What Lula’s Victory Reveals About the Far Right in Latin America

Flávio Contrera, Lecturer at the Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados, Brazil

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during a campaign event in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Photograph by Ricardo Stuckert on October 24, 2026. Retrieved from Flikr.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory in Brazil’s 2026 presidential runoff offers an opportunity to reflect on the strategies of mobilization capable of challenging the far right in a Latin American context marked by the growing strength of conservative forces. The result does not signal the end of Bolsonarismo, nor does it halt the rightward shift observed across the region. It does, however, demonstrate that this trajectory is not inevitable. In Brazil, the electoral contest was shaped by three interconnected dimensions that help explain political mobilization: streets, networks, and fear.

Streets: Political Mobilization and Intergenerational Engagement

The response to the first-round results began at universities. At Fluminense Federal University (UFF), in Niterói, students organized a demonstration on October 5, one day after the vote. Initially coordinated through WhatsApp groups and student organizations, the mobilization drew thousands of people and inspired demonstrations at more than 40 universities across 14 states and the Federal District. What began as a localized reaction developed into a national public mobilization (Brasil de Fato⁠).

The significance of these demonstrations went beyond the number of participants. The streets became spaces for organizing, circulating messages, and revitalizing political engagement. Students mobilized classmates, relatives, and local communities, connecting the presidential race to concrete experiences. These included the impacts of funding cuts at federal universities during Jair Bolsonaro’s administration and concerns about the future of public policies.

This mobilization also had an intergenerational dimension. Reports published during the campaign described young people encouraging elderly relatives to vote and accompanying those with disabilities to polling stations. In some cases, voters who had gone years without voting returned to the polls. Meanwhile, voter absenteeism fell from 21.08% in the first round to 19.22% in the runoff, a reduction of approximately three million nonvoters (Agência Brasil⁠; Viva⁠).

The overlap between these initiatives and the decline in abstenteeism does not mean that street mobilization alone explains the change. Nevertheless, these episodes reveal an important political mechanism: electoral participation can be encouraged through close social relationships, with the engagement of one generation helping reactivate that of another. In a closely contested election, in-person organizing is not a remnant of traditional forms of activism. It is a mechanism for democratic participation.

Networks: Distributed Organizing and Platform Power

The second dimension was the ability to turn digital communication into collective mobilization. The WhatsApp channel Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”), coordinated by federal deputy André Janones, surpassed ten million followers during the campaign. The initiative circulated texts, audio recordings, videos, and guidance encouraging supporters to share content across different platforms. More than a communications channel, it became a coordination structure connecting participants and expanding the reach of political messages (Exame⁠).

This experience shows that digital campaigns do not depend exclusively on formal party structures. Supporter networks can coordinate decentralized action, engage people beyond traditional channels of political activism, and bring political communication closer to everyday social relationships. The combination of digital organizing and street mobilization was particularly important after the first-round results, when the campaign needed to reach voters beyond its already engaged base.

But digital networks are not neutral spaces. Their infrastructure belongs to private companies that control advertising tools, content moderation, recommendation systems, and artificial intelligence. During the campaign, controversies involving Meta exposed the political consequences of this power. Tests reported in October showed that Meta AI refused certain requests to generate pro-Lula electoral images while accepting comparable requests involving Flávio Bolsonaro. Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) ordered the company to ensure equal treatment in the distribution of posts, recommendations, and search results related to the candidates (Agência Brasil⁠).

The controversy is not merely a technical problem. When digital tools are used to produce and distribute political communication on a large scale, differences in how these tools operate affect the conditions under which candidates compete for public attention. The difficulty of auditing political advertising prices and distribution, identified by NetLab at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and the International Panel on the Information Environment, compounds the problem. Without sufficient transparency, campaigns, researchers, and the public struggle to understand how digital infrastructure shapes electoral competition (NetLab/UFRJ⁠).

One lesson learned from Brazil’s recent presidential election is that digital mobilization must be accompanied by a public agenda for platform transparency and accountability. Democratic competition takes place not only among candidates and parties, but also within private environments that influence which messages circulate, how they are distributed, and which audiences they reach.

Fear: Material Conditions, Institutions, and Political Violence

The third dimension was fear. In the Brazilian election, it was associated with three concerns: the possibility of material losses, the future of democratic institutions, and political violence.

The first concerned employment, income, and the continuity of social programs. The debate over the fiscal adjustment proposed by Flávio Bolsonaro raised questions about the potential effects of spending cuts on income transfers, public services, and economic activity. A simulation by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE) estimated that an adjustment of approximately 194 billion reais could put up to 2.2 million jobs at risk. The study relied on assumptions about the composition of the cuts because the measures had not been fully specified, but it made the social stakes of the fiscal debate explicit (UOL⁠).

The second concern involved democratic institutions. Flávio Bolsonaro’s government platform proposed changes to the jurisdiction of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF), including ending part of its original criminal jurisdiction and limiting justices’ unilateral decisions. During the campaign, discussions also addressed changes to the Court’s composition and the possibility of impeaching justices (CNN Brasil⁠; BBC News Brasil⁠).

These proposals brought the scope of constitutional oversight and the relationship among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches to the forefront of the debate. The STF plays a central role in protecting the Constitution and constraining potential abuses of power. Changes to its composition and jurisdiction, therefore, have implications far beyond the internal organization of the judiciary: they affect the balance of power and the institutional safeguards of democracy. The prospect of changes of this kind was thus a substantive democratic concern in the election.

The third concern was political violence. During the 50-day first-round campaign, the organizations Terra de Direitos and Justiça Global recorded 134 cases of political violence in Brazil, including assaults and threats. The figure exceeded the 121 cases recorded during the first round of the 2022 election (Terra de Direitos and Justiça Global⁠).

These episodes help explain the concrete meaning of defending democracy in a polarized environment. The issue is not simply preserving electoral procedures but also ensuring that political participation can take place without intimidation or violence. Defending democracy is therefore inseparable from protecting social rights, preserving constitutional checks on power, and safeguarding those who participate in public life.

Lessons for Latin America

Lula’s victory came at a time when right-wing forces have expanded their electoral presence across Latin America, often mobilizing concerns about public security, the economy, and dissatisfaction with established governments. The regional context also includes Donald Trump’s public support for ideological allies in Latin America and an increasingly intense struggle for political and economic influence in the hemisphere. An analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations highlights this tension: Lula’s reelection stands out against the regional trend, while the Brazilian right retains a substantial presence in Congress (CFR⁠).

The Brazilian case offers three lessons. First, defending democracy requires organized participation that connects universities, social movements, communities, and voters across generations. Second, digital campaigns need their own communication networks while also requiring public rules that subject platform power to transparency and accountability. Third, defending democratic institutions gains political meaning when it is linked to material living conditions and protection from violence.

Flávio Bolsonaro’s electoral defeat does not eliminate Bolsonarismo or resolve the social and political conditions that sustain the far right. Nor does it guarantee that the mobilization that brought Lula to victory will remain active. The result nevertheless demonstrates that the expansion of conservative forces is not predetermined. Streets, networks, and fear help explain how an election can mobilize different sectors of society when collective organizing connects popular participation to the concrete conditions of democracy.

For democratic forces across Latin America, the remaining challenge is to transform electoral mobilization into a lasting capacity for participation, organization, and the defense of rights—even after the ballot box is no longer the center of political struggle.

Survey Data Shows Mixed Views on Forced Deportation

Press Release | October 28, 2026

Americans show great concern about forced deportation, but those concerns do not translate into support for ending removals altogether. An online survey conducted by the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and YouGov asks 5,000 registered voters in late September 2026 about a range of immigration-related topics. The sample is structured to represent the American public across key demographics, including age, gender, race, education, and political affiliation.

This report highlights American voters’ attitudes toward forced and mass deportation, focusing on concerns about current enforcement, preferred alternatives, and how factual information influences public opinion. Together, the findings show how humanitarian and political concerns can drive opposition to forced deportation without implying support for ending immigration removals entirely.

The top concern regarding the current deportation approach is family separation (42.9%). Harm to people being deported (30.9%) and concerns about whether the process is humane or orderly (29.8%) are among the most frequent responses. Overall, concerns range from the personal treatment of deportees to broader operational issues within the deportation system.

Public trust in how enforcement agencies carry out deportations further reflects these concerns. Around 50.2% of respondents do not trust ICE to handle deportations fairly, adding further context to doubts about current enforcement practices.

Preferences for deportation approaches demonstrate a similar trend. The largest share of respondents (39.1%) say the appropriate response depends on individual circumstances, while 36.8% favor assisted voluntary return. Only 4.7% see forced removal as the preferred method, 5.4% are unsure, and 14% disapprove of both removal methods.

Learning about costs changes how voters view forced deportation. After learning that deportation flights cost $6,045 per person, more than seven times the cost of a commercial flight, 62.3% become less supportive of forced deportation, compared with 23.9% who become more supportive, while 13.9% are unsure.

