In the wake of a sham Presidential election event, Venezuela’s complex crisis appears to be deepening. Marked by electoral authorities’ apocryphal claims of a government victory, Maduro’s iron-fisted post-election crackdown against the opposition, and thus far unsuccessful efforts at international mediation from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, the ongoing electoral episode has placed the government and opposition in an increasingly bitter conflict.
Stuck in between stands the population, a large portion of which may migrate unless hope for political change can be revitalized. The region should brace itself for a new movement of Venezuelans abroad.
The opposition coalition continues to press its case. The opposition is led by María Corina Machado, the winner of open primaries who was forced to endorse Edmundo González Urrutia after the government-controlled courts banned her candidacy. Their election witnesses documented a landslide victory — 67% to 31% for González Urrutia. Due to both the total lack of transparency by the electoral authorities (disaggregated precinct-level data has still not been published though that was the norm in previous Maduro-era elections) and the validity of election witness tally sheets consolidated by the González Urrutia campaign, opposition claims have resonated widely. The Biden administration and multiple Latin American governments recognized González Urrutia as the winner of the election, while even historical Left-wing allies of the chavista political movement, such as former President of Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, cast serious doubts on Maduro´s claim to victory.
Privately, numerous pro-government voices have admitted they cannot attest to the credibility of the official results, which state that Maduro won with 51% of the vote, a telling admission that no independent checks on executive power grabs exist. However, despite Maduro´s most acute crisis of legitimacy yet, no highly influential ruling party official or strategic international ally (Bolivia, China, Cuba, Russia) has publicly aired such concerns. Maduro seems more influenced by the hard line elements in his government and, amid his intransigence toward calls for releasing credible electoral data, his government seems headed for greater international isolation. Meanwhile, the opposition — though strengthened by its impressive organizational effort to retrieve over 80% of the tally sheets from voting centers — is struggling to capitalize on its status as the electoral majority.
The Biden administration is losing patience with the situation. Following a period of pre-election diplomatic engagement with Maduro, Washington is strongly considering the imposition of new individual sanctions against government authorities involved in engineering the fraudulent election results and responsible for recent human rights violations. According to Venezuelan human rights groups, Maduro’s security forces have arbitrarily detained over 1,500 persons since the July 28 vote, including activists and leaders from the different opposition coalition partners, as well as one hundred and thirty adolescents. Over 20 demonstrators died amid state repression against post-election protests held to contest the official results.
As this dark post-election period continues to unfold, Maduro not only has a corrupt and ideologically conditioned army but also time on his side. The regime´s cohesion, while lower than in previous moments of chavismo´s 25 years of rule, appears to be sufficiently strong for Maduro to hold power until the new presidential period begins in January 2025. Maduro holding power does not guarantee Venezuela’s stability. Rather, the electoral crisis is likely to translate into weaker than previously forecast economic growth (4% according to Spring 2024 projections by the IMF), a scenario that could, in turn prompt Maduro to panic and forsake the more pragmatic economic policies he’s been pursuing to contain inflation. Indeed, Maduro has never articulated an overarching vision to unify the movement the way Chávez did. While his ongoing use of coercion and repression has helped him secure loyalties among ruling party power brokers, those tools cannot fix the underlying problem of internal political fragmentations, some of which grew more salient during the multi-billion corruption scandal that resulted in Maduro jailing his oil czar Tareck El-Aissami, among others.
Thus, while the return to democracy in Venezuela still seems far off, it is also true that Maduro´s leadership has never been under as much pressure as it is today. His ability to deliver economic gains from the oil sector is likely to decline, with historical investors such as China likely to take a wait-and-see approach and Maduro´s ambition to join the BRICs+ and obtain New Development Bank financing likely to go unfulfilled. If the economy spirals downward, then Maduro will face tougher questions from his own coalition’s strategic players in the military. In this respect, Maduro’s blatant rigging of the vote count opens a new, highly uncertain chapter in chavismo’s already stressful history of losing popular legitimacy.
Over sixty years ago, a previous Venezuelan dictator, Marco Pérez Jíménez, lost power months after holding a fraudulent plebiscite on his rule. A general uprising catalyzed a coup against Pérez Jiménez, which in turn yielded a caretaker transition government that later paved the way for restoring democratic rule. History may not repeat itself, but if one is searching for reasons to believe Maduro has not consolidated power for good, Venezuela’s past has plenty to offer.
Michael McCarthy is President of Caracas Wire, and Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University
Edited by Ernesto Castaneda, Director of the Center for Latin America and Latino Studies
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Ecuador’s Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) hydroelectric plant has become an infamous symbol of the controversies associated with Chinese development finance in Latin America. As such, the project’s performance has outsized implications for China-Latin America relations. At the same time, CCS illustrates the inherent complexities of large infrastructure projects, where political, environmental, and technical issues can blur the lines between success and failure.
When it was inaugurated by Presidents Rafael Correa and Xi Jinping in 2016, CCS was celebrated as a triumph of South-South cooperation between Ecuador and China, and a contribution to sustainable green growth in Ecuador. Yet nearly eight years after this inauguration, the project has yet to be formally “received” by the Ecuadorian government from the contractor, Chinese state-owned enterprise Sinohydro. The reason for this prolonged state of limbo comes down primarily to fissures present in the powerhouse distributor pipes: despite repeated welding, they have yet to be fully repaired, and a durable fix may not be possible. In addition, the project’s sediment removal mechanisms have proven dysfunctional, leading to frequent pauses in the project’s operation over the past year. Separately, severe regressive erosion on the Coca River is advancing towards the dam and may trigger its collapse. The erosion advanced 1.2 kilometers upriver over the course of three days last month, and is currently located 6 kilometers from the dam.
For these reasons CCS is frequently cited by U.S. media and politicians as evidence of the threat posed by Chinese development cooperation, namely that it will saddle countries with debt, corruption, low-quality projects, and environmental damage. Meanwhile, the project’s protagonists point out that CCS produces 20-30% of Ecuador’s energy consumption on a daily basis, rendering it indispensable — hardly a white elephant. But closer examination of the details of this behemoth project makes clear that neither pro- nor anti-Chinese discourses on “China in Latin America” ring perfectly true.
Negotiations are reportedly underway between the Ecuadorian government and Sinohydro to conclude a deal in which Ecuador would sign over operation of CCS to Sinohydro in exchange for “liquidity.” Under such a deal, Sinohydro would be responsible for CCS’s repair, operations, and administration and would sell electricity back to the Ecuadorian grid. The concessioning of CCS to Sinohydro is just one of the many loose ends that could once again rewrite the story of this contentious megaproject. Beyond this hypothetical deal, the international arbitration case between the Ecuadorian state and Sinohydro has yet to reach a conclusion. The regressive erosion of the Coca River is anticipated to progress further upriver towards the diversion dam within the next five years. A corruption case initiated by the Attorney General’s office could result in the conviction of four Sinohydro representatives and a former Chinese Ambassador, as well as former Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno. Some combination of these various developments will continue to make CCS headline news in Ecuador and abroad — and in so doing, they will rely upon prevailing narratives about China-Latin America relations.
