The Taxing Debate

The Taxing Debate on Migration in the U.S.

By Mary Capone

November 19, 2024

Nearly half of American adults feel that immigration threatens national identity. This proportion has increased in recent years as anti-immigration sentiments have surged in politics and partisan divergence has deepened in rhetoric. The former Trump administration was highly influential in the anti-immigration movement, with much of Trump’s campaigns hinging on xenophobic policies like building a wall on the southern border and ending DACA. Such policies jeopardize the human rights of immigrants in the United States, who make up nearly 14% of the U.S. population. The Biden administration’s handling of immigration has also been criticized by 60% of Americans, indicating that the ongoing conflict over immigration is worsening.

Polls from PBS NewsHour, 2024.

 Why is migration so controversial? Shouldn’t people be allowed to migrate safely?

The answer lies in white supremacy and ‘tax dollars.’

At a 1983 Conservative Party conference, former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously said, “If the State wishes to spend more, it can do so only by borrowing your savings or by taxing you more. It is no good thinking that someone else will pay—that ‘someone else’ is you. There is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers’ money.” Like many politicians, Thatcher propagated the notion that government spending relies on taxpayers’ money, placing the burden of spending on individuals.

Similar sentiments are not uncommon in the United States. Former Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, featured this tagline in his 2018 campaign targeting his opponent: “Tony Evers: Special treatment for illegals, higher taxes for you.” Donald Trump continues to campaign on anti-immigration policies to appeal to Americans who feel skeptical about their tax dollars going to immigrant welcoming programs. Trump’s campaign website highlights “20 Core Campaign Promises to Make America Great Again,” two of which focus on blocking immigration, including the first promise: “Seal the border and stop the migrant invasion.” These arguments are used to justify relatively small government investment in important services that benefit communities of color and immigrants by suggesting they would be an imposition on the ‘taxpayer.’

To understand the historical use of the term ‘tax dollars,’ Camille Walsh analyzed hundreds of letters defending racial segregation addressed to the Supreme Court in the years following the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). One-third of the letters consisted of some language about taxes, taxpayers, or having “paid” for public schools, implying the right to decide whether to keep them segregated. The American ‘taxpayer’ historically represents white individuals, and such language “obscured class divisions among whites and elevated those racialized groups presumed to have higher taxable income to a higher position in claiming citizenship rights.” White individuals like Aura Lee (1956), argued that “poor white taxpayers are entitled to enjoy some all-white places, if they so desire.”

As the term ‘taxpayer’ is historically associated with whiteness, it is used to justify the entitlement of resources concentrated in white communities. Meanwhile, the ‘nontaxpayer’ is meant to symbolize Black and Brown individuals who are perceived not to have “earned” their rights. While this argument is used to exclude people of color from resources, historian James Anderson finds that taxes from predominantly Black communities were at least as much during the time of the Brown ruling, and often higher than those of white neighborhoods. These taxes were often distributed by white school boards into all-white schools prior to Brown. This does not account for today’s common tax evasion of the nation’s wealthiest individuals and corporations. The Treasury Department estimates that there is a $160 billion gap between what the wealthiest 1% of the population should pay and what they actually pay.

Seventy years after the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, politicians, citizens, and the media hold ‘taxpayer dollars’ to be sacred. Similar to the discussions surrounding racial integration in the mid-20th century, immigration represents a battle between the ‘taxpayer,’ or white American, and the ‘nontaxpayer,’ or immigrant. Just as white parents feared sending their children to integrated schools with “much lower standards and run-down facilities than the ones that [they] helped pay for,” many white Americans do not want immigrants to have access to vital resources and fear the use of their dollars on government spending.

Nevertheless, between sales taxes and property taxes, undocumented immigrants pay billions of dollars in taxes each year. Not only are immigrants taxpayers, but they pay taxes at higher rates than the richest Americans and get less in return. Taxpayer rhetoric is another weapon of othering by separating white U.S.-born individuals from Black and Brown immigrants, regardless of who pays their taxes.

Graph from the American Immigration Council (2016).

A quote from former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan counters concerns about government spending causing a deficit, stating: “There is nothing to prevent the government from creating as much money as it wants.” Similar to banks not lending out depositors’ money, government spending does not use tax dollars for spending. To illustrate this, the U.S. government spent trillions on wars post-9/11 and hundreds of billions to bail out banks in 2008, neither of which were framed as a tax dollar problem. Despite the framing of funding essential services as an attack on individual taxpayers, in reality, it falls within the bounds of federal government spending.

International law considers migration to be a universal right. Immigration control “is a relatively recent invention of states,” according to Vincent Chetail, a professor of international law. The U.S. has a duty to protect the rights of all people and not discriminate based on race, national origin, religion, or any other group category according to the 14th Amendment, and many international treaties it is a party to.

Research indicates that government investments in immigrants have a higher return over time. For example, more educated immigrants earn more and, therefore, pay more in taxes. Fiscal concerns are not based on reality, as immigrants are net contributors to the federal budget. ‘Tax dollars’ are simply a code for white dollars to instill fear and discrimination against vulnerable populations, despite taxation realities.

Mary Capone is a researcher at the Immigration Lab at American University.  

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Kamala Will Win

This Is Why Kamala Harris Will Win

By Ernesto Castañeda

November 5, 2024

Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.

Harris at the packed DC rally in the Ellipse on October 29.

My assessment is that Kamala Harris will win the election. It is not based on the polls or the betting markers, which are not helpful given their very tight margins. Instead, Harris’ big tent, misrepresentation of the primacy of the economy and immigration in surveys, and social trends lead me to believe that Harris will win.

First of all, following the voting trends from the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, Trump will not win the popular vote. This matters, as it determines popularity and broad appeal nationwide. Trump has never been appealing to over half of the population as a politician. While Trump was a fresh figure in politics in 2016, and there were some shy voters (given his novel strident and racist anti-immigrant comments), in 2024, he is a well-known entity, and most of his ardent followers are loud about their support, and not shy to say so to pollsters, door knockers, or people calling to get out the vote. Even so, attendance at his rallies and Trump flags outside of houses have decreased from previous cycles. Trump obsesses over crowd sizes, which was one of the indicators of his appeal in 2016. However, the infamous Madison Square Garden Trump rally on October 27 had around 19,500 people in attendance compared to around 30,000 people for Kamala Harris in Houston, Texas, on October 25, and over 75,000 at her rally in Washington, DC, on October 29.

