Book Excerpt: A Life Before Leaving

Catherine Grau, Research & Data Coordinator of the Immigration Lab

Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center of Latin American & Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab

This is an excerpt from an upcoming book, A Mountain of Dreams, an ethnographic exploration of unaccompanied youth migration to the United States between 2019-2022. This project centers a small community of new arrivals in the DC area as they navigate new adulthood, immigration law, and complex relationships.

Note: Names have been changed where needed for interviewee privacy

Photo of cane field on fire in Central America, taken by Catherine Grau.
Photo of cane field on fire in Central America, taken by Catherine Grau.

As the weeks stretched into months, even Sol stopped asking when her father was coming home. Her younger brother was still in diapers. Her mother had been working in the nearby city of La Libertad, El Salvador but she wasn’t making enough to support three kids on her own, so she moved further away. “For a long time, my mother had to go work in the big city, in San Salvador,” Sol expressed. Her mother explained that she was going to find work in the big city and send money to Sol’s sister for anything that they might need. She blinked the tears away as her mother explained why she had to leave, that Sol’s father wasn’t going to live with them again right now, and that her sister was going to be just like her mother and do all the things that her mother wouldn’t be able to do anymore. It made Sol sad to see her mother go, but she thought she understood. Her mother would come back; she just couldn’t be home right then.

Sol remembered, “I got a little bit used to the fact that my mother was gone, but the situation changed because I had my little brother. Now he was the one who was crying when she was gone, it was him who was sad. I felt really, really bad watching him, and aside from that I felt bad seeing that my sister was responsible for both him and me, basically she had to raise us”[1]. They were forced to start acting like adults at a young age. “At that time my sister was fourteen, and well, my brother, older sister, and I lived alone. To be honest, it was very difficult.”2 Her sister tried her best to take care of young Sol and their baby brother. Every morning, Sol’s sister combed her hair before she met her friends for the long walk to school. Her sister stopped attending school.

It was only in the years after her mother left that Sol began to understand how alone she and her siblings really were. They lived in the countryside; their nearest neighbors were little more than distant shapes beyond the fields in the morning. Three children living alone in an isolated house was not a secret that they wanted anyone to discover. They shuddered at each rustle in the sugarcane fields and shrank from the window as slow-moving trucks spat dusty gravel toward their door. For years, Sol and her siblings spent each night waiting anxiously for the morning to come. Eventually, Sol’s mother returned from the big city. Her worn sandals searched for open dirt along the overgrown footpath that led to her children. The door swung open, the barricade forgotten in a corner. Sweet words, small hands, and tight embraces all tumbled together. Once, Sol had been too small to wrap her arms around her mother’s shoulders. But she had grown in the years that had passed. They stood together awkwardly, all four of them, uncertain where one hug ended and the next should begin. The stars seemed a little brighter that night, and the whispers of the sugarcane field seemed a little further away. Then one morning, Sol watched her sister fold the same blouse that she always wore to church. Instead of putting it where it belonged, her sister packed it into a small bag. Sol was confused. Her sister said that she was going to live somewhere else. She said she was sorry. She promised that it was still going to be okay. She said that she would miss Sol very much. She kept talking after that, but Sol never heard what she said. Her ears felt as if the ocean was inside them.

Mothers were supposed to leave for work. Sisters weren’t supposed to leave at all. The bag she was holding looked much too small to carry Sol’s world away. The tears were back, and they wouldn’t stop coming. “When she left, I felt like I lost my other half. And that was where it all came spilling out…I cried every day, I was sad every day for a year,”[3] she said. Sol had grown to accept that her father was gone so long ago that the grief had been replaced by a dull ache. She had nodded her head when her mother left and tried her best to understand. But with her sister gone, Sol felt like a stranger in her favorite places. For years, she had fallen asleep knowing that her sister was only one whisper away. Now she wasn’t.[4] The day that her father appeared on her doorstep, the pandilleros had been waiting for him after work. They wanted money that wasn’t his to give. The man with the money was wealthy enough that everyone in the region knew his name. The Mara Salvatrucha knew it too. They couldn’t reach him, but they could reach the men who worked for him. They found Sol’s father first. “The only person that they could contact was him,” Sol remembers learning. “So, one day they stopped him, out of nowhere”[5]. Everything she knew was explained by her mother, who had heard it from her father. “They threatened him. They told him that he had to make the man pay them an enormous sum of money. I don’t know how much it was, but it was thousands and thousands of dollars and if he didn’t do it, my father, his wife–even though they weren’t together anymore–and my siblings and me, they would kill us all. That was how it all started,” Sol explained.

The first day that the men with tattoos looked at her, Sol told herself it was a coincidence and kept walking. She wasn’t sure on the second day, but her feet didn’t stop moving. By the third, they were calling after her. They told her that her father needed to pay. She kept walking. They told her they weren’t asking. She kept walking. The ocean in her ears wasn’t there to protect her. She heard every word clearly. There was no glass wall to separate her from them. She didn’t turn around. There was no barricade to protect her. She wasn’t even sure she would make it home. They shouted her name, drawing out the last letter into a leer. She couldn’t breathe. Their footsteps were close. She needed to keep moving. All that mattered was the door. She kept walking. “They told me that if they weren’t paid, before they killed us, they would do things to me…,”[6] Sol remembered. She made it home before she cried. That day and every day that came after, she always made it home before she cried. As soon as the door was barricaded, the tears poured out. She shut herself into the furthest corner and refused to talk to anybody. Sol remembers being more afraid than she had ever been before. The panic attacks came next. She gasped for air, choking on fear and desperation and temporary relief all at the same time. In the moments where her lungs simply refused air, she drew small breaths in a low rattle before the next round of sobs forced out more than she could hope to inhale again. Even as her mind screamed, her body refused to seek solace in the arms of her worried mother. “I didn’t want to talk to anybody. I was afraid, but I didn’t want my family to be more scared than they already were.”[7] Even if her mother hadn’t heard Sol crying, it would have been impossible for her to ignore her  daughter’s uniform folded and untouched for days at a time. She knew that Sol had always dreamed of being an architect. But as more and more school days were spent behind a wooden beam at home, they both knew that it was all slipping away. Her first year of secondary school was unfinished. There was no chance for university anymore.

Sol’s teachers never knew what had happened to her. She had been a promising student; she imagined that her teachers would agree. Sol had been among the first to raise her hand when a new question was poised. She sat quietly while her classmates scribbled on the chalkboard and always waited for her turn to speak. Her assignments were always pristine, her uniform neatly pressed, and her words carefully chosen. When her classmates grumbled or folded their arms across their chests, Sol had pressed harder. She had dreamed of a scholarship to university for as long as she had known that they existed. She never missed a day of school. But suddenly, her desk was empty. When attendance was taken, her name went unanswered for weeks. She had never told her teachers about home, so sharing the details of her journey back from school had been unthinkable. By the time she might have wanted to explain or apologize, it hadn’t been safe for her to try. Sol hoped that her grades wouldn’t fall too far with all the assignments she had missed. Of course, if her name disappeared from the roster then it didn’t matter anyway. She wondered if anyone had asked about her. Maybe they just assumed that another empty desk meant another family gone in the night. Sol was still there, hiding in her home. But for all anyone outside knew, she was gone.

The pandilleros laughed as they saw the small family walking down the road to church, sending Sol and her family fleeing back to safety behind the wooden plank. Nothing changed. “You know, in that time we didn’t even think about leaving.” Sol explained, “After insisting and insisting to my father, he finally tried to file a report with the police. And, well, basically the police told him that they couldn’t do anything, that they were sorry, but they couldn’t involve themselves in this”[8].Nothing changed after the police report. Except that the pandilleros burnt the sugarcane fields next to their house. Sol was told that photos of the burned fields had landed in the rich man’s lap with a message that morning. MS-13 wanted silence, and they wanted money. The fields outside Sol’s house were a warning of what would follow if either of their demands remained unmet. “It wasn’t just words anymore,” Sol explained, “they were beginning to act physically…they were already committing actions. And that was when we started to search for alternatives, where to move or what to do, but in El Salvador the gangs are very organized.” Sol knew that their government-issued Documento Único de Identidad cards would prevent them from ever living somewhere that was not controlled by the Mara Salvatrucha. She also knew that moving anywhere controlled by Barrio 18 would mean death. The pandilleros there would see their former municipality printed right below their photos and assume that they were spies. “If we went to another place that also belonged to [MS-13], they would communicate with each other and then kill us,” she said. Their IDs meant that they could never simply disappear into another town. “So, we came to a point where there was nowhere to go in El Salvador, because the police didn’t do anything. The rich man too, he protected himself, but he didn’t protect us. My father didn’t do anything, and we couldn’t do anything”[9].

Sol’s mother called and explained everything to a friend living in the United States. “Thank God, he helped us, he could not pay for us to live in the U.S. indefinitely, but he could help us escape El Salvador if we wanted. We made the decision to accept his proposal, because we were desperate. We had no idea what to do,”[10] Sol remembered. Soon after, Sol, her mother, her brother, and her sister packed their backpacks and left. It was December of 2019, and Sol was sixteen years old.


1. “Pues después de eso, la situación cambió un poco, yo me llegué a acostumbrar un poco a que mi mamá se fuera, pero ahora la situación era distinta, porque tenía a mi hermano pequeño, y ahora él era el que lloraba cuando ella se iba, él que estaba triste, y pues, yo me sentía muy, muy mal viéndolo a él, y aparte me sentía mal viendo que mi hermana estaba responsable de él y mí, siendo ella una niña, básicamente.”

2.“Yo nunca tuve la certeza de si iba a permanecer en un solo lugar en toda mi infancia, y pues era muy triste para mí. Como hija de ellos, ver como ellos discutían y como pasaba todo. Y era muy triste para mí también ver mi mama muy triste ella.”

3. “Entonces, cuando ella se fue, yo sentí como que se fue mi otra mitad, y es donde se derramó todo. En ese tiempo yo estuve, se podría decir llorando todos los días, triste todos los días, como por un año. … Y pues, mi mamá regresó a casa, pero mi hermana fue la que se tuvo que ir, se tuvo que mudar, y pues básicamente yo me crié con mi hermana, y a falta de tener mi figura materna presente todo el tiempo, quien estaba presente para mí era mi hermana.”

4. We interviewed Sol (a pseudonym) in the DMV in 2026 and reconstructed this part of her life as part of a project for the Humanities Truck at American University and a book project we are working on.