CCS provides a vantage point for considering the longer-term effects of development cooperation between China and the region. Looking forward, while the outcomes of CCS are as of yet indeterminate, the project itself has had important implications both for Ecuadorians and for “China’s rise in Latin America” writ large. Chinese economic relations with Latin America have moved away from large state-to-state loans backed by the policy banks. This is due at least in part to the high reputational costs of scandals associated with projects like CCS. While the influence of Chinese actors on Latin American political economies has by no means waned, it now takes the form of Chinese companies’ direct investments or bidding on project contracts instead of by securing market access through granting large loans.
Nevertheless, even with the China-Latin America development relationship moving on from big infrastructure projects like CCS, the project’s politics still hold considerable weight. CCS demonstrates that infrastructure is enduring even as geopolitics can be fickle; its fate will continue to shape China-Latin America relations as a function of the still-ongoing natural and political processes enumerated above. Reductive pro- and anti-China discourses are only one part of the many factors shaping the outcomes of projects like CCS, including continuously evolving local ecologies and domestic political dynamics. In an age of great power competition and the “infrastructure state,” we must pay attention not only to the politics and capital that bring projects into being but also to how they evolve after they are ostensibly completed.
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Trump announced his candidacy in 2015 by viciously attacking immigrants, Mexicans, in particular. Many spectators and commentators waved it off, focusing on other aspects of his candidacy. Nonetheless, immigration restrictionism became the core of his campaign and an area of strong policy action during his presidency (the Zero Tolerance policy that led to forced family separations at the border, Muslim asylum bans, and Title 42, to name a few).
During the Presidential Debate on June 27, 2024, besides a coarse voice and low energy from Joe Biden, what stood out to me was Trump’s obsession with immigrants and his purposeful scapegoating of them in trying to create a wedge between the many voting subgroups.
Few analyses have underlined this, so I went back and analyzed the debate from two weeks ago, question by question, answer by answer. We have replicated the analyses, and it holds.
We found that 55% of the answers to all questions and follow-ups included mentions of immigration, even though there were only three explicit sections where the moderators brought up the topic. Trump was the main culprit, mentioning immigration in 42% of his interventions during the debate on June 27, 2024. See our tally below.
In terms of substance, some of the most dangerous statements include:
Trump stating confidently that, “As sure as you’re sitting there, the fact is that his big kill on the black people is the millions of people that he’s allowed to come in through the border. They’re taking black jobs now and it could be 18. It could be 19 and even 20 million people. They’re taking black jobs and they’re taking Hispanic jobs, and you haven’t seen it yet, but you’re going to see something that’s going to be the worst in our history. “
Factcheck: There are not 18, 19, nor 20 new million undocumented immigrants in the country since Biden took office. Contrary to stereotypes, immigrants create jobs by allowing restaurants and businesses to stay open and expand, they increase demand for goods and services, they start their own businesses and hire citizens and other migrants. There is no such a thing as a “black job” anymore, and black unemployment is at one of its lowest rates. Same with Hispanics. This answer is clearly trying to pit Blacks and Hispanics against recent arrivals and increase the optics of chaos created by the lack of overall housing and the busing of immigrants to certain cities.
TRUMP: “These millions and millions of people coming in, they’re trying to put them on Social Security. He will wipe out Social Security. He will wipe out Medicare.”
Undocumented immigrants do not qualify for many of these programs, although many of them contribute to them with their paychecks. Immigrant families use fewer welfare programs than they are eligible for, as we discuss in detail in a chapter of “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”
TRUMP: “We have a border that’s the most dangerous place anywhere in the world – considered the most dangerous place anywhere in the world.”
As we discuss in the book, the US southern border region is one of the safest places in the country for citizens.
Maybe one of the most obvious time Trump used immigration to deflect critiques was his answer to the political violence incited on January 6, “And let me tell you about January 6th, on January 6th, we had a great border, nobody coming through, very few. On January 6th, we were energy independent. On January 6th, we had the lowest taxes ever, we had the lowest regulations ever. On January 6th, we were respected all over the world.”
Immigration-Specific Questions and Answers
I. Initial Immigration Question
“President Biden, a record number of migrants have illegally crossed the southern border on your watch, overwhelming border states and overburdening cities such as New York and Chicago, and in some cases causing real safety and security concerns. Given that, why should voters trust you to solve this crisis?”
Biden:
Discussed his administration’s efforts to manage the border crisis. Biden highlighted:
· Efforts to get a bipartisan agreement to change the situation, which -among other things- would have funded an increase in the number of border police and asylum officers.
o These efforts were explicitly blocked by Trump for electoral concerns.
· A reduction of 40% in the number of people arriving between ports of entry.
o True, largely due to creating new avenues for legal immigration, processing asylum seekers differently, and increasing dependence on Mexico to settle, manage, and deport migrants. Now, some put it at 50%.
· Criticism of Trump’s family separation policy, referring to babies being separated from their mothers and put in cages.
Trump:
Criticized Biden’s handling of the border, claiming:
· The border was the safest in history during his administration.
o Untrue. The border was closed to asylum seekers and others towards the end of the Trump administration because of the pandemic and the related Title 42.
· Biden opened the borders, allowing dangerous individuals, including those from prisons, mental institutions, and terrorists, to enter the country.
o False. The U.S. does not have an open border. Many now need appointments to even apply for asylum through the CBPOne App. Others need to prove they can afford to live in the U.S. or have established family members who can support and be responsible for them. The number of deportations under Biden is largerin many months than during the Trump administration.
· Biden’s policies have led to increased chaos and danger.
o That is a common perception, but it is not backed by the facts. There have been logistic issues for emergency housing and support, which is new for non-refugees but has become the de facto way to manage unaccompanied minors who are not from Mexico and asylum-seekers without established family members in the U.S. This is a short-term budgetary issue for some cities but will lead to an economic boom in coming years.
I. Follow-up Immigration Question
“President Trump, staying on the topic of immigration, you’ve said that you’re going to carry out, quote, ‘the largest domestic deportation operation in American history.’ Does that mean that you will deport every undocumented immigrant in America, including those who have jobs, including those whose spouses are citizens, and including those who have lived here for decades? And if so, how will you do it?”
Trump:
Detailed his plans for immigration enforcement, stating:
· His administration will deport undocumented immigrants, especially those who are criminals or dangerous.
· Accusations of Biden of allowing criminals into the country.
· Emphasized the need to remove dangerous individuals to protect American citizens.
Biden:
Responded to Trump’s accusations, stating:
· Every claim made by Trump was a lie.
· Defense for the Biden administration’s handling of immigration and border security.
· Emphasis on efforts to reduce illegal crossings and improve the system.
Donald Trump
· Trump’s Statement: “The only jobs he created are for illegal immigrants and bounce-back jobs; they’re bounced back from the COVID.”
