Neither Walls nor Deportations Can Stop Mobility and the Search for Asylum and Shelter
by Ernesto Castañeda
Question by Patricia Caro: Your book with Carina Cione, “Immigration Realities,”contradicts many of the ideas circulating about immigrants. Did you feel like it was time to write a book like this?
Answer by Ernesto Castañeda: Yes, the lies about migration have been going on for many years, but Trump placed immigration as the number one issue of his campaign, and he has spread many falsehoods. The public has many misunderstandings about who immigrants are, why they come, and what are the real economic, social, and cultural effects of immigration.
Q. What do you think is the stereotype about immigrants that has caused the most damage?
A. That immigrants are a threat. In many countries, people think that immigrants are taking jobs and houses from the locals. When moving to a new place, it is true that they need a job, but they also pay rent and thus generate more economic wealth. Also, as they are new, they are more likely to create innovations, start businesses, and generate more jobs for locals hiring them directly or through the goods and services they need. But that is something that is not visible to everyone, it is not immediate, and people find it very hard to imagine something they don’t see. However, research and the data clearly show that immigrants and refugees are net contributions in terms of fiscal taxes, economic output, as well as social, intellectual, culinary, and cultural contributions.
The other dangerous myth is that immigrants are a cultural threat. That, if they hear you speaking Spanish, it is because you may not speak English. But many people are bilingual. American culture can be respected and understood very well without immigrants having to forget their own culture. Teachers and administrators in public schools worry when newcomers who do not speak Spanish arrive, but young immigrants pick up English relatively quickly. So do their parents, if they have the time to learn or access to programs to help them do so. History and social science research show clearly that the children and grandchildren of immigrants are culturally indistinguishable from the locals’ descendants. We see this itself with Donald Trump. His paternal grandfather was an immigrant born in Germany, his mom was an immigrant born in Scotland and a native Gaelic speaker, and now DJT thinks he’s the most American of all.
Q. In your book, “Immigration Realities,” you argue that the border area is one of the safest places. It is surprising because the authorities denounce the insecurity of the area.
A. Yes, I was surprised, too. Northern Mexico has become dangerous in the last two decades. Many people think that the border region —on the U.S. side— is dangerous because of the immigrants who arrive, but as we did research for years for this chapter, we found that for an American citizen, especially middle-class white men, it is one of the safest places in the country. However, if you are a newly arrived immigrant, woman, LGBTQ, undocumented, of Indigenous origin, or someone who does not speak Spanish, you may indeed lose your life in the area. For an average citizen, being in El Paso, San Diego, Arizona, or any city, town, or border state, is very safe, and official data shows that crime rates are among the lowest in the United States. The immigrant who arrives at the border wall, asks for asylum, surrenders to the authorities. Those who have escaped the violence of their countries or come looking for work and try to pass through the desert without being arrested or found may indeed die trying. Nonetheless, there are no cases of someone who has committed a terrorist act within the United States who has crossed undocumented across the border with Mexico. The main concern is political violence among citizens and domestic terrorism.
Q. Is there a migration crisis or not?
A. No, no, no. The focus must be on crises abroad. There are crises in Haiti and Venezuela. An invasion of Ukraine, and a civil war ending in Syria. There are wars and tragedies in those and other countries. The displacement of Ukrainian women and children to save their own lives is a humanitarian problem but the main issue is the continued bombing of cities. Conflict-related displacement is not a permanent state. E.g., now with the fall of Assad, we are seeing that many Syrians immediately are returning home. More will do so if things get stabilized there. If Russia ended the war tomorrow, Ukrainians would look forward to returning if their houses were still standing or if they could afford to rebuild. So, it is not a migration crisis first and foremost; it is an armed conflict, it is a genocide, a civil war, a famine, or climate change, that makes people move. Some say people go to other countries because they are rich, but another way of seeing it is that rich countries are rich because they have relatively a lot of migration.
Japan and China are in relative economic decline because of population decline and too little immigration. Japan does not find a way to attract international people, because it has no tradition nor a good record of receiving immigrants. America has been very successful in turning into American people coming from around the world, something that Trump wants to change. Nevertheless, these trends and traditions are difficult to do away with. But if successful, it would be a real decline for the American economy. It is a wish of MAGA people, but if it comes true, it is not going to make America Great Again, it is going to create some of the weakest America in history.
This interview is an edited and extended translation of the interview with Patricia Caro for El País U.S. Spanish edition published here on January 1, 2025.
In 2023, around 43.4 million people globally were recognized as refugees; of that 43.4 million, only about 60,000 were admitted to be resettled in the United States (UNHCR; OHSS). The number of refugees admitted for resettlement is determined by the cap established by the current president and Congress. This cap has fluctuated largely over the past eight years, with the lowest annual ceiling and number of admitted refugees set by former President Trump in 2017 at 50,000. During his final year in office, 2020, he lowered the cap to 18,000 and the number of refugees admitted fell to 11,000. These admittances were much lower than after, including tighter vetting and restrictions following 9/11.
What exactly defines someone as a refugee? Does it mean they are coming to the United States entirely of their own choice? Will they impose a significant financial burden on U.S. taxpayers? Are they a danger to the safety of U.S. citizens? These are all fair considerations, and while no system is perfect, the refugee vetting and resettlement process in the United States is very secure, safe, and economically beneficial. However, it is becoming increasingly limited, leading to many individuals being denied the opportunity to obtain refuge in the U.S.
Do refugees decide to come to the U.S. of their own autonomous choice?
No, refugees are considered to be forcibly displaced peoples, meaning that their choice to leave is a matter of personal safety, of life and death. To apply for refugee status, a person must have fled and remain outside their home country. To be eligible for refugee status, they must be able to prove a well-founded fear of persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” and be unable or unwilling to return to their home country (UNHCR). This initial qualification is decided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which then refers the case to a resettlement country (such as the U.S.).
Before traveling to the U.S., refugees must undergo a lengthy vetting process that can take up to 36 months and will continue upon arrival in the U.S. This vetting process includes background checks, security clearances, in-person interviews, and medical clearances run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). If the refugee application is rejected during the interview process, it cannot be appealed. If it is accepted, it is only on a conditional basis and is dependent on further medical and security checks. Refugees will also receive a cultural orientation about what to expect upon their arrival in the United States. Finally, the refugee’s case will be designated to a particular refugee resettlement agency and location in the U.S. (there are only 10 approved agencies as of December 2024). Once the refugees arrive, they will receive care from their refugee resettlement agency for 90 days. The resettlement process for refugees in the U.S. is complex and rigorous, but it also serves as a vital lifeline for those fleeing life-threatening circumstances in search of safety and protection.
Do refugees cost U.S. taxpayers lots of money?
No, while refugees who have been in the U.S. less than five years have a median income of about $30,000, that median increases to $70,000 after twenty years. Additionally, studies have shown that refugees end up contributing more than they receive in benefits, paying up to twice as much in the long run. In 2019 alone, the 2.4 million refugees in the United States earned $93.6 billion in income through their contributions to American enterprises and organizations, paid $25 billion in taxes, and were left with $68.6 billion of disposable income, some of which will be spent or invested in U.S. businesses.
