All posts tagged Diplomacy

Why El Salvador is Turning to Soft Power

Sonja Wolf, Research Professor at the Panamerican University in Mexico City*

El Salvador’s elected autocrat claims to have ended gang violence. Soft power is central to Bukele’s efforts to legitimize his rule through these results. Yet the tactic invites greater scrutiny, revealing the state’s inability to tackle violence effectively.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, a former advertising executive, first rose to power in 2019 promising to root out corruption and eradicate gang violence. In 2024 he won a second term in office, despite a constitutional ban on immediate presidential re-election. During his time in power, Bukele has systematically dismantled the country’s democratic institutions. The ongoing state of emergency has made headlines around the world for both its spectacle of cruelty and its controversial nature as a security policy. Police have detained over 91,500 citizens, including more than 33,000 people without gang involvement, and prison abuses have led to at least 523 deaths in state custody. Nonetheless, the measure remains widely popular with Salvadorans who, for decades, were terrorized by gangs.

Bukele’s electoral autocracy hides behind a democratic façade to maintain legitimacy. To demonstrate effectiveness and maintain support, both domestically and abroad, the regime is building its soft power. According to the official narrative, the president is leading El Salvador’s transformation from the world’s murder capital into a safe and modern nation that is open to tourists and investors. To lend credence to this rhetoric, and to raise the brand visibility of Bukele and El Salvador, the country has been hosting major sports and cultural events. In recent years, it has held international surfing competitions, a Miss Universe pageant, and a five-show residency by Shakira. At the 2026 Venice Biennale, El Salvador debuts with its first-ever national pavilion. Adding to this soft power projection is the growing number of self-published hagiographies that extol Bukele’s leadership and the performance of his administration.

A recent example is The Bukele Method by Andrés Guzmán. Until recently, the Colombian lawyer and cybersecurity consultant served as El Salvador’s Presidential Commissioner for Human Rights and Press Freedom. In this role, Guzmán was tasked with countering external criticism of the country’s backsliding on democracy and the rule of law. His text is a compilation of half-truths that appear designed to whitewash the Bukele regime’s human rights record and bolster its legitimacy by touting its alleged security gains.

To take on the gangs, Guzmán asserts, the administration had to begin by stamping out the corruption that had permitted these groups to build their criminal empires. The author takes particular aim at the pacts that the traditional parties, ARENA and the FMLN, had brokered with the gangs to mobilize electoral support and reduce visible homicides. Rather than driving an institutional clean-up, Bukele’s lawmakers passed, in 2021, reforms that placed the justice system under the president’s control. Appointments of regime loyalists, mass firings of non-aligned state workers, and the dismantling of public sector unions concentrated power in the president’s hands. Investigations into government corruption and Bukele’s own gang pacts folded, while tighter transparency restrictions eroded independent oversight.

Guzmán justifies the state of emergency by pointing to its alleged results. In typical populist rhetoric, he paints the autocrat as a hero who made tough decisions, defied his enemies (the opposition, the gangs, international watchdogs), and attained his goals: the dismantling of the gangs and a historic decline in homicides. Or, as the author puts it, mothers can finally sleep without the fear of a gang member knocking on the door at night. This story hides the fact that the “security miracle” relied on Bukele’s gang deals, whose breakdown triggered the state of emergency, as well as statistical manipulation — the homicide count excludes killings by police, murders in prisons, and bodies found in unmarked graves.

Guzmán claims to have rigorously reviewed all human rights complaints and found them to have been exaggerated. But this contradicts independent reports showing that the state has hidden thousands of allegations and rejected thousands of habeas corpus petitions. A recent report by an international group of experts concluded that the human rights violations may in fact amount to crimes against humanity. Guzmán admits that mistakes were made, referring to arbitrary detentions. However, only some 8,000 citizens have been liberated, under conditions, and it was their testimonies that shed light on the prison abuses. The remains of dead detainees speak for themselves.

In defending the state of emergency, the author poses a false dilemma: the government could pursue this measure, or do nothing in the face of an existential threat. But this either-or fallacy ignores that police intelligence about gang members had long existed. Bukele chose to act on this information only once he had institutional control and no longer needed the gangs.

Following Bukele, who defines democracy as simply the will of the people, Guzmán contends that the president’s resounding re-election victory in 2024 validated his security strategy. In this deceptively simple logic, international watchdogs have no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation. What matters is that Salvadorans endorsed the state of emergency by granting their leader a democratic mandate. But depicting “the people” as a homogenous group, unified in their support for Bukele, erases the voices of those who try to stand up to his abuse of power.

Ultimately, the state of emergency is a simulation of legality that tries to hide the state’s incapacity to deal with violence. Laws passed by Bukele’s Legislative Assembly have reshaped a justice system that lacked the capacity to successfully prosecute offenders. In mass trials involving hundreds of defendants in a single proceeding, citizens with no prior gang involvement sit alongside real gang members. In the absence of any meaningful defense, prosecutors present flimsy evidence and unreliable witnesses to achieve convictions of entire criminal structures. Soft power efforts such as Guzmán’s publication promise the kind of performance-based legitimacy that the Salvadoran regime craves. The “Bukele method” should indeed be examined — not because it constitutes a blueprint for security, but because closer scrutiny reveals it to be, like Bukele himself, a marketing product.

*Sonja Wolf is the author of Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador (University of Texas Press, 2017).

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by clalsstaff on June 3, 2026 • Permalink

Posted in El Salvador

Tagged Bukele, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, El Salvador, gangs, Human Rights, news, Politics, Soft Power, trump

Posted by clalsstaff on June 3, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/06/03/why-el-salvador-is-turning-to-soft-power/

Muddling Through: Assessing Prospects for Brazil-U.S. Relations in an Election Year

By Felipe Rezende, Research Fellow and Visiting Scholar in Residence at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (AU-CLALS), from the University of Brasília (UnB), Brazil.

*Meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazil’s President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva in Kuala Lumpur October 26, 2025. Source: Wikimedia Commons*

Notwithstanding the “excellent chemistry” cited by Donald Trump in reference to a brief September 2025 meeting with Lula da Silva on the sidelines of the 80th United Nations General Assembly, in recent times the bilateral Brazil–U.S. relationship has yet to produce the quantity and quality of results one might have expected. Whether a result of different national and international commitments, or differing approaches to foreign policy, at least for the short term the interplay of a variety of factors has cooled the potential for advances in the relationship between the two countries. Reviewing recent developments in the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the U.S., here I consider how the current pattern of this relationship, together with upcoming electoral considerations, are likely to determine its limits and possibilities for the near future.

Sources of Direct and Indirect Friction between the White House and the Palácio do Planalto

Trump’s preferred trade policy in his second term, based on the unilateral imposition of tariffs upon numerous countries, with the declared objective of establishing an alleged fair balance (“Leveling the Playing Field”) in U.S. trade relations with the world, has lately been a primary factor of direct friction in the bilateral relationship with Brazil.

