Failure of Anti-Immigrant U.S. Political Campaigns 2018-2023

by Reilly Phelan, Ernesto Castañeda & Joseph Fournier*

Overview of dataset from 2018, 2020, 2022 election cycles for competitive races / Creative Commons License

Contrary to the common assumption, anti-immigrant rhetoric does not ensure electoral success. In an upcoming report from the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, we prove the moral and electoral failure of using anti-immigrant sentiment in campaign platforms. Our data demonstrates the falsity of the notion that being weak on immigration control is an electoral vulnerability.

In an extensive analysis of campaign material and election outcomes from the 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2023 gubernatorial and congressional elections, we found various candidates who employed anti-immigrant rhetoric and lost their elections. We defined anti-immigrant rhetoric as overarching narratives of border securitization and the criminalization of immigrants.

· In the 2018 election cycle, twenty candidates in competitive elections employed anti-immigrant rhetoric—and lost.

· In the 2020 election cycle, the utilization of such rhetoric relaxed broadly, and Republican candidates benefitted. Ten candidates fit our criterion. 

· In the 2022 election cycle, twelve candidates lost in competitive elections after employing anti-immigrant rhetoric throughout their campaign. 

· In the 2023 special elections, the degree to which immigration was mentioned declined. The defeat of Daniel Cameron (R) by incumbent Andy Beshear (D) in the Kentucky gubernatorial race met the criterion of our prior analyses.

While anti-immigrant sentiment is not exclusive to the Republican party, we found that the presence of such rhetoric in campaigns was overwhelmingly among Republican candidates. For the 2020 election cycle, we conducted an analysis of elections where seats flipped from Democrat-held to Republican-held. Ultimately, nearly half of the Democrat-to-Republican flipped seat candidates did not utilize anti-immigrant sentiment in the campaign material of their successful campaigns. 

In assessing the 2018 and 2020 election cycles, anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric relaxed during the 2020 cycle compared to the 2018 cycle (not to say anything about 2016). Kris Kobach’s losing 2018 Kansas Gubernatorial campaign exemplifies the failures of a campaign largely platformed on anti-immigrant sentiment. Kobach’s campaign hinged upon his pointed immigration rhetoric and ultimately failed to bring Kobach election victory. “Anti-immigration hard-liner[s]” like Kris Kobach largely declined in competitive 2020 elections. That is not to say that anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric disappeared; rather, fewer candidates premised their campaigns fully upon such narratives.

Candidates who ran in 2018 with anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric and chose to run again in 2020 had an observable decrease in the use of anti-immigrant sentiment in the candidate’s campaign platforms. For candidates like Matt Rosendale, Claudia Tenney, and Young Kim, this shift in campaign rhetoric led them to success in their rematch attempts during the 2020 election cycle. 

Coupled with our analysis of election outcomes of anti-immigrant candidates, we provide below an assessment of narrative trends: 

Several candidates mainly used anti-immigrant rhetoric to signal support for and connection to former President Trump. Strong stances against immigration, particularly during the 2018 and 2020 election cycles, became a means to show supposed shared values and allegiance with Trump. By applying “Build the Wall” narratives and framing border security as imperative, candidates premised their campaigns on Trumpist values more broadly. For example, in Greg Gianforte’s winning bid for the Montana Governorship in 2020, Gianforte promised to “stand with President Trump to crack down on illegal immigration.” Interestingly, Donald Trump’s 2020 presidential campaign aligns with our findings— his extensive use of anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric during his 2020 bid for reelection was not enough to lead him to electoral success. 

In 2022, however, references to the border wall largely de-emphasized the securitization project’s explicit link to Trump. While calls to “finish the wall” were present in multiple candidates’ campaign platforms, candidates offered a similar amount of attention to the re-establishment of anti-immigrant policies, including the “Remain in Mexico” program. Arizona Gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake regarded the policy as “the best [immigration] policy I’ve seen.” 

Through further assessment of the rhetoric employed by candidates within our 2022 and 2023 set, we see candidates shift their anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric away from targeting migrants themselves and instead targeting Democratic leadership, whom they label as in support of so-called “open borders.” Candidates such as Kari Lake take this concept a step further, arguing that Democrat leadership has a vested interest in the continuation of undocumented immigration as a means of “solidifying a permanent political majority.” These claims on the campaign trail are dangerous and alarmingly similar to the racist theory of “the Great Replacement”— propagating the idea that elites are purposefully encouraging migration to render America more diverse.

The 2022 elections also demonstrated a rise in claims that immigration is no longer confined to states along the U.S.–Mexico border. As efforts spearheaded by Texas Governor Greg Abbott bring “busloads” of immigrants to cities farther north of the border, the framing of immigration as an issue of concern has shifted both on the campaign trail and beyond. For example, a candidate for Pennsylvania Senate Mehmet Oz stated, “Now every state has become a border state.” With the U.S. increasingly externalizing its border by instituting border outposts, historical conceptions of borders and their significance are shifting across the U.S. Thus, the way immigration is discussed during elections is shifting.

As the U.S. gears up for the 2024 election cycle, the moral and electoral failure of anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric must be taken into account. Plain and simple, anti-immigrant rhetoric does not create electoral victories. In assessing both election outcomes and narrative trends, we see how a more humane, measured, and pragmatic view of immigrants can indeed be the morally and politically right thing to do. 

* Reilly Phelan is a research assistant at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. She has previously worked with the International Rescue Committee and Arizona Legal Women and Youth Services. She will be graduating May 2024 with a degree in International Relations. 

*Ernesto Castañeda is Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University. 

*Joseph Fournier is a research assistant at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.

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Immigration as the Current Main Driver of Economic Growth in the U.S.

