All posts tagged news

Constitutional Crisis: Donald Trump’s Immigration Policies Put Us All in Danger

By Caryalyn Jean

Photo by Anthony Sandoval
Photo by Anthony Sandoval

President Donald Trump’s executive orders surrounding immigration have sparked fear amongst marginalized groups and controversy amid those who hold America’s policy process dear. On January 20, 2025, Trump signed the Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship order which proposes the end to birthright citizenship. Although several judges have blocked the order and several other lawsuits have been filed, this specific executive order has caused concerns surrounding the integrity of the Constitution.

One major issue with Trump’s birthright citizenship order is his interpretation of the 14th Amendment. While he recognizes that the 14th amendment was originally intended to extend citizenship to formally enslaved African Americans during Reconstruction, his argument misinterprets the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” In this order, a mother’s and father’s immigration status at the time of birth determines if a federal department or agency can grant or recognized documents recognizing the United States citizenship of their child. However, there is no recent legal precedent supporting the use of a parent’s citizenship status to determine if a person born within the United States is a proper interpretation of the Amendment or any immigration law. Although Trump acknowledges the historical context in which the 14th Amendment was written, his interpretation would not be applicable to historical context Trump is supposedly intending to preserve. Ironically, Trump’s call for a stricter interpretation of the 14th Amendment calls into question how case law has broadened our understanding of how we view citizenship, even for corporations, which the law considers “artificial people” [see Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. Railroad, 188 U.S. 394 (1886); Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 588 U.S. 310 (2010)].

As a result of this Executive Order and many other policies which have led to the recent increase in ICE activity around the nation. President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador proposed a deal with the Trump Administration to allow for the United States to transport both deportees and imprisoned U.S. citizens to El Salvador for a fee. Despite some praise of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele’s “tough on crime” approach, this deal raises concerns about the conditions of these prisons. Since 2020, organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have reported on the lack of due process, deaths under custody, and living conditions that are below international standards. Although American immigration law would allow El Salvador to accept deportees in an instance in which a deportee returning to their country of origin is “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible,” those factors are not the basis of President’s Bukele’s offer. Likewise, the deportation of American citizens in unconstitutional and violates the rights of incarcerated people. Nonetheless, on April 8, 2025, Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt affirmed that President Trump discussed the possibility and legality of deporting American citizens deemed “violent repeat offenders.”

The offer to accept American prisoners further cements the controversial slave status placed upon incarcerated people in the United States and El Salvador. The 13th Amendment abolishes slavery except for punishment for a crime within the United States and territories within its control. This manifests as the use of prison labor in both the public and private sector in exchange for pennies an hour. Similarly, Salvadoran prisoners make use of prison labor through their Cero Ocio program where prisoners were used to renovate schools, hospitals, and police headquarters under the guise of rehabilitation of prisons. Through this deal, El Salvador is on pace to economically benefit from accepting deportees and American prisoners in exchange for a fee as well as potentially increasing their prison labor force in a system reminiscent of slavery.

The relationship between the Trump Administration and El Salvador has already manifested into negative consequences for deportees and documented immigrants. Despite a U.S. District Judge ordering a temporary halt of the deportation of alleged Venezuelan gang members under the Alien Enemies Act, the flight continued anyway. This decision to disregard the order was a move cosigned by President Bukele on his official X account. Furthermore, Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a permanent resident living in Maryland was deported to El Salvador due to an “administrative error” and his return is being delayed due to pending litigation.

Trump’s birthright Executive Order and El Salvador’s proposal should be cause for concern for everyone regardless of immigration or citizenship status. These actions serve as a reminder of the Trump administration’s total disregard for the law and that solidarity is necessary for preserving human rights. Marking undocumented people and incarcerated citizens as undesirable leads us to overlook the harm being done and what is to come if we do not speak out against it.

Caryalyn Jean is a Research Assistant at The Immigration Lab at American University

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on April 9, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Immigration, United States
Tagged , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on April 9, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/04/09/constitutional-crisis-birthright/

Why Have Hundreds of Thousands Fled Ecuador Since 2020?

By Marshall Plane, Erica Criollo

Turning to shield herself from the biting January wind, 40-year-old Yolanda explained to us the tragic set of events that took her from her thriving market stall in Ecuador to the Manhattan street where she now sells hot meals to residents of a nearby migrant shelter.

Yolanda was part of a merchant association in Cuenca, Ecuador. In 2021, local gangs began extorting these vendors, charging a monthly “security fee.” From there, things only got worse. “The next thing they did was try to recruit our children,” she recalled. “I have a 20-year-old son. He’s the only child I have. They ordered me to give them my son so that he could work for them selling drugs.”

After she reported this to the police, Yolanda was beaten and robbed by gang members. Fearing for her life, she decided to leave Ecuador. “I told my son we couldn’t stay [in Ecuador], because these gangs are all over the country,” she said. “They have connections.” Having crossed seven countries to reach the United States, the two are now renting a room from an Ecuadorian woman in Brooklyn. “I’m here by the will of God, trying to get my daily bread,” she told us. 

Yolanda’s journey is part of a sudden exodus from Ecuador. Fueled by economic hardship and a surge in violence, over 244,000 Ecuadorians have requested asylum in the US since 2021, the 8th-highest of all nationalities. Of those, 57% have settled in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, states with large Ecuadorian communities where many have contacts. At 52,000, Ecuador is the leading country of origin for asylum seekers in New York City.

Figure 1: Notices to appear in immigration court issued to Ecuadorian nationals by month. Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse

Between December 2024 and January 2025, The Immigration Lab conducted fifty-five interviews with asylum seekers and recent immigrants in New York City. Thirty of the individuals we spoke to were from Ecuador. Two significant patterns emerged: many of them were small-business owners in Ecuador who faced extortion from gangs or parents who fled to protect their children from forced gang recruitment and violence. Their stories highlight the devastating impact of rising gang violence, economic instability, and the government’s failure to protect its citizens, all of which have contributed to a major exodus from the country. 