The historical U.S. surplus in trade with Brazil did not prevent the application in June 2025 of a 50 percent tariff on imports of Brazilian products. This imposition greatly hindered the flow of Brazilian agricultural production to North America, generating an oversupply in the South American country and inflation in the U.S. for such consumer products as beef, coffee, soybeans, orange juice, and other fruits.

In November 2025, pressured by domestic demand in the U.S., and interested in advancing strategic talks with Brasília, Washington withdrew the tariff weeks before the U.S. Supreme Court declared such practices illegal. At that time, the Palácio do Planalto appeared to have avoided the domestic political consequences of the tariff standoff by successful mobilization a narrative appealing to Brazil’s sovereignty and to the impropriety of such practices.

Since the inauguration of Trump’s second term, the influence campaign by groups linked to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro – sentenced to 27 years in Brazil for an attempted coup d’état and violent abolition of the Democratic Rule of Law – has also been decisive in dampening official bilateral activity between Brazil and the U.S.

This included months of lobbying with the MAGA movement and gatekeepers of the Trump administration by his son Eduardo Bolsonaro, who endorsed the decision to impose additional tariffs, and suggested that justices of Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court (STF) be sanctioned, which was understood as an attempt to constrain the Court’s role in judging the case concerning the attempted coup d’état on January 8^th, 2023.

In response the U.S. revoked valid visas for entry into the U.S. for almost all ministers of the Court, including Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who was rapporteur in the trial of the January 2023 rioters. The U.S. also applied financial sanctions under the Magnitsky Act, effective between July and December 2025, when they were withdrawn.

Under Lula Brazil’s foreign policy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has continued to follow certain traditional patterns of Brazilian diplomacy, grounded in multilateralism, pacifism, and the reform – rather than rejection – of already existing institutions, organizations, and regimes of global governance, beginning with the United Nations — something that does not necessarily converge with U.S. foreign policy practices under Trump.

This was reflected, for example, in the Lula administration’s reluctance to accept an invitation to join the so-called “Board of Peace” in January 2026, created by Trump as a better alternative – in his view – to managing international conflicts. Lula publicly commented that Trump’s initiative appears to overlap with the competences ascribed to the UN, an important institution for the pursuit of Brazil’s interests as a middle power.

Lula’s skepticism toward Trump’s Board of Peace, with Trump as its self-appointed permanent Chairman and its likely promotion of U.S. foreign-policy interests, was compounded by the White House’s proposed Gaza peace plan even while the U.S. actively initiated global conflicts, especially its most recent incursion into Iran — a fact that delayed the meeting between Lula and Trump.

The May 7^th Meeting and What Comes Next: Between Appearances and Substance

The approximately three hour meeting between Lula and Trump revolved around three principal issues. First was the question of bilateral trade, where disagreement remained as to the use of tariffs and U.S. allegations of unfair trade, refuted by the Brazilian side. Brazil, instead, sought unsuccessfully to convince the Trump administration of a U.S. trade surplus of USD 400 billion over the last 15 years.

With the possibility looming of the reapplication of a 30 percent tariff on Brazilian products, considered within the scope of ongoing investigations undertaken by the U.S. Trade Representative, Brazil achieved at least temporary relief, with the institution of a 30-day delay for the counterparts to reach a common understanding regarding the terms-of-trade scenario.

Second was a potential partnership for the exploitation of critical rare earth minerals in the South American country, which holds the world’s second-largest reserve. The condition set by Brazil is U.S. investment in local processing of the minerals and integration into the production chain. The legal framework to regulate this is on the verge of approval in the Brazilian Congress, thus enabling the U.S. and other countries to invest in this sector in Brazil.

What seems not to have been mentioned at this meeting is Brazil’s government-backed payment method, called PIX, often criticized by U.S. Vice President JD Vance. The White House is bothered that this payment method, in force since 2020, departs from the traditional payment models embraced by U.S. credit-card networks. Above all, the U.S. is concerned about the possibility of extending this model, currently being studied by the New Development Bank, to other BRICS countries.

Third, the meeting addressed questions of public security and cooperation against organized crime. Brasília emphasized that at present there is no significant volume of narcotics produced in the country entering the U.S., while the number of synthetic drugs and American weapons—especially originating from the state of Delaware—entering Brazilian territory is increasing. Brazil’s interest lies in deepening cooperation around preventive measures to stem these illicit flows.

On this topic, the principal unspoken point concerns the U.S. intention of characterizing Brazilian criminal factions, such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), as terrorist cells, which could provide a pretext for U.S. interference in domestic issues related to the repression of crime in Brazilian territory. The view of the Palácio do Planalto is that cooperation in public security and in combating organized crime should involve other approaches than mere classification of these groups as terrorists.

The May 7^th meeting between Trump and Lula at the White House highlighted the sensitivity of these and other topics, which have been sources of frictions in the official relationship between the countries. It became clear that during the meeting an effort was made by both parties to minimize potential disagreement or embarrassment.

This does not mean, contrary to what the niceties of diplomacy might suggest, that the meeting was in fact productive. Despite appearances and exchanges of compliments between the two leaders – both of whom are facing declining popularity with decisive elections on the horizon – in objective terms this meeting does not seem to have gone much beyond a meeting to schedule other meetings, marking the triumph of aesthetics over politics.

Final Considerations

Despite a certain optimism generated by the May 7^th meeting, the recent past demonstrates that a show of courtesies in the Brazil–U.S. relationship does not necessarily mean an absence of conflicts or, still less, indicate the likelihood of productive results in the short term. It is to be expected that evident foreign policy disagreements between Lula and Trump will not overturn a pattern of high-level pragmatism governing the relationship between the two great American powers, with more than two centuries of strong ties.

However, when each pursues their own objectives, including those conflicting with the specific interests of maintaining the bilateral relationship, these meetings become little more than an empty performance. Meanwhile, international far right networks continue to show that they are capable of interfering in the official relationship between Brazil and the U.S., undermining or complicating opportunities to deepen mutual gains while threatening democratic process in both countries.

The prevalence of ties among far-right movements continues to threaten the productivity of the official Brazil–U.S. relationship. Flávio Bolsonaro, another son of Brazil’s former president and a pre-candidate for the Brazilian presidency in the 2026 elections, visited the White House in late May to restore his reputation among voters, with his candidacy facing a setback after his name surfaced in the Banco Master scandal, the worst bank fraud in Brazil’s history. The next day, Marco Rubio declared both the PCC and CV terrorist groups.

Amid distinct tones of populism, it is regrettable that the Brazil–U.S. relationship remains hostage to personalistic interests that often end in transactional bargaining without producing durable results. Overall, it seems unlikely that the Lula-Trump relationship will deliver anything substantive beyond cordial meetings used primarily to restore the domestic reputations of each, particularly given a polarized electoral landscape in Brazil that continues to treat the Bolsonaro-Trump relationship as a relevant factor.