5. “Entonces, un día se acercaron a él, así de la nada, entraron y todo. Yo no estaba, yo no presencié eso, pero me lo contó mi mamá, porque él habló con ella. Pero básicamente lo amenazaron. Le dijeron que él tenía que hacer que el señor les dieran una suma muy grande de dinero. No sé cuánto era, pero era una suma muy grande de miles de dólares y que, si no lo hacía, que mi papá, su esposa, me decían ellos que era mi mamá, pero ellos ya no estaban juntas, y sus hijos, que eran mis hermanos y yo, básicamente que nos iban a matar a todos. Y, este, pues para nosotros fue horrible.”

6. “Y empezaban a decirme que, si no les pagaban, de que antes de matarnos que me iban a hacer cosas a mí, ya saben en qué tono, no…lo decían de una forma horrible, sinceramente muy, muy fea. Pues básicamente ellos empezaron a seguirme, a acosarme, a decirme cosas feas, cosas vulgares, y yo me acuerdo de que yo me sentía muy insegura.”

7.“A mí en ese tiempo sí, ahora que me acuerdo me daban ataques de ansiedad. Cuando llegaba a la casa yo llegaba a llorar, me encerraba, no quería hablar con nadie. Porque estaba en yo, que estaba asustada y aparte porque no quería asustar a mi familia más de lo que ya estaba.”

8. “Pues fíjate que en ese momento no pensábamos en migrar, de hecho, en un tiempo, después de tanto insistir e insistir a mi papá, él intentó poner una denuncia, una denuncia con la policía, y pues la policía básicamente dijo que ellos no podían hacer nada, que lo sentían, que es que ellos no podían meterse en eso.”

9. “y ahí fue donde empezamos a buscar alternativas de a dónde movernos o qué hacer, pero en El Salvador las pandillas tenían esto que eran muy organizadas y si tú te ibas para un lado, que era, por ejemplo, era la MS-13, si nosotros nos íbamos para otro lugar que era también de la pues ellos se comunicaban y básicamente nos mataban. Y si nos íbamos a un lugar que no era de la MS 13, sino que de la 18, pues ellos decían que nosotros éramos como espías de ellos y también nos mataban. Entonces llegamos a un punto en el que nos encontramos sin salida en el país, porque la policía no hizo nada, el hombre rico tampoco, él sí se protegió él mismo, pero no nos protegió a nosotros. Mi papá no hizo nada, nosotros no podíamos hacer nada.”

10. “Y mi mamá le contó a un amigo de acá la situación y gracias a Dios, él nos ayudó, nos dijo que él no podía mantenernos pero que nos podía ayudar a salir del país. Y sí, nosotros queríamos venirnos para acá y pues tomamos la decisión de aceptar esa propuesta porque nos encontramos desesperados, no sabíamos qué hacer.

Where American Voters Stand on MAGA’s Immigration Policies

Report | October 20, 2026

Asked whether they approve or disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling immigration, 52.8% disapprove and 44.9% approve, most interestingly many more strongly disapprove (44.6%) than those who strongly approve (30.5%). This comes from a poll of 5,000 English-speaking registered voters conducted between September 9 and September 25, 2026, by the polling organization YouGov on behalf of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University. It gathered views on a variety of immigration policy-related topics. The margin of error is: +/-1.5%. The pool of participants was structured to be demographically representative of likely voters. White Americans, those living in the South, highly educated Americans, and people aged 65 and over are slightly overrepresented. Because the survey was only conducted in English among registered voters, most of whom voted in the last two presidential elections and midterms, the views of Spanish-only speakers, permanent residents, and non-citizens are not included. The results presented here are, therefore, conservative estimates.

Respondents also differently support the government deporting people in different migration statuses: 37.3% strongly support deporting individuals who are undocumented, 24.8% strongly support people with Temporary Protected Status until recently, while 50.5% somewhat or strongly oppose; 17.7% strongly support while 53.4 oppose deporting those who have applied for asylum; and 59.2% oppose, and 9.4% are unsure, while only 15.5% strongly support deporting those who are in the process of regularizing their immigration status (e.g., renewing visa, applying for immigration relief, a green card, or citizenship).  

Respondents report varying levels of familiarity with U.S. immigration programs and policies. Asylum (75.2%) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) (59.9%) were the most familiar programs among respondents. While only 6.8% were familiar with the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV) Humanitarian Parole Program, implemented by the Biden Administration, which allowed eligible individuals from these countries to temporarily enter legally if they had a sponsor in the United States. Awareness is also particularly limited for more recent immigration initiatives, with more than half of respondents reporting being very unfamiliar with Project Homecoming and the CBP Home and CBP One smartphone applications.

Contrary to online discourse, a large majority of respondents support more humane immigration policies, expanded legal immigration pathways, and opportunities for undocumented immigrants to legalize their status. More than eight in ten respondents (85.2%) agree that allowing individuals to leave voluntarily is more humane than deporting them in restraints, with 52.8% strongly agreeing. Similarly, 69.6% supported expanding legal pathways for immigration, while 61.8% support providing undocumented immigrants with a pathway to legal status.

Most people are against mass deportation by force and they share many concerns. The most frequently cite concern is the separation of families during the removal process (43%), followed by the harm caused to individuals being deported (31%), and the lack of a humane or orderly removal process (30%). Other concerns include prolonged immigration detention (26%), costs to taxpayers (25%), and the use of government resources and personnel (20%). Fewer respondents cite the impact on American communities (16%), the country’s international image (14%), or the economy (11%). Only 17% report having no concerns about the current approach to deportation.

A majority of respondents  support providing humanitarian assistance to individuals seeking asylum in the United States, however support varied depending on the populations and types of assistance described. Support was highest for providing emergency temporary shelter to individuals fleeing violent conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan and Ukraine, with 69.2% in favor (36.1% strongly favoring and 33.1% somewhat favoring), compared to 20.6% opposed. Similarly, 63.3% supported welcoming programs for individuals and families escaping persecution, regardless of their country of origin, while 63.4% favored temporary shelter and food assistance for asylum seekers from countries experiencing crises, such as Haiti, Venezuela, and Cuba.

Support for proposals involving more extensive assistance to people regardless of country of origin is also popular, with 57.7% favoring temporary housing, financial support, and programming, compared to 30.4% opposed. The lowest level of support is for the current practice of helping white South Africans who self-identify as refugees relocate and settle in the United States. Only 37.9% support this policy, while 41.8% oppose it, and 20.2% are unsure.

A majority of respondents support providing Green Cards to international students who graduate from U.S. universities, a proposal discussed by both major presidential candidates during the 2024 election. Overall, 61.2% express support for the policy, including 33.3% who strongly support it. These findings indicate broad support among respondents for creating pathways to permanent residency for international graduates of U.S. institutions.

Respondents are more likely to support a member of Congress who voted to reduce funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) than one who opposed such cuts. Overall, 41% report that a vote to cut ICE funding would make them more likely to vote for their representative, compared with 33.5% who say it would make them less likely. This represents a 7.5-percentage-point difference in reported voting intentions. Younger people tend to be more likely to support Congresspeople cutting funding for forced deportations. Only 43% of those who identity as republicans, and 47% of those who support Trump are much less likely to vote for a member of Congress who cuts ICE funding.

Although the National Guard has not traditionally been responsible for immigration enforcement, some units have assisted federal immigration authorities, including Border Patrol, ICE, and HSI agents, during the second Trump administration. Despite this limited non-traditional role, 60% of respondents express trust in the National Guard to handle deportations fairly. In contrast, respondents ae more skeptical of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), with 50% reporting that they do not trust ICE to carry out deportations fairly. These findings highlight notable public distrust of federal immigration enforcement agencies.

Respondents overwhelmingly support Democrats and Republicans working on creating pathways toward citizenship, reducing family separations, expanding asylum protections, and even making deportation more humane and following due process. Voters want both parties to work together to improve the immigration system.

Overall, the findings reveal a notable contrast between political rhetoric that often frames immigration as a threat or challenge and public attitudes that reflect greater sympathy toward immigrants and openness to bipartisan immigration reform.


This survey is based on 5,000 interviews of registered voters conducted by YouGov online. The sample was weighted according to gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, and U.S. Census region based on voter registration lists, the U.S. Census American Community Survey, and the U.S. Census Current Population Survey, as well as 2020 Presidential vote and approximate 2024 Presidential vote based on available results, and party identification estimates based on Pew Research Center’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey. Respondents were selected from YouGov to be representative of registered voters. The weights range from 0.22 to 5.4 with a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.43. The margin of error (a 95% confidence interval) for a sample percentage p based upon the subsetted sample is approximately 1.5. It does not reflect potential selection bias in panel participation in the survey.

Read more from the report: https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/yougov-survey.cfm

More information about the CLALS: https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm

For media inquiries contact clals@american.edu or olmos@american.edu

Ecuador as Laboratory for Warfare

Luis Córdova-Alarcón, Director of the Order, Conflict, and Violence Research Program at the Central University of Ecuador

The commander of U.S. Southern Command, Marine Gen. Francis L. Donovan, meets with Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa on March 2, 2026 in Ecuador. Photo retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

With U.S. assistance, Daniel Noboa has turned Ecuador into a laboratory for warfare—a space for technological and psychological experimentation led by military power that is reshaping the political, economic, and social order of this small South American nation. This laboratory serves as the primary theater of operations for the “war on cartels” promoted by the Trump administration through the multination coalition known as the “Shield of the Americas.” It is also the testing ground for the “Technological Republic” envisioned by Palantir’s founders, as the state is being increasingly captured by a transnational oligarchy.

As in any laboratory, experimentation is feasible because the environment is controlled. In Ecuador’s case, state and para-state intervention is what is being controlled, while the effects of such intervention trigger key legal and illegal economies that remain beyond control. The use of lethal violence—whether by criminals or the military—acts as a source of power and is used as a mechanism that creates “invisible borders” between individuals and their daily lives.

However, a series of unusual events reveals the misleading nature of the “internal armed conflict” that was declared by Noboa in January 2024, as well as the political use of the “state of war” (1). Two events are particularly significant.

The first occurrence was in early March 2026, when an airstrike with direct support from the U.S. Southern Command was carried out on Ecuadorian soil. On March 3, Ecuadorian and U.S. authorities released a video reporting that they had bombed a suspected camp belonging to the “Comandos de la Frontera” (Border Commandos) in the Sucumbíos province (2). The Ecuadorian government promoted this event as the start of “the next phase of the fight against organized crime” in Ecuador. The day before the strike, the head of the U.S. Southern Command, General Francis L. Donovan, met with Noboa in Quito, Ecuador to announce the launch of joint military operations (3). Two weeks later, an investigation published by The New York Times confirmed that the military target that had been bombed was actually a dairy farm (4) and not a camp as had been claimed.