In 2018, Ecuador was one of the safest countries in Latin America, with a homicide rate around 6 per 100,000—a figure comparable to the United States. By 2023, its homicide rate was the highest in the region at 47 per 100,000. These statistics reflect what many interviewees described as a collapse of public safety in the country of 18 million.

Source: InSight Crime

Ecuador is the latest country to fall victim to the failure of US-led drug policy in the Western Hemisphere. A shift in trafficking routes was the proximate cause of the recent spike in violence. With security tightening in Colombian ports, international traffickers began using ports on Ecuador’s Pacific coast to smuggle cocaine to North America and Europe. Factors such as lax security, a weak judicial system, and official corruption made Ecuador an attractive transit point.

Control over these newly lucrative routes became hotly contested, a process worsened when the nation’s largest gang, Los Choneros, split into several factions in 2020. The policy of dividing inmates by gang affiliation exacerbated the prison violence it was supposed to prevent and made prisons a nexus of recruitment and coordination for major gangs.

Gangs’ increased need for manpower to control contested areas coincided with an economic downturn worsened by the pandemic. From 2019 to 2022, unemployment, underemployment, and poverty all increased. Gang recruiters began frequenting schools and soccer pitches in impoverished areas, recruiting youths with promises of income and status. When this fails, they often use force, threatening the family members of those who refuse to join.

According to InSight Crime, this is especially common in strategically important, contested areas where gangs need manpower to assert control. A prime example is Esmeraldas, a coastal region that has seen severe violence due to its utility as a chokepoint for cocaine entering the country from Colombia. “Ecuador has practically fallen to pieces,” says Miguel, a 40-year-old fishmonger from Esmeraldas. When he didn’t let Los Lobos recruit his stepson, they kidnapped and beat the boy. “He came home all beaten, swollen,” Miguel recalls. “We had to leave everything behind, because otherwise they were going to kill us.”

Twenty percent of our participants said forced recruitment of their children forced them to flee Ecuador. Another 23% were small business owners who said gang extortion made their lives impossible.  Reports of extortion grew nearly 800% from 2021 to 2023. According to InSight Crime, gangs that lose control of cocaine trafficking routes often turn to extortion to finance their operations.

Source: InSight Crime

Anthony, a 43-year-old father of three from Guayaquil, told us extortion ruined his growing business as a self-employed trucker. “When we said that we didn’t have any more to give, they said they were going to bring reprisals. They were going to kidnap my son, kill him,” he recalled. “Unfortunately, the politicians are corrupt up to the police themselves, so we couldn’t make a report.”

According to a November 2022 poll, 75% of Ecuadorians similarly viewed the police as unreliable. Police corruption has exacerbated Ecuador’s crisis, allowing the flow of thousands of weapons to gangs. In many cases, officers who try to challenge gangs’ power have been assassinated. This fate nearly befell Marcelo, 29, a police officer and restaurant owner in the city of Machala. In late 2022 gang hitmen arrived and committed the first murder in what Marcelo says had been a very peaceful city. “We arrested them the next day,” he said. “Because of that arrest, I received multiple death threats. They knew my address, my restaurant, my children.” Marcelo now lives in Ridgewood, Queens, selling bread and delivering for Grubhub to make ends meet.

While increased violence has fueled emigration from Ecuador, many interviewees were also motivated to come by economic advancement, particularly that of their children. As of 2022, 25% of Ecuador’s population lived in poverty and was classified as having “inadequate employment.” When asked why she came to America, Katy, 29, immediately responded, “My son. With my love as a mother, I wanted my son to have more opportunities, learn another language, go to college. I want him to have what I didn’t have.”

Others, especially those who came alone, were focused on improving their family’s situation back in Ecuador. “I come from a poor family, we don’t have many resources, that’s why we came,” says David, 33. “I want to buy a house [in Ecuador] for my daughter, because right now we don’t have a home.”

Some indigenous Ecuadorians felt constrained by both poverty and discrimination. Pedro, 38, from the Shuar people of the Ecuadorian Amazon, said his departure was motivated by a feeling that racism in Ecuador would prevent his daughters from succeeding. “Just for being indigenous, for being Shuar, people assume you’re ignorant,” he said. In addition, the candy vendors on New York City’s subways are largely Quechua women from the Andean highlands, many of whom were also vendors back home.

These women, like many recent arrivals, are currently struggling to find a reliable niche in New York City’s labor market as they seek to rebuild their lives. In our next article, we will highlight notable patterns in the experiences of Ecuadorians working to adjust to their new homes.

Marshall Plane is a Research Assistant at The Immigration Lab at American University

Erica Criollo is the Research Coordinator at The Immigration Lab at American University

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on April 9, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on April 9, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/04/09/thousands-fled-ecuador-since-2020/

Climate Disaster, Human Displacement, and the Risks of Non-Economic Loss for Latin America and the Caribbean

By Robert Albro

Associate Director, CLALS

April 8, 2025

Migrants use a dam to cross into the US in Texas on Saturday. By Free Malaysia Today

Recent devastating fires in Hawaii, the Pacific Northwest, and Los Angeles, similarly catastrophic floods in Kentucky and severe hurricane damage in North Carolina, have brought home to people in the U.S. that natural disasters made worse by climate change are more frequently displacing a growing number of people around the world. An estimated 220 million people have been displaced by weather-related disasters over the previous decade, which amounts to approximately 60,000 per day. That number is expected to grow.

Over that same period an estimated 7.7 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean have been displaced due to disasters, with climate change an increasing contributor. In recent years the region has been repeatedly devastated by hurricanes, as well as floods and wildfires, all of which have become larger, more frequent, and damaging as a result of climate change.

