Misconceptions, Latino Youth, and the Path Ahead: The Immigration Realities for Latino Communities in Washington, DC 

By Maria Muradyan 

Most of the narratives about immigration are wrong. They are simplistic, outdated, and dangerous. — Ernesto Castañeda.  

This quote carries particular weight here in Washington, DC, where harmful rhetoric and harsh policy are produced just a couple of blocks away from immigrant communities who face its consequences directly. For decades, the topic of immigration has been at the forefront of American political discourse. Americans on opposite ends of the aisle have consistently disagreed on immigration policy and whether or not we as a country have a responsibility to accept people who cross the border and enter America “illegally”. Opinions on the topic, though always polarizing, have transformed and intensified drastically in the last decade, with the election of President Donald Trump and the emergence of the “MAGA” movement. The slogan “Make America Great Again” can be most often associated with right-wing populism, conservative nationalism, but perhaps most famously, a narrative that casts Latin American immigrants as threats to national security and as a strain on American society. 

The current administration’s rhetoric and policy on immigration have single handedly created one of the most polarized political environments in American history. As the political climate has shifted, these ideological divisions have fueled a wave of widespread misconceptions and stereotypes about Latino immigrants, who they are, why they come, and the impact they have on American society. These harmful misinterpretations not only distort public attitudes but also pave the path for harsh immigration policies and are used to justify the unlawful and inhumane deportation practices carried out by ICE in Washington, DC, and across the nation. 

In an effort to better understand these stereotypes and the effects they have on victims and their families, I conducted an interview with Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, a migration scholar, professor, and Director of Immigration Lab at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. Dr. Castañeda is a leading voice on how misconceptions shape the lived experiences of immigrant communities in DC, and how enforcement, family separation, and uncertainty shape the lives and psychological well-being of youth. 

The first false assumption he addressed is the belief that America has become ‘overflooded with immigrants’. Dr Castañeda pointed out that actual population data proves just the opposite. According to a Pew Research study conducted in 2023, immigrants make up roughly 15% of America’s population (52% being from Latin America). Not only this, but out of the total number of individuals not born in America, undocumented immigrants made up a mere 27% (Pew Research 2025). Locally, immigrants constitute about the same share of the D.C. population as they do nationally. All immigrants make up about 13% of the population, out of which 11.3% identify as Latino (American Immigration Council 2025) 

When looking at data from the 2024 election year, an analysis of tens of thousands of statements made by Trump showed that he repeated the sentence ” [South American countries are] emptying out their prisons and their mental institutions into the United States ” or similar ones over 560 times during his most recent re-election campaign (Marshall Project 2024). Dr. Castañeda explains how these repeated claims are what perpetuate stereotypes such as Latinos are ‘dangerous criminals, ‘ invading the country, and ‘using up public resources. ’ When average Americans, with little knowledge or exposure to immigrants, hear these statements repeatedly, they will inevitably begin to accept them as facts. However, long-term empirical studies show us otherwise. Research analyzed by the Journal of Criminology over the span of 24 years showed that no evidence exists that links undocumented immigrants to the number of violent crimes in the country. Not only this, but this study found that increases in the immigrant population within the states correspond to decreases in the prevalence of violence and crime (Light & Miller, 2018). 

According to Castañeda, current narratives fail to take into account that the vast majority of Latino immigrants come to America to ‘study, work, contribute to science, to work in hospitals, to get married, and that is rarely part of the story’. Furthermore, as he explains both in his book Immigration Realities and in our interview, immigrants actually rely on public assistance at lower rates than U.S. citizens, and this is true even for their U.S born children. They also play an essential role in keeping the economy and population growing. Immigrants contribute to scientific progress, cultural creativity, and the continuation and spread of American ideas and culture. Any evolving society needs new people to sustain itself, and throughout history, immigrants have taken on that role in the United States. 

While these negative narratives dominate the national conversation, their most immediate impact becomes visible in places like DC, where families must confront fear and instability while navigating their day to day lives. The Shrine of the Sacred Heart, a Catholic Church, which is just a short bus ride from the White House, has long served as a place of worship for the Catholic Latin American community in DC. However, in the last several months, it has become a hub for ICE attacks this October. The Associated Press reports that over 40 members of the parish have been recently deported as churchgoers are ‘fearful to leave their homes, get food, medical care or attend Mass’. The Archdiocese of Washington describes these mass deportations as “instruments of terror” for the Latino community of DC. The climate in the city remains especially volatile for mixed status families, who must live with the fear that their loved one will be detained while doing their daily tasks. This became a reality for one member of the Sacred Heart Church whose husband was detained by ICE while selling fruits and vegetables at the family owned fruit stand. She says, “ It’s been a very difficult, bitter month of crying and suffering…our lives changed forever one day to the next” (Associated Press, 2025) 

Stories like these are not limited to Sacred Heart but are a reflection of the unique set of challenges that mixed-status families face in DC and across the nation. These effects are already being felt in DC high schools and universities, where Dr. Castañeda notes the current political environment is having consequences on youth in these mixed status families. He states, “Youth are afraid for themselves and are afraid for their families, for their friends, for the communities…that makes it harder to focus on school, we see that in the universities, we see that with colleagues, we see that with staff members who have undocumented family members”. A 2024 study published by the Journal of Latinx Psychology followed a sample of youth who are US citizens but lived in mixed status families. They discovered that exposure to current violent immigration enforcement, such as witnessing a parent or loved one deported, significantly increases severe anxiety, fear, and depression among the sampled youth. These psychological effects extended beyond the immediate family members, as the trauma was felt even when enforcement actions targeted people in their community rather than someone directly inside the home. Their study also confirmed that anti-immigration stigma quickly becomes internalized, as adolescents in the study reported feeling ashamed of their background, immigrant family, and language (Lieberman et al., 2024). 

These effects could be expected to be felt especially strongly in DC due to the high prevalence of Latino youth immigrants who arrived a decade prior. Beginning in 2014, DC saw a large surge in unaccompanied youth, between the ages of 13-18, who came to America to unite with their parents, grandparents, or extended families. Castañeda explains that since this group of youth has reached a legal adult age, ICE agents might be ‘looking for an excuse to deport them’. As ICE revisits these old cases of unaccompanied minors, they are also using this as an opportunity to track down their immediate and extended families as well as their sponsors. Subsequently, the result is a painful cycle in which youth who once struggled to reunite with their family, once torn apart by borders, must now live in psychological torment and fear of losing each other once more. Current immigration enforcement practices are undoubtedly a form of psychological violence that produces hypervigilance, fear, and depression, and will cause long term trauma in immigrant communities. 

Looking ahead, it is clear that America is in dire need of immigration reform, one that is based on facts, research, and empirical evidence, rather than stereotypes. However, Castaneda notes that the general public is not to blame, as one cannot expect regular Americans to understand topics as complex as immigration law. Rather, this responsibility falls on our lawmakers who must put aside partisanship and focus on creating solutions that maintain the dignity of immigrants, while addressing the realities of the current day border.  

Castañeda explains the best form of immigration reform would be what he calls “generous amnesty”, or a broad pathway to legalization. Individuals and families who have been living in America for an extended period of time and have built entirely new lives must be given a path to citizenship. This is both a moral imperative but also it is a sentiment that, according to him, is largely supported by most Americans on both sides of the aisle. Recent Gallup polls confirm this fact, as 64% of Republicans and 91% of Democrats classify immigration as a positive (Gallup, 2025). A generous amnesty does not mean an open borders concept. Rather, it is a way to create legal paths to citizenship, so that migrants have other options rather than resorting to crossing the border. It is only natural that individuals and families desperate for survival will resort to the only option available to them.  

Second, the US is becoming an aging nation with a retiring workforce and a declining birth rate. With the declining population and lowered birth rates, many key industries, such as agriculture, are having projected worker shortages, unable to meet the labor demands. The Economic Policy Institute finds that “Achieving historically ‘normal’ GDP growth rates will be impossible, unless immigration flows are sustained” (Bivens 2025). Employment based immigration is one way through which the government can offset this issue. Granting a greater number of H-1B and H-2B visas can help balance these effects by bringing in younger and eager individuals who are ready to work in these essential positions. 

In conclusion, data, decades of research, the realities in DC, and Dr. Castañeda’s expertise make one point unmistakably clear. The narratives that dominate our national conversation about immigration are misinformed, outdated, and harmful to those who live with its consequences daily. The political rhetoric from our nation’s leaders creates instability, fear, and psychological trauma in immigrants while simultaneously distorting the public’s perception of the issue. Research continues to show that immigrants make America stronger, enriching society, unifying communities, and bettering the economy. Dr. Castañeda’s work reminds us that looking ahead, we must demand from our lawmakers a change that is rooted in the recognition of these principles and the creation of dignified paths to citizenship.  