Political reactions to mass deportation are similarly divided. When asked how they view a member of Congress who opposes mass deportation, 41% of respondents say they are more likely to support them, while 33.5% say they are less likely. Another 17.3% say it makes no difference, and 8.3% are unsure.

Ultimately, the survey results point to a nuanced middle ground. Respondents expressed concerns about family separation and treatment during deportation while also favoring case-by-case or voluntary alternatives. Cost information also moved many respondents away from forced deportation. Overall, the results suggest that humanitarian concerns and practical objections can both shape opposition to forced removal.


Report created by Fernando Atencio Herrera, Ismail Akbulut, Ernesto Castañeda, and Katheryn Olmos

Read more about the survey:

https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/yougov-survey.cfm

More information about CLALS:

https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm

For media inquiries, contact clals@american.edu or olmos@american.edu

Part 1: The Diaspora Stadium

Visas, Belonging, Unaffiliated fans, and the 2026 World Cup

Julia Lisco, Researcher at American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab, International Affairs Policy Analysis in Global Migration MA candidate

Image by Julia Lisco of the June 14th, 2026, Ecuador v Côte d’Ivoire FIFA World Cup 2026 game, with a Team USA jersey visible in the crowd.

With exorbitant prices required to attend the matches due to dynamic pricing and the extensive immigration bans instituted by the US, many fans were unable to make the expensive pilgrimage to witness their national team compete in the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Of the 48 participating countries, only a handful had a 100% success rate for fan visa applications, disproportionately excluding smaller and poorer nations. Canada was also extremely strict when issuing visas for both players and fans. While soccer may not be the most popular sport in the U.S., it does have something that made it uniquely equipped to welcome the world: vast and diverse diaspora communities. In fact, it was largely diaspora communities that filled the stands and made up the heart of the tournament.

Many diaspora communities have complex relationships with their homeland; often separated by generations, political ostracism, or forced relocation, bringing with it a host of complex emotions. As Daniel Alarcón discussed on The Athletic’s “Pablo Torre Finds Out” podcast in June 2026, supporting one’s national team is often a less emotionally complicated way for diaspora members to connect with their homeland without the socio-political baggage that comes with other attachments and the history they carry.

The homeland relationship is complicated, but diasporas overwhelmingly brought their hearts to the tournament and made every team feel like they had a bit of home with them. But it wasn’t just diaspora members and local fans filling the stands.

As was the nature of ticket sales for this tournament, many fans, eager to pay the cheapest rate, committed to matches not knowing who would be playing, only the time and location of the match. This led to significant portions of every stadium being made up of observers who held no particular affinity or affiliation with either nation. Some would select a side to support for the day, letting themselves get wrapped up in the energy, while others, refusing to wear a jersey for any other nation, would wear their team’s shirt to the match, despite them not playing.

Ecuador v Côte d’Ivoire

I was one of the many fans who secured tickets to a match without knowing who would play. That game ended up being the June 14th, 2026, Ecuador v Côte d’Ivoire game. I didn’t have any loyalty toward either team, and, not wanting to spend a small fortune on a jersey for either, I wore the Scottish Women’s new alternative shirt to the game. Once in my seat, directly in front of me was a group of men in various USA jerseys. Throughout the stadium, I also noticed many people wearing Colombia jerseys, which look extremely similar to the Ecuador shirts, both sharing a similar solid yellow base. Once I saw one, I saw many, and I was nowhere near the only person in a non-represented team’s jersey.

On the way to the stadium, which was, by my estimation, roughly 85% (at least) filled with Ecuadorian fans, we were swept up in their songs on the subway. Once in the stadium, during the national anthem (as for all matches), the lyrics are displayed on the jumbotrons, and my family, surrounded by Ecuadorian fans, joined right in in their joyous rendition of Salve, Oh Patria, pulled into the expression of their passion for their country and team.

This is not to say that there weren’t many genuine Ecuadorian fans in the stadium, while Côte d’Ivoire supporters made up a passionate minority. The disparity in the stadium between the number of fans for this match is twofold. The Ecuadorian diaspora is one of the largest in the New York metro area, and Philadelphia Stadium (more commonly known as Lincoln Financial Field when it’s not being rented by FIFA), where the match was played, is an easy day trip for the passionate community, drawing significant numbers of genuine Ecuadorian fans.

The second factor contributing to disproportionate attendance is visa restrictions. At the time of the tournament, Côte d’Ivoire had been subject to a visa ban since December 16, 2025, severely limiting possible entry for fans from the small African nation, even if they were able to secure tickets. Meanwhile, Ecuador has not been subject to any country-specific visa restrictions under the Trump administration.

France v Senegal.

One of the most anticipated matches of the tournament was France v Senegal on June 16, 2026, largely due to their shared long colonial history. Senegal was one of the many countries affected by the immigration restrictions; meanwhile, France was one of the few whose fans faced no specific legal restrictions, yet this could not be felt in the stadium.

Unlike the Ecuador match, I was in the stadium as an on-field Pre-Match Ceremony volunteer, standing along the edge of the Senegalese flag on the pitch while more than 80,000 people passionately sang the French and Senegalese national anthems. The stadium was overwhelmingly decked in blue France jerseys (with most unaffiliated fans backing the 2018 World Cup champions, and large Francophile diasporas in the New York Metro area populating the stadium), but when the national anthems were being sung, that discrepancy completely melted away, with Senegalese fans singing just as loudly as the French fans.

I’ve never seen such expressions of pure joy and excitement as than I did at the matches I got to attend as a fan and as a volunteer. National identity and pride are complicated concepts for many to reconcile within themselves, but when applied to sport, much of the weight of history is lessened, and for a moment people get to embrace the joy, whether it’s for their country or for the love of the game. 

Book Excerpt: A Life Before Leaving

Catherine Grau, Research & Data Coordinator of the Immigration Lab

Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center of Latin American & Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab

This is an excerpt from an upcoming book, A Mountain of Dreams, an ethnographic exploration of unaccompanied youth migration to the United States between 2019-2022. This project centers a small community of new arrivals in the DC area as they navigate new adulthood, immigration law, and complex relationships.

Note: Names have been changed where needed for interviewee privacy

Photo of cane field on fire in Central America, taken by Catherine Grau.
Photo of cane field on fire in Central America, taken by Catherine Grau.

As the weeks stretched into months, even Sol stopped asking when her father was coming home. Her younger brother was still in diapers. Her mother had been working in the nearby city of La Libertad, El Salvador but she wasn’t making enough to support three kids on her own, so she moved further away. “For a long time, my mother had to go work in the big city, in San Salvador,” Sol expressed. Her mother explained that she was going to find work in the big city and send money to Sol’s sister for anything that they might need. She blinked the tears away as her mother explained why she had to leave, that Sol’s father wasn’t going to live with them again right now, and that her sister was going to be just like her mother and do all the things that her mother wouldn’t be able to do anymore. It made Sol sad to see her mother go, but she thought she understood. Her mother would come back; she just couldn’t be home right then.

Sol remembered, “I got a little bit used to the fact that my mother was gone, but the situation changed because I had my little brother. Now he was the one who was crying when she was gone, it was him who was sad. I felt really, really bad watching him, and aside from that I felt bad seeing that my sister was responsible for both him and me, basically she had to raise us”[1]. They were forced to start acting like adults at a young age. “At that time my sister was fourteen, and well, my brother, older sister, and I lived alone. To be honest, it was very difficult.”2 Her sister tried her best to take care of young Sol and their baby brother. Every morning, Sol’s sister combed her hair before she met her friends for the long walk to school. Her sister stopped attending school.

It was only in the years after her mother left that Sol began to understand how alone she and her siblings really were. They lived in the countryside; their nearest neighbors were little more than distant shapes beyond the fields in the morning. Three children living alone in an isolated house was not a secret that they wanted anyone to discover. They shuddered at each rustle in the sugarcane fields and shrank from the window as slow-moving trucks spat dusty gravel toward their door. For years, Sol and her siblings spent each night waiting anxiously for the morning to come. Eventually, Sol’s mother returned from the big city. Her worn sandals searched for open dirt along the overgrown footpath that led to her children. The door swung open, the barricade forgotten in a corner. Sweet words, small hands, and tight embraces all tumbled together. Once, Sol had been too small to wrap her arms around her mother’s shoulders. But she had grown in the years that had passed. They stood together awkwardly, all four of them, uncertain where one hug ended and the next should begin. The stars seemed a little brighter that night, and the whispers of the sugarcane field seemed a little further away. Then one morning, Sol watched her sister fold the same blouse that she always wore to church. Instead of putting it where it belonged, her sister packed it into a small bag. Sol was confused. Her sister said that she was going to live somewhere else. She said she was sorry. She promised that it was still going to be okay. She said that she would miss Sol very much. She kept talking after that, but Sol never heard what she said. Her ears felt as if the ocean was inside them.