· Context: Biden was bragging about creating a large amount of jobs. Yes, many of the jobs created are those lost during the pandemic and could be called “bounce-back” jobs, but the number of jobs in June 2024 is higher than before the pandemic. The employment rate of the native-born is back to pre-pandemic levels. The labor force and, therefore, the economy have grown because of new immigrants.
· Statement: “We’re like a Third World nation. Between weaponization of his election, trying to go after his political opponent, all of the things he’s done, we’ve become like a Third World nation. And it’s a shame the damage he’s done to our country. And I’d love to ask him, and will, why he allowed millions of people to come in here from prisons, jails and mental institutions to come into our country and destroy our country.”
· Context: When answering a question about the deficit, Trump pivoted to criticize Biden’s policies, including those on immigration, that have led to the deterioration of the country while likening it to a third-world country. He specifically accused Biden of allowing large numbers of dangerous individuals into the country. The mention of prisons and mental institutions is likely a reference to people who came largely to Miami through the port of Mariel, Cuba, as described in works of fiction like Scarface. Those coming were less wealthy Cubans than in the first waves and included a few that may have been political prisoners or LGTBQ. A few could have engaged in crime, but the minority did not, and most of them have become part of middle-class families.
· Statement: “He has killed so many people at our border by allowing… all of these people to come in.”
· Context: Trump made this statement while discussing Biden’s immigration policies. Yes, some immigrants have committed heinous crimes, but they are closer to the exception; undocumented immigrants’ crime rates are around half of those of U.S. citizens, so it is unfair to highlight crimes just from this group.
Joe Biden
· Biden’s statement: “We found ourselves in a situation where, when he was president, he was taking – separating babies from their mothers, putting them in cages, making sure the families were separated. That’s not the right way to go.”
· Context: Biden said this when asked about immigration and border security. It was criticism of Trump’s zero-tolerance policy that separated families arriving between ports of entry at the US-Mexico border.
· Statement: “Every single thing he said is a lie, every single one. For example, veterans are a hell of a lot better off since I passed the PACT Act. One million of them now have insurance, and their families have it – and their families have it. Because what happened, whether was Agent Orange or burn pits, they’re all being covered now. And he opposed – his group opposed that.”
· Context: Biden was responding to Trump’s critique of the administration’s handling of many issues, among them immigration. Biden was fact-checking Trump and later bragged about his administration’s achievements. While not directly about immigration, it was part of a defense against Trump’s allegations, which included criticisms of Biden’s immigration policies leading to some veterans being homeless, a sad issue and policy concern that predates Biden’s presidency and is not directly related to immigration. I have conducted research on the subject.
Glossary of Immigration-Related Terms Used by Candidates
Biden:
· Immigrant
· Migrants
· Border
· Illegally crossed
· Border police
· Asylum officers
· Separating babies
· Putting them in cages
· Families separated
· Illegal crossings
Trump:
· Illegal immigrants
· Migrants
· Border
· Mental institutions
· Prisons
· Criminals
· Domestic deportation
· Undocumented immigrant
· Illegal crossings
· Immigration enforcement
· Open borders
· Criminals
· Dangerous individuals
Terms used solely by Biden:
· Immigrant
· Asylum officers
· Separating babies
· Putting them in cages
· Families separated
Terms used solely by Trump:
· Illegal immigrants
· Mental institutions
· Prisons
· Criminals
· Domestic deportation
· Undocumented immigrant
· Immigration enforcement
· Open borders
· Dangerous individuals
As this glossary of terms used shows, the way that Trump discusses immigration is incendiary and aims to create a sense of fear of immigrants.
For more context on family separation read Reunited. For the truth behind immigration processes pre-order Immigration Realities.
Parts or the whole of this piece can be republished with acknowledgment of the author. I acknowledge the help of Pablo Landsmanas Gary and Alexander Castañeda to conduct this analysis. Isabel Leong helped with copy-editing.
On June 26th, recently fired Bolivian general Juan José Zúñiga attempted an ill-conceived coup supposedly in the name of “restoring democracy.” If coups were once a fact of life in Latin America, that is no longer the case. Yet, this short-lived failed attempt highlights a brewing institutional crisis in Bolivia: growing improvisation and confusion around the institutionalized transfer of power through elections, and declining public confidence in the results. The origins of this crisis can be traced to efforts by Evo Morales, head of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party and long-time president, to remain in power, and the perceived illegitimacy of the judiciary, as it has been caught up in the politics of these efforts.
Zúñiga’s attempted coup consisted of ramming the door of the traditional presidential palace, located in the historic Plaza Murillo in the capital city of La Paz, with an armored vehicle. The poorly executed coup attempt lasted all of three hours, appeared to have no political support, and ended when Bolivia’s president Luis Arce personally confronted Zúñiga inside the palace and ordered him to withdraw. Soon thereafter, Zúñiga was under arrest, and Arce thanked Bolivians for helping to thwart the coup amid cheering supporters while insisting that “democracy must be respected.” In the days following dozens of identified “coup plotters” have also been arrested.
The coup attempt received broad international condemnation. And initially Bolivian politicians across the spectrum rejected the attempted mutiny. This included Morales, ex-president turned bitter rival of Arce, who decried any attempt by the armed forces to “violate democracy.” It also included members of Bolivia’s fragmented opposition, such as imprisoned caretaker president Jeanine Añez, who tweeted that Bolivians will “defend democracy.” The attempt was likewise immediately condemned by the country’s powerful union movements, with the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) declaring a strike in opposition.
However, evident unity regarding the need to defend Bolivian democracy quickly gave way to a much stranger fog of contradictory accounts. Once in custody, Zúñiga – previously known as a stalwart Arce loyalist – insisted that Arce had ordered the coup attempt as a ruse to bolster his flagging popularity. The beleaguered president’s approval ratings have gone into freefall amid a worsening economic crisis caused by dwindling foreign reserves, declining gas exports, fuel and dollar shortages, and the specter of inflation, provoking rounds of protests and strikes.
Morales amplified the “self-coup” theory on his radio program, a claim that the ex-president’s supporters have seized on and perpetuated. Argentina’s president Javier Milei echoed the charge. The fact that Bolivian political analysts have taken Zúñiga’s story seriously points to a deeper distrust, shared by many ordinary Bolivians, of the country’s political and military authorities. Such distrust is partly a result of the unresolved circumstances and resulting enmities around Morales’s ouster in 2019, under military pressure, and ongoing heated national and international debate about whether those events constituted electoral fraud or a coup. Scholars still can’t agree.
The question of whether a coup – a sudden, overt, unlawful, and often violent seizure of power – has occurred is seldom a source of confusion. But both in 2019 and in 2024 in Bolivia, whether a “coup,” “self-coup,” or something else, took place have been questions of ongoing fierce and partisan debate and wellsprings for conspiracy theories. The mystery around Zúñiga’s actions led Bolivia’s minister of government to hold a press conference to take reporters through the failed coup step by step, with diagrams. And yet, many ordinary Bolivians don’t know who or what to believe.
