Brazil: Will Lula Shake Things Up?

By Fábio Kerche*

lula

Former Brazilian President Lula Da Silva/ Flickr/ Creative Commons/ https://bit.ly/2TxyFJ7

Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva — out of prison but not acquitted of his alleged crimes — is stirring up the country’s political debate, but he faces tough challenges reestablishing his leadership and revitalizing his party, the Workers’ Party (PT).

  • After serving 580 days of a 12-year sentence, Lula was released from prison earlier this month when the Supreme Court ruled that, under the Brazilian Constitution, one can be imprisoned only after judicial appeals have been completed. The court did not explicitly say that prosecutors rushed Lula to prison in order to remove him from the presidential race that led to President Bolsonaro’s election in October 2018, but a number of Brazilian legal experts believe that to be the case. The good news for Lula is that the majority of the Brazilians support his release — 54 percent, according to Datafolha, Brazil’s most important survey center.
  • Even though he is out of prison, Lula will not be able to run for office again unless his previous convictions in lower courts are annulled or overturned by higher courts — which could take a long time. (The electoral law specifies that someone convicted at two different levels of the judiciary cannot run for office.) The former president is apparently hoping that leaks published last June by The Intercept revealing allegedly inappropriate contacts between prosecutors and the judge on Lula’s case, Sérgio Moro, are reason to overturn his convictions. Prospects of such a reversal appear poor, however, because Moro, currently Bolsonaro’s Justice Minister, has a clear incentive to put Lula back behind bars, and observers say he retains considerable influence in the Judiciary.

In the short and medium term, Lula’s strategy appears to be to erode the Bolsonaro Administration’s support and lay the groundwork for his own party’s next campaign, in next year’s municipal elections. His freedom allows him to travel around the country, make political talks, and build alliances.

  • His most ardent supporters remain loyal; he still has strong backing at a popular level; and still projects formidable charisma, according to many observers. While some of his speeches since his release have been more aggressive, his current political drive signals that he will seek to broaden alliances beyond the left.
  • But Lula faces huge political challenges. There are signs that his influence has diminished in recent years thanks to his legal baggage and economic mistakes made by the administration of his successor, former President Dilma Rousseff. Some is also due to unrelenting attacks on him and the PT by the media —portraying him as a radical. Splits in the left, including the lack of an identifiable candidate to replace Lula in the 2022 elections, are also a vulnerability.

Brazil has changed since Lula was arrested: Temer was president; the PT led in the polls; the economic elite’s candidate was from the Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Bolsonaro was not widely considered a viable candidate. Lula’s challenges as he tries to rebuild his image and his party are huge. An immediate one is an effort by some members of Congress to modify the law that protects defendants from prison until all appeals have been heard, except if the defendant poses a threat to society or investigations. The goal is put Lula in prison again, to reduce his influence in the political game. For a number of jurists, however, this modification would be considered unconstitutional.

  • Next year’s local elections will be the first big test of Lula’s ability to negotiate widely and reorganize opposition to Bolsonaro, win control over the government in major cities, and prepare a PT alternative in the 2022 presidential election.
  • Bolsonaro is not without problems. His popularity is suffering due to the economy — high unemployment, low quality of jobs offered, and very low growth — and some unpopular policies, such as tougher rules for retirement. The president and his sons retain a major edge in social media, but Datafolha this week reported that 36 percent of respondents classified Bolsonaro’s government as “terrible.”

Lula’s best hope seems to convince the Brazilians that the corruption charges were political constructions by his adversaries — a tough task — and that PT and its allies can restore the pace of economic growth obtained during his administrations. Next year’s local elections are key for this project.

December 12, 2019

* Fábio Kerche is a professor at UNIRIO and IESP-UERJ in Rio de Janeiro. He was a CLALS Research Fellow in 2016-2017.

 

Latin America: Total Chaos?

By Carlos Malamud*

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South American Presidents waving to the cameras in Santiago, Chile / Flickr / Creative Commons

Democracy and democratic values are in crisis throughout South and Central America, but the causes – and solutions – vary across the region, with rays of hope that at least some countries will find their way forward. The Bolivian elections, plagued by suspicions of fraud, reflect some of the problems that affect all of Latin America. The previously unbeaten President Evo Morales, in government since 2006, has now shown his limits and, even if his election is confirmed, will govern without the parliamentary majorities he enjoyed in the past.