Mothers were supposed to leave for work. Sisters weren’t supposed to leave at all. The bag she was holding looked much too small to carry Sol’s world away. The tears were back, and they wouldn’t stop coming. “When she left, I felt like I lost my other half. And that was where it all came spilling out…I cried every day, I was sad every day for a year,”[3] she said. Sol had grown to accept that her father was gone so long ago that the grief had been replaced by a dull ache. She had nodded her head when her mother left and tried her best to understand. But with her sister gone, Sol felt like a stranger in her favorite places. For years, she had fallen asleep knowing that her sister was only one whisper away. Now she wasn’t.[4] The day that her father appeared on her doorstep, the pandilleros had been waiting for him after work. They wanted money that wasn’t his to give. The man with the money was wealthy enough that everyone in the region knew his name. The Mara Salvatrucha knew it too. They couldn’t reach him, but they could reach the men who worked for him. They found Sol’s father first. “The only person that they could contact was him,” Sol remembers learning. “So, one day they stopped him, out of nowhere”[5]. Everything she knew was explained by her mother, who had heard it from her father. “They threatened him. They told him that he had to make the man pay them an enormous sum of money. I don’t know how much it was, but it was thousands and thousands of dollars and if he didn’t do it, my father, his wife–even though they weren’t together anymore–and my siblings and me, they would kill us all. That was how it all started,” Sol explained.

The first day that the men with tattoos looked at her, Sol told herself it was a coincidence and kept walking. She wasn’t sure on the second day, but her feet didn’t stop moving. By the third, they were calling after her. They told her that her father needed to pay. She kept walking. They told her they weren’t asking. She kept walking. The ocean in her ears wasn’t there to protect her. She heard every word clearly. There was no glass wall to separate her from them. She didn’t turn around. There was no barricade to protect her. She wasn’t even sure she would make it home. They shouted her name, drawing out the last letter into a leer. She couldn’t breathe. Their footsteps were close. She needed to keep moving. All that mattered was the door. She kept walking. “They told me that if they weren’t paid, before they killed us, they would do things to me…,”[6] Sol remembered. She made it home before she cried. That day and every day that came after, she always made it home before she cried. As soon as the door was barricaded, the tears poured out. She shut herself into the furthest corner and refused to talk to anybody. Sol remembers being more afraid than she had ever been before. The panic attacks came next. She gasped for air, choking on fear and desperation and temporary relief all at the same time. In the moments where her lungs simply refused air, she drew small breaths in a low rattle before the next round of sobs forced out more than she could hope to inhale again. Even as her mind screamed, her body refused to seek solace in the arms of her worried mother. “I didn’t want to talk to anybody. I was afraid, but I didn’t want my family to be more scared than they already were.”[7] Even if her mother hadn’t heard Sol crying, it would have been impossible for her to ignore her  daughter’s uniform folded and untouched for days at a time. She knew that Sol had always dreamed of being an architect. But as more and more school days were spent behind a wooden beam at home, they both knew that it was all slipping away. Her first year of secondary school was unfinished. There was no chance for university anymore.

Sol’s teachers never knew what had happened to her. She had been a promising student; she imagined that her teachers would agree. Sol had been among the first to raise her hand when a new question was poised. She sat quietly while her classmates scribbled on the chalkboard and always waited for her turn to speak. Her assignments were always pristine, her uniform neatly pressed, and her words carefully chosen. When her classmates grumbled or folded their arms across their chests, Sol had pressed harder. She had dreamed of a scholarship to university for as long as she had known that they existed. She never missed a day of school. But suddenly, her desk was empty. When attendance was taken, her name went unanswered for weeks. She had never told her teachers about home, so sharing the details of her journey back from school had been unthinkable. By the time she might have wanted to explain or apologize, it hadn’t been safe for her to try. Sol hoped that her grades wouldn’t fall too far with all the assignments she had missed. Of course, if her name disappeared from the roster then it didn’t matter anyway. She wondered if anyone had asked about her. Maybe they just assumed that another empty desk meant another family gone in the night. Sol was still there, hiding in her home. But for all anyone outside knew, she was gone.

The pandilleros laughed as they saw the small family walking down the road to church, sending Sol and her family fleeing back to safety behind the wooden plank. Nothing changed. “You know, in that time we didn’t even think about leaving.” Sol explained, “After insisting and insisting to my father, he finally tried to file a report with the police. And, well, basically the police told him that they couldn’t do anything, that they were sorry, but they couldn’t involve themselves in this”[8].Nothing changed after the police report. Except that the pandilleros burnt the sugarcane fields next to their house. Sol was told that photos of the burned fields had landed in the rich man’s lap with a message that morning. MS-13 wanted silence, and they wanted money. The fields outside Sol’s house were a warning of what would follow if either of their demands remained unmet. “It wasn’t just words anymore,” Sol explained, “they were beginning to act physically…they were already committing actions. And that was when we started to search for alternatives, where to move or what to do, but in El Salvador the gangs are very organized.” Sol knew that their government-issued Documento Único de Identidad cards would prevent them from ever living somewhere that was not controlled by the Mara Salvatrucha. She also knew that moving anywhere controlled by Barrio 18 would mean death. The pandilleros there would see their former municipality printed right below their photos and assume that they were spies. “If we went to another place that also belonged to [MS-13], they would communicate with each other and then kill us,” she said. Their IDs meant that they could never simply disappear into another town. “So, we came to a point where there was nowhere to go in El Salvador, because the police didn’t do anything. The rich man too, he protected himself, but he didn’t protect us. My father didn’t do anything, and we couldn’t do anything”[9].

Sol’s mother called and explained everything to a friend living in the United States. “Thank God, he helped us, he could not pay for us to live in the U.S. indefinitely, but he could help us escape El Salvador if we wanted. We made the decision to accept his proposal, because we were desperate. We had no idea what to do,”[10] Sol remembered. Soon after, Sol, her mother, her brother, and her sister packed their backpacks and left. It was December of 2019, and Sol was sixteen years old.


1. “Pues después de eso, la situación cambió un poco, yo me llegué a acostumbrar un poco a que mi mamá se fuera, pero ahora la situación era distinta, porque tenía a mi hermano pequeño, y ahora él era el que lloraba cuando ella se iba, él que estaba triste, y pues, yo me sentía muy, muy mal viéndolo a él, y aparte me sentía mal viendo que mi hermana estaba responsable de él y mí, siendo ella una niña, básicamente.”

2.“Yo nunca tuve la certeza de si iba a permanecer en un solo lugar en toda mi infancia, y pues era muy triste para mí. Como hija de ellos, ver como ellos discutían y como pasaba todo. Y era muy triste para mí también ver mi mama muy triste ella.”

3. “Entonces, cuando ella se fue, yo sentí como que se fue mi otra mitad, y es donde se derramó todo. En ese tiempo yo estuve, se podría decir llorando todos los días, triste todos los días, como por un año. … Y pues, mi mamá regresó a casa, pero mi hermana fue la que se tuvo que ir, se tuvo que mudar, y pues básicamente yo me crié con mi hermana, y a falta de tener mi figura materna presente todo el tiempo, quien estaba presente para mí era mi hermana.”

4. We interviewed Sol (a pseudonym) in the DMV in 2026 and reconstructed this part of her life as part of a project for the Humanities Truck at American University and a book project we are working on.

5. “Entonces, un día se acercaron a él, así de la nada, entraron y todo. Yo no estaba, yo no presencié eso, pero me lo contó mi mamá, porque él habló con ella. Pero básicamente lo amenazaron. Le dijeron que él tenía que hacer que el señor les dieran una suma muy grande de dinero. No sé cuánto era, pero era una suma muy grande de miles de dólares y que, si no lo hacía, que mi papá, su esposa, me decían ellos que era mi mamá, pero ellos ya no estaban juntas, y sus hijos, que eran mis hermanos y yo, básicamente que nos iban a matar a todos. Y, este, pues para nosotros fue horrible.”

6. “Y empezaban a decirme que, si no les pagaban, de que antes de matarnos que me iban a hacer cosas a mí, ya saben en qué tono, no…lo decían de una forma horrible, sinceramente muy, muy fea. Pues básicamente ellos empezaron a seguirme, a acosarme, a decirme cosas feas, cosas vulgares, y yo me acuerdo de que yo me sentía muy insegura.”

7.“A mí en ese tiempo sí, ahora que me acuerdo me daban ataques de ansiedad. Cuando llegaba a la casa yo llegaba a llorar, me encerraba, no quería hablar con nadie. Porque estaba en yo, que estaba asustada y aparte porque no quería asustar a mi familia más de lo que ya estaba.”

8. “Pues fíjate que en ese momento no pensábamos en migrar, de hecho, en un tiempo, después de tanto insistir e insistir a mi papá, él intentó poner una denuncia, una denuncia con la policía, y pues la policía básicamente dijo que ellos no podían hacer nada, que lo sentían, que es que ellos no podían meterse en eso.”