Growing doubt around transitions of power can be traced at least to 2016, when Morales ignored the result of a national referendum he himself had called that rejected his intention to stand for a third term, despite being constitutionally limited to two. Then followed the confusion and conflicting narratives around 2019’s election results, Morales’s exit, and subsequent partisan violence and security crackdown. Añez’s caretaker government then compounded a perception of illegitimacy by repeatedly delaying new elections while going after MAS opponents.
If Arce’s 2020 election was without major controversy, last month’s failed coup – if that is what it was – has become additional fuel in a rancorous and personalistic rivalry between Arce and Morales for control over the MAS. The lead-up to 2025 has seen MAS loyalists divided into hostile camps that threaten to fracture the once dominant party. Perhaps more importantly, who gets to claim party leadership has become a legal squabble, with Morales attempting to throw the president out of the party, competing party congresses, and courts weighing in to determine the legitimate leader. It is increasingly likely that whoever runs for president on the MAS ticket will also be an internally contested candidate.
Finally, during the second half of his presidency, and not entirely without justification, Morales was accused by opponents of stacking the judiciary. This appeared to pay off in 2017 when the country’s electoral court ruled that, despite term limits, Morales could run in 2019 because doing so was a “human right.” In turn, this decision was overturned in late 2023 by the same court, a ruling Morales has rejected while he continues to run. But that tribunal is viewed by many as illegitimate, since its members previously delayed constitutionally mandated judicial elections and reappointed themselves indefinitely, before issuing a string of rulings in the Arce government’s favor. Both rivals are perceived as trying to manipulate the courts to decide the outcome of their personal political contest to control the MAS and emerge as the party’s anointed presidential candidate.
As the 2025 elections loom, Bolivia seems to be playing out its own post-truth political drama, characterized by increasingly frequent disruptions of, confusion around, and conflicts over, the institutionalized transfer of power through elections, which is not good news for public confidence in the country’s political and electoral institutions.
On June 24, 2024, President Biden signed a flurry of executive orders providing renewed hope to the immigrant community and its allies. The highlight of these was providing a pathway, also known as “parole in place” to legalized status for the undocumented spouses and children of U.S. citizens, opening the door for around 500,000 mixed-status families to sponsor their undocumented family members without having to leave the country for a protracted period of time. Additionally, the administration moved to facilitate the work permit acquisition process for DACA recipients and other Dreamers who earned a degree at an accredited higher education institution in the United States and received an offer of employment in their field of study.
These measures have been promoted as a strategy to “keep families together” amid longstanding policies resulting in migrant family separations. However, even though these developments should be applauded and celebrated, concerns remain for segments of the non-citizen population left out of these status relief granting actions, notably, the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens.
As mixed-status families composed of undocumented parents and U.S. born children continue to proliferate across the United States, the policy generated dichotomies of citizen/non-citizen and undocumented/documented, which also give rise to binary premised discourses of deservingness, are rendered not only morally bankrupt, but also completely misaligned with the realities of people’s lives. People as young as adolescents and children born in the United States are subjected to the ripple effects of illegality experienced by their parents as a result of non-status. In most U.S. states, undocumented people are banned from driving, accessing Medicaid, CHIP benefits, and other forms of public assistance. Moreover, a multitude of U.S. states block undocumented students from accessing in-state tuition and financial aid at public universities, severely impeding their upward social mobility and ensuring that they remain trapped in low-wage, low-skill, and physically arduous jobs that offer no benefits or health coverage.
All of these issues do not only impact undocumented individuals themselves; they profoundly affect their families, including U.S. born children who experience these challenges alongside their parents and have to live with the looming fear and trauma of parental loss due to deportation. For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Trump Administration proposed a ruleprohibiting access to public and subsidized housing for mixed-status families. While the rule was subsequently rescinded by the Biden administration, it is an illustration of some of the ways in which federal, state, and local governments routinely discriminate against mixed-status families. Additionally, during the pandemic, which has had more adverse impacts on communities of color and minoritized people, mixed-status families were excluded from federal pandemic stimulus checks designed to provide relief under the Congressional CARES Act.
Given that mixed-status families will continue to increase, immigrant community activists and policy advocates need to spotlight these families’ experiences and particular challenges to illustrate the arbitrary distinction between citizenship status. Focusing on immigration status to judge the worth of a person is not only morally wrong but also no longer a pragmatic notion. Additionally, these reductionist frameworks give rise to hierarchies. Zeroing in on the distinctions between citizens and the undocumented makes invisible mixed-status households.
Thus, it is paramount that allies to the immigrant community shift the migrant policy discourse to focus more on mixed-status households. Shifting the focus to these families will help combat one-sided discourses praising young people demonstrating high-achieving academic ability while vilifying their parents, siblings, or other members of their communities. Highlighting the existence of mixed-status households demonstrates that young people do not exist in isolation from their parents, siblings, or other family members and that their experiences and challenges are organically interconnected in ways that current policy does not reflect. If rhetorically pro-immigrant politicians and the majority of the American public truly wish for these young people to become integrated into U.S. society as recent polls suggest, then we cannot, as a country, allow for family separation to be the price to pay for segmented integration. We also cannot allow the status quo, where these policies continue to affect a score of children who are U.S. citizens with deported parents.
The first and only time that status relief for the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents was addressed was in 2014 when the Obama administration designed the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents Act (DAPA) policy, a policy that was fought by the courts and buried by the Trump administration. If we are to truly uphold this administration’s promise to keep families together, then we need to do more, and we need to do better for immigrant families. A DAPA-type policy would extend the kinds of protections afforded under President Biden’s recent executive order to many more immigrant families and further shield immigrant communities from deportation and secure their future so that they can keep contributing to American society.
Marina Lambrinou, Ph.D. Postdoctoral Research Fellow Center for Equity, Leadership, and Social Justice in Education (CELSJE) School of Education Loyola University Maryland
The Executive Order announced on June 18, 2024, is another action taken due to Congress’s lack of legislative action. Several proposals were on the table, but Republicans did not want to support any bill. The new program is political in the sense that it helps Biden fulfill campaign promises not to separate migrant families and to find ways to regularize people without papers. It is not a universal amnesty, but rather a particular regularization for very established people and part of our communities. It could help up to 500,000 adults and 50,000 children.
These new measures also help several DACA recipients who are married to U.S. citizens. Part of the measures announced concern the individuals known as “dreamers,” minors who arrive to the U.S. undocumented. It would even make it easier for some who could not apply for the DACA program to obtain a work permit if they have higher education, and it would finally open a path to citizenship after holding a green card for some years. Twelve years ago, President Obama launched the DACA program to protect these young people from deportation. The DACA program has been a great success and is quite popular with the American population. With these measures, the Biden-Harris administration marks a clear contrast with their electoral rival, Donald Trump, who has promised mass deportations if he becomes president again.
