Fleeing Collapse, Facing Barriers

Fleeing Collapse, Facing Barriers: The Venezuelan Crisis and U.S. Immigration Hurdles 

By Katheryn Olmos, Emma Wyler, & Isabella Serra

Photo of popular Venezuelan activist, Rafael Araujo, holding a sign that says, “Feb 12th 2014-2015 Impunity Persecution and Torture,” at a protest in Caracas, Venezuela on February 12, 2015. Image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Severe Humanitarian Emergency in Venezuela

Just a few decades ago, Venezuela stood as a beacon of economic prosperity and oil wealth on the Caribbean coast of South America. However, the rise of authoritarian rule led to economic collapse, widespread corruption, and rampant inflation, creating a dangerous political climate that forced millions to flee their homes.

For many Venezuelans, including the 48 living in the Washington Metropolitan region (DMV) whom we interviewed, migrating to the U.S. was not their first choice when pursuing a more stable life. Previously, many Venezuelans migrated to and were displaced from places closer to home, from neighboring countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil.

Venezuelan displacement is driven by a myriad of circumstances. Almost all of the Venezuelans we interviewed expressed that the economic situation in their home country, including hyperinflation, food scarcity, and inadequate wages, is not viable to sustain themselves or their families.

“No hay trabajo. [Cuando] hay trabajo y te quieren pagar, son 20 dólares semanales. Sí, y eso es muy poco dinero para los consumos de mi mamá, mis hijas. Nada más un bote de leche son 10 dólares. ¿Y me quedan 10 dólares para qué?”

“There’s no work. When there is work and they want to pay you, it’s 20 dollars a week. Yes, and that’s very little money for my mom and daughters’ basic needs. Just one gallon of milk costs 10 dollars. That leaves me 10 dollars for what?”

— Gabriel, Venezuelan Man, 28

When asked about corruption and impunity playing a role in the reason they migrated, the answer is almost always “yes.” Many of our participants experience corruption and political persecution from their government.

“Pues primero por la escasez de comida, y segundo, el barrio donde yo vivía era uno de los barrios más peligrosos de Venezuela… No tanto por parte de los que te roban sino más que todo por la policía. A la policía no importa si eres sano, si eres delincuente, igualito te extorsionaban, te sembraban drogas, de todo… nada más por el hecho de que uno perteneciera a La Cota 905 pensaban que ya uno estaba relacionado con [la pandilla]. Sí a todo el mundo que agarraron o sembraron le daban golpe, lo metieron preso, lo desaparecía… Te mataban y te ponían un arma, y ponían carajo de la banda de La Cota 905, cuando no es así. Entonces esa fue uno de los principales motivos porque me vine: La policía.”

“Well, first, because of the scarcity of food, and second, the neighborhood where I lived was one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in Venezuela…Not so much by people who rob you, but mostly by the police. It doesn’t matter to the police if you’re normal or if you’re a criminal; they still extorted you, planted drugs, everything. Just because you belonged to La Cota 905, they thought you were part of the gang. Everyone they grabbed or planted on was beaten, imprisoned, disappeared… They’d kill you and put a gun on you, and they’d say you were from La Cota 905 gang, when that’s not true. So that was one of the main reasons why I left: The police.”

— Andres, Venezuelan Man, 25

Humanitarian Protection Terminated

Given the unsafe conditions back home, many of the interviewees entered the United States under humanitarian parole, a common pathway to seek protection. The discriminatory attempt by the second Trump administration (now being blocked in federal court) to terminate humanitarian parole for Venezuelans, Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans (CHNV) has upended the legal status for over half a million immigrants, and threatens to block all new applicants from these countries from receiving humanitarian protection. As of December 2024, 117,330 Venezuelan nationals had entered the U.S. under humanitarian parole. As Nicolas, a 29-year-old Venezuelan man, described:

“Entré con un permiso humanitario… A través de la aplicación [CBP One]. Ahorita no tengo los papeles, pero estoy en Estados Unidos gracias al permiso humanitario que ofrece Estados Unidos. Me lo aprobaron. … Cuando estaba en Chile, me aprobaron la entrada legal.”

