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Escazú Explained

Latin America’s Treaty for Environmental Defenders at a Crossroads

Belén Fernández Milmanda, Associate Professor, Trinity College

Giancarlo Madera, undergraduate student and research assistant, American University

Mariana Muñoz Restrepo, undergraduate student and research assistant, Trinity College

Andrea Vilán, Assistant Professor, American University

Photo: ECLAC / United Nations via the official Escazú Agreement COP 4 Portal.

While environmental and land defenders are under attack around the world, nowhere is this danger more palpable than in Latin America, which accounted for 85 percent of deadly attacks in 2025.[1] Four Latin American countries – Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Honduras – account for 58 percent of all murders of environmental activists around the world since record keeping began.[2]

In response to this dire situation, in 2018 the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries established the Escazú Agreement, the first legally binding treaty to include provisions on the rights of environmental defenders. In this post, we explore its impact so far and what can be expected going forward.

What is the Escazú Agreement?

The Escazú Agreement is a landmark treaty that includes specific measures to protect environmental defenders. It also enshrines the rights of communities and individuals to access environmental information, participate in environmental decision-making, and access the judicial system when their rights have been violated, thus facilitating legal mobilization against environmental degradation. Specifically, Escazú instructs members to protect the physical integrity and freedom of expression of environmental and land activists (Article 9) and to guarantee public access to environmental information (Article 5). Moreover, it enshrines the rights of communities and individuals to participate in environmental decision-making (Article 7) and access justice in environmental matters (Article 8).

The Agreement was negotiated over six years, including three years of preparatory meetings and three of formal treaty drafting. The text was written over the course of nine committee meetings held virtually and in person and ultimately adopted in Escazú, Costa Rica, in 2018. After receiving the eleventh ratification, it entered into force in 2021.

Commitment to Escazú So far

While most countries participated in the negotiations of Escazú, to date commitment to its standards has been uneven. So far, only 19 countries out of 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have ratified or acceded to the treaty. In particular, it is worrisome that some of the countries with the highest deforestation rates in the world, such as Brazil or Paraguay, as well as some of the most biodiverse ones, like Peru, Costa Rica and Guatemala, have signed the treaty but failed to ratify it.[3]

Map of Escazú Agreement status across Latin America and the Caribbean (2018).
Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Some countries like Argentina or Mexico, ratified the agreement quickly. Strong opposition to the agreement, coming in particular from extractivist industries, has delayed or obstructed commitment in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. In some cases, social mobilization in support of the agreement has been key to overcoming the reticence of business interests. Colombia – a country that we have studied in-depth with support from American University’s Public Affairs and Policy Lab – only committed to the agreement after a mass mobilization known as the Paro Nacional pressured then President Duque to sign and subsequently set in motion a political process that President Petro finished while in office in 2022.[4]

In the last few years, several Caribbean countries joined the agreement, including Dominica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago. In fact, the fourth conference of state parties (COP4) – a multi-day event including state and elected representatives from the public – was held in Nassau in April of 2026. The region is one of the most vulnerable to climate change in the world, so their inclusion is important. However, their inclusion also introduces several complexities, since many state parties are not Spanish-speaking and do not follow civil law.

Ratification is only one of the first steps, and a growing group of countries are now working on implementation. Many countries have developed a national roadmap (hoja de ruta) for putting the treaty into practice, with support from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). In 2023, Argentina and Ecuador produced the earliest roadmaps; Uruguay and Chile followed in 2024, Panama in 2025 and Belize and Colombia in 2026.[5]

What Lies Ahead

At the COP4 held in 2026, state parties made several key decisions,[6] including creating an official working group on “pollutant release and transfer registers,” intended to provide publicly available information systems and verifiable data on pollutants released into natural ecosystems. State delegates also approved the composition of new leadership, choosing Saint Kitts and Nevis to take the Chair, and electing the Bahamas, Belize, Colombia and Panama, as Vice-chairs. The election of the representatives of the public — a novel feature of the agreement designed to encourage participation on environmental matters — will be held in November of 2026.