By Ernesto Castañeda, Edgar Aguilar, and Natalie Turkington

March 12, 2024

A new report from CLALS and the Immigration Lab finds that recent immigrants are a key driver of economic growth in the United States.

The report presents an original calculation that finds that only in 2022:

  • Immigrants who sent money home contributed over $2.2 trillion dollars to the U.S. economy.
  • This contribution by migrant labor constitutes about 8% of the U.S. GDP.
  • Remittances represent just 4% of the total output generated by immigrants, even if they add up to $81.6 billion annually, disputing the narrative that immigrants drain the U.S. economy.


Immigrants who remit contribute around $2.2 trillion annually to the U.S. economy. Despite concerns that remittances drain U.S. dollars, they only represent 4% of immigrants’ total contributions. This estimate is based on credible sources indicating that 17.5% of immigrants’ income is sent as remittances and considering a combined yearly salary of approximately $466.5 billion.  Using data from the World Bank, the Association for Central Banks of Latin America, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, however, this is just a good approximation to quantify some of the benefits of migration. Immigrants’ contributions to the economy are greater as not all send remittances through formal channels. Additionally, it overlooks the economic growth immigrants stimulate by spending their wages in the U.S., creating demand, and generating jobs. Not to say anything about the human, cultural, culinary, and creative contributions. Below are more details about this novel estimation and projections of future contributions by immigrants to the U.S. economy.

The Congressional Budget Office’s Demographic Outlook 2024-2054, which has gotten some deserved media attention, estimates that in 2034 the U.S. economic output will be $7 trillion larger due to new immigration. Tax revenues would also be higher and the deficit lower because of immigration all else equal.

The quote from the CBO Director’s press release is, “in our projections, the deficit is also smaller than it was last year because economic output is greater, partly as a result of more people working. The labor force in 2033 is larger by 5.2 million people, mostly because of higher net immigration. As a result of those changes in the labor force, we estimate that, from 2023 to 2034, GDP will be greater by about $7 trillion and revenues will be greater by about $1 trillion than they would have been otherwise.”

We estimate immigrants’ contribution to the U.S. economy between 2023 and 2034 will be greater. Using the same immigration estimates as the Congressional Budget Office’s (see graph below), we calculate new immigrants have the potential to elevate the U.S. economic output by a staggering $17 trillion just in 2034.

Net population growth is through immigration.

Source: Congressional Budget Office interactive graph here.

However, if the number of new immigrants and asylum seekers continues at the same pace as in estimated for 2024, 3.3 million per year (10,000 per day as happened in December of 2023), we calculate that the U.S. would enjoy an increased economic output of over $37 trillion just in 2034.

As the Economic Policy Institute writes, “The unemployment rate for U.S.-born workers averaged 3.6% in 2023, the lowest rate on record. Obviously, immigration is not causing high unemployment among U.S.-born workers.” They further write, “immigrants that make up 18.6% of the U.S. labor force are playing key roles in numerous industries and are employed in a mix of lower, middle, and higher-wage jobs. And as the Congressional Budget Office recently reported, immigration is contributing to strong economic growth—with future immigration forecasted to boost real gross domestic product by 2% over the next 10 years—as well as increasing government revenue. Immigrants are also complementing U.S.-born workers by contributing to overall population and workforce growth. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that if the U.S. were to have lower-than-expected immigration levels, the population would begin to decline in 20 years, and if there were suddenly zero immigration, the population would begin to decline next year, deeply harming economic growth.”

A Washington Post article states that around 50% of the growth in the labor market in 2023 was due to foreign-born workers. The same was the case in the 1990s.

In 2021, 45 million immigrants lived in the United States, accounting for 14% of the country’s population. Immigrants are integrated into American social, economic, cultural, and political life. The Immigrant Research Initiative calculates that “Immigrants account for 17 percent of the U.S. economic output (GDP), even higher than their share of the population. The United States has a $19.6 trillion economy according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis 2021 statistics, which means immigrants are conservatively responsible for $3.3 trillion of economic output.” This supports our calculation of around 2.2 trillion only from immigrants who send money abroad because many do not send remittances.

Estimates and projections vary, but what is clear is that there would be no economic growth without recent immigrant arrivals. If immigration (of all types) decreases in the following years, economic growth will most likely plummet, and inflation will rise. Furthermore, this does not only apply to the United States but to other countries as well.

You can find coverage of the report in Spanish here:

“Immigracion y Economia en EE.UU.” RTVE 24h.

“Los hispanos y el mercado laboral en EE. UU.” Y Esto No es Todo podcast on YouTube.

“Ernesto Castañeda y el mercado laboral en EE.UU.” RTVE audio.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.

Edgar Aguilar and Natalie Turkington are research assistants at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies.

Full report here.

Invisible Deaths

The U.S. and Mexico’s Federal Strategic Plans against Migration and their Relation to Invisible Deaths

by Sofia Guerra*

March 8, 2024

A monument at the Tijuana-San Diego border for those who have died attempting to cross. Each coffin represents a year and the number of dead.
A monument at the Tijuana-San Diego border for those who have died attempting to cross. Each coffin represents a year and the number of dead. (Photo credit: © Tomas Castelazo, www.tomascastelazo.com / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The U.S. and Mexico have strategies to control migration that dehumanize migrants and sometimes lead to their deaths becoming invisible. The U.S. border infrastructure forces migrants to be exposed to extreme natural environments causing deaths while crossing. Some paths to the U.S. are controlled by criminal organizations making them experience violence. The lack of transparency, visibility, and care create invisible deaths.

The U.S./Mexico border has become a dangerous path for immigrants when crossing, creating thousands of deaths. An invisible death is when people die while migrating, later to be found without any form of identification and no information about who the person is and why they passed away.  Jason De Leon conducted a deep dive into invisible deaths within the U.S./Mexico border. He argues that the existing border infrastructure is the result of a federal strategic plan to deter migration that facilitates death but hides its strategy by redirecting blame to migrants.