Trump counts on a core base of around 33% of the electorate that holds strong views against immigration, complains about the economy, and will support Trump no matter what. Some more traditional Republicans will also vote for him. Nonetheless, his main campaign strategic imperative was to appeal to moderates, independents, and White suburban women to expand his margin over 50%. His 2024 campaign has not done so; he has focused on animating and mobilizing his core base. Many of his comments and those of his surrogates and supporters have alienated moderates as well as some registered Republicans. He has been more focused on discrediting the electoral process, the media, and his opponents and critics than on appealing to all voters.

In contrast, Kamala Harris has been explicitly open to conservative-leaning independents and even former Republican officeholders, including, but not limited to, Liz Cheney. Many registered Republicans, college-educated men, and many women will vote for her. That should be enough to guarantee her victory. She has done so not by compromising her beliefs and Democratic priorities but by promising to uphold the Constitution and protect democracy.

It is true that an unintended effect of Trump’s hate speech has created a certain increase in support among some Black, Latino, and Asian voters, but that will not be enough to counter the fact that a majority of women across racial and ethnic groups will vote for Kamala Harris as will many men and registered Republicans and independents.

A weakness for Harris lies in the uncommitted voters because of the situation in the Middle East who may vote for Jil Stein or abstain in places like Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Detroit, Dearborn, and college campuses. Trump’s election would make things worse in the Middle East, so some will reluctantly vote for Harris and then get ready to continue with their protests and demands for a ceasefire.

The media across the board has obsessed with “immigration” and “the economy” being the main concerns of the electorate and that public opinion favors Trump to handle them. But first of all, objectively, the economy is strong, and asylum-seeking at the border today is at very low levels. Second, and most importantly for elections, when one looks at the polls that are used to make these claims, these are the main issues for less than half of the electorate, and they are the main issues for Republican respondents, who naturally favor Trump’s solutions on these areas. In other words, putting the bulk of the Republican agenda around closing the border is not enough to gain a majority of voters nationwide or even in most swing states. The urban legend about immigrants eating cats shows voters how exaggerated these warnings are. The common claims against immigrants are false, as my book —coming out today— Immigration Realities documents.

Many pundits, consultants, and advisors have been saying that “Harris is weak on the border.” Not only is that false, but my response has been that the immigration obsession will cost Trump the election. Mass deportations are not popular outside of MAGA circles, while a path to citizenship has large levels of support. The Madison Square Garden rally made it clear to many voters and agnostic observers that this was not about undocumented immigration but about creating a White Christian Ethnostate.

There are even some indications (like the exit polls in the Republican primaries in Ohio) that some Evangelicals and religious voters are tired of Trump supposedly representing their views and values. The majority will still vote for him, but less than in previous elections when he has been on the ballot. The same is true for rural and union members. Biden has been a strong pro-labor president. Tim Walz is more familiar with rural White voters than Vance is these days. The majority will vote Republican, but many will vote Democrat. Harris is endorsed by both Liz Cheney and Bernie Sanders. Her appeal and favorability are wide, and she could create an even wider base of support than Obama.

Democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and many other values and institutions are on the line. This is the first election where Trump is on the ballot after January 6, 2021, and the many trials against him. He will not lose all his supporters, but he will lose some.

Recent local and midterm elections have shown that the across-the-board restrictions on abortion and emergency care while pregnant are large motivators to drive women and men to the polls to repeal these propositions and to vote for Democrats. In 2016, most White women supported Trump and not Hilary Clinton. This may be different this time because of the end of Roe vs. Wade. This would be crucial because women are the majority of likely voters, and they were more active in early voting.

Established Latinos of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and South American origin in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and New York will make important contributions to the Democratic vote. I predict that many women and new citizens of immigrant origin and some who did not vote in previous elections because of age or lack of interest (thus often not in pollster models of likely voters) will turn out to vote for Harris.

All along, the expectations have been set very highly for Harris, and she has excelled at each challenge, including securing the nomination uncontested, choosing a strong VP candidate,  leading the RNC, speaking at rallies, showing she can be Commander in Chief, bettering Trump at their debate, engaging with the media effectively, she can take questions from the media and answer them thoughtfully, to round it all out she can engage in retail politics with much enthusiasm and empathy.

Trump carries all the media attention and campaign resources from the RNC, and most Republicans down the ballot depend, to a large degree, on his appeal. This does not bode well for them. Furthermore, the Republican-led Congress has been one of the most ineffective in recent memory. Government shutdowns have been adverted, and there have been impactful and popular bipartisan accomplishments such as the Infrastructure Bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS Act, and support for Ukraine, but many Republican Congresspeople have voted against these achievements.

All these factors combined seem to indicate that Trump supporters will have a weaker showing than when he lost in 2020, even if we are not in the middle of a pandemic. Kamala Harris has benefited from a fresh, exciting, flawless campaign, drawing all the enthusiasm that had been lacking since Obama’s first presidential campaign.

To recap, the biggest errors in the 2024 election coverage have been the out-of-proportion focus on the economy and immigration as the biggest concerns of all voters when, indeed, these complaints are not fully based on reality and are mainly coming from Republican-leaning voters. Nobody likes inflation, but unemployment is low, and wage and economic growth rates are positive and steady, with a big improvement from 2020. Reproductive health and women’s rights will be more important in motivating people across party affiliations to vote for Harris and Democrats. While the polls are currently very tight, and there is noise that favors Trump (allowing him to repeat the big lie), ultimately, cold analyses of the electorate’s behavior and preferences tell us that Harris is on track to win the electoral college and with wider margins than the polls show.

Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.

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Political Piñatas

Political Piñatas: How Conservatives Use Latinos to Polarize U.S. Society

By Ernesto Castañeda

November 5, 2024

Many are surprised to learn that some Latinos vote Republican. A larger percentage of Latinos voted for Trump in 2020 than in 2016. A similar percentage or even more may vote for Trump in 2024. There are many reasons for this, which are often misunderstood by the wider public. I discuss some of them here.

