The Taxing Debate

The Taxing Debate on Migration in the U.S.

By Mary Capone

November 19, 2024

Nearly half of American adults feel that immigration threatens national identity. This proportion has increased in recent years as anti-immigration sentiments have surged in politics and partisan divergence has deepened in rhetoric. The former Trump administration was highly influential in the anti-immigration movement, with much of Trump’s campaigns hinging on xenophobic policies like building a wall on the southern border and ending DACA. Such policies jeopardize the human rights of immigrants in the United States, who make up nearly 14% of the U.S. population. The Biden administration’s handling of immigration has also been criticized by 60% of Americans, indicating that the ongoing conflict over immigration is worsening.

Polls from PBS NewsHour, 2024.

 Why is migration so controversial? Shouldn’t people be allowed to migrate safely?

The answer lies in white supremacy and ‘tax dollars.’

At a 1983 Conservative Party conference, former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously said, “If the State wishes to spend more, it can do so only by borrowing your savings or by taxing you more. It is no good thinking that someone else will pay—that ‘someone else’ is you. There is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers’ money.” Like many politicians, Thatcher propagated the notion that government spending relies on taxpayers’ money, placing the burden of spending on individuals.

Similar sentiments are not uncommon in the United States. Former Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, featured this tagline in his 2018 campaign targeting his opponent: “Tony Evers: Special treatment for illegals, higher taxes for you.” Donald Trump continues to campaign on anti-immigration policies to appeal to Americans who feel skeptical about their tax dollars going to immigrant welcoming programs. Trump’s campaign website highlights “20 Core Campaign Promises to Make America Great Again,” two of which focus on blocking immigration, including the first promise: “Seal the border and stop the migrant invasion.” These arguments are used to justify relatively small government investment in important services that benefit communities of color and immigrants by suggesting they would be an imposition on the ‘taxpayer.’

To understand the historical use of the term ‘tax dollars,’ Camille Walsh analyzed hundreds of letters defending racial segregation addressed to the Supreme Court in the years following the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). One-third of the letters consisted of some language about taxes, taxpayers, or having “paid” for public schools, implying the right to decide whether to keep them segregated. The American ‘taxpayer’ historically represents white individuals, and such language “obscured class divisions among whites and elevated those racialized groups presumed to have higher taxable income to a higher position in claiming citizenship rights.” White individuals like Aura Lee (1956), argued that “poor white taxpayers are entitled to enjoy some all-white places, if they so desire.”

As the term ‘taxpayer’ is historically associated with whiteness, it is used to justify the entitlement of resources concentrated in white communities. Meanwhile, the ‘nontaxpayer’ is meant to symbolize Black and Brown individuals who are perceived not to have “earned” their rights. While this argument is used to exclude people of color from resources, historian James Anderson finds that taxes from predominantly Black communities were at least as much during the time of the Brown ruling, and often higher than those of white neighborhoods. These taxes were often distributed by white school boards into all-white schools prior to Brown. This does not account for today’s common tax evasion of the nation’s wealthiest individuals and corporations. The Treasury Department estimates that there is a $160 billion gap between what the wealthiest 1% of the population should pay and what they actually pay.

Seventy years after the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, politicians, citizens, and the media hold ‘taxpayer dollars’ to be sacred. Similar to the discussions surrounding racial integration in the mid-20th century, immigration represents a battle between the ‘taxpayer,’ or white American, and the ‘nontaxpayer,’ or immigrant. Just as white parents feared sending their children to integrated schools with “much lower standards and run-down facilities than the ones that [they] helped pay for,” many white Americans do not want immigrants to have access to vital resources and fear the use of their dollars on government spending.

Nevertheless, between sales taxes and property taxes, undocumented immigrants pay billions of dollars in taxes each year. Not only are immigrants taxpayers, but they pay taxes at higher rates than the richest Americans and get less in return. Taxpayer rhetoric is another weapon of othering by separating white U.S.-born individuals from Black and Brown immigrants, regardless of who pays their taxes.

Graph from the American Immigration Council (2016).

A quote from former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan counters concerns about government spending causing a deficit, stating: “There is nothing to prevent the government from creating as much money as it wants.” Similar to banks not lending out depositors’ money, government spending does not use tax dollars for spending. To illustrate this, the U.S. government spent trillions on wars post-9/11 and hundreds of billions to bail out banks in 2008, neither of which were framed as a tax dollar problem. Despite the framing of funding essential services as an attack on individual taxpayers, in reality, it falls within the bounds of federal government spending.

International law considers migration to be a universal right. Immigration control “is a relatively recent invention of states,” according to Vincent Chetail, a professor of international law. The U.S. has a duty to protect the rights of all people and not discriminate based on race, national origin, religion, or any other group category according to the 14th Amendment, and many international treaties it is a party to.

Research indicates that government investments in immigrants have a higher return over time. For example, more educated immigrants earn more and, therefore, pay more in taxes. Fiscal concerns are not based on reality, as immigrants are net contributors to the federal budget. ‘Tax dollars’ are simply a code for white dollars to instill fear and discrimination against vulnerable populations, despite taxation realities.

Mary Capone is a researcher at the Immigration Lab at American University.  

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Kamala Will Win

This Is Why Kamala Harris Will Win

By Ernesto Castañeda

November 5, 2024

Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.

Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.

My assessment is that Kamala Harris will win the election. It is not based on the polls or the betting markers, which are not helpful given their very tight margins. Instead, Harris’ big tent, misrepresentation of the primacy of the economy and immigration in surveys, and social trends lead me to believe that Harris will win.

First of all, following the voting trends from the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Trump will not win the popular vote. This matters, as it determines popularity and broad appeal nationwide. Trump has never been appealing to over half of the population as a politician. While Trump was a fresh figure in politics in 2016, and there were some shy voters (given his novel strident and racist anti-immigrant comments), in 2024, he is a well-known entity, and most of his ardent followers are loud about their support, and not shy to say so to pollsters, door knockers, or people calling to get out the vote. Even so, attendance at his rallies and Trump flags outside of houses have decreased from previous cycles. Trump obsesses over crowd sizes, which was one of the indicators of his appeal in 2016. However, the infamous Madison Square Garden Trump rally on October 27 had around 19,500 people in attendance compared to around 30,000 people for Kamala Harris in Houston, Texas, on October 25, and over 75,000 at her rally in Washington, DC, on October 29.

Trump counts on a core base of around 33% of the electorate that holds strong views against immigration, complains about the economy, and will support Trump no matter what. Some more traditional Republicans will also vote for him. Nonetheless, his main campaign strategic imperative was to appeal to moderates, independents, and White suburban women to expand his margin over 50%. His 2024 campaign has not done so; he has focused on animating and mobilizing his core base. Many of his comments and those of his surrogates and supporters have alienated moderates as well as some registered Republicans. He has been more focused on discrediting the electoral process, the media, and his opponents and critics than on appealing to all voters.

In contrast, Kamala Harris has been explicitly open to conservative-leaning independents and even former Republican officeholders, including, but not limited to, Liz Cheney. Many registered Republicans, college-educated men, and many women will vote for her. That should be enough to guarantee her victory. She has done so not by compromising her beliefs and Democratic priorities but by promising to uphold the Constitution and protect democracy.

It is true that an unintended effect of Trump’s hate speech has created a certain increase in support among some Black, Latino, and Asian voters, but that will not be enough to counter the fact that a majority of women across racial and ethnic groups will vote for Kamala Harris as will many men and registered Republicans and independents.