As I reflect on my childhood and the little girl I was when I first arrived in America, I see no difference between myself and another little girl today arriving from El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras, Cuba, or Guatemala. We all carried the same fears of an unfamiliar place, the same uncertainty, the same dreams of a brighter, better future in this country. The only difference between the treatments we received was the country we came from and the political implications that country brought with it. It is time that we begin to approach immigration with greater empathy, remembering that we ourselves, or our parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, once stood in these very same shoes. Latino immigrants have positively shaped this nation from the beginning of its history, and they continue to do so today. These facts are unmistakable, the human suffering is devastating, and the need for humane immigration reform has long been overdue. 

Maria Muradyan is a senior at UCLA studying Political Science with a strong interest in American politics and public policy. She participated in UCLA’s UCDC program in Washington, DC. Her interests include immigration policy and community advocacy, with a particular emphasis on how political institutions and policy frameworks shape social and economic outcomes. Through her research and writing, Maria aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of contemporary policy debates and their real-world implications. 

References 

Castañeda, Ernesto (2025, November 21st), Personal Interview on Immigration. 

Geiger, A. (2025, August 21). What the data says about immigrants in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/21/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/  

Immigrants in the District of Columbia – American Immigration Council. (2025). American Immigration Council. https://map.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/locations/district-of-columbia/?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

The Marshall Project. (2024, October 21). Fact-checking Over 12,000 of Donald Trump’s Statements About Immigration. The Marshall Project. https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/10/21/fact-check-12000-trump-statements-immigrants 

Light, M., & Miller, T. (2018). Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime? Criminology, 56(2), 370–401. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12175  

Henao, L. A., & Stanley, T. (2025, October 27). Immigration crackdown sows fear among Catholic church community in US capital. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/immigration-crackdown-catholic-church-washington-874e6deca9e54a4e14081c63adca7718  

Jamile Tellez Lieberman, Dsouza, N., Valdez, C. R., Pintor, J. K., Weisz, P., Carroll-Scott, A., & Martinez-Donate, A. P. (2024). Interior immigration enforcement experiences, perceived discrimination, and mental health of U.S.-citizen adolescents with Mexican immigrant parents. Journal of Latinx Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/lat0000263  

Saad, L. (2025, July 11). Surge in U.S. Concern About Immigration Has Abated. Gallup.com; Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/692522/surge-concern-immigration-abated.aspx  

The U.S.-born labor force will shrink over the next decade: Achieving historically “normal” GDP growth rates will be impossible unless immigration flows are sustained. (2025). Economic Policy Institute. https://www.epi.org/publication/the-u-s-born-labor-force-will-shrink-over-the-next-decade-achieving-historically-normal-gdp-growth-rates-will-be-impossible-unless-immigration-flows-are-sustained/?utm_source  

Immigration Myths Die Hard

One Year into Trump 2.0, Some Immigration Myths are Shattering, but Some of the Big Lies from the 2024 Trump Campaign Continue

Protest in Minneapolis on January 23. Photo by protestor used with permission.

By Ernesto Castañeda, PhD

One year into Trump’s second administration, significant developments have reshaped U.S. immigration policy. This piece examines key changes and events, clarifies factual misunderstandings, and analyzes how immigration has been framed and discussed in media coverage and political commentary.

Biden Did Not Have an Open Border

It is factually wrong to claim that “Biden had an open border policy and welcomed a record number of undocumented immigrants.” Although this claim is frequently repeated, it is misleading. Following the COVID-19 Pandemic, the U.S., along with the rest of the world, closed its borders for months. Under the pretense of public health, Title 42 was used to block access to asylum at the border. Thus, many individuals seeking asylum, attempting to reunite with family members, or workers reporting to jobs in the United States were trapped en route. Ultimately, a lot of people were forced to wait in Mexico for their opportunity to request asylum, and hundreds of thousands of people were deported from the border shortly after entry. 

Interestingly, after the end of the pandemic and the eventual lift of Title 42, members of the Biden administration came up with creative solutions to deal with a border surge — which again was not caused by the Biden administration but was a by-product of the pandemic and the terrible political, economic, and security conditions across much of Latin America and the Caribbean. In response, the Biden administration implemented the use of the CBP One mobile application, an app developed during the first Trump administration, which allowed individuals to obtain a spot in line to present themselves at border ports of entry for an orderly metered process to enter and request asylum. This was not a promise that all of them would be granted asylum or allowed to stay, but it did allow them to start their legal process. 

There were technical problems with this trial app, and in practice, it amounted to an online algorithmic lottery that created competition among hundreds of thousands of people for appointments. Nevertheless, it was an improvement from sleeping in camping tents during the winter while in line at border entrances in Mexico, or having notebooks where people wrote their names to hold their place in line on a first-come, first-served basis. The CBP One app also generated data on who sought to enter the country and on those permitted to enter. 

Other alternatives to detention, such as ankle bracelets and other tracking apps, allowed the U.S. government to identify newcomers and track their whereabouts. These tools have been used by ICE under the current Trump administration to locate and deport individuals who entered legally under these programs. As I said following Trump’s election, ICE agents would be tempted to detain and deport these easy-to-find immigrants in temporary or between immigration statuses in order to fulfill quotas while inflating the numbers of “dangerous” deportees.

Given hemispheric geopolitics, the Biden administration also created a legal program, known as CHNV, for certain people with family or contacts in the US who could offer financial support if needed and vouch for them to enter the U.S. legally through airports from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, to apply for asylum. These new programs were created for populations from countries to which the U.S. was sympathetic, and because these countries would not accept deportations. These programs shifted what could have been undocumented immigration flows into technically legal immigration flows. These new arrivals quickly received work permits so that they could work legally. This system became a lifeline for the U.S. economy and a lifeline for essential workers, allowing the U.S. economy and society to recover faster from the negative effects of the COVID pandemic.

Images of lines at the border and people sleeping in the streets of El Paso and in front of the Roosevelt Hotel in New York City after the busing of immigrants and the unfortunate statements from New York’s Mayor Adams seemed to make these arrivals unmanageable, but as we have researched at The Immigration Lab, new arrivals have managed to find jobs to pay for the housing, food, and other expenses and even send some money to family in their places of origin. These individuals enter with permission from the government, which knows who and where they are. They are not undocumented nor “illegal.”

The Biden administration deported hundreds of thousands of people from the border, and people from Mexico and many other countries were not allowed in. 

The Biden administration actively helped individuals fleeing crises in Cuba, Venezuela, Haiti, Nicaragua, as well as those displaced from violent conflict in Ukraine and Afghanistan. Most people were coming into the U.S./Mexico border, raising their hands, waving, presenting themselves to authorities at the border, giving their information, and then following the procedures and instructions that they were given. Many, but not all, of them were then legally allowed into the country, granted work visas soon after staying a few days on the streets of host cities like El Paso, New York City, or Washington, DC. The great majority of the new arrivals eventually found places to rent and obtained jobs in the broader economy. Today, many are either still working or have been deported with no legal grounds or reasons beyond fulfilling ICE quotas to reduce the number of people of color born abroad.

Any serious discussion of immigration must take into account the barriers preventing people from returning and rebuilding a life in their country of origin, including instability, political repression, and economic hardships in countries like Venezuela and Haiti. 

Claims that the Border is Now Secured 

Border communities in the United States have long been safe, as documented in our book “Immigration Realities.” It is true that fewer people are arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border seeking entry, but this is not purely a Trump effect.  There are five main reasons for this: 

1) The pandemic created a bottleneck influx of immigrants that eventually eased during the second part of the Biden administration. The programs discussed above (CBP One and CHNV) onboarded quickly those people who had been waiting at the border for years before. These numbers had already begun to decrease in the last months of the Biden administration due to policy changes and the organic leveling off from the bottleneck and pent-up demand. 

2) There was lower demand for people from Ukraine and Afghanistan to enter through the border. 

3) Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, and Colombia were pressured by the U.S. to make it even harder to cross the Darien Gap and to get close to the U.S./Mexico border. Many of these countries used their military to control, dissuade migration, and deport people, often without due process. As a result, new arrivals stopped.

4) On January 20, 2025, Trump declared a national emergency at the border and sent the military to certain areas of the border. 

5) People from Latin America are largely no longer arriving seeking to apply for asylum because, contrary to international and U.S. law, people are not allowed to enter the country by applying for asylum at the borders. Title 42 conditions have become chronic. These immigration policies, along with the strong campaign rhetoric, dissuaded many from entering the country, whether illegally or legally.

At his January 20, 2026, press conference, Trump compared his desire for the U.S.-Mexico border to that of North Korea. Likewise, in order to carry out these mass deportations quickly, authoritative actions of going against civil liberties are needed, as seen in Minnesota. He also boasted that “the border is secure” and with “no legislation” on the topic. 

For those concerned about “chaos at the border,” or upset that some new migrants were entering with permission at the border while others could not previously, do not worry. Most of the new arrivals have lost their legal status; many have been detained or deported, or are in the process of moving back. Their absence will have negative consequences for the U.S. employers, neighbors, and communities that relied on them. 

