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Anti-Immigration Rhetoric is an Electoral Vulnerability: Evidence from the 2022 Midterm Elections

By Ernesto Castañeda, Joseph Fournier, and Mary Capone

October 1, 2024

Graph elaborated by the authors with data collected from CNN Politics’ Midterm Election Results.

The above graph represents the proportional success of candidates who used anti-immigration sentiment in their campaigns for the 2022 midterm elections. Results data was taken from CNN Politics. Anti-immigration rhetoric was found in campaign material through Meta Ad Library, X (formerly Twitter), debate responses, campaign website archives, YouTube ad searches, and general Google searches. We focused on competitive elections defined as having electoral results within a 10% margin between candidates. Candidates in these competitive elections who used ani-immigrant sentiment were no more likely to win the election than those who did not; in fact, more candidates who campaigned on anti-immigration lost than won in 2022. This data provides evidence that not being anti-immigration is not a hindering campaign decision. It may be quite the opposite.

Immigration often emerges as a prominent talking point among candidates in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections. Former President Donald Trump frequently employs anti-immigration rhetoric and continues to campaign under similar sentiments about the allegedly dangerous porosity of the southern U.S. border. In the presidential debate in June of 2024 against President Joe Biden, Trump mentioned immigration in 42% of the 38 times he spoke while Biden mentioned immigration 13% of the time.  In the subsequent debate against Vice President Kamala Harris, out of 38 times when Trump spoke for more than two sentences, he incorporated immigration 10 times (26% of the time). In comparison, Harris did so 4 out of 27 times (15% of the time).

Anti-immigration rhetoric has become practically synonymous with the Republican Party as these candidates often use immigrants as scapegoats for shortcomings in national security, economics, and crime control. While several Democratic candidates support anti-immigration policies as well, it is less commonly a key aspect of their campaigns. The graphic below indicates the overall tone of immigration speeches in Congress and the president by party from the late nineteenth century until 2020. While the data excludes 2022, it encapsulates the general trends of immigration sentiments over time.

Source: Card et al., 2022 published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The top of the graph shows that trends in the rhetoric of Republican and Democratic congressional representatives were negative before the 1950s and became positive in both parties in the late 1950s and through the 1960s and 1970s. The divergence in sentiments is clearest in the early 1980s and beyond, with the greatest points of divergence occurring between 2000 and 2020. Card et al. acknowledge that the divergence also represents other trends in the polarization of other issues. However, they find that immigration polarization predated the rise in generic political polarization observed in Gentzkow et al. by more than a decade.

The lower part of the graph shows the variation in presidential sentiments through positive and negative language employed to discuss immigration. The anti-immigrant rhetoric of President Trump has been unseen since the presidency of Herbert Hoover. Overall, the graph represents the rise in anti-immigration rhetoric in congressional and presidential speeches by Republicans in recent years as it has become more of a political talking point.

Discourse gathered from the campaign sites and social media accounts of Republican candidates who ran in competitive elections in 2022 with anti-immigration campaigns includes several instances of strongly prejudiced statements. Republican Mark Robertson (Nevada District 1) sought to “turn off the illegal flow of people coming into our country… end chain-migration, visa lotteries and vacation-birth citizenship.” Ending “vacation-birth citizenship” implies a possible erasure of birthright citizenship. Anti-immigrant candidates describe policies like these in misleading ways to garner political support, despite understanding the implausibility of such a policy.

Many of these anti-immigrant candidates take further aim at immigrant children. Republican candidate for the Senate in Pennsylvania Mehmet Oz stated in an ad that, “The Biden administration’s failure on the border is so massive that they are flying illegal immigrants up to airports like this where illegal immigrants are being taken on buses. Now every state has become a border state.” The ad is filmed outside of Scranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport in Pennsylvania, an airport that has been instrumental in the facilitation of protecting unaccompanied migrant children. This airport and the role it plays in the migrant children protection apparatus made it a popular target for Pennsylvania Republicans in 2022. Jim Bognet (R), who ran for Congress in the district that includes the airport itself, ran an ad claiming “Joe Biden & Matt Cartwright still won’t STOP ghost flights of illegal immigrants into (Northeast Pennsylvania).” The reason for this secrecy is that these are minors whose identities are obscured to ensure their security. Many of these children come from vulnerable backgrounds, including a sixteen-year-old victim of sex trafficking seeking protection while awaiting possible testimony and an asylum claim. These children have become the target of a political stunt by the GOP in their attempt to create fear surrounding migration.

Numerous other candidates posit a link between undocumented immigration and drug cartels. Republican Congressman Bryan Steil, who won in Wisconsin District 1, claimed on his campaign website that “drug dealers (and) human traffickers” are crossing the border, framing it in such a way that implies the two are intertwined in their business dealings. Republican Congressman John James, who won reelection in 2022 for Michigan District 10, conducts a similar framing in a tweet highlighting “millions of illegal border crossings, millions of lethal doses of Chinese fentanyl.”

A more brazen example of such framing can be found in campaign material from Blake Masters’ failed bid for Arizona Senate, which shamelessly claims that “More than 225,000 illegal aliens pour into our country every month. And they bring enough fentanyl over each month to kill every American twice over.” In a recent conference on immigration at American University, Dr. Andrew Selee, head of the Migration Policy Institute, notes that these organizations are separate entities. Though they sometimes do collaborate, they are by no means the same and have independent organizational structures. This is a subtle yet important distinction that has been masked to criminalize migrants and conflate them with criminal enterprises such as drug cartels.

The criminalization of migrants was certainly not limited to linking them to cartels. Many candidates rely upon preconceived racist notions of immigrant populations (mostly Latinos) in making generalizations. Such candidates keep their statements on immigration vague, like Nevada Republican Senate hopeful Adam Laxalt: “[the] crisis at the border that has put communities across Nevada in danger…. [Laxalt] fought against dangerous sanctuary city policies and worked to help stop their spread.” The advantages yielded by anti-immigrant candidates in utilizing this sort of vagueness are twofold. The first is that it appeals to a voter base that has already constructed a negative bias toward immigrant populations, and it is this sort of rhetoric that energizes these voters. The second advantage of such vagueness is the removal of the burden of proof from Laxalt or other candidates. Because of this vagueness, the claim becomes difficult to disprove because the meaning can be fluid and easily manipulated at the whim of the candidate.

Similarly, a campaign ad from Republican gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake of Arizona claims to finish the southern border wall and reinstate the “Remain in Mexico” policy: “the best policy I’ve seen in my 27 years, it worked.” The “Remain in Mexico” policy, a Trump-era directive modified by President Biden, has been largely condemned by human rights groups. Multiple immigration advocates highlighted that the policy forced all migrants to wait on the Mexican side of the border, including those who are escaping persecution in Mexico, in unsafe and uncertified conditions while their asylum case were pending.

Overall, anti-immigration statements like those highlighted in the 2022 midterm election campaigns are prevalent across Republican candidates. Trends indicate a rise in such rhetoric in congressional and presidential speeches with a partisan divergence as Republican candidates are more likely to employ this as a strategy in campaigning. Nonetheless, there was limited success for anti-immigrant campaigns in the 2022 midterm elections. The data shows that anti-immigration rhetoric is not a guarantee for winning elections; in fact, it may be an electoral vulnerability as it does not lead to more success in competitive elections.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

Joseph Fournier and Mary Capone are research assistants at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.

Sources

“2022 Midterms.” CNN Politics, Accessed September 17, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/election/2022.

Adam Laxalt for NV. “Issues | Adam Laxalt for Senate.” Accessed February 6, 2024. https://www.adamlaxalt.com/issues.

Card, D., Chang, S., Becker, C., Mendelsohn, J., Voigt, R., Boustan, L., Abramitzky, R., & Jurafsky, D. (2022). Computational analysis of 140 years of us political speeches reveals more positive but increasingly polarized framing of immigration. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(31). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2120510119 

Castaneda, Ernesto. “First Presidential Debate Was Mainly about Immigration, Few Noticed”. AULA Blog Accessed September 25, 2024 https://aulablog.net/2024/07/19/first-presidential-debate-was-mainly-about-immigration-few-noted/.

“Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy.” Justice for Immigrants. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://justiceforimmigrants.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Remain-in-Mexico_en.pdf.

Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Taddy, M. (2019). Measuring group differences in high dimensional choices: Method and application to congressional speech. Econometrica, 87(4), 1307–1340. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16566

James, John. (JohnJamesMI). “Our border is plagued with chaos – millions of illegal border crossings, millions of lethal doses of Chinese fentanyl & incompetence from the White House. I’m glad to support the House GOP’s Commitment to America to fund border security & put an end to human & drug trafficking.” September 26, 2022. 3:10 PM. Tweet. https://x.com/JohnJamesMI/status/1574476402392457217.

Jordan, Miriam. “’Ghost Flights’? The Facts Behind Transporting Migrant Children”. New York Times. June 24, 2022. Accessed February 4, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/us/ghost-flights-migrant-children.html?login=google&auth=login-google#.

“Kari Lake January 2022 Ad.” Accessed February 6, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&id=313372640712991&media_type=all.

“Remain in Mexico” Human Rights Watch. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/tag/remain-mexico

Robertson, Mark. “Mark’s Stances – Robertson for Congress.”Accessed February 11, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20221104220014/https://robertsonforcongress.com/stances/

Selee, Andrew. “Wilson Center Discussion on Immigration Policy”. September 23, 2024. C-SPAN, 58:43. https://www.c-span.org/video/?538598-1/wilson-center-discussion-immigration-policy.

Steil, Bryan. “The Issues: Bryan’s Vision for America – Securing Our Border”. Accessed September 26, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20221104220838/https://www.bryansteil.com/issues/.

“STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION – Dr. Oz for Senate.” Accessed February 11, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20221028022107/https://doctoroz.com/issue/stop-illegal-immigration/.

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by clalsstaff on October 3, 2024  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 3, 2024

https://aulablog.net/2024/10/03/anti-immigration-rhetoric-is-an-electoral-vulnerability-evidence-from-the-2022-midterm-elections/

Voter Concerns: The Economy or The Government’s Role in Shaping It?

By Ernesto Castañeda

September 27, 2024

On the morning of September 9, 2024, a Republican voter called into C-SPAN’s Washington Journal and said, “Democrats used to be all about the workers, but now it’s just socialism.” This short piece is respectfully directed to those who may share that sentiment. First, it’s important to note that, in principle, socialism is centered around workers, but it asks that workers own the companies they work at. Democrats are not socialists. Even the party’s most progressive figures, like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), identify as Democratic Socialists and advocate for the U.S. to adopt some of the social safety nets seen in Northern European countries and fight monopolies and for workers’ rights to create a tempered capitalism. Now, let’s turn to the real concerns about the economy as we approach the upcoming elections.

The economy is doing well

The U.S. economy is objectively performing very well, largely due to the Biden-Harris administration’s adoption and successful implementation of policies championed by figures like Sanders, Warren, and AOC. Compared to other countries, the U.S. has recovered more quickly from the pandemic’s effects, which were driven by lockdowns, labor shortages, and disruptions to global supply chains—all of which contributed to inflation. These policies, alongside immigration, have supported healthy economic growth. Notably, inflation and interest rates are decreasing without the economy slipping into a recession—an almost ideal outcome often referred to as a “soft landing.”

Nonetheless, some citizens and commentators still insist that the economy is weak, and voters often mention “the economy” as their main concern.

A shift in expectations on the economy

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was already common for millions of Americans to live paycheck to paycheck and carry significant debt. The pandemic, however, reshaped Americans economic expectations in at least three important ways: 1) The imminent threat to life placed greater value on human life and people’s time; 2) It exposed our heavy dependence on foreign producers, global supply chains, and essential local workers; and 3) It led to a bipartisan recognition that the government can and should take action to address hunger, unemployment, public wellbeing, inequality and support the working and middle class, as well as small and large business and postpone evictions in times of collective suffering.

Let me elaborate on point three. The economic policies and incentives—such as support for businesses both large and small, direct checks to families, and the child tax credit—implemented in a bipartisan effort during the pandemic by both the Trump-Pence and Biden-Harris administrations significantly raised economic standards and cut child poverty in half. These policies also reflected what C. Wright Mills advocated in the 1960s: when unemployment is widespread, it should be viewed as a social issue rather than a matter of personal responsibility, worth, or morality. In contrast to the neoliberal focus on market fundamentalism, these pandemic-era measures revived Keynesian principles, emphasizing a return to full employment and expanding support for policies reminiscent of FDR’s New Deal—where the government plays a role in reducing inequality and supporting the working and middle class.

The real cause of frustration

One of Joe Biden’s boldest and most significant accomplishments may have been his repeated assertion that “trickle-down economics has never worked. It’s time to grow the economy from the bottom up and the middle out.” This is a change in the long-held belief in individualistic ideologies, such as the notion of “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.” Stemming from this ideological shift, I believe much of the unease felt by the working and lower-middle class about “the economy” stems from frustration over the end of many pandemic-era cash transfers and stimulus checks, which were initiated by both the Trump and Biden administrations. These transfers and the forced savings due to the lockdowns allowed some families to pay credit card debt and even increase their savings, which for many are now depleted again.

Ironically, it was the Republican Party that blocked the extension of the child tax credit, a key measure backed by Democrats to support working families. Yet, many voters remain unaware of this. Meanwhile, tax-evading billionaires, including figures like Trump, exacerbate the economic challenges rather than providing solutions. A modest increase in taxes on billionaires would help fund essential programs like the child tax credit, and contrary to popular rhetoric, this is not socialism—it’s a practical approach to ensuring fair contributions from the wealthiest.

Outdated and Misguided Economic Narratives

Trump has attempted to link his scapegoating of immigrants to the current economic challenges, falsely claiming that immigrants are taking jobs from those most in need, particularly African Americans, Hispanics, and union workers. However, this argument does not hold up—unemployment rates are low, and wages are rising. As a result, most people are unlikely to be swayed by this rhetoric. Those who do buy into it likely already held anti-immigration views prior to the pandemic and/or are victims of structural changes stemming from Reaganomics.

By invoking fears that the U.S. could become “like Venezuela,” Trump taps into concerns among immigrants who lived Venezuela’s prosperity before Chavismo or those fleeing other authoritarian regimes. However, Republicans risk losing these voters by frequently portraying Venezuelan immigrants as criminals—members of the Tren de Aragua gang—or as individuals released from prisons and mental institutions by Maduro and sent to the U.S. This narrative echoes real historical events such as Cuba’s Marielitos or British prisoners sent to Australia as settlers, as well as xenophobic stereotypes and prejudices once directed at Irish, Italian, and Mexican immigrants. History, however, shows that the children of immigrants often experience rapid social mobility and thus contribute as much, if not more, to society than the children of native-born citizens.

Some attempt to alarm undecided voters by claiming that Harris is advocating for price controls. In reality, she is focused on preventing monopolies and negotiating better prices when the government buys in bulk, as demonstrated successfully with insulin. This pragmatic approach has broad support across Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. Harris and Walz are not pushing radical leftist ideas; rather, they are promoting a moderate populism that is not linked to exclusionary Christian nationalism.

“Opportunity economy”

In her speech at the Economic Club of Pittsburgh on September 25, 2024, Harris stated:

“The American economy is the most powerful force for innovation and wealth creation in human history. We just need to move past the failed policies that have proven not to work. And like generations before us, let us be inspired by what is possible. As president, I will be guided by my core values of fairness, dignity, and opportunity. I promise you I will take a pragmatic approach. I will engage in what Franklin Roosevelt called bold, persistent experimentation, because I believe we shouldn’t be constrained by ideology but instead pursue practical solutions to problems.”

With this statement, she invoked FDR’s legacy while offering a centrist, pragmatic vision for addressing the economic challenges facing Americans.