Latinos represent the largest minority in the U.S. at over 65 million and have gained attention as political parties vie for the so-called “Latino vote” as elections are won by tighter margins. This is particularly the case in swing states with large Latino populations. How best to describe the landscape of Latino voters’ preferences remains a question of regular debate. On the one hand, Latinos are still frequently superficially treated as a relatively uniform voting bloc —even if more “up for grabs” today with polling data suggesting gradual shifts in party affiliation. As such, Latinos are often treated as a demographic that can tip the balance in favor of a party. Nonetheless, polls and pundits necessarily flatten the real views of Latinos. This has always been a diverse group. The birth of the term Hispanic aimed to bring together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans around common causes. Regional differences are key; for example, in the D.C.-metro region, Latinos are diverse and majority Salvadoran; in California and Texas, they are mainly of Mexican and Central American descent; in South Florida, they are a mixture of Cuban, Venezuelan, Colombian, Nicaraguan, among others.

Many recent immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean come escaping failed states and so-called leftist regimes. Many migrants have been directly affected by inequality in their countries of origin. Democratic erosion throughout Latin America and the Caribbean makes it hard for opposition activists and critics of these regimes. Like Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain and Cubans after Castro’s takeover, many recent immigrants see themselves as forced political exiles escaping from authoritarian states that robbed them of their wealth and freedoms. Therefore, in the U.S. they are more likely to identify with ideals of individual freedom and free enterprise.

Trump has also had a polarizing effect on Latinos. Republicans have sought to exploit a process well-documented by scholars: the creation of social boundaries. Trump’s discourse encourages distinctions between “good immigrants” and “good Latinos” in contrast to undocumented “criminals.” Those immigrants with visas and legal permits, higher education levels and family incomes, lighter skin, or who align better with the U.S. geopolitical preferences tend to be more successful than those who do not have immigration papers. This creates hierarchical differences within Latinos. Many U.S.-born and legal Latino immigrants try hard to distinguish themselves from individuals and groups framed as “illegal” and “criminal” to avoid the stigma assigned to those groups.

These social processes create durable inequalities not only between Latinos and non-Latinos but also among Latinos. In public discourse, Latinos are used as proxies and piñatas to polarize Americans further. In turn, some Latinos internalize feelings of inferiority or superiority and may loudly act upon them, adding to the process of polarization. Some Latinos organize against dehumanizing language and build networks of solidarity among Latinos and with other groups. However, a numerical minority such as the White Nationalists and antisemites Nick Fuentes or Enrique Tario, leader of the Proud Boys, are not passive receivers of stigmatizing attacks but become amplifiers of hate speech in exchange for group membership as part of a sometimes-xenophobic White majority. Some who have seen fellow Latinos excluded, targeted, and stigmatized may try to pass as White by attacking other Latinos, further polarizing the country in the process and weakening democratic institutions and minority rights. For these reasons, studying the effects of polarization on Latinos and the role that Latinos have in social polarization is of national importance. 

Latinos can hardly be said to form a cohesive or predictable voting bloc. Latinos do not fit neatly into the racial categories that often orient public political debate, which can lead to simplifications of Latinos’ views. Latinos are relatively less partisan as a group. A Pew Research Center report indicates that less than half of Latinos acknowledge significant differences between political parties, with a large share agreeing that neither party effectively represents their interests. Immigration is motivated by economic success, so access to jobs and better pay are their priority. Most Latinos have papers, so immigration is not an immediate concern for most Latino individuals, but it is a theme full of an emotional load; the immigration struggles of family members are close to their hearts.

An influential narrative regarding political polarization is that the electorate has become increasingly stoked by racial tensions and grievances. In this account, race is an important source of polarization. Latinos’ views are diverse and sometimes distinct from those of other Americans and more often map with those of similar occupations and socio-economic status. The diversity within Latino communities impacts the overall political polarization dynamics in the U.S. Typical analyses of race/ethnicity as a variable in culture war-type political contests do not adequately account for the heterogeneity of Latinos as a group and for the range of variation of their political commitments. National origin, gender, religious affiliation, geographic location, educational attainment, class, media consumption, and generational experience, among others, are impactful factors in identity formation.

Latinos display greater cultural unity than political unity. Latinos are part of their local and larger national political ecosystems. Latinos, despite immigration status, have demonstrated notable unity mobilizing in response to racist anti-immigrant rhetoric from local, state, or national politicians. Research also shows that over time, anti-immigrant policies can contribute to the withdrawal of Latinos from the public sphere. But sometimes there is increased group cohesion among Latinos as a reaction to external group threats such as public hostility toward immigrants and the portrayal in the media of  Latinos as likely to be Mexican, undocumented, and lesser than. A stronger identification as Latino resulting from previous political organizing does lead to higher levels of political participation. In other cases, as Latinos become business owners, upper middle class, and part of mainstream U.S. society, they may become more politically conservative and may try to distinguish themselves from newcomers. Other successful Latinos, who are less insecure about their status, mentor and open doors for others, volunteer, and become philanthropists.

Furthermore, some Latino subgroups are more susceptible to misinformation. The choice of media varies by immigration status and age. Older first-generation Latinos often opt for more traditional media sources such as radio and T.V., and more often in Spanish. Younger Latinos, often second- or third-generation, exhibit a wider range of media consumption, mainly in English and social media. These choices create different media echo chambers, differing attitudes about the meaning of “Latino,” and varying political values even within the same family.

Ernesto Castañeda, PhD is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab and Professor at American University.

This piece is a revised and shortened version of an unfunded research proposal written for the Carnegie Fellows Program on Polarization in November of 2023.

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Anti-Immigrant Campaigns

Anti-Immigration Rhetoric: Winning Campaign Strategy or Coin Toss?

By Joseph Fournier and Ernesto Castaneda

October 10, 2024

With the U.S. presidential election drawing nearer, many Kamala Harris supporters fear a perceived weakness on the border “crisis” may cost her the election to Donald J. Trump. Trump has championed himself as the figurehead for tough border policy. Restricting immigration has been associated with Trump. An NBC poll showed that 89% of people who identify as conservative point to the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border as a major factor in their vote for president, while only 25% of those who identify as liberal do so, and 52% among moderates. Therefore, we are not witnessing an anti-immigrant turn in public opinion but a further polarization by political ideology.

Crosstab from CBS, YouGov poll page 23.