Trump’s base is quite anti-immigrant, but not Biden’s base, nor are most independent voters who will be key to winning the election in November. The Latino vote is also key. Latinos, especially Mexican and Central Americans would mostly benefit from these programs. In addition, people from Asia, Africa, Canada, and Europe, as well as their citizen families, will benefit from the measure. To clarify, the direct beneficiaries will NOT be able to vote this November, but their family members, employers, customers, and neighbors will. As anti-immigrant as Biden has become (e.g., numerical limits on asylum applications between ports of entry at the border), he will not take away Trump’s hard vote. This is a better route. The Immigration Lab’s analysis of elections since 2018 shows that being anti-immigrant does not help win elections in competitive elections and swing states.
The Executive Order on numerical caps to asylum-seeking in between ports of entry establishes a negative practical precedent where a President tries to unilaterally limit the asylum-seeking process in a situation not related to public health concerns (as was the supposed rationale for the use of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic). It gives tacit bipartisan support to Trump’s campaign threat of completely ending asylum in the U.S. if elected. This executive order does not help the Biden-Harris campaign to differentiate itself from Trump on migration. Agreeing with MAGA Republicans about border arrivals being a top issue helps Republican candidates––not Democrats. It also alienates voters with undocumented family members and those who are sympathetic to those in need of asylum because they are escaping war, armed conflict, or religious or political persecution. The Executive Order on spouses and Dreamers does the opposite because it positively connects the government with many members of society.
The Border Executive Order will affect future asylum-seekers including those who are already on their way to the U.S. southern border. The public tends to equate asylum seekers arriving between ports of entry at the wall or river with people trying to enter undetected. Asylum seekers look for Border Patrol and other officials to be processed and start their legal process to request asylum. The government, therefore, knows who they are and where they are located. Some of them will be allowed in, others will be returned quickly or later deported to their countries, or asked to leave if they are refused asylum. Hopefully, they can find safety in Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, or other countries in the region.
Some pundits argued that this move on limiting asylum would silence the criticisms that Biden was ‘weak’ on border security. The executive action limiting asylum-seekers was supposed to convince independent and conservative voters to vote for Biden. However, those criticisms have not ended––nor will they partly because they are political and not based on facts. Even if some conservative voters in, Montana, for example, were happy with this partial ‘border closure,’ they would probably disagree with Biden on contraception and reproductive health, taxes for billionaires, climate change, etc. Most people are not single-issue voters. Their values and position on the ‘culture wars’ framed by Republicans and the media tend to cluster into particular groups. Independents are unlikely to vote solely on perceptions about border security. Many of the people who are worried about immigration are worried about a hypothetical fear around the great replacement conspiracy theory. They may be worried about demographic changes in the short term, forgetting that immigrants in the past became integrated into the U.S. majority culture; they are doing so now and will continue in the future. The main issues on the ballot are about policy and protecting democratic institutions, not the less than 3.3 percent of residents in the country who are currently undocumented.
Ernesto Castañeda is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, the Immigration Lab, and the Masters in Sociology, Research, and Practice at American University in Washington, D.C.
This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.
Based on data from the Immigration Lab’s Immigration to the DMV (DC, Maryland, and Virginia) project, there is a new wave of immigration from El Salvador, even though people from this country have sought refuge in the U.S. for decades. Despite being better educated, many Salvadoran immigrants work in lower-income, service-oriented jobs due to credential recognition issues and language barriers. Addressing integration challenges through inclusive policies for immigrants is crucial for harnessing their full potential and strengthening society.
El Salvador is similar in size to New Jersey and has a population like Tennessee. Although a relatively small country, Salvadorans are the biggest immigrant group in Washington, DC. Seventeen percent of the population in DC is immigrants, 11% of which are from El Salvador.
Why did they choose to migrate? El Salvador experienced right-wing military regimes seizing power through rigged elections in the 1950s. The failure of land reform and political turmoil led to a civil war from 1979 to 1992, causing a 21.5% drop in GDP.
The United States justified its intervention in the Salvadorean civil war as preventing a left-wing party from taking power within the context of the Cold War. The conflict led to many refugees moving to the United States. A few of them formed gangs in Los Angeles, who were incarcerated and later deported, leading to the emergence of gangs in El Salvador, including MS-13. These gangs focused on territorial control and their violence caused some targeted people to look for safety in the United States.
Among the immigrants interviewed in the Immigration to the DMV project, 95% answered that El Salvador’s violence, climate, and economic difficulties influenced their decision to immigrate to the U.S. Our interviewees cite a bad economic situation, a serious lack of security, and corruption as the reasons they left.
Female immigrants make up a significant portion of the sample in this interview. The data indicates an increasing trend of more female migrants, which aligns with previous research. Some of the factors contributing to this include the demand for care and domestic work in the U.S. and an increased probability for women to pursue higher in the United States. A young woman who came to Washington, D.C. in 2022 mentioned that she migrated for a better chance at self-development, to study college, and to become a nurse.
Even though the female participants in this study faced danger, including receiving contraceptive injections to avoid pregnancies during the arduous journey and threats of sexual violence, they desperately wanted to find long-term security and a chance to study.
New Generation of Salvadoran Immigrants
We interviewed Salvadoran immigrants who arrived in the U.S. fleeing the aftermath of the civil war, which they saw as a truly traumatic event. Political violence contributed to political corruption, economic failure, and widespread violence. Interviewers coming later also came looking for safety and economic opportunity.
People who arrived after 2019 are relatively proficient in English and more educated. Interviewees are from a country where only 33% of the population graduated from middle school, but 80% of the interviewees from this generation graduated middle school, and 60% graduated high school or with their GED. All of them had a better education than their parents. They had much better education and skills than their parents, but still, even though they are minors and part-timers, most still tend to work in lower-income jobs in the service sector. What causes this tendency?
Two main challenges face this group: language barriers and lack of recognition of relevant training and job experience. These factors hinder their integration into the U.S. job market and society.
One of the main challenges that Salvadoran immigrants face is credential recognition. The skills and experiences they obtain in their home country may need to be properly evaluated or acknowledged in the United States. This includes the requirement for a GED, a U.S. high school diploma, or a U.S.-specific certificate. This can prevent immigrants from utilizing their previous experience and instead require them to start from scratch.
A 24-year-old Salvadoran man who lives in DC has been certified in forklift management in El Salvador. Another former electric technician also mentioned a similar experience. Still, those certifications needed to be recognized in the U.S., and ultimately, their professional experience was dismissed. So, in this case, the electrician became a cook even though electricians and forklift drivers are in high demand and are well-paying jobs.
This experience can lead to immigrants’ struggle with “imposter syndrome,” which negatively affects their self-image and makes it harder to derive self-esteem from their work. Furthermore, it can be argued that language barriers are a significant obstacle for immigrants to fully participate in the labor market.