While some commentators argue that Harris and Walz haven’t provided enough details on their economic policy, they are actually offering a balanced approach that appeals to both corporations and small businesses. Their plan promotes U.S. manufacturing and nearshoring, aims to reduce the climate impact of production and consumption, and provides much-needed support to the low and middle class in regions hit hardest by deindustrialization. Trump talks much about caring about the working class but did little to benefit them structurally and long-term while in the White House. Policies like exempting tips and overtime from taxation fit within Harris’ framework, but Harris also advocates for more ambitious measures to really level the economic playing field a bit more. Harris calls this vision the ‘opportunity economy,’ a pragmatic approach to economic and industrial policy that many former Bernie and Trump supporters could, in principle, support.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

Edited by Robert Albro, CLALS Associate Director of Research, and Edgar Aguilar, International Economics master’s student at American University.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

 

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by clalsstaff on September 27, 2024  •  Permalink
Posted in Immigration, Regional Snapshot, United States
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 27, 2024

https://aulablog.net/2024/09/27/voter-concerns-the-economy-or-the-governments-role-in-shaping-it/

Deportaciones Masivas Podrían Crear una Recesión en EE.UU

Ernesto Castañeda

Entrevista de Diana Castrillón a Ernesto Castañeda publicada por Stornia 13 de agosto de 2024 editada y expandida por Castañeda.

Diana Castrillón: “La inmigración irregular es uno de los temas más importantes de las campañas presidenciales de los candidatos, el republicano Donald Trump y la demócrata Kamala Harris. Por un lado, la administración de Biden-Harris restringió el número de solicitantes de asilo que pueden ingresar al país. Por otro lado, los republicanos están prometiendo el “mayor programa de deportación masiva en la historia de Estados Unidos” si es que ganan la Casa Blanca este otoño.

El sentimiento antiinmigrante en Estados Unidos está en aumento. Este año, el 55% de los estadounidenses dijeron que les gustaría ver una disminución de la inmigración, una novedad desde el 2001. Esto se debe en parte a la creencia que los inmigrantes, en particular los indocumentados, son una carga para los recursos del gobierno y no contribuyen en nada.

Sin embargo, un nuevo estudio del Instituto de Política Fiscal y Económica muestra que es todo lo contrario. Según el informe, los inmigrantes indocumentados contribuyeron con casi $100 mil millones de dólares en impuestos durante 2022 y a su vez, no pudieron acceder a muchos de los programas que financiaron sus dólares de impuestos.

De esos casi $100 mil millones, $60 mil millones se destinaron al gobierno federal. Por cada millón de inmigrantes indocumentados, los servicios federales reciben $8.900 millones de dólares adicionales en ingresos fiscales. Más de un tercio de los impuestos que pagan estos inmigrantes se destinan a programas a los que no pueden acceder, como la Seguridad Social ($25,700 millones de dólares), salud Medicare ($6,400 millones de dólares) y el seguro de desempleo ($1,800 millones de dólares).

Los indocumentados suelen pagar tasas impositivas más altas que los ciudadanos estadounidenses. En 40 de los 50 estados del país, los inmigrantes irregulares pagan tasas de impuestos estatales y locales más altos que el 1% de los hogares con mayores ingresos. Además, no pueden recibir muchos créditos fiscales. No se dan cuenta que pueden reclamar reembolsos y tampoco tienen acceso a ayuda fiscal.

“En total, la contribución fiscal federal de los inmigrantes indocumentados ascendió a $59,400 millones de dólares en 2022, mientras que la contribución fiscal estatal y local se situó en 37,300 millones de dólares”, escribieron los autores del estudio. “Estas cifras dejan claro que las decisiones sobre política migratoria tienen implicaciones sustanciales para los ingresos públicos en todos los niveles de gobierno”, menciona el informe.”

En entrevista con Stornia, Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director del Laboratorio de la Inmigración y el Centro de Estudios Latino Americanos y Latinos de American University en Washington DC, aseguró que los inmigrantes son necesarios y esenciales para el crecimiento económico de Estados Unidos.

Diana Castrillón: ¿Cómo paga un inmigrante indocumentado impuestos, si como su nombre lo dice, son migrantes irregulares?

Ernesto Castañeda: Los indocumentados pagan impuestos cada vez que compran algo, está el impuesto a la compra, el porcentaje depende de cada localidad. Si compran casas, que lo pueden hacer, también pagan impuestos, si rentan o pagan renta, también hay un porcentaje que se debe pagar en impuestos al gobierno local y federal. La gente indocumentada que trabaja en compañías formales, que son muchos, pueden tener una identificación temporal para pagar impuestos (ITIN), que funciona de manera similar al número de Seguridad Social, entonces pagan impuestos a la nómina como cualquier otra persona trabajando en Estados Unidos. Hay gente que usa documentos de identidad falsos o que no les corresponden, pero alguien se los presta, y así pagan a las arcas de Seguro Social y programas de retiro y de salud, pero como el número es falso o no es de ellos, no tienen acceso a esos beneficios.

Entonces, no solo pagan a estos servicios, sino que muchos inmigrantes no piden ese apoyo. Por lo tanto, tienen una contribución mayor a los ciudadanos que pagan, pero quien luego si retiran esas ayudas. Es una ganancia que el Gobierno Federal y el Tesoro aceptan abiertamente que sucede.

¿Entonces los inmigrantes indocumentados están pagando más impuestos que los mismos ciudadanos americanos?

Si, la tasa de muchos indocumentados que pagan impuestos es más alta que las tasas que paga la gente más rica del país. Claro, los ingresos son diferentes pero la tasa es a veces mayor o muy similar, a la de los ciudadanos. Los ciudadanos llenan sus declaraciones de impuestos y muchas veces piden reembolsos, por ejemplo, por gastos de negocios o les dan un crédito por tener hijos, pero muchos de los indocumentados no hacen esos reclamos porque no quieren que más adelante se les niegue la ciudadanía por haber pedido ayudas o servicios. Por ese temor, tampoco piden programas de apoyo para sus hijos, que ya son ciudadanos y tienen derecho a esos servicios. Hemos comprobado en nuestras investigaciones en el Laboratorio de Inmigración que los inmigrantes usan menos servicios sociales que los nacionales (Castañeda y Cione, 2024).

Pareciera que los indocumentados están entre la espada y la pared ahora con la campaña electoral tanto por el lado de los republicanos como por el lado de los demócratas, ¿hay preocupación en la comunidad?

Algunos políticos usan a los inmigrantes indocumentados como chivos expiatorios en tiempos electorales. Por un lado, Trump hace esta amenaza de deportaciones masivas, pero es poco probable que lo haga, eso mismo lo había prometido anteriormente y cuando fue presidente no deportó a tanta gente. Eso no significa que la gente no tenga miedo ahora y si gana creará un terror real entre la población que ya de por sí vive con mucho miedo a que los encuentren como indocumentados a ellos o a alguien cercano.

En cuanto situaciones de asilo, en efecto, mucha gente está escapando de situaciones difíciles en Afganistán, Ucrania, Cuba, Venezuela, Haití o Nicaragua.  Muchos con pruebas de persecución, y ahora el gobierno ha cambiado cómo tramita buscar asilo.  La frontera está cerrada a muchas de esas peticiones de asilo como se hizo durante la pandemia. Por ende, estamos viendo menos cruces irregulares en la frontera. La administración Biden-Harris piensa que eso les puedes ayudar electoralmente para que los republicanos no les hagan la crítica de que la frontera está supuestamente abierta y los que indocumentados o quienes piden asilo están recibiendo comida y vivienda en algunas ciudades. Es un momento difícil, y no es sostenible. En algún momento van a tener que reabrir la frontera al asilo humanitario, porque a lo que llaman el derecho nacional e internacional es a recibir a la gente que está pidiendo asilo. Tras procesar sus aplicaciones, a unos los aceptarán a otros no.

Trump necesitaría mucho dinero y mucha policía, casi tendría que crear un estado totalitario para poder deportar a toda la gente que está aquí sin papeles migratorios en regla. Muchas de estas personas tienen más de 10 años aquí, tienen hijos ciudadanos, trabajan, contribuyen, por lo cual, deportar masivamente o dejar de recibir inmigrantes es un gran ataque a Estados Unidos. La economía se podría contraer. Se podría crear una recesión porque como mencionamos anteriormente, los migrantes pagan miles de millones en impuestos, pero los impuestos son un porcentaje pequeño de lo que la gente gana. La mayoría de los inmigrantes ganan, lo gastan en las ciudades donde viven, y con el trabajo que hacen generan crecimiento económico, servicios, entretenimiento y hacen que la economía crezca.