A weakness for Harris lies in the uncommitted voters because of the situation in the Middle East who may vote for Jil Stein or abstain in places like Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Detroit, Dearborn, and college campuses. Trump’s election would make things worse in the Middle East, so some will reluctantly vote for Harris and then get ready to continue with their protests and demands for a ceasefire.

The media across the board has obsessed with “immigration” and “the economy” being the main concerns of the electorate and that public opinion favors Trump to handle them. But first of all, objectively, the economy is strong, and asylum-seeking at the border today is at very low levels. Second, and most importantly for elections, when one looks at the polls that are used to make these claims, these are the main issues for less than half of the electorate, and they are the main issues for Republican respondents, who naturally favor Trump’s solutions on these areas. In other words, putting the bulk of the Republican agenda around closing the border is not enough to gain a majority of voters nationwide or even in most swing states. The urban legend about immigrants eating cats shows voters how exaggerated these warnings are. The common claims against immigrants are false, as my book —coming out today— Immigration Realities documents.

Many pundits, consultants, and advisors have been saying that “Harris is weak on the border.” Not only is that false, but my response has been that the immigration obsession will cost Trump the election. Mass deportations are not popular outside of MAGA circles, while a path to citizenship has large levels of support. The Madison Square Garden rally made it clear to many voters and agnostic observers that this was not about undocumented immigration but about creating a White Christian Ethnostate.

There are even some indications (like the exit polls in the Republican primaries in Ohio) that some Evangelicals and religious voters are tired of Trump supposedly representing their views and values. The majority will still vote for him, but less than in previous elections when he has been on the ballot. The same is true for rural and union members. Biden has been a strong pro-labor president. Tim Walz is more familiar with rural White voters than Vance is these days. The majority will vote Republican, but many will vote Democrat. Harris is endorsed by both Liz Cheney and Bernie Sanders. Her appeal and favorability are wide, and she could create an even wider base of support than Obama.

Democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and many other values and institutions are on the line. This is the first election where Trump is on the ballot after January 6, 2021, and the many trials against him. He will not lose all his supporters, but he will lose some.

Recent local and midterm elections have shown that the across-the-board restrictions on abortion and emergency care while pregnant are large motivators to drive women and men to the polls to repeal these propositions and to vote for Democrats. In 2016, most White women supported Trump and not Hilary Clinton. This may be different this time because of the end of Roe vs. Wade. This would be crucial because women are the majority of likely voters, and they were more active in early voting.

Established Latinos of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and South American origin in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and New York will make important contributions to the Democratic vote. I predict that many women and new citizens of immigrant origin and some who did not vote in previous elections because of age or lack of interest (thus often not in pollster models of likely voters) will turn out to vote for Harris.

All along, the expectations have been set very highly for Harris, and she has excelled at each challenge, including securing the nomination uncontested, choosing a strong VP candidate,  leading the RNC, speaking at rallies, showing she can be Commander in Chief, bettering Trump at their debate, engaging with the media effectively, she can take questions from the media and answer them thoughtfully, to round it all out she can engage in retail politics with much enthusiasm and empathy.

Trump carries all the media attention and campaign resources from the RNC, and most Republicans down the ballot depend, to a large degree, on his appeal. This does not bode well for them. Furthermore, the Republican-led Congress has been one of the most ineffective in recent memory. Government shutdowns have been adverted, and there have been impactful and popular bipartisan accomplishments such as the Infrastructure Bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS Act, and support for Ukraine, but many Republican Congresspeople have voted against these achievements.

All these factors combined seem to indicate that Trump supporters will have a weaker showing than when he lost in 2020, even if we are not in the middle of a pandemic. Kamala Harris has benefited from a fresh, exciting, flawless campaign, drawing all the enthusiasm that had been lacking since Obama’s first presidential campaign.

To recap, the biggest errors in the 2024 election coverage have been the out-of-proportion focus on the economy and immigration as the biggest concerns of all voters when, indeed, these complaints are not fully based on reality and are mainly coming from Republican-leaning voters. Nobody likes inflation, but unemployment is low, and wage and economic growth rates are positive and steady, with a big improvement from 2020. Reproductive health and women’s rights will be more important in motivating people across party affiliations to vote for Harris and Democrats. While the polls are currently very tight, and there is noise that favors Trump (allowing him to repeat the big lie), ultimately, cold analyses of the electorate’s behavior and preferences tell us that Harris is on track to win the electoral college and with wider margins than the polls show.

Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.

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Political Piñatas

Political Piñatas: How Conservatives Use Latinos to Polarize U.S. Society

By Ernesto Castañeda

November 5, 2024

Many are surprised to learn that some Latinos vote Republican. A larger percentage of Latinos voted for Trump in 2020 than in 2016. A similar percentage or even more may vote for Trump in 2024. There are many reasons for this, which are often misunderstood by the wider public. I discuss some of them here.

Latinos represent the largest minority in the U.S. at over 65 million and have gained attention as political parties vie for the so-called “Latino vote” as elections are won by tighter margins. This is particularly the case in swing states with large Latino populations. How best to describe the landscape of Latino voters’ preferences remains a question of regular debate. On the one hand, Latinos are still frequently superficially treated as a relatively uniform voting bloc —even if more “up for grabs” today with polling data suggesting gradual shifts in party affiliation. As such, Latinos are often treated as a demographic that can tip the balance in favor of a party. Nonetheless, polls and pundits necessarily flatten the real views of Latinos. This has always been a diverse group. The birth of the term Hispanic aimed to bring together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans around common causes. Regional differences are key; for example, in the D.C.-metro region, Latinos are diverse and majority Salvadoran; in California and Texas, they are mainly of Mexican and Central American descent; in South Florida, they are a mixture of Cuban, Venezuelan, Colombian, Nicaraguan, among others.

Many recent immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean come escaping failed states and so-called leftist regimes. Many migrants have been directly affected by inequality in their countries of origin. Democratic erosion throughout Latin America and the Caribbean makes it hard for opposition activists and critics of these regimes. Like Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain and Cubans after Castro’s takeover, many recent immigrants see themselves as forced political exiles escaping from authoritarian states that robbed them of their wealth and freedoms. Therefore, in the U.S. they are more likely to identify with ideals of individual freedom and free enterprise.

Trump has also had a polarizing effect on Latinos. Republicans have sought to exploit a process well-documented by scholars: the creation of social boundaries. Trump’s discourse encourages distinctions between “good immigrants” and “good Latinos” in contrast to undocumented “criminals.” Those immigrants with visas and legal permits, higher education levels and family incomes, lighter skin, or who align better with the U.S. geopolitical preferences tend to be more successful than those who do not have immigration papers. This creates hierarchical differences within Latinos. Many U.S.-born and legal Latino immigrants try hard to distinguish themselves from individuals and groups framed as “illegal” and “criminal” to avoid the stigma assigned to those groups.

These social processes create durable inequalities not only between Latinos and non-Latinos but also among Latinos. In public discourse, Latinos are used as proxies and piñatas to polarize Americans further. In turn, some Latinos internalize feelings of inferiority or superiority and may loudly act upon them, adding to the process of polarization. Some Latinos organize against dehumanizing language and build networks of solidarity among Latinos and with other groups. However, a numerical minority such as the White Nationalists and antisemites Nick Fuentes or Enrique Tario, leader of the Proud Boys, are not passive receivers of stigmatizing attacks but become amplifiers of hate speech in exchange for group membership as part of a sometimes-xenophobic White majority. Some who have seen fellow Latinos excluded, targeted, and stigmatized may try to pass as White by attacking other Latinos, further polarizing the country in the process and weakening democratic institutions and minority rights. For these reasons, studying the effects of polarization on Latinos and the role that Latinos have in social polarization is of national importance. 