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by clalsstaff on June 2, 2026 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Brazil, Diplomacy, Economy, news, Politics, Regional Relations, tariffs, trump, United States

Posted by clalsstaff on June 2, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/06/02/muddling-through-assessing-prospects-for-brazil-u-s-relations-in-an-election-year/

Between Giants: How Uruguay Is Expanding Its Global Trade Strategy

By Juan A. Bogliaccini, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay

This small South American country is seeking new markets and investment while remaining anchored to MERCOSUR and balancing ties with the United States and China.

For more than three decades, Uruguay’s strategy for international economic integration has revolved around the Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR. Founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the bloc emerged at the end of the Cold War with the goal of deepening regional economic integration and strengthening trade among its members. For Uruguay, a small country of just over three million people located between two regional giants, the bloc initially proved highly beneficial. During the 1990s, MERCOSUR became the main engine of Uruguayan exports and foreign investment.

That dynamic began to shift at the end of the decade. Brazil’s currency devaluation in 1998 and Argentina’s financial collapse in 2001 exposed the vulnerabilities of Uruguay’s economic dependence on its neighbors. At the time, a majority of the country’s exports was destined for these two markets, and the crises had profound effects on Uruguay’s economy.

These events triggered a long-running debate within the country’s political and economic elites about the future of Uruguay’s international trade strategy. At the center of the discussion was one of MERCOSUR’s key institutional rules: member states cannot negotiate individual free trade agreements outside the bloc. Critics argued that this constraint limited Uruguay’s ability to diversify its economic partnerships in an increasingly globalized world.

For many years, much of the political center-right advocated a strategy similar to that pursued by Chile—signing bilateral free trade agreements across multiple regions of the world. The center-left generally defended remaining firmly within the regional framework, emphasizing the importance of political and economic integration with neighboring countries.

Over time, however, both sides gradually converged toward a more pragmatic position. Today there is broad consensus that Uruguay should remain in MERCOSUR while pushing for greater flexibility within the bloc allowing for members to pursue complementary trade agreements. In practice, leaving MERCOSUR has never been a realistic option. Brazil and Argentina remain crucial trading partners, particularly for exports linked to regional value chains and cross-border production networks.

At the same time, the bloc itself has increasingly sought to expand outward. In recent years, MERCOSUR has concluded trade agreements with Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. In 2026, after more than twenty-five years of negotiations, MERCOSUR also finalized a landmark trade agreement with the European Union. Across successive governments representing different political parties, Uruguay has consistently supported these negotiations as part of a long-term strategy of gradual trade opening.

Meanwhile, Uruguay’s broader trade relationships have evolved significantly. Over the past two decades, China has become the country’s principal destination for goods exports, particularly agricultural commodities such as soybeans and forestry products like cellulose pulp. At the same time, the United States has become the main market for Uruguay’s rapidly growing service sector, especially software development and business services.

These trends have positioned Uruguay within a complex global landscape shaped by growing geopolitical competition between the world’s two largest economies. Rather than aligning strongly with either side, successive Uruguayan governments have sought to maintain a careful balance between Washington and Beijing while preserving strong ties with their regional partners.

Recent administrations have also attempted to broaden the country’s commercial horizons. During the presidency of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), Uruguay applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), one of the world’s most significant multilateral trade agreements. Although accession negotiations are only beginning, the move signaled Uruguay’s intention to deepen economic ties with Asia-Pacific markets.

The Lacalle Pou government also explored the possibility of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with China. While the initiative ultimately did not move forward—largely because Beijing made clear it preferred negotiations with MERCOSUR as a whole—the effort served an important political purpose. Alongside the negotiations with the CPTPP, it signaled to Uruguay’s regional partners that the country was determined to pursue broader trade opportunities.

The current administration of President Yamandú Orsi has continued this strategy of balanced engagement. Diplomatic outreach to both the United States and China reflects Uruguay’s pragmatic approach in an increasingly multipolar global economy. Promoting exports has become particularly important as the strength of the Uruguayan peso makes international competitiveness more challenging for domestic producers.

Despite these global ambitions, Uruguay’s integration into international value chains remains heavily regional. Much of the country’s participation in global trade occurs through “import-to-export” production models, particularly in agro-industrial sectors that rely on imported inputs and regional processing networks. A large share of these exports continues to be destined for MERCOSUR markets, reflecting the enduring importance of regional economic integration.

This structural reality explains why Uruguay’s leaders have consistently pursued a dual strategy: maintaining strong economic ties with Argentina and Brazil while simultaneously seeking new markets and investment partners around the world.

The recently concluded trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union may represent an important step in that direction. Together with the agreements with Singapore and EFTA—and the expected accession of Bolivia to MERCOSUR—the deal could gradually expand the economic horizons of a country that remains heavily dependent on a limited number of export sectors.

For Uruguay, the stakes are significant. Since the end of the global commodity boom in the early 2010s, economic growth has slowed. As a result, it has become more difficult to reduce a fiscal deficit that hovers around 4 percent of GDP while public debt continues to rise gradually. Expanding exports and attracting foreign investment have therefore become central priorities for policymakers.

Yet Uruguay’s small domestic market inevitably limits its appeal to international investors. The country’s greatest economic asset lies instead in its potential role as a stable regional hub within the much larger South American market. With strong institutions, political stability, and relatively high levels of human capital, Uruguay often presents itself as a reliable gateway for companies seeking access to the region.

Realizing that potential, however, will require more than trade agreements alone. Expanding Uruguay’s global economic presence will depend on developing new productive sectors, increasing productivity in existing industries, and moving gradually toward exports with higher value added.

For a small country navigating between two regional giants and competing global powers, this is no simple task. But Uruguay’s strategy remains clear: maintain its regional anchor while steadily expanding its reach into the global economy.

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by clalsstaff on March 11, 2026 • Permalink

Posted in Uruguay

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, China, Civil Society, democracy, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, history, news, Politics, tariffs, Uruguay

Posted by clalsstaff on March 11, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/03/11/between-giants-how-uruguay-is-expanding-its-global-trade-strategy/

Costa Rica 2026: Political Continuity and Signs of Democratic Erosion

By Ilka Treminio-Sánchez, Political Scientist of the University of Costa Rica.

The national elections held in Costa Rica on February 1, 2026, marked a turning point in the country’s recent political trajectory. Contrary to expectations of a runoff—common in a highly fragmented party system—the ruling party candidate, Laura Fernández, won in the first round with 48.3 percent of votes counted. This result not only ensured the continuity of the political project championed by President Rodrigo Chaves but also consolidated a deeper transformation of the Costa Rican political system.

The election saw a 69 percent voter turnout, the highest since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as a sign of civic revitalization, but also as a consequence of growing polarization. During the campaign, two distinct blocs emerged: on one side, the ruling party, organized around Chaves’s personalistic leadership; on the other, a fragmented opposition that, despite its ideological differences, shared concerns about the country’s institutional direction, and which ultimately consolidated most of its votes around the National Liberation Party. In the run up to the election, supporters of traditional and emerging parties came together. Concerned about the country’s democracy, they spontaneously organized various forms of collective action outside event venues. These activities culminated in the so-called “multicolored caravans,” named for the diversity of party flags displayed under the unifying slogan: “Out with Chaves!” But, despite such mobilizations, and in line with poll results, the opposition did not advance to a runoff.