The next conference of the parties will take place in 2028. In the meantime, states will have to navigate the political shifts in the region, including potential realignments due to presidential elections. The current shift to the right in the region could mean trouble for the agreement, as detractors took office.  In Brazil, a Flávio Bolsonaro administration would almost certainly lower the chances of the country ratifying the agreement – which awaits consideration in the Senate after having cleared the Chamber of Deputies in November of 2025 – to zero. In Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, even if withdrawing the agreement may prove difficult, governments may undermine the agreement by cutting public resources supporting implementation.

However, ratifying the agreement is no panacea for environmental defenders on the ground, as many implementation challenges remain. Ecuador is a case in point. While the country was the first in the world to enshrine the Rights of Nature in its national constitution in 2008 and among the first to ratify Escazú in 2020,[7] violence against environmental defenders remains high. The 2023 assassination of Eduardo Mendúa Vargas, a leader of the Indigenous Nations Confederation (CONAIE) and a key member in the implementation of Escazú who was fighting the state oil company Petroecuador, sent the country into uproar. Environmentalists demanded justice from President Guillermo Lasso, but the case remains open.[8] Presidents Lasso and Noboa have faced criticisms for not implementing Escazú and, more broadly, neglecting the constitutionally enshrined Rights of Nature. In 2025, for example, over 250 domestic and international organizations criticized the government for not implementing Escazú.[9] Still, in 2026 two environmental activists were killed in Santa Elena province, presumably due to their environmental and anti-corruption activism.[10]

Before states meet at the next Conference of the Parties in April 2028, several tests will show how strong the treaty really is. Will Brazil finally join? Will governments hollow it out from within? Will the implementation roadmaps help turn states’ commitments into concrete action? Will the newly elected representatives of the public decisively shape the path forward? The next years will show whether the agreement moves from promise to practice, and whether it can deliver for the people it was meant to protect.

[1] Global Witness. https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/collective-power/

[2] Authors’ calculations based on Global Witness,  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/collective-power/

[3] UN Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxvii-18&chapter=27&clang=_en

[4] We explore these political dynamics in Fernández Milmanda & Vilan, “Who Protects Environmental Defenders? How Domestic Interest Groups Shape Latin American States’ Commitment to the Escazú Agreement,” presented at the 2026 APSA Annual Meeting. 

[5] See https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/es

[6] CEPAL. https://acuerdodeescazu.cepal.org/cop4/en/news/cop-4-escazu-agreement-approves-key-decisions-accelerating-treatys-implementation-latin-america

[7] Observatory on Principle 10, CEPAL https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/treaty/regional-agreement-access-information-public-participation-and-justice-environmental-matters

[8] Vargas assassination https://es.mongabay.com/2023/03/asesinato-de-eduardo-mendua-en-ecuador/

[9] Front line defenders (250 organizations protest) https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/over-280-ecuadorian-and-international-organizations-speak-out-against

[10] Silva and Pezo assassination https://gk.city/2026/06/12/tres-activistas-hallados-sin-vida-ecuador-siete-meses/

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by clalsstaff on October 15, 2026  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 15, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/10/15/escazu-explained/

Latin America’s Challenges and Opportunities

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Image of wind mills and solar panels. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Latin America is a region of great contrasts that currently faces serious challenges and also great opportunities. At the global level, the current outlook is uncertain. Forecasts for 2025 suggest that the world economy will experience moderate growth. In particular, the pace of growth shows signs of slowing in both the United States and China, and a slight increase in Europe (International Monetary Fund, 2025).

Emerging economies are likely to continue contributing to global growth, but they are also vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and increased financial selectivity (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025). Escalating trade tensions, uncertainty surrounding global interest rates, and the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related incidents increase long-term risks. Moreover, persistent geopolitical tensions and protectionist policies are making supply chains highly volatile (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

At the domestic level, Latin American countries face a mixed panorama. While the dramatic changes in socioeconomic conditions have significantly impacted the post-pandemic recovery, it has also presented opportunities for resource mobilization. However, current regional records indicate that the balance of payments will continue to be impacted by external vulnerability. Domestic demand is expected to remain weak, and employment growth is anticipated to be lower than in previous years, although informality and unemployment are expected to show slight improvements (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025).