The pandemic’s profound economic repercussions severely impacted El Salvador, exacerbating the country’s preexisting high crime rates. Interestingly, statistical data indicates that language barriers among Salvadoran immigrants do not immediately result in income disparities. Their incomes are quite similar when comparing Spanish-speaking immigrants who arrived recently with English-speaking immigrants who arrived in 2010 (Median is $30,000 for English speakers versus $35,000 for Spanish speakers, and the average is $36,430 versus $37,000). Most interviewees noted that their ability to speak only Spanish did not pose a significant challenge in assimilating into society. Spanish speakers might even have an advantage when seeking certain jobs.
However, English-speaking individuals tend to have a wider range of job opportunities, which can influence their assimilation and long-term settlement. While Spanish-speaking immigrants typically work in service-oriented roles, English speakers often have access to a broader spectrum of employment options, including management positions and roles in non-governmental organizations. Language proficiency plays a crucial role in the employment opportunities available to immigrants, affecting their ability to assimilate and succeed long-term.
Although immigrants from El Salvador could get jobs with the help of friends and relatives, there is a risk that the occupation will be limited to the service industry only. A Salvadoran woman in her 20s who wants to be a Spanish teacher faced challenges getting information about how to become one due to language barriers.
In the DMV area, organizations like Northern Virginia Family Service, Maryland Multicultural Youth Centers, and DC Central Kitchen’s Culinary Job Training Program are available in multiple languages for immigrants. However, these services are decentralized and challenging for immigrants to access due to lack of time and transportation, creating barriers to utilization. In the data analyzed, almost none of the participants reported being part of a community organization, but most of them stated they were interested in learning opportunities and cultural activities.
It would be helpful to create a centralized portal that provides professional skills enhancement and digital-based social networking, integrating Salvadoran cultural influences.
It is important to acknowledge that immigrants, specifically Salvadorans, contribute to diverse cultural environments and enrich communities economically and socially. Addressing their integration challenges through inclusive policies and accessible support systems is crucial for developing a united and strong society.
Rodrigo Salazar is a man who entered the U.S. without a visa and has been living in the country without legal status ever since. Because of this, Rodrigo, who asked that we not use his or his wife’s real names in order to protect their identity, cannot advance from low-paying jobs at restaurants and car washes.
His wife, Carmela, is a U.S. citizen, but she is also facing career limitations. Carmela doesn’t feel safe moving to a place where she could get a higher-paying job. She worries that Rodrigo’s lack of legal status would be more obvious in a city with a smaller Latino population, which would put him at risk for arrest and deportation.
The entire Salazar family, including their two children, live with the constant fear of family separation if Rodrigo is deported.
The Biden administration estimates that about 500,000 immigrant spouses of citizens will be protected from deportation with this policy change. The policy will also apply to approximately 50,000 U.S. citizens’ stepchildren who are living in the U.S. without legal immigration status.
We are migration scholars who study mixed-citizenship marriages – meaning some family members are citizens or have the legal right to stay in the U.S., while others do not – and the consequences of being undocumented. Our research shows that when one family member lacks legal immigration status in the U.S., the family as a whole assumes an undocumented status.
Generally, having an immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen gives a foreign citizen the chance to live legally in the U.S. with permanent residency and a pathway to citizenship.
For most of the 20th century, all spouses of U.S. citizens who met the legal standards for qualified marital relationships were able to become citizens through a relatively straightforward process, but that changed in 1996.
A 1996 law called the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act imposed harsh penalties for people living in the U.S. without legal immigration status. One of the penalties is a 10-year “bar to re-entry” for anyone who has lived without a visa in the U.S. for one year or more. This ban goes into effect as soon as that individual leaves U.S. territory.
Technicalities create a divide
A consequence of this 1996 law was that getting a green card, which is an identity document that gives someone legal permanent residency in the country, became dependent on whether an immigrant entered – and remained in – the U.S. with or without a visa.
This change in the law produced a stark inequality in U.S. citizens’ ability to legally sponsor their immigrant spouses for permanent residency.
If an immigrant spouse of a U.S. citizen has overstayed a visa, this person can apply for legal immigration status – through their spouse – from within the U.S. In these cases, the spouse does not have to leave U.S. territory and is not subject to the 10-year ban.
In contrast, if a U.S. citizen’s spouse entered the U.S. without a visa or other legal permission, they must leave the country for the final step in their legal immigration application process. But when they leave the country, their 10-year ban automatically goes into effect.
This means that although every U.S. citizen’s spouse, including those lacking legal immigration status, technically qualifies for legal permanent residency, some of them will have to spend a decade or more outside the country before they can actually get a green card.
As a result, over the past few decades, millions of immigrants who were living in the U.S. without legal permission but were married to U.S. citizens have not gotten legal immigration status.
In these cases, citizens married to immigrants without legal permission to be in the U.S. have two difficult options. They can resign themselves to a life of fear and limitations in the U.S., including the ever-present threat of their spouse’s deportation, or they can give up living in the U.S. altogether for a decade or more.
A new U.S. citizen, originally from Mexico, poses with his family after a naturalization ceremony in November 2023 in Long Beach, Calif. Biden’s new policy will make it easier for undocumented immigrants with citizen spouses to become citizens. Mario Tama/Getty Images
The impacts of Biden’s immigration policy changes
The Biden administration has connected this new executive action on families to its recent announcement that it will heighten restrictions for seeking asylum, which scholars have called a ban on asylum.
The administration said in a press release that it both wants to “secure the border” and expand “lawful pathways to keep families together.”
Under this new policy, immigrant spouses who entered the country without a visa before June 17, 2014, will be allowed to “parole in place,” which is similar to a policy that benefitsmilitary veterans’ immigrant spouses who lack legal immigration status in the U.S. Parole in place means that these immigrants will have authorization to work and increased protection from deportation.
Parole in place will also allow immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens to have their immigration applications processed within the U.S., whether they arrived with or without a visa. This means they will no longer need to leave the country for 10 years or more if they entered the U.S. without a visa.
The executive action will also yield economic benefits for the communities where mixed-citizenship families live.
Economic analysesmeasuring the impact of expanding work authorization and access to citizenship predict that this will create new jobs, boost incomes across communities, increase local and federal tax revenues and encourage ongoing economic growth.
As scholars of migration, we believe that this executive action is an important step toward guaranteeing that U.S. citizens who marry immigrants do not end up experiencing negative consequences because their spouses cannot legally live, work or vote in the U.S. It will also prevent the de facto deportation of U.S. citizens alongside their noncitizen spouses.
In essence, this policy change benefits American families and protects the rights of U.S. citizens to marry the person they love, keep their families together and even live in their own country. Beyond helping families, this change will have far-reaching economic benefits for the communities – and country – where they live.
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*Jane Lilly López is an Assistant Professor of Sociology, Brigham Young University. Jane Lilly López’s research on mixed-citizenship couples has received funding from the National Science Foundation, UC MEXUS, and the Center for US-Mexican Studies.
*Kristina Fullerton Rico is a Research Fellow, Center for Racial Justice, Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. Kristina Fullerton Rico’s research on the impact of long-term undocumented immigration status has received funding from the Russell Sage Foundation and Sociologists for Women in Society.