Latinos can hardly be said to form a cohesive or predictable voting bloc. Latinos do not fit neatly into the racial categories that often orient public political debate, which can lead to simplifications of Latinos’ views. Latinos are relatively less partisan as a group. A Pew Research Center report indicates that less than half of Latinos acknowledge significant differences between political parties, with a large share agreeing that neither party effectively represents their interests. Immigration is motivated by economic success, so access to jobs and better pay are their priority. Most Latinos have papers, so immigration is not an immediate concern for most Latino individuals, but it is a theme full of an emotional load; the immigration struggles of family members are close to their hearts.

An influential narrative regarding political polarization is that the electorate has become increasingly stoked by racial tensions and grievances. In this account, race is an important source of polarization. Latinos’ views are diverse and sometimes distinct from those of other Americans and more often map with those of similar occupations and socio-economic status. The diversity within Latino communities impacts the overall political polarization dynamics in the U.S. Typical analyses of race/ethnicity as a variable in culture war-type political contests do not adequately account for the heterogeneity of Latinos as a group and for the range of variation of their political commitments. National origin, gender, religious affiliation, geographic location, educational attainment, class, media consumption, and generational experience, among others, are impactful factors in identity formation.

Latinos display greater cultural unity than political unity. Latinos are part of their local and larger national political ecosystems. Latinos, despite immigration status, have demonstrated notable unity mobilizing in response to racist anti-immigrant rhetoric from local, state, or national politicians. Research also shows that over time, anti-immigrant policies can contribute to the withdrawal of Latinos from the public sphere. But sometimes there is increased group cohesion among Latinos as a reaction to external group threats such as public hostility toward immigrants and the portrayal in the media of  Latinos as likely to be Mexican, undocumented, and lesser than. A stronger identification as Latino resulting from previous political organizing does lead to higher levels of political participation. In other cases, as Latinos become business owners, upper middle class, and part of mainstream U.S. society, they may become more politically conservative and may try to distinguish themselves from newcomers. Other successful Latinos, who are less insecure about their status, mentor and open doors for others, volunteer, and become philanthropists.

Furthermore, some Latino subgroups are more susceptible to misinformation. The choice of media varies by immigration status and age. Older first-generation Latinos often opt for more traditional media sources such as radio and T.V., and more often in Spanish. Younger Latinos, often second- or third-generation, exhibit a wider range of media consumption, mainly in English and social media. These choices create different media echo chambers, differing attitudes about the meaning of “Latino,” and varying political values even within the same family.

Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.

This piece is a revised and shortened version of an unfunded research proposal written for the Carnegie Fellows Program on Polarization in November of 2023.

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Anti-Immigrant Campaigns

Anti-Immigration Rhetoric: Winning Campaign Strategy or Coin Toss?

By Joseph Fournier and Ernesto Castaneda

October 10, 2024

With the U.S. presidential election drawing nearer, many Kamala Harris supporters fear a perceived weakness on the border “crisis” may cost her the election to Donald J. Trump. Trump has championed himself as the figurehead for tough border policy. Restricting immigration has been associated with Trump. An NBC poll showed that 89% of people who identify as conservative point to the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border as a major factor in their vote for president, while only 25% of those who identify as liberal do so, and 52% among moderates. Therefore, we are not witnessing an anti-immigrant turn in public opinion but a further polarization by political ideology.

Crosstab from CBS, YouGov poll page 23.

Trump has been capitalizing on this perceived base of support by making even more extreme comments regarding the issue, most recently employing race pseudo-science in claiming that recent migrants possess “bad genes.”

In the past, Harris and the Democrats have painted themselves in clear opposition to his cruel immigration policies, such as family separation. When on the campaign trail in 2019, Harris’s rhetoric focused on pathways to citizenship and the plight of migrants. This strategy worked as Biden and Harris defeated Trump in 2020.

There was a slight rightward shift from Harris and the DNC on immigration. This was probably in reaction to an increase in the visibility of border crossings after the pandemic.  Trump has framed these increases as a “border crisis.”

But do Democrats need to get harsher on immigration if they want to win? Data shown in Figure 1 demonstrates a phenomenon that may surprise political strategists on both sides of the aisle. Research from The Immigration Lab analyzing congressional and gubernatorial elections in 2018, 2020, and 2022 has shown that these anti-immigrant campaign victories have decreased by about 15%. This data was pulled from online campaign material from every election result with a 10% margin between the two major candidates.

Successes of anti-immigrant campaigns in competitive elections, 2018-2022 by the authors.

In 2018, businessman and former state senator Brian Kemp ran for governor in Georgia. His campaign epitomized the culture wars that the GOP included as part of their messaging strategy. Kemp styled himself as a “politically incorrect conservative” and filmed himself touting chainsaws and shotguns in service of this persona. He ended one of his ads by showcasing him in his truck, threatening to “round up criminal illegals myself.” On November 8, 2018, Kemp defeated his opponent in the closest Georgia gubernatorial race since 1966.

In 2022, Kemp ran for re-election against the same opponent. With essentially the same election conditions, Kemp’s strategy radically changed. His new primary TV ad, titled “Stronger Georgia,” listed a myriad of his accomplishments as governor. Many of his themes continued from his 2018 ads, including his support of decreased government regulation. Nonetheless, a notable point missing from his 2022 ad, however, was immigration. Kemp made no mention of the issue, making only a brief note of him “fighting human trafficking.” In softening his tone on migration, Kemp nearly tripled his margin of victory in 2022 in comparison to 2018.

Even while encounters at the border today are as low as during the pandemic when Title 42 was in effect closing the border to asylum-seekers, many think that long lines of people asking for asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border is a political liability for the Biden-Harris administration. However, when Americans in these competitive elections have shown up to the polls in the last six years, running an anti-immigrant campaign has demonstrated itself to be well short of the secure victory strategy that many seem to think it is.

Joseph Fournier is a Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and a senior at American University.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American Studies.

Uncertainty: Migrant Self-classification of Immigration Statuses

By Mackenzie Hoekstra

October 3, 2024

Starting in 2022, the Immigration Lab at American University began interviewing recent migrant and refugee arrivals to the DMV. So far, we have interviewed 181 from a variety of origins. The interviews aim to understand the experiences of refugees and migrants before, during, and after their entrance into the United States. Interviewers asked participants to reflect on their immigration journey and classify their immigration status. Self-perception, specifically individual understanding of immigration status, varied depending on the respondents’ country of origin, with particular uncertainty for migrants coming from South and Central America. Out of the fifty-nine respondents who were asked to classify their immigration status, eight were uncertain, seven of these were from El Salvador and one from Venezuela.

This broad range of understanding can be partly attributed to the higher clarity in legal definitions for refugee status and recipients of asylum or humanitarian parole versus migrants who have come without papers or who are in the middle of requesting asylum or other humanitarian relief. Refugees and asylum seekers qualify for legal residence based on proving a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR). Refugees are vetted, approved, and brought to the U.S. through international refugee organizations and the U.S. government. They receive specific resettlement services and benefits through sponsoring resettlement agencies in the U.S. under the program known as Reception and Placement. These services are usually limited to the first 90 days after arrival and include necessities such as securing and setting up housing and rent assistance. Other services are provided by case managers, such as cash assistance, cultural orientations, school enrollment, benefit application assistance, employment support, and aid in navigating medical and legal services in their new communities. The goal of these services is for refugees to be economically self-sufficient as soon as possible. The number of refugees allowed in the U.S. is capped each year by the president and Congress. The current admissions cap for FY 2024 is 125,000 and 100,000 were resettled.