  • Latin America witnessed violent protests almost simultaneously in Ecuador and Chile; Mexico blinked during a confrontation with the son of narcotics kingpin Chapo Guzmán; the Congress was dissolved in Peru; an ex-President in the Dominican Republic denounced as fraudulent the primary election he lost and joined another party to be its candidate; and a massive exodus continued pouring out of Venezuela, whose crisis is terminal but without an expiration date.
  • The Argentine and Uruguayan elections on October 27 marked the end of a three-year cycle of elections during which 14 countries voted to elect or re-elect their presidents. Speculation was originally that a swing to the right would counteract the Bolivarianism of the previous swing to the left. That shift never happened. In its place, a more heterogeneous and divided Latin America emerged, reflected in the outcome of the Argentine and Uruguayan elections, and in the not-insignificant fact that Mexico is governed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador while Brazil, the other regional power, has Jair Bolsonaro.

The causes of this wave of divisiveness are the subject of different theories. Many observers speak of a Castro-Chavista conspiracy, orchestrated by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the leftist São Paulo Forum. Others think it’s a popular reaction to the drastic adjustment programs of the IMF. Yet others argue about a contagion factor and the impact of social networks, which enable real-time communication and the transfer of vivid images of events. Nonetheless, any theory that tries to harness all of these theories will be flawed because each national reality is responding to different logic and dynamics.

  • All of the countries of the region are experiencing inequality, poverty, corruption, violence and narco-trafficking, unhappiness with democracy and its institutions, rejection of politicians, and the impact of the “new politics” of social media and fake news. But they are not present to the same proportions.
  • Neoliberal, Bolivarian, and populist governments are all suffering from rebellions. The Chilean protests over transportation fees under neoliberal President Piñera were preceded by protests in Brazil in 2013 under progressive President Dilma Rousseff. If Piñera resorts to military force to stop the protests, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega did something similar in 2018, killing more than 300. The IMF might have been behind the reduction of fuel subsidies in Ecuador, but it had no role in Chile. While elections went as normal in Argentina and Uruguay, in Bolivia, like in Venezuela, the allegations of fraud have been constant.

The solutions to each country’s challenges will have to be as different as their causes. While one country needs deeper economic adjustment, another needs to fix its political institutions. Each is going to have to find its way through the crises. Latin America will find little solace, moreover, in the fact that this high level of conflict is not exclusive to its region. From Hong Kong to Cataluña, or in Libya and Lebanon, similar challenges are disrupting national life.

  • Amid the many indications that representative or liberal democracy is under direct attack – that we may be facing the end of an era with potentially dire implications – some positive notes are visible in Latin America. In addition to the orderly contests in Argentina and Uruguay, the local and regional elections in Colombia in late October were an effective exercise in democracy – won by the center and lost by the extremes. Uribismo on the right and Gustavo Petro on the left were the big losers. The emerging symbol was Claudia López, the first woman elected mayor of Bogotá, who is also a lesbian, environmentalist, and leader against corruption. The path ahead is certainly not going to be easy for Latin America, but there is evidence that, with a big dose of tolerance and respect for each other’s reality, Latin Americans can do a lot better.

November 5, 2019

* Carlos Malamud is Senior Analyst for Latin America at the Elcano Royal Institute and Professor of Latin American History at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid. A version of this article originally was published as Turbulencias latinoamericanas in El Clarín of Buenos Aires.

 

Latin America: Drug Traffickers Vary Routes as Circumstances Warrant

By Carolina Sampó

U.S officers confiscating narcotics in the Eastern Pacific

Crews from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Waesche offload nearly 660 kilograms of narcotics, Feb. 2, 2015 / Coast Guard Compass / Creative Commons / https://coastguard.dodlive.mil/files/2015/07/1785654.jpg

Drug traffickers, who have proven agile at avoiding detection and interdiction in the past, are increasingly creative in moving their product to market through circuitous routes – even moving cocaine through Africa on its way to the United States. Since cocaine is produced only in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia but consumed in many other countries, the criminal organizations run robust, expansive distribution networks. Routes are not chosen by chance; the traffickers are rational actors who evaluate the risks and advantages depending on circumstances, just as they did by shifting the flow to Central America and Mexico in the early 2000s when counternarcotics operations made the Caribbean less hospitable. My review of the criminal organizations’ shifts indicates they see several basic factors as key to determining a low-risk route:

  • The weakness of the state used as a transit route is key. A state without control of its borders and without effective presence in significant parts of its territory is particularly vulnerable to domination by criminal organizations. Corruption and impunity in government and society in general are also major factors. The availability of logistics networks controlled by local criminal organizations guarantees the secure movement of drugs. To make the business sustainable in the long term, traffickers want groups to have cooperative relations, not competitive tensions, and solid control over operating areas. While some instability has proven helpful to traffickers’ expansion, too much undermines their confidence. Evidence suggests, for example, that the deepening crisis in Venezuela has persuaded some traffickers to choose Brazilian routes. 
  • The countries of the “Northern Triangle” of Central America – Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador – are vivid examples of how state weaknesses, corruption, and impunity open the door to Mexican and Colombian criminal organizations’ activities. Traffickers hire smaller criminal organizations – such as maras –to provide them the local support they need. In Venezuela, corruption has long been a factor, but the government’s inability to exercise sovereignty in border areas is increasingly a problem. The Colombian government does not exercise control over large parts of its national territory, and the breakdown of its peace agreement with the FARC suggests the situation will worsen. 