Trump has been capitalizing on this perceived base of support by making even more extreme comments regarding the issue, most recently employing race pseudo-science in claiming that recent migrants possess “bad genes.”

In the past, Harris and the Democrats have painted themselves in clear opposition to his cruel immigration policies, such as family separation. When on the campaign trail in 2019, Harris’s rhetoric focused on pathways to citizenship and the plight of migrants. This strategy worked as Biden and Harris defeated Trump in 2020.

There was a slight rightward shift from Harris and the DNC on immigration. This was probably in reaction to an increase in the visibility of border crossings after the pandemic.  Trump has framed these increases as a “border crisis.”

But do Democrats need to get harsher on immigration if they want to win? Data shown in Figure 1 demonstrates a phenomenon that may surprise political strategists on both sides of the aisle. Research from The Immigration Lab analyzing congressional and gubernatorial elections in 2018, 2020, and 2022 has shown that these anti-immigrant campaign victories have decreased by about 15%. This data was pulled from online campaign material from every election result with a 10% margin between the two major candidates.

Successes of anti-immigrant campaigns in competitive elections, 2018-2022 by the authors.

In 2018, businessman and former state senator Brian Kemp ran for governor in Georgia. His campaign epitomized the culture wars that the GOP included as part of their messaging strategy. Kemp styled himself as a “politically incorrect conservative” and filmed himself touting chainsaws and shotguns in service of this persona. He ended one of his ads by showcasing him in his truck, threatening to “round up criminal illegals myself.” On November 8, 2018, Kemp defeated his opponent in the closest Georgia gubernatorial race since 1966.

In 2022, Kemp ran for re-election against the same opponent. With essentially the same election conditions, Kemp’s strategy radically changed. His new primary TV ad, titled “Stronger Georgia,” listed a myriad of his accomplishments as governor. Many of his themes continued from his 2018 ads, including his support of decreased government regulation. Nonetheless, a notable point missing from his 2022 ad, however, was immigration. Kemp made no mention of the issue, making only a brief note of him “fighting human trafficking.” In softening his tone on migration, Kemp nearly tripled his margin of victory in 2022 in comparison to 2018.

Even while encounters at the border today are as low as during the pandemic when Title 42 was in effect closing the border to asylum-seekers, many think that long lines of people asking for asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border is a political liability for the Biden-Harris administration. However, when Americans in these competitive elections have shown up to the polls in the last six years, running an anti-immigrant campaign has demonstrated itself to be well short of the secure victory strategy that many seem to think it is.

Joseph Fournier is a Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and a senior at American University.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American Studies.

Uncertainty: Migrant Self-classification of Immigration Statuses

By Mackenzie Hoekstra

October 3, 2024

Starting in 2022, the Immigration Lab at American University began interviewing recent migrant and refugee arrivals to the DMV. So far, we have interviewed 181 from a variety of origins. The interviews aim to understand the experiences of refugees and migrants before, during, and after their entrance into the United States. Interviewers asked participants to reflect on their immigration journey and classify their immigration status. Self-perception, specifically individual understanding of immigration status, varied depending on the respondents’ country of origin, with particular uncertainty for migrants coming from South and Central America. Out of the fifty-nine respondents who were asked to classify their immigration status, eight were uncertain, seven of these were from El Salvador and one from Venezuela.

This broad range of understanding can be partly attributed to the higher clarity in legal definitions for refugee status and recipients of asylum or humanitarian parole versus migrants who have come without papers or who are in the middle of requesting asylum or other humanitarian relief. Refugees and asylum seekers qualify for legal residence based on proving a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR). Refugees are vetted, approved, and brought to the U.S. through international refugee organizations and the U.S. government. They receive specific resettlement services and benefits through sponsoring resettlement agencies in the U.S. under the program known as Reception and Placement. These services are usually limited to the first 90 days after arrival and include necessities such as securing and setting up housing and rent assistance. Other services are provided by case managers, such as cash assistance, cultural orientations, school enrollment, benefit application assistance, employment support, and aid in navigating medical and legal services in their new communities. The goal of these services is for refugees to be economically self-sufficient as soon as possible. The number of refugees allowed in the U.S. is capped each year by the president and Congress. The current admissions cap for FY 2024 is 125,000 and 100,000 were resettled.

Asylum seekers must also prove they meet the conditions set by UNHCR but apply for asylum upon their arrival to the United States. They can apply affirmatively either at the point of entry or within a year of arriving in the U.S., or defensively once they receive notice of removal proceedings. Once granted asylum, they are known as asylees and gain access to government benefits and services similar to refugees like cash assistance and medical assistance, but do not have the same level of support as refugees do through case management. The are no numerical caps on how many asylum seekers can be granted that status but rather are decided on an individual case through immigration courts. This process can be lengthy and has a very significant backlog. According to TRAC, 1,101,819 asylum applicants currently have a pending case with U.S. immigration courts. This number translates into an average wait time of 1,424 days, a wait of almost four years for their case to be heard and decided.

For individuals who do not qualify for legal permanent residency as refugees or asylees, the definitions and processes become more complicated. Unlike for refugees and asylum seekers, there is no legal definition of a ‘migrant.’ A variety of programs/statuses exist for migrants including, but not limited to Humanitarian Parole (HP), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), work permits/visas, student visas, and green card applications, all of which have strict eligibility requirements and timelines.

Social services and benefits available to asylum seekers and migrants are limited. According to the National Immigration Forum, federal benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicare are not available for these immigrants. These benefits are only available to immigrants who have been granted asylum or become lawful permanent residents (LPR) and lived in the U.S. for a minimum of 5 years. Some states offer limited cash, food, and healthcare assistance, however, most of the services available are provided by local nonprofits which face similar barriers to resources and visibility. Accordingly, research shows that immigrants use less government services than the U.S.-born.

In addition to limited social benefits, legal status designations are complex to navigate, often requiring legal guidance and representation to get one’s status adjusted and obtain permanent residency. The interviews conducted by the Immigration Lab highlight this confusion and uncertainty and the need for better and more accessible resources and legal guidance for migrants.

Among respondents who did not classify themselves with a concrete immigration status in the interviews, two main groups emerged, those with some form of legal guidance and those without. Respondents without any form of legal guidance were quick to classify themselves originally as undocumented or express complete uncertainty as to their status. When prompted further during the interviews, many respondents clarified that they were uncertain about their status, not undocumented.