The U.S. federal strategy pushes migrants into physically demanding natural environments like deserts, rivers, and extreme temperatures. This endangers the migrant’s lives and risks the possibility of death while crossing. USA’s federal strategy also involves developing infrastructure such as walls, militarization, ground sensors, checkpoints, and other measures to impede migrants’ passing.  These strategies cause migrants to face isolation and physiological strain,  making the migration process more challenging and leading to higher mortality rates.

Like the U.S., Mexico has an infrastructure of checkpoints and militarized immigration stations, but with increased anti-immigrant policies criminal organizations further interfere in the movement of people across “their” territories. Corruption has allowed the growth of criminal activities, affecting the safety of migrants passing through. Thus, Mexico has also developed a quiet strategic federal plan against migrants that consists of extreme violence. Mexican trials to get to the US have become a site of intense violence, exploitation, and profit-making among gang members. They encounter abuse, rape, kidnapping, dismemberment, and death. Their migrant journey is used to make a profit and form part of the strategic corruption in the criminal world. This makes the Mexican drug war members control some of the routes that immigrants take within Mexico, making migrant smuggling blend into criminal activity. Migrants’ lives are at risk when encountering the criminal world while crossing; those who die due to criminal activities are likely to have an invisible death. This is due to the lack of transparency that organized crime has with its victims. 

Although the USA and Mexico have different federal strategic plans to dissuade land migration, it becomes evident that their strategies do not favor life but instead create a systematic weapon against migrants. In the USA, migration is seen as a dangerous crisis, while in Mexico, migration is seen as an opportunity for profit. Migrants are dehumanized, and therefore, their lives are not protected, increasing the invisibility of their death.

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* Sofia Guerra is a sociology graduate student at American University. She is a research assistant at the Immigration Lab and Center of Latin American Studies at AU. She has conducted research on migration, gender studies, and the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States. She also has an interest in policy-making and expanding her research expertise. 

From Coup Attempt to Inauguration: Guatemala’s Tumultuous Elections

by Edgar Aguilar*

February 21, 2024

“Dia nacional de la bandera de Guatemala.” Gobierno de Guatemala. Gobierno de Guatemala. CC. / Creative Commons License

Edie Cux, director of Acción Ciudadana, local chapter of Transparency International, spoke with CLALS’ researcher Edgar Aguilar about Guatemala’s recent presidential elections. Read a synthesis of the interview below.  

What were the defining issues in Guatemala’s recent elections? 

The main problem in the social imaginary here in Guatemala was the issue of the fight against corruption. This was key after years of exposed corruption in the government by Alejandro Giammattei. The other issue was security. 

How do presidential elections work in Guatemala? 

In Guatemala, there are two electoral rounds. The first round is in June and the second is in August. In the first round, there were 24 candidates. Many of the candidates had previously run for election. In the second round, there were 2 candidates, Sandra Torres and Bernardo Arévalo. 

Why was Mr. Arévalo making it to the final round a surprise?  

Sandra Torres, a perennial politician, was expected to make it to the second round. The surprise was Bernardo Arévalo. During the first round, Arévalo was initially in ninth place but then emerged as a surprise contender.  

How much support did Mr. Arévalo receive in the second round? 

In the second round, Bernardo Arévalo received 58% of the vote while Torres received 42%. That shows that people were really hoping for a change in the country. Arévalo was a new face and a left-wing or progressive candidate. Alternatively, Torres was a former first lady and had previously run for president twice.  

How did the uncertainty surrounding the inauguration of Mr. Arévalo begin? 

It started immediately after the first round when it was known that both Bernardo Arévalo and Sandra Torres were the favorites. From there, the attacks began against Arévalo’s Semilla party and the electoral authorities. Even the Prosecutor’s Office went after the people who participated in the polling stations and municipal, electoral, and departmental boards. This began a strategy of questioning the electoral results: going through a second review of the counts.  

Who started the questioning of the results?  

The Attorney General’s office initiated legal challenges that cast doubt on the election results. Judges joined in, further amplifying the uncertainty. Other groups used social media accounts, like X and TikTok, to spread narratives questioning the outcome. These unsuccessful efforts were part of a broader attempt by identified “coup plotters,” including influential groups such as congressmen. The goal here was to prevent Bernardo Arévalo from assuming power.  

The instrumentalization of both legal and social media channels was key to their strategy. They questioned Arévalo 

 but especially focused on the election results: the transmission of data and the electoral authority. At this point, the authorities of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal were practically in exile. They were stripped of the immunity that the law gives them.  

Were there actual irregularities in the process? 

These were the most observed elections in Guatemala, maybe ever. Actors like the European Union (EU) (with over 100 observers) and civil society organizations had mechanisms (like Mirador Electoral) to watch every step of the elections. After the elections, an Organization of American States (OAS) report confirmed clean results, corroborated by other countries and civil society.  

No international or national observer questioned the elections, except the Attorney General’s office. They illegally dug into things, opened bogus cases, demanded information from the electoral tribunal, and even took ballot boxes! Basically, they stole them, which I believe is illegal. This narrative only came from them. The OAS, with 29 votes, all countries, basically said the Attorney General was trying to mess with the results and backed the results.  

Why was there uncertainty until the day of the inauguration?  

Groups within Congress continued their efforts to obstruct Arévalo’s election until the inauguration day, delaying the swearing-in process by nine hours. 

Can you tell me what the day of the inauguration was like? 