Some trafficking routes seem counterintuitive. Some of the cocaine reaching North America, for example, does not reach that market through Central America. My research indicates that it leaves South America through Brazil or Venezuela and goes to Western Africa, from which it is redirected to a final destination, sometimes entering the United States through Canada. 

  • The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported last year that only 39 percent of the cocaine reaching the United States in 2016 came through Mexico, compared to 70 percent in 2013. Even though it may seem absurd, especially considering the distances involved in shipping through Africa, criminal organizations reduce risks if they do not take the Central American route. They are apparently using this new route also to create a wider market – some of the drug may go to Russia, for example, or to Asia and even Oceania – as well as to satisfy demand on the African continent. 

Governments seeking to stop the drug trade have not shown as much agility as have the traffickers, who have proven over the years that they can adapt to eradication, surveillance, and interdiction – which remain central elements of governments’ strategies. Colombia’s production surge, despite multi-billion-dollar programs over the past 20 years, shows that much work remains on strengthening the state and reducing corruption and impunity there as well as in transit nations. Addressing drug use as a public health challenge holds promise but requires political commitment that most big consumer countries have so far lacked. Efforts to follow the money trail and freeze suspects’ accounts help but haven’t dealt a mortal blow. No single tactic will work, and no strategy will work as long as governments’ partners show the vulnerabilities that traffickers are so adept at exploiting.

September 27, 2019

*  Carolina Sampó is Coordinator of the Center for Studies on Transnational Organized Crime (CeCOT), International Relations Institute, La Plata National University, and a researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (Conicet) and Professor at the Buenos Aires University.

Brazil: How Long the Nightmare?

By Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira 

Current Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro shaking hands with former President Michel Temer

Jair Bolsonaro (right) meeting with former Brazilian President Michel Temer (left)/ Flickr/ Creative Commons/ https://www.flickr.com/photos/micheltemer/45044560194

The decline of Brazil’s democratic culture since 2013 has thrust the country into nightmarish times from which only its ample civil society, if mobilized, can rescue it. The media daily reveal evidence that many Brazilians now celebrate violence, irrationality, torture, racism, and the demeaning of education, science and culture. We are witnesses to a blend of authoritarianism and radical economic liberalism, explicit subordination to the United States, and abnormality and evil.

  • Many Brazilians long nostalgically for the 20 years behind us, when two parties – one left- and another right-of-center – alternated as incumbents. They were subject to hits and misses, achieved good and bad outcomes. Each side swore that its policies and results were the best, but they were democratic, and they knew the meaning and rules of politics. Until 2013, politics was not a bitter fight between enemies that hated each other, but a compassionate fight between mutually respectful adversaries.

The two adversaries were the Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and the Workers’ Party (PT) – one standing for liberal orthodoxy, the other for distributive orthodoxy. The former put its chips on the markets, the latter on industrial policy. The PT achieved greater growth because it increased public investment and benefitted from the commodities boom of the 2000s, but the two administrations fell into the macroeconomic trap of high interest rates and an appreciated exchange rate that prevented private-sector investment.

  • On the fiscal level, after the financial crisis of 1998, the two administrations posted satisfactory primary surpluses up until 2013. Crisis in 2014 changed all that. Commodities prices plunged; a fiscal crisis ended surpluses and caused a large primary deficit; manufacturing firms were unable to turn a profit because of an overvalued real that flooded the domestic market with imports and caused excessive corporate indebtedness.

The political crisis might have been resolved or partly addressed if the opposition had won in 2014. The reelection of President Dilma Rousseff deepened it instead as her new term began with no support whatsoever from the economic elites.

  • During his brief period as Minister of Finance, Nelson Barbosa attempted to counter the fiscal crisis with a sharp current-spending cut, while increasing investment. Instead, the country returned to an absurd procyclical policy that persists to this day and keeps unemployment at unacceptable levels.
  • These mistakes were the fruit of the deep political crisis that since 2013 put hatred at the heart of political life. Although classic liberalism is defined by tolerance and some level of relativism concerning truth in politics, a form of intolerant liberalism emerged among the liberals, and Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (president in 2003-2010) and the PT were turned into enemies, even if they were simply adversaries. The leaders of the Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigations took advantage of this hatred for self-promotion. Michel Temer, vice president under Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, took advantage of it to take over, using his “A Bridge to the Future” plan as an instrument. President Jair Bolsonaro, who took office on January 1 this year, harnessed the hatred to win last year’s elections, while relying on economist and investment banker Paulo Guedes as an assurance of a neoliberal economic policy.