All Immigrants Are Criminals

Trump promised he would deport “the worst of the worst.” Many voters, and even some immigrants themselves, supported and voted for Trump, believing that he was referring only to criminals, not themselves or their loved ones.  As 2026 is already showing, nothing could be further from the truth. Most people detained and deported have no criminal records. For Trump and MAGA, no immigrants from non-majority White countries were welcome or innocent. Even if they had an H1-B visa.

The goal to deport the “worst of the worst” to send ICE or the National Guard to reduce crime in cities was always a lie. There is no need to keep repeating it as either a supposed campaign promise or ICE’s mission, only to compare it to the excesses we have seen on the streets this year. We do not need to abolish ICE; we need amnesty to regularize people. Local police and courts can handle the small percentage of foreign-born individuals who commit crimes. At some point, Trump officials said that most immigrants detained had a criminal record or could build one in the future. In hindsight, the criminalization of migration that Trump and Vance were promoting during the 2024 presidential campaign was successful because they (barely) won the elections. But since the election, those happy with Trump closing the border were in the low 50s in polls at their highest points in time. On January 23, 2026, the views on the border are 50/50; nothing to campaign on. Most people who identify as Democrats and the great majority of independents oppose ICE. Regarding immigration policies in general, the administration is underwater, with many more people saying they have gone too far than supporting it.

In 2025, many Democratic elected federal politicians had been saying on TV interviews that Trump had won the immigration argument, meaning electorally but also implying empirically and in terms of policies. Immigration policies as a whole have been toxic. Contrary to the desire of people in the center right to deport all people without a current immigration status, detentions and deportations in the first year of this Trump administration have largely focused on people who entered legally with a visa or CBP One, people applying to renew their TPS, or asking for asylum. People have been arrested in immigration courts even when judges have not asked for removal. Some individuals have been arrested during their naturalization ceremonies just minutes before becoming citizens. This makes sense if one cares more about quotas and about removing people who are not seen as White before they become American citizens and/or have more U.S.-born children. Trump has also gone after birthright citizenship and has asked for denaturalizations —stripping citizenship from those who proactively jumped all the hoops to become citizens. These facts, along with the many dog whistles and open loudspeaker broadcasting to extreme right subcultures in public speeches, conferences, and X posts, show that the energy behind all these immigration policies is White Christian Nationalism. A dream about racial purity, one not too far from being open to using violence to achieve it, possibly leading to genocide if nobody opposes it. Fortunately, most Americans are against that. But many of those in favor of the current full immigration agenda openly say they do not want religious and racial minorities in the U.S., and even want more to be done. There is no staying neutral on these matters while people are shot at, imprisoned, and terrorized.

Official post from DHS on X idealizing a future where all people of color have been deported from the U.S.

Unfortunately, in early 2026, I still hear some elected Democrat officials and operators saying that Trump “had won the immigration debate.” That is false. Others claim without evidence that Trump won, including in 2024, because of his promise to close the border. They forget the 2016 promise about the border wall and how little he built. They do not explain why anti-immigrant claims against caravans and Central American immigration did not help him win in 2000. Other problematic praises from Democratic officials come along the lines of saying, “Trump did a great job closing the border to undocumented immigrants, and that this is a good thing, that should continue.” MAGA without MAGA.

That is disrespectful to the undocumented immigrants and their communities, which would prefer to vote Democrat but are repulsed by such Trumpian comments. In another sense, polls and massive protests show that most people in the interior do not really care about the status of border crossings. What most people care about today is what we see in Minneapolis and what we saw before in Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, New Orleans, and many other places around the country. That is an excessive use of force by ICE to find our neighbors who happen to be undocumented. Violations of the Bill of Rights, unconstitutional stops, entering homes without judicial orders, and racial profiling.

Caption of poll about favorability along a number of issues. The “border” does not break 50% and it will continue to go down, along with the other areas.

Mass Deportations are Regular Politics

The number of undocumented people in the U.S., between 8 and 15 million, and probably around 11 million when Trump retook the Presidency constitutes around 3% of the overall population in the United States. For the U.S. to get rid of all its undocumented population, it would indeed need something related something akin to an authoritarian state. That is what we have started to see, and that is what most people don’t like because there are undocumented kids in schools. There are undocumented nurses. There are undocumented teachers, agricultural workers, construction workers, and also people with their own businesses providing professional services, designing and renovating homes, etc. So, in order to find them, we will have to trample the civil liberties of many citizens. Is it worth it? I don’t think so. So, rather than just calling for the abolition of ICE, reform, or a return to the status quo so that the minimum due processes are followed before deportation, we have to start talking again about amnesty, paths to citizenship, and expanding chosen ways for legal immigration. Because, despite a false rhetoric that this was about “illegality,” this second Trump administration has also limited the legal pathways for migration. He has limited people’s ability to seek asylum. He has really reduced the number of refugees, made it more difficult and expensive to obtain professional visas like the H-1B visa, and curtailed other forms of legal migration, including for international students, the diversity visa lottery, and other programs that had bipartisan consensus that they were good for the country. He has also limited the ability to apply for new immigrant visas and green cards for people from over 75 countries, plus a travel ban of at least 19 countries, and has declared places such as Belize as safe third countries, making gaining asylum in the U.S. more difficult if people passed through those countries and making it easier to deport people from third countries there.

So, it is a masquerade to say that this was only about illegal immigration or getting criminals off the streets. These have been other of the big lies of the 2016 and 2024 campaigns. It is time that we get rid of those lies and we talk about the truth. We need immigration reform that allows people who are already living and paying taxes in the U.S. to do so legally, safely, and as fully recognized members of society. And lastly, we must establish a new legal pathway for newcomers because the country needs workers to keep the U.S. population and economy growing. So that’s what we need today. That’s the truth about immigration.

Ernesto Castañeda is a Professor at American University, where he leads the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. He has been studying immigration scientifically for over 20 years and has written many books on the subject, among them “Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration” and “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”

Magical Thinking Won’t Produce Cuba’s Final Hour 

Robert Albro, Associate Director, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University 

Fulton Armstrong, Research Fellow, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University 

Philip Brenner, Emeritus Professor of International Relations and History, American University 

William LeoGrande, Associate Vice Provost for Academic Affairs and Professor of Government, American University 

“A block in the Vedado neighborhood of Havana, Cuba.” Source: Robert Albro 

In 1992, veteran Miami Herald journalist Andrés Oppenheimer brazenly forecast the downfall of the Cuban government. He reportedly asked Simon & Schuster to rush Castro’s Final Hour into print because the collapse seemed imminent. In the wake of the U.S. abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia, pundits are once again predicting that the Havana government’s days are numbered. Based on our research during a recent visit* to Cuba, we conclude that headlines echoing Oppenheimer’s prediction are wrong again. 

The feeding frenzy has been fueled by President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Early in January Trump called Cuba a “very badly failing nation,” and later asserted that “Cuba looks like it is ready to fall.” Rubio remarked at Trump’s January 3rd press conference that “Cuba is a disaster…it’s in total collapse.” Sources tell us that the Trump team believes regime change will occur by the end of 2026: the deepening immiseration of the Cuban people will lead dissenting government officials or military officers to declare that it’s time for the country to become a capitalist democracy, and poof, as if by magic, it will happen. Exactly how is unclear. Recent reports say Washington does not actually have a plan to bring this about but is in search of someone to lead the rebellion. Meanwhile, the U.S. goal remains fixed on creating a humanitarian disaster in Cuba.   

The electrical blackouts that have plagued Cuba for the past several years will certainly get worse as Trump maintains the current policy of blocking Venezuelan oil shipments to the island. The small increase in oil coming from Mexico is hardly enough to replace the reduced supply from Venezuela. Most of the Cuban population already is suffering from shortages of food, medicine, medical care, gasoline, and necessities that regular electrical power would provide, such as functioning water pumps, lights, and working refrigerators. U.S. sanctions – which include severe limitations on tourism, remittances, and most trade, as well as the financial straitjacket the Trump administration imposed without justification by placing Cuba on the State Department’s list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” – are the major source of Cuba’s misery.  

But the organization of Cuba’s economy also contributes to its dysfunction. Subsidies for inefficient state enterprises, regulations that discourage foreign investment, and limitations imposed on farmers and private sector companies stifle productive economic activity. Cuba imports roughly seventy percent of its food despite an abundance of arable land and supply of fish. In 2025 it purchased more than $300 million in agricultural commodities, such as frozen chicken, from the United States. Notably the government had to sell some of its precious Venezuelan oil to China to earn enough hard currency to continue that level of food importation.  

Lists of proposed economic reforms circulate in Havana, but while proposals may have merit in theory, they rarely take into account the constraints—both economic and political—under which the government is operating. Cuba is trying to implement a macroeconomic stabilization program with almost no foreign reserves, an intensifying U.S. embargo, and no access to help from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.   

