ORLANDO, Florida.- La política migratoria en Estados Unidos se encuentra en el foco de la atención tras las recientes órdenes ejecutivas firmadas por el presidente Donald Trump en los primeros días de su mandato. Entre las medidas, se encuentran restricciones temporales para refugiados, la limitación de solicitudes de asilo en la frontera y la polémica orden para negar certificados de nacimiento a hijos de padres sin estatus migratorio regular.
Estos movimientos han generado demandas en 18 estados, argumentando que violan el derecho de ciudadanía por nacimiento, protegido por la 14.ª Enmienda de la Constitución.
1. Migrante
Un migrante es cualquier persona que se traslada lejos de su lugar de origen, ya sea dentro de su país o al extranjero. Algunos se ven forzados a moverse por violencia o desastres naturales, mientras que otros migran por razones económicas o familiares. Este término incluye tanto a quienes cruzan fronteras de manera documentada como no documentada.
2. Inmigrante
El inmigrante es un migrante que se establece en un país diferente al de su nacimiento. En Estados Unidos, los inmigrantes pueden tener diferentes estatus legales, desde la residencia permanente (Green Card) hasta visas temporales, como las de trabajo (H-1B) o estudio (F-1). También hay visas humanitarias, como la T para víctimas de tráfico humano y la U para víctimas de crímenes graves.
3. Inmigrante indocumentado o irregular
Este término engloba a personas que ingresan o permanecen en un país sin autorización legal. Algunos llegaron con visas que vencieron, mientras que otros cruzaron sin documentos. En Estados Unidos muchos indocumentados trabajan y pagan impuestos, aunque no reciben beneficios de seguridad social.
4. Solicitante de asilo
Es alguien que pide protección al llegar a un puerto de entrada o dentro del país, alegando peligro en su nación de origen por persecución política, religiosa, étnica o de otro tipo. El proceso puede tomar años y requiere pruebas contundentes.
5. Refugiado
Un refugiado solicita protección desde el extranjero antes de ingresar a Estados Unidos, generalmente escapando de conflictos armados o persecución. Una vez en el país, pueden trabajar legalmente y, al cabo de un año, solicitar la residencia permanente.
6. Niños no acompañados
Se refiere a menores que cruzan la frontera sin un tutor legal. Según las leyes estadounidenses, pueden permanecer en el país y buscar estatus legal, generalmente bajo el cuidado de familiares ya residentes.
7. Separación familiar
Esta práctica polémica, intensificada durante el primer mandato de Trump, consiste en separar a padres migrantes de sus hijos al cruzar la frontera. Aunque la administración Biden intentó reunificar familias, cientos de niños aún están separados de sus padres.
8. Detención migratoria
Es la detención de inmigrantes en centros similares a cárceles, gestionados por el gobierno o empresas privadas, mientras esperan audiencias o deportaciones. Estas condiciones han sido criticadas por su dureza, incluyendo el uso de “hieleras” con temperaturas extremadamente bajas.
9. Coyote
Es el término utilizado para describir a los guías que, a cambio de dinero, ayudan a migrantes a cruzar fronteras de manera clandestina. Esta actividad se ha vuelto más costosa y peligrosa debido al endurecimiento de las políticas fronterizas.
10. Jugadores clave del gobierno
La política migratoria en EE. UU. involucra varias agencias: el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DHS), la Patrulla Fronteriza (CBP), Inmigración y Control de Aduanas (ICE) y el Departamento de Salud y Servicios Humanos (HHS), que asiste a menores no acompañados. Entender estos términos humaniza a las personas detrás de las estadísticas. En tiempos de políticas migratorias restrictivas, la empatía y el conocimiento son herramientas esenciales para abordar este tema con sensibilidad.
President Donald Trump aims to upend the immigration system in the United States in his first few days in office. On Jan. 20, 2025, Trump signedvarious executive ordersthat temporarily prevent refugees from coming to the U.S. and block immigrants from applying for asylum at a U.S. border, among other measures.
We arescholarsofimmigrationwho closely followpublic discussionsabout immigrationpolicy, trends and terminology. Understanding the many different immigration terms – some technical, some not – can help people better understand immigration news. While not an exhaustive list, here are 10 important terms to know:
1. Migrant
A migrant is a person who moves from their place of birth to another location relatively far away. There are different words used to describe migrants and their particular circumstances. Internally displaced people, for example, means people who are forced to move within their own country because of violence, natural disasters and other reasons.
International migrants move from one country to another, sometimes without the legal authorization to enter or stay in another country. There are also seasonal or circular migrants, who often move back and forth between different places.
Between 30% and 60% of all migrants eventually return to their birth countries.
There is not much difference in why people decide to migrate within their own country or internationally, with or without the legal permission to do so. But it is easier for people from certain countries to move than from others.
2. Immigrants
The terms immigrants and migrants are often used interchangeably. Migration indicates movement in general. Immigration is the word used to describe the process of a non-citizen settling in another country. Immigrants have a wide range of legal statuses.
An immigrant in the U.S. might have a green card or a permanent resident card – a legal authorization that gives the person the legal right to stay and work in the U.S. and to apply for citizenship after a few years.
An immigrant with a T visa is a foreigner who is allowed to stay in the U.S. for up to four years because they are victims of human or sex trafficking. Similarly, an immigrant with a U visa is the victim of serious crimes and can stay in the U.S. for up to four years, and then apply for a Green Card.
Many international students in higher education have an F-1 visa. They must return to their country of birth soon after they graduate, unless they are sponsored by a U.S. employer, enroll in another educational program, or marry a U.S. citizen. The stay can be extended for one or two years, depending on the field of study.
Photo cerdits to Brandon Bell/Getty Images
3. Undocumented Immigrants, Unauthorized Immigrants and Illegal Immigrants
These three charged political terms refer to the same situation: migrants who enter or remain in the country without the proper legal paperwork. People in this category also include those who come to the U.S. with a visa and overstay its permitted duration.
Some of these immigrants work for cash that is not taxed. Most work with fake Social Security numbers, pay taxes and contribute to Social Security funds without receiving money after retirement.
Immigrants without legal authorization to be in the U.S. spent more than US$254 billion in 2022.
4. Asylum Seekers
An asylum seeker is a person who arrives at a U.S. port of entry – via an airport or a border crossing – and asks for protection because they fear returning to their home country. An immigrant living in the U.S. for up to one year can also apply for asylum.
Asylum seekers can legally stay temporarily in the U.S. while they wait to bring their case to an immigration judge. The process typically takes years.
Someone is eligible for asylum if they can show proof of persecution because of their political affiliation, religion, ethnic group, minority status, or belonging to a targeted group. Many others feel they need to leave their countries because of threats of violence or abusive relationships, among other dangerous circumstances.