In 2017 hurricanes Maria and Irma pummeled the Caribbean. Maria wrought long-lasting damage, leaving Puerto Rico without power for almost a year, with an estimated 130,000 people leaving the island in the storm’s aftermath to resettle in Florida and elsewhere. Irma followed soon thereafter, displacing a total of 1.7 million in 15 countries and territories, making it the largest global disaster event that year. In 2019 Dorian, the strongest recorded hurricane ever to hit the Bahamas, left at least 70,000 homeless. In 2024 Beryl tore through large parts of the Caribbean and Yucatan Peninsula, displacing an estimated 200,000 while damaging or destroying 90 percent of homes and buildings.

Massive flooding events are also now more common in Latin America. A result of the El Niño-la Niña oscillation, climate change has made such floods twice as likely. Brazil alone has been the scene of recurring annual flooding. In 2022 torrential rains caused the worst floods on record leading to nearly 700,000 displaced Brazilians. Again in 2024 a period of intense rainfall during April and May produced the worst floods to hit Brazil in over 80 years, displacing over 600,000. Many of these were migrants from other countries living in Brazil.

Wildfires are also becoming an increasingly familiar annual occurrence, particularly in South America. Since the 1970s the number of days per year with conditions of high fire risk have quadrupled in some parts of South America. Over the past decade the average annual number of wildfires has steadily risen, and 2024 saw the highest recorded number of fire hotspots ever in South America. Below-average rainfall in many areas, together with higher temperatures, and prolonged draughts, aggravated by logging and deforestation, are the main contributors.

In recent years Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil have been particularly hard hit. In February 2024 an estimated 40,000 people in Chile’s Valparaíso region were displaced by fire, with 14,000 houses damaged or destroyed. So far in 2025 three large-scale fires in Argentina’s Patagonian region displaced more than 200 families. Finally, Brazil is in the midst of its worst draught since at least the 1950s. And Bolivia and Brazil experienced record numbers of fires in 2024, with thousands displaced.

Taken together, millions of people have been displaced in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years as a result of climate-exacerbated natural disasters. But these numbers only account for rapid-onset destructive weather events. They do not reflect rising human mobility in response to slower-onset and harder to discern climate impacts and forms of environmental degradation, such as glacial melt, desertification, or sea level rise, which are directly negatively affecting agricultural economies throughout the region and forcing people to move. Addressing the consequences of displacement for these less obvious reasons promises to be among the major humanitarian challenges of the rest of this century.

The great majority of people displaced by environmental upheaval are internal and not international migrants. But particularly smaller and comparatively under-resourced states do not typically have the financial means or capacity to provide ongoing humanitarian assistance to victims of climate-related disasters. Regional entities, such as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), provide much needed resources and expertise, if often insufficient and unsustainable over the long term. International aid groups and multilateral agencies also assist with recovery and resilience efforts, but have been slow to organize and channel adequate resources to address the losses and damages incurred as a result of climate catastrophes. Short sighted U.S. disinvestment in humanitarian aid promises to make this situation considerably worse.

In the aftermath of disaster, understandably an initial priority of states is to mount a recovery effort, which includes stabilizing the economy and rebuilding critical material assets and infrastructure, including housing. But, as I’ve explored in depth elsewhere, intangible forms of non-economic loss are, so far, almost entirely neglected. And yet, as climate-induced displacement becomes widespread, we ignore their significance at our own peril.

Non-economic losses encompass family separations, the fragmentation of community, decline of social cohesion, disruption of cultural identities and relationships to heritage, among others. We should understand the difficulties posed by such losses as comparable to characteristic challenges of many post-conflict societies and failed states, where absent families, the erosion of norms, fractured social structures, and unaddressed grievances, often promote alienation and undermine human security as known factors contributing to the growth of gangs, and new forms of violence, criminality, and social instability. In Latin America, Haiti, Venezuela, El Salvador, and more recently, Ecuador, all serve as sobering reminders of what’s at stake. It’s time that we recognize the risks of ignoring the potentially comparable consequences of non-economic losses from increased climate displacement across the region.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on April 8, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on April 8, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/04/08/climate-disaster/

Community Development Financial Institutions as Underappreciated Bridging Institutions for Latino Small Business Success

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

March 26, 2025

Latina-owned business in Columbia Heights, Washington DC. Credit: Elizabeth Albro

Building upon its previous research on Latino entrepreneurship, with the generous support of the Wells Fargo Foundation, AU’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies recently launched a project to assess the effectiveness of community development financial institutions (CDFIs) for Latino small businesses in the DC-metro region. CDFIs provide bespoke financial services and investment capital to underserved communities, and the economic crisis caused by the pandemic highlighted their crucial role as bridging institutions connecting minority small businesses with the resources they needed to stay afloat. But how have CDFIs gone about their work since the pandemic?

Together with our community partner, the Greater Washington Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, we surveyed representatives of CDFIs throughout our region to better understand how they interact with Latino business owners, but also post-pandemic challenges in doing so, as they seek to support this increasingly important community for our region’s economy. Here we report on preliminary results that show how the effectiveness of CDFIs depends upon their greater attention not just to the specific needs of Latino small business owners but also to the social and cultural circumstances, and communities, within which these small businesses operate.

CDFI’s have been a source of inspiration and innovation when it comes to engaging sometimes hard-to-reach minority small business owners. These include pioneering the use of cohort models when providing assistance, as a way to build peer relationships and support a more networked community of minority business owners. They also include the use of equity impact scorecards to help weigh disparities when evaluating eligibility for business loans. They further encompass a more strategic use of microloans and sustained efforts to rethink traditional risk evaluation systems, which have served as barriers to entrance for minority start-ups. But the role of CDFI’s as critical mediators between minority business owners and the formal financial system remains underappreciated.