Inflation is expected to remain stable in 2025 and 2026 and close to target levels, but an upward trend cannot be ruled out. Although monetary policy does not necessarily have to be restrictive, ambiguous capital inflows, exchange rate volatility, and global uncertainty are impacting central banks’ policies, which must preserve stability without decelerating economic activity.

Economic growth, interest and exchange rates, as well as commodity prices, all affect fiscal sustainability. Therefore, fiscal space will remain limited, as many countries face upward pressure on spending and high borrowing costs. Similarly, in this case, one of the biggest issues facing the region’s governments is the need to take into account various restrictions without compromising economic growth.

Productivity growth remains sluggish, hindering advancements in poverty alleviation and impeding significant enhancements in living conditions. Despite a recent decrease, inequality in Latin America is higher not only in comparison with advanced countries but also with other countries of a similar level of development (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

Additionally, growth models in the region have struggled to foster technical advancement, which has contributed to low per capita research rates. A marginal position in global innovation, insufficient investment in innovation ecosystems, and persistent problems related to infrastructure and digital skills have prevented the region from achieving a competitive technological position.

Overall, persistent structural challenges continue to hinder long-term economic growth. Although the future is clearly complicated, the region’s ability to seize new opportunities will depend on the policy decisions taken now. Increased regional integration, pro-growth structural reforms, and stronger institutional frameworks are necessary to transition from just stable to inclusive and sustainable growth.

In particular, the global economy is experiencing sluggish growth but also abrupt changes. This scenario creates tensions and new imbalances, while also presenting significant opportunities for Latin American economies. Certainly, they have the potential to increase their integration into global markets, which in turn would lead to greater economic growth, thereby enhancing regional prosperity and diversification.

Although changing economic relationships and supply chains are not precisely good for everyone, Latin America may benefit from them in the current global environment. Thus, exploring the development of renewable energies presents a significant opportunity for the region in the context of an increasingly divided world, which is seeking greener and more sustainable growth strategies (O’Neil, 2024).

Latin America has extensive sustainable energy resources, with one-third coming from clean sources, which exceeds the global average of 20%. Additionally, 60% of its electricity already derives from renewable energy. The region is backed by abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, helping businesses meet climate goals and explore green hydrogen, which results in very low or zero carbon emissions. It also produces a third of global lithium and possesses significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, nickel, and rare earth elements crucial for electric vehicles, solar energy, and wind turbines.

Image of renewable energy examples. Retrieved from Science Notes.

In this respect, factors related to political economy might represent obstacles despite strict environmental policies, suggesting that to advance towards a greener economy, countries need to integrate environmental policy with an overall enhancement of institutional quality, take into account the government’s political stance on environmental policies, and assess the impact of large energy-intensive sectors within the economy.

Furthermore, the shift to “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring” benefits Latin America since many nations in the region maintain enduring diplomatic, commercial, and cultural connections with the United States. Although some Latin American governments face challenges due to democratic erosion, the region continues to offer the best platform for balancing democratic governance and economic growth, as it has been the most peaceful region in terms of wars (Latinometrics, 2025).

Transitioning to clean energy poses difficulties but offers significant opportunities to generate employment, stimulate economic development, and improve energy security by decreasing dependence on fossil fuels and encouraging innovation in sustainable technologies. All in all, Latin America’s energy potential is enormous, and its leadership must act swiftly to attract stable trade and investment flows in response to evolving geopolitical and economic policies for future success.

References

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025, Resource mobilization to finance development, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, ECLAC, Santiago de Chile.

Inter-American Development Bank, 2025, Regional Opportunities amid Global Shifts, 2025 Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Report, IDB, Washington DC.

International Monetary Fund, 2025, Latin America in the Current Global Environment, Regional Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, DC.