“I came in with a humanitarian parole… Through the [CBP One] application. Right now, I don’t have the papers, but I’m in the United States because of the humanitarian parole that the United States offers. They approved me. … When I was in Chile, they approved me for legal entry.”

— Nicolas, Venezuelan Man, 29

In the appointment-making process for their asylum cases and legal processing, many interviewees used the CBP One app.

“Había hecho varios registros [en la aplicación CBP One] y todo eso, y no salía nada… Y trabajé hasta que me salió la cita… Estuve casi 12 meses, 11 meses [en México esperando la cita]… Entonces, de ahí, me dieron [la cita] para San Ysidro… Cuando por fin crucé, pues, solo la felicidad de estar aquí, todo fue, bueno, incluso mejor. Y de ahí llegué, compré [un boleto], tomé mi vuelo, y luego volé hasta aquí.”

“I had done several registrations [on the CBP One app] and all that, and nothing came up… And I worked until I got the appointment… I spent almost 12 months, 11 months [in Mexico waiting for the appointment]… So, from there, I got [the appointment] for San Ysidro… When I finally crossed, well, just the happiness of being here, everything was, well, even better. And from there, I arrived, bought [a ticket], I got my flight, and then I flew here.”

— Diego, Venezuelan Man, 19

The CBP One app, once a tool to schedule asylum appointments, was shut down by Trump and transformed “self-deportation” tool. This effectively weaponizes one of the only services for Venezuelans to legally process their asylum applications.

Venezuelans we spoke to often had experience with the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program. TPS provides temporary protection and work permits to individuals who are unable to safely return to their home countries.

In February of 2025, President Trump announced his intentions to upend TPS for Venezuelans, stripping the 700,000 who would have been eligible for the program. While ending TPS for Venezuelans backpedals on basic humanitarian protection policy, our interviews shine a more nuanced light on the program’s existing limitations. TPS was too temporary to be a pathway.

“Ah sí, porque con el estatus temporal, o sea, lo dan solo por 18 meses. Y el asunto es que, para cuando lo recibes, ya casi se está acabando, así que nadie te va a dar un trabajo por un mes y luego te quedarás, ya sabes, sin los papeles legales.”

“Oh yeah, because with the temporary status, I mean they give it for only 18 months. And the scene is by the time you receive it. It’s almost already sparse, so I mean, nobody will go in to give you a job for a month, and then you will be, you know, without the legal paper.”

— Alejandra, Venezuelan Woman, 73

Despite its limitations, now that TPS is terminated, Venezuelans in the U.S. have lost their temporary work authorizations and currently risk deportation. The sensationalization of Venezuelan deportations by the Trump administration is an escalation of racial profiling experiences that interviewees previously reported.

Experiences in the U.S.

The hardships Venezuelans face do not end at the border. Our team looked deeper into the immigrant experiences of Venezuelans upon entering the U.S.

Many of our interviews uncovered further obstacles, including racial profiling, political persecution, labor exploitation, health implications, and detainment.

A commonality we discovered within our interviews is that people who seek refuge in the United States are criminalized based on their country of origin. Many Venezuelans interviewed experienced racial profiling committed by American police enforcement. The following interview, along with several others, reported job exploitation and unlivable wages. Racial profiling by police is a common thread among our interviews.

In our interviews with Venezuelans who had been detained in the United States, there were reports of close confinement and stress leading to health issues. On his experience being detained, a young man shared:

“Hubo un momento en que, prácticamente por tanto encierro, se me estaba cayendo el cabello del estrés y de tanto pensar. A veces quería pedir la deportación, y a veces me decía a mí mismo, ‘No estoy aquí, ya no estoy aquí’… Entonces aguanté, y cuando salí, me rapé la cabeza porque se me estaba cayendo el cabello.”

“There was a moment when, practically from so much confinement, my hair was falling out from the stress and the thinking. Sometimes I wanted to ask for deportation, and sometimes I said [to myself], I’m not here, I’m not already here… Then, I held on, and when I came out, I shaved my head because my hair was falling out.”

— Jose, Venezuelan Man, 23

U.S. Border Patrol agents process migrants at the Central Processing Center in McAllen, Texas, Sunday, June 17, 2018. Retrieved from picryl.