9. “y ahí fue donde empezamos a buscar alternativas de a dónde movernos o qué hacer, pero en El Salvador las pandillas tenían esto que eran muy organizadas y si tú te ibas para un lado, que era, por ejemplo, era la MS-13, si nosotros nos íbamos para otro lugar que era también de la pues ellos se comunicaban y básicamente nos mataban. Y si nos íbamos a un lugar que no era de la MS 13, sino que de la 18, pues ellos decían que nosotros éramos como espías de ellos y también nos mataban. Entonces llegamos a un punto en el que nos encontramos sin salida en el país, porque la policía no hizo nada, el hombre rico tampoco, él sí se protegió él mismo, pero no nos protegió a nosotros. Mi papá no hizo nada, nosotros no podíamos hacer nada.”

10. “Y mi mamá le contó a un amigo de acá la situación y gracias a Dios, él nos ayudó, nos dijo que él no podía mantenernos pero que nos podía ayudar a salir del país. Y sí, nosotros queríamos venirnos para acá y pues tomamos la decisión de aceptar esa propuesta porque nos encontramos desesperados, no sabíamos qué hacer.

Suspended Dreams: Asylum Seekers in Tapachula, Mexico

Tens of Thousands of Displaced People are Stuck in Mexico’s Poorest State?

Marshall Plane, CLALS Researcher and the Immigration to New York City Research & Data Coordinator

A Mural in Spanish and Haitian Creole reads: “Sister, believe in yourself, don’t be afraid to start again.”
A Mural in Spanish and Haitian Creole reads: “Sister, believe in yourself, don’t be afraid to start again.”

Note: Names have been changed where needed for interviewee privacy.

At 19, Samantha summoned the courage to leave her abuser, who is a gang member and the father of her three-year-old son. She knew this might also mean leaving her country. “In Honduras, we have so many femicides, and you can’t rely on the police because they’re working with the same gangs who commit them,” she told me.

Yet Samantha’s departure was quicker and more painful than expected: her abuser followed through on his threat to have her father killed, and she was told she had a matter of days before meeting a similar fate.

For decades, people fleeing such situations in Central America have hoped to reach the United States. By May 2026—eight months after leaving Honduras—Samantha instead found herself living in a shelter near Tapachula, a city just twenty miles north of the Mexico-Guatemala border, and navigating the asylum bureaucracy of Mexico rather than the US.

When we spoke, Samantha was spending her days in the shelter’s sweltering backyard caring for her son. Her new partner—who had similarly fled gang violence in Ecuador—worked day jobs in the coffee and banana fields surrounding Tapachula, which sits in the humid coastal lowlands of Chiapas, Mexico’s southernmost state.

“Here I feel trapped,” Samantha told me. “Once the current president is no longer there, I want to go to the United States. I feel that it’s safer there and that there my son will have opportunities to grow, to study, to have a better life.”

Lingering in the shade behind this austere Catholic shelter were dozens of migrants in similar states of limbo. Their unusual visitors—myself and other students visiting Chiapas as part of a two-week migration course organized by Juniata College and the Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas—provided many with a unique opportunity to vent their frustrations.

Throughout our time in Tapachula, the fruits of a longtime goal of US immigration policy—to make the journeys of northward-bound asylum seekers terminate in Mexico—were on full display. This unassuming city of 350,000 has become a kind of purgatory for people fleeing the Western Hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crises. Unable to enter the United States under the second Trump administration’s draconian policies, many have decided that, for the time being, Mexico offers the best available respite from hunger and violence in their countries of origin.

Tapachula is the first city migrants reach after crossing from Guatemala into Mexico. The manager at Albergue Belén, a Catholic shelter, told us that since the 1980s, thousands of mostly Central American migrants have passed through Tapachula each year on their way to the United States. In the early 2020s, they were joined by Cubans, Haitians, South Americans, Africans, and Asians. Olga Sánchez Martínez, director of the shelter Jesús el Buen Pastor, said that spending by northward-bound migrants had long been central to Tapachula’s economy.

A residential area of Tapachula near our hotel.
A residential area of Tapachula near our hotel.

At the end of 2023, Mexico—at the insistence of the US, which is determined to prevent people from moving northward—began requiring asylum seekers to remain in the city where they first seek asylum while their case is pending. This policy, combined with the closure of the US border, has rapidly transformed Tapachula from a transit hub to a holding ground.

None of the migrants we spoke to described Tapachula, a poor city in Mexico’s poorest state, as their preferred destination. Yet due to its proximity to the border, Chiapas received 66 percent of the 52,000 asylum applications submitted in Mexico in the first nine months of 2025. While their cases are being processed—which now frequently takes upwards of a year—those applicants are bound to Tapachula by the mandatory biweekly check-ins at the city’s Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) office.

Tapachula is now home to an estimated 60,000 migrants in addition to its 350,000 permanent residents. The largest groups are an estimated 20,000 Haitians and 18,000 Venezuelans. Cubans are perhaps the fastest-growing group: they represented nearly half of asylum applications in Mexico in 2025, and that was before a US oil blockade worsened Cuba’s already dire economic situation.

A store called “Mini Bangladesh” near downtown Tapachula advertises wholesale and retail sales of various items, including hats, purses, glasses, and toys.
A store called “Mini Bangladesh” near downtown Tapachula advertises wholesale and retail sales of various items, including hats, purses, glasses, and toys.

Due to color and language, Haitians are the city’s most visible migrants. As the sun rose on our first day in the city, I passed two men speaking Haitian Creole while loading cement barrels onto a pickup truck. A sticker on the truck’s rear window read: somos negritos, pero útiles a la sociedad. We are Black (using the diminutive form of the word), but useful to society.

On our third evening in Tapachula, I spoke with two of the many Haitians who were selling water bottles in the city’s lively central plaza. Both had crossed the border into the Dominican Republic in 2021 as Haiti spiraled into violence following the assassination of its president. “In Haiti there is no safety. There is no president,” said Jonel, the younger man, in accented but fluent Spanish.

“The United States is not helping Haiti to get out of this situation,” added his friend Bernard, noting that the gangs who control most of the capital are armed with trafficked US-made guns.

In 2025, an escalating deportation campaign led both to flee the Dominican Republic to avoid being sent back to Haiti. “In the DR, there is work, but you can’t be calm because immigration [enforcement] is looking for you every day,” said Jonel. “That’s why we crossed the jungle to come here. And well, here, it’s not as racist, but there’s no work.”

Jonel and Bernard both said they left home early each morning to look for construction or farm jobs. When none could be found, they would instead spend the day selling water bottles. “Imagine, you leave home at four, three in the morning.  How much will they pay you for a day of work? Maybe 300, 250 pesos [$14.50-17],” said Bernard, who was supporting a wife and two children in Haiti with remittances. He hoped to eventually reunite with them and join his brother in Florida. Jonel, lacking family in the US, said he intended to settle in Tijuana, a Mexican border city where a sizeable Haitian community has emerged in recent years.

We heard these economic frustrations repeatedly during our time in Tapachula. According to Sánchez Martínez, Tapachula’s businesses have been struggling since 2025 as fewer migrants pass through the city and spend money, while the requirement for asylum seekers to stay in Tapachula has swelled the number of people looking for work and housing. Migrants and natives alike said this was depressing wages and increasing rents.

“I’m earning less now,” a Tapachula-born construction worker told me at a brightly lit taqueria near our hotel. “If I want 400 pesos [$23] a day and a Cuban will work for 250 pesos [$14.50], who do you think they’ll hire?”

Our server at the same taqueria, Ángela, was herself a Cuban migrant—one of over one million people who have fled the island this decade amid crippling shortages of food and medicine. Shortly after crossing into Mexico in October 2024, she and her fellow travelers were kidnapped by a cartel. “We were eight. Only three made it out,” she said. Ángela avoided a grisly death only because her aunt in the US helped pay the $5,000 ransom. 

Government posters for missing people are a common sight in southern Chiapas. These posters at Albergue Jesús el Buen Pastor feature people from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jordan, and Venezuela. All were last seen in late 2024.
Government posters for missing people are a common sight in southern Chiapas. These posters at Albergue Jesús el Buen Pastor feature people from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jordan, and Venezuela. All were last seen in late 2024.

Without money to continue northward, Ángela began working in Tapachula and was still there when Trump took office. By May 2026, she had married a Mexican man and used her restaurant earnings to help her brother escape Cuba and join her in Tapachula. “We’ll see what happens, but for now I’m content here,” said Ángela.

“Most of us here are migrants,” Ángela told me, gesturing to her coworkers. “She’s Guatemalan, he’s Venezuelan, those two are Cuban, and in the back there’s also a Haitian.” Tapachula’s restaurant and nightlife sectors, she said, had become reliant on immigrant labor.

The relative stability Ángela achieved in Tapachula seemingly felt out of reach to the more recent arrivals we spoke to in the shelters. Once their asylum cases were processed, everyone planned to go to more prosperous locations: Mexico City, Monterrey, Ciudad Juárez, or Tijuana.