From an organizational standpoint, the process was impeccable. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal once again demonstrated high standards of transparency and efficiency, reaffirming the technical soundness of the Costa Rican electoral system. However, this procedural strength contrasts sharply with the political tensions that accumulated during Chaves’s presidency, characterized by a confrontational discourse toward oversight bodies and the judiciary.

The Ruling Party and the Construction of Continuity

Fernández’s victory cannot be understood without considering the central role of the outgoing president. Although constitutionally barred from immediate reelection, Chaves devised a succession strategy based on personal loyalty and the symbolic transfer of his leadership. The official campaign revolved around the slogan “continuity of change,” presenting Fernández as the custodian of the president’s political mandate and as its guarantor of continued power.

The electoral vehicle was the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), created after Chaves fell out with the leadership of the Social Democratic Progress Party, with which he rose to power in 2022. The reorganization allowed it to concentrate the vote and achieve not only the presidency, but also 31 of the 57 legislative seats, an absolute majority unprecedented in recent decades.

This result substantially alters the conditions for governance. While previous administrations had to govern with small and fragmented factions, the new government will have a robust parliamentary group, although of late some friction has emerged among its leaders. Nevertheless, only the National Liberation Party – historically the most dominant political force in Costa Rica – had achieved a similar number of representatives in 1982, during an exceptional economic crisis.

This legislative majority opens the door to the possibility of far-reaching political reforms. During his presidency, Chaves repeatedly expressed interest in expanding the executive branch’s powers, limiting oversight bodies’ authority, and promoting a transformation of the state that his supporters call the “Third Republic,” a successive step in the destruction of the Second Republic inherited after the 1948 Civil War, whose foundations were laid by the liberationist José Figueres Ferrer. Without a supermajority, such reforms were not feasible. Today, the balance of power looks different.

During the transition period, two unprecedented decisions were announced. First, the president-elect expressed her intention to appoint Rodrigo Chaves as Minister of the Presidency, the sole responsible for coordinating actions between the executive and legislative branches. Second, the outgoing president appointed Laura Fernández as Minister of the Presidency for the remaining months of the administration. Chaves also stated that, in his future role, he would seek to bring on board members of the National Liberation Party to form the supermajority necessary to approve constitutional reforms.

Populism, Leadership, and Institutional Tensions

Rodrigo Chaves’s governing style represented a break with traditional Costa Rican political patterns. His confrontational rhetoric, directed against media outlets, public universities, judges, and opposition members of parliament, reinforced an anti-establishment narrative that resonated with sectors disillusioned with the status quo. His rhetoric fits into the political model followed by other populist presidents on the continent.

Surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research and Studies (CIEP) at the University of Costa Rica showed that his supporters primarily valued his ability to “impose order” and “produce results.” These attributes reflect a social demand for strong leadership and swift decisions, even if such an approach creates tension with the deliberative procedures inherent in liberal democracy.

In this sense, the Costa Rican case fits into a broader regional trend. The political and inspirational affinity with Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s influence was evident throughout the campaign, particularly regarding public safety and proposals to toughen the prison system. Likewise, the first congratulatory messages to Fernández came from far-right figures such as Chilean president-elect Antonio Kast, and Mexican media figure Eduardo Verástegui, suggesting the integration of Costa Rica’s new leadership into transnational conservative-right networks. This realignment does not necessarily imply a break with traditional partners, but it does signal an ideological shift that redefines the country’s international standing.

Security, Social Cohesion, and a Democratic Future

The new government’s main challenge will be public security. The sustained increase in homicides and expansion of organized crime have eroded Costa Rica’s reputation as a peaceful exception in Central America. Policies implemented so far have been lax and ineffective, to the point that candidates labeled them permissive during the campaign debates.

Added to this are structural problems: the deterioration of the education system, the strain on the healthcare system, and the weakening of environmental policies that historically formed part of a national consensus. These issues not only affect social well-being but also undermine the legitimacy of a democratic system seemingly unable to improve the situation.

The 2026 elections do not simply represent a change or continuity of political parties. They reflect a reconfiguration of the political system around a personalistic leadership that combines right-wing populism, social conservatism, an evangelical agenda, and challenges to institutional checks and balances. The electoral strength of the ruling party is undeniable; so too is the broad-based support it received.

The underlying concern is undoubtedly that the new continuity government could further the trajectory of democratic erosion. When anti-institutional rhetoric is legitimized by those in power and the political concentration of that power is presented as a condition for effective governance, the risk is not an abrupt collapse but rather an incremental erosion.

For a society with a long tradition of stability and the rule of law, the central challenge will be to rebuild a minimal consensus around respect for horizontal checks and balances and pluralistic deliberation. The continuity of Chaves’s political project opens a new cycle. Its outcome will depend not only on the Executive and its legislative majority, but also on the capacity of the citizenry and institutions to maintain the balances that have historically defined Costa Rican democracy.

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by clalsstaff on March 5, 2026 • Permalink

Posted in Costa Rica

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Civil Society, Costa Rica, democracy, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, history, news, Politics, women

Posted by clalsstaff on March 5, 2026

https://aulablog.net/2026/03/05/costa-rica-2026-political-continuity-and-signs-of-democratic-erosion/

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

By Ernesto Castañeda

Regarding the question of what is happening between the United States and Venezuela, the answer is that this is a partially unintended, unanticipated international focus at the end of the first year of Trump’s second term. While the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela have not been close for a while, this path opened up as other areas of intervention, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, got stuck at a standstill.

The potential intervention in Venezuela is not a popular option. There is little support among experts about its merits. Likewise, Venezuelans are not eager to go to war.

This was not a priority for Trump in the past. But three key members of his cabinet and White House staff have zeroed in on Venezuela in the last few months.

As an article in the Washington Post on December 18, 2025, explains convincingly by drawing from inside sources and visible actions, Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, and the main engine behind the aggressive anti-immigrant agenda, wanted to conduct military attacks in Mexico as another way to curb immigration, his long obsession. But as undocumented and asylum-seeker arrivals at the border have approached zero —in part thanks to Mexico’s role—, Miller looked further south.

Trump campaigned in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 elections, bashing MS-13 and Salvadoran immigration. But this time around, he found an ally in Salvadoran President Bukele. Other Central American governments have also collaborated, so he zoomed in on Venezuela through Tren de Aragua (TdA) as an excuse to expedite deportations. Tren de Aragua-related deportations to CECOT in El Salvador became a fiasco and highly unpopular, not to say unlawful. So, the administration moved to declaring the so-called Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as its supposed head. After targeting small boats off the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean, then the excuse became fighting drug trafficking and then to old claims on permits to exploit Venezuelan oil by Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies, without discarding the ideas of regime change as the support for Machado grew internationally, and as the Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, told Chris Whipple to get rid of Maduro, to put pressure on Venezuela until Maduro would give up or “call uncle.”