For nine months, governmentlessness has resulted, with little or no prospect of a return to right-of-center liberalism or left-of-center developmentalism. Brazil does not appear headed back to the path of normalcy and a healthy alternation of moderate and democratic parties. Brazilians do not know where they are headed, but one thing for sure is that the rule of law and democracy are facing very severe risks. Only a far-right minority truly identifies with the incumbent administration’s policies. But Brazil’s civil society is already well organized, with a working class, a middle class, and a varied and qualitative business class. These are the assets that could help the country overcome the nightmare into which it has plunged. 

September 24, 2019

* Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira is emeritus professor of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, has served as government minister in several Brazilian administrations, and is author of numerous books and articles catalogued at www.bresserpereira.org.br.

 

EU-MERCOSUR: Does Their New Association Agreement Mean Much?

By Thomas Andrew O’Keefe*

29/06/2019 Coletiva de Imprensa UE-Mercosul

Press conference about the trade agreement between the Mercosur and the EU / Palácio do Planalto / Creative Commons

After nearly two decades of intermittent negotiations, the European Union and the four core MERCOSUR nations (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) have finally inked a trade agreement, but its real impact won’t be felt for years, if ever. When the negotiations began in the mid-1990s, the EU was the largest trading partner of the MERCOSUR countries, and the United States was number two. Today China is in first place, the European Union is second, and the U.S. is fourth, behind intra-Latin American trade (EU investors, however, continue to have the largest stock of foreign direct investment assets in the MERCOSUR region). When ratified, the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement, signed in Brussels on June 28, will exempt a little more than 90 percent of two-way trade from tariffs.

  • About 93 percent of MERCOSUR exports will eventually obtain duty-free access into the EU market, the bulk as soon as the agreement comes into effect. Agricultural commodities such as beef, chicken, corn, eggs, ethanol, honey, pork, rice, and sugar only get reduced duties, with many also subject to quotas. Another 100 MERCOSUR agricultural items are completely excluded from any type of preferential treatment.
  • Some 91 percent of European exports will get duty-free access to MERCOSUR, but gradually as tariffs are reduced over a 10-year period. The phase-out is over 15 years in the case of European automobiles, furniture, and shoes. MERCOSUR tariffs on the remaining 9 percent of primarily EU manufactured goods will remain in place permanently.
  • The agreement offers service providers from any signatory country full access to the markets of all the other signatory states.

MERCOSUR showed greater flexibility with the EU on agricultural subsidies than it had with the United States, a position that contributed to ultimate rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Subsidies in the EU-MERCOSUR agreement are permitted if “necessary to achieve a public policy objective.” The MERCOSUR countries also capitulated on the use of anti-dumping tariffs on intra-hemisphere trade. The new accord, however, does authorize governments to impose a duty that is less than the margin of dumping if it adequately removes injury to the affected domestic industry. It also includes provisions for ensuring that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as technical norms are not abused and become disguised impediments to free trade, although it permits enforcement of the European “precautionary principle” notion to restrict the importation of genetically modified food, for example, where the risks to health are not scientifically conclusive.

The agreement – now being “legally scrubbed” and translated into the EU’s 23 official languages – faces an elaborate, multi-year ratification process in the EU, where individual countries and the European Parliament must approve it, as well as each MERCOSUR government. Agricultural forces are already lining up in many European countries in opposition. In the meantime, the accord’s greatest impact is a signal by Brazilian President Bolsonaro and Argentine President Macri that they’re making progress on their stated objective to return MERCOSUR to its original trade focus – in contrast to their predecessors – and to claim an economic “victory” when growth in both countries remains stagnant.

  • Despite the flexibility MERCOSUR showed on agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping, its main sticking points with the United States in the FTAA, a free trade agreement with the United States seems remote as the Trump administration – in contrast to the Europeans – is unlikely to offer meaningful concessions based on the lesser developed status of the MERCOSUR countries. Neither will the Association Agreement with the EU reverse or even slow the region’s shift toward trade with China and the rest of Asia.

August 6, 2019

* Thomas Andrew O’Keefe is the President of New York City-based Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd. and a lecturer at Stanford University. He is the author of Bush II, Obama, and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Brazil: Corruption of Anti-Corruption

By Fábio Kerche*

Moro, Bolsonaro, and Paraná governor Ratinho Júnior seated during a visit to the Integrated Center of Intelligence and Public Security of the Southern Region in May 2019.