Latinometrics, 2025, Sabías que América Latina no ha vivido una guerra territorial en más de 30 años? Latinometrics, available at https://www.linkedin.com/posts/latinometrics_sab%C3%ADas-que-am%C3%A9rica-latina-no-ha-vivido-activity-7338249978001207298-KNtw/?originalSubdomain=es

O’Neil Shannon K., 2024, Latin America’s Big Opportunity, Project Syndicate, June 10, available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/shannon-k-oneil

Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

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by clalsstaff on September 19, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 19, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/09/19/latin-americas-challenges-and-opportunities/

Immigrants Fuel the US Economy

Proof that immigrants fuel the US economy is found in the billions they send back home

Migrant workers pick strawberries during harvest south of San Francisco, Calif.
Visions of America/Joe Sohm/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Ernesto Castañeda, American University

Donald Trump has vowed to deport millions of immigrants if he is elected to a second term, claiming that, among other things, foreign-born workers take jobs from others. His running mate JD Vance has echoed those anti-immigrant views.

Researchers, however, generally agree that massive deportations would hurt the U.S. economy, perhaps even triggering a recession.

Social scientists and analysts tend to concur that immigration — both documented and undocumented — spurs economic growth. But it is almost impossible to calculate directly how much immigrants contribute to the economy. That’s because we don’t know the earnings of every immigrant worker in the United States.

We do, however, have a good idea of how much they send back to their home countries – more than US$81 billion in 2022, according to the World Bank. And we can use this figure to indirectly calculate the total economic value of immigrant labor in the U.S.

Economic contributions are likely underestimated

I conducted a study with researchers at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab at American University to quantify how much immigrants contribute to the U.S. economy based on their remittances, or money sent back home.

Several studies indicate that remittances constitute 17.5% of immigrants’ income.

Given that, we estimate that the immigrants who remitted in 2022 had take-home wages of over $466 billion. Assuming their take-home wages are around 21% of the economic value of what they produce for the businesses they work for – like workers in similar entry-level jobs in restaurants and construction – then immigrants added a total of $2.2 trillion to the U.S. economy yearly.

That is about 8% of the gross domestic product of the United States and close to the entire GDP of Canada in 2022 – the world’s ninth-largest economy.

Immigration strengthens the US

Beyond its sheer value, this figure tells us something important about immigrant labor: The main beneficiaries of immigrant labor are the U.S. economy and society.

The $81 billion that immigrants sent home in 2022 is a tiny fraction of their total economic value of $2.2 trillion. The vast majority of immigrant wages and productivity – 96% – stayed in the United States.

Remittances from the U.S. represent a substantial income source for the people who receive them. But they do not represent a siphoning of U.S. dollars, as Trump has implied when he called remittances “welfare” for people in other countries and suggested taxing them to pay for the construction of a border wall.

The economic contributions of U.S. immigrants are likely to be even more substantial than what we calculate.

For one thing, the World Bank’s estimate of immigrant remittances is probably an undercount, since many immigrants send money abroad with people traveling to their home countries.

In prior research, my colleagues and I have also found that some groups of immigrants are less likely to remit than others.

One is white-collar professionals – immigrants with careers in banking, science, technology and education, for example. Unlike many undocumented immigrants, white-collar professionals typically have visas that allow them to bring their families with them, so they do not need to send money abroad to cover their household expenses back home.

Immigrants who have been working in the country for decades and have more family in the country also tend to send remittances less often.

Both of these groups have higher earnings, and their specialized contributions are not included in our $2.2 trillion estimate.

A business owner stocks her grocery store.
A Somali business owner stocks her store in Lewiston, Maine.
Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call

Additionally, our estimates do not account for the economic growth stimulated by immigrants when they spend money in the U.S., creating demand, generating jobs and starting businesses that hire immigrants and locals.

For example, we calculate the contributions of Salvadoran immigrants and their children alone added roughly $223 billion to the U.S. economy in 2023. That’s about 1% of the country’s entire GDP.

Considering that the U.S. economy grew by about 2% in 2022 and 2023, that’s a substantial sum.

These figures are a reminder that the financial success of the U.S. relies on immigrants and their labor.The Conversation

Ernesto Castañeda, Professor, American University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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by clalsstaff on October 31, 2024  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 31, 2024

https://aulablog.net/2024/10/31/immigrants-fuel-the-us-economy/