On the other hand, Marco Rubio—both National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, which in other countries would be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs—has long had an obsession with the regime in Cuba, which he sees as related to Venezuela. This is partly because of the financial and oil support that Venezuela gave to Cuba for many years, which, although it continues—it seems that the first oil tanker that was seized was going from Venezuela to Cuba—though the Venezuela support is no longer the support it once was, and it’s not enough to help the Cuban regime, which is in deep economic trouble. Officials in Cuba see this as a move with them ultimately in mind.

Marco Rubio is especially interested in attacking the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, and there is nobody left in the White House to contradict him, not Susie Wiles, as John Kelly would have done in the first Trump administration, to stop such a bad idea.

According to the Washington Post article mentioned before, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was happy to jump into the frenzy to protect his job following Signalgate. He was eager to prove himself, show “leadership,” and get more attention in the spotlight and ingratiate himself with Miller. So, he found the idea of bombing the small boats appealing, and he would probably like to lead a small incursion into Venezuela.

The objective is not truly drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine that reaches the United States doesn’t come from Venezuela. There are a few shipments that pass through Venezuela and then to the Caribbean; these drug shipments were going to other islands in the region, and perhaps some of that cocaine would eventually reach Europe, but very little reaches the United States. The Coast Guard has been in charge of seizing these vessels for many years, and the DEA could be conducting more formal investigations, so this idea of the drugs as the rationale to threaten Venezuela is not believable. The American people don’t believe it, and this new pseudo-label of “narco-terrorists” isn’t logically convincing either legally or at the logical or expert levels. Indeed, it seems that the administration is already giving up on that; also, with the pardon for the president of Honduras, the drug angle is less convincing. The contradiction remains, and they are rightly not going to attack Mexico or Colombia over the drug issue in the near future.

Things changed a bit with Maria Corina Machado’s visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize regarding democracy in Venezuela and regime change. And lately, there have been a few statements from Trump about the interests of U.S. oil companies in Venezuela. The U.S. oil lobby has been a key factor in Trump’s re-election. So, another goal is for U.S. oil companies to regain access to Venezuela, although there is already an American company doing business there: Chevron. So, this is not something of a priority. All this to say, there is no master strategy behind it.

It is partly a personal animosity between Trump and Maduro, evident in public declarations and supposed ideological differences, but the two governments have also had occasions when they handled structured negotiations very well. There have been instances of negotiations resulting in detained individuals returning from Venezuela to the United States, deportations with permission of Venezuelans from the United States, and then from El Salvador. So, it’s not that there has been a terrible personal relationship between Trump and Maduro or their intermediaries.

Marco Rubio’s obsession is the main driver. He has made recent public statements presenting new arguments and rationales, but they have seemed improvised and unconvincing. Even an overt, public declaration of a return to the Monroe Doctrine is not enough to justify this; it is mainly good news for Russia and China.

To justify an attack on Venezuela and the boats around the coasts, members of the Trump administration have claimed that they wanted to combat terrorism, foreign enemies in the American war on terror, to accelerate deportations, but they still haven’t been able to win that mediatic battle or the legal or logical argument, but they have not done so not even in the local or federal courts. Although the Supreme Court hasn’t stopped them either.

Steven Miller is mainly interested in the idea of a war with Venezuela or with someone else, as a pretext to push through certain laws, such as the Alien Enemies Act and the Insurrection Act, both of which require the U.S. to be at war to be invoked. But this is not even necessary to continue with the mass deportations as they have been. They are deporting many people. Detaining people, they are practically at war with immigrant-based communities, though they are violating human rights and constitutional protections within the country. A declaration of war would not change that reality or make it any more appealing to citizens.

It is very clear that the majority of the American public opinion, even part of the MAGA base, is against the U.S. getting directly involved in any new war. They would be against an invasion or bombing of Venezuela, whether prolonged or even for a short period. It would be more difficult to stop something like an Iran-type one-targeted bombing situation, but removing Maduro probably wouldn’t be as quick or simple.

So, the American people are quite against an intervention in Venezuela. Furthermore, as we see with the debates surrounding the small fishing boats, critics, including legislators in the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans, see these bombings of ships off the Latin American coasts as extralegal. They are putting a lot of pressure on the Pentagon to release the videos showing the killing of two survivors, and to either stop this type of operation, to explain what is happening, and if the intention is to engage in war, then, to make the case to Congress of why the U.S. needs to wage a war, on what basis, and with what objective.

All indicates it would not be something Congress would easily approve. Trying to get the Republicans in Congress to do that could cost some of them their seats in 2026. So, it’s a war, a strategy without rhyme or reason, hence the clear disorder. Venezuela is very worried about Trump’s pronouncements, but their aimlessness is nothing new. So, no one knows what’s going to happen, not even the Pentagon, which has deployed elements that are not sufficient for sustained ground intervention, though they are spending a lot of money bringing the ships there.

They thought military mobilization would be enough to intimidate Maduro, but it obviously hasn’t been. The Nobel Prize hype around Machado has already passed, and it hasn’t changed anything on the ground. The Venezuelan diaspora is asking for military intervention, but that is not enough. Understandably, from their point of view and personal experiences, they are asking Trump to do something. Those who are more established, have money, and have been here for a while, are still upset they were forced to leave. But the more recent Venezuelan migrants who came here seeking asylum after the pandemic are being denied asylum, their work permits revoked, and deported. So that is also a contradiction about Venezuela supposedly being a narco-state. So, the whole armed intimidation of Venezuela is bullying to the extreme, but it is incoherent as foreign policy.

The majority in the United States are against this war in Venezuela and the attacks on the small boats, oil tankers, and the possibility of bombings or military action. Contrary to what some in the White House bubble seem to believe, a war with Venezuela would not be enough to distract from the economic and political situation in the U.S. It would not totally change the narrative, help speed deportations to what would become a war zone, and the attempts to further concentrate power on the executive could be more directly opposed by the legislative branch which is the one supposed to declare and fund wars. The oil tanker confiscations and chases are just the latest in a series of policies in which the administration’s words, threats, and actions are not enough to scare Maduro or convince the public of the righteousness of these actions.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed are his alone.

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by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in United States, Venezuela

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, donald-trump, Economy, Elections, news, Politics, Regional Relations, trump, Venezuela

Posted by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/23/what-is-behind-the-us-escalation-of-threats-against-venezuela/

Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks

By Jake Johnston

Research Associate, Center for Economic and Policy Research

It’s been nearly a decade since Haitians last went to the polls to elect a president. Even then, barely one in five participated. In a country with a majority of the population under 25 years of age, this means that, for most Haitians, voting for one’s leaders is a privilege never before experienced.

Haiti’s transition, precipitated by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, is ongoing. For the better part of four years, progress toward elections has remained elusive. But that all appeared to change this fall.

“The Haitians need to come to an election and elect a president,” the US Charge d’Affaires, Henry Wooster said in September. Security and other challenges must not be a “red herring for taking action,” he continued. Speaking directly to Haiti’s de facto authorities, he warned: “In other words, you can’t stay in those jobs for life.”