Asylum seekers must also prove they meet the conditions set by UNHCR but apply for asylum upon their arrival to the United States. They can apply affirmatively either at the point of entry or within a year of arriving in the U.S., or defensively once they receive notice of removal proceedings. Once granted asylum, they are known as asylees and gain access to government benefits and services similar to refugees like cash assistance and medical assistance, but do not have the same level of support as refugees do through case management. The are no numerical caps on how many asylum seekers can be granted that status but rather are decided on an individual case through immigration courts. This process can be lengthy and has a very significant backlog. According to TRAC, 1,101,819 asylum applicants currently have a pending case with U.S. immigration courts. This number translates into an average wait time of 1,424 days, a wait of almost four years for their case to be heard and decided.

For individuals who do not qualify for legal permanent residency as refugees or asylees, the definitions and processes become more complicated. Unlike for refugees and asylum seekers, there is no legal definition of a ‘migrant.’ A variety of programs/statuses exist for migrants including, but not limited to Humanitarian Parole (HP), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), work permits/visas, student visas, and green card applications, all of which have strict eligibility requirements and timelines.

Social services and benefits available to asylum seekers and migrants are limited. According to the National Immigration Forum, federal benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicare are not available for these immigrants. These benefits are only available to immigrants who have been granted asylum or become lawful permanent residents (LPR) and lived in the U.S. for a minimum of 5 years. Some states offer limited cash, food, and healthcare assistance, however, most of the services available are provided by local nonprofits which face similar barriers to resources and visibility. Accordingly, research shows that immigrants use less government services than the U.S.-born.

In addition to limited social benefits, legal status designations are complex to navigate, often requiring legal guidance and representation to get one’s status adjusted and obtain permanent residency. The interviews conducted by the Immigration Lab highlight this confusion and uncertainty and the need for better and more accessible resources and legal guidance for migrants.

Among respondents who did not classify themselves with a concrete immigration status in the interviews, two main groups emerged, those with some form of legal guidance and those without. Respondents without any form of legal guidance were quick to classify themselves originally as undocumented or express complete uncertainty as to their status. When prompted further during the interviews, many respondents clarified that they were uncertain about their status, not undocumented.

In other cases, individuals thought they may be out of status but in reality, they were pending a decision by migrant courts. In one instance, a respondent from a woman from Colombia stated, “Let’s say right now I don’t have status. I don’t have documentation. I am undocumented.” However, further discussion revealed that she had been processed and released by U.S. immigration and had been allowed to stay in the U.S. on legal grounds, which she did not fully understand. This response highlights how a self-classification as “undocumented” is used as a way to express initial uncertainty. While this response pattern emerged in a few cases, one example of complete uncertainty came from a Honduran male respondent. When we asked about his immigration status, he responded “What can you call it?” The interviewer then went on to explain different avenues of immigration: asylum, visa, and entry without inspection. In response, the man once again affirmed that “I don’t know…” The man explained that he was interested in getting a work permit but had no avenues through whichto obtain one. This shows that they do not know how the U.S. immigration system works, much less how to navigate it.

For those who expressed having legal guidance or representation, a theme of classifying as “in-process” was common. These respondents understood that there was a process that they were going through to get documentation but could not specifically articulate what that process was. For example, when asked to identify her immigration status, one El Salvadorian female explained that she and her family had found a lawyer to represent them. But never articulated what legal avenue was lawyer pursuing. Similarly, an El Salvadorian male expressed confusion over his next court date, not knowing when or what the court appearance was for.

In a working paper written by the American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies on Newcomer Central American Immigrants’ Access to Legal Services, researchers found that less than half of Central American immigrants have access to legal services because low-income and pro bono services are hard to find. Additionally, this affordable representation often only takes on limited cases, specifically focusing on the cases that are more likely to be won in court. This has resulted in more legal referrals to private firms, and despite these firms providing high-quality services, they are very expensive. Immigrants may be tempted to work with notary generals confusing them with notarios, who in Latin America are highly influential lawyers. This creates a higher degree of fraud risk. Therefore, these Central American immigrants either avoid, don’t have access to, or cannot afford legal services. This means that they must rely on their knowledge or the knowledge of family and friends. In the context of the complex and process-oriented immigration legal system, this information is often not enough and may lead to them losing their immigration case to remain in the U.S.

The analysis of these interviews uncovered the important reality that migrants are often uncertain about their immigration status in the U.S., even when they have access to legal representation or guidance. Volunteers, legal offices that do pro-bono immigration work, and non-profits that have this as their mission are overburdened by caseloads and don’t receive enough funding and donations to expand. People come to the United States for a variety of reasons and often must take timely action to secure their legal statuses. It is crucial that theyhave access to resources that can help guide and support them through the various processes available to them, both legal and non-legal. It is not enough to ensure basic access to these resources; efforts must be made to make information about immigration statuses accessible and understandable for migrants.

Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior majoring in Sociology at American University and a member of the Immigration Lab.

Edited by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, CLALS, and Immigration Lab Director.

Anti-Immigration Rhetoric is an Electoral Vulnerability: Evidence from the 2022 Midterm Elections

By Ernesto Castañeda, Joseph Fournier, and Mary Capone

October 1, 2024

Graph elaborated by the authors with data collected from CNN Politics’ Midterm Election Results.

The above graph represents the proportional success of candidates who used anti-immigration sentiment in their campaigns for the 2022 midterm elections. Results data was taken from CNN Politics. Anti-immigration rhetoric was found in campaign material through Meta Ad Library, X (formerly Twitter), debate responses, campaign website archives, YouTube ad searches, and general Google searches. We focused on competitive elections defined as having electoral results within a 10% margin between candidates. Candidates in these competitive elections who used ani-immigrant sentiment were no more likely to win the election than those who did not; in fact, more candidates who campaigned on anti-immigration lost than won in 2022. This data provides evidence that not being anti-immigration is not a hindering campaign decision. It may be quite the opposite.

Immigration often emerges as a prominent talking point among candidates in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections. Former President Donald Trump frequently employs anti-immigration rhetoric and continues to campaign under similar sentiments about the allegedly dangerous porosity of the southern U.S. border. In the presidential debate in June of 2024 against President Joe Biden, Trump mentioned immigration in 42% of the 38 times he spoke while Biden mentioned immigration 13% of the time.  In the subsequent debate against Vice President Kamala Harris, out of 38 times when Trump spoke for more than two sentences, he incorporated immigration 10 times (26% of the time). In comparison, Harris did so 4 out of 27 times (15% of the time).

Anti-immigration rhetoric has become practically synonymous with the Republican Party as these candidates often use immigrants as scapegoats for shortcomings in national security, economics, and crime control. While several Democratic candidates support anti-immigration policies as well, it is less commonly a key aspect of their campaigns. The graphic below indicates the overall tone of immigration speeches in Congress and the president by party from the late nineteenth century until 2020. While the data excludes 2022, it encapsulates the general trends of immigration sentiments over time.

Source: Card et al., 2022 published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The top of the graph shows that trends in the rhetoric of Republican and Democratic congressional representatives were negative before the 1950s and became positive in both parties in the late 1950s and through the 1960s and 1970s. The divergence in sentiments is clearest in the early 1980s and beyond, with the greatest points of divergence occurring between 2000 and 2020. Card et al. acknowledge that the divergence also represents other trends in the polarization of other issues. However, they find that immigration polarization predated the rise in generic political polarization observed in Gentzkow et al. by more than a decade.