This is reproduced from The Conversation with the authors’ permission.
This graph summarizes the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey data, capturing the percentage of uninsured adult Latinos in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area. By Rodrigo Stein / Creative Commons License
Gaps in access to public health insurance like Medicaid and other subsidized programs, coupled with restrictions in private job-based health coverage, create significant barriers for immigrants in obtaining essential healthcare services. The disparate treatment of immigration statuses leads to a fragmented health coverage system, resulting in many immigrants, including those lawfully present, foregoing necessary medical care. This contributes to poorer health outcomes, reduced life expectancy, and increased morbidity rates among immigrant populations in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.1
Immigration Status Impacts Health
The Washington, D.C. metropolitan area is home to over 900,000 Latinos, 53% of whom are foreign-born.2 A significant portion of this immigrant population hails from Central American countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Numerous studies highlight how immigration and immigration status impact health outcomes through various material and psychological mechanisms.3,4 These include heightened fear and stress, unequal access to resources, experiences of prejudice and violence, and disparities in accessing safe employment and quality housing.2,3 Despite the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), individuals with Central American heritage are still less likely to have health insurance compared to non-Latino Whites.4
Over 32,000 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders who have sought protection in the United States due to conflict or natural disasters in their home countries reside primarily in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.5 TPS holders (the majority, Salvadoran nationals) qualify for ACA subsidies and plans but not Medicaid.6 Medicaid, the primary public health program for low-income working-age adults, is limited to citizens and “qualified non-citizens,” a category that requires both legal status and (in most cases) completion of a five-year waiting period to be eligible for public assistance programs.7
These provisions combine to make thousands of immigrants ineligible for public health services and financial assistance for purchasing insurance, forcing them to choose between purchasing expensive private market insurance at cost, going without health insurance, or relying on the emergency room as their main source of care. (See Table 1).
Table 1 Eligibility for Federally Funded Health Care Coverage Based on Immigration Status
Eligibility for Federally Funded Coverage Based on Immigration Status
Immigration Status
Marketplace Eligible
Medicaid/CHIP Eligible
Lawfully Present and Eligible for Federally Funded Coverage
Valid non-immigrant visa holders (e.g. students, worker visas)
✔
X
Humanitarian statuses or circumstances (including Temporary Protected Status, Special Juvenile Status, asylum applicants, Convention Against Torture, victims of trafficking)
✔
X
Legal status conferred by other laws (temporary resident status, Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, Family Unity individuals)
✔
X
Qualified non-citizens • Lawful Permanent Residents [(LPR)/Green Card Holder)]* • Paroled into the U.S. for at least one year* • Battered non-citizens, spouses, children, or parents* • People fleeing persecution (e.g., asylees, refugees) • Granted withholding of deportation • Cuban/Haitian entrants • Certain Amerasian immigrants • Members of a federally recognized Indian tribe or American Indian born in Canada • Veterans or active duty military and their family members • Victims of trafficking and their family members • Citizens of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau who are living in one of the U.S. states or territories [“Compact of Free Association (COFA) migrants”] • Granted Iraqi or Afghan special immigrant status • Children receiving foster care or adoption assistance • Conditional entry granted before 1980
✔
✔
Ineligible for Federally Funded Coverage
Undocumented immigrants:Individuals who entered the country without authorizationIndividuals who entered the country lawfully and stayed after their visa or status expired
X
X
DACA: Temporary status allowing individuals who came to the country as children to remain in the U.S.
X
X
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful PermanentResidents (DAPA): Temporary status allowing parents of citizens or LPRs to remain in the country
X
X
*Subject to the five-year bar (i.e. requirement to reside in the U.S. for five years or more before becoming eligible for Medicaid/CHIP). Note that there is no five-year bar for accessing subsidized Marketplace coverage.
Health Risks & Social Determinants of Health
In addition to access barriers, immigrants experience a lack of social support and the absence of culturally and linguistically competent services. This means that many Latino immigrants, even those with access to quality care, forego seeking medical care until they face an emergency. Language barriers contribute to increased rates of misdiagnoses, weaker health literacy skills, and reduced access to acute and preventive care.8
This issue is compounded by the fact that many Latino immigrants are employed in occupations that offer limited access to employer-sponsored health coverage and often have comparatively lower incomes.9 As a result, these individuals face barriers to accessing care when trying to afford employer-sponsored coverage, when available, or when navigating the individual health insurance market. Given these barriers, what policy alternatives exist to ensure thousands of Latino immigrant residents in our region are not excluded from health care?
Current Options: Federally Qualified Health Centers
Because of their limited access to health care, Latino immigrants often seek services at community health centers (CHCs) where they can access care without insurance (over 35% of CHC patients in the U.S. are Latino).10 Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) are CHCs that meet stringent federal requirements and receive funding via the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to provide primary health care services to all people regardless of their ability to pay or documentation status through a sliding fee scale.11
FQHC’s like La Clínica Del Pueblo (La Clínica), play a significant role in reducing racial and ethnic health disparities. The success of these centers in narrowing these gaps is attributed to the wide range of services they offer, culturally competent care, and strong relationships built with underserved communities.12 Since all direct service staff are bilingual, and most are first-generation Latino immigrants, La Clínica provides much-needed culturally and linguistically appropriate health care to a large yet excluded population in the Washington, D.C. metro area.
However, despite their effectiveness in producing high-quality healthcare outcomes, FQHCs are limited in size, scope, and resources. Because these centers vary in size, depth, and jurisdiction, addressing the cost of care for those who are ineligible for federally funded health programs is paramount—without them, FQHCs bear the burden of uncompensated care for a population with significant health needs.
Potential Policy Solutions
As of March 2024, the District of Columbia and six states—California, Colorado, Illinois, New York, Oregon, and Washington—have expanded fully state-funded coverage to some income-eligible adults regardless of immigration status.13 These legislative or administrative actions rely on establishing state Medicaid/CHIP equivalent or comparable programs, and creating state premium or cost-sharing subsidies to enable individuals to purchase marketplace coverage.9 In addition to these six states, Maryland will allow income-eligible individuals to purchase marketplace coverage regardless of immigration status through a Section 1332 waiver.
Maryland’s Access to Care Act
On May 16, Maryland Governor Wes Moore signed the Access to Care Act into law. Sponsored by Delegate Bonnie Cullison and Senator Antonio Hayes, the law removes immigration status as an eligibility requirement for purchasing a health plan through the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange (MHBE). In doing so, Maryland allows the remaining 6% of uninsured Maryland residents to purchase insurance. Immigrants make up a substantial number of that uninsured population; they are 15% of Maryland’s population overall, and the state’s Montgomery and Prince George’s counties have the highest concentrations of the Latino population in Maryland, with 21% in each jurisdiction. Soon, they will not only have the choice to buy a healthcare plan in the state but also receive care in a culturally and linguistically competent manner.