On prior trips to Cuba, we were dismayed that some Cuban officials expressed little recognition that Cubans were becoming desperate and the government was facing a crisis of legitimacy. But in December we found this attitude had changed. The change became evident earlier in the year when President Miguel Díaz-Canel fired the Minister of Labor and Social Security for denying that there were real beggars looking for food in trash bins. Now there seems to be a sense of urgency, a recognition that the Cuban regime can no longer survive by muddling through. 

Shortly after we arrived, the Communist Party took the unusual step of canceling the party congress scheduled to convene in April. In the past, party congresses have been the venue for announcing major reforms, so the reason for the cancellation became the focus of widespread speculation. One explanation we dismissed was that under the circumstances, the cost of bringing and housing so many delegates would be prohibitive or at least unseemly. Three other explanations struck us as more plausible. One was that party leaders were still arguing over which economic reforms the government should make. A congress that did not announce major changes would demoralize the population even further. A second explanation was that popular discontent was so great the leadership feared a convocation of grassroots party delegates might produce harsh criticism of the leadership’s handling of the crisis. A third, about which several of us are skeptical, was that national party leaders had reached consensus on reform measures but felt a need to move swiftly rather than wait for four months to conduct the grassroots discussion that normally precedes a party congress.  

In any event, it appears that serious economic change might actually occur this year. While we were there, the government took two steps it had long resisted: it legalized the use of U.S. dollars in retail sales and floated the Cuban peso against the dollar and various other foreign currencies.  Frustrated with the lack reforms, Vietnam and China have made deeper cooperation contingent on change. With the loss of Venezuelan oil, Cuba will need to rely even more on its international friends and will need to make the reforms necessary to reassure them that Havana is a reliable economic partner.   

Reforms are not the only reason the Cuban government is unlikely to collapse. Economic despair does not automatically generate an opposition movement capable of overthrowing the government. Foreign diplomats in Havana told us that they perceive organized opposition in Cuba is weaker today than at any time in recent memory. Spontaneous anti-government demonstrations are likely to continue. But without a sustained organization to channel discontent security forces will be able to contain occasional outbursts. Moreover, the “maximum pressure” policy of the Trump administration is having exactly the opposite of its intended effect. Even Cubans who freely criticize government policies and leaders told us they resent U.S. actions and statements they view as exploiting their current difficult conditions to humiliate and dominate them.  

In short, President Trump is more likely to realize his commercial interests in Cuba by sitting down with the government to see what sort of a deal can be made rather than waiting for the government to collapse—something U.S. presidents have been anticipating ever since 1959. 

*The authors traveled to Cuba this past December 14-19. 

Does Colombia Pose a Threat to U.S. Security?

By Jorge Rojas Rodríguez

Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Colombia 

Gustavo Petro in 2022. (Source: Wikimedia)

The question in the title would seem to have no logical basis were it not for the fact that President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth have all accused the president of the South American nation, Gustavo Petro, of being “a drug trafficking leader” and “sponsor of narco-terrorists,” and the U.S. has cancelled his visa and put him on the sanctions list of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

At the same time the Trump administration implemented operation “Southern Spear,” deploying U.S. naval and air forces in the Caribbean and directing attacks, with missiles, against vessels accused of transporting cocaine in the Caribbean and Pacific. As of this writing, 23 boats have been destroyed and 87 persons killed. Official sources indicate that at least one of these attacks occurred in Colombian waters.

Initially, Washington justified these actions in terms of the need to “protect our homeland from drugs that kill our people.” But the U.S. has subsequently begun referencing “antiterrorist actions,” accompanied by assertions of operations along the Colombian-Venezuelan border involving armed groups such as the FARC dissident groups,[1] the ELN,[2] and Hezbollah.

Clearly this military deployment by the U.S., and attacks, are disproportionate, leading to civilian deaths that could be declared war crimes, because they violate international humanitarian law. In addition, the cocaine allegedly destroyed represents a fraction of the volume of drugs transported on ships that cross the Pacific Ocean, not the Caribbean. Furthermore, as has been explained by U.S. intelligence agencies, neither Colombia nor Venezuela produces or traffics in fentanyl, the cause of most drug deaths in the U.S. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2023, 107,500 Americans died from overdoses, 74,700 from fentanyl, and 29,000 from cocaine. In 2024, deaths totaled 70,596, with fentanyl the main cause of death from overdoses.

Drug policy in Colombia changed since leftist Gustavo Petro became president in 2022; his administration decided to attack the clandestine laboratories, seize the cocaine already processed (especially at sea), extradite large-scale drug-traffickers and go after their wealth. Petro’s is a very different policy from that of previous administrations, which focused their efforts on attacking those who grow the coca leaf, considered the weakest link in the chain.

The result is that the current administration has seized 2,700 tons of cocaine, destroyed approximately 15,000 laboratories, and extradited 400 drug traffickers to the U.S. In contrast to these figures, the volume of coca leaf grown has expanded during the same period. According to the UN’s Integrated System for Monitoring Illicit Crops, Colombia today has 255,000 hectares of coca and produces approximately 2,664 tons of cocaine that is exported illegally to the U.S., Europe, and Asia.

The government of Colombia has undertaken a policy of the voluntary eradication of coca crops, substituting legal agricultural alternatives in place of coca, while supporting peasant farmers with agricultural land –  a policy that has shown positive results, even though its effects are slower in coming.

It is clear that the government of Colombia is engaged in combatting drug-trafficking, the president has been firm in fighting the drug mafias, and the arguments brandished by Washington show a profound lack of knowledge of what drug-trafficking has meant for this Andean country.

President Petro has proposed a policy of cooperation to Trump to combat the cultivation of coca leaf, production and commercialization of cocaine, as has been done with prior governments over the course of the long strategic relationship between the two countries. There has been no response and some have begun to wonder whether drug-trafficking isn’t just a pretext for the Trump administration to intervene politically in Latin America, encouraged by sectors of the far right in Florida, as has now happened in Venezuela.

The paradox is that the problem of cocaine cannot be resolved by militarizing the Caribbean, invading countries and killing civilians on the high seas but instead by adopting a harm reduction policy that works to better understand the harms to both producers  and consumers, to prevent continued drug consumption, and provide effective and publicly available treatment options for those who continue to be trapped in the world of drugs. In this way the current figure of 5.3 million habitual users of cocaine in the U.S. would decline.

While the United Nations takes steps to improve upon failed models of the past, and is forming an independent commission to evaluate the “war on drugs” of the last 50 years, the U.S.  is backsliding toward militaristic policies that, while they might serve any number of purposes, will not overcome the trafficking and consumption of cocaine.


[1]   Factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, some of which did not go along with the 2016 peace deal between the Government of Colombia and FARC, and others that demobilized in 2016 and then took up weapons anew.

[2]   ELN: National Liberation Army, which has fought the government continuously since 1964.

This piece was authored by Jorge Rojas Rodríguez, translated by Charlie Roberts, and edited by Robert Albro, CLALS Associate Director.

El Salvador Risks Becoming a Zone of Silence  

By Sonja Wolf 

Research Professor, School of Government and Economics, Panamerican University, Mexico

Nayib Bukele on Salvadoran Independence Day in 2024. (Source: Wikimedia)

On December 17, 2025, a local court released lawyer Alejandro Henríquez and pastor José Ángel Pérez. Seven months earlier, the two activists had been arbitrarily detained under El Salvador’s state of emergency and charged with public disorder and aggressive resistance. The arrests occurred when Henríquez and Pérez were attending a peaceful rally of the El Bosque cooperative outside President Nayib Bukele’s private residence. The El Bosque cooperative is a farming community that had obtained its lands because of agrarian reforms in the 1980s and was now making a last-ditch effort to prevent the eviction of more than 300 families from their plots. In a bittersweet turn of events, Henríquez and Pérez pled guilty to regain their freedom after an abbreviated judicial process. Each received a suspended three-year prison sentence that essentially prohibits them from participating in protests during this time. The verdict criminalizes social movement activity and is a reminder that the state of emergency has become a tool to silence critical voices. 

Generalized citizen discontent with the country’s traditional parties and his own anti-establishment campaign had propelled Bukele to the presidency of El Salvador in 2019. Since then, he has quickly established an electoral authoritarian regime that retains a democratic façade but sees him wield executive control over other branches of government. His party, Nuevas Ideas, obtained a legislative supermajority in both the 2021 and 2024 elections. Bukele capitalized on these wins to neutralize all checks and balances on his power and to engineer his successful run for an unconstitutional second mandate in 2024. A secret pact with the country’s street gangs helped mobilize voters and contributed to Bukele’s early triumphs at the ballot box. In late March 2022, the breakdown of this agreement prompted gang members to kill 87 people in three days. By then, Bukele no longer needed the gangs to consolidate his rule.  