This psychological warfare operation marked the beginning of an “intervention by invitation” that had been in the making for a long time. Its origins date back to 2018, when the Security Cooperation Office at the U.S. Embassy—which had been closed in 2014 under the presidency of Rafael Correa (2007–2017)—was reopened, and efforts began to shape the Ecuadorian government’s security policy.

In the Integrated Country Strategy for Ecuador, approved on September 18, 2018, the U.S. Department of State established the roadmap for the U.S. Embassy in Quito. It states verbatim: “The strategic objective of Mission Ecuador […] is to support the emergence of a government that shares U.S. interests in combating transnational criminal and terrorist networks and contributes to regional security”; it adds that “engagement with the Ecuadorian Armed Forces will create commercial opportunities for U.S.-based suppliers while enhancing Ecuador’s military capabilities […]”(5).

With Guillermo Lasso’s assumption of the presidency in May 2021, the Department of State strategic objective outlined in 2018 was realized. The Department of State acknowledged this in April 2022, with the Integrated Country Strategy for Ecuador, noting: “President Guillermo Lasso—the most pro-U.S. president in over two decades—has strengthened the bilateral relationship between the United States and Ecuador, offering a significant opportunity to expand the security partnership.” It also noted: “Ecuador will need to significantly increase defense spending to adequately train and equip its armed forces. Relying solely on U.S. security cooperation funding will not be sufficient to meet security objectives. The Mission intends to mitigate these risks by advocating for increased defense spending through Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales” (6).

In December 2022 the U.S. Congress passed the “United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022” as part of the “James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023” (7). It authorized the initiation of a broad-spectrum intervention across all areas of Ecuadorian society and mandated that the State Department, together with other relevant federal departments and agencies, submit a comprehensive strategy for the law’s implementation within 180 days.

On July 19, 2023, Ecuador’s Minister of National Defense, General Luis Lara, traveled to Washington to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Defense. This document outlined 169 tactical objectives with an implementation timeline extending to 2030 (8). This was followed by the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement on September 27, 2023, and the Agreement on maritime interdiction in Ecuadorian waters on October 6 of the same year.

By the time Daniel Noboa won the presidential election on October 15, 2023—following a turbulent campaign marked by the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio on August 9, 2023—the United States’ “intervention by invitation” was already in the works. The gun was loaded; all that remained was to pull the trigger.

The second event worth highlighting occurred on January 13, 2026. The vessel “Fiorella” set sail from Jaramijó with a nine-person crew to carry out artisanal fishing operations. Days later, the boat vanished. Relatives reported the incident, and one crew member was found alive; he recounted that they had been attacked by drones. To date, the other eight fishermen remain missing, with neither the Ecuadorian nor the U.S. government having issued a statement on the matter. However, in August, an investigation published by The Washington Post reported that the “Fiorella” had likely been intercepted as part of a covert action program led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (9). Meanwhile, The New York Times analyzed flight data and discovered that a maritime patrol aircraft—based at a military facility in El Salvador and owned not by the Pentagon but by a Virginia-based company—had flown toward the vessels in the days leading up to the attack (10).

Frequent attacks on suspected drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea and the South Pacific —carried out as part of the Pentagon-led “Operation Southern Spear”—are not only leaving a trail of deaths and disappearances but are also forcing the displacement of artisanal fishermen who wish to avoid risking their lives. Harassed by criminal groups that extort or recruit them, and facing stealthy attacks by U.S. drones, families who rely on artisanal fishing are experiencing an accelerated process of “dispossession through militarization.”

The military operations carried out by the Department of Defense are deeply intertwined with Silicon Valley’s Big Tech companies. It is no longer just a matter of billion-dollar contracts, but also of the ongoing fusion of cutting-edge technological expertise and military innovation. On June 13, 2025, the Pentagon announced the creation of “Detachment 201”—known as the “Executive Innovation Corps”—and granted the highest military reserve rank to four senior executives from Palantir, Meta, and OpenAI (11).

On March 12, 2026, Cameron Stanley, director of artificial and digital intelligence at the Department of Defense, presented Palantir’s new software called the “Maven Smart System.” This comprehensive decision support system is based on artificial intelligence and can combine 8 to 9 separate massive data streams to deliver military objectives in real time (12). The Southern Command has already enlisted this system to operate in Ecuador. By automating the attack chain (find, fix, track, attack, and assess) using AI, the most sensitive decision-making process is delegated to an algorithm to generate attack targets continuously, replacing human discretion, which is modifying the nature of war. This subverts the concept of selective warfare. War becomes an infinite interface.

The use of Lavender software—designed by Palantir—to bomb the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces is a dramatic example of this mutation in asymmetric conflict (13). The incessant attack on fishing boats in the Ecuadorian Pacific is helping the Southern Command to calibrate the use of these tools in aquatic spaces.

In August of this year, it was uncovered that the U.S. army was building an airfield at the Taura Air Base, the largest in the Ecuadorian Air Force (14). In September, the Southern Command reported that it had deployed its brand new HANX military drone in Ecuador, manufactured with 3D printing and designed by the United States Air Force (15). Later in October, Ecuador’s Minister of National Defense, Gian Carlos Loffredo, reported that two MQ-9 Reaper drones were already flying through the skies of Ecuador. The use of this military technology of “war without risks” confirms that Ecuador is a great field of military experimentation.

At the same time, a “digital cage” managed by Palantir is taking shape in Ecuador. In January 2025, with the backing of the United States Embassy, ​​the national government signed the “Alliance Framework Agreement” (AFA) with Google Cloud for the digital transformation of the public sector (16). In May 2025, Noboa signed his first agreement with Palantir, granting the corporation access to all data from Ecuador’s National Customs Service (SENAE) and Internal Revenue Service (SRI) with the goal of strengthening Ecuador’s border and customs control through artificial intelligence and data analysis tools (17). In January 2026, President Noboa used his visit to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, to meet with Alex Karp, the CEO of Palantir. The only detail to emerge from the meeting was that Palantir would open a business office in Cuenca (18). However, by October of this year, it was revealed that the Financial and Economic Analysis Unit (UAFE)—a government entity attached to Ecuador’s National Intelligence Center—would use Palantir’s platform to track and monitor money laundering (19).

Ultimately, the critical situation of insecurity remains unresolved. Daniel Noboa’s government has chosen a path of convenient strategic subordination to Washington in exchange for the Trump administration’s approval to weaken democracy and leverage the business interests of a transnational oligarchy—featuring capital from the UAE, the United States, China, and Israel. The political cost for Ecuadorian society is immense: the republic is succumbing, becoming a vast laboratory for warfare.


  1. Córdova-Alarcón L. El Estado de Guerra como mecanismo de dominación política en Ecuador. Sociología y Política Hoy [Internet]. 2026 Feb 23 [cited 2026 Oct 7];11:137–57. Available from: https://revistadigital.uce.edu.ec/index.php/hoy/article/view/9714
  2. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional del Ecuador. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional del Ecuador [Internet]. 2026 [cited 2026 Oct 7]. Operación “Exterminio Total” destruye a los Comandos de Frontera”. Available from: https://www.defensa.gob.ec/operacion-exterminio-total-destruye-a-los-comandos-de-frontera/
  3. Rueda R. Daniel Noboa se reúne con el Comando Sur de Estados Unidos, que ve a Ecuador como un socio clave. Primicias [Internet]. 2026 Mar 2 [cited 2026 Mar 15]. Available from: https://www.primicias.ec/politica/daniel-noboa-reunion-comando-sur-estados-unidos-anuncio-operaciones-coordinacion-seguridad-117122/
  4. Ferré-Sadurní L, León Cabrera JM, Correal A, Schmitt E. The U.S. Said It Helped Bomb a Drug Camp. It Was a Dairy Farm. The New York Times [Internet]. 2026 Mar 24 [cited 2026 Mar 23]. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/world/americas/us-ecuador-drug-camp-bombing-dairy-farm.html
  5. Department of State. Integrated Country Strategy. Ecuador [Internet]. 2018 Sep [cited 2024 Sep 28]. Available from: https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Ecuador_UNCLASS_508.pdf
  6. Department of State. Integrated Country Strategy. Ecuador [Internet]. 2022 Apr [cited 2024 Sep 28]. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_WHA_Ecuador_Public-1.pdf
  7. 117th Congress. James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. 2022 Dec 23.
  8. Televistazo. El acuerdo de cooperación entre EE.UU. y Ecuador para fortalecer las Fuerzas Armadas se firmará el 20 de julio. Ecuavisa [Internet]. 2023 Jul 9 [cited 2024 Sep 28]. Available from: https://www.ecuavisa.com/noticias/ecuador/militares-estados-unidos-ecuador-acuerdo-cooperacion-YY5540346
  9. Echeverría G. La CIA estuvo detrás de los ataques a pesqueros en Ecuador, según The Washington Post. Expreso [Internet]. 2026 Aug 13 [cited 2026 Aug 16]. Available from: https://www.expreso.ec/justicia/cia-estuvo-detras-ataques-pesqueros-ecuador-the-washington-post-292401.html
  10. Abi-Habib M, Melen R, León JM. Hablaban inglés, llevaban banderas de EE. UU. y atacaron a los pescadores. ¿Quiénes eran? The New York Times [Internet]. 2026 Aug 12 [cited 2026 Sep 28]. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2026/08/12/espanol/america-latina/ecuador-ataques-barcos.html
  11. U.S. Army Public Affairs. Army Launches Detachment 201: Executive Innovation Corps to Drive Tech Transformation. U.S. Army [Internet]. 2025 Jun 13 [cited 2026 Jan 5]. Available from: https://www.army.mil/article/286317/army_launches_detachment_201_executive_innovation_corps_to_drive_tech_transformation
  12. Stanley C. @PalantirTech [Internet]. 2026 [cited 2026 Oct 7]. “This is Maven Smart System—Palantir’s software as a service product that we are deploying across the entire department.” Available from: https://x.com/PalantirTech/status/2032142543022960980
  13. Abraham Y. ‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza. +972 Magazine [Internet]. 2024 Apr 3 [cited 2024 Dec 29]. Available from: https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/
  14. DVIDS. LCF-24: CLB-8 Airfield Clearing [Internet]. 2026 Sep [cited 2026 Sep 16]. Available from: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/9913386/lcf-24-clb-8-airfield-clearing
  15. Primicias. Estados Unidos despliega en Ecuador el HANK, un nuevo dron militar impreso en 3D, en medio de operaciones contra el narcotráfico. Primicias [Internet]. 2026 Sep 26 [cited 2026 Sep 27]. Available from: https://www.primicias.ec/seguridad/dron-hanx-militar-ecuador-estados-unidos-comando-sur-133498/
  16. U.S. Mission Ecuador. U.S. Mission Ecuador [Internet]. 2025 [cited 2026 Oct 7]. The United States supports Ecuador’s digital transformation through an agreement with Google Cloud. Available from: https://ec.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-supports-ecuadors-digital-transformation-through-an-agreement-with-google-cloud/
  17. Primicias. ADuanas de Ecuador busca una suscripción a la plataforma de Palantir por USD 17 millones, tras un año del primer contrato. Primicias [Internet]. 2026 May 27 [cited 2026 Jun 7]. Available from: https://www.primicias.ec/politica/aduanas-suscripcion-contrato-palantir-millones-cnt-123736/
  18. La Hora. Palantir Technologies abrirá oficina en Ecuador, Daniel Noboa se reunió con el CEO en Suiza. La Hora [Internet]. 2026 Jan 21 [cited 2026 Oct 7]. Available from: https://www.lahora.com.ec/politica/palantir-technologies-abrira-oficina-en-ecuador-daniel-noboa-se-reunio-con-el-ceo-en-suiza-20260121-0026.html
  19. Vélez R. Ecuador utilizará Palantir para detectar lavado de activos en apuestas deportivas desde 2027, dice Neira. Primicias [Internet]. 2026 Oct 6 [cited 2026 Oct 7]. Available from: https://www.primicias.ec/economia/ecuador-palantir-jose-julio-neira-apuestas-deportivas-lavado-activos-134294/