A judge will eventually decide whether a person’s fear is with merit and can stay in the country.
Photo cerdits to Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images
5. Refugees
Refugees are similar to asylum seekers, but they apply to resettle in the U.S. while they remain abroad. Refugees are often escaping conflict.
The Biden administration had a cap of admitting up to 125,000 refugees a year.
Refugees can legally work in the U.S. as soon as they arrive and can apply for a green card one year later. Research shows that refugees become self-sufficient soon after they settle in the country and are net-positive for the country’s economy through the federal taxes they pay.
6. Unaccompanied Children
This is a U.S. government classification for migrant children who enter the U.S. without a parent or guardian, and without proper documentation or the legal status to be in the country. Because they are minors, they are allowed to enter the country and apply for the right to stay. Most often, they have relatives already in the country, who assume the role of financial and legal sponsors.
7. Family Separation
This refers to a government policy of separating detained migrant parents or guardians from the children they are responsible for an traveling with as a family unit. The first Trump administration separated families arriving at the border as part of an attempt to reduce immigration.
Legal migration systems that lack avenues for immigrants who work in manual labor to move with their families, and deportations, both also create family separations.
8. Immigration Detention
Immigration detention refers to the U.S. government apprehending immigrants who are in the U.S. without authorization and holding them in centers that are run similar to prisons. Some of these centers are run by the government, and others are outsourced to private companies.
When a U.S. Customs and Border Protection official apprehends an immigrant, they are often first brought to a building where they are placed in what many call a hielera, which means icebox or freezer in Spanish. This refers to cells, cages or rooms where the government keeps immigrants at very low temperatures with foil blankets and without warm clothing.
Immigrants might then be quickly deported or otherwise released in the country while they await a court date for an asylum case. Other immigrants who are awaiting deportation or a court date will be placed in an immigration detention center. Some must post bond to be released while awaiting trial.
9. Coyote
A coyote is the Spanish word for a guide who is paid by migrants and asylum seekers to take them to their destination, undetected by law enforcement. Coyotes used to be trusted by the migrantsthey were helping cross into the country. As the U.S. has tried to make it harder to enter illegally, the business of taking people to and across the U.S.-Mexico border unseen has become more expensive and dangerous.
10. The Alphabet Soup of Government Players
The Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, is a law enforcement agency created after 9/11. It includes a number of agencies that focus on immigration.
These include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, an agency that is in charge of collecting import duties, passport and document controls at airports, ports, and official points of entry along the border.
The Border Patrol is a federal law enforcing agency under CBP in charge of patrolling and securing U.S. borders and ports.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is a branch of DHS that works within the U.S., within its borders, focusing on detaining and deporting immigrants.
In 2023, around 43.4 million people globally were recognized as refugees; of that 43.4 million, only about 60,000 were admitted to be resettled in the United States (UNHCR; OHSS). The number of refugees admitted for resettlement is determined by the cap established by the current president and Congress. This cap has fluctuated largely over the past eight years, with the lowest annual ceiling and number of admitted refugees set by former President Trump in 2017 at 50,000. During his final year in office, 2020, he lowered the cap to 18,000 and the number of refugees admitted fell to 11,000. These admittances were much lower than after, including tighter vetting and restrictions following 9/11.
What exactly defines someone as a refugee? Does it mean they are coming to the United States entirely of their own choice? Will they impose a significant financial burden on U.S. taxpayers? Are they a danger to the safety of U.S. citizens? These are all fair considerations, and while no system is perfect, the refugee vetting and resettlement process in the United States is very secure, safe, and economically beneficial. However, it is becoming increasingly limited, leading to many individuals being denied the opportunity to obtain refuge in the U.S.
Do refugees decide to come to the U.S. of their own autonomous choice?
No, refugees are considered to be forcibly displaced peoples, meaning that their choice to leave is a matter of personal safety, of life and death. To apply for refugee status, a person must have fled and remain outside their home country. To be eligible for refugee status, they must be able to prove a well-founded fear of persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” and be unable or unwilling to return to their home country (UNHCR). This initial qualification is decided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which then refers the case to a resettlement country (such as the U.S.).
Before traveling to the U.S., refugees must undergo a lengthy vetting process that can take up to 36 months and will continue upon arrival in the U.S. This vetting process includes background checks, security clearances, in-person interviews, and medical clearances run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). If the refugee application is rejected during the interview process, it cannot be appealed. If it is accepted, it is only on a conditional basis and is dependent on further medical and security checks. Refugees will also receive a cultural orientation about what to expect upon their arrival in the United States. Finally, the refugee’s case will be designated to a particular refugee resettlement agency and location in the U.S. (there are only 10 approved agencies as of December 2024). Once the refugees arrive, they will receive care from their refugee resettlement agency for 90 days. The resettlement process for refugees in the U.S. is complex and rigorous, but it also serves as a vital lifeline for those fleeing life-threatening circumstances in search of safety and protection.
Do refugees cost U.S. taxpayers lots of money?
No, while refugees who have been in the U.S. less than five years have a median income of about $30,000, that median increases to $70,000 after twenty years. Additionally, studies have shown that refugees end up contributing more than they receive in benefits, paying up to twice as much in the long run. In 2019 alone, the 2.4 million refugees in the United States earned $93.6 billion in income through their contributions to American enterprises and organizations, paid $25 billion in taxes, and were left with $68.6 billion of disposable income, some of which will be spent or invested in U.S. businesses.
You may be wondering, if refugees are making so much money, does that mean they are taking jobs from U.S.-born citizens? The answer is no. Research shows that refugees fill three important gaps within the U.S. labor market: entrepreneurship, the service industry, and slightly rejuvenating an overall aging U.S.-born population. In 2019, 19% of refugees in the U.S. were entrepreneurs compared to only 9% of U.S.-born citizens and generated business income of $5.1 billion. Refugees also participate in the workforce at a rate of over 80%, a rate of almost 20% more than the overall national average (at around 60%), and are two times more likely than U.S.-born citizens to work in the service industry. The population of the United States is aging, and it is predicted that over 20% of people in the United States will be 65 or older in 15 years, compared to only 16% in 2016. Furthermore, almost 80% of the current refugee population is of working age compared to only 60% of the U.S.-born population. In conclusion, refugees contribute significantly to the U.S. economy and help address critical labor market needs, making them valuable assets.
Are refugees a danger to the safety of U.S. citizens?
Research demonstrates that the growing presence of refugees and immigrants in U.S. cities does not lead to increased crime rates; in fact, it often correlates with stability or reductions in crime. Studies spanning from 1980 to 2022 reveal a clear pattern: areas that welcome diverse populations experience steady or declining rates of both property and violent crimes.