The lower part of the graph shows the variation in presidential sentiments through positive and negative language employed to discuss immigration. The anti-immigrant rhetoric of President Trump has been unseen since the presidency of Herbert Hoover. Overall, the graph represents the rise in anti-immigration rhetoric in congressional and presidential speeches by Republicans in recent years as it has become more of a political talking point.

Discourse gathered from the campaign sites and social media accounts of Republican candidates who ran in competitive elections in 2022 with anti-immigration campaigns includes several instances of strongly prejudiced statements. Republican Mark Robertson (Nevada District 1) sought to “turn off the illegal flow of people coming into our country… end chain-migration, visa lotteries and vacation-birth citizenship.” Ending “vacation-birth citizenship” implies a possible erasure of birthright citizenship. Anti-immigrant candidates describe policies like these in misleading ways to garner political support, despite understanding the implausibility of such a policy.

Many of these anti-immigrant candidates take further aim at immigrant children. Republican candidate for the Senate in Pennsylvania Mehmet Oz stated in an ad that, “The Biden administration’s failure on the border is so massive that they are flying illegal immigrants up to airports like this where illegal immigrants are being taken on buses. Now every state has become a border state.” The ad is filmed outside of Scranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport in Pennsylvania, an airport that has been instrumental in the facilitation of protecting unaccompanied migrant children. This airport and the role it plays in the migrant children protection apparatus made it a popular target for Pennsylvania Republicans in 2022. Jim Bognet (R), who ran for Congress in the district that includes the airport itself, ran an ad claiming “Joe Biden & Matt Cartwright still won’t STOP ghost flights of illegal immigrants into (Northeast Pennsylvania).” The reason for this secrecy is that these are minors whose identities are obscured to ensure their security. Many of these children come from vulnerable backgrounds, including a sixteen-year-old victim of sex trafficking seeking protection while awaiting possible testimony and an asylum claim. These children have become the target of a political stunt by the GOP in their attempt to create fear surrounding migration.

Numerous other candidates posit a link between undocumented immigration and drug cartels. Republican Congressman Bryan Steil, who won in Wisconsin District 1, claimed on his campaign website that “drug dealers (and) human traffickers” are crossing the border, framing it in such a way that implies the two are intertwined in their business dealings. Republican Congressman John James, who won reelection in 2022 for Michigan District 10, conducts a similar framing in a tweet highlighting “millions of illegal border crossings, millions of lethal doses of Chinese fentanyl.”

A more brazen example of such framing can be found in campaign material from Blake Masters’ failed bid for Arizona Senate, which shamelessly claims that “More than 225,000 illegal aliens pour into our country every month. And they bring enough fentanyl over each month to kill every American twice over.” In a recent conference on immigration at American University, Dr. Andrew Selee, head of the Migration Policy Institute, notes that these organizations are separate entities. Though they sometimes do collaborate, they are by no means the same and have independent organizational structures. This is a subtle yet important distinction that has been masked to criminalize migrants and conflate them with criminal enterprises such as drug cartels.

The criminalization of migrants was certainly not limited to linking them to cartels. Many candidates rely upon preconceived racist notions of immigrant populations (mostly Latinos) in making generalizations. Such candidates keep their statements on immigration vague, like Nevada Republican Senate hopeful Adam Laxalt: “[the] crisis at the border that has put communities across Nevada in danger…. [Laxalt] fought against dangerous sanctuary city policies and worked to help stop their spread.” The advantages yielded by anti-immigrant candidates in utilizing this sort of vagueness are twofold. The first is that it appeals to a voter base that has already constructed a negative bias toward immigrant populations, and it is this sort of rhetoric that energizes these voters. The second advantage of such vagueness is the removal of the burden of proof from Laxalt or other candidates. Because of this vagueness, the claim becomes difficult to disprove because the meaning can be fluid and easily manipulated at the whim of the candidate.

Similarly, a campaign ad from Republican gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake of Arizona claims to finish the southern border wall and reinstate the “Remain in Mexico” policy: “the best policy I’ve seen in my 27 years, it worked.” The “Remain in Mexico” policy, a Trump-era directive modified by President Biden, has been largely condemned by human rights groups. Multiple immigration advocates highlighted that the policy forced all migrants to wait on the Mexican side of the border, including those who are escaping persecution in Mexico, in unsafe and uncertified conditions while their asylum case were pending.

Overall, anti-immigration statements like those highlighted in the 2022 midterm election campaigns are prevalent across Republican candidates. Trends indicate a rise in such rhetoric in congressional and presidential speeches with a partisan divergence as Republican candidates are more likely to employ this as a strategy in campaigning. Nonetheless, there was limited success for anti-immigrant campaigns in the 2022 midterm elections. The data shows that anti-immigration rhetoric is not a guarantee for winning elections; in fact, it may be an electoral vulnerability as it does not lead to more success in competitive elections.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

Joseph Fournier and Mary Capone are research assistants at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.

Sources

“2022 Midterms.” CNN Politics, Accessed September 17, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/election/2022.

Adam Laxalt for NV. “Issues | Adam Laxalt for Senate.” Accessed February 6, 2024. https://www.adamlaxalt.com/issues.

Card, D., Chang, S., Becker, C., Mendelsohn, J., Voigt, R., Boustan, L., Abramitzky, R., & Jurafsky, D. (2022). Computational analysis of 140 years of us political speeches reveals more positive but increasingly polarized framing of immigration. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences119(31). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2120510119 

Castaneda, Ernesto. “First Presidential Debate Was Mainly about Immigration, Few Noticed”. AULA Blog Accessed September 25, 2024 https://aulablog.net/2024/07/19/first-presidential-debate-was-mainly-about-immigration-few-noted/.

“Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy.” Justice for Immigrants. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://justiceforimmigrants.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Remain-in-Mexico_en.pdf.

Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Taddy, M. (2019). Measuring group differences in high dimensional choices: Method and application to congressional speech. Econometrica, 87(4), 1307–1340. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16566

James, John. (JohnJamesMI). “Our border is plagued with chaos – millions of illegal border crossings, millions of lethal doses of Chinese fentanyl & incompetence from the White House. I’m glad to support the House GOP’s Commitment to America to fund border security & put an end to human & drug trafficking.” September 26, 2022. 3:10 PM. Tweet. https://x.com/JohnJamesMI/status/1574476402392457217.

Jordan, Miriam. “’Ghost Flights’? The Facts Behind Transporting Migrant Children”. New York Times. June 24, 2022. Accessed February 4, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/us/ghost-flights-migrant-children.html?login=google&auth=login-google#.

“Kari Lake January 2022 Ad.” Accessed February 6, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&id=313372640712991&media_type=all.

“Remain in Mexico” Human Rights Watch. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/tag/remain-mexico

Robertson, Mark. “Mark’s Stances – Robertson for Congress.”Accessed February 11, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20221104220014/https://robertsonforcongress.com/stances/

Selee, Andrew. “Wilson Center Discussion on Immigration Policy”. September 23, 2024. C-SPAN, 58:43. https://www.c-span.org/video/?538598-1/wilson-center-discussion-immigration-policy.

Steil, Bryan. “The Issues: Bryan’s Vision for America – Securing Our Border”. Accessed September 26, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20221104220838/https://www.bryansteil.com/issues/.

“STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION – Dr. Oz for Senate.” Accessed February 11, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20221028022107/https://doctoroz.com/issue/stop-illegal-immigration/.