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

U.S. Cuba Policy: Might Makes Wrong

Fulton Armstrong, Research Fellow, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University

Philip Brenner, Emeritus Professor of International Relations and History, American University

View of Havana, Cuba. Source: Robert Albro

The Trump administration has been applying to Cuba its credo that might makes right. At the United Nations President Donald Trump pointed to Cuba shortly after musing that he might “annihilate the Islamic Republic [of Iran]”, driving the Iranian people “into hell with no chance of survival.” U.S. escalation of its “extreme pressure” measures to effect regime change in Cuba, especially the oil blockade in place since January, amounts to the strongest attack from the United States since Fidel Castro marched into Havana more than 66 years ago, with little prospect of an outcome pleasing to the United States.

The across-the-board economic, diplomatic, and military steps to block all oil shipments to the Cuban oil processing and distribution industry – allowing only one small Russian shipment and a variety of small shipments of finished products to cash-paying clients in the private sector – are causing a multi-tiered humanitarian crisis. The blockade covers even solar panels, and shippers afraid of U.S. sanctions are delaying delivery of containers of food, medicine, and other essentials. Legal experts say these measures amount to a violation of international law.

Blackouts last 20 hours a day, and the whole national grid has crashed six times since January. Numerous press reports indicate that homes have no water because pumps cannot function without electricity. Patients needing hospital care are dying, with an estimated 100,000 people unable to obtain essential surgeries. Without fuel for trucks, garbage is piled high on city street corners, increasing the spread of mosquitoes bearing a range of diseases including chikungunya, dengue, and zika. The energy system has long been vulnerable because of previous embargo measures, such as prohibitions on the sale of spare parts with 10 percent or more of U.S. content, and because of inconsistent government policies. But the new U.S. actions have, by far, been the decisive cause of the current crises.

The underlying premise of U.S. policy since the 1960s is to spark a popular uprising that would lead to government collapse. The $60 million-$70 million a year the U.S. spends on information programs and other psychological operations directed at the island, primarily through social media, are clearly aimed at fomenting discontent, and many Cubans do blame their own government more than they do the U.S. for the lack of meaningful reform in past years.

But the government retains residual strengths that have enabled it to resist the U.S. pressure over these nine months. The people’s stoic and often creative survival strategies indicate that, even though they want change that will improve living conditions, they don’t want it dictated by Washington or Miami. The government has initiated and begun implementing significant economic reforms – at lightning speed compared to the past – that give the private sector huge new operating space, welcome foreign investment (including from expatriates) with very few conditions, and finally begin to dismantle inefficient state enterprises. Government officials say they’re not embracing capitalism, but their statements increasingly reflect acceptance of market mechanisms, decentralization, and a commitment to get the bureaucrats out of citizens’ way. Although they point out that Vietnam and China had drastically different conditions under which they implemented economic reforms in the 1980s, they’re not shy about signaling that they’re clearly moving toward a similarly mixed economy.  The people won’t feel relief for some time, but change is in the air.

The U.S. Administration seems to think it will win this race for time – that Cuba will “fail” or “collapse” before the benefits of reform can be felt. It is doing all it can to fan the flames on the island, including through threats of military intervention. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio want to make Cuba a “failed state,” but they don’t want to face the consequences of the humanitarian disaster that their aggression is creating. In response to deteriorating conditions, an estimated 1.5 million-to 2 million Cubans already have migrated in the last five years, mainly to Spain and Latin America. But those options are drying up, and Trump and Rubio certainly don’t want Cubans to take to the boats and arrive on Florida shores. 

Even if the U.S. were to achieve its dream of effecting “regime collapse,” the island isn’t going to fall into its lap like a ripe fruit. The economic, infrastructural, and social damage will take decades to mend – and any new regime is going to face serious challenges to its legitimacy as a U.S. puppet and will struggle to maintain order. Indeed, government failure would probably benefit disciplined, orthodox enforcers rather than pro-democracy citizens with no experience. There is no pretty scenario at this point, but the less-ugly scenario would be to let the Cubans, without expressly excluding the party in charge, decide their own future. Cubans want change, but they want it to be evolutionary.

Lethality and Illegality in the U.S. Boat Strikes Campaign: Why Characterization Matters for Regional Accountability Efforts

Marie Miller, Program Associate, Reiss Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law

Source: Wikimedia Commons

On September 2, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that he had ordered a kinetic strike against a boat off the coast of Venezuela. U.S. military forces, he said, had identified those onboard as “narcoterrorists” of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a decentralized criminal organization with Venezuelan origins and a transnational reach. Thirteen days later, another strike, and a glimpse into the administration’s purported rationale: to disrupt narcotics networks affecting Americans—notwithstanding that Venezuela plays essentially no role in fentanyl production and smuggling. And then came another. Now, nearly a year later, more than 200 have been killed in 66 strikes by the U.S. Without evidence, without interdiction and trial, nor the administration’s stated legal authority made public, there’s still no telling when Operation Southern Spear, as the U.S. calls the campaign, will truly end.

With each strike, the administration has failed to make public any evidence that these boats are transporting drugs, much less that the passengers on board are affiliated with cartels or are participants in an “armed attack.” Most of the victims have not been identified, yet reports suggest victims include farmworkers and fishermen, compelled to participate in the trafficking network as independent laborers without ownership over the illicit product. With regard to cases where boats have been unusually crowded, one military official suggested that human trafficking victims could have been amongst those killed.

The Trump administration has claimed that the laws of war permit the killing of passengers smuggling narcotics in support of cartels designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). In 2025, TdA was designated as such by Trump’s State Department, under a statutory authority delegated by Congress. Typically, the military can stop instances of trafficking with far less lethal force. If a vessel is suspected of ferrying drugs, it can be intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard and its passengers arrested. Instead, it appears that boats merely suspected of drug trafficking have been blown to bits from above, taking the lives of those on board and occasionally leaving survivors who, eventually, are also presumed dead or missing at sea. Even if evidence had been provided that these individuals were indeed associated with TdA—and it has not—the administration’s justification for these strikes relies on a flawed legal basis.

An FTO designation made by the U.S. government can include financial, criminal, and immigration consequences for its material supporters. Importantly, despite having led to military operations in the past, the designation by itself does not create a state of war or armed conflict, nor does it authorize “wartime” authorities like targeting or detention. Nonetheless, in a classified memo notifying Congress of the administration’s legal basis for the operation, the “President determined that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with these designated terrorist organizations.” The president can surely repel threats of terrorism when a sudden attack is imminent. Yet there is no evidence that this high threshold was met at the onset of Operation Southern Spear. The initial strikes were framed as “self-defense” against a critical threat to American life and security. A state’s self-defense is justified under the U.N. Charter’s Article 51 only in the case of preventing an armed attack or subduing an ongoing one.

In an undisclosed notice to Congress, the Trump administration apparently shifted its basis, indicating that the strikes go beyond discrete acts of self-defense, labeling the targeted cartels as “nonstate armed groups” whose actions amount to “an armed attack” against the U.S. Many legal experts, on the other hand, contend that drug trafficking and its effects cannot constitute an “armed attack” triggering the right of self-defense. In its description of non-international armed conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia refers to it as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” While the Trump administration has indicated that TdA is engaged in “irregular warfare” in the U.S., it has yet to define what this entails. Whether this amounts to “protracted armed violence” is uncertain and unsupported by available evidence.

In the absence of such an organized group engaged in protracted armed violence with the U.S., the law of armed conflict does not apply. Thus, the passengers on the boats—alleged associates of TdA, though not identified as such in the formal report from President Trump informing Congress of the initial strike—would not be combatants, nor civilians within an armed conflict. (If there was an armed conflict, the boaters’ civilian status would render them prohibited targets). Subsequently, the strikes would not be classified as war crimes. Outside of armed conflict, premeditated killing of suspected criminals is called murder. And under U.S. domestic law, it is prohibited. Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the U.S. is a party, further prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. Those responsible for authorizing the strikes may also be guilty of murder under Article 118 of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice.

According to former U.S. State Department attorney Charlie Trumbull, with each of the 66 strikes constituting discrete acts of murder across a ten month window, the attacks can arguably be described as “widespread.” Crimes against humanity (CAH), one of three atrocity crimes alongside genocide and war crimes, are understood as part of a “widespread or systemic attack directed against a civilian population” in “furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.” A named policy—Operation Southern Spear—implemented by U.S. Southern Command in an organized manner, therefore, may meet the “state or organizational policy” requirement for CAH.

Operation Southern Spear appears to be one of many prongs of the Trump administration’s aggressive aims to reassert the U.S. preeminence in the western hemisphere, as part of the National Security Strategy’s “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.” In spite of condemnation from civil society, a largely tepid response from Caribbean states met the U.S. militarization of the Caribbean and the capture of Maduro in January. While Cuba’s representative to the U.N. decried the “military aggression” of the United States against Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago—whose military has partnered with the U.S. for joint exercises in Caribbean waters—verbally committed to the “cooperative efforts led by the United States to disrupt and dismantle networks that enable transnational crime,” remaining “steadfast” in support of U.S. “initiatives that strengthen regional security.” When Colombian President Gustavo Petro called one of the strikes “murder,” President Trump sanctioned members of his family, threatening to reduce aid and raise tariffs on the country. Since ending intelligence sharing with the U.S. (to, in his words, refrain from “collaborating with a crime against humanity”) Petro has reportedly toned down his criticism of U.S. Southern Command. Colombian authorities, moreover, have been slow to identify bodies that have washed ashore.