Following this latest escalation in violence, he asked the Legislative Assembly to declare a state of emergency to crack down on these groups. The measure, which suspends certain constitutional rights and allows extended pretrial detention, dismantled the gangs as the country knew them and sharply cut the number of registered homicides. While the administration appears to be manipulating crime statistics, its perceived results made the state of emergency widely popular with Salvadorans and helped Bukele’s re-election in 2024. Far from being of a temporary nature, the measure has come to fulfill an essential function in the regime’s propaganda and repression. Some 90,000 people have thus far been detained, including human rights defenders and political opponents. Often apprehended on the spurious charge of illicit association, individuals find themselves mired in a justice system that does not ensure a fair trial. Civil society groups have extensively documented the systematic human rights violations committed under the state of emergency. The abuses are particularly egregious in the prisons where, by December 2025, they had occasioned at least 473 deaths. 

The weaponization of the state of emergency follows the progressive closure of El Salvador’s civic space. Bukele’s regime has severely restricted access to public information, making it difficult for reporters and transparency activists to obtain data about government policies, contracts, spending, and statistics. If anything, this opacity has increased under the state of emergency. Since he came to power, Bukele has denied independent journalists access to press briefings and subjected them to systematic campaigns of stigmatization and delegitimization. Efforts aimed at undermining critical media workers range from online harassment and defamation to surveillance and abusive legal tactics such as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or SLAPPs, initiated to exhaust targets financially and emotionally.  

At El Faro, an award-winning investigative outlet, journalists received physical threats and Pegasus spyware attacks. Advertisers were harassed, and the newspaper faced spurious money laundering accusations and frivolous audits. Jorge Beltrán is a veteran reporter who had been covering organized crime and gangs for El Diario de Hoy, one of El Salvador’s oldest mainstream newspapers. In 2022 Beltrán was targeted with a $10 million SLAPP after an exposé about Israeli cyber espionage firms in Mexico. A relative of the director of El Salvador’s state intelligence agency was mentioned in the piece and subsequently sued both the newspaper and Beltrán for moral damage. While the court rejected the compensation claim, it required El Diario de Hoy to publish an apology and withdraw the article. Beltrán himself went into exile in June 2025 because of a reasonable fear of being arrested on fabricated criminal charges.  

For Salvadoran civil society, however, it was the arbitrary detention of Ruth López that constituted a watershed moment. As lead anti-corruption investigator for Cristosal, a prominent human rights NGO, López had worked on cases of government corruption and irregularities in public contracts involving Bukele’s relatives. Her arrest in May 2025 on spurious grounds of illicit enrichment had a chilling effect. Since 2020, at least 130 journalists and human rights defenders have gone into exile, though most of them left El Salvador in the aftermath of López’s capture to avoid meeting a similar fate. In addition to individual departures, NGOs and independent media organizations also felt compelled to exit the country. El Faro had already moved its legal office to Costa Rica in 2023, whereas Focos and the Journalists’ Association of El Salvador (APES) did so two years later. As government repression increased throughout 2025, El Faro and Cristosal moved all of their staff abroad for their own safety. The decision to reduce the organizations’ in-country presence,  while understandable, will pose new challenges to documenting abuses of power, defending its victims, and holding officials accountable. 

Bukele’s regime found an additional mechanism to quash dissent with the Foreign Agents’ Law passed in May 2025. The legislation requires non-profits to register with the interior ministry and pay a 30 percent tax on all foreign funding they receive. The decree gives the administration broad powers to monitor, sanction, and dissolve organizations that fail to register or that engage in political activities that threaten the stability of the country. In response, some NGOs voluntarily decided to close, many others try to keep operating with a low profile. The Jesuit Central American University, long a vocal advocate for the poor and oppressed, is known in El Salvador for its research, public opinion surveys, and human rights reports. Its leadership, however, must now hope to avoid a repeat of what happened in Nicaragua where the Ortega regime seized the school’s property and assets in 2023. In El Salvador, meanwhile, proposed reforms to the rules governing communal associations suggest a government intent upon hindering community organizing. For anyone working in NGOs, media, and academia, self-censorship becomes a survival strategy. As journalist Raymundo Riva Palacio remarked, regarding the erosion of press freedom in his native Mexico, self-censorship is the most effective form of censorship, because it leaves no trace, creates no scandal, and normalizes silence.  

Self-imposed exile and self-censorship are turning El Salvador into what the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has called a “zone of silence.” The term is typically associated with areas where violence against journalists leaves entire communities misinformed, as has happened in Mexico. A similar trend is occurring in El Salvador since the Bukele administration is deploying “technologies of censorship” to inhibit public scrutiny and criticism. The resultant information vacuum is filled by the official narrative, extensively promoted through government-controlled television channels, newspapers, and social media accounts. Influencers and pro-Bukele trolls do their part to spread regime propaganda and attack human rights defenders, journalists, and opposition politicians. Since citizens primarily rely on television and social media to access information, Salvadorans are likely relatively unaware of major government decisions and their impacts on people’s lives. 

Exiles may have escaped state terror at home. Some stay out of the public eye to keep their relatives in El Salvador out of harm’s way. Others continue their professional work as best as they can, but they have started to be impacted by Bukele’s methods of transnational repression. The United Nations Human Rights Office defines transnational repression as acts that a state or its proxy commits to deter or punish advocacy directed towards it from abroad. It can take various forms, including digital attacks, reprisals against in-country relatives, the arbitrary refusal of consular services, harassment through INTERPOL red notices, and physical violence. Ingrid Escobar directs Socorro Jurídico Humanitario, a legal aid organization that assists victims of the state of emergency, and has repeatedly been subjected to online defamation campaigns. Ivania Cruz and Rudy Joya of the human rights organization UNIDEHC were targeted with INTERPOL red notices but managed to have these lifted. 

Given the Bukele regime’s persistent attempts to intimidate journalists and activists, it is vital that these groups create international pressure to denounce abuses and demand respect for human rights. It is equally important that exiles find spaces for collective solidarity and resistance. Their ability to continue their work is key, more so since parts of the international community are either reluctant to criticize the democratically elected Bukele or perceive his security “model” as effective. APES documents and reports abuses against journalists and offers media workers safety guides and legal assistance. In Mexico City, Casa Centroamérica has become a home for Central Americans fleeing political and legal persecution. The NGO can provide recent arrivals with temporary shelter, is building an archive of national publications, and researches the causes of exile. 

Realistically, the state of emergency only stands a chance of being dismantled if El Salvador returns to democracy. Many citizens choose not to report abuses or speak out against Bukele’s regime for fear of being arbitrarily detained. Constitutional reforms passed in July 2025 extend the presidential term to six years, permit indefinite re-election, abolish the runoff election, and brought the next presidential election forward to 2027. Bukele can comfortably perpetuate himself in power if abstention levels are high and the political opposition fails to present a compelling alternative to his vision of the country. During Bukele’s time in government, economic growth has been weak, and poverty has increased as soaring debt and corruption have depleted state resources. A fiscal adjustment insisted upon by the International Monetary Fund requiring a smaller public sector has already led to massive job losses in areas such as health and education. These cuts will affect the quality of public services and likely fuel social discontent. The country’s economic woes, which Bukele will be unable to resolve as quickly as the security situation, may ultimately help bring about the demise of his regime.

Understanding Deportation for Children, Teens, and Their Parents

By Ernesto Castañeda

If you are a young student in the United States and you are worried that you, a classmate, or a loved one could be deported by ICE agents, as you have seen on social media, TV, or in your neighborhood, this short text is for you.

School dance. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

Why are people in pseudo-military clothes and vests with the initials ICE, HSI, CBP,* and others patrolling the streets and aggressively arresting people in public? It all starts with the popular but dangerous idea that a country must have closed borders, allowing only invited people to pass through. This makes sense for private houses, schools, and other large private institutions, but cities and countries do not work like that. Think about it most people born in the United States can move in their cities, towns, as well as to other cities or towns in the 50 states without having to ask permission from any political authority. They can even move to Guam, the Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico.

*ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement], HSI [Homeland Security Investigations], CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection, agency that houses the Border Patrol which has now also being mobilized to both coast and Chicago] are all immigration enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the current administration other federal and local agencies have also been assigned to help carry out raids and aid in deportation efforts.

People in Any Country Are Not All the Same  

Another dangerous myth is that all the people in a country must share a language, culture, and even look the same, as if related by blood. But countries are not big extended families, so this is a fable. But many adults believe this was true in the past and want it to happen soon in the places where they live. As you know, not everyone is the same. Even within the same family, a student club, or sports team, people have differences that make them who they are.

People in some large cities complain about a few people around them speaking a different language in the streets or having a different religion. This is not new; some people have always done so in any booming city. 

Even While Most People Stay Put Most of the Time, Mobility is Normal 

Many people go to other countries to travel, study, work, or visit family members and friends. Most people get visas, which are permits from a country’s government to visit or move in with permission. People from the United States and Europe rarely need visas to visit other countries, but it is not the same the other way around. People from most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America need vetted visas to visit Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, or Australia. 