Latinos are an increasingly important part of the U.S. economy, primarily through business ownership and job creation. They continue to start businesses at a faster rate than any other group, and are projected to be almost a third of business owners by 2050. But, despite comparable liquidity, credit risk and default rates, when compared with counterparts, Latino small businesses encounter more obstacles accessing capital for start-up, growth, and to survive downturns. They are, for example, 60 percent less likely than White-owned businesses to be approved for a bank loan. This disparity is a major contributor to the long-standing racial wealth gap among small business owners in the U.S.

Recent economic disruptions have also highlighted the greater vulnerability of Latino businesses. Less than half of Latino immigrants nationwide have a relationship with a bank. With less access to lending institutions, Latino business owners have relied disproportionately on personal funds, home equity, and informal social networks, leaving them more financially exposed in times of crisis. The Pew Research Center reported that Latino household wealth fell 66 percent as a result of the 2008 Great Recession, the largest decrease among any group.

During Covid-19, Latino business owners struggled to access capital to weather the pandemic. If more likely to seek funds, they were less likely to receive them from private lending sources. The Small Business Administration reported a success rate of 7 percent for Latino-owned businesses who applied to receive Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds provided by the federal CARES Act in 2020, compared to 83 percent for White-owned enterprises. In 2021 the Federal Reserve reported that Latino businesses were less than half as likely as White-owned businesses to receive a PPP loan. Such disparities highlight the urgency to understand the factors that continue to limit Latino asset building, and to identify successful alternatives for engaging Latino small businesses.

Overall, survey responses prioritized the bridging function of CDFIs. On the one hand, representatives of CDFIs emphasized the importance of not simply understanding the specific concerns of Latino business owners, but also the need to be actively present “in the community.” This included, as one respondent put it, “hyper local knowledge,” not just about specific industry sectors, socioeconomic status or tax rates, but about extra-financial social contexts impacting Latino business success, such as new immigration policies or incipient gentrification in a given neighborhood.

Being “in the community” encompassed the necessity of meeting business owners “where they are at.” Respondents emphasized strategies of direct personal contact, such as texting over email, the importance of “personal visits” to places of business, providing information in Spanish, access to bilingual financial professionals, use of social media platforms popular with Latinos, and outreach through Spanish-language media. This extended to attending family and other local celebrations, and was about “establishing trust” with a group, Latino small business owners, often suspicious of formal institutions. One takeaway is that CDFIs illustrate the need for lending institutions to adopt a more expansively encompassing approach to culturally informed “community engagement,” as a core competency of their work with minority small businesses.

On the other hand, respondents repeatedly emphasized that throughout the pandemic, and going forward, it has been challenging to make Latino business owners aware of their financial assistance options. For many, this boils down to a pervasive lack of “financial literacy.” Microenterprises and small businesses often do not keep adequate records and do not maintain basic financial management and accounting practices, which make it hard for them to provide the necessary documentation to qualify for grants or loans. Much of what CDFI staff spends their time doing is helping business owners “put their financial house in order.” Overcoming such informality remains a major challenge. If CDFIs are critical conduits connecting Latino small business owners to formal financial institutions, a second takeaway is the need to offer basic financial literacy assistance further upstream, prior to the business start-up phase, perhaps in coordination with immigrant-serving nonprofits and conceived as one among a set of core wraparound services.

This research project highlights the critical role played by CDFIs in connecting Latino small business owners with resources for success, but also bridging informal and formal dimensions of business practice, and often underserved minority communities with local and regional small business ecosystems. In our current environment, where federal funds supporting the work of CDFIs are under threat, it is increasingly important to bring attention to their value.

*The research for this post was made possible by a grant from the Wells Fargo Foundation. We thank Victor Burrola, who leads Wells Fargo’s philanthropy in the Greater Washington DC region, for his support throughout.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on March 27, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in United States
Tagged , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on March 27, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/03/27/community-development/

Marginalizing Multilingualism: The Impact of Trump’s Order Establishing English as the Official Language of the United States

By Sophia Robinson

Stop sign “English Only”. Image from flicker

On March 1st, 2025, President Trump passed Executive Order 14224 making English the official language of the United States; this decision will undoubtedly have profound societal effects, further marginalizing migrant communities and diminishing multiculturalism in the U.S. By examining this order alongside a summary of “Immigrants Want to, and Do, Learn the Local Language,” Chapter Four of Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misconceptions by Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione, it is possible to see how this action will affect the lives of millions across the U.S.

This Executive Order revokes President Clinton’s 2000 policy requiring language assistance for non-English speakers. Executive Order 13166 (“Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency”) helped non-native speakers access essential services, including government documents, healthcare forms, and voting materials, and its absence could leave millions without access to these vital resources. The dynamics of language barriers are rooted in both historical and contemporary struggles faced by immigrants in the U.S, and Clinton’s 2000 policy was designed to ensure that non-English speakers could access government services without facing language-based discrimination. Trump’s order frames English as central to a cohesive American identity, which is inherently multifaceted and complex.

Supporters of this recent order argue that designating one language will improve the efficiency of government operations and promote national unity. However, this change can have serious consequences, especially for immigrant communities who rely on translated government materials for essential services. With over 68 million U.S. residents speaking a language other than English at home, Executive Order 14224 threatens to further marginalize a significant portion of the population both through limited required accessibility to government services and further reinforcement of misconceptions about migrants’ desire and ability to learn English.

As Castañeda and Cione’s book highlights, the challenges non-English speakers are far more complex than they appear. Many immigrants, especially those from Latin America, face significant social, economic, and legal barriers to learning English. Even with sufficient economic means, access to language education varies by region and available free time. Discrimination adds another layer of difficulty, with nearly half of Hispanic immigrants feeling judged for their English abilities. As a result of various obstacles, many are left isolated and unable to fully integrate into American society. A policy that systematically and socially upholds English as the only possible standard for success will only worsen these challenges.