Hace algunos días JD Vance, la fórmula vicepresidencial de Donald Trump justificaba el plan de deportación masiva y decía que los indocumentados le están robando plazas de trabajo a los ciudadanos americanos. ¿Existe esa fila de estadounidenses esperando a que deporten inmigrantes para tomar sus puestos de trabajo?

Esto no funciona así. Trump y Vance están equivocados sobre que los inmigrantes les quitan trabajos a los afroamericanos o a otros ciudadanos. Es un estereotipo fácil de vender, algún votante pudo haber tenido una experiencia donde pareciera que pudo ser el caso, sin embargo, si vemos a la economía en general, la inmigración genera nuevos empleos.

En Florida, está en efecto la ley anti-inmigrante más estricta del país. De hecho, han salido muchos indocumentados del estado, y hoy no hay suficiente mano de obra para la construcción, para servicios como hoteles, para la agricultura en los cultivos de naranjas. Entonces los negocios que necesitaban esa mano de obra para generar riqueza ahora no pueden tener su negocio al 100%. Propietarios de granjas han tenido que cerrar porque les falta mano de obra para trabajar, algunos negocios pequeños han tenido que limitar sus horas de servicios. Si no hay construcción no hay viviendas, seguirá habiendo inflación por las viviendas existentes. Los inmigrantes llegan y necesitan un lugar donde vivir, quien les corte el pelo, quien les venda comida, entonces generan trabajo e ingreso para los comerciantes.

Los migrantes emprenden con más negocios (desde pequeños negocios hasta las grandes empresas) que los nacidos en Estados Unidos. También sabemos que los inmigrantes emplean más gente que los dueños de negocios del país. No es que haya un pastel que esté limitado y se lo reparta el número de gente que llega, entre más personas lleguen, incrementa el tamaño del pastel entonces hay más pastel para todos. No es una competencia desleal y eso se ve en las tasas de desempleo.

Ahora bajo la administración Biden-Harris tenemos una tasa de desempleo para afroamericanos históricamente baja, una tasa de desempleo de latinos muy baja y no hay muchos ciudadanos de origen europeo que están desempleados porque algún migrante esté tomando su trabajo, si noq que usualmente no encuentran trabajo porque no los estudios o capacitación suficiente para tomar un empleo bien pagado, o por el contrario, porque tienen demasiada educación y no hay un empleo con alto ingreso que les convenga tomar. O porque se rehúsan a mudarse dentro del país para buscar trabajo. Las tasas de desempleo son bajas en general y de lo que se quejan los empresarios es que no tienen suficiente personal para expandir sus negocios. Esto también afecta a los ciudadanos buscando servicios, teniendo que esperar más en restaurantes porque no hay suficientes meseros o cocineros.

¿Cuál es la respuesta para el manejo de inmigración, más visas temporales de empleos, legalizar a los indocumentados o hacer más muro en la frontera?

La solución a los casos de inmigración irregular a largo plazo es aumentar las visas temporales de empleo para que la gente venga de manera legal. Existen programas como la Visa H2A, H2B son ejemplos de visas que funciona muy bien, la gente viene, trabaja y se regresa a su país, porque ya ganaron ingresos en dólares pudieron ahorrar suficiente y ahora quieren estar con su familia.

El problema es que hay límites, hay cuotas para esas visas, son para cierto tipo de empleos, y hay más demanda de esa gente trabajadora temporal de lo que la que la ley permite. Para que aumenten los topes, los números de esas visas, el Congreso tiene que actuar. Tiene que actuar la Cámara de Representantes y el Senado, y tienen que estar de acuerdo los demócratas, de que es lo que harían, y un número suficiente de republicanos. Pero ellos se niegan a hacerlo, porque parece que no quieren solucionar el tema, solo lo quieren usar de manera electoral.

Para las personas que ya están aquí, la solución es legalizarlos. Al darle papeles o permisos laborales a quienes están aquí, de esa manera muchos ganarían más dinero, tendrían más confianza de invertir, pagarían más impuestos. Esto sería una inyección a la economía americana, y podrían traer a sus familiares de manera legal y expandir la base trabajadora un poco más.

Y eso es algo que ni Trump ni Vance entienden, nunca lo harán. A diferencia del presidente Ronald Reagan, quien sí firmó una ley como esa, aunque a regañadientes. Tampoco es algo sobre lo que han querido hablar mucho Kamala Harris ni Tim Walz en la campaña porque la gente lo usa como un ataque muy simple con ellos, pero los dos tienen un historial político de apoyar este tipo de medidas.

¿Y con esta legalización de indocumentados en Estados Unidos ganan países de América Latina o pierden?

Las remesas representan solo el 4% de lo que los inmigrantes generan en Estados Unidos. Un migrante que está más establecido o es profesional, manda remesas menos seguido, entonces son ayudas a familias en pobreza. Las remesas representan separaciones familiares por años hasta que el migrante termina regresando o trata de traer a la familia entera. Es una ayuda a corto plazo, pero pone a las familias que se dividen en dificultad emocional y cualquier país que pierde migrantes, desde agricultores hasta científicos, médicos, como en Cuba que ha perdido un par de millones de migrantes profesionales durante el último par de años debilita cada vez más su economía. También pasa en la economía venezolana, que ha sido debilitada entre otras muchas cosas por la emigración. Las remesas son ayudas de corto plazo, pero la verdadera ayuda económica se da en donde llegan los migrantes, en este caso Estados Unidos.

De acuerdo con el estudio de Instituto de Política Fiscal y Económica, la autorización de trabajo sería beneficiosa para todos, pues otorgar a los inmigrantes indocumentados una autorización de trabajo resultaría en un aumento de sus contribuciones fiscales de $40,000 millones de dólares a $137,000 millones de dólares por año, ya que la autorización de trabajo aumentaría los salarios.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director del Laboratorio de Inmigración y el Centro de Estudios Latino Americanos y Latinos, American University en Washington DC.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

The English version of this text is available at the following link: https://aulablog.net/2024/08/26/mass-deportations-could-create-a-us-recession/

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by clalsstaff on August 26, 2024  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 26, 2024

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Mass Deportations Could Create a US Recession

By Ernesto Castañeda

Interview by Diana Castrillon with Ernesto Castañeda published in Stornia August 13, 2024. Edited and expanded by Castañeda. Original in Spanish. Translated by Castañeda.

Diana Castrillon: “Irregular immigration is one of the most important issues in the presidential campaigns of the candidates, Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris. On the one hand, the Biden administration, of which Vice President Harris is part, restricted the number of asylum seekers entering the country, and on the other hand, Republicans are promising the “largest mass deportation program in US history” if they win the White House this fall.

Anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States is on the rise, with more than half (55%) of Americans this year saying they would like to see a decrease in immigration, a first since 2001. This is partly due to the belief that immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, are a burden on government resources and contribute nothing to the economy.

However, a new study from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy shows that the opposite is true. According to the report, undocumented immigrants contributed nearly $100 billion in taxes during 2022, while being unable to access many of the programs their tax dollars funded. Of that nearly $100 billion, $60 billion went to the federal government. For every million undocumented immigrants, federal services receive an additional $8.9 billion in tax revenue. More than a third of the taxes paid by these immigrants go to programs they cannot access, such as Social Security ($25.7 billion), Medicare ($6.4 billion), and unemployment insurance ($1.8 billion).

In addition, undocumented immigrants often pay higher tax rates than American citizens: in 40 of the 50 U.S. states, illegal immigrants pay higher state and local tax rates than the 1% of households with the highest incomes. In addition, they cannot receive many tax credits and often do not realize that they can claim refunds or prefer not to. “In total, the federal tax contribution of undocumented immigrants amounted to $59.4 billion in 2022, while the state and local tax contribution stood at $37.3 billion,” the authors of the study wrote. “These figures make it clear that decisions on immigration policy have substantial implications for public revenues at all levels of government,” the report says.

In an interview with Stornia, Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University in Washington DC, said that immigrants are necessary and essential for the economic growth of the United States.

Diana Castrillon: How does an undocumented immigrant pay taxes, if as their name suggests, they are irregular migrants?