Moro, Bolsonaro, and Paraná governor Ratinho Júnior during a visit to the Integrated Center of Intelligence and Public Security of the Southern Region in May 2019/ Marcus Correa/ Wikimedia Commons

New revelations about the political objectives and operational decisions of Brazil’s Lava Jato anti-corruption investigators have dealt a blow to their credibility and to the legitimacy of President Jair Bolsonaro’s election. The “Car Wash” Operation began in 2014, with prosecutors and Judge Sérgio Moro leading what was seen as a crusade against corruption and in the process becoming heroes for significant portions of society. It started with an investigation into Petrobras, the biggest state-owned company, and spread across several sectors of the economy. Although the activities of several political parties came under scrutiny, the left-wing Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) suffered the most. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached and removed from office, and President Lula da Silva was arrested – opening the path for Bolsonaro, a far-right politician with an undistinguished political biography, to win the 2018 election.

  • Bolsonaro appointed Lava Jato judge Moro as his Minister of Justice – a move cited by some observers as evidence of the new President’s commitment to fight corruption. Others, however, were concerned that Moro’s acceptance of the job confirmed long-held suspicions, based on his own statements against Lula, that the lawsuit against the former president was a political farce to get him out of the race. Critics said the new job was Moro’s reward for putting Lula, who was leading in all polls during the campaign, behind bars. Some political analysts and journalists even speculated that Moro would run for President in 2022.

The Intercept, a news website co-founded by Pulitzer-winning U.S. journalist Glenn Greenwald, has published internal messages between Moro and Lava Jato prosecutors that confirm they had a political agenda. The communications confirm several violations of the law and ethics.

  • According to Brazilian law, prosecutors and judges cannot exchange information about cases outside of court, particularly in a secret way. Judges, according to the legislation, should listen to the prosecution and the defendant’s attorney in an equitable way. A judge exchanging messages by Telegram with a prosecutor about a lawsuit is illegal.
  • Moro took a firm hand in directing the prosecution team – another violation of LOMAN (Organic Law of the Judiciary). The Intercept has so far released only 1 percent of the conversations, but the information already shows that Moro criticized members of the team, gave others tips on how to proceed, asked for new police operations, recommended press strategies, steered investigators away from looking at possible wrongdoing by former President Cardoso, and undertook other initiatives. Lula’s defense did not have the same “opportunity”: the judicial balance weighed heavily on the prosecution side.

Moro has not been dismissed in the wake of these revelations, and the charges against Lula have not been cancelled – as would have happened in a less turbulent political environment. But there are clear signs that Moro has been losing support in Brazilian society. Even the news media who transformed him into a hero now criticize how he handled Lula’s case, and persons who supported Lula’s arrest now affirm that the former president should be released. The Brazilian Bar Association and some Judges Associations are openly criticizing Moro. Talk of Moro getting a seat in the Supreme Court or running for president in 2022 has evaporated.

Moro and his cohorts’ crusade against the alleged corruption of PT leaders whose politics or style they didn’t like amounts to use of the Judicial System to interfere in politics – if not criminalize what, in many ways, are normal political activities. The apparently illegal alliance between Moro and prosecutors seems to leave little doubt that Lula was convicted in an unfair trial based more on biased opinions rather than objective evidence. His supporters’ claim that he is a political prisoner increasingly makes sense. The Brazilian judicial system is supposed to give every citizen a fair and balanced trial. Although annulling Bolsonaro’s election seems impossible, the fact has been established that Moro was able to interfere in the electoral process by removing the leading candidate from the presidential race. The judicial fraud that marred the 2018 election has dealt yet another blow to Brazilian democracy.

June 28, 2019

* Fábio Kerche is a Researcher at Casa de Rui Barbosa Foundation and Professor at UNIRIO and IESP/UERJ in Rio de Janeiro. He was a CLALS Research Fellow in 2016-2017.

Brazil: Bolsonaro Targeting Political Participation

By Paulo Castro*

President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil looking pensive

Jair Bolsonaro / Fabio Rodrigues Pozzebom – Agência Brasil / https://flickr.com/photos/129729681@N06/35164638165/ Wikimedia Commons

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro – unwilling or unable to engage in the coalition-building necessary to pass legislation – has focused an important part of his first 100 days in office on social policies that he can dominate with executive power while reducing citizen participation in policy formation. Elected in one of the most polarized elections in Brazilian history, Bolsonaro ran a campaign focused on fighting corruption and implementing a market-oriented economic agenda that would lead to GDP growth, with pension reform as its main pillar. His first months have been far from a “honeymoon” with Congress; a wide array of problems add up to a legislative inertia as seldom seen in contemporary Brazil.