Key Takeaways

Venezuelans had to leave their worlds behind to escape the humanitarian crisis, just to face repeated struggles in an escalating authoritarian regime seizing power in the United States. Daniel, a 46-year-old Venezuelan man, described that throughout the difficult journey across the Americas, all he was doing was:

“Buscando una oportunidad de vida y una mejor calidad de vida, buscando una forma en la que me puedan dar una oportunidad o de tener mis documentos. Buscar un estatus.”

“Looking for an opportunity and a better quality of life, searching for a way in which they can give me the opportunity of having documents… a chance to have a status.”

— Daniel, Venezuelan Man, 46

ICE now weaponizes these discriminatory views of Venezuelans, painting them as gang members or terrorists. These are not unlike the claims with which the government in Venezuela used to persecute normal citizens back home.

The rampant political corruption, lack of transparency and due process, and smothering of dissent are escalating in the United States. This is a story Venezuelans know because they have already witnessed the fall of a functioning democracy to authoritarian excesses.

At the end of the day, a Venezuelan man responds to the question of whether he sees himself as an immigrant, saying:

“Yo le digo una cosa, todos somos iguales porque somos personas, somos seres humanos [a pesar de haber] nacido aquí y allá en diferentes ciudades. O sea, no quiere decir que seas tú más que el otro porque tengas más dinero. Todos vamos a morir, vamos a un solo hueco.”

“I’ll tell you what, we’re all the same because we’re people, we’re human beings [despite being]… born in different cities. In other words, just because you have more money doesn’t mean you’re more than everyone else. We’re all going to die; we’re going to the same hole.”

— Liam, Venezuelan Man, 29


Katheryn Olmos, Research and Data Coordinator at the Immigration Lab and graduate student in the Sociology Research and Practice program at American University.

Emma Wyler, Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and undergraduate student at American University.

Isabella Serra, Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and recent graduate of American University.

Edited by Jacqueline Aguirre De La O, Noah Green & Ernesto Castañeda

Detention Inc: A Private Industry of Immigrant Detention Centers

How the Private Immigration Detention Industry Functions and Thrives in the US

By Tazreena Sajjad, PhD and Jack Spehn

The United States is home to the oldest and largest immigration detention system in North America and arguably, in the world. As of June 24, 2025, approximately 59,000 immigrants are being detained across the country under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the federal agency responsible for enforcing immigration law within the United States, with roughly 46,000 being detained on an average day since January 26. These numbers, significant as they are, are still notably below the Trump administration’s April claim that the government had “surpassed the entirety of Fiscal Year 2024” in immigration enforcement, with over 151,000 arrests and 135,000 deportations. As of late June, ICE’s detention level is at over 140% capacity.

Furthermore, despite the claims that these arrests —and even the most recent travel ban on 19 countries and counting— are a response to a dangerous invasion and a threat to the US, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the vast number of detained immigrants present a “clear and present danger” to either US national security interests or to the American public. In fact, approximately 47%  of those currently detained by ICE lack a criminal record, and less than 30% have been convicted of crimes that constitute minor offenses, including traffic violations. Meanwhile, the immigration detention business is only slated to expand – the new budget (OBBBA) approved by Congressional Republicans has allocated $45 billion for the construction of new immigrant detention centers alone, including facilities for family detention.

 A growing number of immigrants are being incarcerated in the US in the private immigration detention industry, on which the US government increasingly relies for immigration enforcement. In recent years, it is estimated that as many as 90% of ICE detainees in the US have been incarcerated in facilities operated by private immigration detention companies. 

The discussion below provides an overview of the US immigration detention system’s growing reliance on the private sector, the extent to which these companies continue to derive enormous profits from immigration imprisonment, and how they navigate the US political landscape. Despite widespread allegations and documentation of abuse in these private detention centers, the industry continues to generate significant profits and thrive on support from different public and private actors.

