficult for ICE to patrol the streets around the Levy Stadium. Furthermore, it would have been economically and politically expensive if a large ICE operation in or around the stadium had caused the Super Bowl to start later or be severely understaffed. 

When criticized by conservatives for being selected, Bad Bunny defended himself. In doing so, he also indirectly defended other Latinos who are not as famous as he is, but who also contribute in their own way to daily life in the U.S.A. 

The U.S. continues living a practical contradiction on the one side being dependent on immigrant labor for affordability and economic growth but also complains about people arrivie to work and study. On the one hand, we have ICE detaining people for speaking Spanish, for being Latino, and hundreds of thousands of deportations happening. On the other hand, we have Latinos, the majority of whom are American citizens. Latinos are part of the economy, of culture, and of music. In the case of Bad Bunny, they make America great. 

All Puerto Ricans are citizens because Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory. Nevertheless, many assume that being American means being white and speaking English without an accent, which is not true. There are U.S. citizens of all origins, races, skin colors, faiths, and mother tongues. This Super Bowl halftime show was a celebration of that diversity, which makes us strong. Bad Bunny was not out of place in the Super Bowl, but much discrimination against Latinos includes the belief that Latinos are not one hundred percent American.

The upset from MAGA spokespeople is because they do not have control over popular culture. They would like corridos and songs in all genres to be written in celebration of Trump. However, with a few rare exceptions, this is not the case. 

People vote every few years, but they listen to music every week. The “culture wars” are not what Fox News says they are. Fox and other right-wing organizations politicize social issues that are at the early stages of the popular opinion shifts that ultimately lead to social change. No cultural product is loved by one hundred percent of the public. Culture is about practice, consumption, and remixing. People choose what type of food, music, and movies to consume time and time again. In recent years, Pedro Pascal, Diego Luna, Oscar Isaac, Benicio del Toro, Marcelo Hernández, Zoe Saldana, Ana de Armas, Rosario Dawson, Sofia Vergara, to name a few, have played key roles in some of the most popular movies and shows. 

The takeaway is that Latinos are an important part of the United States and make cultural contributions that benefit the whole world. Besides many transnational influences, collaboration with other artists based in the U.S. and throughout the Americas creates a new cultural reality. This cultural reality is a blend of contributions from Latinos and other U.S.-based artists. Together, we are all stronger, and our music is more universal, as the broad national and international appeal of Bad Bunny’s performance clearly shows.

Ernesto Castañeda is a political, social, and cultural analyst.

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by clalsstaff on February 13, 2026  •  Permalink
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A Challenge Becoming an Opportunity: The Venezuelan Diaspora’s Journey to Social Integration

By Danjha Leon Martinez

Peru has become one of the top destinations for Venezuelan migrants, second only to Colombia, with close to a million Venezuelans now calling it home. The Venezuelan diaspora started their mobilization journey after being forcibly displaced due to the socio-political situation in their home country.

Most migrants are young adults aged 18 to 34. About half hold technical or university degrees. Despite this, they had been encountering difficulties finding enough opportunities suitable for their professional or occupational credentials. In terms of resettlement, Peru still faces challenges in delivering the social services needed for effective migrants’ social integration. Specifically, the Peruvian system does not expedite their access to primary services such as documentation, healthcare, housing, and education during the early stages of their integration into the country. Thus, Venezuelans find themselves working in the informal economy as street vendors, construction workers, or housekeepers, taking any opportunities that they can find.

For many migrants, the choice to settle in Peru isn’t random. They are drawn by the country’s steady economic growth and its notable progress in reducing poverty. Others come to reunite with family or because Peru’s legal migration procedures are comparatively easier than those of other nations.

Diego: When I arrived in Peru, I said ‘Vaya! Hay Audis, Mercedes Benz, Starbucks…’ In Peru, I found opportunities… I was able to open a barbershop and take a loan to buy a car.

Venezuelan arrivals have put a slight increase in demand on Peru’s public services, with hospitals, schools, and social programs. But a growing population will grow the economy and produce more opportunities for all in Peru. Locals have noticed more competition for low-wage jobs, fueling worries about unemployment and sparking some anti-immigrant attitudes that are tied to xenophobic sentiment.

Lutheran World Relief, 9/16/2021, Tumbes, Peru (https://lwr.org/blog/2021/veninformado-una-plataforma-digital-para-migrantes-y-refugiados-venezolanos-en-peru)

Given the high degree of informality in Peru’s economy, migrants can find work quickly, and open migration policies have made it easier for them to get temporary permits. Still, Venezuelans in Lima, the capital of Peru, face hurdles in getting formal jobs, leaving many with higher education degrees to work as street vendors, housekeepers, and in small trades just to get by.

For this reason, Venezuelans heavily rely on transnational and local social networks, which provide crucial support, including information about job opportunities, housing, and other resources that aid economic survival.

Pedro: (former employee at PDVSA, Petróleos de Venezuela): During the first three months that I was here in Peru, I could not find a job. I survived only with the support of my countrymen. 

Despite issues such as job precariousness and limited rights, Lima offers better economic opportunities than other potential destinations in Peru’s main cities. 

Saul: I feel like I really prospered. When I arrived, the challenges were overwhelming, but the benefits I gained from it are invaluable. Now I can give stability to my family, and I own a business which I’m proud of.