Murals depicting people with missing legs at Albergue Jesús el Buen Pastor. The shelter was initially opened to help migrants who were injured while riding atop La Bestia, a notorious train long used by mainly Central Americans trying to evade Mexican migration patrols en route to the US border.
Murals depicting people with missing legs at Albergue Jesús el Buen Pastor. The shelter was initially opened to help migrants who were injured while riding atop La Bestia, a notorious train long used by mainly Central Americans trying to evade Mexican migration patrols en route to the US border.

“Nobody wants to be here,” said Diego, a single father who fled Honduras with his three-year-old son in February 2026 when a gang demanded that he deliver drugs along his bus route. Like several other Hondurans I spoke to in the shelters, he said organized crime in the country had worsened to the point of intolerability.

“Here in Tapachula you make up to 300 pesos [$17] a day, and that’s if you find work. In Monterrey you can make 800 pesos [$46],” said Diego. Most of the jobs he found in Tapachula were day-to-day, and like many migrant workers, his promised wages had been withheld multiple times.

“We now see caravans forming on an almost weekly basis, and the main reason is the employment issue,” said the manager of Albergue Belén. “Some people who can’t find jobs here to sustain themselves while they go through the asylum process end up giving up and trying to get to places like Mexico City or Monterrey.”

Sánchez Martínez said the same, and added that cartels had taken to extorting and kidnapping migrants who headed north on foot along Chiapas’s coastal highway. “We beg people not to go,” she said. “Just the other day, they disappeared a group of twelve Hondurans.”

Those who remain in Tapachula rely on support and guidance from two main sources: the large networks of co-nationals that have emerged in the city, and an underfunded but determined collection of NGOs and shelters dedicated to serving its refugee population. One of these is Casa Frida, an NGO that assists LGBT+ refugees. They hosted a panel for our group on our second day in Tapachula.

One of the speakers, Adrián Lozano, had joined the exodus from Cuba in 2024, not long after earning his degrees in theater and journalism. Material concerns put these dreams on hold. “The minimum [monthly] wage in Cuba is 2,500 pesos1. A carton of eggs costs 3,000 pesos,” said Adrián. Medical treatment, he said, is free but sparse: his mother was diagnosed with cancer in early 2024 and faced a years-long waiting period for her treatment, which Adrián suspected was partly due to his own record of anti-government statements.

Adrián’s partner, who had crossed the US-Mexico border in 2023 and settled in Phoenix, helped finance his flight out of Cuba. Due to Trump taking office, Adrián’s journey—and his relationship—ended shortly after he crossed into Mexico. With the help of Casa Frida, he found work as a waiter in Tapachula. His immediate priorities, he said, were to help his mother and younger brother in Cuba buy food, and eventually to bring his mother to Mexico for her cancer treatment.

“I don’t want to denigrate the importance of service work, but I studied to be a writer, a professional,” said Adrián. Tapachula lacked professional opportunities, he said, and he had also faced more homophobia there than he ever had in Cuba. (Another speaker, accustomed to intense homophobia in eastern Venezuela, reported the opposite experience.) Adrián said his dream was no longer to reach the US, but rather to build a career as a television writer in Mexico City.

While he hoped to see the Cuban government fall—even if it required violence or US intervention—Adrián said he did not plan to return to the island, even if things improved drastically. “In Cuba, I was happy, and they say if you were happy somewhere, don’t go back there,” he said.

Another speaker at Casa Frida, Natalie, candidly showed us the deep bruises on her neck—remnants of the abuse she had suffered as a trans woman placed in a men’s prison in Cuba. Lacking relatives abroad who could finance her journey to the US, she instead flew in 2023 to Russia, which allows visa-free entry for Cubans. In Moscow, she saved up money through sex work.

“It was my first time seeing the capitalist world, so I was amazed by some of the things they had. But it was also kind of a scary place to be. They saw me as some kind of exotic symbol,” said Natalie, who identifies as Afro-Cuban. Natalie used her earnings to fly to Nicaragua in 2024, but her journey northward was also cut short by the change in US policy.

Like the other panelists, Casa Frida helped her find housing, submit her asylum claim, and, she said, build a much-needed sense of community with other LGBT+ people. Nonetheless, like everyone I spoke to, Natalie found life in Tapachula constraining. She hadn’t found employment and was still relying on sex work against her wishes. “You know, like everyone, I have my goals, I have my dreams, and I know this isn’t the best place to achieve them,” she said.

I asked where that place was. Without hesitation, she responded that it was the United States. “I want to live a normal life. I want to get married, have kids, maybe start a business,” she said. “And like lots of us who have had to abandon our countries, I believe the United States is the best country to do that.”

“I know it’s not possible right now with this president,” she added. “But nothing in this world is forever.”

A mural outside the UNICEF-funded Solidarity and Hospitality Shelter represents people who have stayed at the shelter with paper planes featuring the flags of their countries. The text on the bottom right reads: “Solidarity is the way.”
A mural outside the UNICEF-funded Solidarity and Hospitality Shelter represents people who have stayed at the shelter with paper planes featuring the flags of their countries. The text on the bottom right reads: “Solidarity is the way.”

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, and Catherine Grau, Research & Data Coordinator of the Immigration Lab.

Where American Voters Stand on MAGA’s Immigration Policies

Report | October 20, 2026

Asked whether they approve or disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling immigration, 52.8% disapprove and 44.9% approve, most interestingly many more strongly disapprove (44.6%) than those who strongly approve (30.5%). This comes from a poll of 5,000 English-speaking registered voters conducted between September 9 and September 25, 2026, by the polling organization YouGov on behalf of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University. It gathered views on a variety of immigration policy-related topics. The margin of error is: +/-1.5%. The pool of participants was structured to be demographically representative of likely voters. White Americans, those living in the South, highly educated Americans, and people aged 65 and over are slightly overrepresented. Because the survey was only conducted in English among registered voters, most of whom voted in the last two presidential elections and midterms, the views of Spanish-only speakers, permanent residents, and non-citizens are not included. The results presented here are, therefore, conservative estimates.

Respondents also differently support the government deporting people in different migration statuses: 37.3% strongly support deporting individuals who are undocumented, 24.8% strongly support people with Temporary Protected Status until recently, while 50.5% somewhat or strongly oppose; 17.7% strongly support while 53.4 oppose deporting those who have applied for asylum; and 59.2% oppose, and 9.4% are unsure, while only 15.5% strongly support deporting those who are in the process of regularizing their immigration status (e.g., renewing visa, applying for immigration relief, a green card, or citizenship).  

Respondents report varying levels of familiarity with U.S. immigration programs and policies. Asylum (75.2%) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) (59.9%) were the most familiar programs among respondents. While only 6.8% were familiar with the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV) Humanitarian Parole Program, implemented by the Biden Administration, which allowed eligible individuals from these countries to temporarily enter legally if they had a sponsor in the United States. Awareness is also particularly limited for more recent immigration initiatives, with more than half of respondents reporting being very unfamiliar with Project Homecoming and the CBP Home and CBP One smartphone applications.

Contrary to online discourse, a large majority of respondents support more humane immigration policies, expanded legal immigration pathways, and opportunities for undocumented immigrants to legalize their status. More than eight in ten respondents (85.2%) agree that allowing individuals to leave voluntarily is more humane than deporting them in restraints, with 52.8% strongly agreeing. Similarly, 69.6% supported expanding legal pathways for immigration, while 61.8% support providing undocumented immigrants with a pathway to legal status.

Most people are against mass deportation by force and they share many concerns. The most frequently cite concern is the separation of families during the removal process (43%), followed by the harm caused to individuals being deported (31%), and the lack of a humane or orderly removal process (30%). Other concerns include prolonged immigration detention (26%), costs to taxpayers (25%), and the use of government resources and personnel (20%). Fewer respondents cite the impact on American communities (16%), the country’s international image (14%), or the economy (11%). Only 17% report having no concerns about the current approach to deportation.

A majority of respondents  support providing humanitarian assistance to individuals seeking asylum in the United States, however support varied depending on the populations and types of assistance described. Support was highest for providing emergency temporary shelter to individuals fleeing violent conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan and Ukraine, with 69.2% in favor (36.1% strongly favoring and 33.1% somewhat favoring), compared to 20.6% opposed. Similarly, 63.3% supported welcoming programs for individuals and families escaping persecution, regardless of their country of origin, while 63.4% favored temporary shelter and food assistance for asylum seekers from countries experiencing crises, such as Haiti, Venezuela, and Cuba.

Support for proposals involving more extensive assistance to people regardless of country of origin is also popular, with 57.7% favoring temporary housing, financial support, and programming, compared to 30.4% opposed. The lowest level of support is for the current practice of helping white South Africans who self-identify as refugees relocate and settle in the United States. Only 37.9% support this policy, while 41.8% oppose it, and 20.2% are unsure.