Bernardo’s inauguration victory belongs to the people, especially the indigenous communities. Their 20-day strike, continued resistance, and unwavering presence on inauguration day, with mothers and children even sleeping in the Plaza de la Constitución, were crucial. Their sacrifice overflowed the central park, keeping spirits high even amidst delays. International observers, delegations from the OAS, Spain, the U.S., and key figures like Petro solidified the legitimacy of the process, forcing the “coup groups” to stand down. The transfer of power, thanks to the people’s energy, marked a dramatic shift in Guatemala’s political climate. 

What do Guatemalans expect now that President Arévalo has been inaugurated? 

At this moment, the panorama is changing a lot; there is already an expectation of how the new government is going to develop. There is a lot of hope, and everyone is waiting. Different civil society and especially indigenous peoples, we are all waiting to see what the new government is going to be like.  

What are the key takeaways from this turbulent process? 

Guatemala’s democratic institutions have been under attack since their beginning. The institutions have never been trusted. Indigenous people maintain alternative governance, economy, and justice structures. The state of Guatemala has not enjoyed the legitimacy that has been achieved in other states. Neither has it created the representativeness of a plurinational population. What happened in Guatemala is an example, globally, of what indigenous people have done to protect a democracy that does not even represent them.  

Currently, there are several democratic crises globally. Additionally, there are many examples of the instrumentalization of public institutions, especially the justice system, to attack democracy. Guatemala has brought to light how indigenous peoples propose sustainability not only environmentally but also for democracy and politics.  

Edition: Ernesto Castañeda 

Interview and writing: Edgar Aguilar 

Transcription and translation: Aleli Nava 

Copyright Creative Commons. Reproduction with full attribution is possible by news media and for not-for-profit and educational purposes. Minor modifications, such as not including the “About the Study” section, are permitted. 

Edgar Aguilar is an International Economics Master’s student at American University and a research assistant at the Center for Latin America and Latino Studies (CLALS). With four years of experience as a researcher and analyst, he specializes in migration, human security, energy, finance, and environmental policy. He is passionate about sustainable energy solutions that unlock prosperity in the Western Hemisphere.

X- @EdgarAAguilar

Where Is Cuba’s Economic Policy Going?

by Ricardo Torres*

A photo of Havana, Cuba taken in December 2023 / Ernesto Castañeda / Creative Commons License

In the concluding sessions of the National Assembly in December, the Cuban Prime Minister alluded to new economic policy initiatives aimed at “correcting distortions and boosting the economy.” Subsequently, he emphasized that these reforms should not be perceived as mere continuation of previous policies. His discourse encompassed several areas, including pricing and subsidies, the role of the private sector and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), international trade and tariff regulations, investment, and the foreign exchange market, among others. In the first weeks of January, various representatives from the government elaborated on the price increases of essential goods, which has become a focal point of discussions due to the immediate impacts on people’s daily lives. This new wave of measures is being introduced against a unique context:

  • The Cuban economy’s inability to embark on a path to sustainable recovery after the economic downturn triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic is noteworthy. The year 2023 witnessed a contraction in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), marking this period as the most severe crisis encountered by Cuba since the revolution in 1959, given its widespread economic, social, and political implications.
  • The ineffectiveness of previously implemented economic policies, including the so-called “Monetary Ordering,” is evident. The Cuban authorities persistently attribute these economic adversities to external factors, notably the sanctions imposed by the United States. There is little mention of the government’s obvious mistakes.  
  • The Biden administration’s limited opening towards Cuba has narrowed the window to implement substantial measures to mitigate the island’s economic challenges. 
  • The Cuban government has continued to search for support elsewhere. For example, Russia and China have provided some economic support, and Mexico has provided cheap oil, oxygen after the pandemic, and some food. But not one country can provide all the support that Cuba needs.

The measures announced thus far appear to have limited potential in contributing to the economic recovery. The fiscal strategy focuses more on revenue collection rather than containing expenditures, as indicated by the incomplete budget data for 2024 when the deficit is set to increase. 

  • Notably, the emphasis remains on preserving the extensive public sector, including state-owned enterprises, without introducing substantial structural reforms.
  • The marginalization, or at most, a cursory mention of other structural reforms aimed at stimulating domestic supply, is significant. The criticism of the private sector and the lack of initiatives to address external debt are particularly conspicuous. 
  • The potential impact of the price increase and these newly announced measures on the fiscal deficit remains ambiguous, especially given the scant details regarding their implications for the 2024 budget. Besides, these measures will likely exacerbate inflationary pressures in the short term.

In a rather dramatic turn, Cuban authorities announced the suspension of the price increases on January 31st, citing a cyberattack, and failed to commit to a new date. Furthermore, the government reshuffled the cabinet, including the sacking of the Economy Minister. 

The challenges of runaway inflation and elevated fiscal deficits should be viewed as symptoms rather than the root cause of the economic malaise. Historical evidence from the 1970s and 1980s has demonstrated that attempts to manipulate aggregate demand to counter stagflation are futile. Cuba’s economic stagnation, however, presents a unique case, having persisted for decades and intensified due to a series of adverse external shocks commencing around 2016 with the decline of Venezuela’s economy. Superficial adjustments to economic policies are unlikely to yield significant medium-term benefits. Instead, a concerted effort towards systemic change by both the government and international stakeholders is imperative. The existence of the political will and strategic insight, both within Cuba and internationally, to enact such comprehensive reforms to the ultimate benefit of the embattled Cuban people remains an open question.

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Ricardo Torres is a Professor and Faculty Fellow in the Department of Economics, Research Fellow at American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, and Coordinator of the Red de Investigadores Cubanos (RedIC).

Ecuador: The Formation of Gangs in Prison Systems

By Erica Criollo

January 17, 2024

Solidarity rally in Queens, New York by members of the Ecuadorian diaspora. Photo by Erica Criollo 

On January 7th, 2024, José Adolfo Macías Villamar, alias“Fito,” the leader of one of Ecuador’s most prominent gangs, was found missing from his luxury prison cell the day he was meant to be transferred to a maximum-security prison to be held in isolation.