Stepping Toward Equity
By expanding eligibility for public health programs and supporting community health centers, we can ensure that all residents, regardless of immigration status, have access to essential healthcare services. Legislative actions like the Maryland Access to Care Act represent significant steps towards achieving health equity for immigrant populations.
[1] Martinez O, Wu E, Sandfort T, Dodge B, Carballo-Dieguez A, Pinto R, Rhodes SD, Moya E, Chavez-Baray S. Evaluating the impact of immigration policies on health status among undocumented immigrants: a systematic review. J Immigr Minor Health. 2015 Jun;17(3):947-70. doi: 10.1007/s10903-013-9968-4. Erratum in: J Immigr Minor Health. 2016 Feb;18(1):288. Rhodes SD [corrected to Rhodes SD]. PMID: 24375382; PMCID: PMC4074451.
[3] Yamanis T, Morrissey T, Bochey L, Cañas N, Sol C. “Hay que seguir en la lucha”: An FQHC’s Community Health Action Approach to Promoting Latinx Immigrants’ Individual and Community Resilience. Behavioral Medicine. 2020;46(3-4):303-316. doi:10.1080/08964289.2020.1738320
[4] Bucay-Harari L, Page KR, Krawczyk N, Robles YP, Castillo-Salgado C. Mental Health Needs of an Emerging Latino Community. The journal of behavioral health services & research. 2020;47(3):388-398. doi:10.1007/s11414-020-09688-3
[10] Ortega AN, Rodriguez HP, Vargas Bustamante A. Policy dilemmas in Latino health care and implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Annu Rev Public Health. 2015;36:525-544. doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122421
[12] Yamanis T, Morrissey T, Bochey L, Cañas N, Sol C. “Hay que seguir en la lucha”: An FQHC’s Community Health Action Approach to Promoting Latinx Immigrants’ Individual and Community Resilience. Behavioral Medicine. 2020;46(3-4):303-316. doi:10.1080/08964289.2020.1738320
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*Rodrigo Stein is a resourceful public health professional with experience in program management, design and evaluation, advocacy, and strategic planning.
Susan Eckstein’s recent book, Cuban Privilege: The Making of Immigrant Inequality in America, is a deep dive into how the U.S. government structured its immigration policy to the advantage of Cuban migrants as part of its Cold War policy to destabilize Fidel Castro’s revolutionary government. The book caused quite a stir among some Cuban Americans, who were insulted that someone pointed out policies that helped make the Cuban American community a success story.
Cuban Privilege was not Eckstein’s first book on Cuban diaspora. She has written extensively on the threads that connect Cubans abroad with their family still on the island. Her book The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the U.S. and Their Homeland was one of the first in-depth studies of how the Cuban American community began reconnecting to the island in the 1980s and 1990s, building bridges based mainly on family ties.
In the 1960s and 1970s, both the Cuban and U.S. governments erected a “sugar cane curtain” that made it almost impossible for families to stay connected across the Florida Strait. Travel was prohibited, direct mail service was unavailable, and connecting by phone was nearly impossible and prohibitively expensive.
But in the 1980s, travel opened up, and remittances began to flow. Ever since the Special Period, Cuba’s economic crisis in the 1990s, Cuban American remittances have made an essential contribution to the livelihood of millions of Cuban families—a stark reality demonstrated by the humanitarian crisis on the island that resulted when Donald Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic cut remittance flows by some two-thirds.
Cuban Privilege reverses the lens to look not at Cuban immigrants but at the U.S. immigration policies that brought them here. It is the definitive account of how Washington, motivated by the Cold War, gave Cuban immigrants privileged access to the United States and unprecedented support once they got here. Key elements of that privilege remain in place today, exacerbating the current migration crisis—foremost among them the Cuban Adjustment Act, which allows Cubans living in the United States for a year to apply for permanent residence, regardless of their form of entry.
Most of the time, academics toil in relative obscurity, writing for one another in hopes of contributing new knowledge to their chosen field. On occasion, they write for a broader audience, hoping that their expertise might have some positive impact on public policy. And most of the time, when they speak truth to power, power isn’t listening. Rarely do academic contributions to the public debate attract much attention or make much difference.
Susan Eckstein’s Cuban Privilege is a cautionary tale of what can happen when the public does take notice. Presenting her book in Miami, Eckstein endured 30 minutes of hate, denounced as an agent of Castroism, because she had the nerve to state the obvious — Cuban immigrants to the United States have enjoyed enormous privileges that no other immigrant group has enjoyed. To say that is not an attack on Cuban Americans; it’s a simple truth.
Ironically, the policy of privileged immigration for Cubans, which was intended to weaken and embarrass the Cuban government, has instead weakened and embarrassed the U.S. government producing a series of migration “crises” or more correctly punctuated increases (Camarioca in 1965, Mariel in 1980, the rafters crisis in 1994, and the post-Covid increase in emigration that is ongoing today), and distorting U.S. domestic politics by creating one of the most powerful domestic foreign policy lobbies in history—Cuban Americans in south Florida.
For 30 years, successive presidents —with the sole exception of Barack Obama— have been afraid to stand up to the Miami lobby on U.S. policy toward Cuba. As President George H. W. Bush’s National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft put it, “Cuba is not a foreign policy question. Cuba is a domestic issue.” The result is a policy of regime change that, in 65 years, has done nothing to advance the cause of democracy or human rights in Cuba, but has lowered the living standard of the Cuban people and alienated Washington from allies in Latin America.
Before the Trump administration, Cuban American attitudes were gradually evolving toward moderation and support of engagement. President Obama won more Cuban American votes in Florida than any Democrat before him. And a majority—albeit a narrow one—supported his normalization policy.
But Trump’s return to a policy aimed at overthrowing the Cuban government re-energized the most recalcitrant Cuban American right. Recently both attitudes and voting behavior in the community seem to have swung sharply to the right, the result of a new wave of immigrants, a toxic social media environment, and disinformation spread by some of Miami’s Spanish language media.
As a result, Democrats have gone back to being afraid of Cuba—not the island, but the issue. Despite his campaign promise to return, for the most part, to Obama’s policy of engagement, President Biden has kept in place most of Donald Trump’s draconian economic sanctions aimed at strangling the Cuban economy.
The final irony is that Florida does not actually matter very often in presidential elections. Conventional political wisdom casts it as a critical swing state. But in the sixteen presidential elections since 1960, Florida has determined the outcome in Electoral College only twice: in 2000, when Cuban Americans gave George W. Bush a 537-vote margin over Al Gore because the Clinton administration returned six-year-old Elián González to his father in Cuba; and in 2004 when Bush narrowly beat John Kerry.
Kerry lost Florida by such a wide margin that he would have lost the state even if he had won the Cuban vote. So Cuban Americans in Florida have only cost the Democrats the White House once: in the unforgettable election of 2000. Ever since, Democrats have suffered from electoral post-traumatic stress disorder over the issue of Cuba, and it appears that 2024 will be no different. That is the legacy of the immigration policies that Susan Eckstein so expertly chronicles in Cuban Privilege.
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