A majority of respondents support providing Green Cards to international students who graduate from U.S. universities, a proposal discussed by both major presidential candidates during the 2024 election. Overall, 61.2% express support for the policy, including 33.3% who strongly support it. These findings indicate broad support among respondents for creating pathways to permanent residency for international graduates of U.S. institutions.

Respondents are more likely to support a member of Congress who voted to reduce funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) than one who opposed such cuts. Overall, 41% report that a vote to cut ICE funding would make them more likely to vote for their representative, compared with 33.5% who say it would make them less likely. This represents a 7.5-percentage-point difference in reported voting intentions. Younger people tend to be more likely to support Congresspeople cutting funding for forced deportations. Only 43% of those who identity as republicans, and 47% of those who support Trump are much less likely to vote for a member of Congress who cuts ICE funding.

Although the National Guard has not traditionally been responsible for immigration enforcement, some units have assisted federal immigration authorities, including Border Patrol, ICE, and HSI agents, during the second Trump administration. Despite this limited non-traditional role, 60% of respondents express trust in the National Guard to handle deportations fairly. In contrast, respondents ae more skeptical of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), with 50% reporting that they do not trust ICE to carry out deportations fairly. These findings highlight notable public distrust of federal immigration enforcement agencies.

Respondents overwhelmingly support Democrats and Republicans working on creating pathways toward citizenship, reducing family separations, expanding asylum protections, and even making deportation more humane and following due process. Voters want both parties to work together to improve the immigration system.

Overall, the findings reveal a notable contrast between political rhetoric that often frames immigration as a threat or challenge and public attitudes that reflect greater sympathy toward immigrants and openness to bipartisan immigration reform.


This survey is based on 5,000 interviews of registered voters conducted by YouGov online. The sample was weighted according to gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, and U.S. Census region based on voter registration lists, the U.S. Census American Community Survey, and the U.S. Census Current Population Survey, as well as 2020 Presidential vote and approximate 2024 Presidential vote based on available results, and party identification estimates based on Pew Research Center’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey. Respondents were selected from YouGov to be representative of registered voters. The weights range from 0.22 to 5.4 with a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.43. The margin of error (a 95% confidence interval) for a sample percentage p based upon the subsetted sample is approximately 1.5. It does not reflect potential selection bias in panel participation in the survey.

Read more from the report: https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/yougov-survey.cfm

More information about the CLALS: https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm

For media inquiries contact clals@american.edu or olmos@american.edu

Escazú Explained

Latin America’s Treaty for Environmental Defenders at a Crossroads

Belén Fernández Milmanda, Associate Professor, Trinity College

Giancarlo Madera, undergraduate student and research assistant, American University

Mariana Muñoz Restrepo, undergraduate student and research assistant, Trinity College

Andrea Vilán, Assistant Professor, American University

Photo: ECLAC / United Nations via the official Escazú Agreement COP 4 Portal.

While environmental and land defenders are under attack around the world, nowhere is this danger more palpable than in Latin America, which accounted for 85 percent of deadly attacks in 2025.[1] Four Latin American countries – Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Honduras – account for 58 percent of all murders of environmental activists around the world since record keeping began.[2]

In response to this dire situation, in 2018 the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries established the Escazú Agreement, the first legally binding treaty to include provisions on the rights of environmental defenders. In this post, we explore its impact so far and what can be expected going forward.

What is the Escazú Agreement?

The Escazú Agreement is a landmark treaty that includes specific measures to protect environmental defenders. It also enshrines the rights of communities and individuals to access environmental information, participate in environmental decision-making, and access the judicial system when their rights have been violated, thus facilitating legal mobilization against environmental degradation. Specifically, Escazú instructs members to protect the physical integrity and freedom of expression of environmental and land activists (Article 9) and to guarantee public access to environmental information (Article 5). Moreover, it enshrines the rights of communities and individuals to participate in environmental decision-making (Article 7) and access justice in environmental matters (Article 8).

The Agreement was negotiated over six years, including three years of preparatory meetings and three of formal treaty drafting. The text was written over the course of nine committee meetings held virtually and in person and ultimately adopted in Escazú, Costa Rica, in 2018. After receiving the eleventh ratification, it entered into force in 2021.

Commitment to Escazú So far

While most countries participated in the negotiations of Escazú, to date commitment to its standards has been uneven. So far, only 19 countries out of 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have ratified or acceded to the treaty. In particular, it is worrisome that some of the countries with the highest deforestation rates in the world, such as Brazil or Paraguay, as well as some of the most biodiverse ones, like Peru, Costa Rica and Guatemala, have signed the treaty but failed to ratify it.[3]

Map of Escazú Agreement status across Latin America and the Caribbean (2018).
Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Some countries like Argentina or Mexico, ratified the agreement quickly. Strong opposition to the agreement, coming in particular from extractivist industries, has delayed or obstructed commitment in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. In some cases, social mobilization in support of the agreement has been key to overcoming the reticence of business interests. Colombia – a country that we have studied in-depth with support from American University’s Public Affairs and Policy Lab – only committed to the agreement after a mass mobilization known as the Paro Nacional pressured then President Duque to sign and subsequently set in motion a political process that President Petro finished while in office in 2022.[4]

In the last few years, several Caribbean countries joined the agreement, including Dominica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago. In fact, the fourth conference of state parties (COP4) – a multi-day event including state and elected representatives from the public – was held in Nassau in April of 2026. The region is one of the most vulnerable to climate change in the world, so their inclusion is important. However, their inclusion also introduces several complexities, since many state parties are not Spanish-speaking and do not follow civil law.

Ratification is only one of the first steps, and a growing group of countries are now working on implementation. Many countries have developed a national roadmap (hoja de ruta) for putting the treaty into practice, with support from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). In 2023, Argentina and Ecuador produced the earliest roadmaps; Uruguay and Chile followed in 2024, Panama in 2025 and Belize and Colombia in 2026.[5]

What Lies Ahead

At the COP4 held in 2026, state parties made several key decisions,[6] including creating an official working group on “pollutant release and transfer registers,” intended to provide publicly available information systems and verifiable data on pollutants released into natural ecosystems. State delegates also approved the composition of new leadership, choosing Saint Kitts and Nevis to take the Chair, and electing the Bahamas, Belize, Colombia and Panama, as Vice-chairs. The election of the representatives of the public — a novel feature of the agreement designed to encourage participation on environmental matters — will be held in November of 2026.

The next conference of the parties will take place in 2028. In the meantime, states will have to navigate the political shifts in the region, including potential realignments due to presidential elections. The current shift to the right in the region could mean trouble for the agreement, as detractors took office.  In Brazil, a Flávio Bolsonaro administration would almost certainly lower the chances of the country ratifying the agreement – which awaits consideration in the Senate after having cleared the Chamber of Deputies in November of 2025 – to zero. In Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, even if withdrawing the agreement may prove difficult, governments may undermine the agreement by cutting public resources supporting implementation.

However, ratifying the agreement is no panacea for environmental defenders on the ground, as many implementation challenges remain. Ecuador is a case in point. While the country was the first in the world to enshrine the Rights of Nature in its national constitution in 2008 and among the first to ratify Escazú in 2020,[7] violence against environmental defenders remains high. The 2023 assassination of Eduardo Mendúa Vargas, a leader of the Indigenous Nations Confederation (CONAIE) and a key member in the implementation of Escazú who was fighting the state oil company Petroecuador, sent the country into uproar. Environmentalists demanded justice from President Guillermo Lasso, but the case remains open.[8] Presidents Lasso and Noboa have faced criticisms for not implementing Escazú and, more broadly, neglecting the constitutionally enshrined Rights of Nature. In 2025, for example, over 250 domestic and international organizations criticized the government for not implementing Escazú.[9] Still, in 2026 two environmental activists were killed in Santa Elena province, presumably due to their environmental and anti-corruption activism.[10]

Before states meet at the next Conference of the Parties in April 2028, several tests will show how strong the treaty really is. Will Brazil finally join? Will governments hollow it out from within? Will the implementation roadmaps help turn states’ commitments into concrete action? Will the newly elected representatives of the public decisively shape the path forward? The next years will show whether the agreement moves from promise to practice, and whether it can deliver for the people it was meant to protect.


[1] Global Witness. https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/collective-power/

[2] Authors’ calculations based on Global Witness,  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/collective-power/

[3] UN Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxvii-18&chapter=27&clang=_en

[4] We explore these political dynamics in Fernández Milmanda & Vilan, “Who Protects Environmental Defenders? How Domestic Interest Groups Shape Latin American States’ Commitment to the Escazú Agreement,” presented at the 2026 APSA Annual Meeting. 