While Macías began his 34-year sentence in 2011, he remained the leader of the criminal gang, Los Choneros, due to their longstanding influence over government officials and extensive illicit drug networks. Following his escape, the country descended into chaos resulting in President Daniel Noboa declaring that the country was under “armed internal conflict” to mitigate gang wars and the killings of police officers.

This presidential declaration has prompted questions as to how Ecuador could have experienced such a sudden upsurge in gang violence. Along with government corruption, the escalation can be traced to the gradual formation of gangs dominating prison systems over several years. 

 In 2003, Los Choneros, who are associated with Mexican and Colombian cartels, took control of the drug trafficking route in the province of Manabí, Ecuador, from where drug shipments were sent to Mexico, the United States, and several European countries. Transnational networks and external groups engaged in the illicit drug trade utilized Ecuador’s coasts, leveraging its access to major shipping routes and ports to transport illicit drugs across international borders. 

Furthermore, Ecuador’s adoption of the U.S. dollar, coupled with inadequate enforcement and prevalent corruption, has facilitated money laundering by drug traffickers through industries such as real estate, illegal mining, and the illicit timber trade. This impacted the way corruption played a role in the country’s efforts to combat such illicit activities. 

When Former President Rafael Correa took office in 2007, he gained public favor through his initiative to remove the United States from the Manta military base from which the U.S. has been controlling anti-drug efforts with targets against the Colombian illicit drug trade since 1999.

However, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Manta military base, the country witnessed a worsening of drug trafficking. Former President Correa failed to stop the activities of groups like Los Choneros and other Mexican cartels, allowing the unhindered transportation of drugs to and from Ecuador.

Before Macías, Los Choneros was led by Jorge Luis Zambrano, alias “Rasquiña,” who, while incarcerated, directed orders alongside arrested gang members. By 2010, the group had transitioned to operating within prison systems and communicating with members on the outside. This operational shift steered the group away from international drug trafficking, focusing instead on micro-trafficking, contract killings, extortion, and contraband activities.

Emerging factional gangs, including Los Choneros, Gorras, Lagartos, Latin Kings, and the Cubanos, have become more extensive and aggressive, leading to deadly conflicts in prisons. In 2019, a brutal fight claimed the lives of several inmate gang members at Penitenciaria del Litoral, and in 2021, a prison riot resulted in the deaths of 119 inmates in the same facility. These deviations of gangs were also a result of government initiative in dismantling gang groups through the transfer of leaders between prisons, but it only multiplied the presence of gang wars.

Following Zambrano’s death in 2020, Macías obtained leadership, triggering an uproar of chaos and gang violence across the country as gang leaders fought to dominate. Despite being in prison, Macías remained in control. For him, communication with members was not an obstacle, as several reports indicate Macías’ prison cell had plugs to charge his cell phone and an internet router. Macías was also open to sharing his lavish living space on social media, regularly throwing parties, and having access to weapons, appliances, liquor, jewelry, and ceramics.

Ecuador has experienced a long trajectory of government corruption which has led to an escalation in gang formation and violence in prison systems. With Macías’ most recent escape, the country has been submitted to crazed gang members responsible for several car bombings, kidnappings, and slayings of prison guards and innocent civilians. In response to President Daniel Noboa’s crackdown on gang members in prisons, gang leaders on the outside have resorted to hostage-taking, capturing military and prison guards. These captives are coerced into recording messages, pleading with President Noboa to halt military operations in prisons and cease the killing of gang members. The objective behind these threats is to secure the gangs’ dominance within prisons and ensure the unrestricted proliferation of gang members. 

In one such video shared on Facebook, a gang member asserts, “Just as you safeguard the right to life of Ecuadorian citizens, we too have the right to live…we are not afraid of your tactics.” In essence, Ecuador is confronted with a formidable coalition of gangs wielding enough power to subvert the law and pursue their objectives, fueled by their substantial numbers and collective readiness to act in unison to carry out attacks. 

Currently, President Noboa’s plan to overpower gang violence is to enforce stricter regulations in prisons. However, this raises concerns for Ecuadorian citizens alarmed by several online videos featuring hostages pleading with the government for compliance to spare their lives. As events unfold, President Noboa’s actions will require careful consideration to ensure that no more civilian lives are endangered and to respect the human rights of all people. 

*Erica Criollo is a Graduate Research Assistant of the Immigration Lab at American University. 

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Blinken and Mayorkas visited Mexico to Discuss Migration

By Ernesto Castañeda

January 11, 2024

Republicans in Congress are denying funding to Ukraine and Israel over migration and border security, but the premises and assumptions used to discuss the issue fail to take the following elements into account.

It is hard to determine if numbers are really without precedent. There has been a change in that immigrants come and turn themselves in to try to come in with a legal immigration status, such as through asylum or the regularization programs available to Ukrainians, Afghans, Cubans, Haitians, Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, and other groups. In previous decades, many low-skilled workers knew there were no avenues to enter legally and would try to pass undetected and live undocumented in the United States. That is less common today for so-called low-skilled, recently arrived immigrants. So, an imaginary example would be to count people who once would mainly drive to New York City for the holidays and then compare them to a time when most people would arrive via plane. It would be easier to count the people arriving on planes, but that would not necessarily mean that there are more people arriving now by plane than the ones who arrived driving in the past. 