The reaction, in a country where the political class remains more responsive to Washington than the population in Haiti, was swift. Two months later, a new electoral law has been established and a vote scheduled for next August. But does this present Haitians with a path out of the multiple, overlaid crises affecting the country? More than half the country is facing food insecurity, the economy is about to wrap up its seventh consecutive year of negative growth, and insecurity continues to dominate daily life.

In 2023, when asked if they had trust in the electoral process, fewer than one in four Haitians responded yes. It is hard to imagine that number is higher today. Though few would be sorry to see the much-loathed leaders atop the transition fall, a vote is not a path out of the current crisis.

The quick response to Wooster’s threats was not so much about elections. It was about a date much closer on the horizon: February 7, 2026. That is when the mandate of the nine-member presidential council — which was put in place with a strong push from the Biden administration, CARICOM, UN, and the OAS 18 months ago — formally ends. For months, debate has raged over what should come next. The political class is auditioning, not with the ten-plus million citizens of Haiti, but with the foreign diplomats and multilateral entities they see as key to their own survival.

And if there was any doubt about who would ultimately decide, it was put to rest in mid-November. Amid an effort from some on the transitional presidential council to, once again, replace the prime minister, the US embassy stepped into the fight.

“If you and your family value your relationship with the United States, I urge you in the strongest terms to desist from initiatives to oust the PM and to instead publish the electoral decree … This is not the time to test U.S. resolve,” Wooster texted Fritz Jean, one of the councilors. Days later, Jean’s US visa was revoked and the State Department publicly accused him, without providing evidence, of supporting armed gangs. The effort to replace the PM was stopped — at least for now. The next week, the electoral decree was published.

The “plan” is coming into focus, and it is a familiar one: stability at all costs, no matter how rotten the foundation. To enforce this notion of stability and allow for elections, the US has been quick to assure that more security support is on the way.

In September, the UN Security Council approved a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Authorized for up to 5,500 soldiers, it is currently little more than a rebranding of the Kenyan-led Multinational Support Mission (MSS) that the UN authorized in 2024. No new troops have arrived and, while this new mission will have some level of UN support, operationalizing any of it is expected to take the better part of a year.

The main difference then, for the 1,000 or so mostly Kenyan police on the ground in Haiti is that the rules of engagement have changed. The GSF, as its name suggests, is intended to be more “muscular,” by which its architects mean lethal. The newly drafted Concept of Operations outlines a mission with a simple goal: kill the bandits.

But while few have taken note, that has been the de facto authorities’ strategy for some time. So far this year, police forces have been responsible for well over half of the 4,500-plus killings in Haiti. Hundreds of civilians have been caught in the crossfire as police battle armed groups that exert influence over much of Port-au-Prince and have traumatized a nation. Drone attacks, led by a secretive police unit operating with Blackwater CEO Erik Prince’s private mercenaries, are also racking up civilian casualties and drawing growing condemnation.

The outspoken leaders of Haiti’s armed groups, however, only seem to continue to accumulate more power, political influence, and heavy weaponry. While some areas of the capital have seen tension ease, violence in the provinces is expanding by the day. Armed groups still control all the major arteries of the nation. More people are displaced today than at the height of the post-earthquake recovery.

The US has expressed its goal in Haiti as saving the state from imminent collapse, thereby avoiding mass migration or the further entrenchment of transnational criminal organizations. But while precious oxygen is consumed by raging debates over electoral timelines, transitional governance structures, and how quickly foreign soldiers can arrive, nobody has stopped to ask a basic question: is the current state worth saving?

The root of the tension that has paralyzed the country for much of the last decade is not a fight between violent gangs and the state. Simplistic narratives of good versus evil miss the mark. Rather, it is a fight over putting the train back on the tracks to save a rump state in the name of stability or to lay new tracks to create the foundations for a more representative state to rise from the ashes. It is not elections nor a foreign military force that will resolve this fundamental tension. In fact, history shows those two responses are more likely to consolidate the status quo.

The Haitian people need an opportunity to vote freely. They need to feel safe and secure in their communities. But what is missing is a plan to bring it all together, to begin restoring faith in a state that long ago lost the trust of the population; a plan to achieve peace, which is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of opportunity. What is missing is a vision that can inspire the population and bring the nation together around a common path forward.

A peace process can fill that gap. Such an endeavor does not mean legitimizing armed actors, condoning violence, or accepting impunity; rather, what it should mean is treating the situation holistically while centering the population and in particular victims of both state and non-state violence. A foreign military force and low-turnout elections are tracks Haiti has been down many times before. A peace process offers a chance at laying new ones. But first, what Haiti needs are political leaders responsive to the needs of the people and not simply to foreign embassies.

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by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, Haiti, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/12/haiti-needs-to-lay-new-tracks/

The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

By Lívia Peres Milani

Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)

National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)

President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30^th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.

The imposition of tariffs

The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.

Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort.

Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.

Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners.

Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations

However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products.

These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis.

Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.

On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.

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by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Brazil, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, Politics, Regional Relations, United States

Posted by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/09/the-multiple-dimensions-of-the-us-brazil-relations-crisis/

Takeaways from the North American Leaders Summit and Biden’s Visit to Canada

Editorial

By Ernesto Castañeda*

North American leaders, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Justin Trudeau and Joe Biden, met in Mexico for the 10th North American Leaders’ Summit /Eneas De Troya /Flickr/ Creative Commons License

President Joe Biden conducted his first trip to Mexico in the context of the North American Leaders’ Summit on January 10, 2023. These summits started with George W. Bush in 2005 and did not take place at all while Trump was President. The 2021 and 2023 meetings signal a return to thinking of and valuing the North American region as such. The discussions were best when they decoupled local political considerations, common challenges, and regional opportunities. Three points toward integration are described here.