Ernesto Castañeda: Undocumented immigrants pay taxes every time they buy something; there is a sales tax, and the percentage depends on each locality. If they buy houses, they also pay taxes, or if they rent, there is a percentage that must be paid in taxes to the local and federal governments. Undocumented people who work in formal companies, which are many, can have a temporary identification to pay taxes (ITIN), which works in a similar way to a Social Security number, so they pay payroll taxes like any other person working in the United States. There are some undocumented people who use false or incorrect identification documents, but someone lends them one, and so they pay into the Social Security and retirement and health programs. However, since the number is false or does not belong to them, they do not have access to those benefits when they retire. So, not only do they pay for these services, but many immigrants do not ask for these benefits. Therefore, they have a net or even greater contribution than the citizens who pay, but then they withdraw those benefits such as social security after retirement. It is a gain that the federal government and the Treasury openly accept that happens.

So, are undocumented immigrants paying more taxes than American citizens themselves?

Yes—the rate of many undocumented people who pay taxes is higher than the rates paid by the richest people in the country. Of course, their incomes are different, but the rate is sometimes higher or very similar to that of citizens. Citizens fill out their tax returns and often ask for tax returns and reimbursements, for example, they get a credit for having children, but many undocumented taxpayers do not make these claims because they do not want to be denied citizenship in the future for having asked for aid. Nor do they ask for support programs for their children, who are already citizens and have the right to those services, out of fear. We have documented that, indeed, immigrants use fewer social services than U.S.-born citizens (Castañeda and Cione, 2024).

It seems that undocumented immigrants are between a rock and a hard place now with the electoral campaign on both the Republican and Democratic sides. Is there concern in the community?

Some politicians use undocumented immigrants as scapegoats. On the one hand, Trump makes this threat of mass deportations, but it is unlikely that he will do it. He had promised that before, and when he was president, he did not deport as many people. That doesn’t mean that people aren’t scared now, and if he wins, he’s going to create real terror among the people who already live in fear of themselves or their family members being found. That’s a reality that undocumented immigrants have been living with for many years.

As for asylum, in fact, many people are fleeing Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti, many with proof of persecution, and now the government has changed how it processes these asylum cases. The border is closed to many of these asylum requests as it was during the pandemic, so we’re seeing fewer people let in through the wall in between ports of entry. The Biden-Harris administration thinks that this can help them electorally so that Republicans don’t criticize them about the border supposedly being open or about undocumented individuals or those seeking asylum temporarily receiving food and housing in some cities. At some point, they will have to reopen the border to asylum seekers because national and international law calls to receive people who are asking for asylum. Some will be accepted, others will not after processing their applications.

Trump would need a lot of money and policing. He would have to create a totalitarian state to be able to deport all the people who are here. Many of these people have been here for more than 10 years. Their children are citizens. They work, and they contribute. So, deporting in massive numbers or stopping receiving immigrants and asylum seekers is a great attack on the United States and the economy could contract. Massive deportations from the interior could create a recession because, as we indicated, migrants pay billions in taxes. However, taxes are a small percentage of what people earn, and most of what immigrants earn is spent in the cities where they live. With the work they do, they generate economic growth, services, and entertainment.

A few days ago, JD Vance, Donald Trump’s vice-presidential candidate, justified the mass deportation plan and said that undocumented immigrants are stealing jobs from American citizens. Is there a line of Americans waiting for immigrants to be deported to take their jobs?

It doesn’t work like that. Trump and Vance are wrong about immigrants taking jobs from citizens or African Americans. It’s an easy stereotype to sell. Some voters may have had an experience where it seemed that could be the case. However, if we look at the economy in general, immigration generates new jobs. In Florida, the strictest anti-immigrant law in the country is in effect. In fact, many undocumented immigrants have left the state, and today, there is not enough labor for construction, services such as hotels, or even to pick oranges. So, the businesses that needed that labor to generate wealth now do not have their business functioning 100%. Middle-sized farm owners have had to close because they lack the labor, and some small businesses have had to limit their service hours. If there is no construction, there is no housing, and there is more inflation for existing housing. Immigrants arrive and need a place to live, someone to cut their hair, and someone to sell them food, so they generate work and income for merchants. Immigrants start more service businesses, as well as large companies, than those born in the United States. We also know that in general, immigrants employ more people than business owners who are from the country.

It is not like there is an economic pie that is shared by the number of people who are here plus those who arrive. Indeed, the more people arrive, the bigger the pie becomes, so there will be more pie for everyone to share. It is not unfair competition, and that is seen in the unemployment rates. Under the Biden-Harris administration, we have a historically low unemployment rate for African Americans and for Latinos. There are very few citizens of European origin who are unemployed because some immigrants are taking their jobs. They usually do not find work because they do not have enough education to take a job or, on the contrary, because they have too much education and there is no high-income job that they can take. Or because they refuse to move to look for work. Unemployment rates are low and what business owners complain about is that they do not have enough staff in organizations to expand their businesses. This also affects citizens looking for services and having to wait longer in restaurants because there are not enough waiters or cooks.

What is the answer to immigration management, more temporary employment visas, legalizing undocumented immigrants, or building more walls on the border?

The solution to long-term cases of irregular immigration is to increase temporary employment visas so that people can migrate legally. There are programs such as the H2A and H2B visas, which are examples of visas that work very well. People come, work, and return to their country because they have already earned income in dollars and want to be with their families. The problem is that there are limits, there are quotas for these visas, they are for certain types of jobs, and there is more demand for these temporary workers than the law allows. Congress has to pass legislation to increase the number of these visas. Thus, the House of Representatives and the Senate, along with enough members from both parties, have to agree. Many Republicans refuse to reform immigration because they want to use it for electoral purposes rather than solve the issue.

For the people who are already here, the solution is to legalize them. By giving papers or work permits to those who are here, many would earn more money, have more confidence to invest, and pay more taxes. This would be an injection into the American economy, and they could bring their relatives legally and expand the worker base a little more. That is something that neither Trump nor Vance understands, and they would never do it. Unlike President Ronald Reagan, who did sign a law like that, although reluctantly. It is not something that Kamala Harris or Tim Walz have wanted to talk about much in the campaign either because people use it as a very simple attack, but they have a political history of supporting these types of measures.

And with this legalization of undocumented immigrants in the United States, do Latin American countries win or lose?

Remittances represent only 4% of the wealth that immigrants generate in the United States, and a migrant who is more established sends remittances less often. Remittances help support families in economic need, but they represent long family separations until the migrant ends up returning or tries to bring the entire family. So, it is short-term help, but it puts families that are divided in emotional difficulty. In any country that loses migrants, from farmers to scientists, from teachers to doctors —like Cuba which loses a couple of million professional migrants every year for the last couple of years— and increasingly weakens its economy. The same is true of the Venezuelan economy, which, among other things, has been weakened by emigration.

Remittances are short-term aid, but the real economic growth happens where the migrants live, in this case, the United States.

According to the study by the Institute for Fiscal and Economic Policy, work authorization would be beneficial for everyone since granting undocumented immigrants a work authorization would result in an increase in their tax contributions from $40 billion to $137 billion per year since the work authorization would increase salaries.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

The Spanish version of this text is available at the following link: https://aulablog.net/2024/08/26/deportaciones-masivas-podrian-crear-una-recesion-en-ee-uu/

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Venezuela: Authoritarian Election Aftermath

By Michael McCarthy

Photo credit to Matias Delacroix /AP

In the wake of a sham Presidential election event, Venezuela’s complex crisis appears to be deepening. Marked by electoral authorities’ apocryphal claims of a government victory, Maduro’s iron-fisted post-election crackdown against the opposition, and thus far unsuccessful efforts at international mediation from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, the ongoing electoral episode has placed the government and opposition in an increasingly bitter conflict.

Stuck in between stands the population, a large portion of which may migrate unless hope for political change can be revitalized. The region should brace itself for a new movement of Venezuelans abroad.   

The opposition coalition continues to press its case. The opposition is led by María Corina Machado, the winner of open primaries who was forced to endorse Edmundo González Urrutia after the government-controlled courts banned her candidacy. Their election witnesses documented a landslide victory — 67% to 31% for González Urrutia. Due to both the total lack of transparency by the electoral authorities (disaggregated precinct-level data has still not been published though that was the norm in previous Maduro-era elections) and the validity of election witness tally sheets consolidated by the González Urrutia campaign, opposition claims have resonated widely. The Biden administration and multiple Latin American governments recognized González Urrutia as the winner of the election, while even historical Left-wing allies of the chavista political movement, such as former President of Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, cast serious doubts on Maduro´s claim to victory.