Voter Concerns: The Economy or The Government’s Role in Shaping It?

By Ernesto Castañeda

September 27, 2024

On the morning of September 9, 2024, a Republican voter called into C-SPAN’s Washington Journal and said, “Democrats used to be all about the workers, but now it’s just socialism.” This short piece is respectfully directed to those who may share that sentiment. First, it’s important to note that, in principle, socialism is centered around workers, but it asks that workers own the companies they work at. Democrats are not socialists. Even the party’s most progressive figures, like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), identify as Democratic Socialists and advocate for the U.S. to adopt some of the social safety nets seen in Northern European countries and fight monopolies and for workers’ rights to create a tempered capitalism. Now, let’s turn to the real concerns about the economy as we approach the upcoming elections.

The economy is doing well

The U.S. economy is objectively performing very well, largely due to the Biden-Harris administration’s adoption and successful implementation of policies championed by figures like Sanders, Warren, and AOC. Compared to other countries, the U.S. has recovered more quickly from the pandemic’s effects, which were driven by lockdowns, labor shortages, and disruptions to global supply chains—all of which contributed to inflation. These policies, alongside immigration, have supported healthy economic growth. Notably, inflation and interest rates are decreasing without the economy slipping into a recession—an almost ideal outcome often referred to as a “soft landing.”

Nonetheless, some citizens and commentators still insist that the economy is weak, and voters often mention “the economy” as their main concern.

A shift in expectations on the economy

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was already common for millions of Americans to live paycheck to paycheck and carry significant debt. The pandemic, however, reshaped Americans economic expectations in at least three important ways: 1) The imminent threat to life placed greater value on human life and people’s time; 2) It exposed our heavy dependence on foreign producers, global supply chains, and essential local workers; and 3) It led to a bipartisan recognition that the government can and should take action to address hunger, unemployment, public wellbeing, inequality and support the working and middle class, as well as small and large business and postpone evictions in times of collective suffering.

Let me elaborate on point three. The economic policies and incentives—such as support for businesses both large and small, direct checks to families, and the child tax credit—implemented in a bipartisan effort during the pandemic by both the Trump-Pence and Biden-Harris administrations significantly raised economic standards and cut child poverty in half. These policies also reflected what C. Wright Mills advocated in the 1960s: when unemployment is widespread, it should be viewed as a social issue rather than a matter of personal responsibility, worth, or morality. In contrast to the neoliberal focus on market fundamentalism, these pandemic-era measures revived Keynesian principles, emphasizing a return to full employment and expanding support for policies reminiscent of FDR’s New Deal—where the government plays a role in reducing inequality and supporting the working and middle class.

The real cause of frustration

One of Joe Biden’s boldest and most significant accomplishments may have been his repeated assertion that “trickle-down economics has never worked. It’s time to grow the economy from the bottom up and the middle out.” This is a change in the long-held belief in individualistic ideologies, such as the notion of “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.” Stemming from this ideological shift, I believe much of the unease felt by the working and lower-middle class about “the economy” stems from frustration over the end of many pandemic-era cash transfers and stimulus checks, which were initiated by both the Trump and Biden administrations. These transfers and the forced savings due to the lockdowns allowed some families to pay credit card debt and even increase their savings, which for many are now depleted again.

Ironically, it was the Republican Party that blocked the extension of the child tax credit, a key measure backed by Democrats to support working families. Yet, many voters remain unaware of this. Meanwhile, tax-evading billionaires, including figures like Trump, exacerbate the economic challenges rather than providing solutions. A modest increase in taxes on billionaires would help fund essential programs like the child tax credit, and contrary to popular rhetoric, this is not socialism—it’s a practical approach to ensuring fair contributions from the wealthiest.

Outdated and Misguided Economic Narratives

Trump has attempted to link his scapegoating of immigrants to the current economic challenges, falsely claiming that immigrants are taking jobs from those most in need, particularly African Americans, Hispanics, and union workers. However, this argument does not hold up—unemployment rates are low, and wages are rising. As a result, most people are unlikely to be swayed by this rhetoric. Those who do buy into it likely already held anti-immigration views prior to the pandemic and/or are victims of structural changes stemming from Reaganomics.

By invoking fears that the U.S. could become “like Venezuela,” Trump taps into concerns among immigrants who lived Venezuela’s prosperity before Chavismo or those fleeing other authoritarian regimes. However, Republicans risk losing these voters by frequently portraying Venezuelan immigrants as criminals—members of the Tren de Aragua gang—or as individuals released from prisons and mental institutions by Maduro and sent to the U.S. This narrative echoes real historical events such as Cuba’s Marielitos or British prisoners sent to Australia as settlers, as well as xenophobic stereotypes and prejudices once directed at Irish, Italian, and Mexican immigrants. History, however, shows that the children of immigrants often experience rapid social mobility and thus contribute as much, if not more, to society than the children of native-born citizens.

Some attempt to alarm undecided voters by claiming that Harris is advocating for price controls. In reality, she is focused on preventing monopolies and negotiating better prices when the government buys in bulk, as demonstrated successfully with insulin. This pragmatic approach has broad support across Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. Harris and Walz are not pushing radical leftist ideas; rather, they are promoting a moderate populism that is not linked to exclusionary Christian nationalism.

“Opportunity economy”

In her speech at the Economic Club of Pittsburgh on September 25, 2024, Harris stated:

“The American economy is the most powerful force for innovation and wealth creation in human history. We just need to move past the failed policies that have proven not to work. And like generations before us, let us be inspired by what is possible. As president, I will be guided by my core values of fairness, dignity, and opportunity. I promise you I will take a pragmatic approach. I will engage in what Franklin Roosevelt called bold, persistent experimentation, because I believe we shouldn’t be constrained by ideology but instead pursue practical solutions to problems.”

With this statement, she invoked FDR’s legacy while offering a centrist, pragmatic vision for addressing the economic challenges facing Americans.

While some commentators argue that Harris and Walz haven’t provided enough details on their economic policy, they are actually offering a balanced approach that appeals to both corporations and small businesses. Their plan promotes U.S. manufacturing and nearshoring, aims to reduce the climate impact of production and consumption, and provides much-needed support to the low and middle class in regions hit hardest by deindustrialization. Trump talks much about caring about the working class but did little to benefit them structurally and long-term while in the White House. Policies like exempting tips and overtime from taxation fit within Harris’ framework, but Harris also advocates for more ambitious measures to really level the economic playing field a bit more. Harris calls this vision the ‘opportunity economy,’ a pragmatic approach to economic and industrial policy that many former Bernie and Trump supporters could, in principle, support.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

Edited by Robert Albro, CLALS Associate Director of Research, and Edgar Aguilar, International Economics master’s student at American University.

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No More Room in the Great White North?

Pablo Landsmanas*

September 25, 2024

Photo credit to Shutterstock

For those looking to immigrate to North America, Canada has long been seen as the easier, friendlier path to naturalization. But that perception may have changed this week as the Canadian government rolled out a series of restrictive anti-immigration policies.

Recent policies reduce and limit the arrival of temporary foreign workers into Canada. These measures include tightening the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), which is similar to the US H-1B visa, allowing companies to hire non-Canadians for limited periods. A cap has also been placed on student visas, and the option to receive a Post-Graduation Work Permit (similar to the F-1 OPT in the US) has been revoked for those enrolled in a program using a curriculum licensing arrangement, which allow private institutions to use public colleges curricula but without the same quality controls. Concerns arose that some private institutions used these arrangements to attract international students without providing a quality education, later pushing them into the Canadian workforce.