  • Lacking a strong base in the House and Senate – and facing dissidence even within his own Partido Social Liberal – Bolsonaro has relied on the risky strategy of ignoring the nature of the Brazilian political system, which includes building support for his agenda in Congress, and is focusing instead on attacking adversaries and what he calls the “ideological agenda” of the Workers Party (PT). Meanwhile, key ministries have yet to announce even general policy goals. The Ministry of Education, which has the second largest budget in the federal government and is responsible for one of the most deficient areas of the country, has been largely silent even though reform of the early education system was one of Bolsonaro’s main campaign promises. The President has issued executive measures, such as the bureaucracy reduction decree this week to help business owners and start-ups, but has introduced no relevant legislative agenda.

Shifting social issues is the one area in which the government is running at full throttle. Social accountability, gender equality, and broader human rights initiatives have experienced budget cuts. Because many PT-era policies were implemented by presidential decree or ministerial order, the Bolsonaro administration can cancel or alter them without Legislative Branch approval. (Many changes in the economic area require amending the Constitution, with a three-fifths majority of both houses of Congress.) Far from the prying eyes of the press and markets, small changes in the government processes threaten to increase the country’s democratic deficit.

  • An executive order signed by Bolsonaro abolished more than 600 civil society participation councils that promoted transparency and accountability by bringing civil society into policy discussions. Bolsonaro has eliminated the National Environment Council, the National Council of People with Disabilities, National Council for the Promotion of LGBT Rights, National Commission for the Eradication of Slave Labor, and National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor, among others. The Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights, headed by conservative religious leader Damares Alves, has announced it will limit the number of requests analyzed by its Amnesty Committee, created in 2002 to promote remedial actions for victims of the military dictatorship in Brazil.
  • On the environmental front, conflict between farmers and indigenous people has escalated since Bolsonaro limited the powers of the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI). Along with the National Forest Service, he transferred FUNAIS’s responsibility for the demarcation of new indigenous lands to the Ministry of Agriculture, which is headed by Congresswoman Tereza Cristina, a former leader in agribusiness.

Bolsonaro is trying to appear confident, but the consequences of his inaction on big-picture items such as pension reform – which will affect economic performance and public perceptions of his effectiveness – will reach a point at which his emphasis on social, cultural, and symbolic matters will not be sufficient to maintain his position. By deinstitutionalizing democratic participation on these important social issues, Bolsonaro is further reducing the country’s ability to take up tough issues, such as the priority reforms awaiting Executive and Legislative Branch attention. When it comes to education and health policies, civil society organizations and union representatives have important roles in mobilizing the interests of beneficiaries. While it is natural that opposing governments have opposing political views, Bolsonaro’s actions don’t only reflect policy shifts; they amount to a substantive reduction in accountability and government responsiveness, closing important doors that enable citizens to influence public policy and make political processes more inclusive.

May 3, 2019

* Paulo Castro is Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Brasilia and professor at the Brasilia Institute for Public Law. He has worked as an advisor and analyst in the Ministry of Justice and private sector organizations. He was a CLALS Research Fellow.

South America: Regional Integration or Presidential Posturing?

By Stefano Palestini Céspedes*

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South American Presidents waving to the cameras in Santiago, Chile / Flickr / Creative Commons

Seven South American presidents’ launch of brand-new regional grouping called PROSUR last week was intended to give a boost to their personal agendas rather than take a serious step toward regional integration. The announcement was made on March 22 at a summit organized by Chilean President Piñera and attended by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay. The declared goal of the summit was to overcome what Piñera called the “paralysis” of the decade-old UNASUR.  Its final declaration emphasized the need “more than ever to work together to update and strengthen the South American countries’ process of integration” in the face of current and future challenges, including “inserting ourselves in an efficient way into the fourth industrial revolution and society based on knowledge and information.”

  • The creation of the Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR), however, delivered very little in terms of regional integration. The Santiago Declaration does not tackle the obstacles that hampered UNASUR, such as its decision-making procedure based on consensus. On the contrary, the declaration envisions PROSUR as a forum exclusively based on presidential diplomacy, in which all decisions by definition must be taken by consensus.
  • The Presidents said the new organization will focus on infrastructure, energy, health, defense, and dealing with natural disasters – the same areas where UNASUR had shown some progress. The declaration did not mention any particular ongoing crisis, such as Venezuela, but it made clear that it would work for full respect for democracy, constitutional order, and human rights. Again, this is not a departure from UNASUR, which also had a democracy clause adopted and ratified by the national parliaments.