Privately, numerous pro-government voices have admitted they cannot attest to the credibility of the official results, which state that Maduro won with 51% of the vote, a telling admission that no independent checks on executive power grabs exist. However, despite Maduro´s most acute crisis of legitimacy yet, no highly influential ruling party official or strategic international ally (Bolivia, China, Cuba, Russia) has publicly aired such concerns. Maduro seems more influenced by the hard line elements in his government and, amid his intransigence toward calls for releasing credible electoral data, his government seems headed for greater international isolation. Meanwhile, the opposition — though strengthened by its impressive organizational effort to retrieve over 80% of the tally sheets from voting centers — is struggling to capitalize on its status as the electoral majority.

The Biden administration is losing patience with the situation. Following a period of pre-election diplomatic engagement with Maduro, Washington is strongly considering the imposition of new individual sanctions against government authorities involved in engineering the fraudulent election results and responsible for recent human rights violations. According to Venezuelan human rights groups, Maduro’s security forces have arbitrarily detained over 1,500 persons since the July 28 vote, including activists and leaders from the different opposition coalition partners, as well as one hundred and thirty adolescents. Over 20 demonstrators died amid state repression against post-election protests held to contest the official results.

As this dark post-election period continues to unfold, Maduro not only has a corrupt and ideologically conditioned army but also time on his side. The regime´s cohesion, while lower than in previous moments of chavismo´s 25 years of rule, appears to be sufficiently strong for Maduro to hold power until the new presidential period begins in January 2025. Maduro holding power does not guarantee Venezuela’s stability. Rather, the electoral crisis is likely to translate into weaker than previously forecast economic growth (4% according to Spring 2024 projections by the IMF), a scenario that could, in turn prompt Maduro to panic and forsake the more pragmatic economic policies he’s been pursuing to contain inflation. Indeed, Maduro has never articulated an overarching vision to unify the movement the way Chávez did. While his ongoing use of coercion and repression has helped him secure loyalties among ruling party power brokers, those tools cannot fix the underlying problem of internal political fragmentations, some of which grew more salient during the multi-billion corruption scandal that resulted in Maduro jailing his oil czar Tareck El-Aissami, among others.

Thus, while the return to democracy in Venezuela still seems far off, it is also true that Maduro´s leadership has never been under as much pressure as it is today. His ability to deliver economic gains from the oil sector is likely to decline, with historical investors such as China likely to take a wait-and-see approach and Maduro´s ambition to join the BRICs+ and obtain New Development Bank financing likely to go unfulfilled. If the economy spirals downward, then Maduro will face tougher questions from his own coalition’s strategic players in the military. In this respect, Maduro’s blatant rigging of the vote count opens a new, highly uncertain chapter in chavismo’s already stressful history of losing popular legitimacy.

Over sixty years ago, a previous Venezuelan dictator, Marco Pérez Jíménez, lost power months after holding a fraudulent plebiscite on his rule. A general uprising catalyzed a coup against Pérez Jiménez, which in turn yielded a caretaker transition government that later paved the way for restoring democratic rule. History may not repeat itself, but if one is searching for reasons to believe Maduro has not consolidated power for good, Venezuela’s past has plenty to offer.

Michael McCarthy is President of Caracas Wire, and Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University

Edited by Ernesto Castaneda, Director of the Center for Latin America and Latino Studies

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by clalsstaff on August 26, 2024  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 26, 2024

https://aulablog.net/2024/08/26/venezuela-authoritarian-election-aftermath/

Brazil: Lula Trying to Exert Civilian Control over Security Forces

By Luiza Duarte*

Property damage in the National Congress Building in Brasilia caused by pro-Bolsonaro insurrectionists on January 8, 2023 / Agência Senado / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

The attack on the Three Powers Plaza in Brasilia on January 8 exposed a civil-military crisis that threatens to hinder President “Lula” da Silva’s efforts to put Brazilian democracy back on track and pursue the agenda for which he was elected. The direct participation of current and former members of the military, the military police, and their family members in the invasion of the country’s Congress, Presidential Palace, and Supreme Court is evidence that the relationship of the new government with the security forces is at the center of its struggle to protect Latin America’s largest democracy.

  • The security forces not only failed to block a coup attempt about which threats were made repeatedly; they protected pro-coup demonstrators for weeks in front of military installations in different states. They also chose not to publicly condemn the unprecedented anti-democratic riots, nor to dismiss baseless claims of electoral fraud. Videos show military police dismantling a barrier in Congress, facilitating the invasion. Evidence suggests that some had been collaborating with the attackers. A recent survey shows that four in 10 public security agents see the January 8 rioters’ demands as “legitimate.”
  • The politicization of the security forces deepened under former President Jair Bolsonaro, when the number of military personnel in civilian leadership positions in the Federal Administration more than doubled – reaching the highest figure since re-democratization in the late 1980s. A retired captain himself, Bolsonaro had a general as his vice president and had 10 state ministers from the uniformed armed forces. His reelection bid in October mobilized support in the defense sector.
  • Before the second round of elections, retired General Maynard Santa Rosa, Bolsonaro’s Secretary for Strategic Affairs for nine months, told the press that police forces may be insufficient to contain possible conflicts in the event of a Bolsonaro defeat. Rather than discourage protests, he suggested that the armed forces could establish order through a Law and Order Guarantee (GLO) decree.

Security threats and signs of security forces’ dissatisfaction with the election results mounted during the transition period to the point that Lula moved to change the military command even before his inauguration. Radical Bolsonaro supporters burned eight vehicles in the capital one day after Lula’s victory was confirmed by the Electoral Court in mid-December. One week before his swearing-in on New Year’s Day, police arrested a suspect in a failed bomb attack – a man who had camped out with other radicals in front of the Brazilian Army’s general headquarters and planned to force a declaration of “state of siege” that would pave the way for a coup.

  • The need to reduce the number of non-civilians in the government was recognized by the new administration before January 8, but the coup attempt made it urgent to move quickly. In the aftermath of the attacks, Lula sacked the country’s Army chief, Júlio Cesar de Arruda (in the position for less than one month); changed the command of Federal Police in 18 states; and dismissed 26 commanders of the Federal Highway Police. The latter was involved in widespread allegations of illegal roadblocks on election day, raising fears of voter suppression in pro-Lula regions.
  • The day after the January 8 attack, the Federal District governor was suspended for 90 days. One week after, Brazilian police searched the residence of Anderson Torres, Bolsonaro’s Justice Minister and in charge of Brasilia’s public security at the time, and found a draft decree to overturn the election results. Torres was arrested on suspicion of “omission” and “connivance.” In all, Lula so far has removed more than 140 troops assigned to different bodies linked to the Presidency, including some in charge of his security, for which the Federal Police is now responsible.

The political capital garnered by the new government after January 8 opens a window of opportunity for long-needed reform to address the military’s institutional hold on power. Less than two months into his presidency, Lula has announced changes in the Brazilian public security structure, including the restructuring of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) to remove the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (BIN) from military control. At the same time, the new administration is defending the creation of a permanent National Guard to replace the federal district military police in the protection of federal institutions in the capital. The new force would also act in indigenous lands and border areas and support state security, as the National Force currently does.

  • The security forces grew once again into a non-legitimate political actor, reversing progress made over the past 37 years. Brazil now has a fragile combination of political will and conditions to press for accountability and civilian control over the armed services.

*Luiza Duarte is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and at the Wilson Center, Brazil Institute. Duarte holds a PhD in Political Science from Sorbonne Nouvelle University’s Institute of Latin American Studies.

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by clalsstaff on February 17, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 17, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/02/17/brazil-lula-trying-to-exert-civilian-control-over-security-forces/

Chile: Dim Prospects for New Constitutional Assembly Soon

By Carlos Cruz Infante and Miguel Zlosilo*

The Constitutional Convention, shown here during a moment of silence at its inauguration, started amid optimism that a new Constitution would help heal the country’s deep splits / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Chile does not appear likely to restart efforts to write a new Constitution soon. The failure of the first draft – rejected by 62 percent of Chilean voters – has significantly weakened political leaders’ ability and resolve to try a second draft. Pollsters predicted that Rechazo (rejection) would win on September 4, and the result would fit within the left-right pendular swings of Chilean votes, but the devastating 16‑point advantage surprised all major observers.