President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) discussed the advantages of further integrating supply chains within the region. Labor costs in China have gone up, and the pandemic showed that relying on long-distance shipping can delay things during crises, epidemics, and international disputes. There was a push for nearshoring, meaning having an increasing proportion of essential and high-value products manufactured in Canada, Mexico, and Central America rather than Asia. Concrete efforts were mentioned to increase manufacturing in the region within the context of the regional trade agreement USMCA, which includes regulations, respects local preferences, and supports specific sectors and products. Thus, during the summit, Biden and Trudeau were able to look past Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s protection of PEMEX, Mexico’s oil company, and specific controversies about car manufacturing. Furthermore, Biden, Trudeau, and López Obrador discussed the desire for further integration beyond trade. The Mexican President mentioned in his closing speech that Mexico will be represented in planned regional integration meetings by Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, Finance Minister of Mexico Rogelio Ramírez de la O, Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro Sánchez, and independent businessman who represents the business community, Alfonso Romo Garza. During the meetings, Prime Minister Trudeau was accompanied by his wife, Sophie Gregoire Trudeau, Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly, Minister of International Trade Mary Ng, and the Minister of Public Safety Marco Mendicino. President Biden was accompanied by the First Lady Dr. Jill Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ken Salazar, U.S. Ambassador to Canada David Cohen, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodd, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez. The size and high profile of the entourage show the seriousness of these talks and the intentions to communicate further and coordinate around shared challenges and regional integration.
The three leaders emphasized that migration is a regional process requiring a regional approach. Biden and Trudeau recognized their history and reality as countries of immigration. Canada emphasized its desire to welcome new people to keep growing its population and economy. Biden recognized the history of the United States as a country built largely by immigrants. The Mexican President missed an opportunity to acknowledge that in the last hundred years, a substantial number of people moved to Mexico from places like Spain, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Lebanon, Guatemala, and the United States. There were mentions about the need for Mexico to become the place where some of the people from the hemisphere should receive asylum and be allowed to settle legally long-term. The three heads of government also stressed a safe, humane, and legal entry for migrants through more legal pathways and shared responsibility as advocated for in the Los Angeles Declaration. Additionally, Biden announced the monthly legal entry of 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela with appropriate sponsors, background checks, and airplane flights. Generally, they recognized that the people who emigrate do it as an option of last resort. They expressed the humanitarian need to help create ways to migrate more safely than is currently possible for many.
Prime Minister Trudeau and Presidents López Obrador and Biden committed to collaborating on climate change and promoting racial equity, diversity, and inclusion, including collaborating with marginalized populations to fight violence against Native women and girls and expand the protection of LGBTQI+ people. Regarding climate change, the three nations promised to reduce methane emissions by 15% by the end of 2030, develop a plan to cut food loss and waste in half by 2030, and create trilateral infrastructure for EV chargers. The three leaders also spoke about their support for democratic practice and condemned the events on January 8 in Brazil. Biden and Trudeau spoke about how a feature and strength of their democracies is their diversity. Overall, most of the meetings were about strengthening ties and facing shared challenges pragmatically and collectively. The demeanor was friendly, forward-looking, and about partnership. As Justin Trudeau said, “We are stronger together.”

Where are we two and a half months later, when Biden visited Canada?

Biden spoke about the interconnectedness of the U.S. and Canadian economies, sports leagues, and people. Saying that “the U.S. and Canada share one heart.” Both spoke about green jobs and more regional manufacturing with unionized jobs.

Nevertheless, the attention was focused on asylum seekers. President Biden referred to the Los Angeles Declaration and the importance of helping migrants as a region. Canada announced the orderly welcoming of 15,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. However, the discussion about the official announcement underlines “irregular migration” while mainly talking about people seeking prompt and secure asylum. Cable media commentary often referred to an agreement to address “illegal arrivals” to Canada by people asking for asylum. Nonetheless, asking for asylum is a right that people have under U.S., Canadian, and international law. The issue is that some have arrived away from official ports of entry and then approached authorities to announce themselves and exercise their right to ask for asylum proactively. Under the new agreement, Canada can send migrants back to the United States if they have not applied for asylum in-country first and vice versa. This agreement further weakens the right to asylum in North America and criminalizes those seeking it. The often-mentioned record numbers are probably inaccurate regarding legal and undocumented migrants as a proportion of the population. Still, an increasing number of asylum seekers from Ukraine, Afghanistan, Haiti, Cuba, and the Americas are arriving at land borders. The announcement of this agreement with so much fanfare constitutes a narrowing of asylum avenues and conceding to the Canadian opposition’s framing of immigrants and asylum seekers as “burdens.” It contradicts the speeches of Biden and Trudeau at the North American Leaders Summit in Mexico City on January 10 and Biden’s speech at the Canadian parliament, which recognized the many contributions immigrants make and have made to both countries.

President Biden noted the continued interest of the U.S. and Canada in supporting democracy in the Western Hemisphere.

In the meantime, the Mexican President did not appreciate messages of alarm from the north about the proposed changes to the independent Mexican electoral agency (INE) and other signs of de-democratization. In turn, AMLO spoke about the possible criminal charges against Trump being politically motivated. He also wrongly stated that Mexico is safer than the U.S. after the killing and disappearances of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents in Mexico.

Therefore, a few months after the North American Leaders Summit, we see how some leaders are more concerned with national politics, popularity polls, and elections than working with other countries to face common problems. At the same time, working meetings about regional cooperation also serve as a reminder that despite nationalistic and isolationist presidents (like Trump was), civil servants continue working with their counterparts to make sure that regional trade, tourism, migration, consular relations, and educational and cultural exchanges continue.

March 28, 2023

*Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, Immigration Lab, and the MA in Sociology Research & Practice.

Fact-checking and editing by Karen Perez-Torres. Copy-editing by Mackenzie Cox.

CC BY-ND: This license allows reusers to copy and distribute the material in any medium or format in unadapted form only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator. The license allows for commercial use by news sites.

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by clalsstaff on March 28, 2023 • Permalink

Posted in Canada, Mexico, United States

Tagged asylum, Diplomacy, North American, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on March 28, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/03/28/editorial-takeaways-from-the-north-american-leaders-summit-and-bidens-visit-to-canada/

Colombia: Will New Drug Policies Damage U.S. Ties?

By Pedro Arenas*

Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Vice President Francia Márquez meeting with United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken / U.S. Department of State / Flickr / Creative Commons License

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s push for a major overhaul of the “war on drugs” is likely to cause tensions with Washington, but both sides appear to be proceeding with caution. Like its predecessors, the Biden Administration is reluctant to acknowledge the failure of the old tactics, but the burden will be on Petro to make the case that new approaches will work better.

Colombia has agreed with the United States on drug policies since the 1970s, with a focus on the Colombian Police and, later, the National Army. In 1996, the U.S. State Department said that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were directly engaged in narco-trafficking, which opened the door for deeper cooperation. With “Plan Colombia” in the 2000s, Bogotá made the war on drugs a central element of its counterinsurgency – and Washington became deeply involved despite the implications for human rights in affected regions.
The two countries put aerial eradication of coca crops and extradition of traffickers at the center of the relationship, even though the initiatives did not significantly reduce the production or flows of the narcotic into the United States. The cartels fragmented and grew more violent as they fought for control of the trade.

President Petro’s proposed reform is not the first challenge to the decades-old approach. A peace agreement between President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in 2016 challenged the nature and depth of cooperation. The accord included commitments in four areas: incentivizing coca growers to change crops (through agrarian reform and secure access to markets); stopping the traffic (through interdiction); eliminating money-laundering; and getting transit and consumer countries to do more to reduce demand. The goal was to reduce the trade and demand more than to criminalize the production of raw material.

Little progress was made before President Iván Duque (2018-2022) put the emphasis back onto classic supply reduction. (The Constitutional Court would not allow the resumption of aerial spraying for environmental and health reasons, but ground-based operations increased.) The United States continued to demand increased eradication of coca, while continuing to reinforce police and military bases and cooperating in narco arrests.
Petro argues that peace in Colombia should start with the reform of these policies. (Colombia has suffered a conflict with 9 million victims.) He has proposed a permanent end to aerial spraying and an emphasis on crop substitution in coca-producing communities; expanded interdiction in the air, at sea, and on rivers; and greater efforts to bring all illegal armed groups, including narco-traffickers, into the national judicial system with assurances that they will not be extradited if they cooperate, compensate victims, and do not repeat their crimes.