In other cases, individuals thought they may be out of status but in reality, they were pending a decision by migrant courts. In one instance, a respondent from a woman from Colombia stated, “Let’s say right now I don’t have status. I don’t have documentation. I am undocumented.” However, further discussion revealed that she had been processed and released by U.S. immigration and had been allowed to stay in the U.S. on legal grounds, which she did not fully understand. This response highlights how a self-classification as “undocumented” is used as a way to express initial uncertainty. While this response pattern emerged in a few cases, one example of complete uncertainty came from a Honduran male respondent. When we asked about his immigration status, he responded “What can you call it?” The interviewer then went on to explain different avenues of immigration: asylum, visa, and entry without inspection. In response, the man once again affirmed that “I don’t know…” The man explained that he was interested in getting a work permit but had no avenues through whichto obtain one. This shows that they do not know how the U.S. immigration system works, much less how to navigate it.

For those who expressed having legal guidance or representation, a theme of classifying as “in-process” was common. These respondents understood that there was a process that they were going through to get documentation but could not specifically articulate what that process was. For example, when asked to identify her immigration status, one El Salvadorian female explained that she and her family had found a lawyer to represent them. But never articulated what legal avenue was lawyer pursuing. Similarly, an El Salvadorian male expressed confusion over his next court date, not knowing when or what the court appearance was for.

In a working paper written by the American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies on Newcomer Central American Immigrants’ Access to Legal Services, researchers found that less than half of Central American immigrants have access to legal services because low-income and pro bono services are hard to find. Additionally, this affordable representation often only takes on limited cases, specifically focusing on the cases that are more likely to be won in court. This has resulted in more legal referrals to private firms, and despite these firms providing high-quality services, they are very expensive. Immigrants may be tempted to work with notary generals confusing them with notarios, who in Latin America are highly influential lawyers. This creates a higher degree of fraud risk. Therefore, these Central American immigrants either avoid, don’t have access to, or cannot afford legal services. This means that they must rely on their knowledge or the knowledge of family and friends. In the context of the complex and process-oriented immigration legal system, this information is often not enough and may lead to them losing their immigration case to remain in the U.S.

The analysis of these interviews uncovered the important reality that migrants are often uncertain about their immigration status in the U.S., even when they have access to legal representation or guidance. Volunteers, legal offices that do pro-bono immigration work, and non-profits that have this as their mission are overburdened by caseloads and don’t receive enough funding and donations to expand. People come to the United States for a variety of reasons and often must take timely action to secure their legal statuses. It is crucial that theyhave access to resources that can help guide and support them through the various processes available to them, both legal and non-legal. It is not enough to ensure basic access to these resources; efforts must be made to make information about immigration statuses accessible and understandable for migrants.

Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior majoring in Sociology at American University and a member of the Immigration Lab.

Edited by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, CLALS, and Immigration Lab Director.

Colombia: LGBTQ+ Youth Faces Discrimination, Bullying, and Institutional Harassment 

by Juliana Martínez* 

Group of demonstrators in Colombia for LGBTQ+ rights / Erick Morales / Sentiido / Creative Commons License

Despite significant progress in laws advancing their rights, Colombia’s LGBTQ+ youths face systemic hostility and receive little support from the institutions that are supposed to help them, leading to higher mental health issues and reduced academic achievement. Surveys by the Colombian Sentiido Foundation – receiving 1,555 and 3,246 responses from LGBTQ+ youth in August-September 2021 – provide a comprehensive picture of their lives, experiences, needs, and support networks. 

Despite the most progressive legal protections in Latin America, the public record and various comprehensive studies show that LGBTQ+ people in Colombia continue to experience widespread discrimination and violence – including bullying, verbal harassment, mean rumors, and physical assault – that make them feel unsafe. Ninety-eight LGBTQ+ people were murdered in Colombia in 202021. 

  • Colombia’s highest judicial body, the Constitutional Court, has established strong precedents that explicitly protect sexual orientation and gender identity from discrimination. Gay couples can get married and enjoy the rights of straight couples. While the country does not have a comprehensive gender identity law, trans people can change their name and sex marker on all official documents freely. The Court has shown a strong anti-discrimination stance with a series of rulings protecting students as well. 
  • Despite this, LGBTQ+ youth suffers on many levels. Sentiido’s surveys confirmed that young LGBTQ+ Colombians experience harassment, bias, and discrimination in school and other aspects of their lives. Ironically, the Sentiido study found that, rather than being the solution, adults are often part of the problem – failing LGBTQ+ youths in school, home, and even churches. Teachers, parents, and other adults in positions of responsibility often press youths into therapies and treatments to make them conform to traditional models rather than prosper as they are. Eighty-seven percent of LGBTQ+ youths have heard homophobic or transphobic comments from family members, and almost one in five reports having been physically punished by parents for their sexual orientation or gender identity. 

Regarding school climate, more than half report they feel unsafe in school and were cyber-bullied at home, causing more than a third of them to miss at least one day of class a month. More than 90 percent hear homophobic remarks at school, and 75 percent report being verbally harassed based on sexual orientation, gender, gender expression, and race or ethnicity. Thirty percent have been physically harassed (e.g., shoved or pushed). Some 87 percent feel deliberately excluded by other students. 

  • Most students (65.5 percent) reported hearing homophobic remarks from school staff. Teachers’ and administrators’ unwillingness to create a safe environment, such as by discouraging peer meanness, create an impression of condoning the abuse. Almost 15 percent of youths taking the survey reported facing disciplinary processes for being LGBTQ+ despite laws explicitly prohibiting it. 
  • When students reported incidents, moreover, staff usually did not help. Less than a fifth reported that school personnel intervened most of the time or always. (Peers were much more reliable in assisting.) As a result, almost seven in 10 students never reported incidents to staff. 

Youths facing such challenges without reliable support networks, affirming resources, and safe spaces endure stresses that negatively impact their mental health and academic achievement – consequences that are visible in rates of attempted suicide and school absences. These data, however, can help responsible people make institutions more responsive. Almost 70 percent of LGBTQ+ youth think things will be better in the future, apparently because they see the obvious solutions that adults can adopt. 