Lowered crime rates for refugees come in conjunction with successful integration into a local community and job market. Refugees undergo thorough vetting processes, which makes it unlikely for individuals with a predisposition to criminal behavior to receive approval. Furthermore, as refugees are assigned to resettlement agencies, they receive support to help them integrate into their communities and the local job market. These agencies work closely with refugees and can address any inappropriate behaviors at the start of the resettlement process. The evidence clearly indicates that embracing refugees enriches communities and makes them safer.
Possible Impacts of a Second Trump Term on Refugee Resettlement
As you can see, refugee resettlement is a system with many benefits; however, its future is uncertain. Refugee resettlement organizations rely on government funding to resettle and support refugees during their 90-day resettlement period. During the first Trump administration, the cap for refugees allowed was significantly reduced, and subsequently, funding decreased. Despite the proven success of refugee resettlement, Donald Trump has promised to target the system once again under a second term. He may once again push to allow states the right to refuse refugee resettlement, putting an undue burden on certain areas of the country and creating further barriers to integration. Finally, Trump may also target private sponsorship for refugees which allows communities to privately sponsor, fundraise for, and resettle refugees, leading to better integration, economic participation, and a lesser cost for the government and U.S. taxpayers.
A Series of Travel Bans (AKA Muslim Bans)
Like during his first term, he may implement travel bans, further spreading the harmful and misinformed narrative that refugees from Muslim-majority countries have ties with terrorism. At the beginning of 2017, Trump signed an executive order, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, which banned entry to the United States for 90 days for citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries–Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen–and prohibited entry for refugees from Sudan indefinitely. Six weeks later, he signed another executive order that removed Iraq from the list and halted all refugee admissions for 120 days. Later in 2017, Trump signed a third executive order, which included travel restrictions for two additional countries, Chad and North Korea, as well as stricter vetting procedures. Although many of Trump’s critics dubbed these travel bans as Muslim bans, many of his supporters as well as the Department of Homeland Security, were insistent that these bans were solely focused on addressing and preventing terrorism threats. But the fact is that these bans greatly and unduly affected immigrants and refugees from Muslim-majority countries.
The implementation of such bans unjustly put numerous refugees from these countries at risk and tore families apart. It also contributed to a rise in hate crimes targeting Muslim communities in the United States. Additionally, this ban was implemented under the guise of addressing ethnic and religious terrorism threats in the United States. However, the number of arrests for suspected terrorist plots and acts of terrorism in the U.S. has been very small. In fact, threats of domestic terrorism from far-right extremists occur at a higher rate (40% more) than Islamic terrorist events. This policy was ineffective, and it caused great psychological and physical harm to Muslim communities in the U.S. due to increased Islamophobia and hate crimes.
Opting Out of Resettlement
During Trump’s first term, he signed an executive order requiring local refugee resettlement agencies in the U.S. to obtain written permission from their local and state governments to continue resettling refugees. This order would also have allowed state governors to opt their entire state out of refugee resettlement. Although a federal judge blocked this order, Trump has continued to advocate for lower immigration levels and increased local control over resettlement.
Implementing a policy like this in his second term could alienate refugees and place an undue short-term burden on areas willing to accept them. Additionally, opting out of refugee resettlement could have significant negative economic impacts on the longer-term for areas missing out. Before the executive order was blocked, Texas Governor Greg Abbott had opted out of refugee resettlement, a choice that could have cost the state around $17 million. Implementing such restrictive policies could undermine the humanitarian goals of refugee resettlement and hinder economic growth in states with communities that are willing to embrace diversity and support vulnerable populations.
The United States has long provided refuge to those fleeing persecution, violence, and life-threatening circumstances. Refugee resettlement has great humanitarian importance and provides a safe, secure, and economically beneficial system that strengthens communities and the workforce. However, this important system faces significant threats. During his first term, Trump’s policies drastically reduced the number of refugees allowed in the United States, perpetuated negative stereotypes, and attacked resettlement infrastructure. The second Trump term could once again target this system through travel bans and restrictions on local resettlement–actions that would harm refugees, the U.S. economy, local communities, and international reputation.
Rather than working to tear down a system that saves lives and benefits our country, there must be a shift in focus on protecting, expanding, and strengthening it. Refugees enrich a society through economic contributions, filling labor shortage gaps, and expanding cultural diversity, all while undergoing one of the most secure and rigorous vetting processes in the world. The United States should move away from narratives driven by fear and misinformation and instead endorse policies that promote the overall well-being of refugees, benefiting the nation’s prosperity as a whole.
Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior in Sociology student at American University.
Donald Trump ha prometido deportar a millones de inmigrantes si es elegido para un segundo mandato, afirmando que, entre otras cosas, los trabajadores nacidos en el extranjero les quitan el trabajo a los locales. Su compañero de fórmula, JD Vance ha hecho eco de esas opiniones antiinmigrantes.
Los científicos sociales y los analistas tienden a estar de acuerdo en que la inmigración —tanto de personas documentadas como indocumentadas— estimula el crecimiento económico. Pero es casi imposible calcular directamente cuánto contribuyen los inmigrantes a la economía. Eso se debe a que no conocemos los ingresos de cada trabajador inmigrante en los Estados Unidos.
Sin embargo, tenemos una buena idea de cuánto envían a sus países de origen; más de 81 mil millones de dólares en 2022, según el Banco Mundial. Podemos utilizar esta cifra para calcular indirectamente el valor económico total que genera la mano de obra inmigrante en EE. UU.
Es probable que se subestimen las contribuciones económicas
Teniendo en cuenta eso, estimamos que los inmigrantes que enviaron remesas en 2022 tuvieron salarios netos de más de $466 mil millones. Luego, suponiendo que sus salarios netos representan alrededor del 21% del valor económico de lo que producen para las empresas donde trabajan, por ejemplo, en restaurantes y construcción, los inmigrantes agregaron un total de $2,2 billones a la economía estadounidense sólo en 2022.
Esto es aproximadamente el 8% del producto interno bruto de los Estados Unidos y cerca de todo el PIB de Canadá para 2022,la novena economía más grande del mundo.
Los Inmigrantes en Estados Unidos que mandan dinero al extranjero crean al menos $2 billones en actividad económica
Basado en cuanto dinero los inmigrantes en Estados Unidos envían al exterior en 2022, los académicos estimaron los ingresos y de allí, cuanta productividad generaron en la economía estadunidense. El estudio estimó que las contribuciones totales de los migrantes a la economía estadunidense exceden $2 billones (trillones en inglés) en 2022.
La inmigración fortalece a Estados Unidos
Más allá de su gran valor, esta cifra nos dice algo importante: los principales beneficiarios de la mano de obra inmigrante son la economía y la sociedad de Estados Unidos.