Six Colombian think tanks (including the one I cofounded) have given the President recommendations on how to implement his priorities. The recommendations stress the need for internal Colombian reforms, most of which can be made without the permission of the United States. Important ones include ending the excessive use of criminal law in non-violent drug cases; suspending the use of force against communities in coca-producing areas; implementing the Peace Accord (including promised investments to fund alternative crops); permitting a regulated cannabis market; and opening markets of food products, with appropriate protection for users, derived from coca leaf.

Despite his progressive international discourse on the need to end the war on drugs, Petro’s opponents say that his proposals would make Colombia a narco-state, and peasant organizations are concerned that land eradication by the military and police forces will continue. The State Department’s top drug official initially said publicly that he saw “a problem” in Petro’s proposals, but Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with Petro on Monday said he “strongly supports the holistic approach that President Petro’s administration is taking,” and that the two administrations are “largely in sync” on drugs policy. They did not publicly address the thorny issue of extradition.

Washington will probably have difficulty making deep changes to policy, particularly as U.S. mid-term elections approach. In addition to competing perspectives on how to deal with crime, there are political sectors, bureaucracies, and powerful business interests that have benefited greatly from the past policy emphasis on criminalizing peasant production of coca leaf – even if the results have been questionable. Their justification is that the drug problem “would be worse if we didn’t do it.”
Petro surely knows he will have to be creative and patient with Washington. For instance, recently the Colombian Police chief received two U.S. helicopters, the first of 12, for protecting the forests in Colombia, suggesting the new President will seek common ground with the United States. He wants to avoid provoking Washington to use its anachronistic “decertification” process to punish him for showing insufficient commitment.

The six think tanks believe that Petro can thread the needle in the U.S. relationship and that, if implemented correctly, the reforms of drug policies will bring Colombia in line with international norms, including the protection of human rights, and win broad international support. A frank conversation among Latin America, Africa, Oceania, and Europe within the OAS or UN would benefit all.

* Pedro Arenas is cofounder of Corporación Viso Mutop, a Bogotá-based organization that facilities dialogue on sensitive issues among diverse social, political, and institutional actors.

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by clalsstaff on October 5, 2022 • Permalink

Posted in Colombia

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Diplomacy, Elections

Posted by clalsstaff on October 5, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/10/05/colombia-will-new-drug-policies-damage-u-s-ties/

Argentina: Is China Nostalgic for the Macri Era?

by Patricio Giusto*

Argentine President Alberto Fernández and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China / Casa Rosada / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons license

Argentina’s return to Peronism with the victory of President Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirchner in 2019 has not led to a rapprochement between Argentina and China as widely predicted. After the first half of the Fernández’s presidency, relations with China are riddled with unfulfilled promises, political and bureaucratic obstacles, detrimental economic measures, and other challenges. To some extent, paradoxically, Beijing might be missing center-right President Mauricio Macri’s times (2015-2019).

Fernández and other key figures of the Argentinean government frequently refer to the country’s “deep friendship” and “strategic relationship” with China. Under Fernández, Argentina has just joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, according to the official line, bilateral links are very strong. Of China’s top priorities for the relationship, however, almost nothing has been accomplished with Fernández. Fierce political struggles within the Fernández coalition have contributed to an erratic foreign policy that lacks of a comprehensive strategy on China. Mounting U.S. pressure on certain critical issues has also been a factor.

When Fernández traveled to Beijing to sign the BRI agreement three months ago, the two governments announced more than $13 billion in infrastructure investments, but they have released no details on projects or their financing.

The energy sector has been particularly messy for China with Fernández in charge.

An $8 billion nuclear power project with Hualong One technology has stalled as Argentina tries to renegotiate the financial conditions during a severe economic crisis – and faces tough diplomatic pressure from Washington to abandon the project. The Santa Cruz hydroelectric dams, the largest Chinese investment project in Argentina, have suffered constant economic restraints and union strikes for two years. An Argentinian financial default has provoked the total interruption of Chinese finance. PowerChina filed an official complaint about handling of its bid to build a Chihuidos hydroelectric dam in Neuquén province. The Belgrano II thermal power plant project with China’s CNTIC – financed by the U.S. EXIM Bank – has mysteriously never started. The oil company Sinopec, weary of economic volatility and strikes, sold its assets in Argentina in early 2020, affecting its operations.

The Argentinian government has slowed other forms of cooperation, apparently for security reasons, as well.

Buenos Aires announced, for example, that it alone would fund the Antarctic Logistics Pole project in Tierra del Fuego province that it had discussed with China. It has not acted on the long-awaited purchase of Chinese J-17 fighter jets and wheeled armored vehicles because of financial constraints and U.S. pressure, according to Ministry of Defense sources.
On another flagship project, management the Paraná-Paraguay waterway, the country’s most strategic fluvial corridor, Fernández decided to nationalize part of the operation and determined that only a Belgian company was a qualified partner.
In the agricultural sector, Fernández has also dismissed a Chinese investment project estimated to be worth $3.7 billion to develop the pork industry through the installation of mega-factories in different parts of the country.

Some Fernández policies have hurt Argentina’s interests directly as well. He suspended beef exports to China last year – supposedly to curb domestic inflation – but inflation continued to rise while Argentina lost hundreds of millions of dollars from exports and hurt Chinese buyers’ confidence. The country’s bilateral trade deficit with China reached a record $7.3 billion in 2021, after having decreased to $2 billion a year in Macri’s times.

The repeated friendly rhetoric and gestures between Argentinian and Chinese counterparts do not conceal the fact that the relationship under Fernández has been full of obstacles and frustrations for Beijing. President Macri’s international approach was openly pro-West and he had clear ideological differences with China, but there is no doubt that relations then were much more fluent and fruitful for both Argentina and China.

The second half of Alberto Fernández’s term is likely to be similarly plagued, with the critical issues blocking progress unlikely to be resolved. Argentina’s economic situation will almost certainly continue to worsen, depriving it of resources to hold up its side of any deal with China. U.S. pressure will continue being a key factor, aimed at restricting cooperation with China in critical issues for Washington’s agenda, such as telecommunications and defense. On the other hand, the two countries’ desire to find ways to cooperate will remain strong no matter who wins the Argentinian presidency in 2023, and China – if patient enough with the ups and downs of the relationship – will continue to be an irreplaceable partner for Argentina.

June 1, 2022

* Patricio Giusto is executive director of the Sino-Argentinian Observatory, an advisor to the Argentinian National Senate, and a visiting professor at Zhejiang University. He is also a researcher and associate professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina.

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by clalsstaff on June 1, 2022 • Permalink

Posted in Argentina

Tagged Diplomacy, Economy, Politics

Posted by clalsstaff on June 1, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/06/01/argentina-is-china-nostalgic-for-the-macri-era/

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