The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

By Lívia Peres Milani

Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)

National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)

President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction  of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted  coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.  

The imposition of tariffs  

The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.  

Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort. 

Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.  

Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners. 

Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations 

However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products. 

These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis. 

Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.  

On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.   

Bolsonaro’s Long Shadow and Brazil’s Ongoing Democratic Crisis

by Fernando Medici, Mackenzie Presbyterian University

Photo Credit to Amauri Nehn/NurPhoto via AP

Few people outside of Brazil are likely aware that this South American country endured its own version of a Capitol attack. On January 8th, 2023 — two years after the infamous U.S. incident — a mob of supporters of former president Bolsonaro stormed government buildings, including Congress and the Supreme Court. This brazen assault on democratic institutions highlights the dangerous influence of right-wing radicalization and rampant social mediatized fake news, which continue to undermine the nation’s fragile democracy by amplifying a hate campaign against Brazil’s Supreme Court, and pleas for military intervention, while  celebrating the insurrection that ended with Bolsonaro’s followers storming the Supreme Court Building.

Like its American counterpart, the unrest was fueled by unsubstantiated claims of election fraud following Bolsonaro’s defeat at the polls. However, what set Brazil’s crisis apart was the additional troubling involvement and support of several high-profile military figures.

Subsequently many of the insurgents were indicted, but until recently little had been done regarding the still unknown leadership of the movement.

That changed this past November as former President Jair Bolsonaro and 36 others were indicted by Brazil’s Federal Police for crimes including an attempted coup d’état, violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, and involvement in an alleged attempt on the lives of President Lula, Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Minister Alexandre de Moraes.

Of course, despite the political weight of these charges, an indictment is not equivalent to a conviction and does not automatically lead to a trial. It only provides evidence for the Prosecutor General’s Office to decide whether to proceed with the case or not. This is not the first time Bolsonaro has been indicted. He was previously implicated in investigations for fraudulent vaccine records and for trying to conceal Saudi Jewelry he was gifted as president, which, according to Brazilian Law, belongs to the government. Both criminal proceedings are currently underway, and Bolsonaro is prohibited from leaving the country.

Regarding the coup d’état-related indictments, after an extensive investigation, the Brazilian Federal Police concluded that the alleged coup attempt was supposed take place in late 2022, after Bolsonaro’s election defeat and led by prominent military figures, including General and formal State-Secretary Mario Fernandes and General Braga Netto, Bolsonaro’s vice president candidate in the most recent election. According to the investigators, Bolsonaro was aware of and supported the coup efforts.

This case underscores the frail state of Brazilian Democracy after years of political radicalization and the unchecked spread of rampant fake news. In large part the proliferation of fake news has been fueled by Bolsonaro’s “Hate Cabinet”, a group led Bolsonaro’s sons Flávio and Eduardo and responsible for managing far-right social networks, the spread of misinformation, and promotion of hate campaigns against Bolsonaro’s political adversaries.  

Now, Brazilians await conclusion of the legal process. Expectations are that at the soonest a possible legal action could be filed next year, since the General Prosecutor’s Office will need months to go through the evidence.

Uncertainty surrounding the legal process and the timeline for potential action reflect the broader challenges facing Brazilian institutions and democracy. While the indictments represent a significant step toward accountability, the slow pace of the justice system underscores deeper institutional challenges, exacerbating political polarization and social mistrust. It also feeds narratives of persecution and bias, particularly among Bolsonaro’s far-right supporters, who often portray the judiciary as politically motivated. The credibility of the Brazilian Supreme Court, already eroded by its controversial role in the Lava Jato operation and its perceived partisanship during past political crises, now faces renewed scrutiny. In a country already deeply divided along ideological lines, its lack of perceived impartiality risks intensifying public skepticism, further destabilizing Brazil’s fragile democratic institutions.

It is not a surprise that Bolsonaro supporters have dismissed the allegations against him as political persecution and remain entrenched in their views, further deepening political rifts in Brazilian society. When large segments of the population operate under different understandings of reality, it becomes nearly impossible to foster the trust needed for a healthy democracy.

This scenario places Brazil’s democratic institutions under considerable strain. The 2023 storming of Congress and the Supreme Court demonstrated the vulnerability of these institutions when confronted with coordinated antidemocratic efforts. Now, with claims of military involvement, the alleged coup raises serious questions about how long Brazilian democracy can continue to withstand such blows.