You may be wondering, if refugees are making so much money, does that mean they are taking jobs from U.S.-born citizens? The answer is no. Research shows that refugees fill three important gaps within the U.S. labor market: entrepreneurship, the service industry, and slightly rejuvenating an overall aging U.S.-born population. In 2019, 19% of refugees in the U.S. were entrepreneurs compared to only 9% of U.S.-born citizens and generated business income of $5.1 billion. Refugees also participate in the workforce at a rate of over 80%, a rate of almost 20% more than the overall national average (at around 60%), and are two times more likely than U.S.-born citizens to work in the service industry. The population of the United States is aging, and it is predicted that over 20% of people in the United States will be 65 or older in 15 years, compared to only 16% in 2016. Furthermore, almost 80% of the current refugee population is of working age compared to only 60% of the U.S.-born population. In conclusion, refugees contribute significantly to the U.S. economy and help address critical labor market needs, making them valuable assets.
Are refugees a danger to the safety of U.S. citizens?
Research demonstrates that the growing presence of refugees and immigrants in U.S. cities does not lead to increased crime rates; in fact, it often correlates with stability or reductions in crime. Studies spanning from 1980 to 2022 reveal a clear pattern: areas that welcome diverse populations experience steady or declining rates of both property and violent crimes.
Lowered crime rates for refugees come in conjunction with successful integration into a local community and job market. Refugees undergo thorough vetting processes, which makes it unlikely for individuals with a predisposition to criminal behavior to receive approval. Furthermore, as refugees are assigned to resettlement agencies, they receive support to help them integrate into their communities and the local job market. These agencies work closely with refugees and can address any inappropriate behaviors at the start of the resettlement process. The evidence clearly indicates that embracing refugees enriches communities and makes them safer.
Possible Impacts of a Second Trump Term on Refugee Resettlement
As you can see, refugee resettlement is a system with many benefits; however, its future is uncertain. Refugee resettlement organizations rely on government funding to resettle and support refugees during their 90-day resettlement period. During the first Trump administration, the cap for refugees allowed was significantly reduced, and subsequently, funding decreased. Despite the proven success of refugee resettlement, Donald Trump has promised to target the system once again under a second term. He may once again push to allow states the right to refuse refugee resettlement, putting an undue burden on certain areas of the country and creating further barriers to integration. Finally, Trump may also target private sponsorship for refugees which allows communities to privately sponsor, fundraise for, and resettle refugees, leading to better integration, economic participation, and a lesser cost for the government and U.S. taxpayers.
A Series of Travel Bans (AKA Muslim Bans)
Like during his first term, he may implement travel bans, further spreading the harmful and misinformed narrative that refugees from Muslim-majority countries have ties with terrorism. At the beginning of 2017, Trump signed an executive order, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, which banned entry to the United States for 90 days for citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries–Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen–and prohibited entry for refugees from Sudan indefinitely. Six weeks later, he signed another executive order that removed Iraq from the list and halted all refugee admissions for 120 days. Later in 2017, Trump signed a third executive order, which included travel restrictions for two additional countries, Chad and North Korea, as well as stricter vetting procedures. Although many of Trump’s critics dubbed these travel bans as Muslim bans, many of his supporters as well as the Department of Homeland Security, were insistent that these bans were solely focused on addressing and preventing terrorism threats. But the fact is that these bans greatly and unduly affected immigrants and refugees from Muslim-majority countries.
The implementation of such bans unjustly put numerous refugees from these countries at risk and tore families apart. It also contributed to a rise in hate crimes targeting Muslim communities in the United States. Additionally, this ban was implemented under the guise of addressing ethnic and religious terrorism threats in the United States. However, the number of arrests for suspected terrorist plots and acts of terrorism in the U.S. has been very small. In fact, threats of domestic terrorism from far-right extremists occur at a higher rate (40% more) than Islamic terrorist events. This policy was ineffective, and it caused great psychological and physical harm to Muslim communities in the U.S. due to increased Islamophobia and hate crimes.
Opting Out of Resettlement
During Trump’s first term, he signed an executive order requiring local refugee resettlement agencies in the U.S. to obtain written permission from their local and state governments to continue resettling refugees. This order would also have allowed state governors to opt their entire state out of refugee resettlement. Although a federal judge blocked this order, Trump has continued to advocate for lower immigration levels and increased local control over resettlement.
Implementing a policy like this in his second term could alienate refugees and place an undue short-term burden on areas willing to accept them. Additionally, opting out of refugee resettlement could have significant negative economic impacts on the longer-term for areas missing out. Before the executive order was blocked, Texas Governor Greg Abbott had opted out of refugee resettlement, a choice that could have cost the state around $17 million. Implementing such restrictive policies could undermine the humanitarian goals of refugee resettlement and hinder economic growth in states with communities that are willing to embrace diversity and support vulnerable populations.
The United States has long provided refuge to those fleeing persecution, violence, and life-threatening circumstances. Refugee resettlement has great humanitarian importance and provides a safe, secure, and economically beneficial system that strengthens communities and the workforce. However, this important system faces significant threats. During his first term, Trump’s policies drastically reduced the number of refugees allowed in the United States, perpetuated negative stereotypes, and attacked resettlement infrastructure. The second Trump term could once again target this system through travel bans and restrictions on local resettlement–actions that would harm refugees, the U.S. economy, local communities, and international reputation.
Rather than working to tear down a system that saves lives and benefits our country, there must be a shift in focus on protecting, expanding, and strengthening it. Refugees enrich a society through economic contributions, filling labor shortage gaps, and expanding cultural diversity, all while undergoing one of the most secure and rigorous vetting processes in the world. The United States should move away from narratives driven by fear and misinformation and instead endorse policies that promote the overall well-being of refugees, benefiting the nation’s prosperity as a whole.
Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior in Sociology student at American University.
Por Dra. Nayana Guerrero, Azucena Enríquez, Paola Baltazar, Luisa Barajas, Cecilia Pineda, Jimena Sandoval y Victoria Rivera
16 de diciembre de 2024
La Doctora Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo rompió el techo de cristal en México. A 71 años de haber obtenido el derecho a votar y ser reconocidas como ciudadanas, hoy las mujeres de México pueden permitirse aspirar a ser presidentas. Ya no existen más los imposibles en las metas de las nuevas y viejas generaciones, se demuestra con la Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum que si se puede y se podrá para muchas mujeres más. A continuación, se presenta el impacto de tener una mujer a la cabeza del país en México, el largo camino del derecho al voto de las mexicanas y la importancia de la utilización del lenguaje incluyente y no sexista.
Barbie dijo, “Sé lo que quieras ser,” y hoy ya podemos ser presidentas. Las niñas ya no solo pueden jugar a ser presidentas también pueden serlo. Tener una mujer presidenta es una motivación e inspiración para las niñas y jóvenes. Antes ocupar un puesto de liderazgo político era cosa de hombres; hoy, en México, es una realidad que cualquier mujer puede ser líder y tener un alto cargo en el gobierno del país. Es inspirador que una mujer ocupe un puesto de liderazgo político porque mujeres empoderadas, empoderan mujeres.