  • The same questionnaires that paint vivid pictures of the problem also show the way ahead to improvements, starting with adherence to the law. The surveys show that youths who receive positive info about LGBTQ+ people, history, and events – although a minority – have the best outcomes in terms of mental health, a feeling of belonging, and school attendance. Schools with explicitly inclusive policies have more successful staff intervention when problems arise.  
  • Online materials and activities can help as sources of information, but they’re not a substitute for person-to-person interaction. The unsupervised way in which youths navigate online spaces can put them at risk or confuse them. The Sentiido surveys show that inclusion, acceptance, and personal contact are the elements, denied to most LGBTQ+ youths today, that will most help all Colombian youth, including LGBTQ+ youth, thrive. 

*Juliana Martínez  is the Research Director of Sentiido and an Associate Professor at the Department of World Languages and Literatures at American University. Her recent book, Haunting Without Ghosts, Spectral Realism in Colombian Film, Literature and Art, is the winner of the William M. LeoGrande Award for the best scholarly book or article on Latin American or Latino Studies published by a member of the American University community in 2020–2021. 

Latin America: Empowering Young Women to Overcome Violence, Poverty, and Discrimination

By Fulton Armstrong*

Study participants take part in group discussion in Cali, Colombia / Universidad del Valle / FLACSO-Costa Rica / Creative Commons license

In addition to documenting the often-overwhelming challenges facing young women in Latin America, the Vidas Sitiadas (Besieged Lives) project coordinated by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) of Costa Rica analyzed promising approaches for empowering women to improve their lives. The solutions are not one-size-fits-all, but they address similar underlying drivers – gender inequality, systemic violence, and the chronic lack of social inclusion and economic opportunities – in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.

  • Governments have largely failed to address young women’s rights to political and economic inclusion, to protection from community violence, and to progress in reducing and ending gender-based violence. Many of the women feel like prisoners in social and cultural constructs that ignore their needs, undermine their sense of self-worth, and deprive them of the skills and self-confidence necessary to build a better life. Women who want to improve their lot in life often can’t afford the necessary education, and are held back by being from stigmatized neighborhoods, lack of basic social services and transportation, and limited access to employment.

The challenges have deep roots and defy quick fixes, but the Vidas Sitiadas studies revealed that projects addressing their underlying causes can enable progress in individuals’ lives, especially when government steps up in coordination with private companies and NGOs. The programs examined have been in place for several years, so their long-term impact is difficult to gauge, but participants’ feedback shows they are based on sound analysis and point to practical, sustainable solutions.

  • The Girasoles (“Sunflowers”) programs designed and implemented by the Paniamor Foundation in Costa Rica emphasize close collaboration among civil society and government at the national and municipal level. Located in a municipality of San José, the initiative is supported by the Ministry of Justice and Peace, the semi-autonomous National Institute for Learning (INA), and the “Civic Centers for Peace” of the area. Girasoles works with young women to overcome their sense of vulnerability through developing skills, rethinking identities, and rebuilding relationships.
  • The Primer Trabajo (“First Job”) initiative by the Arbusta Company, which specializes in information technology, and Santiago-based Espacio Público demonstrated that getting a first job is a woman’s best means to increase social and economic inclusion in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Medellín. In addition to providing on-the-job training, the company empowers women through personal development classes in areas such as listening and speaking skills, problem-solving, and dealing with violent situations. The experience has enabled some women to change homes, drop old relationships and make new ones, and feel agency over their lives for the first time.
  • The Club de Niñas (“Girls’ Club”) by Glasswing International in El Salvador has demonstrated the value of women creating social bonds while in detention facilities and after their release. The program focuses on the roots of problems that contributed to their involvement in criminal activities – poverty, exclusion, gender discrimination, and lack of opportunity. It improves young women’s ability to protect themselves from gender-specific threats and provides opportunities to replace old friendships and reduce economic dependencies that contributed to their past troubles. Interviews show the program increases their self-confidence to make and carry out decisions.
  • The Jardines Maternales (Nursery Schools), run by the Buenos Aires Municipalidad de Avellaneda, have demonstrated the value of childcare to young women who are employed, receiving assistance, or otherwise engaged in positive social interaction, according to a report by FLACSO Argentina. The program enables young women to work and develop important social capital, which also positions their children for greater stability and progress.
  • An Economic Opportunities study, carried out by the Universidad del Valle (Colombia) with young women who live in high-violence neighborhoods in Cali validated two important recommendations to support women striving to liberate themselves from the traps of inequality and exclusion. Based on in-depth interviews, the study called on governments to guarantee higher education – to build skills and enable social contacts – for women who finish secondary education and to provide early-childhood care so they can work full-time.

The problems of young women are the problems of all of society – economic, security, political, cultural – and long-term solutions therefore need the support of broad swaths of society. The Vidas Sitiadas project shows that equipping girls and young women with tools to navigate unequal and struggling economies, systemic violence, and suffocating gender roles is important – and feasible. It has provided the proof of concept and identified some concrete steps forward that alleviate the suffering and fear of at least some young women. That incremental progress is important, but macro solutions reducing or eliminating the many obstacles women face will take political will and time.

  • Government collaboration in some of the projects has already been key, and that success could provide the foundation for persuading political, economic, and security elites to broaden and deepen it. Increasing social inclusion and reducing violence in society and in the home will benefit everyone. Long-term progress will require serious reflection into deeply entrenched aspects of each country’s attitudes and practices toward women, but Vidas Sitiadas has shown that concerted action can make a difference.

This is the final of three AULABLOG articles on the Vidas Sitiadas project. The first two discussed the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on women and programs for women under detention. For additional information about the project, undertaken by FLACSO-Costa Rica and its partners with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, please consult the Vidas Sitiadas website.

September 12, 2022

*Fulton Armstrong is a Research Fellow at CLALS and Director of the AULABLOG.

Argentina: Joining the BRICS?

By Andrés Serbin*

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, U.S. President Joe Biden, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, France’s President Emmanuel Macron, and Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi pose for a G7 leaders’ photograph during a NATO summit at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels on March 24, 2022 / Michael Kappaler / Flickr / Creative Commons license

The BRICS countries’ efforts to expand the group’s influence in the Global South is giving momentum to Argentina’s bid for membership, but the timeline and outcome of the admission process is far from certain. During a virtual summit hosted by Beijing in June, the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – continued efforts to revitalize the group and follow up on expansion proposals initially agreed to in 2017.