In some exceptional cases, people have to leave the countries where they were born because of war or persecution because of their religion, ethnicity, or political views. It may be hard for them to get immigration visas after that. Other countries are supposed to provide refuge, a safe place to stay for groups facing persecution. But many countries’ governments like to look the other way or play hot potato with people.

Work Abroad is Often More Available than Working Papers 

Other people may have informal verbal (spoken) job offers from restaurants, farms, and small businesses in the United States, but they cannot get visas because the people in charge of approving visas in U.S. consulates abroad think those people would stay in the country, and they think they do not have the savings and education to make them “desirable” to come to the United States. These are not necessarily the views of the people approving visas, but the informal instructions they are told to follow by their bosses.  

Nonetheless, some people from towns with a long history of long-distance migration from point A to B have the contacts, paths, and know-how to go to other countries without the U.S. government’s permission. This is what people refer to as “illegal immigration.” 

Remember, we should not use the term illegal to name a person, because a living human being cannot be “illegal,” but people can commit acts that go against the law, in this case, entering another country without getting their passport inspected and stamped. 

“No Human Being is Illegal.”  Elie Wiesel

People without a legal immigration status, who we can call undocumented, are not automatically bad people. They are just caught in a hard and vulnerable situation. Some adults say they should respect the law of a country and “get in line,” but for many of them there is no line to wait in. And for some of the people with close family members legally in the U.S., the wait in line to reunite can be ten years of longer. Therefore, some people live for over a decade away from their parents or minor children. As we recount in the book, Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration.

Middle schoolers playing soccer. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

For most of U.S. history, lawyers have not labeled this a crime but more a “civil” infraction, something like a minor driving infraction, such as driving without insurance, or watching a movie without paying a ticket. But in those examples, people are getting something without paying or putting others at potential financial risk. Immigrants come to the U.S. to work, to pay for all of their expenses, those of their family members, and to send money to loved ones who stayed in the places they came from. Preventing people from moving to a country, and more appropriately to a particular city or neighborhood, even if they can pay for their housing, is like public parks or libraries not allowing only certain people in. 

The problem with the label of “illegal” (rude name-calling) is that it conjures or brings together the idea of coming as a family without a visa, along with generalizations and stereotypes that only people who are poor and of different races are “illegal.” That “illegals” are inferior, potentially dangerous criminals, a threat to the homogeneity (looking or being similar) of a country. These all false.

In recent U.S. history, the label of “illegality” has been applied to people from Mexico and Central America with limited English and/or African and indigenous features working in sectors such as agriculture, construction, contracting, food preparation, etc. There are business owners who are undocumented as well as people from Canada and Europe, but it is easier for them “to pass.” 

Immigrants who commit violent crimes are not immune (protected) from being stopped by police and imprisoned. But for many decades, people in the news have said that people without papers are dangerous and taking things from U.S. citizens. Many adults have come to believe this after hearing it so many times. 

Some politicians run for office sometimes with as little as promising to “get rid of” all the undocumented people in a country. This has been the case of President Trump, and he has acted on this words. His team has set ambitious goals to find people without valid visas or immigration permits and to remove them from the country, which is what we call deportations. He and his team campaigned on closing the border to new arrivals, deporting people with criminal convictions, and with the signs and slogans of mass deportation

How do you carry out mass deportations quickly in a country with over 350 million people, where less than 3% of the population is undocumented? 

Unlike a classroom, there is no list of everyone living in the U.S. that includes everyone’s immigration status. So, this federal administration is trying to reach its goal is by deporting under any pretext some people who are renewing visas, trying to get papers to stay longer, become citizens, or get protection from deportation because they fear for their safety if they were sent back to dangerous places. 

Another shortcut by ICE is to go to places where many stereotypical potentially undocumented immigrants gather and stop and ask for papers from people based only on their physical appearance, job, and accent. (Lawyers call this racial profiling).

Communities with many Latinos are specially afraid about deportations hitting close to home. Over 68,000 people are in immigration detention centers at the end, so of them will be let go after proving they are citizens or have valid permits. Many others will eventually be deported without their family members. 

Because of this, families with undocumented members are afraid of spending time in public and may always fear it may be their last day together. So, it is important to be patient and supportive of people who could be in that situation. It is understandable if your classmates or even friends do not want to talk about this. Their parents may have told them not to share their immigration status or that of their parents, afraid that it could be used against them. Many live with the continuous fear that an enemy could call la migra (ICE) on them. The have lived with this fear sometimes for decades.

ICE Arrests from Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

People who are undocumented have to try to act perfectly

Afraid about her only daughter being caught by surprise, an interviewee we talked to confidentially, recounts that she told her 13-year-old daughter this year that she was “illegal,” and that she should be careful not to skip class, misbehave, or even think about experimenting with illegal drugs, alcohol, or marijuana because this could cause her deportation and that of her mother and maybe other family members too. 

She had never before realized she was undocumented; she thought she was like anyone else in her class, and she is and so she is at risk of deportation. She cannot help but be worried, but how worried should her best friends be? Well, there were around 11 million individuals who were undocumented when Trump became president again on January 20, 2025. Because of changes to immigration laws, procedures, and programs, there may be 14 million people out of status a the end of 2026. 

In 2025, the Trump admin, with its aggressive policing, raiding, and detaining, forcibly deported between 200k and 600k people. Self-deportation is a luxury that many immigrants do not have. The official estimates for this are not credible. 

So, let’s do some simple math for the probability of being forcible deported by DHS by dividing the maximum estimate for 2025 deportation by a medium-high estimate for the number of undocumented: 600,000/14,000,000=.04 or 4%. This is the probability that an undocumented person is deported each year that these mass deportation goals continue along with large federal agent deployments and police collaboration in some localities [287(g) agreements]. The probability of being detained while attending an immigration court appointment is also low. So, while it is possible this may happen to you, your mom, or your friend, most immigrants won’t be deported. Clearly, the likelihood varies by location. In some places, other certain groups are targeted, like Somalis in the Twin Cities recently. But detaining people and deporting them in this way is very expensive, damaging for the U.S. economy and society, and currently very unpopular. Over 60% percent of U.S. adults oppose these policies. Tell the people you know in this situation not to despair or give up.

Deportation by City. Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

Despite sad cases about children receiving cancer treatment, nurses and care worker women being deported, the numbers show that, because of profiling, most of the people deported are working-age men from Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras. Over 70% of them have no criminal record whatsoever, and only a very small percentage have a violent crime conviction. Meaning most people are innocent hard workers, fathers, sons, but they have been deported because they look like the stereotype. There are good and bad people everywhere. This may remind you of why some teachers and adults may tell you the importance of not generalizing, not falling for common stereotypes and prejudices, and of getting to know people from all backgrounds and with origins in all parts of the world. Learning how to put yourself in their shoes is the best way to understand them, comfort them, and protect them, in the future, by changing the way we aim to deal with undocumented immigration, not by mass deportations or having people afraid of deportation, but by giving them a way to become documented through new laws voted in Congress. Your care and your voice matter.

Ernesto Castañeda is a Professor at American University, where he leads the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. He has been studying immigration scientifically for over 20 years and has written many books on the subject, among them “Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration” and “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

By Ernesto Castañeda

Regarding the question of what is happening between the United States and Venezuela, the answer is that this is a partially unintended, unanticipated international focus at the end of the first year of Trump’s second term. While the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela have not been close for a while, this path opened up as other areas of intervention, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, got stuck at a standstill. 

The potential intervention in Venezuela is not a popular option. There is little support among experts about its merits. Likewise, Venezuelans are not eager to go to war.

This was not a priority for Trump in the past. But three key members of his cabinet and White House staff have zeroed in on Venezuela in the last few months.

As an article in the Washington Post on December 18, 2025, explains convincingly by drawing from inside sources and visible actions, Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, and the main engine behind the aggressive anti-immigrant agenda, wanted to conduct military attacks in Mexico as another way to curb immigration, his long obsession. But as undocumented and asylum-seeker arrivals at the border have approached zero —in part thanks to Mexico’s role—, Miller looked further south. 

Trump campaigned in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 elections, bashing MS-13 and Salvadoran immigration. But this time around, he found an ally in Salvadoran President Bukele. Other Central American governments have also collaborated, so he zoomed in on Venezuela through Tren de Aragua (TdA) as an excuse to expedite deportations. Tren de Aragua-related deportations to CECOT in El Salvador became a fiasco and highly unpopular, not to say unlawful. So, the administration moved to declaring the so-called Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as its supposed head. After targeting small boats off the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean, then the excuse became fighting drug trafficking and then to old claims on permits to exploit Venezuelan oil by Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies, without discarding the ideas of regime change as the support for Machado grew internationally, and as the Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, told Chris Whipple to get rid of Maduro, to put pressure on Venezuela until Maduro would give up or “call uncle.”