Understanding US Immigration Detention 

In the US, immigration detention refers to the federal government’s ongoing practice of confining individuals in a range of facilities for violating immigration law. Confinement may last the duration of an individual’s immigration proceedings and, in certain situations, even after their immigration proceedings have been completed. While lacking a current immigration status is a civil violation and immigration detention under the law should be “nonpunitive and preventative,” many of its aspects are indiscernible from criminal incarceration. Detained immigrants are incarcerated in prisons and prison-like facilities; required to wear government-issued uniforms and wristbands with identifying information at all times; and have highly regimented lives under constant surveillance. Detainees are also subjected to discipline and segregation, with very limited access or contact with the world outside. Furthermore, immigrant detainees do not receive the same legal protections as criminal defendants, i.e., they do not have the right to government-appointed counsel. They also do not have the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial, nor are they protected from the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

Over the past several decades, changes in the federal immigration enforcement policy paved the way for an expansive rise in detention rates. For instance, in 1973, the U.S. government detained a daily average of 2,370 migrants and increased to 5,532 by 1994. By 2009, the numbers had surged to 34,000; by 2019, the numbers had risen to a record 55,000.

Chart: Austin Kocher Source: ICE Get the data Embed Download image Created with Datawrapper

Chart: Austin Kocher Source: ICE Get the data Embed Download image Created with Datawrapper

What is clearly notable in these numbers is that since the 1990s, the US immigration policy has relied extensively on detention as a primary means of immigration enforcement. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act increased the incarceration of  U.S. citizens, particularly the Black population. In addition, the 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) ushered in a new era of U.S. immigration detention. Succinctly, these two latter laws not only broadened the types of criminal offenses that could trigger removal proceedings but also expanded the categories of noncitizens — including legal permanent residents — who could be detained without the possibility of release pending the completion of their removal proceedings, and even be subjected to deportation.

Following 9/11, immigration transformed into a national security concern, evidenced by the US Patriot Act, conflating terrorism with the arrival of people at US shores, while drawing on long-standing anti-immigrant sentiments and rhetoric. Under President George W. Bush, the immigration system underwent dramatic changes with Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) being replaced by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which housed all these agencies. DHS’ 2003 Operation Endgame used ICE to detain and deport all “removable aliens by 2012” –possibly the largest police operation in US history– was particularly instrumental in expanding immigration detention and deportation. During Obama’s presidency, the implementation of the detention bed quota (later removed in 2017) and the expansion of deportation programs such as the Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program resulted in thousands of immigrants being incarcerated in detention centers. Following the significant number of Central American arrivals in 2014, immigration detention —particularly family detention— expanded further.

Under the first Trump administration, the deportation dragnet became more extensive with increasing number of 278 g agreements – which allow for state and local law enforcement to work collaboratively for “protecting the homeland” – subsequent community raids, elimination of policies that prioritized detention and deportation of “criminal immigrants,” mandatory detention, and a skyrocketing detention budget that produced a growing system of mass incarceration. In FY 2019 alone, the detention system held more than 500,000 immigrants.

President Biden further funded the increase in the number of detention beds, broadened the 287(g) program, and pursued new and expanded detention facility contracts. Biden’s 2021 executive order directing the Department of Justice to phase out its contracts with private prison companies did include ICE contracts, since the agency is part of the Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, at the beginning of Biden’s presidency, there were fewer than 15,000 in ICE detention, yet the FY2024 spending bill he signed just a few years later provided funding to detain a daily average of 41,500 immigrants. While years of local organizing to end ICE contracts bore fruit along with the growth of pro-immigrant state legislation in multiple places like Irwin County, Georgia, the pipeline to detention has consequently grown, largely as a result of arrested migrants funneled through border apprehensions.

The Private Immigration Detention Industry: Growth and Expansion

The private detention industry plays a critical role in enabling immigration detention in the US. In August 2023, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that more than 9 out of 10 immigrant detainees were held in private prison facilities. Such corporations argue that private prisons are important in immigration management due to their cost-effectiveness, increased safety, and the humane treatment of inmates. In particular, GEO Group and CoreCivic (formerly the Corrections Corporation of America) are two companies responsible for the largest number of private immigration detention facilities in the country. Since the early 1980s, both companies have played a significant role in dominating the private prison industry to satisfy the growing demand for prisons. With the shrinking of the prison population in recent years, GEO Group and CoreCivic adapted their prison facilities to incarcerate noncriminal immigrants in the civil immigration system. In 2020, CoreCivic and GEO Group held half of all ICE detainees while bringing in billions of dollars in revenue through ICE detention contracts. As of December 31, 2024, CoreCivic operated 69 correctional, detention, and reentry facilities domestically, with a total capacity of roughly 76,000 beds. As of the same date, the GEO Group operated 99 facilities worldwide in 2024, with a total capacity of approximately 79,000 beds, the majority of which are located in the US.