  • Conceived as an alternative to the G7 when launched in 2009, the BRICS represent 42 percent of the planet’s population, 24 percent of world GDP, and more than 16 percent of global growth, according to 2019 World Bank estimates. Each member plays a significantly different role in international affairs, but the group is moving in a unified fashion to position themselves as a decisive factor in the global governance architecture and as a voice of the “Global South” that advocates an economic and political alternative for emerging economies. Brazilian analyst Oliver Stuenkel notes that the five “share a profound skepticism of the U.S. international liberal order and perceived danger that unipolarity represents to their interests.”
  • The June summit reviewed initiatives to increase economic cooperation and development, promote multilateralism and world peace, and create a vaccine research and development center. As a reaction to Western economic sanctions, Russia proposed the development of a “de-dollarized” financial space for trade between the group’s economies – a proposal already introduced in the discussions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the main Eurasian cooperation institution. The group also took up China’s 2017 proposal for a “BRICS Plus” – expansion to incorporate new members of the Global South, including Argentina.

The Argentina proposal faces obstacles within the BRICS even though Russia, China, and India (whose foreign minister visited Buenos Aires last week) support it and Celso Amorim, former and likely future foreign minister if Brazilian President Lula da Silva is reelected, has said Brazil will support as well.

  • Political and geopolitical challenges within the group include differences in how members relate to the international liberal order. Ties to the West vary from Russia’s more belligerent position to China’s more cautious one and India’s ambiguity. There are marked differences in their foreign policies that potential new members could aggravate.
  • Members also have different viewpoints on whether to incorporate regional integration blocs such MERCOSUR, whose own heterogeneities, tensions, and conflicts can hinder the expansion process and bloc effectiveness. At a MERCOSUR Summit in July, key leaders’ absences and a divisive debate about the signing of an FTA between Uruguay and China revealed differences. While Paraguay keeps diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the other three full members of the group have close diplomatic and economic ties with the PRC.

Argentina’s application has also given rise to divided views and opinions in the country itself. Despite the fact that all sectors of the ruling coalition can be considered “Peronists,” the current government has pursued an erratic and at times contradictory foreign policy, including conflicting positions regarding international relations, alignments, and alliances. Argentine sinologists disagree on the feasibility of membership, and many more Argentines object because it would hurt relations with the United States, Europe, and the IMF, which has recently helped the country avoid defaulting on $44 billion the Fund previously loaned it. A simultaneous application by Iran – some of whose government officials Argentine justice blames for several terrorist acts in Argentina, including the bombing of Israel’s Embassy and the Jewish local organization AMIA – doesn’t help to build consensus on the issue.

Notwithstanding the divergent opinions in Argentina and among the BRICS, interest on both sides has been persistent and shows signs of growing – even if not necessarily resulting in admission in the near future. Argentina’s interest in pursuing a relationship with the BRICS has continued through governments of different political persuasions since 2014. The need to maintain good relations with traditional partners is key, and the agreement with the IMF presents another reason for caution. It is not clear if Argentina’s incorporation could complicate its geopolitical position without yielding tangible benefits.

  • For the BRICS, the shared interest – a desire to curtail U.S. and Western influence and create a counterweight to it – helps them overcome their differences and seems unlikely to change soon, but obstacles to the evolution of the global transition they seek will also remain in the short term. However, in the context of the current debate in Latin America, BRICS expansion fits the increasing regional aspiration to promote active non-alignment amid an increasingly turbulent international order.

September 7, 2022

*Andrés Serbin is an international analyst and president of the Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research (CRIES), a regional think tank and network focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. He is also co-chair of the Asia and the Americas section of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and author of Guerra y transición global (War and Global Transition), recently published.

El Salvador: Young Women and Mothers Lack Opportunities after Incarceration

By Carina Cione*

Volunteers from Glasswing International and the U.S. Embassy paint a local library / U.S. Embassy in El Salvador / Flickr / Creative Commons license

Incarcerated young women in El Salvador face immense obstacles to creating new lives for themselves after release from detention, but programs to empower them offer a glimmer of hope. Interviews conducted as part of the CLALS-FLACSO Vidas Sitiadas (Besieged Lives) project have documented the challenges facing young Salvadoran women and provide strong evidence that others throughout Latin America face similar situations.

  • The stigma of a criminal past compounds the systemic exclusion young Salvadoran women often face before arrest just for being from high-crime neighborhoods. Previous offenders who lack support face dismal job prospects. The Vidas Sitiadas reports, which also examined conditions in four other countries, indicate that access to the formal job market is extremely limited; employers turn down job applicants with criminal records. Becoming a student can be just as difficult since universities have the right to refuse admission based on criminal histories. The period of “re-entry” is stressful and lonely as women strive to re-build healthy relationships, establish and maintain financial independence, secure healthcare, and recover from their potentially traumatic incarceration experiences.
  • The problem has surged over the last two decades, as rates of imprisonment in Latin America have risen dramatically, with mass incarceration increasingly impacting women. In El Salvador, since President Nayib Bukele launched a crackdown on gangs in 2019, the number of inmates has since skyrocketed (50,000 just since late March), according to UN experts, human rights agencies, and press reports. The government provides free tattoo removal services for former gang members seeking to break ties with their past, but attention to reintegration programs and post-release services to equip previous offenders with coping skills has been negligible. 

Nonetheless, Vidas Sitiadas and other studies have identified programs for released prisoners that, while still in relatively early phases, appear promising. Two examples in El Salvador:

  • Glasswing International runs the Club de Niñas, in collaboration with prison authorities in San Salvador, for young women in detention facilities or those who are recently released who want to overcome sociocultural barriers to independence. The three-year-old program teaches strategies for surviving traditional gender roles and expectations, healing trauma in a safe space, and breaking out of the conditions and mindsets that led them to criminality. Researchers working with Glasswing found that all of the women serving criminal sentences had suffered repeated episodes of violence beginning in childhood – neglect, abuse, sexual violence, exposure to community violence, parental alcohol abuse, and parental fighting. Many had fled their dangerous home environments at a young age and joined gangs, which provided them with basic necessities, a steady income, and protection – but also subjected them to physical and psychological abuse. The Club encourages them to feel a frisson of optimism for the first time in their young adulthood.
  • Yo Cambio, a four-year-old program run at various Salvadoran prisons, teaches craftsmanship skills to hundreds of inmates that they can use to secure a job upon release. It builds “peaceful co-living” in prison and offers free tattoo removal services for former gang members seeking to break ties with their past. To join the initiative, the inmates have to demonstrate that they practice “positive mindsets” and exhibit wanting to change before joining. 