In the wake of Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro from power, and the reported preparation of indictments against Cuba’s “political and military leadership,” Caribbean and Latin American states may be hesitant to further push back on the campaign, lest they risk falling into disfavor with a highly unpredictable Trump administration. In March, Ecuador began joint military exercises with U.S. Southern Command, with the intention of combatting drug trafficking. These led to various land and sea strikes, property destructions, and detentions. Since Operation Southern Spear appears to rely on a presumption that the U.S. is in an armed conflict with TdA, would the U.S. further target perceived associates—potentially including civilians—on land in Latin America? It is not outside the bounds of possibility.

If the relevant crime is indeed murder under U.S. law, the U.S. would hold prosecutorial jurisdiction. An ACLU case brought on behalf of the boat strikes victims’ families for wrongful death and extrajudicial killing is currently pending in Massachusetts, for instance. But if the killings are recognized as a crime against humanity, states outside of the U.S. may have universal jurisdiction status, in which international or foreign courts could step in when the U.S. fails to hold perpetrators accountable. This is why the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity matters. Despite President Trump’s ability to pardon those who have executed his orders in his chain of command, a determination that Operation Southern Spear is a crime against humanity would open new routes of accountability on the international level.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), for instance, can assert jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territory and maritime space of states that have ratified the Rome Statute. A point of comparative interest lies with the case of former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, who is now jailed after the ICC confirmed charges of crimes against humanity against him. In light of the murders of persons involved in drug-related criminal activity under the supervision of Philippines law enforcement, the ICC found reasonable grounds for the elements of crimes against humanity to be met. States can also prosecute crimes committed against their citizens abroad, such as the victims of the boat strikes, if they embrace passive personality jurisdiction and are able to either acquire prosecutorial custody or allow in absentia prosecution.

The geopolitical risks of accountability-seeking by victims’ states—Colombia or Trinidad, for instance—are evident. But the Trump administration won’t last forever. Right now, if they are able to muster the political will, Caribbean and Latin American states can quietly gather evidence of the strikes and secure witnesses. Once President Trump is out of office, indictments of perpetrators responsible for driving Operation Southern Spear on the state’s behalf can still come about.

The U.S. Supreme Court Immigration Rulings: Citizenship, Asylum, Metering, and TPS

By Ernesto Castañeda

American University

By Ernesto Castañeda

In recent weeks, the conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several rulings affecting the U.S. immigration system. One of these rulings states that people cannot seek asylum in the United States until they are physically inside U.S. territory. This has significant implications for people arriving—especially at the U.S.-Mexico border—who were requesting entry at the border wall or at ports of entry, turning themselves over to immigration agents to ask for admission with the stated goal of seeking asylum. Now, according to the Supreme Court, the U.S. government will view them as being in Mexico, and since they will largely be denied entry, they cannot apply for asylum while still outside U.S. territory. That is, the Court treated people waiting on the Mexican side of the border as not yet having entered the United States for asylum purposes. This is curious because in some cases the side of the border wall facing Mexico is already U.S. territory because clearly the U.S. cannot build on Mexican territory. Meaning that in many places, by reaching the wall, one is technically already on U.S. soil. Future suits may test this. However, given these new legal precedents, it appears the U.S. government would deny entry for the purpose of seeking asylum inside the country. This will affect many people, particularly those from Latin America and regions experiencing armed conflict or political turmoil. 

Another ruling related to what is known as “metering”—essentially a slow, controlled trickle of people allowed into U.S. territory when there is congestion of asylum seekers at the border, or when large numbers of people wish to enter the United States. It is not the first time this border-processing policy, which limits how many asylum seekers are admitted or processed at a time, has been brought up. During the pandemic—and even earlier, under programs like “Remain in Mexico”—the U.S. government stated it would only accept, say, five hundred, two hundred, or two thousand people per day across the entire border. Consequently, even though many people sought asylum, they were not immediately admitted. The U.S. government claimed this was necessary to maintain order and manage logistics—handling the entry process in a way they could manage without people sleeping on the streets or needing more hostels for migrants or overcrowded immigration detention centers. Metering was an “emergency” policy that began under Obama, continued under Trump, was paused during most of Biden’s term, though it was brought back towards the end, and continued under the Trump administration. The Supreme Court has allowed the policy to proceed into the future by lifting the lower-court block.

The third topic is Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allows legal residence in the United States to whole groups of people from particular countries due to events like earthquakes, hurricanes, civil conflict, or other crises—as seen in Honduras, Haiti, El Salvador, and other countries—where nationals could stay in the U.S. without fear of deportation. However, the Supreme Court has now ruled that, in the case of Haitians and Syrians, this status of temporary protection can be completely revoked despite motives and the decision-making process. But the Supreme Court conservative majority went further, arguing that TPS designation is a matter that falls under executive authority, specifically the president’s power to decide whom, how, when, and for how long TPS is granted. Therefore, the decision strengthens the executive’s ability to terminate TPS designations and may affect other TPS holders. So, although the ruling did not directly address cases involving, for example, Salvadorans, it grants the president greater power to revoke TPS at will without explanation, preventing even lower courts from blocking such decisions—something they had done in recent years. 

Altogether, these decisions have many implications that make it harder for people to enter the U.S. legally or to seek asylum, and make it difficult for those already inside the country to apply for asylum, given the lengthy, difficult process, made even worse by recent procedures implemented by the second Trump administration. Now, regarding people holding TPS, deportations will begin—starting with Haitians and Syrians—but the issue likely will not stop there. People with TPS have been in the U.S. for decades, working, paying taxes, contributing to the economy and the arts. They have children born in the U.S. who are U.S. citizens under the current practice of granting birthright citizenship; soon, the Court will rule on the future of birthright citizenship, which is so common in many countries in the Americas, which started as European colonies with an important proportion of the population born from parents and ancestors born elsewhere.  

Ernesto Castañeda is a political, social, and cultural analyst. Edited by Esmeralda Alverde Duarte, Research Intern at the Immigration Lab

Changing Birthright Citizenship Would Weaken American Democracy

By Ernesto Castañeda

American University

The U.S. Supreme Court will soon announce its ruling on Birthright Citizenship. If it sides with the Trump administration, it will revoke the practice of automatically obtaining citizenship by birth in U.S. territories. The outcome of this case has the potential not only to change how immigration law functions but also how citizenship is defined for everyone in the United States. Doing away with it would permanently damage the Supreme Court’s reputation.

Birthright Citizenship is part of the 14th Amendment and has been a right guaranteed to anyone born within the country since 1868. The amendment was originally implemented to guarantee citizenship to formerly enslaved people and means that anyone born on American soil is an American citizen, regardless of their parents’ citizenship at birth. Slaves were not considered citizens nor had the same political rights, and their status was inherited through maternal lines and thus also affected the children slave-owners had with enslaved mothers.

Revoking Birthright Citizenship would immediately bring into question the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of children born each year, both to citizens and to undocumented or temporary residents with permission to work and study in the United States, and not officially representing a foreign country.  It would reinstate the inheritance of status that existed during slavery, where a mother’s status, in this case, documentation, would be passed down to her children, possibly for generations. It would create a group of people in the U.S. with no rights, greatly deepening inequality and democratic erosion.

Previous court decisions have upheld Birthright Citizenship regardless of the parents’ immigration status. There is a strong precedent for birthright citizenship. Even during previous periods of immigration restriction in the US, like during the years following the Chinese Exclusion Act, the U.S.-born children of undocumented Chinese parents were American citizens. Changes to birthright citizenship would directly impact newborns from undocumented parents as well as the children of foreign workers with permission to reside in the country. Systems like this have existed before in countries like Germany, but were abandoned due to their impracticality and the enduring inequalities they created.

A small group is fighting to end birthright citizenship. Most Americans do not have a problem with birthright citizenship; 64% of Americans support it. The widespread impact of ending birthright citizenship would be felt not just by everyday people but also by foreign-born CEOs, scientists, healthcare professionals, and, yes, agricultural and service workers. It would impact U.S. innovation for decades to come. It would deter people from immigrating and bringing new ideas and approaches to common problems. The U.S. would no longer be the main global hub of intellectual exchange and creativity that it has been for decades.

Ernesto Castañeda is a political, social, and cultural analyst.

Misconceptions, Latino Youth, and the Path Ahead: The Immigration Realities for Latino Communities in Washington, DC 

By Maria Muradyan 

Most of the narratives about immigration are wrong. They are simplistic, outdated, and dangerous. — Ernesto Castañeda.  

This quote carries particular weight here in Washington, DC, where harmful rhetoric and harsh policy are produced just a couple of blocks away from immigrant communities who face its consequences directly. For decades, the topic of immigration has been at the forefront of American political discourse. Americans on opposite ends of the aisle have consistently disagreed on immigration policy and whether or not we as a country have a responsibility to accept people who cross the border and enter America “illegally”. Opinions on the topic, though always polarizing, have transformed and intensified drastically in the last decade, with the election of President Donald Trump and the emergence of the “MAGA” movement. The slogan “Make America Great Again” can be most often associated with right-wing populism, conservative nationalism, but perhaps most famously, a narrative that casts Latin American immigrants as threats to national security and as a strain on American society. 

The current administration’s rhetoric and policy on immigration have single handedly created one of the most polarized political environments in American history. As the political climate has shifted, these ideological divisions have fueled a wave of widespread misconceptions and stereotypes about Latino immigrants, who they are, why they come, and the impact they have on American society. These harmful misinterpretations not only distort public attitudes but also pave the path for harsh immigration policies and are used to justify the unlawful and inhumane deportation practices carried out by ICE in Washington, DC, and across the nation. 

In an effort to better understand these stereotypes and the effects they have on victims and their families, I conducted an interview with Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, a migration scholar, professor, and Director of Immigration Lab at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. Dr. Castañeda is a leading voice on how misconceptions shape the lived experiences of immigrant communities in DC, and how enforcement, family separation, and uncertainty shape the lives and psychological well-being of youth. 