Language assimilation is further complicated when considering the gendered challenges of language learning. Immigrant women, particularly in Latino communities, often face more difficulty learning English due to domestic pressures, cultural expectations, and fears of discrimination. This reinforces cycles of economic and social marginalization, as women are often left without the tools to access better opportunities. 

Language barriers can have serious consequences for mental and physical health, leading to stress, isolation, and even misdiagnosis in healthcare settings. It is vital to uphold and validate the multicultural realities of the U.S. in all spaces and having that upheld in government accessibility is a crucial part of inclusion. Lack of support for bilingualism and multicultural identity can lead second and third generation migrants to lose contact with their linguistic and cultural heritage, which has proven to be harmful to community health and well-being. The executive order’s reduction of language assistance programs will only worsen disparities and perpetuate negative perceptions of multilingualism in the U.S.

The implications of Executive Order 14224 are clear: it risks exacerbating the social and economic divides between English-speaking citizens and immigrants. While the goal of national unity is important, the needs of non-English speakers should not be overlooked. If the federal government reduces its support for language assistance, vulnerable immigrant populations will face even greater challenges in accessing essential services, deepening existing inequalities. Policymakers must consider the long-term impact of such decisions on social cohesion and the well-being of all citizens, regardless of language and background.

Sophia Robinson is a Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University 

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on March 26, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in United States
Tagged , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on March 26, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/03/26/marginalizing-multilingualism/

Trump Halts Immigration Application for Migrants Welcomed under Biden Administration

By Valeria Chacon

March 4th 2025

USCIS Application Support Center, retrieved from wikimedia

A memorandum was issued on February 14 by  U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) acting Director Andrew Davidson that has effectively paused all pending immigration applications filed by migrants already living in the United States. The USCIS cited fraud and security concerns as the reasons for the halt, and the application freeze will remain in place indefinitely as government officials investigate and identify potential fraud cases

Thousands of Migrants Left in Limbo

Changes announced by the Trump administration directly impact a number of migrants, including from Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Ukraine, who have received legal entry and stay in the United States from categorical parole programs established under the Biden administration. Among them includes beneficiaries under Uniting for Ukraine, created in 2022 to provide Ukrainian citizens fleeing from Russia’s invasion legal entry to the United States. Applicants under the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela (CHNV) Parole Program are also affected. Initiated in 2023, this humanitarian parole program allowed nationals from these countries to seek stability and refuge in the U.S. In the first six months of the program, nearly 160,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans arrived lawfully under this legal process. The latest data from USCIS shows that in December 2024, right before Trump’s inauguration, 27,340 migrants arrived in the United States with parole grants.

Applicants under the Family Reunification Parole (FRP) Program will also be affected. This program was made to reunite eligible individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, and Haiti with family in the United as they wait for a family-based green card. It was created, in part, to discourage migrants from making dangerous crossings at the southern border by instead offering a legal migration pathway.

Lastly, those who have pending applications for Temporary Protective Status (TPS) from certain countries, including Haiti, Ukraine, and Venezuela, will also be impacted. The TPS program allows individuals to seek protection in the United States from ongoing armed conflict, environmental disasters, or extraordinary conditions. A TPS designation can be granted in 6, 12, or 18 months increments and recipients will need to re-register to keep their protection. However, Venezuelan and Ukrainian beneficiaries have had their protections extended until October 2025, while Haitian beneficiaries are covered through February 2026. As of March of 2024, there were 863,800 people living in the U.S. with TPS.

Legal Pathways Shut Down, Deportation Risks Rise

The programs previously mentioned provide work permits, travel authorization, protection from deportation, and legal migration channels to individuals from designated countries seeking a better life away from persecution and poverty or to reunite with family members in the U.S. However, under this policy shift, officials will no longer process any pending applications for these programs. Effectively, impeding applicants’ ability to transition to another legal status and making them vulnerable to deportation from the country.

In just his first month in office, President Trump has deported 37,660 people, and this number is expected to rise in the coming months due to the halts on the programs above that leave those already in the U.S. without legal status. It is evident that while Trump aggressively targets undocumented immigrants, he also has little regard for those who arrive under excruciating circumstances through legal migration processes.

Valeria Chacon is a research assistant with the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University in Washington, DC

Edited by Katheryn Olmos, and Ernesto Castañeda

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on March 4, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in United States
Tagged , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on March 4, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/03/04/halts-immigration-application/

Green, Red, and Gold. I Need Only Blue to Play Uno

By Anthony Sandoval

March 3rd, 2025

Image of Uno cards: UNO retrieved from Flickr

The United States is where migrants come for that golden opportunity. To live a better life. To work, to be safe, to get an education. But once one leaves “La Jaula de Oro,” (“The Golden Cage”) they can’t return. All they have might be a green or red card, or maybe no card at all.

The U.S. has a visa program for temporary workers in “specialty occupations” called the H1-B visas. During Trump’s first term, he claimed the H1-B visa program was “very, very, bad for workers” and Suspended the H1-B visa program in 2020. Trump has switched his stance on H1-B visas, claiming “it’s a great program.” After Elon Musk showed his support for H-1B visas, nothing has happened to support  H-1B Visas meaning we might still see the reform that was outlined in Project 2025 to make the program ‘better.’

Other types of visa programs might be affected within the next couple of months, student visas, and visas for survivors of human trafficking and other crimes. Another program that is getting attacked is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). All visas get a card and DACA gets a work permit card. Just another card to keep ahold of.

A migrant factory worker from Chicago said, “I have been waiting for my daughter to turn 21 so I can get my green card.” This working migrant applied to the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV) 15 years ago and is still waiting for a Green Card. The DV program is a lottery. In 2023, the DV program had nearly 9.6 million qualified entries and only 50 thousand recipients.