Los 81 mil millones de dólares que los inmigrantes enviaron a casa en 2022 son una pequeña fracción del valor total con el que contribuyen a la economía: 2.2 billones de dólares. La gran mayoría de los salarios y la productividad de los inmigrantes (el 96 %) se queda en Estados Unidos.
Es probable que las contribuciones económicas de los inmigrantes estadounidenses sean incluso más sustanciales de lo que calculamos.
Por un lado, la estimación del Banco Mundial sobre las remesas de inmigrantes es probablemente un recuento insuficiente, ya que muchos inmigrantes envían dinero al exterior con personas que viajan a sus países de origen.
En investigaciones previas, mis colegas y yo también hemos descubierto que algunos grupos de inmigrantes tienen menos probabilidades de enviar remesas que otros.
Uno de ellos son los profesionales de cuello blanco: inmigrantes con carreras en la banca, ciencia, tecnología y educación, por ejemplo. A diferencia de muchos inmigrantes indocumentados, los profesionales de cuello blanco generalmente tienen visas que les permiten traer a sus familias con ellos, por lo que no necesitan enviar dinero al extranjero para cubrir sus gastos domésticos. De igual forma, los inmigrantes que han estado trabajando en el país durante décadas y tienen más familiares en el país también tienden a enviar remesas con menos frecuencia. Ambos grupos tienen mayores ingresos y sus contribuciones no están incluidas en nuestra estimación de 2,2 billones de dólares.
Además, nuestras estimaciones no tienen en cuenta el crecimiento económico estimulado por los inmigrantes cuando gastan dinero en los EE. UU., creando demanda, generando empleos y empezando negocios que contratan inmigrantes y locales.
Por ejemplo, calculamos los aportes de los inmigrantes salvadoreños y solo sus hijos agregaron aproximadamente 223 mil millones de dólares a la economía de Estados Unidos en 2023. Eso es aproximadamente el 1% del PIB total del país.
Teniendo en cuenta que la economía de Estados Unidos creció alrededor de un 2% en 2022 y 2023, esa es una suma sustancial.
Las cifras qué presentamos son un recordatorio de que parte del éxito financiero de Estados Unidos depende de los inmigrantes y su trabajo.
Ernesto Castañeda es director del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos y del Laboratorio sobre la Inmigración de American University.
Edgar Aguilar ayudo con la preparación, análisis y traducción.
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A table full of vegetables including celery and carrots.
Addressing and combatting food insecurity requires a coordinated approach across all sectors, including nonprofit organizations, government agencies, and private corporations. Although these varying groups may approach the cause differently, there is a shared goal of increasing food security. This analysis was influenced by my experience working in a nonprofit addressing food insecurity as well as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the Food and Nutrition Service. My experiences gave me valuable insights into the stark differences between government and nonprofit organizations. in understanding, approaching, and solving food insecurity between government and nonprofit organizations.
The mission of the USDA Food and Nutrition Service is stated as, “To increase food security and reduce hunger in partnership with cooperating organizations by providing children and low-income people access to food, a healthy diet and nutrition education in a manner that supports American agriculture and inspires public confidence.” They administer 15 federal assistance programs including SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), school meals, CACFP (Child and Adult Food Care Program), WIC (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and Children), TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). My responsibilities included reviewing and editing resources that program administrators used to properly procure and serve food that aligns with the nutritional standards set by the agency. This opportunity allowed me to gain experience in the federal processes that go into the nutrition programs that serve and assist millions of Americans.
The nonprofit organization I worked with aimed their mission as, “Striving to eliminate hunger in the nation’s capital while enhancing the nutrition, health, financial stability, and overall well-being of low-income residents in the District.” Their main focuses are on D.C. resident participation in federal nutrition programs, improving public policies, and educating the public on the reality of hunger’s existence within the District. My responsibilities were increasing SNAP and WIC participation by creating relationships with residents and producing educational content. This role gave me first-hand experience with the communities directly affected by food insecurity and allowed me to see how the policy created by our government affects Americans every day.
The differences I noted between the two experiences varied, from how the meetings were conducted to how they defined activism. Within the USDA, meetings were highly structured, with a specific focus on compliance with federal regulations and guidelines. I found the weekly staff meetings to be lively, with a lot of small talk and team activities. On the contrary, the nonprofit team meetings were centered around community intervention with little to no small talk and few team connection activities. These differences were notable for me, as they showed the discrepant level of urgency in the line of work between the two sectors. This could be attributed to numerous factors, including different standards and regulations each organization is held to. Nevertheless, it shined light on the importance of nonprofit organizations supporting USDA policy.
Additionally, the difference in staffing retention and burnout between the two organizations was striking. Throughout my year at the nonprofit, I saw many team members resign from positions due to the stress and emotional toll that comes with aiding underserved communities. Furthermore, there were few to no employees who had been with the organization for over four years. In my year with the organization, I witnessed the reinstating of three different presidents and the resignation of two. Whereas in the USDA, most employees had high tenure, with some even reaching 20-25 years in the agency. This difference in retention is a common problem, in the nonprofit sector. With limited funding and resources, staff often are forced to take on responsibilities beyond their original job description, working long hours to meet deadlines, and to keep up with the needs of District residents. In the government, however, there are strict guidelines in place limiting hours worked by each employee and the duties they are permitted to perform, helping keep their retention rate high.
Beyond job loss from burnout, I also witnessed the nonprofit organization’s largest layoff period in its history. Essential positions such as communications and public relations coordinators, government affairs specialists, and others were released from the organization due to large budget cuts. Additionally, other employees were forced to take furlough days to keep their jobs afloat. In contrast, job stability within the government sector was a promising factor for prospective employees. The federal government, the largest employer in the United States, provides comprehensive benefits and job security.
Overall, both organizations play vital roles in supporting and combatting food insecurity nationwide. The government creates vital policies and budgets to support the “boots on the ground” and educational information that nonprofit organizations work tirelessly to implement. Through these experiences, I was able to see the varying factors that go into supporting our neighbors who experience food insecurity every day. Having worked at a nonprofit before the USDA allowed my work through the government to remain grounded in the experiences of those we are seeking to help. Therefore, policymakers and direct service providers should better collaborate in hopes of making these efforts more effective.
Lia Sullivan is an MA student in the Sociology and Research Program at American University.
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Nearly half of American adults feel that immigration threatens national identity. This proportion has increased in recent years as anti-immigration sentiments have surged in politics and partisan divergence has deepened in rhetoric. The former Trump administration was highly influential in the anti-immigration movement, with much of Trump’s campaigns hinging on xenophobic policies like building a wall on the southern border and ending DACA. Such policies jeopardize the human rights of immigrants in the United States, who make up nearly 14% of the U.S. population. The Biden administration’s handling of immigration has also been criticized by 60% of Americans, indicating that the ongoing conflict over immigration is worsening.