Immigration has been a cornerstone of Canada’s economic growth. Foreign nationals contribute significantly to the labor market, especially in understaffed sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and construction. In 2022, nearly 120,000 workers held a TFWP, filling essential roles that the domestic workforce could not. International students, who numbered over 800,000 in 2022, contribute billions of dollars to the education sector and the broader economy through tuition, living expenses, and occasional work.  

Canada has an aging population, and with declining birth rates and an increasing number of retirees, immigration has been crucial in addressing these challenges. The need for a young, skilled workforce is more critical than ever. Additionally, international students pay millions in tuition and taxes that fund programs that they may not legally access, such as Canada’s renowned free healthcare, which is exclusive to citizens and residents in provinces like Ontario.

Working off-campus as an international student in Canada has minimal requirements, making the country an appealing destination for foreign students. If there are opportunities to partially support themselves while studying, working also exposes foreign students to significant risks of exploitation. Many are underpaid and overworked, yet hesitate to voice their concerns due to fears of deportation or the bureaucratic hurdles involved in holding employers accountable. For students from economically disadvantaged countries like India or Bangladesh, the need to continue working, even under unfair conditions, is often a matter of survival, as they cannot afford to lose their income despite rights violations. The tuition at many schools can be four times more expensive for foreign students than for Canadians, making these schools partly reliant on them. This was evidenced in 2018, when a diplomatic conflict with Saudi Arabia led to the sudden departure of 6,000 students and the loss of $140 million in revenue.

Despite the economic benefits foreign nationals bring, among Canadians there is growing concern about the rapid increase in immigration and its social impacts. Policymakers are focusing more on societal rather than economic concerns. One of the most pressing issues is the housing crisis. Rent prices have soared, and buying a home is nearly impossible. Many blame foreign nationals for this situation. The reality is that temporary workers and international students increase housing demand, and without a corresponding increase in supply, this leads to higher rent prices. The Canadian government issued a new housing plan in April 2024, but it is yet to be realized. Meanwhile, major cities are under strain, with public services like transportation and healthcare struggling to keep up with population growth.

A balanced approach is needed—one that addresses the immediate challenges posed by high immigration, leverages the economic benefits foreign nationals provide, and sees the humanity in every newcomer. These newcomers have worked hard and invested significant resources to live, study, and work in Canada. The emotional and financial toll on these would-be immigrants is significant, as many have left behind families, jobs, and a sense of security in their home countries, betting on the promise of a better life in Canada. Yet, they face uncertainty navigating a system that seems to be shutting them out more than ever before.

Pablo Landsmanas is an international affairs student at American University’s School of International Service. He currently serves as executive aide at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies and is a political affairs intern at the Embassy of Mexico in the United States.

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Un Motor Invisible: Cómo los Inmigrantes Propulsan la Economía Estadounidense, el Caso de los Salvadoreños

Ernesto Castañeda, Edgar Aguilar and Oscar Alberto Ibarra*

20 de Septiembre de 2024

Edificio nuevo en Rosslyn, Arlington, Virginia construido en gran medida por mano de obra Centro Americana. Foto tomada por Ernesto Castañeda.

Más allá de contribuir a la economía en su país de origen, los migrantes salvadoreños impulsan la economía estadounidense.

El Salvador es uno de los países más pequeños de América Latina, con una población de 6.3 millones de habitantes y en pocos años la población empezará a decrecer. En Estados Unidos viven más de 1.3 millones de personas nacidas en El Salvador y más de 1.2 millones de personas nacidas en EE. UU. de al menos un padre salvadoreño. Las más de 2.5 millones de personas de origen salvadoreño viviendo en EE. UU. equivalen al 40% de la población qué habita en El Salvador. De acuerdo con nuestros cálculos hay alrededor de 1.8 millones de salvadoreños qué trabajan en Estados Unidos que envían remesas. Estas personas son parte importante de ambas economías.

Solo en 2023, El Salvador recibió $8,181 millones de dólares en remesas. Esa cantidad representó el 24% del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) del país. 

Algunos piensan que las remesas son una fuga de efectivo para la economía estadounidense. Sin embargo, un cálculo novedoso realizado por el Centro de Estudios de Latinoamérica y Latinos (CLALS) y el Laboratorio de Inmigración de la Universidad American en Washington, DC ha demostrado que las remesas son un indicador importante de las contribuciones que los migrantes hacen a la economía estadounidense. Siguiendo el mismo cálculo encontramos que los migrantes salvadoreños en Estados Unidos que enviaron remesas, solo en 2023 contribuyeron con $223,468 millones de dólares a la economía estadounidense. Los migrantes salvadoreños contribuyen significativamente en sectores como la construcción, restaurantes, jardinería, agricultura, servicios domésticos, y mecánica automotriz, salud, ciencia y educación, entre otros.

En este documento presentamos otro ejercicio novedoso para calcular el aporte económico de todos los inmigrantes salvadoreños en Estados Unidos, no solo los que mandan remesas. Para este análisis, también se partió del total de remesas enviadas a El Salvador en 2023, que fue de 8,181.8 millones de dólares, y en base en el promedio mensual de 330.3 dólares por remesa y la frecuencia estimada de 14 remesas anuales, una por mes más una adicional durante el día de la madre y navidad, se calculó el número de migrantes que remiten en aproximadamente 1,769,344 migrantes que envían dinero. 

 De acuerdo con un estudio del USAID, OIM y el Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador alrededor del 79.7% de migrantes salvadoreños envía remesas, así que en total podemos estimar que hay más de 2.2 millones de salvadoreños que trabajan en EE. UU. Este estimado es mayor al de la oficina del censo americano, esto no es sorprendente ya que muchos migrantes no participan en el censo. Multiplicando la cantidad de migrantes (tanto los qué envían remesas como los qué no) por el salario promedio anual de $26,523 dólares, estimado por la oficina del censo, se calculó el ingreso agregado de estos migrantes como cerca de $59 mil millones de dólares. Finalmente, al considerar que los salarios recibidos por los migrantes después de impuestos y deducciones representan el 21% de su productividad, se estimó su contribución al PIB de Estados Unidos, de más $280 mil millones. Lo que revela el profundo impacto de los migrantes salvadoreños en la economía estadounidense. En la gráfica anterior se presentó únicamente el impacto de los migrantes que envían remesas. En la siguiente gráfica, se muestra la contribución económica de todos los migrantes salvadoreños en Estados Unidos que perciben un ingreso.

La contribución de los migrantes salvadoreños que remiten a la economía de Estados Unidos es superior a las contribuciones de estados enteros. Si todos los migrantes salvadoreños que mandan remesas fueran un estado, este tendría un PIB cinco veces más grande que el de Vermont y más de dos veces más alto que el de Delaware.

Conclusión

Los 1.8 millones de migrantes salvadoreños en Estados Unidos que enviaron remesas, solo en 2023 contribuyeron con $223,468 millones de dólares a la economía estadounidense. Los 2.2 millones de salvadoreños que trabajan en EE. UU. generaron más de $280 mil millones dólares, dado que el PIB de El Salvador es de US$34,015.62 millones. Este estimado muestra que los migrantes salvadoreños, mediante su mano de obra, generan 8 veces más valor económico en su país de residencia (EE. UU.) que todos los habitantes en su país de origen. Tambien encontramos que los migrantes salvadoreños y sus hijos generaron alreadedor del 1% del GDP de Estados Unidos en 2023.