On the other hand, Marco Rubio—both National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, which in other countries would be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs—has long had an obsession with the regime in Cuba, which he sees as related to Venezuela. This is partly because of the financial and oil support that Venezuela gave to Cuba for many years, which, although it continues—it seems that the first oil tanker that was seized was going from Venezuela to Cuba—though the Venezuela support is no longer the support it once was, and it’s not enough to help the Cuban regime, which is in deep economic trouble. Officials in Cuba see this as a move with them ultimately in mind. 

Marco Rubio is especially interested in attacking the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, and there is nobody left in the White House to contradict him, not Susie Wiles, as John Kelly would have done in the first Trump administration, to stop such a bad idea.

According to the Washington Post article mentioned before, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was happy to jump into the frenzy to protect his job following Signalgate. He was eager to prove himself, show “leadership,” and get more attention in the spotlight and ingratiate himself with Miller. So, he found the idea of bombing the small boats appealing, and he would probably like to lead a small incursion into Venezuela.

The objective is not truly drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine that reaches the United States doesn’t come from Venezuela. There are a few shipments that pass through Venezuela and then to the Caribbean; these drug shipments were going to other islands in the region, and perhaps some of that cocaine would eventually reach Europe, but very little reaches the United States. The Coast Guard has been in charge of seizing these vessels for many years, and the DEA could be conducting more formal investigations, so this idea of ​​the drugs as the rationale to threaten Venezuela is not believable. The American people don’t believe it, and this new pseudo-label of “narco-terrorists” isn’t logically convincing either legally or at the logical or expert levels. Indeed, it seems that the administration is already giving up on that; also, with the pardon for the president of Honduras, the drug angle is less convincing. The contradiction remains, and they are rightly not going to attack Mexico or Colombia over the drug issue in the near future.

Things changed a bit with Maria Corina Machado’s visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize regarding democracy in Venezuela and regime change. And lately, there have been a few statements from Trump about the interests of U.S. oil companies in Venezuela. The U.S. oil lobby has been a key factor in Trump’s re-election. So, another goal is for U.S. oil companies to regain access to Venezuela, although there is already an American company doing business there: Chevron. So, this is not something of a priority. All this to say, there is no master strategy behind it.

It is partly a personal animosity between Trump and Maduro, evident in public declarations and supposed ideological differences, but the two governments have also had occasions when they handled structured negotiations very well. There have been instances of negotiations resulting in detained individuals returning from Venezuela to the United States, deportations with permission of Venezuelans from the United States, and then from El Salvador. So, it’s not that there has been a terrible personal relationship between Trump and Maduro or their intermediaries.

Marco Rubio’s obsession is the main driver. He has made recent public statements presenting new arguments and rationales, but they have seemed improvised and unconvincing. Even an overt, public declaration of a return to the Monroe Doctrine is not enough to justify this; it is mainly good news for Russia and China

To justify an attack on Venezuela and the boats around the coasts, members of the Trump administration have claimed that they wanted to combat terrorism, foreign enemies in the American war on terror, to accelerate deportations, but they still haven’t been able to win that mediatic battle or the legal or logical argument, but they have not done so not even in the local or federal courts. Although the Supreme Court hasn’t stopped them either.

Steven Miller is mainly interested in the idea of a war with Venezuela or with someone else, as a pretext to push through certain laws, such as the Alien Enemies Act and the Insurrection Act, both of which require the U.S. to be at war to be invoked. But this is not even necessary to continue with the mass deportations as they have been. They are deporting many people. Detaining people, they are practically at war with immigrant-based communities, though they are violating human rights and constitutional protections within the country. A declaration of war would not change that reality or make it any more appealing to citizens.

It is very clear that the majority of the American public opinion, even part of the MAGA base, is against the U.S. getting directly involved in any new war. They would be against an invasion or bombing of Venezuela, whether prolonged or even for a short period. It would be more difficult to stop something like an Iran-type one-targeted bombing situation, but removing Maduro probably wouldn’t be as quick or simple.

So, the American people are quite against an intervention in Venezuela. Furthermore, as we see with the debates surrounding the small fishing boats, critics, including legislators in the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans, see these bombings of ships off the Latin American coasts as extralegal. They are putting a lot of pressure on the Pentagon to release the videos showing the killing of two survivors, and to either stop this type of operation, to explain what is happening, and if the intention is to engage in war, then, to make the case to Congress of why the U.S. needs to wage a war, on what basis, and with what objective.

All indicates it would not be something Congress would easily approve. Trying to get the Republicans in Congress to do that could cost some of them their seats in 2026. So, it’s a war, a strategy without rhyme or reason, hence the clear disorder. Venezuela is very worried about Trump’s pronouncements, but their aimlessness is nothing new. So, no one knows what’s going to happen, not even the Pentagon, which has deployed elements that are not sufficient for sustained ground intervention, though they are spending a lot of money bringing the ships there.

They thought military mobilization would be enough to intimidate Maduro, but it obviously hasn’t been. The Nobel Prize hype around Machado has already passed, and it hasn’t changed anything on the ground. The Venezuelan diaspora is asking for military intervention, but that is not enough. Understandably, from their point of view and personal experiences, they are asking Trump to do something. Those who are more established, have money, and have been here for a while, are still upset they were forced to leave. But the more recent Venezuelan migrants who came here seeking asylum after the pandemic are being denied asylum, their work permits revoked, and deported. So that is also a contradiction about Venezuela supposedly being a narco-state. So, the whole armed intimidation of Venezuela is bullying to the extreme, but it is incoherent as foreign policy.

The majority in the United States are against this war in Venezuela and the attacks on the small boats, oil tankers, and the possibility of bombings or military action. Contrary to what some in the White House bubble seem to believe, a war with Venezuela would not be enough to distract from the economic and political situation in the U.S. It would not totally change the narrative, help speed deportations to what would become a war zone, and the attempts to further concentrate power on the executive could be more directly opposed by the legislative branch which is the one supposed to declare and fund wars. The oil tanker confiscations and chases are just the latest in a series of policies in which the administration’s words, threats, and actions are not enough to scare Maduro or convince the public of the righteousness of these actions. 

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed are his alone.

Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks

By Jake Johnston

Research Associate, Center for Economic and Policy Research

It’s been nearly a decade since Haitians last went to the polls to elect a president. Even then, barely one in five participated. In a country with a majority of the population under 25 years of age, this means that, for most Haitians, voting for one’s leaders is a privilege never before experienced.

Haiti’s transition, precipitated by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, is ongoing. For the better part of four years, progress toward elections has remained elusive. But that all appeared to change this fall.

“The Haitians need to come to an election and elect a president,” the US Charge d’Affaires, Henry Wooster said in September. Security and other challenges must not be a “red herring for taking action,” he continued. Speaking directly to Haiti’s de facto authorities, he warned: “In other words, you can’t stay in those jobs for life.”

The reaction, in a country where the political class remains more responsive to Washington than the population in Haiti, was swift. Two months later, a new electoral law has been established and a vote scheduled for next August. But does this present Haitians with a path out of the multiple, overlaid crises affecting the country? More than half the country is facing food insecurity, the economy is about to wrap up its seventh consecutive year of negative growth, and insecurity continues to dominate daily life.

In 2023, when asked if they had trust in the electoral process, fewer than one in four Haitians responded yes. It is hard to imagine that number is higher today. Though few would be sorry to see the much-loathed leaders atop the transition fall, a vote is not a path out of the current crisis.

The quick response to Wooster’s threats was not so much about elections. It was about a date much closer on the horizon: February 7, 2026. That is when the mandate of the nine-member presidential council — which was put in place with a strong push from the Biden administration, CARICOM, UN, and the OAS 18 months ago — formally ends. For months, debate has raged over what should come next. The political class is auditioning, not with the ten-plus million citizens of Haiti, but with the foreign diplomats and multilateral entities they see as key to their own survival.

And if there was any doubt about who would ultimately decide, it was put to rest in mid-November. Amid an effort from some on the transitional presidential council to, once again, replace the prime minister, the US embassy stepped into the fight.

“If you and your family value your relationship with the United States, I urge you in the strongest terms to desist from initiatives to oust the PM and to instead publish the electoral decree … This is not the time to test U.S. resolve,” Wooster texted Fritz Jean, one of the councilors. Days later, Jean’s US visa was revoked and the State Department publicly accused him, without providing evidence, of supporting armed gangs. The effort to replace the PM was stopped — at least for now. The next week, the electoral decree was published.

The “plan” is coming into focus, and it is a familiar one: stability at all costs, no matter how rotten the foundation. To enforce this notion of stability and allow for elections, the US has been quick to assure that more security support is on the way.

In September, the UN Security Council approved a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Authorized for up to 5,500 soldiers, it is currently little more than a rebranding of the Kenyan-led Multinational Support Mission (MSS) that the UN authorized in 2024. No new troops have arrived and, while this new mission will have some level of UN support, operationalizing any of it is expected to take the better part of a year. 