[5] See https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/es

[6] CEPAL. https://acuerdodeescazu.cepal.org/cop4/en/news/cop-4-escazu-agreement-approves-key-decisions-accelerating-treatys-implementation-latin-america

[7] Observatory on Principle 10, CEPAL https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/treaty/regional-agreement-access-information-public-participation-and-justice-environmental-matters

[8] Vargas assassination https://es.mongabay.com/2023/03/asesinato-de-eduardo-mendua-en-ecuador/

[9] Front line defenders (250 organizations protest) https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/over-280-ecuadorian-and-international-organizations-speak-out-against

[10] Silva and Pezo assassination https://gk.city/2026/06/12/tres-activistas-hallados-sin-vida-ecuador-siete-meses/

U.S. Cuba Policy: Might Makes Wrong

Fulton Armstrong, Research Fellow, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University

Philip Brenner, Emeritus Professor of International Relations and History, American University

View of Havana, Cuba. Source: Robert Albro

The Trump administration has been applying to Cuba its credo that might makes right. At the United Nations President Donald Trump pointed to Cuba shortly after musing that he might “annihilate the Islamic Republic [of Iran]”, driving the Iranian people “into hell with no chance of survival.” U.S. escalation of its “extreme pressure” measures to effect regime change in Cuba, especially the oil blockade in place since January, amounts to the strongest attack from the United States since Fidel Castro marched into Havana more than 66 years ago, with little prospect of an outcome pleasing to the United States.

The across-the-board economic, diplomatic, and military steps to block all oil shipments to the Cuban oil processing and distribution industry – allowing only one small Russian shipment and a variety of small shipments of finished products to cash-paying clients in the private sector – are causing a multi-tiered humanitarian crisis. The blockade covers even solar panels, and shippers afraid of U.S. sanctions are delaying delivery of containers of food, medicine, and other essentials. Legal experts say these measures amount to a violation of international law.

Blackouts last 20 hours a day, and the whole national grid has crashed six times since January. Numerous press reports indicate that homes have no water because pumps cannot function without electricity. Patients needing hospital care are dying, with an estimated 100,000 people unable to obtain essential surgeries. Without fuel for trucks, garbage is piled high on city street corners, increasing the spread of mosquitoes bearing a range of diseases including chikungunya, dengue, and zika. The energy system has long been vulnerable because of previous embargo measures, such as prohibitions on the sale of spare parts with 10 percent or more of U.S. content, and because of inconsistent government policies. But the new U.S. actions have, by far, been the decisive cause of the current crises.

The underlying premise of U.S. policy since the 1960s is to spark a popular uprising that would lead to government collapse. The $60 million-$70 million a year the U.S. spends on information programs and other psychological operations directed at the island, primarily through social media, are clearly aimed at fomenting discontent, and many Cubans do blame their own government more than they do the U.S. for the lack of meaningful reform in past years.

But the government retains residual strengths that have enabled it to resist the U.S. pressure over these nine months. The people’s stoic and often creative survival strategies indicate that, even though they want change that will improve living conditions, they don’t want it dictated by Washington or Miami. The government has initiated and begun implementing significant economic reforms – at lightning speed compared to the past – that give the private sector huge new operating space, welcome foreign investment (including from expatriates) with very few conditions, and finally begin to dismantle inefficient state enterprises. Government officials say they’re not embracing capitalism, but their statements increasingly reflect acceptance of market mechanisms, decentralization, and a commitment to get the bureaucrats out of citizens’ way. Although they point out that Vietnam and China had drastically different conditions under which they implemented economic reforms in the 1980s, they’re not shy about signaling that they’re clearly moving toward a similarly mixed economy.  The people won’t feel relief for some time, but change is in the air.

The U.S. Administration seems to think it will win this race for time – that Cuba will “fail” or “collapse” before the benefits of reform can be felt. It is doing all it can to fan the flames on the island, including through threats of military intervention. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio want to make Cuba a “failed state,” but they don’t want to face the consequences of the humanitarian disaster that their aggression is creating. In response to deteriorating conditions, an estimated 1.5 million-to 2 million Cubans already have migrated in the last five years, mainly to Spain and Latin America. But those options are drying up, and Trump and Rubio certainly don’t want Cubans to take to the boats and arrive on Florida shores. 

Even if the U.S. were to achieve its dream of effecting “regime collapse,” the island isn’t going to fall into its lap like a ripe fruit. The economic, infrastructural, and social damage will take decades to mend – and any new regime is going to face serious challenges to its legitimacy as a U.S. puppet and will struggle to maintain order. Indeed, government failure would probably benefit disciplined, orthodox enforcers rather than pro-democracy citizens with no experience. There is no pretty scenario at this point, but the less-ugly scenario would be to let the Cubans, without expressly excluding the party in charge, decide their own future. Cubans want change, but they want it to be evolutionary.

The Complex Mexico-U.S. Relationship

The Complex Mexico-U.S. Relationship: Claudia Sheinbaum’s Responses to Donald Trump’s Bullying

By Tomás Milton Muñoz Bravo

Professor of Political and Social Sciences and Researcher at the Center for International Relations of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Image of Claudia Sheinbaum. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Following the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, relations between Mexico and the United States centered primarily on three major issues—trade, security, and migration—and institutional channels were established to address each issue separately. However, everything changed in January 2017 when Donald Trump took office; as an outsider, he damaged established relationships, complicated the bilateral agenda, and used coercion as a primary tactic in his dealings with former presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

Joe Biden’s presidency (January 2021–January 2025) largely marked a return to traditional bilateral relations with Mexico. With few exceptions—such as the July 2024 arrest of drug trafficker Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in Sinaloa and his subsequent transfer to Texas, an operation involving U.S. agents and conducted without consultation with Mexican authorities—both governments regularly used institutional channels to address shared issues and challenges. Yet, Trump’s return to the presidency on January 20, 2025, once again upended the bilateral agenda. Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo—Mexico’s first female president, who had been in office for just over three months— had to contend with Trump’s return and his aggressive political style.

Beginning with the 2024 election campaign and continuing throughout his second term, Trump has once again set his sights on Mexico. As he did during his first administration, he conflates issues, distorts reality, uses threats to gain political leverage, and places additional demands on the Mexican president—most notably, that politicians accused of collusion with organized crime be handed over to the United States.

Through media, political, and economic pressure, “Trump 2.0” has ensured that the Sheinbaum administration continues to act as an extension of the U.S. border—preventing migrants from passing through Mexican territory and accepting migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees from other countries who have been expelled by the United States. He has also secured commitments to allocate additional security resources to combat criminal groups, shut down fentanyl-producing laboratories, increase drug seizures, and expel members of organized crime groups from Mexico without extradition proceedings to hand them over to U.S. authorities.

On trade, pressure from the United States has forced the Sheinbaum administration to limit its relations and exchanges with China and operate under constant uncertainty concerning the imposition of new tariffs and the hostile attitude of U.S. negotiators during the ongoing review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

Against this backdrop, Trump has employed a “praise and punishment” strategy in his dealings with the Mexican leader. Within a single day, he might describe her as a “good person,” a “great woman,” and “beautiful,” with a “great voice,” only to question her capabilities minutes later and claim that she is “terrified” of drug cartels, thereby demanding that she accept the presence of U.S. armed forces on Mexican soil to combat criminal groups.

The bilateral relationship has historically been complex, but it has become even more fraught due to Trump’s attitudes, slights, and systematic bullying —from renaming the Gulf of Mexico the “Gulf of America” and ignorantly and maliciously claiming that Mexico exports nothing but tamales and tomatoes to the U.S. to posting AI-generated memes that disparage Mexico and its migrants or depict the entire continent draped in the U.S. flag.  More than a year and a half after Trump’s return to office, it is possible to make an initial assessment of the hostile policies and actions that Washington has directed at the Sheinbaum administration in the areas of migration, politics, trade, and security.

On migration, Trump has achieved his goal: Mexico has become yet another containment barrier for migrants and asylum seekers. In addition to a reduction of more than 90 percent in unauthorized crossings through Mexican territory into the United States, the Sheinbaum administration has agreed—without asking for anything in return—that Mexico will once again serve as a de facto “safe third country,” where migrants become stranded, unable to enter the United States yet lacking the means to fully integrate into Mexican society. These migrants are joined by deportees—both Mexican nationals and nationals of other countries—who arrive in Mexico after being expelled from the United States.

Turning to Trump’s political attacks on Mexico, it is important to emphasize that they have indeed tarnished the image of the Mexican president’s political project. She has repeatedly refused to hand over members of the ruling MORENA party sought by the United States in connection with their alleged ties to organized crime groups. To date, the most prominent politicians whose arrest and extradition to the United States the State Department has requested are Rubén Rocha Moya—the governor of the northern state of Sinaloa (currently on leave)—and Enrique Inzunza Cázarez, a senator representing the same state.

In Mexico, ties between politicians and organized crime have plagued the country since the mid-20th century. However, these ties solidified during the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador—founder of MORENA—creating a legacy that the current Mexican leader must confront. Yet, in an effort to avoid weakening her party or fracturing the alliance that backed her presidential bid, she has chosen to downplay these connections and refrain from taking decisive legal action.