Historically, numbers are not comparable because, before Title 42, apprehensions were counted versus encounters afterward. Previously, most apprehensions would happen inside the U.S., while today, most people present themselves in groups and in a visible manner at ports of entry, along the physical border, or in front of the border wall. Another important difference is that in the past, undocumented workers relied on established family members and networks to get provisional housing and food and find a job. Many recent arrivals may not have close people in the United States and are actively asking for temporary housing and food from city governments. The U.S. does this for refugees and has done it in the past for Cubans and others escaping repressive regimes. Research and history show that these short-term expenses have been good investments, given that refugees and immigrants are more likely than U.S.-born individuals to work, start businesses, and be innovative leaders. Republicans in Congress have denied requests from the White House to provide funding to cities to cover some of these costs.

Some propose detention as deterrence, but prolonged detention in the United States is very expensive and mainly benefits the companies or workers providing and managing detention centers.

A misconception repeated in the media is that most people are immigrating illegally. That is technically incorrect because people are presenting themselves to immigration authorities. Many migrants are applying to legal programs, asking for asylum, or being placed in deportation proceedings.

The situation that we are seeing at the border and some of the solutions proposed indicate some important points that have been rarely discussed,

1) Border walls do not work. Smugglers can cut them, and people can walk around them or come in front of them on U.S. territory. 

2) People are turning themselves in, so contrary to what Trump said recently, authorities know where people are from and where they are going. They have notices to appear in immigration court, and they register an address in order to receive notices and updates if they want to continue with their asylum process and regularize their status. In the past, a great majority of people go to their migration court hearings.

3) CBP One appointments are too cumbersome to make, and there are not enough slots available, so people are showing themselves at ports of entry and between them.

4) The parole program for Haitians, Cubans, Venezuelans, and Nicaraguans is working to create a more rational and orderly process. Taking the program away —as Republicans in the Senate want—would make things worse. 

5) Putting more pressure on Mexico to deport more people and stop them from getting to the border is unsustainable. Mexico cannot manage the issue by itself unless it gets pressure and funding from the U.S. and international organizations, like Colombia does, to establish immigrant integration programs for immigrants who want to stay in Mexico, and it provides paths to citizenship for them. 

Thus, Blinken, Mayorkas, and their companions and team’s visit to Mexico is important. Mexico has been a willing partner, agreeing to take people from third countries under the Remain in Mexico and Title 42 programs, but those programs could only work temporarily. Mexico has also increased the number of deportations. However, deportation only works if people are unwilling to try multiple times. Increasing immigration surveillance, deterrence, and deportation does make arriving in the U.S. harder. It also makes it more expensive and thus attractive for organized crime to get involved in it as a business, thus getting more people to the border once they figure out the business model and logistics even with new policies in place. 

Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has asked for a regularization of U.S. relations with Cuba and Venezuela. There have been positive steps with Venezuela already. This could be a good opportunity to remove Cuba from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, which would reduce some of the emigration pressure in Cuba. 

Mexican authorities have disbanded many caravans and slowed the trek of thousands of migrants. Nevertheless, people who are escaping violence and persecution or have sold everything will try to get to the United States. 

Long-term ways to address the root causes of migration are to continue providing international aid and supporting democratic institutions. One has to keep in mind human rights. The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice has found that profiling people suspected to be migrants in buses to be unconstitutional. To engage the Mexican Army is not the solution either.

The silver lining is that despite the images we see in the news and seasonal peaks, it is not as if all the world is on the way to the U.S.-Mexico border. Most people want to stay home.

Congresswoman Delia C. Ramirez (IL-03)

Congresswoman Delia C. Ramirez (IL-03) presenting immigration policies the Congress could be working on instead.

In the January 10 hearing towards impeaching DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Republicans repeated many myths, cliches, and anti-immigrant talking points but did not propose any sensible solutions. It was remarkable that Democrats in the committee saw the political nature of the exercise, and many offered actual solutions to improve the situation at the border and inside the United States in a way that makes the immigration and asylum processes more humane and above ground.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latino American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab at American University.

Creative Commons license. Free to republish without changing content for news and not-for-profit purposes. 

“Driven Out” Panel Synopsis

by Lily Tierney and Ernesto Castañeda* edited by Makenna Lindsay November 29, 2023

Driven Out: Global Response to the Plight of Forcibly Displaced People at Wilson Center . / Creative Commons License

On Wednesday, November 15, 2023, the Refugee and Forced Displacement Initiative (RAFDI) at the Wilson Center in Washington D.C. hosted a roundtable discussion on forced migration. The panel of experts analyzed the effectiveness of the current refugee systems to address the predicaments refugees around the world face, and the underlying causes and drivers of forced displacement. James Hollifield, professor and director of the Tower Center for Public Policy and International Affairs at SMU introduced the program. Rina Agarwala, Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University, moderated the conversation. 

David Scott FitzGerald, co-chair for the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies and Professor of Sociology at UCSD, emphasized the limitations of silos within the academic bodies of knowledge that tend to think separately about migration, refugees, and conflict. FitzGerald recommends a systems approach that would look at all forms of migration and forced displacement within the same system and at the path dependencies and feedback loops that armed interventions and previous migration have on future population moves. 

Pieter Bevelander, director of Studies of Migration, Diversity, and Welfare at Malmö University, offered a European perspective to the discussion. Bevelander spoke of a new migration and asylum pact within the European Union (EU) that will hopefully be finalized next year. This pact will create new asylum and migration management regulations that will streamline procedures, create mandatory solidarity in the relocation process, and increase financial contribution to countries with many refugees. EU member states that do not wish to sign on have the option of paying 20,000 pounds per person due to solidarity reasons, however, this is still being negotiated. Bevelander also noted that the attitude towards Ukrainian refugees is more widely accepted than refugees from the “outside,” implying that refugees from non-western countries are less likely to be embraced by the EU governments.