Polls from PBS NewsHour, 2024.
Why is migration so controversial? Shouldn’t people be allowed to migrate safely?
The answer lies in white supremacy and ‘tax dollars.’
At a 1983 Conservative Party conference, former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously said, “If the State wishes to spend more, it can do so only by borrowing your savings or by taxing you more. It is no good thinking that someone else will pay—that ‘someone else’ is you. There is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers’ money.” Like many politicians, Thatcher propagated the notion that government spending relies on taxpayers’ money, placing the burden of spending on individuals.
Similar sentiments are not uncommon in the United States. Former Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, featured this tagline in his 2018 campaign targeting his opponent: “Tony Evers: Special treatment for illegals, higher taxes for you.” Donald Trump continues to campaign on anti-immigration policies to appeal to Americans who feel skeptical about their tax dollars going to immigrant welcoming programs. Trump’s campaign website highlights “20 Core Campaign Promises to Make America Great Again,” two of which focus on blocking immigration, including the first promise: “Seal the border and stop the migrant invasion.” These arguments are used to justify relatively small government investment in important services that benefit communities of color and immigrants by suggesting they would be an imposition on the ‘taxpayer.’
To understand the historical use of the term ‘tax dollars,’ Camille Walsh analyzed hundreds of letters defending racial segregation addressed to the Supreme Court in the years following the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). One-third of the letters consisted of some language about taxes, taxpayers, or having “paid” for public schools, implying the right to decide whether to keep them segregated. The American ‘taxpayer’ historically represents white individuals, and such language “obscured class divisions among whites and elevated those racialized groups presumed to have higher taxable income to a higher position in claiming citizenship rights.” White individuals like Aura Lee (1956), argued that “poor white taxpayers are entitled to enjoy some all-white places, if they so desire.”
As the term ‘taxpayer’ is historically associated with whiteness, it is used to justify the entitlement of resources concentrated in white communities. Meanwhile, the ‘nontaxpayer’ is meant to symbolize Black and Brown individuals who are perceived not to have “earned” their rights. While this argument is used to exclude people of color from resources, historian James Anderson finds that taxes from predominantly Black communities were at least as much during the time of the Brown ruling, and often higher than those of white neighborhoods. These taxes were often distributed by white school boards into all-white schools prior to Brown. This does not account for today’s common tax evasion of the nation’s wealthiest individuals and corporations. The Treasury Department estimates that there is a $160 billion gap between what the wealthiest 1% of the population should pay and what they actually pay.
Seventy years after the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, politicians, citizens, and the media hold ‘taxpayer dollars’ to be sacred. Similar to the discussions surrounding racial integration in the mid-20th century, immigration represents a battle between the ‘taxpayer,’ or white American, and the ‘nontaxpayer,’ or immigrant. Just as white parents feared sending their children to integrated schools with “much lower standards and run-down facilities than the ones that [they] helped pay for,” many white Americans do not want immigrants to have access to vital resources and fear the use of their dollars on government spending.
Nevertheless, between sales taxes and property taxes, undocumented immigrants pay billions of dollars in taxes each year. Not only are immigrants taxpayers, but they pay taxes at higher rates than the richest Americans and get less in return. Taxpayer rhetoric is another weapon of othering by separating white U.S.-born individuals from Black and Brown immigrants, regardless of who pays their taxes.
Graph from the American Immigration Council (2016).
A quote from former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan counters concerns about government spending causing a deficit, stating: “There is nothing to prevent the government from creating as much money as it wants.” Similar to banks not lending out depositors’ money, government spending does not use tax dollars for spending. To illustrate this, the U.S. government spent trillions on wars post-9/11 and hundreds of billions to bail out banks in 2008, neither of which were framed as a tax dollar problem. Despite the framing of funding essential services as an attack on individual taxpayers, in reality, it falls within the bounds of federal government spending.
International law considers migration to be a universal right. Immigration control “is a relatively recent invention of states,” according to Vincent Chetail, a professor of international law. The U.S. has a duty to protect the rights of all people and not discriminate based on race, national origin, religion, or any other group category according to the 14th Amendment, and many international treaties it is a party to.
Research indicates that government investments in immigrants have a higher return over time. For example, more educated immigrants earn more and, therefore, pay more in taxes. Fiscal concerns are not based on reality, as immigrants are net contributors to the federal budget. ‘Tax dollars’ are simply a code for white dollars to instill fear and discrimination against vulnerable populations, despite taxation realities.
Mary Capone is a researcher at the Immigration Lab at American University.
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Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.
My assessment is that Kamala Harris will win the election. It is not based on the polls or the betting markers, which are not helpful given their very tight margins. Instead, Harris’ big tent, misrepresentation of the primacy of the economy and immigration in surveys, and social trends lead me to believe that Harris will win.
First of all, following the voting trends from the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Trump will not win the popular vote. This matters, as it determines popularity and broad appeal nationwide. Trump has never been appealing to over half of the population as a politician. While Trump was a fresh figure in politics in 2016, and there were some shy voters (given his novel strident and racist anti-immigrant comments), in 2024, he is a well-known entity, and most of his ardent followers are loud about their support, and not shy to say so to pollsters, door knockers, or people calling to get out the vote. Even so, attendance at his rallies and Trump flags outside of houses have decreased from previous cycles. Trump obsesses over crowd sizes, which was one of the indicators of his appeal in 2016. However, the infamous Madison Square Garden Trump rally on October 27 had around 19,500 people in attendance compared to around 30,000 people for Kamala Harris in Houston, Texas, on October 25, and over 75,000 at her rally in Washington, DC, on October 29.
Trump counts on a core base of around 33% of the electorate that holds strong views against immigration, complains about the economy, and will support Trump no matter what. Some more traditional Republicans will also vote for him. Nonetheless, his main campaign strategic imperative was to appeal to moderates, independents, and White suburban women to expand his margin over 50%. His 2024 campaign has not done so; he has focused on animating and mobilizing his core base. Many of his comments and those of his surrogates and supporters have alienated moderates as well as some registered Republicans. He has been more focused on discrediting the electoral process, the media, and his opponents and critics than on appealing to all voters.
In contrast, Kamala Harris has been explicitly open to conservative-leaning independents and even former Republican officeholders, including, but not limited to, Liz Cheney. Many registered Republicans, college-educated men, and many women will vote for her. That should be enough to guarantee her victory. She has done so not by compromising her beliefs and Democratic priorities but by promising to uphold the Constitution and protect democracy.
It is true that an unintended effect of Trump’s hate speech has created a certain increase in support among some Black, Latino, and Asian voters, but that will not be enough to counter the fact that a majority of women across racial and ethnic groups will vote for Kamala Harris as will many men and registered Republicans and independents.