The use of private immigration detention companies is by no means limited to Republican administrations; Democratic administrations have also increasingly relied on this industry for immigration enforcement. In fact, in July 2023, more than 90 percent of the average 30,000 people held daily in ICE detention were housed in private facilities.

The profit margins of the most prominent private detention centers have also been notable. From 2000 to 2020, the combined annual revenue of just the GEO Group and CoreCivic rose from well under half a billion dollars to around $4.5 billion. In 2022, GEO Group, which operates internationally as well as domestically, had $1.05 billion in revenue —43.9% of its total revenue from ICE contracts alone. This included $408 million, a significant 17%, on programs involving electronic monitoring of immigrants. In the same year, CoreCivic made $552.2 million (i.e., 30% of its total revenue) from ICE detention contracts. For FY 2023, the US Congress also appropriated $2.9 billion dollars to hold 34,000 people in ICE detention each day.

In 2024, CoreCivic reported a total revenue of $2 billion, up from $1.9 billion in 2023. A little over $1 billion came from federal contracts. Revenues from ICE  totaled $564.8 million in 2024, and $565.5 million in 2023. Meanwhile, GEO Group reported consolidated revenues of roughly $2.4 billion in 2024, 91% of which came from domestic contracts. ICE accounted for 41.5% of the company’s total 2024 revenues.

Both CoreCivic and GEO Group state plainly that their ability to grow is dependent on their ability to secure contracts to develop and manage new facilities. In turn, ICE has a heavy reliance on these private companies and their subcontractors.

Photograph of a CoreCivic Detention Center by Patrick Feller. Retrieved from Flickr.

Photograph of a CoreCivic Detention Center by Patrick Feller. Retrieved from Flickr.

The second Trump administration, with its overt commitment to an anti-immigrant agenda and increase in detention and deportations, has continued to be a boon for the private immigration detention industry. ICE plans to spend as much as $45 billion over the next two years on immigration detention. CoreCivic, in its end-of-2024 financial disclosures, stated “[we] expect demand from the federal government for our correctional and detention facilities to increase under the new presidential administration, particularly from ICE, as a result of anticipated changes in immigration policy.” Meanwhile, GEO Group said, “[we] continue to be encouraged by the current landscape of growth opportunities” and are “preparing for what we believe is an unprecedented opportunity…” Their excitement is evidently shared by their investors; both companies’ stock prices increased dramatically in the aftermath of the November 2024 election and remain well above their average pre-election value.

Questions for the Private Immigration Industry

The U.S. private immigration detention industry —like the private prison industrial complex— has long thrived based on the argument that its existence is necessary to reduce the costs of incarceration to state and federal correctional agencies and the burden on taxpayers. In fact, privatized companies have cut corners, such as reducing basic facilities for detainees and cutting back on their wages, in order to deliver on their promise of cutting government costs while maximizing profits for their shareholders.

While these measures may deliver in the short run, existing research shows they are far more likely to be more expensive in the long run. In addition to the reduction of services and reduced wages that negatively impact imprisoned immigrants, the U.S. immigration detention has long continued to be subject to intense scrutiny for human rights abuses, including verbal and physical assault, sexual harassment, insufficient food and nutrition provision, mistreatment of marginalized communities, insufficient access to medical care, negligence, lack of transparency and accountability alleged by many detainees. In May 2024, a group of U.S. Senators wrote to the Department of Homeland Security and ICE about “well-documented horrific conditions, such as ‘yellow drinking water,’ forced sleep deprivation, prolonged solitary confinement, inadequate medical care, limited access to legal counsel, and violent retaliation against those who complain.” A joint report by the ACLU, Physicians for Human Rights, and American Oversight found that 49 out of 52 deaths during detention ICE reported between January 2017 and December 2021 were “preventable or possibly preventable if appropriate medical care had been provided.” In certain cases reviewed in the report, medical staff vacancies and other health care deficiencies were found to have contributed to deaths. Groups such as Human Rights Watch have also documented multiple instances of substandard medical practices, including “unreasonable delays, poor practitioner and nursing care, and botched emergency response,” contributing to deaths in both publicly- and privately-operated facilities. Government oversight and regulatory bodies have consistently failed to anticipate, mitigate, identify, and rectify the conditions that enable such abuses. 