Sin embargo, no ha sido un recorrido sencillo ni corto. Tuvieron que pasar 71 años para romper el techo de cristal, una metáfora que designa un tope para la realización de la mujer en la vida pública y profesional, generado por los estereotipos de género.
El derecho al voto para la mujer no fue un derecho concedido, es parte de una lucha que duró años y que empezó a exigirse a inicios del siglo XX. El sufragio femenino en México fue impulsado por múltiples mujeres entre las que destacan Elvia Carrillo Puerto, Hermila Galindo, Margarita Robles de Mendoza, María Ríos Cárdenas y Esther Chapa.
Margarita Robles de Mendoza y Elvia Carrillo Puerto, son reconocidas como unas de las primeras sufragistas mexicanas exigiendo los derechos políticos de las mujeres, siendo esta última una de las primeras mujeres electas.
María Ríos Cárdenas, Esther Chapa, y Hermila Galindo exigen el derecho al voto a través de mítines políticos, huelgas de hambre y manifestaciones. Marcando un momento clave en la lucha por el sufragio femenino, Hermila Galindo solicitó por primera vez al congreso constituyente el voto femenino en 1917.
No fue hasta mitad del siglo XX, el 17 de octubre de 1953 que las mujeres lograron el derecho a votar y a ser votadas. Sin embargo, en México sólo 8 mujeres han sido candidatas a la presidencia. En 1982, Rosario Ibarra de Piedra se postuló como la primera candidata a la presidencia de México. Pero no fue sino hasta 2024 que como lo indicó la presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum en su discurso de toma de protesta “por primera vez no en 200 años, sino en 500 años no había habido una mujer presidenta de México.” Ha sido una lucha larga y con altibajos en la que Sheinbaum dijo ¡No llego sola, llegamos todas las mujeres de México!
Por primera vez en la historia de México se utiliza la palabra presidenta. Si existe la palabra reina para referirse a la máxima soberana de una monarquía, ¿por qué no feminizar presidenta cuando se trata de una república?
En el “video del acertijo” la periodista Inma Gil Rosendo habla sobre la parcialidad implícita que se define como un prejuicio inconsciente que puede dar lugar a una falta de neutralidad. Estos estereotipos subconscientes relacionan conceptos y rango de poder con categorías de personas. Por ejemple, cuando pensamos en quién puede liderar un país frecuentemente pensamos en un hombre.
La Presidenta de México indicó en su discurso de toma de protesta la importancia del lenguaje incluyente no sexista. Constantemente en sus intervenciones la Dra. Sheinbaum subraya la necesidad de visibilizar la presencia de las mujeres en las diferentes profesiones, cargos y oficios.
La carencia histórica de términos femeninos referidos a cargos y oficios se vincula con la lucha de la historia de las mujeres en abrirse caminos en espacios mayormente masculinizados.
El lenguaje incluyente y no sexista hace referencia a toda forma de expresión sin discriminación. El lenguaje inclusivo busca promover una cultura de igualdad y reconocimiento de los derechos de las mujeres.
Lo que no se nombra no existe. La forma de expresión ha sido mayormente androcéntrica. El androcentrismo expresa una visión del mundo donde el hombre es el referente por default, el modelo a seguir. Históricamente los espacios de toma de decisiones han sido ocupados mayormente por hombres, pero esto está cambiando.
La presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum ha dicho que es “tiempo de mujeres” lo que representa romper los estereotipos y las barreras que enfrentan las mujeres en varias esferas de la vida, es una oportunidad contra la violencia de género, pero sobre todo el momento de alcanzar la igualdad sustantiva.
Dra. Nayana María Guerrero Ramírez es profesora titular de la asignatura empresarial “liderazgo de las mujeres en las organizaciones para el desarrollo sostenible” que se imparte en la Facultad de Contaduría y Administración de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, es antigua académica global en American University y forma parte del comité directivo de la Red UNAM DC.
Azucena Enríquez García es profesora adjunta de la asignatura empresarial.
Paola Baltazar Vargas, Luisa Maria Barajas Torres, Cecilia Pineda Vargas Frida, Jimena Sandoval Vázquez y Victoria Rivera Mejia son alumnas de la asignatura empresarial.
Este texto es parte del trabajo final de la asignatura “liderazgo de las mujeres en las organizaciones para el desarrollo sostenible” que se imparte en la Facultad de Contaduría y Administración de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
According to the UNHCR, the real crisis is that a few countries have “a disproportionate responsibility for taking newcomers,” and not there is a relatively disproportionate number of arrivals:
Politicians and journalists speak of “immigrant and refugeecrises,” but the authors explain why “we see it as a political crisis, not a crisis of migration.”
The constant production of refugee crises influences the public’s political and social views about migration.
“Migration cannot be “solved” because it is a timeless and constantly fluctuating phenomenon.”
It is an open secret that the strong opinions that people often have are based on idiosyncratic personal experiences, prejudiced views, and false assumptions spread by politicians and mainstream media.
However, the average citizen often does not have all the facts at hand to look at the topic of migration from an objective yet sensitive perspective – and cannot do so.
The authors attach great importance to summarizing academic literature to help promote public understanding of today’s international migration.
The recent book summarizes relevant research results on common myths for readers who are not familiar with contemporary migration or border studies.
In other words, the authors present the relevant scientific research, which is often closed behind paywalls, research specialization, and subject-specific jargon so that most readers find it awkward and difficult to understand. This book is clearly aimed at the general public.
Each chapter revolves around a certain misunderstanding and can be read as an independent work or together with the others. The individual chapters contain relevant and up-to-date knowledge about the realities of migration, which is presented in such a way that it is also appealing and accessible to non-professionals.
Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione distinguish how some rhetoric accuses, patronizes, and criminalizes refugees, which, in connection with xenophobia, stereotypes, and fear-mongering, support the myth of a crisis.
A refugee is defined as someone who has left his home country and cannot return because he has a reasonable fear of violence and/or persecution due to his identity or political conviction.
The word has two meanings: a “legal meaning” that describes a person entitled to asylum under international law, and a “colloquial meaning” that describes a person who has fled their homeland. The criteria for international recognition as a refugee are strict, and other displaced people can be wrongly referred to as refugees.Neo-colonialism under the auspices of neoliberal capitalism, for example, contributed to the fact that entire regions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which were first described as “the third world” and then now the “Global South,” because they were oppressed in the past and the present, and not simply because of their low national income or the degree of integration into international trade.
Every “refugee crisis” is a socially constructed term that distracts from the real problem: the high-income and imperialist countries do not take responsibility for their violent actions because they benefit from the equally violent postcolonial world order.
The current neo-colonial conditions are undoubtedly part of the neoliberal driven dismantling of the welfare state, which leads to a lack of state programs for the public and the acceptance of tax cuts for the rich.
Globalization and migration are presented as two sides of the same coin, but in reality, they are very different phenomena – economic globalization and migration are not causal since migration tendencies do not necessarily agree with trade trends: periods of expanding international trade do not always correlate with migration waves or vice versa.
The authors also clarify usual terms such as “integration, assimilation, and acculturation.” Yours truly, for example, has so far preferred the term “acclimatization” to “assimilation” and “integration.”