The cost of green cards is already so high, that the filing cost for a family-based green card is approximately 3 thousand dollars for an applicant applying from within the United States. Other categories of green cards may have different costs depending on which one the person is aiming for, not including legal service fees. For DACA it costs $555 to renew online. The most expenses being EB-5 visas, which are for foreign investors that has made investments within the United States around one million dollars and created 10 permanent full-time jobs. For these pathways are not accessible to everyone due to the cost. While some immigrants may not have green cards, visas, or DACA, one thing that they might have are Red Cards ━which can make a difference in whether a person stays in the U.S. or gets deported. Red Cards were made back in 2007 by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. Red cards are used to protect undocumented immigrants from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). They can come in 19 different languages, including Ukrainian, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, and Tagalog.

Photo of the front and back of a Red Card by Anthony Sandoval

Trump’s “Border Czar,” Tom Homan stated, “For instance, Chicago—very well-educated, they’ve been educated on how to defy ICE, how to hide from ICE.”

On February 25th, President Trump talked about a new type of pathway to citizenship, he calls it a Gold Card. For years, many groups have been asking for an improved way for citizenship or an easier way to come into the United States. The answer was simple: a card that’s worth five million dollars. Ask your friends and family to help cover the cost. It’s that simple… but few people have that type of money. This new card is for investors. The gold card would just replace the EB-5 program.

We don’t need this. Not a 5 million dollar pathway that very few people can pay for. We need another way for citizenship, another way to come into the United States, a faster program that allows people to get green cards and not wait for years. We must remember these people are not “aliens;” they are people. One action that can help is supporting the Dream & Promise Act of 2025 that offers some DACA recipients, immigrant youth, Temporary Protected Status holders, and Deferred Enforced Departure holders a pathway to citizenship.

Anthony Sandoval is a research assistant with the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab at American University in Washington, DC.

Edited by Katheryn Olmos, Ana Gaston, and Ernesto Castañeda,

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on March 2, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in United States
Tagged , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on March 2, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/03/02/green-red-gold-cards/

Balancing Conservation and Extraction: Governance Challenges of Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative

By Edgar Aguilar

Gas flaring at oil drilling site on the Napo river, Amazone, Ecuador (image: flicker)

In 2007, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, named after the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini oil fields located within Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. Correa novel proposal was to leave the approximately 846 million barrels of oil in these fields unexploited in exchange for $3.6 billion in international compensation—half the projected revenue from these reserves. This plan aimed to preserve one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and respect indigenous territories while addressing Ecuador’s economic needs. However, contradictions in Correa’s governance—marked by ambitious social spending funded by extractive industries—highlighted the difficulty of reconciling economic development with long-term environmental commitments.

During Correa’s tenure, Ecuador saw a significant increase in public spending, rising from 20 percent of GDP in 2004 to 43 percent in 2014. This expansion was largely financed through renegotiated oil contracts and an increased state share of oil revenues. Social investments, such as doubling government health expenditures from 2006 to 2016, led to substantial improvements in poverty reduction and infrastructure development.

However, this economic model deepened Ecuador’s reliance on oil, which highlighted the problem of directly linking social progress goals to environmentally destructive practices. While Correa promoted the Yasuní-ITT Initiative internationally, Ecuador simultaneously expanded oil exploration elsewhere, such as in the Amazonian blocks outside Yasuní. Oil concessions in the Amazon in 2007 covered 5 million hectares; 4.3 million of them conceded to foreign companies. In 2011 these numbers doubled with the incorporation of 20 more oil blocks. This inconsistency weakened the credibility of the initiative, making it difficult to secure international funding.

From the outset, the initiative faced skepticism. Donor countries were reluctant to provide funds without enforceable guarantees that future Ecuadorian administrations would uphold the agreement. Additionally, the initiative lacked a clear legal framework to ensure that the pledged conservation funds would lead to sustained economic diversification. Consequently, by 2013 the initiative had secured only $116 million in pledges, with a mere $13 million received, falling significantly short of the $3.6 billion target. The global oil market likely also played a role. In 2014 a sharp decline in oil prices significantly impacted Ecuador’s revenues, further reducing the feasibility of keeping Yasuní’s reserves untapped. With mounting fiscal deficits, Correa’s administration abandoned the initiative in 2013, citing insufficient international contributions.

As Yasuní ITT illustrates, Correa’s government struggled to maintain a coherent environmental policy, oscillating between conservation rhetoric and extractive expansion. This eroded trust among both domestic and international stakeholders. While his administration positioned itself as a defender of indigenous rights and nature, its policies often prioritized oil revenues over sustainability.

The abandonment of the initiative’s conservation goals sparked resistance from environmental and indigenous groups, leading to the formation of YASunidos, a coalition of youth activists, environmentalists, and indigenous advocates. Their activism sought to hold the government accountable, culminating in a push for a national referendum. Although the Ecuadorian government initially obstructed these efforts, the movement continued to pressure policymakers for conservation-oriented reforms.

In an August 2023 national referendum, 60 percent of voters supported the cessation of oil drilling in Yasuní National Park. In response to the vote, the government initiated plans to shut down oil operations in the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini fields. The Energy Ministry announced the closure of the Ishpingo B-56 well, with the full decommissioning process expected to take over five years and cost more than $1.3 billion. However, concerns have been raised regarding government compliance, since the court mandated that the oil industry infrastructure be dismantled within a year.

The failure of the initiative led to the expansion of oil drilling in Yasuní National Park. Oil extraction has contributed to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and contamination of water sources, threatening endemic species and fragile ecosystems. Indigenous communities have faced territorial encroachment, social displacement, and health crises linked to pollution.

The Yasuní-ITT project illustrates the complexities of balancing economic development with environmental sustainability. Ecuador’s experience highlights the contradictions within populist environmental policies and discourse—where ambitious social programs depend on extractive revenues, ultimately undermining conservation efforts. While the 2023 referendum offers a renewed opportunity for environmental protection, long-term success will depend on sustained public pressure, policy consistency, and international cooperation.

