By Luiza Duarte*

The attack on the Three Powers Plaza in Brasilia on January 8 exposed a civil-military crisis that threatens to hinder President “Lula” da Silva’s efforts to put Brazilian democracy back on track and pursue the agenda for which he was elected. The direct participation of current and former members of the military, the military police, and their family members in the invasion of the country’s Congress, Presidential Palace, and Supreme Court is evidence that the relationship of the new government with the security forces is at the center of its struggle to protect Latin America’s largest democracy.

• The security forces not only failed to block a coup attempt about which threats were made repeatedly; they protected pro-coup demonstrators for weeks in front of military installations in different states. They also chose not to publicly condemn the unprecedented anti-democratic riots, nor to dismiss baseless claims of electoral fraud. Videos show military police dismantling a barrier in Congress, facilitating the invasion. Evidence suggests that some had been collaborating with the attackers. A recent survey shows that four in 10 public security agents see the January 8 rioters’ demands as “legitimate.”
• The politicization of the security forces deepened under former President Jair Bolsonaro, when the number of military personnel in civilian leadership positions in the Federal Administration more than doubled – reaching the highest figure since re-democratization in the late 1980s. A retired captain himself, Bolsonaro had a general as his vice president and had 10 state ministers from the uniformed armed forces. His reelection bid in October mobilized support in the defense sector.
• Before the second round of elections, retired General Maynard Santa Rosa, Bolsonaro’s Secretary for Strategic Affairs for nine months, told the press that police forces may be insufficient to contain possible conflicts in the event of a Bolsonaro defeat. Rather than discourage protests, he suggested that the armed forces could establish order through a Law and Order Guarantee (GLO) decree.

Security threats and signs of security forces’ dissatisfaction with the election results mounted during the transition period to the point that Lula moved to change the military command even before his inauguration. Radical Bolsonaro supporters burned eight vehicles in the capital one day after Lula’s victory was confirmed by the Electoral Court in mid-December. One week before his swearing-in on New Year’s Day, police arrested a suspect in a failed bomb attack – a man who had camped out with other radicals in front of the Brazilian Army’s general headquarters and planned to force a declaration of “state of siege” that would pave the way for a coup.

• The need to reduce the number of non-civilians in the government was recognized by the new administration before January 8, but the coup attempt made it urgent to move quickly. In the aftermath of the attacks, Lula sacked the country’s Army chief, Júlio Cesar de Arruda (in the position for less than one month); changed the command of Federal Police in 18 states; and dismissed 26 commanders of the Federal Highway Police. The latter was involved in widespread allegations of illegal roadblocks on election day, raising fears of voter suppression in pro-Lula regions.
• The day after the January 8 attack, the Federal District governor was suspended for 90 days. One week after, Brazilian police searched the residence of Anderson Torres, Bolsonaro’s Justice Minister and in charge of Brasilia’s public security at the time, and found a draft decree to overturn the election results. Torres was arrested on suspicion of “omission” and “connivance.” In all, Lula so far has removed more than 140 troops assigned to different bodies linked to the Presidency, including some in charge of his security, for which the Federal Police is now responsible.

The political capital garnered by the new government after January 8 opens a window of opportunity for long-needed reform to address the military’s institutional hold on power. Less than two months into his presidency, Lula has announced changes in the Brazilian public security structure, including the restructuring of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) to remove the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (BIN) from military control. At the same time, the new administration is defending the creation of a permanent National Guard to replace the federal district military police in the protection of federal institutions in the capital. The new force would also act in indigenous lands and border areas and support state security, as the National Force currently does.

• The security forces grew once again into a non-legitimate political actor, reversing progress made over the past 37 years. Brazil now has a fragile combination of political will and conditions to press for accountability and civilian control over the armed services.

*Luiza Duarte is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and at the Wilson Center, Brazil Institute. Duarte holds a PhD in Political Science from Sorbonne Nouvelle University’s Institute of Latin American Studies.