Programs like these can point to preliminary indicators of success in at least some facilities. Young women interviewed by Vidas Sitiadas valued the safe place that Club de Niñas gave them for honest conversation and building stronger senses of community and self-worth. They underwent skills training to strengthen their likelihood of securing employment post-release, which in turn also helps secure their safety from past abusers. The interviews also show that participants are embarking on a process of developing new prosocial identities, reflecting a desire to engage in positive relationships, and trying to break with past attitudes of rebellion. Mothers promised to try to be better for their children.

Adjustment back into society for previously imprisoned people is anything but simple. The UN General Assembly in 2010 approved a resolution on the treatment of women who are in prison and have been released – called “The Bangkok Rules” – that specifies that they must be provided comprehensive re-entry support by social welfare services, local organizations, and probation authorities. Adherence to such guidelines has not been the norm in El Salvador. The systemic barriers to former prisoners becoming successful members of society remain.

  • Efforts like those identified by Vidas Sitiadas are premised on the hope that progress is possible even if locally and incrementally, but society-level outcomes will change only after broader obstacles to successful reintegration, such as geographic exclusion, are resolved. Studies show that, when re-entering into unchanged social and economic conditions, most previous offenders resort to familiar criminal behavior and fall back into dangerous social circles to meet their basic needs. They also lack accessible mental healthcare to help them grapple with trauma experienced before and during incarceration. But, while programs like Club de Niñas and Yo Cambio alone can’t solve such deep-rooted problems for everyone, they improve individual lives and are proof of concept that, if embraced by political leaders, could have a broader impact. 

August 25, 2022

*Carina Cione is Program Coordinator at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. For additional information about the project undertaken by FLACSO-Costa Rica and its partners, please consult the Vidas Sitiadas website.

Cuba: Is the Economic Crisis Prompting Meaningful Reform?

By Ricardo Torres*

Cuban flag jigsaw puzzle / Yasiel Scull / Pexels / Creative Commons license

The economic measures that the Cuban government recently announced may help on the margins with the country’s deepening economic crisis, but they are short-term fixes with potential downsides and, yet again, fall far short of the comprehensive reforms needed for significant growth. 

  • The country’s economic troubles are alarming. While inflation officially clocked in at 77 percent in 2021, the GDP price index – a broader measure of price dynamics – suggests an increase of 500 percent, which is more consistent with partial data from informal retail vendors and anecdotal evidence. [The preceding sentence was updated on August 11 to reflect new information.] Skyrocketing prices coincide with shortages of practically all goods and services; long lines to buy basic goods; and rapidly expanding blackouts. After a brief rise in May, the Cuban Peso continues to depreciate. 
  • Small but growing numbers of public protests and sustained, strident criticism on social media indicate a notable drop in popular confidence that the authorities can deal with this crisis. As it has expanded electricity rationing, the government has warned that it does not have a short-term solution. The devastation at the Matanzas Supertanker Base will surely be another setback to energy supply shortages and the broader economy. The health system lacks essential medications and supplies, and officials have acknowledged that they lack resources to deal with an infestation of mosquitos responsible for the rapid spread of dengue. 

To respond to some of the more important economic problems, the government announced a series of measures during the National Assembly sessions in late July. Most of the steps are aspirational rather than concrete changes in economic policy, and are aimed at the short-term crisis. The government is reopening a formal market where people can sell hard currency (although they cannot yet buy it); moving to adopt new regulations to open up foreign investment in private companies; and – if the statements are to be believed – probably will implement a program to reduce the fiscal deficit. 

  • Details are lacking, but some aspects of the measures could actually worsen the crisis. The announcement that the exchange market will start with only the state as purchaser of hard currency, offering a rate similar to that in the informal markets, entails significant risks. To stabilize a market, transactions have to go both ways, or else people will continue to buy currency at higher prices on the street – fueling its depreciation. The use of the hard currency market to finance the economy reflects the decline in productive capacity on the island, and the purchase of dollars without increasing the supply in Pesos is frankly inflationary. The most impoverished sectors will not receive relief from this step.
  • With regard to foreign investment, the dominant tendency has been to try to reproduce for private companies an operating framework similar to that of state enterprises. If the Cuban state hopes to give potential investors confidence by using, for example, investment mechanisms like its own, with unclear policies for approving projects, or with extended delays for approval of investments, it will be repeating the same errors as in the past. 

Even if robustly implemented, the measures are at best focusing on the symptoms of the economic crisis, while the short- and long-term real causes remain unaddressed. The ongoing recessive cycle is taking place in the middle of an international situation that is adverse for small countries dependent on imported energy and food, such as Cuba. The island is particularly vulnerable to a context featuring dramatic effects of the pandemic, the Venezuelan crisis, the war in Ukraine, and continued U.S. sanctions. But neither is the government showing resolve to fix the systemic problems rooted in the Cuban economic model itself. 

  • Recycling measures implemented in the 1990s, such as the hard-currency market, will have limited effectiveness. Cuba’s economy operates against a backdrop of structural problems that Cuban leaders have dodged for decades because of the social and political costs of a serious adjustment, ideological dogmatism in economic policy, and for many years the existence of external allies that could “pay the bill” of inefficiencies of the system. 
  • The government perceives that the United States and some groups in the country will take advantage of any change that transforms the distribution of power. That logic is understandable, as is Cuban leaders’ preference for stability over radical reform. They remember well the lessons of uncontrolled perestroika. But they must find a middle-ground between micro-measures of little strategic value and potentially destabilizing change. They can tone down their ideological statements and media wars, and surround themselves with a competent economic policy team to draw up a roadmap for long-term reform. Compared to clinging to empty promises of reform, that approach would potentially help them find some allies and recover the confidence of its citizens and, no less important, recover social peace. Without a strategic plan, as various Communist Party resolutions have warned over the years, the problems will multiply over time, as they have since 1990.

August 9, 2022

*Ricardo Torres is a CLALS Research Fellow.