The main difference then, for the 1,000 or so mostly Kenyan police on the ground in Haiti is that the rules of engagement have changed. The GSF, as its name suggests, is intended to be more “muscular,” by which its architects mean lethal. The newly drafted Concept of Operations outlines a mission with a simple goal: kill the bandits.

But while few have taken note, that has been the de facto authorities’ strategy for some time. So far this year, police forces have been responsible for well over half of the 4,500-plus killings in Haiti. Hundreds of civilians have been caught in the crossfire as police battle armed groups that exert influence over much of Port-au-Prince and have traumatized a nation. Drone attacks, led by a secretive police unit operating with Blackwater CEO Erik Prince’s private mercenaries, are also racking up civilian casualties and drawing growing condemnation.

The outspoken leaders of Haiti’s armed groups, however, only seem to continue to accumulate more power, political influence, and heavy weaponry. While some areas of the capital have seen tension ease, violence in the provinces is expanding by the day. Armed groups still control all the major arteries of the nation. More people are displaced today than at the height of the post-earthquake recovery.

The US has expressed its goal in Haiti as saving the state from imminent collapse, thereby avoiding mass migration or the further entrenchment of transnational criminal organizations. But while precious oxygen is consumed by raging debates over electoral timelines, transitional governance structures, and how quickly foreign soldiers can arrive, nobody has stopped to ask a basic question: is the current state worth saving?

The root of the tension that has paralyzed the country for much of the last decade is not a fight between violent gangs and the state. Simplistic narratives of good versus evil miss the mark. Rather, it is a fight over putting the train back on the tracks to save a rump state in the name of stability or to lay new tracks to create the foundations for a more representative state to rise from the ashes. It is not elections nor a foreign military force that will resolve this fundamental tension. In fact, history shows those two responses are more likely to consolidate the status quo.

The Haitian people need an opportunity to vote freely. They need to feel safe and secure in their communities. But what is missing is a plan to bring it all together, to begin restoring faith in a state that long ago lost the trust of the population; a plan to achieve peace, which is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of opportunity. What is missing is a vision that can inspire the population and bring the nation together around a common path forward.

A peace process can fill that gap. Such an endeavor does not mean legitimizing armed actors, condoning violence, or accepting impunity; rather, what it should mean is treating the situation holistically while centering the population and in particular victims of both state and non-state violence. A foreign military force and low-turnout elections are tracks Haiti has been down many times before. A peace process offers a chance at laying new ones. But first, what Haiti needs are political leaders responsive to the needs of the people and not simply to foreign embassies.

The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

By Lívia Peres Milani

Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)

National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)

President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction  of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted  coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.  

The imposition of tariffs  

The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.  

Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort. 

Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.  

Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners. 

Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations 

However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products. 

These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis. 

Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.  

On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.   

Latino Sense of Belonging Decreases amid Racial Profiling, Detention, and a Fading American Dream

By Anjini K. Patel

Source: Encuesta de Ipsos para Axios/Noticias Telemundo

A recent Telemundo survey reveals increasing pessimism from Latinos in the United States regarding their sense of belonging. Telemundo, in collaboration with Axios and Ipsos, surveyed a nationally representative sample of over 1,100 U.S. Latino adults from October 21 to 27, 2025. Conducted in both English and Spanish, the survey asked a variety of questions about their views on the American Dream, their sense of belonging in the US, and their optimism about the future of the country. Only 44% of respondents described the American Dream as achievable in 2025, a decrease from 61% in 2023. Similarly, 40% of 2025 respondents affirmed that the US makes them feel like they belong, and only 36% felt optimistic about the future of the US. This ​compares​ to 57% and 52%, respectively, in 2022. This survey provides an insight into the feelings of Latinos as they navigate the uncertainty of the current American political landscape.  

The survey also asked respondents about their anxieties related to being Latino/Hispanic in the United States. Compared with 39% in June 2022, 53% of respondents in 2025 reported feeling worried about themselves or a loved one being attacked because of their ethnicity. Two out of three (2/3) Latinos who identify as Republicans say it is a good time to be a Latino in the United States, while only one in ten (1/10) Latino Democrats agree. Seventy-one percent (71%) of those aged between 18 and 29 and 57% of those who are 50 and older, said it is a bad time to be Latino. 

Most respondents indicate that the Democratic Party, as compared to the Republican Party, better represents Latinos, cares more about them, and is better on economic and immigration policy. Additionally, most respondents agreed that the Republican Party takes Latino Americans for granted (39%) as compared to the Democratic Party (22%). Interestingly, more respondents describe the Republican Party as a good option for public safety compared to the Democratic Party, even in the face of increased fear and anxiety over being attacked for being Latino.  

What do experts say? 

Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, discussed this survey on Telemundo. As he states, the data from this poll are unsurprising given the very strong anti-immigrant rhetoric that Donald Trump and the Republican Party campaigned with and continue to use. Rather than focusing on people with violent criminal records, ICE raids and subsequent deportation, often without due process, have detained and deported people with all types of immigration statuses, and thus increased fear among Latinos. Castañeda points to comments by Justice Cavanagh and decisions by the conservative majority in the Supreme Court that made detaining someone based on their appearance and manner of speaking permissible, further blurring the lines between individuals with papers and those who are undocumented. In light of these violent mass deportations and detentions happening in public places, following stereotypes and racial profiling, it is no wonder that many Latinos report a decreased feeling of belonging in the United States. 

Regarding the impacts of these recent events, Dr. Castañeda explains that the feasibility of immigrants achieving the American Dream is decreasing. While people still arrive in the United States with high hopes that “they can come and work hard, send remittances, enjoy a better life, and that their children can go to university, in the United States right now, we see high underemployment rates, and many people are afraid to go to work because of mass raids. We are seeing inflation. It is harder to pay for health insurance, housing, and to save.” In this way, the American Dream is stalled. Since the end of the pandemic, the U.S. had seen a rapid and strong economic recovery, which Dr. Castañeda attributes largely “to the people arriving, especially from Latin America, seeking asylum—Venezuelans, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and others—which increased the US population by 1%, which was very significant.” With the border closing under the current administration and deportations by the dozens of thousands, businesses are unable to grow at the same rate. Dr. Castañeda underlines: “If there’s less migration, it doesn’t mean there will be more jobs for locals. It means there will be less work for everyone, and more people will lose their jobs because the demand for goods and services decreases, businesses cannot hire and grow, and therefore they stop hiring and start firing workers.” 

Additionally, research shows that immigrants are much more likely to start businesses and hire more workers than businesses started by native-born citizens. Therefore, the lack of immigration has a negative impact on the overall economic growth of the United States. As Dr. Castañeda describes, “the fact that Latinos aren’t going to work here means there are fewer nannies. There are fewer construction workers, fewer lawyers, fewer nurses… it also makes many Latinos afraid. They don’t go to the markets, they don’t go to the malls, they are spending less, which has an impact, and many immigrants, seeing that there’s no American Dream anymore, aren’t going to bring their families or many of them are thinking about returning to their country.” 

The decreased sense of belonging by the Latino/Hispanic community has affected numerous outlets that embrace these cultures. Some events honoring Hispanic Heritage Month were canceled. This hurt artists, folk dancers, and musicians, as well as the larger public, who did not have the opportunity to engage with these rich cultural traditions. “Latin restaurants are struggling,” Dr. Castañeda says. “Hundreds are closing because they can’t hire enough people; workers are afraid to go to work because food is so expensive. So, it’s no longer a profitable business for them. The decline of the Latino food business also means fewer dining options, fewer cultural spaces, and fewer opportunities for communities to enjoy Latino cuisine. This is a loss for the United States as a whole.” 

Hope and Resilience in the Face of Uncertainty 

How should the Latino community respond to the ever-changing political landscape in the United States? Dr. Castañeda urges people to “stay calm and continue with their daily lives. We often do this for our children and grandchildren​,​ who, I truly believe, will have a good future. This storm is temporary. This will pass.” Importantly, he points out that nearly 80% of Americans view immigration positively. Mass raids are not popular​, ​and vulnerable​​ communities are​ witnessing​ peaceful protests carried out by citizens who are physically placing their bodies between immigration agents and migrants ​​who are in the process of being​​ detained. The November 2025 elections indicate that a majority of Americans reject the current administration’s extreme policies on immigration and the mismanagement of the economy. The anti-immigrant sentiment is ​driven ​primarily by​​ the federal government under Donald Trump, not the American people. With a hopeful outlook, Dr. Castañeda says, “I think that once this nightmare is over, there will be a greater sense of belonging, so we have to have patience, have faith in your fellow citizens, and I do truly believe that this will pass and the future will be better for U.S.-born Latinos and those immigrants who are able to stay. There will be concrete actions that will tell Latinos that they belong because this is their home.” 

Anjini K. Patel is a Sociology Research & Practice MA candidate at American University (AU) and works as a graduate research assistant at the AU Inequality, Social Justice, & Health Lab. Her research interests include immigration, criminal legal system & housing justice, and artivism & community building.