A weakness for Harris lies in the uncommitted voters because of the situation in the Middle East who may vote for Jil Stein or abstain in places like Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Detroit, Dearborn, and college campuses. Trump’s election would make things worse in the Middle East, so some will reluctantly vote for Harris and then get ready to continue with their protests and demands for a ceasefire.
The media across the board has obsessed with “immigration” and “the economy” being the main concerns of the electorate and that public opinion favors Trump to handle them. But first of all, objectively, the economy is strong, and asylum-seeking at the border today is at very low levels. Second, and most importantly for elections, when one looks at the polls that are used to make these claims, these are the main issues for less than half of the electorate, and they are the main issues for Republican respondents, who naturally favor Trump’s solutions on these areas. In other words, putting the bulk of the Republican agenda around closing the border is not enough to gain a majority of voters nationwide or even in most swing states. The urban legend about immigrants eating cats shows voters how exaggerated these warnings are. The common claims against immigrants are false, as my book —coming out today— Immigration Realities documents.
Many pundits, consultants, and advisors have been saying that “Harris is weak on the border.” Not only is that false, but my response has been that the immigration obsession will cost Trump the election. Mass deportations are not popular outside of MAGA circles, while a path to citizenship has large levels of support. The Madison Square Garden rally made it clear to many voters and agnostic observers that this was not about undocumented immigration but about creating a White Christian Ethnostate.
There are even some indications (like the exit polls in the Republican primaries in Ohio) that some Evangelicals and religious voters are tired of Trump supposedly representing their views and values. The majority will still vote for him, but less than in previous elections when he has been on the ballot. The same is true for rural and union members. Biden has been a strong pro-labor president. Tim Walz is more familiar with rural White voters than Vance is these days. The majority will vote Republican, but many will vote Democrat. Harris is endorsed by both Liz Cheney and Bernie Sanders. Her appeal and favorability are wide, and she could create an even wider base of support than Obama.
Democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and many other values and institutions are on the line. This is the first election where Trump is on the ballot after January 6, 2021, and the many trials against him. He will not lose all his supporters, but he will lose some.
Recent local and midterm elections have shown that the across-the-board restrictions on abortion and emergency care while pregnant are large motivators to drive women and men to the polls to repeal these propositions and to vote for Democrats. In 2016, most White women supported Trump and not Hilary Clinton. This may be different this time because of the end of Roe vs. Wade. This would be crucial because women are the majority of likely voters, and they were more active in early voting.
Established Latinos of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and South American origin in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and New York will make important contributions to the Democratic vote. I predict that many women and new citizens of immigrant origin and some who did not vote in previous elections because of age or lack of interest (thus often not in pollster models of likely voters) will turn out to vote for Harris.
All along, the expectations have been set very highly for Harris, and she has excelled at each challenge, including securing the nomination uncontested, choosing a strong VP candidate, leading the RNC, speaking at rallies, showing she can be Commander in Chief, bettering Trump at their debate, engaging with the media effectively, she can take questions from the media and answer them thoughtfully, to round it all out she can engage in retail politics with much enthusiasm and empathy.
Trump carries all the media attention and campaign resources from the RNC, and most Republicans down the ballot depend, to a large degree, on his appeal. This does not bode well for them. Furthermore, the Republican-led Congress has been one of the most ineffective in recent memory. Government shutdowns have been adverted, and there have been impactful and popular bipartisan accomplishments such as the Infrastructure Bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS Act, and support for Ukraine, but many Republican Congresspeople have voted against these achievements.
All these factors combined seem to indicate that Trump supporters will have a weaker showing than when he lost in 2020, even if we are not in the middle of a pandemic. Kamala Harris has benefited from a fresh, exciting, flawless campaign, drawing all the enthusiasm that had been lacking since Obama’s first presidential campaign.
To recap, the biggest errors in the 2024 election coverage have been the out-of-proportion focus on the economy and immigration as the biggest concerns of all voters when, indeed, these complaints are not fully based on reality and are mainly coming from Republican-leaning voters. Nobody likes inflation, but unemployment is low, and wage and economic growth rates are positive and steady, with a big improvement from 2020. Reproductive health and women’s rights will be more important in motivating people across party affiliations to vote for Harris and Democrats. While the polls are currently very tight, and there is noise that favors Trump (allowing him to repeat the big lie), ultimately, cold analyses of the electorate’s behavior and preferences tell us that Harris is on track to win the electoral college and with wider margins than the polls show.
Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.
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Political Piñatas: How Conservatives Use Latinos to Polarize U.S. Society
By Ernesto Castañeda
November 5, 2024
Many are surprised to learn that some Latinos vote Republican. A larger percentage of Latinos voted for Trump in 2020 than in 2016. A similar percentage or even more may vote for Trump in 2024. There are many reasons for this, which are often misunderstood by the wider public. I discuss some of them here.
Latinos represent the largest minority in the U.S. at over 65 million and have gained attention as political parties vie for the so-called “Latino vote” as elections are won by tighter margins. This is particularly the case in swing states with large Latino populations. How best to describe the landscape of Latino voters’ preferences remains a question of regular debate. On the one hand, Latinos are still frequently superficially treated as a relatively uniform voting bloc —even if more “up for grabs” today with polling data suggesting gradual shifts in party affiliation. As such, Latinos are often treated as a demographic that can tip the balance in favor of a party. Nonetheless, polls and pundits necessarily flatten the real views of Latinos. This has always been a diverse group. The birth of the term Hispanic aimed to bring together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans around common causes. Regional differences are key; for example, in the D.C.-metro region, Latinos are diverse and majority Salvadoran; in California and Texas, they are mainly of Mexican and Central American descent; in South Florida, they are a mixture of Cuban, Venezuelan, Colombian, Nicaraguan, among others.
Many recent immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean come escaping failed states and so-called leftist regimes. Many migrants have been directly affected by inequality in their countries of origin. Democratic erosion throughout Latin America and the Caribbean makes it hard for opposition activists and critics of these regimes. Like Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain and Cubans after Castro’s takeover, many recent immigrants see themselves as forced political exiles escaping from authoritarian states that robbed them of their wealth and freedoms. Therefore, in the U.S. they are more likely to identify with ideals of individual freedom and free enterprise.
Trump has also had a polarizing effect on Latinos. Republicans have sought to exploit a process well-documented by scholars: the creation of social boundaries. Trump’s discourse encourages distinctions between “good immigrants” and “good Latinos” in contrast to undocumented “criminals.” Those immigrants with visas and legal permits, higher education levels and family incomes, lighter skin, or who align better with the U.S. geopolitical preferences tend to be more successful than those who do not have immigration papers. This creates hierarchical differences within Latinos. Many U.S.-born and legal Latino immigrants try hard to distinguish themselves from individuals and groups framed as “illegal” and “criminal” to avoid the stigma assigned to those groups.