The first false assumption he addressed is the belief that America has become ‘overflooded with immigrants’. Dr Castañeda pointed out that actual population data proves just the opposite. According to a Pew Research study conducted in 2023, immigrants make up roughly 15% of America’s population (52% being from Latin America). Not only this, but out of the total number of individuals not born in America, undocumented immigrants made up a mere 27% (Pew Research 2025). Locally, immigrants constitute about the same share of the D.C. population as they do nationally. All immigrants make up about 13% of the population, out of which 11.3% identify as Latino (American Immigration Council 2025) 

When looking at data from the 2024 election year, an analysis of tens of thousands of statements made by Trump showed that he repeated the sentence ” [South American countries are] emptying out their prisons and their mental institutions into the United States ” or similar ones over 560 times during his most recent re-election campaign (Marshall Project 2024). Dr. Castañeda explains how these repeated claims are what perpetuate stereotypes such as Latinos are ‘dangerous criminals, ‘ invading the country, and ‘using up public resources. ’ When average Americans, with little knowledge or exposure to immigrants, hear these statements repeatedly, they will inevitably begin to accept them as facts. However, long-term empirical studies show us otherwise. Research analyzed by the Journal of Criminology over the span of 24 years showed that no evidence exists that links undocumented immigrants to the number of violent crimes in the country. Not only this, but this study found that increases in the immigrant population within the states correspond to decreases in the prevalence of violence and crime (Light & Miller, 2018). 

According to Castañeda, current narratives fail to take into account that the vast majority of Latino immigrants come to America to ‘study, work, contribute to science, to work in hospitals, to get married, and that is rarely part of the story’. Furthermore, as he explains both in his book Immigration Realities and in our interview, immigrants actually rely on public assistance at lower rates than U.S. citizens, and this is true even for their U.S born children. They also play an essential role in keeping the economy and population growing. Immigrants contribute to scientific progress, cultural creativity, and the continuation and spread of American ideas and culture. Any evolving society needs new people to sustain itself, and throughout history, immigrants have taken on that role in the United States. 

While these negative narratives dominate the national conversation, their most immediate impact becomes visible in places like DC, where families must confront fear and instability while navigating their day to day lives. The Shrine of the Sacred Heart, a Catholic Church, which is just a short bus ride from the White House, has long served as a place of worship for the Catholic Latin American community in DC. However, in the last several months, it has become a hub for ICE attacks this October. The Associated Press reports that over 40 members of the parish have been recently deported as churchgoers are ‘fearful to leave their homes, get food, medical care or attend Mass’. The Archdiocese of Washington describes these mass deportations as “instruments of terror” for the Latino community of DC. The climate in the city remains especially volatile for mixed status families, who must live with the fear that their loved one will be detained while doing their daily tasks. This became a reality for one member of the Sacred Heart Church whose husband was detained by ICE while selling fruits and vegetables at the family owned fruit stand. She says, “ It’s been a very difficult, bitter month of crying and suffering…our lives changed forever one day to the next” (Associated Press, 2025) 

Stories like these are not limited to Sacred Heart but are a reflection of the unique set of challenges that mixed-status families face in DC and across the nation. These effects are already being felt in DC high schools and universities, where Dr. Castañeda notes the current political environment is having consequences on youth in these mixed status families. He states, “Youth are afraid for themselves and are afraid for their families, for their friends, for the communities…that makes it harder to focus on school, we see that in the universities, we see that with colleagues, we see that with staff members who have undocumented family members”. A 2024 study published by the Journal of Latinx Psychology followed a sample of youth who are US citizens but lived in mixed status families. They discovered that exposure to current violent immigration enforcement, such as witnessing a parent or loved one deported, significantly increases severe anxiety, fear, and depression among the sampled youth. These psychological effects extended beyond the immediate family members, as the trauma was felt even when enforcement actions targeted people in their community rather than someone directly inside the home. Their study also confirmed that anti-immigration stigma quickly becomes internalized, as adolescents in the study reported feeling ashamed of their background, immigrant family, and language (Lieberman et al., 2024). 

These effects could be expected to be felt especially strongly in DC due to the high prevalence of Latino youth immigrants who arrived a decade prior. Beginning in 2014, DC saw a large surge in unaccompanied youth, between the ages of 13-18, who came to America to unite with their parents, grandparents, or extended families. Castañeda explains that since this group of youth has reached a legal adult age, ICE agents might be ‘looking for an excuse to deport them’. As ICE revisits these old cases of unaccompanied minors, they are also using this as an opportunity to track down their immediate and extended families as well as their sponsors. Subsequently, the result is a painful cycle in which youth who once struggled to reunite with their family, once torn apart by borders, must now live in psychological torment and fear of losing each other once more. Current immigration enforcement practices are undoubtedly a form of psychological violence that produces hypervigilance, fear, and depression, and will cause long term trauma in immigrant communities. 

Looking ahead, it is clear that America is in dire need of immigration reform, one that is based on facts, research, and empirical evidence, rather than stereotypes. However, Castaneda notes that the general public is not to blame, as one cannot expect regular Americans to understand topics as complex as immigration law. Rather, this responsibility falls on our lawmakers who must put aside partisanship and focus on creating solutions that maintain the dignity of immigrants, while addressing the realities of the current day border.  

Castañeda explains the best form of immigration reform would be what he calls “generous amnesty”, or a broad pathway to legalization. Individuals and families who have been living in America for an extended period of time and have built entirely new lives must be given a path to citizenship. This is both a moral imperative but also it is a sentiment that, according to him, is largely supported by most Americans on both sides of the aisle. Recent Gallup polls confirm this fact, as 64% of Republicans and 91% of Democrats classify immigration as a positive (Gallup, 2025). A generous amnesty does not mean an open borders concept. Rather, it is a way to create legal paths to citizenship, so that migrants have other options rather than resorting to crossing the border. It is only natural that individuals and families desperate for survival will resort to the only option available to them.  

Second, the US is becoming an aging nation with a retiring workforce and a declining birth rate. With the declining population and lowered birth rates, many key industries, such as agriculture, are having projected worker shortages, unable to meet the labor demands. The Economic Policy Institute finds that “Achieving historically ‘normal’ GDP growth rates will be impossible, unless immigration flows are sustained” (Bivens 2025). Employment based immigration is one way through which the government can offset this issue. Granting a greater number of H-1B and H-2B visas can help balance these effects by bringing in younger and eager individuals who are ready to work in these essential positions. 

In conclusion, data, decades of research, the realities in DC, and Dr. Castañeda’s expertise make one point unmistakably clear. The narratives that dominate our national conversation about immigration are misinformed, outdated, and harmful to those who live with its consequences daily. The political rhetoric from our nation’s leaders creates instability, fear, and psychological trauma in immigrants while simultaneously distorting the public’s perception of the issue. Research continues to show that immigrants make America stronger, enriching society, unifying communities, and bettering the economy. Dr. Castañeda’s work reminds us that looking ahead, we must demand from our lawmakers a change that is rooted in the recognition of these principles and the creation of dignified paths to citizenship.  

As I reflect on my childhood and the little girl I was when I first arrived in America, I see no difference between myself and another little girl today arriving from El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras, Cuba, or Guatemala. We all carried the same fears of an unfamiliar place, the same uncertainty, the same dreams of a brighter, better future in this country. The only difference between the treatments we received was the country we came from and the political implications that country brought with it. It is time that we begin to approach immigration with greater empathy, remembering that we ourselves, or our parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, once stood in these very same shoes. Latino immigrants have positively shaped this nation from the beginning of its history, and they continue to do so today. These facts are unmistakable, the human suffering is devastating, and the need for humane immigration reform has long been overdue. 

Maria Muradyan is a senior at UCLA studying Political Science with a strong interest in American politics and public policy. She participated in UCLA’s UCDC program in Washington, DC. Her interests include immigration policy and community advocacy, with a particular emphasis on how political institutions and policy frameworks shape social and economic outcomes. Through her research and writing, Maria aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of contemporary policy debates and their real-world implications. 

References 

Castañeda, Ernesto (2025, November 21st), Personal Interview on Immigration. 

Geiger, A. (2025, August 21). What the data says about immigrants in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/21/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/  

Immigrants in the District of Columbia – American Immigration Council. (2025). American Immigration Council. https://map.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/locations/district-of-columbia/?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

The Marshall Project. (2024, October 21). Fact-checking Over 12,000 of Donald Trump’s Statements About Immigration. The Marshall Project. https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/10/21/fact-check-12000-trump-statements-immigrants 

Light, M., & Miller, T. (2018). Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime? Criminology, 56(2), 370–401. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12175  

Henao, L. A., & Stanley, T. (2025, October 27). Immigration crackdown sows fear among Catholic church community in US capital. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/immigration-crackdown-catholic-church-washington-874e6deca9e54a4e14081c63adca7718  

Jamile Tellez Lieberman, Dsouza, N., Valdez, C. R., Pintor, J. K., Weisz, P., Carroll-Scott, A., & Martinez-Donate, A. P. (2024). Interior immigration enforcement experiences, perceived discrimination, and mental health of U.S.-citizen adolescents with Mexican immigrant parents. Journal of Latinx Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/lat0000263  

Saad, L. (2025, July 11). Surge in U.S. Concern About Immigration Has Abated. Gallup.com; Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/692522/surge-concern-immigration-abated.aspx  

The U.S.-born labor force will shrink over the next decade: Achieving historically “normal” GDP growth rates will be impossible unless immigration flows are sustained. (2025). Economic Policy Institute. https://www.epi.org/publication/the-u-s-born-labor-force-will-shrink-over-the-next-decade-achieving-historically-normal-gdp-growth-rates-will-be-impossible-unless-immigration-flows-are-sustained/?utm_source  

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

By Ernesto Castañeda

Regarding the question of what is happening between the United States and Venezuela, the answer is that this is a partially unintended, unanticipated international focus at the end of the first year of Trump’s second term. While the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela have not been close for a while, this path opened up as other areas of intervention, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, got stuck at a standstill. 

The potential intervention in Venezuela is not a popular option. There is little support among experts about its merits. Likewise, Venezuelans are not eager to go to war.

This was not a priority for Trump in the past. But three key members of his cabinet and White House staff have zeroed in on Venezuela in the last few months.

As an article in the Washington Post on December 18, 2025, explains convincingly by drawing from inside sources and visible actions, Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, and the main engine behind the aggressive anti-immigrant agenda, wanted to conduct military attacks in Mexico as another way to curb immigration, his long obsession. But as undocumented and asylum-seeker arrivals at the border have approached zero —in part thanks to Mexico’s role—, Miller looked further south. 