Various polls continue to show MORENA as the party with the highest voter support ahead of the 2027 elections—which will include contests for 17 governorships and seats in the federal Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless, the protection the Mexican executive branch has extended to MORENA politicians—as well as to at least two of former President López Obrador’s sons, who have been implicated in corruption schemes and alliances with criminal gangs through media reports and formal accusations—has become a weapon for the Trump administration,[1] which has toyed with the idea of ​​intervening on Mexican soil to combat drug trafficking groups, which the current U.S. administration has designated as terrorist organizations.

On trade, despite threats, insults, and pressure from Washington, Mexico has solidified its position as the United States’s top trading partner, with the trade balance increasingly favoring Mexico. In July 2026 alone, Mexico recorded a $26.31 billion trade surplus with the United States.

Finally, regarding U.S. pressure on security matters, Trump can claim victory, as the Mexican government has intensified its fight against major drug cartels—leading to increased seizures of drugs and weapons, more arrests of criminals, and the dismantling of fentanyl laboratories. Yet, insecurity remains rampant in Mexico; drug trafficking groups multiply like a many-headed hydra, continuing to terrorize the population, while the United States offers no reciprocity—even as it is the world’s leading consumer of narcotics. The equation remains unchanged: Mexico bears the brunt of the death and violence, while the United States provides the market for consumption and recreation in a losing war on drugs—a conflict addressed through a military and security approach rather than one grounded in public health and prevention.


[1] U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance has stated that his administration reserves the right to attack Mexican cartels within that Latin American country’s territory. The last time this occurred was on June 17, 2026.

Lethality and Illegality in the U.S. Boat Strikes Campaign: Why Characterization Matters for Regional Accountability Efforts

Marie Miller, Program Associate, Reiss Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law

Source: Wikimedia Commons

On September 2, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that he had ordered a kinetic strike against a boat off the coast of Venezuela. U.S. military forces, he said, had identified those onboard as “narcoterrorists” of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a decentralized criminal organization with Venezuelan origins and a transnational reach. Thirteen days later, another strike, and a glimpse into the administration’s purported rationale: to disrupt narcotics networks affecting Americans—notwithstanding that Venezuela plays essentially no role in fentanyl production and smuggling. And then came another. Now, nearly a year later, more than 200 have been killed in 66 strikes by the U.S. Without evidence, without interdiction and trial, nor the administration’s stated legal authority made public, there’s still no telling when Operation Southern Spear, as the U.S. calls the campaign, will truly end.

With each strike, the administration has failed to make public any evidence that these boats are transporting drugs, much less that the passengers on board are affiliated with cartels or are participants in an “armed attack.” Most of the victims have not been identified, yet reports suggest victims include farmworkers and fishermen, compelled to participate in the trafficking network as independent laborers without ownership over the illicit product. With regard to cases where boats have been unusually crowded, one military official suggested that human trafficking victims could have been amongst those killed.

The Trump administration has claimed that the laws of war permit the killing of passengers smuggling narcotics in support of cartels designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). In 2025, TdA was designated as such by Trump’s State Department, under a statutory authority delegated by Congress. Typically, the military can stop instances of trafficking with far less lethal force. If a vessel is suspected of ferrying drugs, it can be intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard and its passengers arrested. Instead, it appears that boats merely suspected of drug trafficking have been blown to bits from above, taking the lives of those on board and occasionally leaving survivors who, eventually, are also presumed dead or missing at sea. Even if evidence had been provided that these individuals were indeed associated with TdA—and it has not—the administration’s justification for these strikes relies on a flawed legal basis.

An FTO designation made by the U.S. government can include financial, criminal, and immigration consequences for its material supporters. Importantly, despite having led to military operations in the past, the designation by itself does not create a state of war or armed conflict, nor does it authorize “wartime” authorities like targeting or detention. Nonetheless, in a classified memo notifying Congress of the administration’s legal basis for the operation, the “President determined that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with these designated terrorist organizations.” The president can surely repel threats of terrorism when a sudden attack is imminent. Yet there is no evidence that this high threshold was met at the onset of Operation Southern Spear. The initial strikes were framed as “self-defense” against a critical threat to American life and security. A state’s self-defense is justified under the U.N. Charter’s Article 51 only in the case of preventing an armed attack or subduing an ongoing one.

In an undisclosed notice to Congress, the Trump administration apparently shifted its basis, indicating that the strikes go beyond discrete acts of self-defense, labeling the targeted cartels as “nonstate armed groups” whose actions amount to “an armed attack” against the U.S. Many legal experts, on the other hand, contend that drug trafficking and its effects cannot constitute an “armed attack” triggering the right of self-defense. In its description of non-international armed conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia refers to it as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” While the Trump administration has indicated that TdA is engaged in “irregular warfare” in the U.S., it has yet to define what this entails. Whether this amounts to “protracted armed violence” is uncertain and unsupported by available evidence.

In the absence of such an organized group engaged in protracted armed violence with the U.S., the law of armed conflict does not apply. Thus, the passengers on the boats—alleged associates of TdA, though not identified as such in the formal report from President Trump informing Congress of the initial strike—would not be combatants, nor civilians within an armed conflict. (If there was an armed conflict, the boaters’ civilian status would render them prohibited targets). Subsequently, the strikes would not be classified as war crimes. Outside of armed conflict, premeditated killing of suspected criminals is called murder. And under U.S. domestic law, it is prohibited. Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the U.S. is a party, further prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. Those responsible for authorizing the strikes may also be guilty of murder under Article 118 of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice.

According to former U.S. State Department attorney Charlie Trumbull, with each of the 66 strikes constituting discrete acts of murder across a ten month window, the attacks can arguably be described as “widespread.” Crimes against humanity (CAH), one of three atrocity crimes alongside genocide and war crimes, are understood as part of a “widespread or systemic attack directed against a civilian population” in “furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.” A named policy—Operation Southern Spear—implemented by U.S. Southern Command in an organized manner, therefore, may meet the “state or organizational policy” requirement for CAH.

Operation Southern Spear appears to be one of many prongs of the Trump administration’s aggressive aims to reassert the U.S. preeminence in the western hemisphere, as part of the National Security Strategy’s “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.” In spite of condemnation from civil society, a largely tepid response from Caribbean states met the U.S. militarization of the Caribbean and the capture of Maduro in January. While Cuba’s representative to the U.N. decried the “military aggression” of the United States against Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago—whose military has partnered with the U.S. for joint exercises in Caribbean waters—verbally committed to the “cooperative efforts led by the United States to disrupt and dismantle networks that enable transnational crime,” remaining “steadfast” in support of U.S. “initiatives that strengthen regional security.” When Colombian President Gustavo Petro called one of the strikes “murder,” President Trump sanctioned members of his family, threatening to reduce aid and raise tariffs on the country. Since ending intelligence sharing with the U.S. (to, in his words, refrain from “collaborating with a crime against humanity”) Petro has reportedly toned down his criticism of U.S. Southern Command. Colombian authorities, moreover, have been slow to identify bodies that have washed ashore.

In the wake of Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro from power, and the reported preparation of indictments against Cuba’s “political and military leadership,” Caribbean and Latin American states may be hesitant to further push back on the campaign, lest they risk falling into disfavor with a highly unpredictable Trump administration. In March, Ecuador began joint military exercises with U.S. Southern Command, with the intention of combatting drug trafficking. These led to various land and sea strikes, property destructions, and detentions. Since Operation Southern Spear appears to rely on a presumption that the U.S. is in an armed conflict with TdA, would the U.S. further target perceived associates—potentially including civilians—on land in Latin America? It is not outside the bounds of possibility.

If the relevant crime is indeed murder under U.S. law, the U.S. would hold prosecutorial jurisdiction. An ACLU case brought on behalf of the boat strikes victims’ families for wrongful death and extrajudicial killing is currently pending in Massachusetts, for instance. But if the killings are recognized as a crime against humanity, states outside of the U.S. may have universal jurisdiction status, in which international or foreign courts could step in when the U.S. fails to hold perpetrators accountable. This is why the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity matters. Despite President Trump’s ability to pardon those who have executed his orders in his chain of command, a determination that Operation Southern Spear is a crime against humanity would open new routes of accountability on the international level.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), for instance, can assert jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territory and maritime space of states that have ratified the Rome Statute. A point of comparative interest lies with the case of former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, who is now jailed after the ICC confirmed charges of crimes against humanity against him. In light of the murders of persons involved in drug-related criminal activity under the supervision of Philippines law enforcement, the ICC found reasonable grounds for the elements of crimes against humanity to be met. States can also prosecute crimes committed against their citizens abroad, such as the victims of the boat strikes, if they embrace passive personality jurisdiction and are able to either acquire prosecutorial custody or allow in absentia prosecution.

The geopolitical risks of accountability-seeking by victims’ states—Colombia or Trinidad, for instance—are evident. But the Trump administration won’t last forever. Right now, if they are able to muster the political will, Caribbean and Latin American states can quietly gather evidence of the strikes and secure witnesses. Once President Trump is out of office, indictments of perpetrators responsible for driving Operation Southern Spear on the state’s behalf can still come about.