These social processes create durable inequalities not only between Latinos and non-Latinos but also among Latinos. In public discourse, Latinos are used as proxies and piñatas to polarize Americans further. In turn, some Latinos internalize feelings of inferiority or superiority and may loudly act upon them, adding to the process of polarization. Some Latinos organize against dehumanizing language and build networks of solidarity among Latinos and with other groups. However, a numerical minority such as the White Nationalists and antisemites Nick Fuentes or Enrique Tario, leader of the Proud Boys, are not passive receivers of stigmatizing attacks but become amplifiers of hate speech in exchange for group membership as part of a sometimes-xenophobic White majority. Some who have seen fellow Latinos excluded, targeted, and stigmatized may try to pass as White by attacking other Latinos, further polarizing the country in the process and weakening democratic institutions and minority rights. For these reasons, studying the effects of polarization on Latinos and the role that Latinos have in social polarization is of national importance.
Latinos can hardly be said to form a cohesive or predictable voting bloc. Latinos do not fit neatly into the racial categories that often orient public political debate, which can lead to simplifications of Latinos’ views. Latinos are relatively less partisan as a group. A Pew Research Center report indicates that less than half of Latinos acknowledge significant differences between political parties, with a large share agreeing that neither party effectively represents their interests. Immigration is motivated by economic success, so access to jobs and better pay are their priority. Most Latinos have papers, so immigration is not an immediate concern for most Latino individuals, but it is a theme full of an emotional load; the immigration struggles of family members are close to their hearts.
An influential narrative regarding political polarization is that the electorate has become increasingly stoked by racial tensions and grievances. In this account, race is an important source of polarization. Latinos’ views are diverse and sometimes distinct from those of other Americans and more often map with those of similar occupations and socio-economic status. The diversity within Latino communities impacts the overall political polarization dynamics in the U.S. Typical analyses of race/ethnicity as a variable in culture war-type political contests do not adequately account for the heterogeneity of Latinos as a group and for the range of variation of their political commitments. National origin, gender, religious affiliation, geographic location, educational attainment, class, media consumption, and generational experience, among others, are impactful factors in identity formation.
Latinos display greater cultural unity than political unity. Latinos are part of their local and larger national political ecosystems. Latinos, despite immigration status, have demonstrated notable unity mobilizing in response to racist anti-immigrant rhetoric from local, state, or national politicians. Research also shows that over time, anti-immigrant policies can contribute to the withdrawal of Latinos from the public sphere. But sometimes there is increased group cohesion among Latinos as a reaction to external group threats such as public hostility toward immigrants and the portrayal in the media of Latinos as likely to be Mexican, undocumented, and lesser than. A stronger identification as Latino resulting from previous political organizing does lead to higher levels of political participation. In other cases, as Latinos become business owners, upper middle class, and part of mainstream U.S. society, they may become more politically conservative and may try to distinguish themselves from newcomers. Other successful Latinos, who are less insecure about their status, mentor and open doors for others, volunteer, and become philanthropists.
Furthermore, some Latino subgroups are more susceptible to misinformation. The choice of media varies by immigration status and age. Older first-generation Latinos often opt for more traditional media sources such as radio and T.V., and more often in Spanish. Younger Latinos, often second- or third-generation, exhibit a wider range of media consumption, mainly in English and social media. These choices create different media echo chambers, differing attitudes about the meaning of “Latino,” and varying political values even within the same family.
Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.
This piece is a revised and shortened version of an unfunded research proposal written for the Carnegie Fellows Program on Polarization in November of 2023.
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Anti-Immigration Rhetoric: Winning Campaign Strategy or Coin Toss?
By Joseph Fournier and Ernesto Castaneda
October 10, 2024
With the U.S. presidential election drawing nearer, many Kamala Harris supporters fear a perceived weakness on the border “crisis” may cost her the election to Donald J. Trump. Trump has championed himself as the figurehead for tough border policy. Restricting immigration has been associated with Trump. An NBC poll showed that 89% of people who identify as conservative point to the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border as a major factor in their vote for president, while only 25% of those who identify as liberal do so, and 52% among moderates. Therefore, we are not witnessing an anti-immigrant turn in public opinion but a further polarization by political ideology.
Trump has been capitalizing on this perceived base of support by making even more extreme comments regarding the issue, most recently employing race pseudo-science in claiming that recent migrants possess “bad genes.”
In the past, Harris and the Democrats have painted themselves in clear opposition to his cruel immigration policies, such as family separation. When on the campaign trail in 2019, Harris’s rhetoric focused on pathways to citizenship and the plight of migrants. This strategy worked as Biden and Harris defeated Trump in 2020.
There was a slight rightward shift from Harris and the DNC on immigration. This was probably in reaction to an increase in the visibility of border crossings after the pandemic. Trump has framed these increases as a “border crisis.”
But do Democrats need to get harsher on immigration if they want to win? Data shown in Figure 1 demonstrates a phenomenon that may surprise political strategists on both sides of the aisle. Research from The Immigration Lab analyzing congressional and gubernatorial elections in 2018, 2020, and 2022 has shown that these anti-immigrant campaign victories have decreased by about 15%. This data was pulled from online campaign material from every election result with a 10% margin between the two major candidates.
Successes of anti-immigrant campaigns in competitive elections, 2018-2022 by the authors.
In 2018, businessman and former state senator Brian Kemp ran for governor in Georgia. His campaign epitomized the culture wars that the GOP included as part of their messaging strategy. Kemp styled himself as a “politically incorrect conservative” and filmed himself touting chainsaws and shotguns in service of this persona. He ended one of his ads by showcasing him in his truck, threatening to “round up criminal illegals myself.” On November 8, 2018, Kemp defeated his opponent in the closest Georgia gubernatorial race since 1966.
In 2022, Kemp ran for re-election against the same opponent. With essentially the same election conditions, Kemp’s strategy radically changed. His new primary TV ad, titled “Stronger Georgia,” listed a myriad of his accomplishments as governor. Many of his themes continued from his 2018 ads, including his support of decreased government regulation. Nonetheless, a notable point missing from his 2022 ad, however, was immigration. Kemp made no mention of the issue, making only a brief note of him “fighting human trafficking.” In softening his tone on migration, Kemp nearly tripled his margin of victory in 2022 in comparison to 2018.
Even while encounters at the border today are as low as during the pandemic when Title 42 was in effect closing the border to asylum-seekers, many think that long lines of people asking for asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border is a political liability for the Biden-Harris administration. However, when Americans in these competitive elections have shown up to the polls in the last six years, running an anti-immigrant campaign has demonstrated itself to be well short of the secure victory strategy that many seem to think it is.