Gerasimos Tsourapas, professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow, works on the politics of migrants and refugees in the Middle East and the Global South. Tsourapas claims that an overlooked aspect of these discussions is how labor migration and forced migration flows are much more common in the Global South than in the Global North. Those who are forced to migrate are more likely to go from one part of the Global South to another than migrate from the Global South to the Global North. Tsourpas mentioned that it is critical to understand this point to decolonize the conversation of forced migration. He distinguishes two paradoxes: states that hosts most refugees are in the Global South and are not responsible for creating the refugee crisis because of the unwillingness of wealthy countries in the Global North, who often are the cause of the refugee crisis, Global North to accept refugees. The second paradox lies in the fact that most of the refugee-hosting states in the Global South are struggling financially and open their borders to the detriment of their economy and for the betterment of their diplomacy, most refugees are in the Global South. 

Kamal Sadiq, director at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, shared a shocking fact: confirmed that while “a majority of the signatories to the 1951 refugee convention are located in the Global North, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of the worlds refugees are located in states in the Global South, many of whom are not signatories to the refugee convention.” Sadiq states that the refugee regime is broken for several reasons: the first is policy uncertainty. Funding is limited, and short-term funds provide short-term services. Another flaw that Sadiq pointed out is that the refugee regime does not cooperate with non-state actors. This is highly problematic for internally displaced people living within corrupt domestic law and governance. The final weak spot of the refugee regime is documentation. Displaced persons need documentation to access formal work and services but getting documentation needed can be arduous. As a result, displaced persons have multiple documents and are uncertain as to which are legitimate. It is incredibly difficult to adjudicate between real and fake documentation because of how ubiquitous the identification paperwork has become for displaced persons. In a context where states deny documents, a market for false documents appears. 

The discussion closed out with a Q&A session where all speakers agreed on the issue of working in silos, the necessity for each state to host refugees, and the need for equitable responsibility in financing the cost of welcoming large numbers of newcomers. While some panelists and many in the media often mention that welcoming immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees entails large expenditures in terms of providing initial housing and food, we argue that this is one of the few ways that states can engage in creating economic development in the middle and long-term.

The panelists discussed the importance of differentiating refugees from economic migrants. Our view is that refugees should continue to have special protections and rights because of persecution from the state for political reasons or for belonging to a targeted social group or category. But analytically speaking, scholars should not reify these legal distinctions as they are not the most useful in terms of subjective integration, feelings of belonging, and public sentiment. Xenophobes in the streets do not care if one is a refugee, a documented, or an undocumented migrant when there is a climate of exclusion or racial profiling by the police.

Considering population growth, we are not necessarily seeing record numbers of either economic migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers. We must normalize international migration and protection. Less than 4% of the world’s population lives in a country different from the one they were born in. The countries with the largest number of foreign-born people are among the wealthiest nations. People may move to rich countries because they have more job opportunities, but in doing so, they also make those countries even richer. Supporting newcomers is a good investment.

You can watch the full panel here: Driven Out: Global Response to the Plight of Forcibly Displaced People 

 

* Lily Tierney is a student in the School of Communications ’24 at American University.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, Immigration Lab, and the MA in Sociology Research & Practice.

Editing by Makenna Lindsay.

The Winding Down of DACA?

by Andréia Fressatti Cardoso and Ernesto Castañeda*

November 15, 2023

Protestors marching in an event to protect DACA / Steve Rhodes / Flickr / Creative Commons License

Once again, the future of DACA is in question. On September 13, 2023, Judge Andrew Hanen from the Southern District of Texas declared the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program to be illegal in the case, Texas v. United States (2021). He addressed two items in his decision, the 2012 DACA Memorandum and the 2022 Final Rule. Andréia Fressatti Cardoso has been conducting interviews with DACA recipients, organizers, and some attorneys as part of an on-going research, and we dive in on their views on the impacts of this and previous court decisions on the program. All names used here are pseudonyms, protecting the anonymity of the interviews in this research. 

Since 2018, the Department of Homeland Security cannot process any new DACA applications. The DACA protection for individuals who applied before then has been kept in a legal and political limbo for quite some time, and as the future of DACA seems more uncertain, the age restrictions and the impossibility of processing new applications has gradually diminished the number of beneficiaries of the policy. It is estimated that around 579,000 people benefit from DACA now – a much smaller number than the 800 thousand people estimated to have benefitted from DACA at its peak, which in turn is less that the people how could have potentially benefited from it but decided not to apply due to fear of future deportation.  

The September 13 decision is part of an effort to end DACA. An attempt to end the program in 2017 by the Trump administration was unsuccessful due to the lack of observance of due procedure to do so according to a Supreme Court’s 2020 decision. The strategy of conservative opponents then shifted towards forcing DACA to gradually die out by not allowing new applications to be accepted. This strategy has created a new group of subjects in the struggle for immigrant rights, which are the DACA-eligible, those who could have DACA if the courts had not continuously forced the program to pause for new applicants. 

Also, the language used when discussing immigration is of paramount importance, as it draws the borders of belonging and membership. It is noteworthy that the September 13 decision insists on calling people who immigrate “illegal aliens,” even sparing a long footnote to defend such terminology. More than being offensive, the “illegal alien” reifies an us and them, an Other (the alien, the foreigner) whose belonging, and membership is not recognized due to the lack of authorization to cross a border, their undocumentedness. Such dehumanizing language has been part of the vocabulary of people who want to keep the U.S. white when referring to undocumented immigrants in the United States. 

DACA was never meant as a permanent solution, but as a temporary fix for people who immigrated to the U.S. when minors. Nonetheless, the lack of legislative action for the many years that the program has been in place turned the DACA into a buoy for many migrants. But, as pointed out in an interview with Maria*, a DACA recipient in her late-twenties, “DACA was a Band-Aid to Obama not being able to pass actual immigration reform.” The on-going legal battle over DACA has reinforced the limbo into which young migrants have been pushed to: a status that is neither of undocumented nor of belonging, an uncertain in-between.  