Más allá del envío de remesas, los migrantes salvadoreños también desempeñan un papel crucial en el crecimiento económico de Estados Unidos a través de su participación en diversos sectores productivos. Además de su impacto en la producción, los migrantes salvadoreños contribuyen a la economía mediante el pago de impuestos y, sobre todo, al suplir la demanda laboral en áreas clave que el país requiere. En general, estudios demuestran que los inmigrantes no solo apoyan las economías de sus países de origen, sino que también son un motor en las economías de sus países de residencia. 

Fuentes

Pew Research Center – U.S. Hispanics: Facts on Salvadoran Origin Latinos. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-sheet/us-hispanics-facts-on-salvadoran-origin-latinos/

Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador – Las remesas familiares superaron los US$8,000 millones en 2023. https://www.bcr.gob.sv/2024/01/26/las-remesas-familiares-superaron-los-us8000-millones-en-2023/#:~:text=Las%20remesas%20familiares%20superaron%20los%20US%248%2C000%20millones%20en,respecto%20a%202022%2C%20equivalente%20a%20US%24362.2%20millones%20adicionales

World Bank – Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) – El Salvador. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SV

Encuesta sobre salvadoreños en EE.UU. – Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). https://infounitnca.iom.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/encuestasalvadorenosenEEUU.pdf

SSRN – Economic Contribution of Salvadoran Immigrants (2023). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4740925

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) – National GDP and Personal Income. https://www.bea.gov/itable/national-gdp-and-personal-income

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director del Laboratorio de Inmigración y el Centro de Estudios Latino Americanos y Latinos (CLALS), Profesor,American University en Washington DC.

Edgar Aguilar Estudiante de Maestría en Economía Internacional de American University y asistente de investigación en el Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos (CLALS) y consultor para el Banco Mundial. Se especializa en migración, seguridad humana, energía sostenible, finanzas y política ambiental.

Oscar Alberto Ibarra Coordinador del Observatorio de Migración y Transparencia del Centro de Investigación para la Democracia (CIDEMO) de la Universidad de Oriente (UNIVO), en el marco del Proyecto de Sociedad Civil y Democracia en la Región Oriental. 

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An Invisible Engine: How Immigrants Drive the American Economy, the Case of Salvadorans

Ernesto Castañeda, Edgar Aguilar and Oscar Alberto Ibarra*

September 20, 2024

Photo of a new building built largely by Central American labor in Rosslyn, Arlington, Virginia by Ernesto Castañeda

In addition to contributing to the economy in their home country, Salvadoran migrants also boost the U.S. economy.

El Salvador is one of the smallest countries in Latin America, with a population of 6.3 million inhabitants, which is expected to decrease in the next few years. More than 1.3 million people born in El Salvador live in the United States, along with more than 1.2 million born to at least one Salvadoran parent. The more than 2.5 million people of Salvadoran origin living in the U.S. are equivalent to 40 percent of El Salvador’s total population. According to our calculations, there are around 1.8 million Salvadorans who work in the United States and send remittances. These people are an important part of both economies.

In 2023 alone, El Salvador received $8.18 billion dollars in remittances, which represented 24 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

Some believe that remittances are a cash drain on the U.S. economy. However, a novel calculation by the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and Immigration Laboratory at American University in Washington, DC, demonstrates that remittances are an important indicator of the contributions that migrants make to the US economy. Based on this calculation, we find that just in 2023, Salvadoran migrants in the United States who sent remittances contributed $223.47 billion dollars to the US economy, including significant contributions to such industries as construction, restaurants, gardening, agriculture, and domestic services, as well as automotive mechanics, health, science, and education, among others.

Here, we also offer an additional novel means of calculating the economic contribution of all Salvadoran immigrants in the United States, not just those who send remittances. For this analysis, we started again with the total remittances sent to El Salvador in 2023, which was $8.18 billion. Using a monthly average of $330.30 dollars per remittance and an estimated frequency of 14 annual remittances, one per month plus additional ones for both Mother’s Day and Christmas, we calculated the number of migrants who send money to be approximately 1,769,344.

According to a study by USAID, IOM, and the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, around 79.7 percent of Salvadoran migrants send remittances. Therefore, we can estimate that there are more than 2.2 million Salvadorans working in the United States. This estimate is higher than that of the American Census Bureau, which is not surprising since many migrants do not participate in the census. Multiplying the number of migrants (both those who send remittances and those who do not) by the average annual salary of $26,523.00 estimated by the Census Bureau, the aggregate income of these migrants was calculated to be about $59 billion. Finally, considering that the salaries received by migrants after taxes and deductions represent 21 percent of their productivity, we estimated their contribution to the GDP of the United States to be more than $280 billion. This reveals the profound impact Salvadoran migrants have on the U.S. economy. In the previous graph, only the impact of migrants who send remittances was presented. The following graph shows the economic contribution of all Salvadoran migrants in the United States who earn an income.

The contribution of Salvadoran migrants to the United States economy is greater than that of entire states. If all the Salvadoran migrants who send remittances were a state, it would have a GDP five times larger than that of Vermont and more than twice as big as that of Delaware.

Conclusion

The 1.8 million Salvadoran migrants in the United States who sent remittances in 2023 contributed $223.47 billion to the US economy. The 2.2 million Salvadorans working in the US generated more than $280 billion dollars. Given that El Salvador’s GDP is US $34.02 billion, our estimate demonstrates that Salvadoran migrants, through their economic activity, generate eight times more economic value in their country of residence (that is, the U.S.) than does the entire population in their country of origin. This also means that Salvadorean immigrants and their adult children contributed around 1% of the United States GDP in 2023.

Beyond sending remittances, Salvadoran migrants also play a crucial role in the economic growth of the United States through their participation in various productive sectors. In addition to their impact on production, Salvadoran migrants contribute to the economy by paying taxes and, above all, by meeting labor demand in key areas of need for the US. In general, studies show that immigrants not only support the economies of their countries of origin, but also function as economic engines for their countries of residence.

Sources

Pew Research Center – U.S. Hispanics: Facts on Salvadoran Origin Latinos. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-sheet/us-hispanics-facts-on-salvadoran-origin-latinos/

Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador – Las remesas familiares superaron los US$8,000 millones en 2023. https://www.bcr.gob.sv/2024/01/26/las-remesas-familiares-superaron-los-us8000-millones-en-2023/#:~:text=Las%20remesas%20familiares%20superaron%20los%20US%248%2C000%20millones%20en,respecto%20a%202022%2C%20equivalente%20a%20US%24362.2%20millones%20adicionales

World Bank – Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) – El Salvador. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SV

Encuesta sobre salvadoreños en EE.UU. – Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). https://infounitnca.iom.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/encuestasalvadorenosenEEUU.pdf

SSRN – Economic Contribution of Salvadoran Immigrants (2023). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4740925

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) – National GDP and Personal Income. https://www.bea.gov/itable/national-gdp-and-personal-income

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of The Immigration Lab and Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS), Professor, American University in Washington DC.

Edgar Aguilar is an International Economics Master’s student at American University, a research assistant at the Center for Latin America and Latino Studies, and a consultant for the World Bank. He specializes in migration, human security, sustainable energy, finance, and environmental policy.

Oscar Alberto Ibarra Coordinator of the Migration and Transparency Observatory of the Research Center for Democracy (CIDEMO) of the University of Oriente (UNIVO), El Salvador.

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Spanish version available at: https://aulablog.net/2024/09/18/un-motor-invisible-como-los-inmigrantes-propulsan-la-economia-estadounidense-el-caso-de-los-salvadorenos/