Trump campaigned in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 elections, bashing MS-13 and Salvadoran immigration. But this time around, he found an ally in Salvadoran President Bukele. Other Central American governments have also collaborated, so he zoomed in on Venezuela through Tren de Aragua (TdA) as an excuse to expedite deportations. Tren de Aragua-related deportations to CECOT in El Salvador became a fiasco and highly unpopular, not to say unlawful. So, the administration moved to declaring the so-called Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as its supposed head. After targeting small boats off the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean, then the excuse became fighting drug trafficking and then to old claims on permits to exploit Venezuelan oil by Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies, without discarding the ideas of regime change as the support for Machado grew internationally, and as the Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, told Chris Whipple to get rid of Maduro, to put pressure on Venezuela until Maduro would give up or “call uncle.”

On the other hand, Marco Rubio—both National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, which in other countries would be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs—has long had an obsession with the regime in Cuba, which he sees as related to Venezuela. This is partly because of the financial and oil support that Venezuela gave to Cuba for many years, which, although it continues—it seems that the first oil tanker that was seized was going from Venezuela to Cuba—though the Venezuela support is no longer the support it once was, and it’s not enough to help the Cuban regime, which is in deep economic trouble. Officials in Cuba see this as a move with them ultimately in mind. 

Marco Rubio is especially interested in attacking the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, and there is nobody left in the White House to contradict him, not Susie Wiles, as John Kelly would have done in the first Trump administration, to stop such a bad idea.

According to the Washington Post article mentioned before, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was happy to jump into the frenzy to protect his job following Signalgate. He was eager to prove himself, show “leadership,” and get more attention in the spotlight and ingratiate himself with Miller. So, he found the idea of bombing the small boats appealing, and he would probably like to lead a small incursion into Venezuela.

The objective is not truly drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine that reaches the United States doesn’t come from Venezuela. There are a few shipments that pass through Venezuela and then to the Caribbean; these drug shipments were going to other islands in the region, and perhaps some of that cocaine would eventually reach Europe, but very little reaches the United States. The Coast Guard has been in charge of seizing these vessels for many years, and the DEA could be conducting more formal investigations, so this idea of ​​the drugs as the rationale to threaten Venezuela is not believable. The American people don’t believe it, and this new pseudo-label of “narco-terrorists” isn’t logically convincing either legally or at the logical or expert levels. Indeed, it seems that the administration is already giving up on that; also, with the pardon for the president of Honduras, the drug angle is less convincing. The contradiction remains, and they are rightly not going to attack Mexico or Colombia over the drug issue in the near future.

Things changed a bit with Maria Corina Machado’s visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize regarding democracy in Venezuela and regime change. And lately, there have been a few statements from Trump about the interests of U.S. oil companies in Venezuela. The U.S. oil lobby has been a key factor in Trump’s re-election. So, another goal is for U.S. oil companies to regain access to Venezuela, although there is already an American company doing business there: Chevron. So, this is not something of a priority. All this to say, there is no master strategy behind it.

It is partly a personal animosity between Trump and Maduro, evident in public declarations and supposed ideological differences, but the two governments have also had occasions when they handled structured negotiations very well. There have been instances of negotiations resulting in detained individuals returning from Venezuela to the United States, deportations with permission of Venezuelans from the United States, and then from El Salvador. So, it’s not that there has been a terrible personal relationship between Trump and Maduro or their intermediaries.

Marco Rubio’s obsession is the main driver. He has made recent public statements presenting new arguments and rationales, but they have seemed improvised and unconvincing. Even an overt, public declaration of a return to the Monroe Doctrine is not enough to justify this; it is mainly good news for Russia and China. 

To justify an attack on Venezuela and the boats around the coasts, members of the Trump administration have claimed that they wanted to combat terrorism, foreign enemies in the American war on terror, to accelerate deportations, but they still haven’t been able to win that mediatic battle or the legal or logical argument, but they have not done so not even in the local or federal courts. Although the Supreme Court hasn’t stopped them either.

Steven Miller is mainly interested in the idea of a war with Venezuela or with someone else, as a pretext to push through certain laws, such as the Alien Enemies Act and the Insurrection Act, both of which require the U.S. to be at war to be invoked. But this is not even necessary to continue with the mass deportations as they have been. They are deporting many people. Detaining people, they are practically at war with immigrant-based communities, though they are violating human rights and constitutional protections within the country. A declaration of war would not change that reality or make it any more appealing to citizens.

It is very clear that the majority of the American public opinion, even part of the MAGA base, is against the U.S. getting directly involved in any new war. They would be against an invasion or bombing of Venezuela, whether prolonged or even for a short period. It would be more difficult to stop something like an Iran-type one-targeted bombing situation, but removing Maduro probably wouldn’t be as quick or simple.

So, the American people are quite against an intervention in Venezuela. Furthermore, as we see with the debates surrounding the small fishing boats, critics, including legislators in the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans, see these bombings of ships off the Latin American coasts as extralegal. They are putting a lot of pressure on the Pentagon to release the videos showing the killing of two survivors, and to either stop this type of operation, to explain what is happening, and if the intention is to engage in war, then, to make the case to Congress of why the U.S. needs to wage a war, on what basis, and with what objective.

All indicates it would not be something Congress would easily approve. Trying to get the Republicans in Congress to do that could cost some of them their seats in 2026. So, it’s a war, a strategy without rhyme or reason, hence the clear disorder. Venezuela is very worried about Trump’s pronouncements, but their aimlessness is nothing new. So, no one knows what’s going to happen, not even the Pentagon, which has deployed elements that are not sufficient for sustained ground intervention, though they are spending a lot of money bringing the ships there.

They thought military mobilization would be enough to intimidate Maduro, but it obviously hasn’t been. The Nobel Prize hype around Machado has already passed, and it hasn’t changed anything on the ground. The Venezuelan diaspora is asking for military intervention, but that is not enough. Understandably, from their point of view and personal experiences, they are asking Trump to do something. Those who are more established, have money, and have been here for a while, are still upset they were forced to leave. But the more recent Venezuelan migrants who came here seeking asylum after the pandemic are being denied asylum, their work permits revoked, and deported. So that is also a contradiction about Venezuela supposedly being a narco-state. So, the whole armed intimidation of Venezuela is bullying to the extreme, but it is incoherent as foreign policy.

The majority in the United States are against this war in Venezuela and the attacks on the small boats, oil tankers, and the possibility of bombings or military action. Contrary to what some in the White House bubble seem to believe, a war with Venezuela would not be enough to distract from the economic and political situation in the U.S. It would not totally change the narrative, help speed deportations to what would become a war zone, and the attempts to further concentrate power on the executive could be more directly opposed by the legislative branch which is the one supposed to declare and fund wars. The oil tanker confiscations and chases are just the latest in a series of policies in which the administration’s words, threats, and actions are not enough to scare Maduro or convince the public of the righteousness of these actions. 

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed are his alone.

Detention Inc: A Private Industry of Immigrant Detention Centers

How the Private Immigration Detention Industry Functions and Thrives in the US

By Tazreena Sajjad, PhD and Jack Spehn

The United States is home to the oldest and largest immigration detention system in North America and arguably, in the world. As of June 24, 2025, approximately 59,000 immigrants are being detained across the country under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the federal agency responsible for enforcing immigration law within the United States, with roughly 46,000 being detained on an average day since January 26. These numbers, significant as they are, are still notably below the Trump administration’s April claim that the government had “surpassed the entirety of Fiscal Year 2024” in immigration enforcement, with over 151,000 arrests and 135,000 deportations. As of late June, ICE’s detention level is at over 140% capacity.

Furthermore, despite the claims that these arrests —and even the most recent travel ban on 19 countries and counting— are a response to a dangerous invasion and a threat to the US, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the vast number of detained immigrants present a “clear and present danger” to either US national security interests or to the American public. In fact, approximately 47%  of those currently detained by ICE lack a criminal record, and less than 30% have been convicted of crimes that constitute minor offenses, including traffic violations. Meanwhile, the immigration detention business is only slated to expand – the new budget (OBBBA) approved by Congressional Republicans has allocated $45 billion for the construction of new immigrant detention centers alone, including facilities for family detention.

 A growing number of immigrants are being incarcerated in the US in the private immigration detention industry, on which the US government increasingly relies for immigration enforcement. In recent years, it is estimated that as many as 90% of ICE detainees in the US have been incarcerated in facilities operated by private immigration detention companies. 

The discussion below provides an overview of the US immigration detention system’s growing reliance on the private sector, the extent to which these companies continue to derive enormous profits from immigration imprisonment, and how they navigate the US political landscape. Despite widespread allegations and documentation of abuse in these private detention centers, the industry continues to generate significant profits and thrive on support from different public and private actors.

Understanding US Immigration Detention 

In the US, immigration detention refers to the federal government’s ongoing practice of confining individuals in a range of facilities for violating immigration law. Confinement may last the duration of an individual’s immigration proceedings and, in certain situations, even after their immigration proceedings have been completed. While lacking a current immigration status is a civil violation and immigration detention under the law should be “nonpunitive and preventative,” many of its aspects are indiscernible from criminal incarceration. Detained immigrants are incarcerated in prisons and prison-like facilities; required to wear government-issued uniforms and wristbands with identifying information at all times; and have highly regimented lives under constant surveillance. Detainees are also subjected to discipline and segregation, with very limited access or contact with the world outside. Furthermore, immigrant detainees do not receive the same legal protections as criminal defendants, i.e., they do not have the right to government-appointed counsel. They also do not have the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial, nor are they protected from the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

Over the past several decades, changes in the federal immigration enforcement policy paved the way for an expansive rise in detention rates. For instance, in 1973, the U.S. government detained a daily average of 2,370 migrants and increased to 5,532 by 1994. By 2009, the numbers had surged to 34,000; by 2019, the numbers had risen to a record 55,000.

Chart: Austin Kocher Source: ICE Get the data Embed Download image Created with Datawrapper

Chart: Austin Kocher Source: ICE Get the data Embed Download image Created with Datawrapper

What is clearly notable in these numbers is that since the 1990s, the US immigration policy has relied extensively on detention as a primary means of immigration enforcement. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act increased the incarceration of  U.S. citizens, particularly the Black population. In addition, the 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) ushered in a new era of U.S. immigration detention. Succinctly, these two latter laws not only broadened the types of criminal offenses that could trigger removal proceedings but also expanded the categories of noncitizens — including legal permanent residents — who could be detained without the possibility of release pending the completion of their removal proceedings, and even be subjected to deportation.