According to Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione, comprehensive integration is a social integration; it does not mean cultural assimilation to the morals of the dominant group, but rather presupposes certain negotiations, reciprocal communication, and mutual influence.
Integration is often mistakenly equated with assimilation and acculturation. However, these are different concepts.
Acculturation refers to the process of getting to know the culture of the new place of residence and the achievement of a fluid cultural language. Immigrants can acculturate while maintaining many of their native traditions and culture.
In the spirit of Ernesto Castañeda’s previous work, social integration means equality and equal opportunities while maintaining cultural differences.
Assimilation is based on intolerance towards identities that deviate from the dominant and often Eurocentric culture.
Migration is an inherent human phenomenon that is subject to changes that are influenced by local and national political, economic, and social conditions. Data relating to the overall world population does not allow the conclusion that globalization is driving migration forward.
Research refutes widespread misconceptions about immigration. In fact, only 3.5% of the world’s population live in a country other than the one in which they were born.
Worldwide, the percentage of people who change residences due to war, political or religious persecution, poverty, or lack of opportunity is not as high as ever before and is not unmanageable for host countries.
Migration is a geographical and social relocation process. Subjective affiliation also depends on the objective conditions, including the absorption capacity of the new environment and the attitude of the locals towards immigrant groups.
In the US, for example, there is still no national integration program specifically designed to support immigrant integration. Migrants are expected to go through this process alone.
In sum, “Immigration Realities” is an indispensable masterpiece of intellectual honesty.
Immigration Realities – Challenging Common Misperceptions, by Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione – Columbia University Press, Nov 2024.
Originally published in German in ACEMAXX-ANALYTICS’s Newsletter!
Donald Trump ha prometido deportar a millones de inmigrantes si es elegido para un segundo mandato, afirmando que, entre otras cosas, los trabajadores nacidos en el extranjero les quitan el trabajo a los locales. Su compañero de fórmula, JD Vance ha hecho eco de esas opiniones antiinmigrantes.
Los científicos sociales y los analistas tienden a estar de acuerdo en que la inmigración —tanto de personas documentadas como indocumentadas— estimula el crecimiento económico. Pero es casi imposible calcular directamente cuánto contribuyen los inmigrantes a la economía. Eso se debe a que no conocemos los ingresos de cada trabajador inmigrante en los Estados Unidos.
Sin embargo, tenemos una buena idea de cuánto envían a sus países de origen; más de 81 mil millones de dólares en 2022, según el Banco Mundial. Podemos utilizar esta cifra para calcular indirectamente el valor económico total que genera la mano de obra inmigrante en EE. UU.
Es probable que se subestimen las contribuciones económicas
Teniendo en cuenta eso, estimamos que los inmigrantes que enviaron remesas en 2022 tuvieron salarios netos de más de $466 mil millones. Luego, suponiendo que sus salarios netos representan alrededor del 21% del valor económico de lo que producen para las empresas donde trabajan, por ejemplo, en restaurantes y construcción, los inmigrantes agregaron un total de $2,2 billones a la economía estadounidense sólo en 2022.
Esto es aproximadamente el 8% del producto interno bruto de los Estados Unidos y cerca de todo el PIB de Canadá para 2022,la novena economía más grande del mundo.
Los Inmigrantes en Estados Unidos que mandan dinero al extranjero crean al menos $2 billones en actividad económica
Basado en cuanto dinero los inmigrantes en Estados Unidos envían al exterior en 2022, los académicos estimaron los ingresos y de allí, cuanta productividad generaron en la economía estadunidense. El estudio estimó que las contribuciones totales de los migrantes a la economía estadunidense exceden $2 billones (trillones en inglés) en 2022.
La inmigración fortalece a Estados Unidos
Más allá de su gran valor, esta cifra nos dice algo importante: los principales beneficiarios de la mano de obra inmigrante son la economía y la sociedad de Estados Unidos.
Los 81 mil millones de dólares que los inmigrantes enviaron a casa en 2022 son una pequeña fracción del valor total con el que contribuyen a la economía: 2.2 billones de dólares. La gran mayoría de los salarios y la productividad de los inmigrantes (el 96 %) se queda en Estados Unidos.
Es probable que las contribuciones económicas de los inmigrantes estadounidenses sean incluso más sustanciales de lo que calculamos.
Por un lado, la estimación del Banco Mundial sobre las remesas de inmigrantes es probablemente un recuento insuficiente, ya que muchos inmigrantes envían dinero al exterior con personas que viajan a sus países de origen.
En investigaciones previas, mis colegas y yo también hemos descubierto que algunos grupos de inmigrantes tienen menos probabilidades de enviar remesas que otros.
Uno de ellos son los profesionales de cuello blanco: inmigrantes con carreras en la banca, ciencia, tecnología y educación, por ejemplo. A diferencia de muchos inmigrantes indocumentados, los profesionales de cuello blanco generalmente tienen visas que les permiten traer a sus familias con ellos, por lo que no necesitan enviar dinero al extranjero para cubrir sus gastos domésticos. De igual forma, los inmigrantes que han estado trabajando en el país durante décadas y tienen más familiares en el país también tienden a enviar remesas con menos frecuencia. Ambos grupos tienen mayores ingresos y sus contribuciones no están incluidas en nuestra estimación de 2,2 billones de dólares.
Además, nuestras estimaciones no tienen en cuenta el crecimiento económico estimulado por los inmigrantes cuando gastan dinero en los EE. UU., creando demanda, generando empleos y empezando negocios que contratan inmigrantes y locales.
Por ejemplo, calculamos los aportes de los inmigrantes salvadoreños y solo sus hijos agregaron aproximadamente 223 mil millones de dólares a la economía de Estados Unidos en 2023. Eso es aproximadamente el 1% del PIB total del país.
Teniendo en cuenta que la economía de Estados Unidos creció alrededor de un 2% en 2022 y 2023, esa es una suma sustancial.
Las cifras qué presentamos son un recordatorio de que parte del éxito financiero de Estados Unidos depende de los inmigrantes y su trabajo.
Ernesto Castañeda es director del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos y del Laboratorio sobre la Inmigración de American University.
Edgar Aguilar ayudo con la preparación, análisis y traducción.
You can republish and reprint this piece in full or in part as long as you credit the author and link to the original when possible.
A table full of vegetables including celery and carrots.
Addressing and combatting food insecurity requires a coordinated approach across all sectors, including nonprofit organizations, government agencies, and private corporations. Although these varying groups may approach the cause differently, there is a shared goal of increasing food security. This analysis was influenced by my experience working in a nonprofit addressing food insecurity as well as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the Food and Nutrition Service. My experiences gave me valuable insights into the stark differences between government and nonprofit organizations. in understanding, approaching, and solving food insecurity between government and nonprofit organizations.
The mission of the USDA Food and Nutrition Service is stated as, “To increase food security and reduce hunger in partnership with cooperating organizations by providing children and low-income people access to food, a healthy diet and nutrition education in a manner that supports American agriculture and inspires public confidence.” They administer 15 federal assistance programs including SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), school meals, CACFP (Child and Adult Food Care Program), WIC (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and Children), TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). My responsibilities included reviewing and editing resources that program administrators used to properly procure and serve food that aligns with the nutritional standards set by the agency. This opportunity allowed me to gain experience in the federal processes that go into the nutrition programs that serve and assist millions of Americans.