Popular support for Constitutional reform has dissipated, even though many of the underlying issues that sparked the upheavals in 2019 and drove 78 percent of Chileans to vote for the Constituyente process remain formidable. Popular frustration with the political class and unhappiness with the first draft has bred apathy and probably disgust. 

  • The warning signs were clear before the referendum on September 4 rejected the draft. Its architects squandered their opportunity to craft a magna carta that transcended political agendas and instead they loaded the draft up with agenda items that would have best been resolved through normal political processes. Constituyente leaders’ efforts to expand people’s rights without a broader national debate turned out to be counterproductive – alienating even some crucial center-left players – and the lack of fiscal responsibility for some proposals gave right-leaning forces an issue with which to rally opposition. On top of that, investors feared that several regulatory changes would impact economic growth and unemployment.

Since the rejection, the nation’s political leaders have remained too wrapped up in their political agendas to develop a vision that could unify them and win popular support.

  • The center-left argues that a second (and successful attempt) is necessary to institutionalize Chile’s legacy since the end of the dictatorship in the 1990. Its narrative, however, is plagued with unrealistic expectations for them to provide leadership because they missed important opportunities to do so in the early 2000s.
  • President Gabriel Boric’s Frente Amplio and the left-leaning factions aligned with his government have so far failed to develop a political project. They admitted that a new Constitution is essential to their planned policies but did not inspire support. Boric has reached out to the center-left and, after the referendum failure, made a leader of the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Carolina Tohá Morales, Minister of the Interior. But polls, including Plaza Pública by Cadem and Activa Research, indicate that Boric’s approval rating is steadily diminishing, and his disapproval is rising. Critics say that he has been overly focused on Chile’s international image, not the political crisis caused by the Constituyente’s failure, but his recent moves on pension reform may help on that.
  • The center-right, which led the Rechazo efforts against the draft, has not yet shown a compelling need for a new Constitution and simply does not see the citizens’ urgency to push for one. Indeed, center-right leaders are enjoying the failures of the left and center-left during and since the Constituyente. The hard right has never wanted to abandon the Pinochet-era Constitution that was to be replaced.

A centrist coalition comprising some elements of the center-left and center-right has expressed conditional interest in getting a second try off the ground, but fear of “convention disaster 2.0” has stymied any progress. The centrists have separately indicated that they would support another convention if the two hard factions (left and right) accepted conditions that, they say, would pave the way forward. Regarding the substance of a new assembly, they want it built on social issues that already enjoy support – not a long wish list of one political sector or other. They also want constitutional and policy experts to be incorporated into the process as referees and observers empowered to rein in ideologues and partisans on both sides.  Neither the left nor right has so far accepted the conditions.

No clear way to get the constitutional redraft back on track has emerged yet, but the problems that led to popular demands for one have not gone away and could put a fire under the political class. The Amarillos por Chile, a broad-based group of moderates with experience and expertise (at first non-partisan but now its own party), have offered ideas for breaking the impasse – even though, like the political centrists, they so far have not figured out how to hold a successful second convention will help. Moreover, they do not have any elected congress member for political influence. They are former politicians and current business leaders who first emerged during the Constituyente, calling for moderation and rejection of sweeping changes that they called “refoundational.” Their backgrounds and relative lack of political agendas may give them the steady hand Chile needs to launch a second try. Until popular demands for change force the political parties to get serious, however, the Amarillos and other supporters of a new, better modulated Constituyente are in a waiting game.

*Carlos Cruz Infante is a sociologist and has served in several senior strategic planning positions in the Chilean government. Miguel Zlosilo is a sociologist and former chief of research of the Secretary of Communications in the second Sebastián Piñera government (2018-21).

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by clalsstaff on November 11, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on November 11, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/11/11/chile-dim-prospects-for-new-constitutional-assembly-soon/

U.S. Immigration Debate Skewed by Bad Statistics

By Ernesto Castañeda*

Sign demarcating US and Mexico territory on the southern US border in El Paso, Texas / Ernesto Castañeda / Creative Commons License

Immigration figures have long driven heated political debate in U.S. politics – even worse in recent years – but the data often exaggerate the problem because the responsible government agencies are double-counting and media reports are analyzing the numbers incorrectly. Opponents of President Joe Biden claim that over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered the United States each year since he became President. The numbers reported by relevant agencies should not drive headlines or be interpreted as stock tickers about whether immigration is up and down, but the data become political footballs serving generally anti-immigration political interests.

Border encounters involving people without immigration papers are just a small subset of all immigrants, emigrants, visitors, and border crossing commercial and tourist activity – almost 300 million over the past 12 months. Analysis of the numbers about border crossers reported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires clarification of what it considers “encounters.”

  • Because many people enter multiple times, the figures also reflect double-counting of many of the same individuals – sometimes more than five times each. Those of certain nationalities can be quickly removed and returned to Mexico for various reasons without adequate recording of their names and other details, making it impossible to know how many people are counted multiple times. Even those repatriated after a judge determines they do not qualify for asylum, humanitarian parole, or other special visa often try again and count as another “encounter.”
  • “Encounters” do not equal unique individuals but rather interactions between asylum-seekers or migrants and DHS personnel anywhere along the border. The U.S. Government reports, for example, that 1 million-1.3 million migrants were removed from the United States under Title 42 provisions intended to protect U.S. health in the context of the COVID pandemic – almost half of the total reported “encounters.” So “encounters” do not equal individuals entering the U.S. either.
  • The numbers include individuals whom the United States normally welcomes, including 140,000 unaccompanied minors looking to reunite with family members in the country, and over 20,000 Ukrainians. Russians and Afghans are in a similar situation. Cubans no longer are fast-tracked for permanent residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act, but the U.S. government cannot deport them because neither Mexico nor Cuba will take them back. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans, Haitians, and others are fleeing situations that most U.S. observers consider intolerable.
  • Comparing year-on-year figures is also deceptive. During 2020, the acceptance of asylum-seekers came almost to a halt. The pandemic, Title 42, and the “Remain in Mexico” program (under which individuals who pass a “credible fear” screening are forced to stay in Mexico while awaiting a hearing) created a backlog and bottleneck for the normal mobility that had occurred in previous years. Shifts in DHS accounting between years have also exaggerated the impression of a surge.

Other observers have confirmed migration specialists’ concerns about the over-counting. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), which monitors the staffing, spending, and enforcement activities of the federal government, reported in September that detention data released by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “is, once again, riddled with errors.” TRAC found “egregious” mistakes in several data categories that led the agency to seriously misrepresent conditions in its public statements.

While the U.S. government’s bad information makes precise calculations of migrant flows impossible, what is sure is that the total number of distinct individuals entering the United States without documentation is much less than 2 million a year. More credible estimates are that –after accounting for thousands of deportations – probably less than half a million people have been allowed in.

  • Among them, some were granted asylum – a right under U.S. and international law. Many others are welcome refugees and asylum-seekers like those from Ukraine and Afghanistan. Many others are waiting their turn in immigration court. Therefore, most of those included in this estimated half-million are in the United States legally, and the government knows who they are and where they live. By definition, they are not “illegal” or hiding. Allegations by a Texas senator and others that “4.2 million illegal immigrants have streamed across the border” since Biden took office are simply not true.

* Ernesto Castañeda teaches in the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences.

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by clalsstaff on November 3, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on November 3, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/11/03/u-s-immigration-debate-skewed-by-bad-statistics/

Ecuador: Weak Government Faces Growing Challenges

By Pablo Andrade Andrade*

Ecuadorians rallying during the paro nacional / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso has tried to overcome the economic mess and political divisions he inherited from predecessors with neoliberal policies that, along with other missteps, have fueled growing opposition to him and undermined his agenda during the final two years of his term. Even if, unlike most of his predecessors in the past 30 years, he serves out his term, his record will be marred by policies that had failed when first attempted in the 1980s. According to Perfiles de Opinión, a respected poll, 66 percent of the population say that Lasso’s performance is either “bad” or “very bad,” and only 2.06 percent evaluate his government as “very good.” 