The summit promised political gains for several participants. For President Piñera, it was an opportunity to project himself as a regional leader able to convene and coordinate South American heads of states, at a time that his domestic popularity is decreasing. Ecuadorean President Moreno – the only central-left president attending the summit – had yet a new opportunity to signal his willingness to coexist with pro-market governments in the region. For Brazilian President Bolsonaro, a well-known skeptic of South American integration, the summit was a platform to show a more palatable image closer to his liberal peers.

President Piñera and his guests blamed UNASUR’s bureaucracy for its lack of effectiveness, opting instead for a lean mechanism based on presidential diplomacy. Most long-time observers believe, however, that UNASUR’s effectiveness was undermined by its very weak organizational capacity, with a powerless Secretary General and personnel made up of low-ranking national diplomats instead of qualified international civil servants. Presidential diplomacy, unburdened by a bureaucracy of specialists who analyze problems and possible solutions, works well when Presidents get along in ideological terms, but precedent shows it is vulnerable to collapse when governments have divergent preferences or when states must agree on complex transnational issues such as migration, drug-trafficking, or deep economic integration.

  • PROSUR will work exclusively as a forum (not as a regional organization) and its decisions and initiatives will have to be executed and monitored by the national bureaucracies of the member states, which by definition look after national interests rather than regional interests. The Santiago Summit has demonstrated that when it comes to regional integration, leftist and right-wing heads of government look and act alike. No matter which ideology they claim, South American presidents fear collective institutions, cherish presidential diplomacy, and prefer to create new initiatives with pompous names from scratch, rather than make necessary reforms to existing ones. As Uruguayan President Vázquez – who did not attend the summit – put it, South America has a long history of integration initiatives that have not brought about integration. The region would be better served by reinforcing and overhauling existing mechanisms such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, or the Pacific Alliance, and try to make them convergent in any possible way, rather than adding yet another acronym.

March 29, 2019

* Stefano Palestini Céspedes is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Catholic University of Chile.

Brazil: Will Officers’ Role in Government Taint the Military Institution?

By Christoph Harig*

President and Vice President of Brazil

Vice-President General Hamilton Mourão and President Jair Bolsonaro / Pedro França / Agência Senado / Flickr / Creative Commons

More military officers have joined Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s government than during most periods of the country’s last military regime (1964-1985), which raises the question how much the military – as an institution – will avoid compromising its supposed non-partisan nature.  The President, Vice-President, as well as eight government ministers, are retired or reserve military officers.  Bolsonaro furthermore nominated an active-duty army general as the government spokesperson.  In total, more than 100 reserve and active-duty military personnel serve in various ministries and subordinate government agencies.  Some officers have joined out of true allegiance, others, out of a sense of duty or because they want to prevent worse things from happening.  The government is drawing heavily on individual (mostly reserve) military officers, but the military as an institution is not running the government.  This is not a return to the military’s previous political interventionism: instead, a democratically elected government is (re)militarizing politics.

  • The military’s official discourse is keen on maintaining its image as a non-partisan state institution. However, officers are aware that this will be a challenge.  The presence of dozens of reserve officers in government agencies irrevocably connects the armed forces to the administration.  Although many officers do have reservations about Bolsonaro, others have proudly displayed their satisfaction with the victory of the former paratrooper.  Many citizens and international observers will thus perceive the government’s actions as being at least implicitly backed by the military.
  • For the armed forces, this involvement comes with opportunities as well as risks. On the one hand, there is a considerable increase in the military’s veto power.  They can expect privileged treatment and an effective representation of their interests.  The military might for instance be able to draw some red lines when it comes to being included in the government’s planned pension reform.  On the other hand, the prominent role in Bolsonaro’s administration attracts unwanted public scrutiny.  Discontent with an eventual preferential treatment of the armed forces in the pensions reform might grow louder than if the military had stayed below the radar.

So far, military officers’ involvement in government appears to have boosted the military’s standing.  The generals are widely being seen as a moderating force.  They have blocked some controversial foreign policy proposals of Bolsonaro and the radical wing of the government, such as the move of the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem or the establishment of a U.S. military base on Brazilian soil.  Some observers even suggest that the generals have established a tutelary role in foreign policy after the Minister of Foreign Affairs ended military cooperation with Venezuela without consulting the armed forces.

  • Particularly Vice-President General Mourão – once known for threatening military intervention in politics and even considered a liability during the election campaign due to several ill-considered statements – excels in his newly found role as “adult in the room.” As President Bolsonaro is stuck in polarizing campaign mode (for instance, he keeps on attacking Brazil’s press and recently lauded late Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner as great statesman), it is fairly easy for Mourão to present himself as pragmatic and reliable statesman.  In this role, he led Brazil’s delegation to the Lima Group meeting in Bogotá, where he clarified that Brazil would not support a military intervention in Venezuela.