To increase the likelihood of success 1) governments must credibly align environmental with economic policies. Contradictory approaches undermine long-term policy effectiveness. 2) Future conservation-based economic models should incorporate strong institutional safeguards, cross-administration continuity, and financial incentives for long-term compliance. 3) Reducing dependence on oil requires long-term investment in alternative sectors such as renewable energy, ecotourism, and technology.

Edgar Aguilar is a Researcher at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student in International Economics at American University

Edited by Rob Albro, Associate Director, Research, at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on February 26, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Ecuador
Tagged , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on February 26, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/02/26/ecuadors-yasuni-itt-initiative/

(Not) Welcome to Florida: The Impact of Anti-Immigrant Policies

By Katheryn Olmos

Image of Welcome to Florida: The Sunshine State sign retrieved from Flikr
Image of Welcome to Florida: The Sunshine State sign retrieved from Flikr

The atmosphere is so thick in Florida, you could cut it with a knife. Immigrants feel like they cannot catch a breath. As one immigrant told me, “every day there is something new.” Imagine having to check a map of zones to avoid every time you want to go outside, commuting further away from home to shop for groceries, having to refrain from speaking your native language in public, or avoiding going out to get coffee with a friend to lower the risk of encountering ICE raids or deportation. Living in constant fear, paranoia, and mistrust is no way to live.

State patrols will sit along highways to spot white working vans. In one case, a construction worker was pulled over in his working white van one evening at the end of January because his headlights were “too opaque.” The police officer asked him, “How long have you been in the U.S.?” to which the worker replied, “Over 20 years.” Then the officer gives him a ticket for driving without a license and tells him to go on with his day.

Shortly after the incident, Florida Governor Ron Desantis announced that he would enforce Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Therefore, the Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (FLHSMV) will join forces with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through this partnership, ICE authorizes the Florida Highway Patrol to arrest and detain undocumented immigrants. State troopers will now ask individuals about their immigration status on day-to-day traffic stops. Additionally, state troopers are authorized to detain those suspected to be undocumented, regardless of their actual immigration status. This would completely dismiss the notion of “innocent until proven guilty,” leading to racial profiling of Latino drivers and causing fear among Florida residents. Florida residents have seen an increase in law enforcement. Latinos are more frequently reporting seeing people they know stopped and detained by law enforcement. It feels that this policy is only targeting the brown and immigrant community in Florida.

As Florida faces various problems, including the housing crisis, high home and auto insurance premiums, environmental crisis, and idle hurricane impacts, Desantis believes the so-called “immigration crisis” is the biggest issue at hand. On February 13, Desantis signed the “toughest immigration law in the country.” With this legislation, Desantis will allocate $298 million for detaining and deporting immigrants and increase the penalty for crimes committed by immigrants, including requiring the death penalty for undocumented immigrants who commit capital crimes. Additionally, Desantis is creating a new crime of entering the state of Florida as an undocumented person on top of the already existing federal crime of entering the U.S. through an irregular pathway.

There has been an increase in people moving in from out-of-state, including former residents of New York, California, and New Jersey. Many of them are moving to a state where their out-of-state wages for remote work or social security payments get them further, and the politics better align with their conservative beliefs. The changing demographics and anti-immigrant politics in Florida have also been creating a hostile environment for immigrant Floridians.

While Florida is experiencing an increase in residents from out of state, there is also an increase in immigrant residents moving to safer places out of state. Fleeing persecution is a recurring theme for immigrants; they often find themselves in a state of movement and fear while hoping to one day achieve the American Dream. Those who have lived in Florida for many years, even decades, face significant challenges when it comes to leaving their homes. Many immigrants who have established homes, businesses, children, and pets would prefer to remain in Florida. Immigrants who have built lives in Florida or lack the financial resources to leave are modifying their social and economic behaviors out of fear of deportation.

Florida is already witnessing the impact of migrants no longer participating in their social and economic atmosphere. Businesses that rely on Latino consumers are feeling this impact. Restaurants and other franchises that tend to be busy on weekend nights are empty. Rosy, a frequenter of Jacksonville, Florida’s Latino nightlife, says local Latino bar and club events are practically empty. She states that Latino clubs that always had long wait times to enter now have no lines.

Construction work is down due to high interest rates, weather conditions, and labor shortages. Despite Desantis’ push for mass deportations to solve the housing crisis in Florida, we need immigrants to solve the housing crisis in Florida. On February 20, 6 Mexican workers were detained at a gas station on Southside Blvd. in Jacksonville, Florida. Every day more and more innocent Latinos are detained by ICE. Instilling fear against our most vulnerable yet essential members of the community is not the solution to any of the state’s problems

Katheryn Olmos is a Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student at the Sociology Research and Practice program at American University.

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director, and Emma Wyler, Wilfredo Flores, intern at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on February 25, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Immigration, North America, United States
Tagged , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on February 25, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/02/25/not-welcome-to-florida/

Why MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua Are Not Terrorist Groups

by Melissa Vasquez, Ernesto Castañeda, and Anthony Fontes

Image of President Trump of the United States and President Bukele of El Salvador meeting, White House, Sep 25 2019, Fliker

Are MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua terrorist organizations? The short answer is no, they are not. They are transnational criminal organizations. El Salvador’s President Bukele and Donald Trump have officially labeled these groups as terrorist organizations, citing their extreme violence and control over some territories. However, these classifications have sparked debate, as their activities are more aligned with organized crime than political terrorism. Making this distinction is crucial given that mislabeling them can lead to misguided policies that fail at curbing their violence.

The 1980s civil wars in Central America forced nearly a million people to flee the U.S. Some immigrants are still forced to leave their countries because of organized crime and gang recruitment. Today most often, some displaced people are victims of gangs, not members or representatives abroad. However, upon originally arriving in Los Angeles, many Central American migrants faced marginalization and sought protection from the gangs present in the areas where they lived and worked. These challenges ultimately contributed to the formation of the present-day MS-13 and M-18 gangs. Many of the members of these new local gangs were incarcerated in Los Angeles prisons alongside members of other gangs, which allowed them to regroup and learn from their rivals. Shortly after the wars, mass deportations from prisons and streets sent MS-13 and M-18 members back to a weakened Central America, where they expanded their networks and influence. 