Following 9/11, immigration transformed into a national security concern, evidenced by the US Patriot Act, conflating terrorism with the arrival of people at US shores, while drawing on long-standing anti-immigrant sentiments and rhetoric. Under President George W. Bush, the immigration system underwent dramatic changes with Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) being replaced by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which housed all these agencies. DHS’ 2003 Operation Endgame used ICE to detain and deport all “removable aliens by 2012” –possibly the largest police operation in US history– was particularly instrumental in expanding immigration detention and deportation. During Obama’s presidency, the implementation of the detention bed quota (later removed in 2017) and the expansion of deportation programs such as the Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program resulted in thousands of immigrants being incarcerated in detention centers. Following the significant number of Central American arrivals in 2014, immigration detention —particularly family detention— expanded further.

Under the first Trump administration, the deportation dragnet became more extensive with increasing number of 278 g agreements – which allow for state and local law enforcement to work collaboratively for “protecting the homeland” – subsequent community raids, elimination of policies that prioritized detention and deportation of “criminal immigrants,” mandatory detention, and a skyrocketing detention budget that produced a growing system of mass incarceration. In FY 2019 alone, the detention system held more than 500,000 immigrants.

President Biden further funded the increase in the number of detention beds, broadened the 287(g) program, and pursued new and expanded detention facility contracts. Biden’s 2021 executive order directing the Department of Justice to phase out its contracts with private prison companies did include ICE contracts, since the agency is part of the Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, at the beginning of Biden’s presidency, there were fewer than 15,000 in ICE detention, yet the FY2024 spending bill he signed just a few years later provided funding to detain a daily average of 41,500 immigrants. While years of local organizing to end ICE contracts bore fruit along with the growth of pro-immigrant state legislation in multiple places like Irwin County, Georgia, the pipeline to detention has consequently grown, largely as a result of arrested migrants funneled through border apprehensions.

The Private Immigration Detention Industry: Growth and Expansion

The private detention industry plays a critical role in enabling immigration detention in the US. In August 2023, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that more than 9 out of 10 immigrant detainees were held in private prison facilities. Such corporations argue that private prisons are important in immigration management due to their cost-effectiveness, increased safety, and the humane treatment of inmates. In particular, GEO Group and CoreCivic (formerly the Corrections Corporation of America) are two companies responsible for the largest number of private immigration detention facilities in the country. Since the early 1980s, both companies have played a significant role in dominating the private prison industry to satisfy the growing demand for prisons. With the shrinking of the prison population in recent years, GEO Group and CoreCivic adapted their prison facilities to incarcerate noncriminal immigrants in the civil immigration system. In 2020, CoreCivic and GEO Group held half of all ICE detainees while bringing in billions of dollars in revenue through ICE detention contracts. As of December 31, 2024, CoreCivic operated 69 correctional, detention, and reentry facilities domestically, with a total capacity of roughly 76,000 beds. As of the same date, the GEO Group operated 99 facilities worldwide in 2024, with a total capacity of approximately 79,000 beds, the majority of which are located in the US.

The use of private immigration detention companies is by no means limited to Republican administrations; Democratic administrations have also increasingly relied on this industry for immigration enforcement. In fact, in July 2023, more than 90 percent of the average 30,000 people held daily in ICE detention were housed in private facilities.

The profit margins of the most prominent private detention centers have also been notable. From 2000 to 2020, the combined annual revenue of just the GEO Group and CoreCivic rose from well under half a billion dollars to around $4.5 billion. In 2022, GEO Group, which operates internationally as well as domestically, had $1.05 billion in revenue —43.9% of its total revenue from ICE contracts alone. This included $408 million, a significant 17%, on programs involving electronic monitoring of immigrants. In the same year, CoreCivic made $552.2 million (i.e., 30% of its total revenue) from ICE detention contracts. For FY 2023, the US Congress also appropriated $2.9 billion dollars to hold 34,000 people in ICE detention each day.

In 2024, CoreCivic reported a total revenue of $2 billion, up from $1.9 billion in 2023. A little over $1 billion came from federal contracts. Revenues from ICE  totaled $564.8 million in 2024, and $565.5 million in 2023. Meanwhile, GEO Group reported consolidated revenues of roughly $2.4 billion in 2024, 91% of which came from domestic contracts. ICE accounted for 41.5% of the company’s total 2024 revenues.

Both CoreCivic and GEO Group state plainly that their ability to grow is dependent on their ability to secure contracts to develop and manage new facilities. In turn, ICE has a heavy reliance on these private companies and their subcontractors.

Photograph of a CoreCivic Detention Center by Patrick Feller. Retrieved from Flickr.

Photograph of a CoreCivic Detention Center by Patrick Feller. Retrieved from Flickr.

The second Trump administration, with its overt commitment to an anti-immigrant agenda and increase in detention and deportations, has continued to be a boon for the private immigration detention industry. ICE plans to spend as much as $45 billion over the next two years on immigration detention. CoreCivic, in its end-of-2024 financial disclosures, stated “[we] expect demand from the federal government for our correctional and detention facilities to increase under the new presidential administration, particularly from ICE, as a result of anticipated changes in immigration policy.” Meanwhile, GEO Group said, “[we] continue to be encouraged by the current landscape of growth opportunities” and are “preparing for what we believe is an unprecedented opportunity…” Their excitement is evidently shared by their investors; both companies’ stock prices increased dramatically in the aftermath of the November 2024 election and remain well above their average pre-election value.

Questions for the Private Immigration Industry

The U.S. private immigration detention industry —like the private prison industrial complex— has long thrived based on the argument that its existence is necessary to reduce the costs of incarceration to state and federal correctional agencies and the burden on taxpayers. In fact, privatized companies have cut corners, such as reducing basic facilities for detainees and cutting back on their wages, in order to deliver on their promise of cutting government costs while maximizing profits for their shareholders.

While these measures may deliver in the short run, existing research shows they are far more likely to be more expensive in the long run. In addition to the reduction of services and reduced wages that negatively impact imprisoned immigrants, the U.S. immigration detention has long continued to be subject to intense scrutiny for human rights abuses, including verbal and physical assault, sexual harassment, insufficient food and nutrition provision, mistreatment of marginalized communities, insufficient access to medical care, negligence, lack of transparency and accountability alleged by many detainees. In May 2024, a group of U.S. Senators wrote to the Department of Homeland Security and ICE about “well-documented horrific conditions, such as ‘yellow drinking water,’ forced sleep deprivation, prolonged solitary confinement, inadequate medical care, limited access to legal counsel, and violent retaliation against those who complain.” A joint report by the ACLU, Physicians for Human Rights, and American Oversight found that 49 out of 52 deaths during detention ICE reported between January 2017 and December 2021 were “preventable or possibly preventable if appropriate medical care had been provided.” In certain cases reviewed in the report, medical staff vacancies and other health care deficiencies were found to have contributed to deaths. Groups such as Human Rights Watch have also documented multiple instances of substandard medical practices, including “unreasonable delays, poor practitioner and nursing care, and botched emergency response,” contributing to deaths in both publicly- and privately-operated facilities. Government oversight and regulatory bodies have consistently failed to anticipate, mitigate, identify, and rectify the conditions that enable such abuses. 

Private Immigration Detention Companies’ Successful Navigation of Criticisms

During President Obama’s time in office, the 2016 Inspector General report led to a directive to phase out private prisons, causing the stocks of private detention firms to tumble. However, this trend did not translate into significant economic damage for the private immigration detention industry or dampen enthusiasm for its existence. Instead, companies such as Geo Group and Core Civic, continued to develop and expand their public lobby efforts, including making donations to political campaigns. CoreCivic spent $3.7 million in lobbying throughout 2014 and 2015, with nearly $2 million in additional political donations. During Trump’s first presidential run for office, GEO Group donated US$100,000 to his 2016 campaign, and CoreCivic made large contributions to support his inaugural activities. Following President Trump’s 2016 electoral win, both firms’ stocks soared. Soon after, Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Obama directive, citing concern that it would impair “the Bureau’s ability to meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.” In 2017, Texas State Representative John Raney told the Associated Press that a GEO Group lobbyist directly authored legislation that sought to lower childcare standards for private detention centers and extend the amount of time immigrant children could be detained.

Political contributions and lobbying funds remained high throughout the Biden administration. In 2022, GEO Group reported spending more than $4 million on political contributions and $3.1 million on lobbying expenditures, while CoreCivic cited more than $1 million in political contributions and $2.2 million in lobbying fees. Existing research suggests a possible connection between the political contributions made by these companies and their sponsorship of legislation in Congress that benefits the private detention industry. Their methods of influence can also take less overt forms. For example, the contracts these companies sign with governments often include “mandatory minimum” provisions, which guarantee payment for a set number of beds and thus create a financial incentive for governments to fill these spaces. A January 2021 review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that “ICE has increasingly incorporated guaranteed minimum payments into its contracts and agreements … [but] has not taken a strategic approach to these decisions and has spent millions of dollars a month on unused detention space. Some immigrant rights groups have argued that this creates a waste of resources and a financial incentive to keep more immigrants detained within private facilities.

In 2023 alone, CoreCivic reported $983,250 in total political contributions and approximately $2 million in total direct lobbying expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels. In February 2025, GEO Group, along with its associated political action committee, reported a total of $4.02 million in political contributions alongside $3.97 million in direct lobbying expenditures. The company states that their efforts “are focused on promoting the benefits of public-private partnerships in the delivery of support services for secure facilities and processing centers…”, but that they “have not advocated for or against … criminal justice or immigration enforcement policies, such as whether to criminalize behavior, the length of criminal sentences, or the basis for or length of an individual’s incarceration or detention.” CoreCivic also reported donating half a million dollars to the Trump-Vance inaugural committee in December 2024. CoreCivic states that its lobbying efforts are “designed to educate” government officials about “the benefits of partnership corrections”, and that they avoid advocating “for or against policies or legislation that would determine the basis for or duration of an individual’s incarceration or detention.” 

Conclusion

The United States’ growing reliance on the private immigration detention industry has little to do with the country’s national security interests or protecting the American public; but it has consistently been about maximizing the profit margin through the imprisonment of some immigrants with criminal records, but many undocumented immigrants, asylum-seekers, and even lawful permanent residents. Existing research has repeatedly underscored that the private immigration detention system is costly and unsafe, and in several instances, in violation of U.S. and international human rights laws. Yet, the system persists, bolstered by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Under President Trump’s second term, the anti-immigrant agenda has ushered in a time of even more ICE raids, detention, deportation, violent family separations, and human rights violations. All of this leads to a more extensive reliance on private detention centers, which stand to benefit financially from these incarcerations, so much so that CoreCivic’s CEO Damon Hininger describes the present times as “truly one of the most exciting periods in my career.”

For more you can listen to Nancy Hiemstra and Deirdre Conlon, and Austin Kocher ICE Detention Numbers Explained