Joseph Fournier is a Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and a senior at American University.
Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American Studies.
Starting in 2022, the Immigration Lab at American University began interviewing recent migrant and refugee arrivals to the DMV. So far, we have interviewed 181 from a variety of origins. The interviews aim to understand the experiences of refugees and migrants before, during, and after their entrance into the United States. Interviewers asked participants to reflect on their immigration journey and classify their immigration status. Self-perception, specifically individual understanding of immigration status, varied depending on the respondents’ country of origin, with particular uncertainty for migrants coming from South and Central America. Out of the fifty-nine respondents who were asked to classify their immigration status, eight were uncertain, seven of these were from El Salvador and one from Venezuela.
This broad range of understanding can be partly attributed to the higher clarity in legal definitions for refugee status and recipients of asylum or humanitarian parole versus migrants who have come without papers or who are in the middle of requesting asylum or other humanitarian relief. Refugees and asylum seekers qualify for legal residence based on proving a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR). Refugees are vetted, approved, and brought to the U.S. through international refugee organizations and the U.S. government. They receive specific resettlement services and benefits through sponsoring resettlement agencies in the U.S. under the program known as Reception and Placement. These services are usually limited to the first 90 days after arrival and include necessities such as securing and setting up housing and rent assistance. Other services are provided by case managers, such as cash assistance, cultural orientations, school enrollment, benefit application assistance, employment support, and aid in navigating medical and legal services in their new communities. The goal of these services is for refugees to be economically self-sufficient as soon as possible. The number of refugees allowed in the U.S. is capped each year by the president and Congress. The current admissions cap for FY 2024 is 125,000 and 100,000 were resettled.
Asylum seekers must also prove they meet the conditions set by UNHCR but apply for asylum upon their arrival to the United States. They can apply affirmatively either at the point of entry or within a year of arriving in the U.S., or defensively once they receive notice of removal proceedings. Once granted asylum, they are known as asylees and gain access to government benefits and services similar to refugees like cash assistance and medical assistance, but do not have the same level of support as refugees do through case management. The are no numerical caps on how many asylum seekers can be granted that status but rather are decided on an individual case through immigration courts. This process can be lengthy and has a very significant backlog. According to TRAC, 1,101,819 asylum applicants currently have a pending case with U.S. immigration courts. This number translates into an average wait time of 1,424 days, a wait of almost four years for their case to be heard and decided.
For individuals who do not qualify for legal permanent residency as refugees or asylees, the definitions and processes become more complicated. Unlike for refugees and asylum seekers, there is no legal definition of a ‘migrant.’ A variety of programs/statuses exist for migrants including, but not limited to Humanitarian Parole (HP), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), work permits/visas, student visas, and green card applications, all of which have strict eligibility requirements and timelines.
Social services and benefits available to asylum seekers and migrants are limited. According to the National Immigration Forum, federal benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicare are not available for these immigrants. These benefits are only available to immigrants who have been granted asylum or become lawful permanent residents (LPR) and lived in the U.S. for a minimum of 5 years. Some states offer limited cash, food, and healthcare assistance, however, most of the services available are provided by local nonprofits which face similar barriers to resources and visibility. Accordingly, research shows that immigrants use less government services than the U.S.-born.
In addition to limited social benefits, legal status designations are complex to navigate, often requiring legal guidance and representation to get one’s status adjusted and obtain permanent residency. The interviews conducted by the Immigration Lab highlight this confusion and uncertainty and the need for better and more accessible resources and legal guidance for migrants.
Among respondents who did not classify themselves with a concrete immigration status in the interviews, two main groups emerged, those with some form of legal guidance and those without. Respondents without any form of legal guidance were quick to classify themselves originally as undocumented or express complete uncertainty as to their status. When prompted further during the interviews, many respondents clarified that they were uncertain about their status, not undocumented.
In other cases, individuals thought they may be out of status but in reality, they were pending a decision by migrant courts. In one instance, a respondent from a woman from Colombia stated, “Let’s say right now I don’t have status. I don’t have documentation. I am undocumented.” However, further discussion revealed that she had been processed and released by U.S. immigration and had been allowed to stay in the U.S. on legal grounds, which she did not fully understand. This response highlights how a self-classification as “undocumented” is used as a way to express initial uncertainty. While this response pattern emerged in a few cases, one example of complete uncertainty came from a Honduran male respondent. When we asked about his immigration status, he responded “What can you call it?” The interviewer then went on to explain different avenues of immigration: asylum, visa, and entry without inspection. In response, the man once again affirmed that “I don’t know…” The man explained that he was interested in getting a work permit but had no avenues through whichto obtain one. This shows that they do not know how the U.S. immigration system works, much less how to navigate it.
For those who expressed having legal guidance or representation, a theme of classifying as “in-process” was common. These respondents understood that there was a process that they were going through to get documentation but could not specifically articulate what that process was. For example, when asked to identify her immigration status, one El Salvadorian female explained that she and her family had found a lawyer to represent them. But never articulated what legal avenue was lawyer pursuing. Similarly, an El Salvadorian male expressed confusion over his next court date, not knowing when or what the court appearance was for.
In a working paper written by the American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies on Newcomer Central American Immigrants’ Access to Legal Services, researchers found that less than half of Central American immigrants have access to legal services because low-income and pro bono services are hard to find. Additionally, this affordable representation often only takes on limited cases, specifically focusing on the cases that are more likely to be won in court. This has resulted in more legal referrals to private firms, and despite these firms providing high-quality services, they are very expensive. Immigrants may be tempted to work with notary generals confusing them with notarios, who in Latin America are highly influential lawyers. This creates a higher degree of fraud risk. Therefore, these Central American immigrants either avoid, don’t have access to, or cannot afford legal services. This means that they must rely on their knowledge or the knowledge of family and friends. In the context of the complex and process-oriented immigration legal system, this information is often not enough and may lead to them losing their immigration case to remain in the U.S.
The analysis of these interviews uncovered the important reality that migrants are often uncertain about their immigration status in the U.S., even when they have access to legal representation or guidance. Volunteers, legal offices that do pro-bono immigration work, and non-profits that have this as their mission are overburdened by caseloads and don’t receive enough funding and donations to expand. People come to the United States for a variety of reasons and often must take timely action to secure their legal statuses. It is crucial that theyhave access to resources that can help guide and support them through the various processes available to them, both legal and non-legal. It is not enough to ensure basic access to these resources; efforts must be made to make information about immigration statuses accessible and understandable for migrants.
Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior majoring in Sociology at American University and a member of the Immigration Lab.
Edited by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, CLALS, and Immigration Lab Director.
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