The problem is made worse by Bolsonaro’s hate campaign against the Supreme Court, which has eroded trust in the institution, guaranteeing that any legal decision against him will be seen by a large subset of Brazilians as corrupt and politically motivated.

If Brazilian democracy is to survive, it will require more than just the prosecution of a few individuals, even if they are high-profile. A broader effort to rebuild trust in democratic institutions and to reduce the spread of misinformation will also be necessary. Without addressing the root causes of radicalization and polarization, Brazilian Democracy will continue to be vulnerable, whether to attacks by Bolsonaro’s followers or other political groups.

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Brazil: Military Looking out for Its Own Interests, Not Bolsonaro’s

By Matheus de Oliveira Pereira*

An Ordem e Progresso badge on a Brazilian soldier / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Despite President Bolsonaro’s bluster about rejecting the results of Brazil’s national elections on October 2nd, the military does not appear likely to intervene on his behalf – preferring instead to use its power with whoever wins the election to avoid accountability, reduce civilian oversight, and protect its own institutional interests.  

Bolsonaro worked hard during his term to curry favor with the military, giving it significant policy positions and influence.  

  • Based on data from the government’s Tribunal de Contas de União, William Nozaki estimates that more than 6,000 active military personnel took government positions during Bolsonaro’s presidency, including six critical Ministers of State. An intelligence task force created by interim President Temer in 2018 is now dominated by the military. Another 8,540 benefit from public contracts. Retired officers figure prominently in public debate with the government’s endorsement. 
  • This level of participation also reflects the military’s support – at least implicit – for Bolsonaro’s political project. General Eduardo Pazzuelo, who was in charge of the government’s disastrous response to COVID-19, is running for Congress as a member of his party. In São Paulo, General Tarcísio de Freitas is running for governor as an ally as well. Bolsonaro, a retired officer himself, is seeking the presidency again with a general officer as his running mate. 
  • Some officers claim that they have been a moderating force on the President’s impulses. Like the party’s Centrão group, they say they’re pushing for a more “presidential,” less divisive style by the Executive. The divisions in the party, however, are mostly for image rather than reflective of real cleavages, as are the claims of military officers, who frequently embrace Bolsonaro’s conspiratorial allegations about electronic voting machines and other matters.  

Most officers believe it is crucial to keep feeding the narrative that the security forces have not compromised their non-partisan, non-political role. They are also undoubtedly aware that a coup to keep Bolsonaro in power would face significant international resistance, particularly in the Americas. Also, backing a coup led by Bolsonaro would further deepen their role in the government in a context of tough times, mainly in the economy. 

  • Disinterest in a Bolsonaro coup project does not mean that they welcome Lula da Silva’s return as President. He still faces significant resistance in the barracks. The Army Commander, claiming he is not involved in electoral matters, has avoided contact with emissaries of Lula’s campaign. Figures close to the former president, however, have repeatedly stated that they trust the Armed Forces to respect the outcome of the polls. 

The mere speculation that the military would support Bolsonaro’s claims of fraud so seriously and allow him to remain in power is compelling evidence of how damaged Brazilian democracy and military adherence to democratic principles are. Even if the high command does not support Bolsonaro’s schemes, it seems headed to a different, and perhaps more destructive, approach to using its power – bargaining with whoever wins in October by trading military promises of non-intervention in return for civilian promises to pull back from investigations into its behavior and from future oversight. The officers will probably demand a commitment that the new government would grant an amnesty for mismanagement and corruption during the Bolsonaro years, and would not take steps to restrain their autonomy in budgetary matters. 

  • Some members of Lula’s entourage appear aware of the dangers of this scenario and are reportedly looking for creative solutions to it, especially if Bolsonaro’s base mobilizes and causes serious instability, which Lula would need security forces’ help controlling. However much Lula would want to reject a deal with the military, he may be boxed in by a lack of political support for confrontation and his own conciliatory tendencies during the campaign.  
  • If Brazil repeats the mistake it made 37 years ago – when the main political forces did not face the country’s authoritarian past nor establish mechanisms to effectively limit the military’s political autonomy – the country will again be missing a crucial opportunity to impose civilian control over the military and build a better, more robust democracy. 

* Matheus de Oliveira Pereira is a professor of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo and at the University of Ribeirão Preto, and a researcher at the INCT-INEU and GEDES. He is a former CLALS fellow