The nonprofit organization I worked with aimed their mission as, “Striving to eliminate hunger in the nation’s capital while enhancing the nutrition, health, financial stability, and overall well-being of low-income residents in the District.” Their main focuses are on D.C. resident participation in federal nutrition programs, improving public policies, and educating the public on the reality of hunger’s existence within the District. My responsibilities were increasing SNAP and WIC participation by creating relationships with residents and producing educational content. This role gave me first-hand experience with the communities directly affected by food insecurity and allowed me to see how the policy created by our government affects Americans every day.
The differences I noted between the two experiences varied, from how the meetings were conducted to how they defined activism. Within the USDA, meetings were highly structured, with a specific focus on compliance with federal regulations and guidelines. I found the weekly staff meetings to be lively, with a lot of small talk and team activities. On the contrary, the nonprofit team meetings were centered around community intervention with little to no small talk and few team connection activities. These differences were notable for me, as they showed the discrepant level of urgency in the line of work between the two sectors. This could be attributed to numerous factors, including different standards and regulations each organization is held to. Nevertheless, it shined light on the importance of nonprofit organizations supporting USDA policy.
Additionally, the difference in staffing retention and burnout between the two organizations was striking. Throughout my year at the nonprofit, I saw many team members resign from positions due to the stress and emotional toll that comes with aiding underserved communities. Furthermore, there were few to no employees who had been with the organization for over four years. In my year with the organization, I witnessed the reinstating of three different presidents and the resignation of two. Whereas in the USDA, most employees had high tenure, with some even reaching 20-25 years in the agency. This difference in retention is a common problem, in the nonprofit sector. With limited funding and resources, staff often are forced to take on responsibilities beyond their original job description, working long hours to meet deadlines, and to keep up with the needs of District residents. In the government, however, there are strict guidelines in place limiting hours worked by each employee and the duties they are permitted to perform, helping keep their retention rate high.
Beyond job loss from burnout, I also witnessed the nonprofit organization’s largest layoff period in its history. Essential positions such as communications and public relations coordinators, government affairs specialists, and others were released from the organization due to large budget cuts. Additionally, other employees were forced to take furlough days to keep their jobs afloat. In contrast, job stability within the government sector was a promising factor for prospective employees. The federal government, the largest employer in the United States, provides comprehensive benefits and job security.
Overall, both organizations play vital roles in supporting and combatting food insecurity nationwide. The government creates vital policies and budgets to support the “boots on the ground” and educational information that nonprofit organizations work tirelessly to implement. Through these experiences, I was able to see the varying factors that go into supporting our neighbors who experience food insecurity every day. Having worked at a nonprofit before the USDA allowed my work through the government to remain grounded in the experiences of those we are seeking to help. Therefore, policymakers and direct service providers should better collaborate in hopes of making these efforts more effective.
Lia Sullivan is an MA student in the Sociology and Research Program at American University.
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Nearly half of American adults feel that immigration threatens national identity. This proportion has increased in recent years as anti-immigration sentiments have surged in politics and partisan divergence has deepened in rhetoric. The former Trump administration was highly influential in the anti-immigration movement, with much of Trump’s campaigns hinging on xenophobic policies like building a wall on the southern border and ending DACA. Such policies jeopardize the human rights of immigrants in the United States, who make up nearly 14% of the U.S. population. The Biden administration’s handling of immigration has also been criticized by 60% of Americans, indicating that the ongoing conflict over immigration is worsening.
Polls from PBS NewsHour, 2024.
Why is migration so controversial? Shouldn’t people be allowed to migrate safely?
The answer lies in white supremacy and ‘tax dollars.’
At a 1983 Conservative Party conference, former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously said, “If the State wishes to spend more, it can do so only by borrowing your savings or by taxing you more. It is no good thinking that someone else will pay—that ‘someone else’ is you. There is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers’ money.” Like many politicians, Thatcher propagated the notion that government spending relies on taxpayers’ money, placing the burden of spending on individuals.
Similar sentiments are not uncommon in the United States. Former Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, featured this tagline in his 2018 campaign targeting his opponent: “Tony Evers: Special treatment for illegals, higher taxes for you.” Donald Trump continues to campaign on anti-immigration policies to appeal to Americans who feel skeptical about their tax dollars going to immigrant welcoming programs. Trump’s campaign website highlights “20 Core Campaign Promises to Make America Great Again,” two of which focus on blocking immigration, including the first promise: “Seal the border and stop the migrant invasion.” These arguments are used to justify relatively small government investment in important services that benefit communities of color and immigrants by suggesting they would be an imposition on the ‘taxpayer.’
To understand the historical use of the term ‘tax dollars,’ Camille Walsh analyzed hundreds of letters defending racial segregation addressed to the Supreme Court in the years following the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). One-third of the letters consisted of some language about taxes, taxpayers, or having “paid” for public schools, implying the right to decide whether to keep them segregated. The American ‘taxpayer’ historically represents white individuals, and such language “obscured class divisions among whites and elevated those racialized groups presumed to have higher taxable income to a higher position in claiming citizenship rights.” White individuals like Aura Lee (1956), argued that “poor white taxpayers are entitled to enjoy some all-white places, if they so desire.”
As the term ‘taxpayer’ is historically associated with whiteness, it is used to justify the entitlement of resources concentrated in white communities. Meanwhile, the ‘nontaxpayer’ is meant to symbolize Black and Brown individuals who are perceived not to have “earned” their rights. While this argument is used to exclude people of color from resources, historian James Anderson finds that taxes from predominantly Black communities were at least as much during the time of the Brown ruling, and often higher than those of white neighborhoods. These taxes were often distributed by white school boards into all-white schools prior to Brown. This does not account for today’s common tax evasion of the nation’s wealthiest individuals and corporations. The Treasury Department estimates that there is a $160 billion gap between what the wealthiest 1% of the population should pay and what they actually pay.
Seventy years after the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, politicians, citizens, and the media hold ‘taxpayer dollars’ to be sacred. Similar to the discussions surrounding racial integration in the mid-20th century, immigration represents a battle between the ‘taxpayer,’ or white American, and the ‘nontaxpayer,’ or immigrant. Just as white parents feared sending their children to integrated schools with “much lower standards and run-down facilities than the ones that [they] helped pay for,” many white Americans do not want immigrants to have access to vital resources and fear the use of their dollars on government spending.
Nevertheless, between sales taxes and property taxes, undocumented immigrants pay billions of dollars in taxes each year. Not only are immigrants taxpayers, but they pay taxes at higher rates than the richest Americans and get less in return. Taxpayer rhetoric is another weapon of othering by separating white U.S.-born individuals from Black and Brown immigrants, regardless of who pays their taxes.
Graph from the American Immigration Council (2016).
A quote from former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan counters concerns about government spending causing a deficit, stating: “There is nothing to prevent the government from creating as much money as it wants.” Similar to banks not lending out depositors’ money, government spending does not use tax dollars for spending. To illustrate this, the U.S. government spent trillions on wars post-9/11 and hundreds of billions to bail out banks in 2008, neither of which were framed as a tax dollar problem. Despite the framing of funding essential services as an attack on individual taxpayers, in reality, it falls within the bounds of federal government spending.