Similarly, El Tren de Aragua (TdR), which originated in the early 2000s in Venezuelan prisons—particularly the Tocorón prison—has expanded across South America. Originally, a prison gang, Tren de Aragua, expanded beyond prison walls to exploit weak governance, connecting criminal networks across South and North America. Furthermore, like MS-13 and M-18, Tren de Aragua is driven by criminal enterprising rather than political ideology. That is, neither group aims to take over state power or remake society in their own image. Rather, they are hyper-focused on generating maximum profits through illicit means while avoiding state interference. They are criminal syndicates with some capacity—though quite limited—to carry out their rackets across borders. They are certainly NOT terrorist entities. 

What separates a terrorist organization from a criminal syndicate? While both engage in illicit activities and use violence as a means to an end, it is crucial to distinguish their goals and methods to dismantle them effectively. The primary difference lies in their objectives: terrorist organizations seek political, religious, or ideological change by influencing government policies or societal structures, whereas transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operate across borders solely for financial gain, without political or ideological motives beyond sowing conditions to maximize profit. 

For example, the U.S. government has classified groups like Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ISIS as terrorist organizations due to their political objectives. FARCS’s history dates back to 1964 when it emerged as a communist insurgency that employed terrorist tactics. Initially formed as a guerilla movement from campesino self-defense groups, whose primary objective was to overthrow the Colombian government. Over the next five decades, FARC waged guerilla warfare by carrying out illicit activities—such as bombing, kidnappings, and assassinations–all in an effort to challenge state authority. Colombia, the U.S., and the European Union designated FARC as a terrorist organization due to their use of political violence.

However, the 2016 peace accords between FARC and the Colombian government led to the successful disarmament. This agreement allowed the group to transition into a political party known as Comunes. Even though some dissident factions still operate, FARC’s official transformation has been a key factor in maintaining long-term stability in Colombia. Recognizing this shift has been crucial in fostering peace and ensuring that former combatants can engage in democratic processes rather than armed conflict.

The contrast between ISIS and FARC highlights the importance of proper classification. FARC has abandoned the characteristics that once classified it as a terrorist organization and instead has evolved into a political entity. ISIS, on the other hand, remains committed to its extremist and political ideology, seeking to overthrow governments through guerrilla warfare and establish a global Islamic caliphate through territorial control and sectarian violence. Addressing the causes behind these organizations is equally crucial. FARC’s transition has allowed Colombia to tackle the drivers that led to its rise in the first place, providing the foundation for long-term stability. When governments misdiagnose the factors driving their emergence, violence continues.

Despite claims that Tren de Aragua serves the Maduro regime, evidence suggests otherwise. The group arose from Venezuela’s weak governance and not from direct state sponsorship. According to Insight Crime, in September 2023, Venezuelan law enforcement raided the Tocorón prison in Aragua state, aiming to “dismantle and put an end to organized crime gangs and other criminal networks operating from the Tocorón Penitentiary.” This operation demonstrates that Tren de Aragua is not a state-sponsored group, nor is it a tool being used by the Venezuelan state to destabilize the region. Its rise—like that of MS-13 and M-18—can be traced back to systemic failures, including poverty, corruption, and forced population displacement. These factors have allowed transnational criminal organizations to flourish across Latin America. 

MS-13 and M-18 expanded by exploiting political corruption and institutional weakness in their home countries. Similarly, Tren de Aragua has taken advantage of Venezuela’s economic crises and large emigration to expand into new territories, such as the Darién Gap. Unlike terrorist organizations, these gangs did not emerge to push a political ideology; rather, they have thrived by leveraging corruption and weak law enforcement. In many ways, they are products of the environments that fostered them, growing out of instability rather than ideological ambition.  These transnational criminal groups do not engage in violent attacks abroad, targeting governments or aiming to take political power in the United States. That is beyond their purview and capabilities. 

Why does the distinction between organized crime and terrorist organizations matter? Although all of these organizations engage in violence and illicit activities, their end goals set them apart: MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua operate for profit, whereas ISIS and others seek to reshape the political landscape of their regions. Properly distinguishing between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations like MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua is crucial for drafting effective policies and responses to their violence. Mislabeling these groups can lead to inappropriate responses. Applying counterterrorism measures to profit-driven gangs fails to address the root causes for their expansion in the first place. Failing to properly distinguish organized crime from political terrorists leads to failed policies. The misclassification of these groups could destabilize the region by shifting U.S. foreign policy and resources away from where it is truly needed—addressing the drivers of gang-related violence, corruption, and weak governance—toward counterterrorism efforts. 

While transnational criminal organizations are heavily involved in drug trafficking, and their violence may create fear among civilians and impact governance, this does not qualify them as terrorist organizations. Their primary objective is financial gain, not advancing an ideological or political agenda. This distinction matters because government responses shape outcomes. If the goal is to curb migration, drug trafficking, or violence, then we need to stop treating criminal organizations like terrorist groups and start addressing the real issues driving their expansion. If the U.S. truly wants to curb migration and secure the southern border, then it must ensure that its classification of these organizations is accurate and aligned with its actual objectives.

Melissa Vasquez is a Graduate Student in the International Affairs and Policy Analysis program at American University and an Intern at the Immigrant Lab.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a Professor at American University

Anthony Fontes is an Associate Professor and ethnographer at American University’s School of International Service.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on February 20, 2025  •  Permalink
Posted in Central America, El Salvador, South America, Venezuela
Tagged , , , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on February 20, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/02/20/why-not-terrorist-groups/

« Older Posts
Newer Posts »