Private Immigration Detention Companies’ Successful Navigation of Criticisms

During President Obama’s time in office, the 2016 Inspector General report led to a directive to phase out private prisons, causing the stocks of private detention firms to tumble. However, this trend did not translate into significant economic damage for the private immigration detention industry or dampen enthusiasm for its existence. Instead, companies such as Geo Group and Core Civic, continued to develop and expand their public lobby efforts, including making donations to political campaigns. CoreCivic spent $3.7 million in lobbying throughout 2014 and 2015, with nearly $2 million in additional political donations. During Trump’s first presidential run for office, GEO Group donated US$100,000 to his 2016 campaign, and CoreCivic made large contributions to support his inaugural activities. Following President Trump’s 2016 electoral win, both firms’ stocks soared. Soon after, Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Obama directive, citing concern that it would impair “the Bureau’s ability to meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.” In 2017, Texas State Representative John Raney told the Associated Press that a GEO Group lobbyist directly authored legislation that sought to lower childcare standards for private detention centers and extend the amount of time immigrant children could be detained.

Political contributions and lobbying funds remained high throughout the Biden administration. In 2022, GEO Group reported spending more than $4 million on political contributions and $3.1 million on lobbying expenditures, while CoreCivic cited more than $1 million in political contributions and $2.2 million in lobbying fees. Existing research suggests a possible connection between the political contributions made by these companies and their sponsorship of legislation in Congress that benefits the private detention industry. Their methods of influence can also take less overt forms. For example, the contracts these companies sign with governments often include “mandatory minimum” provisions, which guarantee payment for a set number of beds and thus create a financial incentive for governments to fill these spaces. A January 2021 review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that “ICE has increasingly incorporated guaranteed minimum payments into its contracts and agreements … [but] has not taken a strategic approach to these decisions and has spent millions of dollars a month on unused detention space. Some immigrant rights groups have argued that this creates a waste of resources and a financial incentive to keep more immigrants detained within private facilities.

In 2023 alone, CoreCivic reported $983,250 in total political contributions and approximately $2 million in total direct lobbying expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels. In February 2025, GEO Group, along with its associated political action committee, reported a total of $4.02 million in political contributions alongside $3.97 million in direct lobbying expenditures. The company states that their efforts “are focused on promoting the benefits of public-private partnerships in the delivery of support services for secure facilities and processing centers…”, but that they “have not advocated for or against … criminal justice or immigration enforcement policies, such as whether to criminalize behavior, the length of criminal sentences, or the basis for or length of an individual’s incarceration or detention.” CoreCivic also reported donating half a million dollars to the Trump-Vance inaugural committee in December 2024. CoreCivic states that its lobbying efforts are “designed to educate” government officials about “the benefits of partnership corrections”, and that they avoid advocating “for or against policies or legislation that would determine the basis for or duration of an individual’s incarceration or detention.” 

Conclusion

The United States’ growing reliance on the private immigration detention industry has little to do with the country’s national security interests or protecting the American public; but it has consistently been about maximizing the profit margin through the imprisonment of some immigrants with criminal records, but many undocumented immigrants, asylum-seekers, and even lawful permanent residents. Existing research has repeatedly underscored that the private immigration detention system is costly and unsafe, and in several instances, in violation of U.S. and international human rights laws. Yet, the system persists, bolstered by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Under President Trump’s second term, the anti-immigrant agenda has ushered in a time of even more ICE raids, detention, deportation, violent family separations, and human rights violations. All of this leads to a more extensive reliance on private detention centers, which stand to benefit financially from these incarcerations, so much so that CoreCivic’s CEO Damon Hininger describes the present times as “truly one of the most exciting periods in my career.”