International law considers migration to be a universal right. Immigration control “is a relatively recent invention of states,” according to Vincent Chetail, a professor of international law. The U.S. has a duty to protect the rights of all people and not discriminate based on race, national origin, religion, or any other group category according to the 14th Amendment, and many international treaties it is a party to.
Research indicates that government investments in immigrants have a higher return over time. For example, more educated immigrants earn more and, therefore, pay more in taxes. Fiscal concerns are not based on reality, as immigrants are net contributors to the federal budget. ‘Tax dollars’ are simply a code for white dollars to instill fear and discrimination against vulnerable populations, despite taxation realities.
Mary Capone is a researcher at the Immigration Lab at American University.
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Myths about the Causes Behind the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election Results
By Ernesto Castañeda
November 16, 2024
I was wrong about Harris winning. Concerns about the future of democracy were mainly an issue for around 32% of those who voted for Democrats (according to NBC exit polls). The uncommitted, abstainers, and disengaged affected turnout. Both candidates were voted by a diverse electorate. As I wrote before the election, “An unintended effect of Trump’s hate speech has created a certain increase in support among some Black, Latino, and Asian voters.” This was not enough in itself for Trump to win, but it added to the lead among White voters. What I wrote about the rightward shift of the Latino vote [here, here, and here] holds true.
Cable news coverage across the board has obsessed with “immigration” and “the economy” being the main concerns of the electorate and that public opinion favors Trump to handle them. But in polls and exit polls, these were the main issues for less than half of the electorate, and they were the main issues for Republican respondents, who naturally favor Trump’s solutions in these areas.
In terms of the “economy,” members of union households voted slightly more for Democrats (53%) than non-union households (47%). The voting split was not that different across income brackets. Even if unemployment is low, and wage and economic growth rates are positive and steady, with a big improvement from 2020, still many minimum-wage earners and the lower middle class are no longer happy with the economic status quo, as I wrote here.
The biggest errors in the 2024 election coverage have been the out-of-proportion focus on the economy and immigration as the biggest concerns of all voters when, indeed, these complaints are not fully based on reality and are mainly coming from Republican-leaning voters. But the exaggeration around immigrants did not cost Trump the election and probably reinforced his dog whistles and helped in an election against a Black female opponent. Her identity was my major question here about whether Nikki Haley supporters, independents, and enough White men without a college education could vote and actively campaign for Harris.
The Harris campaign was strong, but its short duration meant that many voters did not feel like they knew her well enough. The campaign was careful to stick to the center and even to appeal to Republicans. As in 2016, in 2024, more White women supported Trump than the female candidate. In some states, they voted for Trump and still voted for some protections for abortion in certain cases.
Trump did not win because of the politicization of immigration. One reason for this is that only in a few polls did “immigration” rank as the main concern for over 50% of likely voters. Only a minority said they would vote for a presidential candidate solely on that issue. Those who did were over 70% Republican across polls. There was a similar dynamic regarding “economics.” It was misleading, both during the campaign and after the election, to assert that the primary concerns of the electorate are the economy and immigration. For example, an exit poll from ten key states conducted by NBC shows that only 11% of the electorate saw immigration as the issue that “mattered most” for their vote (when given only five possible issues), and of those voters, 90% of them were Republican.
A different response to that poll sheds further light on the polarization along party lines regarding immigration policy: 75% of Democrats (and 56% of respondents overall) support offering a chance for undocumented immigrants to apply for legal status. In contrast, 87% of Republicans (40% of respondents overall) favor deportation.
Immigration is not the weakness for Democrats that many make it to be. Still, the Harris campaign was hesitant to discuss immigration or border issues in detail. This is largely due to the narrative among mainstream media pundits and consultants, who believe that Trump’s “strengths” lie in the economy and immigration, as these same polls indicated that voters trusted Trump slightly more on these issues. However, this average was significantly impacted by Republican respondents, and the headlines failed to mention that respondents across party identification trusted Harris more on most other issues. Regardless of rhetoric or immigration policies presented by the Democrats (whether it was the bipartisan Senate deal or restriction on asylum seeking at the border), Trump supporters were always going to vote for Trump. As a result, the Harris campaign could have taken a stronger stance against the misinformation about immigrants that the Trump campaign consistently spread and that many others amplified.
The MAGA base cannot be swayed by facts about the issue because they use the term “immigration” as code to promote a White Christian Ethnostate. This goal was said or implied by Trump and his surrogates and is part of Project 2025. Trump’s largest base of support was White men (60%), white people who never attended college 66%), and especially White Protestants/Christians (72%). Many understood Trump to be the White Christian Nationalist Candidate on the presidential ballot.
What Does This All Mean for Immigration Scholars?
My point above indicates that we need to research immigration, racialization, and the politicization of religion in tandem. These processes are linked to each other by right-wing ideologues. Many of us look at immigration; some of us are starting to look again at the relationship between immigration policies and race, and key sociologists have coined and looked at the rise of White Christian Nationalism.
There is much misinformation about immigration trends and processes, and as a community, we have much to offer. Moderates and independents are open to learning more about immigration, and Democratic-leaning voters and spokespeople need more fact-based talking points. For this reason, Carina Cione and I recently published the book “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions” (Columbia University Press 2024). This work condenses years of research on immigration, making it accessible for journalists, policymakers, students, and the public who want to access social science without facing paywalls or complicated jargon.
However, to be realistic, few people read books, much less academic books. Professors are less likely to assign books than before. Thus, to reach a wider audience, we have to write accessible pieces like op-eds, blogs, and newsletters and talk to the media. I encourage all of you to do so more often. If approached, agree to share your insights. It’s important that people learn about our research findings to help shift the negative and inaccurate stereotypes about immigrants.
As we write and read books about recent immigrants, the immigrant rights movement, Dreamers, and similar topics, we tend to focus on immigrants who are left-leaning, progressive, and activists themselves. Some of us often assume that an increase in immigrants and children of immigrants would lead to a shift towards more liberal views among the electorate. This last election puts that assumption partly into question, but what does this mean for immigration studies? As we have collectively written about, immigrants adapt, acculturate, and become distinct from those in their countries of origin. Over time and across generations, many immigrants become culturally like Americans. This means that, eventually, the public opinion of immigrants tends to align with the national average and those of their neighbors and social circles. In a country where around half of the electorate leans Republican, it is likely that around half of Latinos, Asians, and other immigrant groups, particularly those in the third generation, would do the same —whether we like it or not. This is indeed evidence of integration and assimilation. Their voting patterns will increasingly be influenced by education levels, gender, geographic location, and religion, as they do for White Americans.
Prices have gone up around the world, the working class is under large pressure, and housing is scarce. There is much conflict-driven immigration around the world. There is not a federally financed emergency shelter and welcome system in the U.S. similar to that used for refugees. The American immigration legal system is antiquated and inadequate. These are issues that must be addressed by Congress. It is hard for non-specialists to understand how all the pieces are connected, and it is easy for politicians to point to real images of lines at the border, asylum-seekers sleeping in the streets, or outside of shelters and hotels in U.S. cities to say that these human beings in need will lead to local fiscal crises. In a forthcoming report, we show how that is not the case.