In the long run, the impact of officers’ enhanced policymaking role on the military’s prestige will depend on whether they stay clear of blunders, failures, and scandals.  While the military officers in government might succeed in playing a moderating role for the time being, this development entails considerable risks.  Within and outside of the barracks, there already is a widespread perception of the military as savior that is supposed to rescue Brazil in times of extreme crisis.  This historically grown paternalistic role of high levels of political interventionism – in which allegedly competent armed forces save the nation from incompetent civilian politicians – will only become further entrenched.

March 6, 2019

*Christoph Harig is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Political Science at the Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg, Germany.

Venezuela: When Will the Military Flip?

By Fulton Armstrong

venezuelan military marching

A military exercise in Caracas, Venezuela. / Cancilleria del Ecuador / Flickr / Creative Commons

Venezuelan leader Juan Guaidó and his backers, including the Trump administration, are increasingly focused on swaying the country’s security forces to switch allegiance from Nicolás Maduro to the National Assembly President.  Guaidó has appealed to the military to support his efforts to “restore constitutional order” and is pushing through the legislature a law giving amnesty to cooperating officers for certain crimes committed since President Chávez took office in early 1999.  U.S. officials, apparently to shake up the armed forces, continue to say that “all options are on the table”; National Security Advisor John Bolton held a notepad at a press briefing referring to “5,000 troops to Colombia.”  Maduro, for his part, continues to orchestrate loyalty pledges from senior officers and preside over military exercises.

  • Several small units of the military have flipped, and Maduro’s military attaché in Washington – serving there for a number of years to get medical treatment – has declared loyalty to Guaidó. The vast majority of the officer corps, however, still maintain an appearance of commitment to Maduro.

The most common explanation for the military’s apparent loyalty cited by Maduro’s opponents is that the high command has been bought off by opportunities to engage in corruption.  Other factors, however, may better explain why the institution has stuck with him this long.

  • Ideological reasons? Most available information suggests that Madurismo – with its gross, incompetent mismanagement of the economy, corruption, and thuggery – is not attractive to the officer corps.  But they appear to know that Chavismo has deep roots; that the elites, including the more hardline opposition, don’t understand the significance of change since 1999; and that efforts to return to the pre-Chávez era would be destabilizing and bloody.
  • Financial reasons? Although historically and perennially corrupt, senior officers arguably have been able to do more corruption under Maduro than under another regime.  That said, in their heart of hearts, they probably know a lot of their activities will continue under any government.
  • Distrust of the opposition? The military traditionally has communicated better with opposition moderates, such as Henrique Capriles, and in recent years has shown no trust in the faction that Guaidó comes from and its leader, Leopoldo López.  Information is very limited, of course, but many officers may believe that this group’s obsession with overthrowing Maduro and its no-negotiation stance has contributed to the crisis.  Senior officers’ confidence in Maduro’s ability to hold the country together seems to have evaporated, but the opposition have not presented a viable, comprehensive alternative.
  • Concern about the López-Guaidó faction’s ties with Colombia and the U.S.? Good information is elusive, but senior officers’ posture suggests that they see Bogotá’s strategic objective to keep Venezuela weak and Washington’s objective to purge the country of Chavismo and themselves.
  • Concern that the “international community” will not give them a fair deal? Distrust of Washington seems obvious, but – within their logic – senior officers almost certainly are suspicious of OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, the Lima Group, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and others as intolerant and biased.
  • Belief that, in the face of total chaos and widespread bloodshed, they can force a last-minute peaceful solution onto Maduro? Senior officers presumably have good enough intelligence to know when and how to intervene – and persuade Maduro to accept a peaceful solution and fly into exile.  The bigger problem at this point is that they do not see a viable alternative to sticking it out.
  • Fear that Maduro’s people have deeply penetrated officer ranks, and their lives will be at stake if they move against him? As the scope of the crisis grows and the credibility of Maduro’s power begins to slip, this would appear now to be less important.  Officers talk among themselves more than outsiders think.

The Venezuelan military’s threshold for intervening against civilian governments of any stripe has always been high, amplified by the embarrassment of the reversed coup against Chávez in 2002.  None of the factors that, on balance, still appear to favor sticking with Maduro is unmovable.  Distrust of the United States, OAS, and the Lima Group – the outside forces that legitimized Guaidó’s claim to power – leave the military with no reliable allies; Cuban, Russian, and Chinese friends can provide no solace.  A credible negotiation proposal from someone like Mexican and Uruguayan Presidents López Obrador and Vázquez, especially if backed by Pope Francis, could conceivably give them a credible direction in which to push Maduro.  But at this moment – subject to rapid change – the balance still argues in favor of the military fearing a new course.