  • Lasso’s immediate predecessors – Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno – left a country shaken by corruption, debt, a bungled strategy for dealing with COVID, and paralyzed public health and education services. He did not have a working majority in the National Assembly, and his CREO Movement failed to win control of key municipal and provincial governments. 
  • From the beginning, Lasso’s approach to the economic crisis was orthodox, borrowing heavily from the neoliberal fixes attempted in Ecuador in the 1980-90s. Although his administration managed to tap into the relative openness of the IMF and other IFIs, and successfully negotiated its massive debt with China, the Ministry of Economy and Finance adopted a tight budget, cutting state investments. Recovery from the pandemic slowed. Public employment – staple of the middle class – shrank, and inflation rose. 

Opposition to Lasso’s policies started weak but has grown steadily. The Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas (CONAIE), which had flexed its muscles during the Moreno government, was slow to mobilize at first, creating a situation that looked very much like the early wave of neoliberal politics in the 1980s, when a center-right government was able to bypass legislative opposition and weak civil society organizations. Last June, however, a new coalition of the three major rural organizations – CONAIE, Federación de Indígenas Evangélicos (FEINE), and Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN) – held a national strike (paro nacional) that effectively paralyzed the country for 18 days.  

  • The government backpedaled on its decisions to keep domestic fuel prices at international levels; to maintain low state expenditures for health and education; and to deny indigenous organizations a significant role in decision-making. Lasso reshuffled his cabinet, replacing a half dozen ministers. He opened negotiations with the rural organizations on a range of issues – spanning economic matters (i.e., fuel and food staples prices) and political ones (i.e., the designation of a new Secretario de Pueblos y Nacionalidades to replace the founding secretary Luis Pachala, who resigned in the wake of the national strike).  
  • Although the negotiations relieved some of the stress on the government, the core issues remain highly contentious, and so far, no agreement has emerged. Indigenous leaders say they are not happy with the process, and the few things agreed upon remain provisional. The Catholic Church tried to mediate but failed to progress beyond peripheral issues. In what looks like a desperate move, the government initiated a referendum process that most observers believe is intended to wrestle back the initiative on its own terms. 

The road ahead for the Lasso government is a difficult one – having essentially lame-duck status in the face of steadily mounting woes and opposition. His opponents are as strong and angry now as in June. Despite an improved fiscal stance, the government does not have the will or the capacity to expand public expenditures, so economic growth seems likely to continue at a snail’s pace, and employment will stay depressed in both urban and rural areas. The government’s unwillingness to adopt price controls will continue to fuel popular grievances. 

  • The leadership of CONAIE and others have already threatened a new nationwide mobilization and declared their opposition to the referendum initiative. Whatever support the executive was able to extract from the legislature has faded. Additionally, local government elections in 2023 are stimulating the parties to concentrate their efforts on their political fortunes.  
  • The Ecuadorian military, which played a major role in the abrupt departures of several Presidents over the past three decades, has so far avoided joining the partisan factionalism and appears united in the view that Lasso should stay. The President’s health may be as reliable an indicator as any of his fate. He recently traveled to Houston for treatment of melanoma, specifically a lesion in his right eyelid. In Quito’s churning rumor mill, convincing the population that he has been fully cured is nearly impossible. His efforts to assert his credibility as President will continue to be similarly challenged. 

* Pablo Andrade Andrade is the Germánico Salgado Chair on Andean Integration and Professor at the Department of Global and Social Studies, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador. He works on comparative political economy and Latin American politics. 

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by clalsstaff on September 29, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 29, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/09/29/ecuador-weak-government-faces-growing-challenges/

Chile: Constitutional Process Has Settled Little

By Carlos Cruz Infante and Miguel Zlosilo*

Demonstrators in Santiago, Chile call for a new constitution / www.jpereira.net / Creative Commons license

The Chilean Constitutional Convention handed its proposed draft to President Gabriel Boric on July 4 – in preparation for the “exit” referendum on September 4 that will approve or reject country’s new magna carta – but it hasn’t achieved the national unity, social cohesion, or popular support envisioned when 78 percent of Chileans voted for the convention in 2020.

Historical center-left leaders are publicly supporting the nay option, and opinion polls show support is declining.

  • Former President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Talge (1994-2000), a Christian Democrat who played a key role after the Pinochet dictatorship, has urged rejection because he sees “insurmountable disagreements with contents [of the draft] that compromise peace, democracy and the prosperity of our country.” He said the proposed reduction in presidential power and creation of an omnipotent new Senate could lead to dangerous populism. Former President Ricardo Lagos (2000-06) has not rejected the draft, but he has pulled back from his expected endorsement of it – a blow to the Boric government strategy for approval.
  • Leading opponents of the Pinochet-era Constitution, including former senior government officials, have criticized the proposed replacement, writing that “the electoral system is distorted with reserved seats, which reminds us of the institutional [appointed] senators of Pinochet’s Constitution.” Like Frei, they believe that the proposed system would incite conflict rather than cooperation.
  • The eight most reliable polls in the country show likely yay votes for the draft are dropping – from around 50 percent in February to about 35 percent this month. Nay votes rose from a third to roughly 50 percent in the same period. Activa Research has found that 62 percent reject the draft, while 38 percent approve of it. The 30 percent who were “undecided” last month has dropped to 20 percent, with most now rejecting the draft.

Five major factors – not all of which are the Constitutional Convention’s fault – appear to be driving this shift.

  • The Convention majority rejected pleas for greater fiscal responsibility as it wrote in a series of expensive new entitlements and nationalizations. Sponsors’ reactions to the criticism also alienated voters by saying “you stand with us, or you stand with Pinochet’s dictatorship.”
  • Favoritism and strident ideological positions undermined consensus. Most of almost 80 percent of Chileans who voted for the constitutional process in 2020 believed the new Constitution would be, for good, a “casa de todos” in terms of the social contract. The tense and confrontational debate during the process and its outcomes establishing group rights rather than universal policies let them down. 
  • Economic uncertainty since the social upheaval of 2019 – aggravated by the COVID‑19 pandemic and war in Ukraine – has undermined popular support as well. Inflation has risen steadily, and the Chilean peso has plunged to a historical low.
  • People feel insecure. The government’s performance in managing crime, drug trafficking, and the armed conflict in the south of the country against Mapuche extremist factions has not been satisfactory. Boric’s emphasis on a negotiated settlement has failed and may have worsened the problem.
  • Approval for Boric, sworn in less than five months ago amid great expectations, dropped to 34 percent this month, the lowest of his mandate. Poor communications have pushed the First Lady (who serves as head of Sociocultural Coordination) and Minister of Interior Izkia Sichesto to have the lowest approval ratings of the cabinet. Although Boric has repeatedly denied that his administration backs the yay option, his General Secretary of the Presidency affirmed earlier this year that Boric’s program requires the new Constitution to be approved.

No matter how the plebiscite on September 4 turns out, the Constitutional process now appears far from ending – and threats to political stability seem likely. If Chileans approve the draft, both sides will seek significant changes. If they reject it, changing the 1980 Constitution will still be essential to avoid tumult in the streets like rocked the country in 2019. Boric recently suggested starting a new Constitutional process from scratch, fueling further uncertainty.

  • While frustrations appear likely to grow and the chance of instability is not negligible, the Constitutional Convention process has shown that – so far – Chilean institutions have been able to maintain Rule of Law. Compared to Venezuela (1999), Bolivia (2006), and Ecuador (2007-08), Chile has followed an open and relatively stable track. But if the plebiscite does not deliver a clear, workable verdict in September, the country will again be at a crossroads – either build on what it’s accomplished since 2019 or try to start anew.

July 27, 2022

*Carlos Cruz Infante is a sociologist and has served in several senior strategic planning positions in the Chilean government. Miguel Zlosilo is a sociologist and former chief of research of the Secretary of Communications in the second Sebastián Piñera government (2018-21). This updates their recent AULABLOG articles (here and here) on the topic.

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by clalsstaff on July 27, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on July 27, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/07/27/chile-constitutional-process-has-settled-little/

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