To conclude, the results of this election were not determined by immigration policies or the misinformation around it. However, to animate its base with racist dog whistles, Trump vilified, scapegoated, and spread lies about immigrants and minorities. We need to combat these misconceptions. While naturalized citizens and U.S.-born Latino votes did not determine the election outcome, they were used to polarize the electorate, painting Haitians and Latino men as dangerous criminals. In response, some Latinos themselves spread hate speech as a way to pass and protect themselves.
As we have documented well in sociology, many individuals draw symbolic boundaries, try to create distinctions, and avoid racialization and exclusion by trying to pass as White or White-adjacent in response to the stigmatization of whole categorical groups. Individuals in tenuous situations understand that adopting majority opinions and beliefs may be a survival strategy. This is caused by racism. We have collectively documented cases like this for a long time. However, among the public, there is a lack of understanding (even among immigrants, their children, and grandchildren) about immigration history and the common exclusion of newcomers. New immigrant groups are often framed as unassimilable, and once they do, many descendants of those groups repeat the pattern and exclude those who come after them.
Our research is more relevant than ever as we teach our students, readers, and the public about the many positive outcomes brought about by immigration in the long term and about how immigration status does not equal morality. It is not that individuals want to be undocumented, but many find themselves in that situation amidst strong labor demand in the U.S., a lack of legal pathways for many, as well as armed conflicts, and economic and political crises abroad.
Ernesto Castañeda is a Full Professor of Sociology at American University and Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. Among his latest books, he published with Daniel Jenks, “Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration” (Russell Sage Foundation 2024).
A shorter version of this text was written for the newsletter of the International Migration Section of the American Sociological Association.
Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.
My assessment is that Kamala Harris will win the election. It is not based on the polls or the betting markers, which are not helpful given their very tight margins. Instead, Harris’ big tent, misrepresentation of the primacy of the economy and immigration in surveys, and social trends lead me to believe that Harris will win.
First of all, following the voting trends from the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Trump will not win the popular vote. This matters, as it determines popularity and broad appeal nationwide. Trump has never been appealing to over half of the population as a politician. While Trump was a fresh figure in politics in 2016, and there were some shy voters (given his novel strident and racist anti-immigrant comments), in 2024, he is a well-known entity, and most of his ardent followers are loud about their support, and not shy to say so to pollsters, door knockers, or people calling to get out the vote. Even so, attendance at his rallies and Trump flags outside of houses have decreased from previous cycles. Trump obsesses over crowd sizes, which was one of the indicators of his appeal in 2016. However, the infamous Madison Square Garden Trump rally on October 27 had around 19,500 people in attendance compared to around 30,000 people for Kamala Harris in Houston, Texas, on October 25, and over 75,000 at her rally in Washington, DC, on October 29.
Trump counts on a core base of around 33% of the electorate that holds strong views against immigration, complains about the economy, and will support Trump no matter what. Some more traditional Republicans will also vote for him. Nonetheless, his main campaign strategic imperative was to appeal to moderates, independents, and White suburban women to expand his margin over 50%. His 2024 campaign has not done so; he has focused on animating and mobilizing his core base. Many of his comments and those of his surrogates and supporters have alienated moderates as well as some registered Republicans. He has been more focused on discrediting the electoral process, the media, and his opponents and critics than on appealing to all voters.
In contrast, Kamala Harris has been explicitly open to conservative-leaning independents and even former Republican officeholders, including, but not limited to, Liz Cheney. Many registered Republicans, college-educated men, and many women will vote for her. That should be enough to guarantee her victory. She has done so not by compromising her beliefs and Democratic priorities but by promising to uphold the Constitution and protect democracy.
It is true that an unintended effect of Trump’s hate speech has created a certain increase in support among some Black, Latino, and Asian voters, but that will not be enough to counter the fact that a majority of women across racial and ethnic groups will vote for Kamala Harris as will many men and registered Republicans and independents.
A weakness for Harris lies in the uncommitted voters because of the situation in the Middle East who may vote for Jil Stein or abstain in places like Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Detroit, Dearborn, and college campuses. Trump’s election would make things worse in the Middle East, so some will reluctantly vote for Harris and then get ready to continue with their protests and demands for a ceasefire.
The media across the board has obsessed with “immigration” and “the economy” being the main concerns of the electorate and that public opinion favors Trump to handle them. But first of all, objectively, the economy is strong, and asylum-seeking at the border today is at very low levels. Second, and most importantly for elections, when one looks at the polls that are used to make these claims, these are the main issues for less than half of the electorate, and they are the main issues for Republican respondents, who naturally favor Trump’s solutions on these areas. In other words, putting the bulk of the Republican agenda around closing the border is not enough to gain a majority of voters nationwide or even in most swing states. The urban legend about immigrants eating cats shows voters how exaggerated these warnings are. The common claims against immigrants are false, as my book —coming out today— Immigration Realities documents.
Many pundits, consultants, and advisors have been saying that “Harris is weak on the border.” Not only is that false, but my response has been that the immigration obsession will cost Trump the election. Mass deportations are not popular outside of MAGA circles, while a path to citizenship has large levels of support. The Madison Square Garden rally made it clear to many voters and agnostic observers that this was not about undocumented immigration but about creating a White Christian Ethnostate.
There are even some indications (like the exit polls in the Republican primaries in Ohio) that some Evangelicals and religious voters are tired of Trump supposedly representing their views and values. The majority will still vote for him, but less than in previous elections when he has been on the ballot. The same is true for rural and union members. Biden has been a strong pro-labor president. Tim Walz is more familiar with rural White voters than Vance is these days. The majority will vote Republican, but many will vote Democrat. Harris is endorsed by both Liz Cheney and Bernie Sanders. Her appeal and favorability are wide, and she could create an even wider base of support than Obama.
Democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and many other values and institutions are on the line. This is the first election where Trump is on the ballot after January 6, 2021, and the many trials against him. He will not lose all his supporters, but he will lose some.
Recent local and midterm elections have shown that the across-the-board restrictions on abortion and emergency care while pregnant are large motivators to drive women and men to the polls to repeal these propositions and to vote for Democrats. In 2016, most White women supported Trump and not Hilary Clinton. This may be different this time because of the end of Roe vs. Wade. This would be crucial because women are the majority of likely voters, and they were more active in early voting.
Established Latinos of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and South American origin in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and New York will make important contributions to the Democratic vote. I predict that many women and new citizens of immigrant origin and some who did not vote in previous elections because of age or lack of interest (thus often not in pollster models of likely voters) will turn out to vote for Harris.
All along, the expectations have been set very highly for Harris, and she has excelled at each challenge, including securing the nomination uncontested, choosing a strong VP candidate, leading the RNC, speaking at rallies, showing she can be Commander in Chief, bettering Trump at their debate, engaging with the media effectively, she can take questions from the media and answer them thoughtfully, to round it all out she can engage in retail politics with much enthusiasm and empathy.