One of the consequences of such a legal battle is on the impacted people’s mental health, as fear and stigma come back as defining factors in their lives, similarly to what happened when the Trump administration tried to rescind DACA, as pointed by Ana*, a  DACA recipient at her mid-twenties: “and when Trump came and had an opportunity to strike DACA down, it felt very scary. I felt like I was losing hope, and I was like, I was going to lose a lot, like, everything that I’ve done for myself.” And, for those who could not apply for DACA before, Judge Hanen’s decision is even more disheartening, as pointed out by Rosa*, who meets all the criteria for DACA but cannot apply: “it’s horrible because, like, you have this hope, that there’s going to be something good coming out of it, but then it just gets worse and worse. So, honestly, that makes me not even want to hope for it anymore.”  

When talking to people who are beneficiaries of DACA, words such as “tiring,” “stressful,” and “uncertain” are not uncommon, especially from those who are or were activists:  The two-year time frame of the program was already a factor to limit long-term planning, but the limbo to which they have been pushed reactivates a “survival mode” in which much of the undocumented population in the United States lives. 

The uncertainty that people live under is clear. It is hard to fathom for people who are not in this situation; but other situations might convey similar feelings, such as when one remembers the uncertainty felt in the middle of the pandemic when people wondered when vaccines would become available, when schools would open, and when the pandemic would subside. DACA recipients have been living with this uncertainty for 11 years plus the years before the program existed. Jose*, a 28-year-old DACA recipient, explained the feeling: 

“And so, all of these maneuvers are very much like, ‘OK, I have this platform not for long, so what can I get out of it?’ And that to me seems like it’s playing the short game, playing as if there is not going to be longevity for DACA. And there hasn’t. And I think that ever since 2017, right, like, the majority of my existence under DACA has been now under the assumption that DACA is going to end at some point, or that DACA is under danger.” 

DACA still survives but it is unclear for how long. The conservative members of the Supreme Court could unilaterally kill DACA, despite the popularity of the program and how favorably Americans of all political perceptions see Dreamers. It is hard to think of an alternative to such a scenario. Both DACA recipients and organizers have been assessing what other alternatives they have, while keeping up with the news and decisions on the program and hoping for the best. 

*All names used here are pseudonyms, protecting the anonymity of the interviews in this research. 

Andréia Fresssatti Cardoso, Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, and PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. Her project, “Rights Subjectivity in Immigrant Struggles for Rights in the United States: The Struggle for DACA,” has a grant from the São Paulo State Research Foundation (FAPESP, process n. 2022/04176-5). The opinions, hypotheses, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this material are the full responsibility of the author and do not represent FAPESP’s views. 

*Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, the Immigration Lab, and the MA Program in Sociology, Research, and Practice. He is also a member of the Im/migrant Well-being Scholar Collaborative.  

The Employment Experience of Immigrants in the DMV

by Lily Tierney* November 8, 2023

A picture showing people in the workplace. / Creative Commons License

In 2022 American University’s Immigration Lab began conducting interviews in the DMV (D.C., Maryland, and Virginia) area to better understand the experience of migrants and refugees. All migrants and refugees have vastly different experiences due to their place of origin, economic status, and or racial identity. However, there are common threads within these experiences. 

Many participants found employment outside of their educational training because there were more opportunities to earn a higher income elsewhere. This does not deviate from what many people must do to support themselves, but the reasoning differed. A Colombian woman shared that she went into sales rather than film, her field of study, because she knows that one day she will have to support her mother and siblings. Many noted remittances as the reason why they had to seek a higher-paying job and depart from their original discipline.

On the other hand, some participants were unable to use their degrees to seek employment because they were obtained outside of the United States. This circumstance almost always resulted in that individual having to accept a lower-paying job and having to learn a new set of skills. Participants who have yet to work toward higher education tend to pursue employment in the informal labor market, which is defined as work that is not taxed or recorded by the government. 

Many participants in the study reported that they do not have the opportunity to use their first language in the workplace. When there is opportunity to speak their native language, interviewees disclosed feeling uncomfortable. A Salvadoran woman in her late twenties mentioned that she chose not to work in a regionally specific office where Spanish was spoken due to feeling, “pigeonhole(d) into doing this role.”

Almost all participants who have yet to achieve a higher education plan to return to school at some point. Time and money are the most frequently cited hinderances of achieving this goal. Many migrants feel that they are overqualified for the profession they are in but are stuck until they can obtain a degree from an accredited institution in the United States. However, many find themselves in a catch 22: it is almost impossible to dedicate oneself to work, school and family full time. As an Afghan male in his mid-twenties noted, “Life is all about work.” 

The main earning priorities indicated by participants were rent, bills, and family. This is strikingly different to the financial goals of U.S. citizens recorded from 2020 to 2021, which revealed the main priorities as increasing emergency savings and paying down debt. The primary financial concerns among immigrants and refugees are dealt with day to day. Many immigrants and refugees do not have the luxury to pay off debt or accrue savings when they are worried about whether their income will cover basic living needs, bills, and sending remittances to their family in a country that may be in a state of unrest. 

A Colombian woman in her mid-twenties expressed that discrimination has grown to be an expected part of the workplace experience, and she has had to file complaints with Human Resources to create a paper trail. This should not be part of the workplace environment, and she should not have to keep a paper trail in case of something more severe than verbal discrimination. Attaining a U.S. education and being a member of the workforce is challenging, but those challenges are escalated for immigrants and refugees traveling to the DMV region due to racial, social, and economic divisions. 

* Lily Tierney- student in the School of Communications ’24 at American University.

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