Jose (Venezuelan mechanic who moved to Lima in 2018): “The minimum wage here in Peru… it’s not feasible for a Venezuelan to live with dignity because the rent prices and groceries cost basically the whole salary.” 

Despite the funding and technical support from several international NGOs to implement humanitarian assistance, there has been a disconnect between the results of these initiatives and the intended outcomes. Almost 70% of the Venezuelan community still need to accelerate their migration process and acquire a formal status, requiring international protection. Coping strategies for financial survival include juggling multiple informal jobs, entrepreneurial activities, and sharing housing to reduce living costs, often under precarious conditions. Venezuelan migrants who plan for a future in Peru balance hopes for stability with the need to adapt to informal economic contexts and local cultural idiosyncrasies.

Peru’s political will towards the integration of the Venezuelan diaspora could be reflected by future policy frameworks that help secure legal immigration statuses and access to social programs with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Even after facing a difficult journey, Venezuelan migrants have significantly contributed to Peru’s economy and society. They have filled critical labor gaps in sectors such as construction, food services, and informal vending, thereby driving economic growth, particularly in low-wage jobs. Many have also opened small businesses, diversifying local economies and creating jobs.

Overall, migration brings development opportunities to a country. As of now, the Venezuelan diaspora is still in the process of integration and organizing mutual support. Given the diaspora’s positive impact on the country’s development and Peru’s long-standing history of economic growth driven by the arrival of diverse migrant clusters, it would be beneficial for both the vulnerable community and the host country to advocate for the protection and effective integration of the Venezuelan diaspora.

Danjha Leon Martinez is a Research Assistant for the Immigration Lab at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. She is a Development Management graduate student at American University with a focus on humanitarian aid and global migration.

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and the Immigration Lab, Katheryn Olmos, Research & Data Coordinator, and Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich, Research Intern at the Immigration Lab.

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by clalsstaff on February 10, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 10, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/02/10/a-challenge-becoming-an-opportunity-the-venezuelan-diasporas-journey-to-social-integration/

Europe, an Alternative to the United States for Central American Immigrants

by Jonathan Valenzuela

During President Trump’s first term (2017-2021), a variety of immigration policy changes were implemented, which contributed to a shift in migration from Central America away from the United States and towards Europe. Now, in his second term more extreme anti-immigration policies alongside the rollback of Biden-era practices, such as the ending of the CBP One app, similar shifts of destination countries for Central American immigrants may continue. In 2023, it is estimated that there are about 4.3 million Central American immigrants in the United States, and 323,000 Central American immigrants in Spain.  

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (https://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=70341)

Migration of Central Americans to the United States and Europe began during the armed conflicts of the 80s and 90s. It marked the start of a migration pattern which has only continued to grow. The most recent wave of Central American migrants to Europe began with Nicaraguan women in the mid-2000s to the early 2010s. 

The largest Central American population is in Spain, with Hondurans most prevalent in Catalonia, Nicaraguans in the Basque Country, and Salvadorans in Madrid and increasingly in Seville. These populations have concentrated in these regions primarily because of established immigrant communities, strong labor markets, and an unmet need for labor in sectors such as elder or childcare. Notably, the population of Central Americans in Europe is composed primarily of Hondurans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans. Costa Rican and Panamanian immigrants remain at a smaller number than those from the other four countries.

The outlook of Central American immigrants in Spain is both different and like those in the United States. On one hand, many female members of both communities work in domestic jobs such as childcare or housekeeping, but a main difference is that the Central American home in Europe is headed by the women of the household, who struggle less to find jobs than men do.  

The acceleration of Central American immigration to Europe has notably grown because of the increased militarization of the United States’ southern border and policy changes since the first Trump administration. The increased difficulty of migrating to arrive to the United States made Central Americans seek other destinations. Spain is a solid option because of the ease of entering the country due to a lack of visa requirements, a perceived welcoming environment, an easier immigration process, a shared language, and similar cultural elements. From 2021 to 2024, the number of Central American immigrants in Spain grew by some 60,000. 

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (https://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=70340)

The United States is the preferential destination for most Central American as it is the home of the largest diasporas. Experts agree that increased hostility on the Mexico-U.S. border, especially during the first Trump administration, is tied to the increase of Central American immigration to Europe. Through increased collaboration with Spain, the United States seeks to reduce the flows of immigration from the region towards itself, but not necessarily to stop it altogether. 

Now, it is only a matter of time until this pattern further evolves with the second Trump administration, which has signaled its desire to further deter immigrants from entering the country. Regardless of the paid ads or policy changes the administration pushes, people will continue to immigrate.  

Spain has continued to receive immigrants from Latin America and is considered to have “solved” immigration and it has the fastest growth of any European economy thanks to immigration. However, with anti-immigration protests in the country and throughout the world, the question remains whether these deterrent efforts will successfully push Central American immigrants to other destinations? And how long will these destinations such as Spain remain open to Central Americans before they decide to implement stricter migration policies as well? Or whether we are starting to see an equilibrium between the people needing to leave Central America, the people settling in other countries in the region, Mexico, the United States, and Spain, and the decrease in gang violence and economic opportunities in Central America.   

Jonathan Valenzuela Mejia is a Guatemalan-American legal professional based in New York City. He completed a B.A. in Global Studies and a B.A. in Public Affairs with a minor in Central American Studies from UCLA. 

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. 

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by clalsstaff on February 4, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 4, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/02/04/europe-an-alternative-to-the-united-states-for-central-american-immigrants/

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