Trump carries all the media attention and campaign resources from the RNC, and most Republicans down the ballot depend, to a large degree, on his appeal. This does not bode well for them. Furthermore, the Republican-led Congress has been one of the most ineffective in recent memory. Government shutdowns have been adverted, and there have been impactful and popular bipartisan accomplishments such as the Infrastructure Bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS Act, and support for Ukraine, but many Republican Congresspeople have voted against these achievements.
All these factors combined seem to indicate that Trump supporters will have a weaker showing than when he lost in 2020, even if we are not in the middle of a pandemic. Kamala Harris has benefited from a fresh, exciting, flawless campaign, drawing all the enthusiasm that had been lacking since Obama’s first presidential campaign.
To recap, the biggest errors in the 2024 election coverage have been the out-of-proportion focus on the economy and immigration as the biggest concerns of all voters when, indeed, these complaints are not fully based on reality and are mainly coming from Republican-leaning voters. Nobody likes inflation, but unemployment is low, and wage and economic growth rates are positive and steady, with a big improvement from 2020. Reproductive health and women’s rights will be more important in motivating people across party affiliations to vote for Harris and Democrats. While the polls are currently very tight, and there is noise that favors Trump (allowing him to repeat the big lie), ultimately, cold analyses of the electorate’s behavior and preferences tell us that Harris is on track to win the electoral college and with wider margins than the polls show.
Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.
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Political Piñatas: How Conservatives Use Latinos to Polarize U.S. Society
By Ernesto Castañeda
November 5, 2024
Many are surprised to learn that some Latinos vote Republican. A larger percentage of Latinos voted for Trump in 2020 than in 2016. A similar percentage or even more may vote for Trump in 2024. There are many reasons for this, which are often misunderstood by the wider public. I discuss some of them here.
Latinos represent the largest minority in the U.S. at over 65 million and have gained attention as political parties vie for the so-called “Latino vote” as elections are won by tighter margins. This is particularly the case in swing states with large Latino populations. How best to describe the landscape of Latino voters’ preferences remains a question of regular debate. On the one hand, Latinos are still frequently superficially treated as a relatively uniform voting bloc —even if more “up for grabs” today with polling data suggesting gradual shifts in party affiliation. As such, Latinos are often treated as a demographic that can tip the balance in favor of a party. Nonetheless, polls and pundits necessarily flatten the real views of Latinos. This has always been a diverse group. The birth of the term Hispanic aimed to bring together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans around common causes. Regional differences are key; for example, in the D.C.-metro region, Latinos are diverse and majority Salvadoran; in California and Texas, they are mainly of Mexican and Central American descent; in South Florida, they are a mixture of Cuban, Venezuelan, Colombian, Nicaraguan, among others.
Many recent immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean come escaping failed states and so-called leftist regimes. Many migrants have been directly affected by inequality in their countries of origin. Democratic erosion throughout Latin America and the Caribbean makes it hard for opposition activists and critics of these regimes. Like Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain and Cubans after Castro’s takeover, many recent immigrants see themselves as forced political exiles escaping from authoritarian states that robbed them of their wealth and freedoms. Therefore, in the U.S. they are more likely to identify with ideals of individual freedom and free enterprise.
Trump has also had a polarizing effect on Latinos. Republicans have sought to exploit a process well-documented by scholars: the creation of social boundaries. Trump’s discourse encourages distinctions between “good immigrants” and “good Latinos” in contrast to undocumented “criminals.” Those immigrants with visas and legal permits, higher education levels and family incomes, lighter skin, or who align better with the U.S. geopolitical preferences tend to be more successful than those who do not have immigration papers. This creates hierarchical differences within Latinos. Many U.S.-born and legal Latino immigrants try hard to distinguish themselves from individuals and groups framed as “illegal” and “criminal” to avoid the stigma assigned to those groups.
These social processes create durable inequalities not only between Latinos and non-Latinos but also among Latinos. In public discourse, Latinos are used as proxies and piñatas to polarize Americans further. In turn, some Latinos internalize feelings of inferiority or superiority and may loudly act upon them, adding to the process of polarization. Some Latinos organize against dehumanizing language and build networks of solidarity among Latinos and with other groups. However, a numerical minority such as the White Nationalists and antisemites Nick Fuentes or Enrique Tario, leader of the Proud Boys, are not passive receivers of stigmatizing attacks but become amplifiers of hate speech in exchange for group membership as part of a sometimes-xenophobic White majority. Some who have seen fellow Latinos excluded, targeted, and stigmatized may try to pass as White by attacking other Latinos, further polarizing the country in the process and weakening democratic institutions and minority rights. For these reasons, studying the effects of polarization on Latinos and the role that Latinos have in social polarization is of national importance.
Latinos can hardly be said to form a cohesive or predictable voting bloc. Latinos do not fit neatly into the racial categories that often orient public political debate, which can lead to simplifications of Latinos’ views. Latinos are relatively less partisan as a group. A Pew Research Center report indicates that less than half of Latinos acknowledge significant differences between political parties, with a large share agreeing that neither party effectively represents their interests. Immigration is motivated by economic success, so access to jobs and better pay are their priority. Most Latinos have papers, so immigration is not an immediate concern for most Latino individuals, but it is a theme full of an emotional load; the immigration struggles of family members are close to their hearts.
An influential narrative regarding political polarization is that the electorate has become increasingly stoked by racial tensions and grievances. In this account, race is an important source of polarization. Latinos’ views are diverse and sometimes distinct from those of other Americans and more often map with those of similar occupations and socio-economic status. The diversity within Latino communities impacts the overall political polarization dynamics in the U.S. Typical analyses of race/ethnicity as a variable in culture war-type political contests do not adequately account for the heterogeneity of Latinos as a group and for the range of variation of their political commitments. National origin, gender, religious affiliation, geographic location, educational attainment, class, media consumption, and generational experience, among others, are impactful factors in identity formation.
Latinos display greater cultural unity than political unity. Latinos are part of their local and larger national political ecosystems. Latinos, despite immigration status, have demonstrated notable unity mobilizing in response to racist anti-immigrant rhetoric from local, state, or national politicians. Research also shows that over time, anti-immigrant policies can contribute to the withdrawal of Latinos from the public sphere. But sometimes there is increased group cohesion among Latinos as a reaction to external group threats such as public hostility toward immigrants and the portrayal in the media of Latinos as likely to be Mexican, undocumented, and lesser than. A stronger identification as Latino resulting from previous political organizing does lead to higher levels of political participation. In other cases, as Latinos become business owners, upper middle class, and part of mainstream U.S. society, they may become more politically conservative and may try to distinguish themselves from newcomers. Other successful Latinos, who are less insecure about their status, mentor and open doors for others, volunteer, and become philanthropists.
Furthermore, some Latino subgroups are more susceptible to misinformation. The choice of media varies by immigration status and age. Older first-generation Latinos often opt for more traditional media sources such as radio and T.V., and more often in Spanish. Younger Latinos, often second- or third-generation, exhibit a wider range of media consumption, mainly in English and social media. These choices create different media echo chambers, differing attitudes about the meaning of “Latino,” and varying political values even within the same family.
Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.
This piece is a revised and shortened version of an unfunded research proposal written for the Carnegie Fellows Program on Polarization in November of 2023.
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