For more you can listen to Nancy Hiemstra and Deirdre Conlon, and Austin Kocher ICE Detention Numbers Explained

“I was extorted, not a gang member”

How the United States Classification of MS-13 as a Terrorist Organization Complicates Immigration for Salvadorans

By Edwin Santos

El Salvador has long struggled with the legacy of organized violence, most notoriously through gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. Until recently, these gangs wielded near-total control over neighborhoods, operating extortion rackets that shaped the daily lives of ordinary Salvadorans. While recent efforts by President Nayib Bukele’s administration have dramatically curtailed gang activity, the effects of past criminal governance continue to haunt Salvadorans, especially those navigating the United States immigration system. The 2025 executive order issued under the Trump administration, classifying MS-13 as a terrorist organization, may have aimed to combat transnational crime, but it also intensified the exclusion of Salvadorans in and from the United States. This designation renders many Salvadorans inadmissible to the United States and ineligible to receive immigration benefits—not because they pose a threat, but because they were once forced to “pay rent” to survive.

Photograph of Federal Court by Carol M. Highsmith. Retrieved from Raw Pixel.

Before El Salvador’s recent crackdown, gang extortion was a widespread and normalized form of criminal taxation. For years, MS-13 and Barrio 18 demanded weekly or monthly payments from residents, street vendors, and business owners. Refusal to pay often led to harassment, violent retaliation, or even death. This practice was not a matter of choice—it was a matter of survival. Victims lived in a state of constant psychological distress, stripped of agency and decreasing trust in institutions.

Extensive journalistic investigations documented this grim reality. The 2020 VICE documentary Pay Up or Die: The Gangs Extorting a Nation featured firsthand accounts from Salvadorans who, to stay alive, had to close businesses, relocate, or pay gangs what they could. Similarly, Killers on a Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador, a 2016 report by The New York Times, illustrated the staggering scale of gang influence, which, according to this article, once spanned 94 percent of El Salvador’s municipalities. These criminal groups extracted payments from nearly 70 percent of small businesses at their peak. For many Salvadorans, paying rent to a gang was not collaboration—it was a survival mechanism.

In January 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order that allowed criminal organizations to be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) or Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). A month later, the U.S. Department of State officially designated MS-13 as such. While this classification may have served political objectives and enhanced the United States government’s ability to prosecute gang leaders, it also marginalizes Salvadoran nationals who were once coerced into coming into contact with the gang. This classification now has serious repercussions for Salvadorans navigating the United States immigration system.

Creative Commons Licenses.

Under Section 1182 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), individuals who have provided “material support” to terrorist organizations are considered inadmissible to the United States. This includes anyone who has paid money, offered food, or given shelter to a designated group. Crucially, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) case, Matter of M-H-Z, 26 I&N Dec. 757, established that even when providing material support to a terrorist organization is done under duress, it still constitutes a bar to admissibility under the INA. Thus, Salvadorans who previously paid extortion fees to MS-13 to protect themselves and their families could still be barred from entering the United States. As such, a Salvadoran street vendor who once paid $10 a week to avoid being killed by MS-13 may be barred from entering the United States to visit a loved one on a tourist visa or to come to our border and seek asylum the “legal way”—even if they are fleeing the very violence the United States condemns.

This legal rigidity is not only unjust—it is blind to the realities that Salvadorans have endured and the lives they now wish to lead. The landscape in El Salvador changed significantly in the last few years due to mass incarcerations under the Bukele government’s state of exception. Today, many Salvadorans are not fleeing imminent violence, but wish to reunite with their loved ones who once fled the Civil War or gang violence that once terrorized the country. Many may seek to travel to the United States to participate in their loved ones’ most important moments: meeting a newborn grandchild, attending a sibling’s wedding, or celebrating a child’s graduation.

For Salvadorans in the United States with deep transnational ties to El Salvador—especially in cities like Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Houston—these visits are acts of love and family unity, not security risks. Yet the application of terrorism-related inadmissibility rules still casts a wide and indiscriminate net, making it nearly impossible for some to obtain even a tourist visa if they had any past contact with MS-13, regardless of context. Not to mention those who have legitimate persecution claims and are fleeing from violence. This legal structure contradicts both humanitarian principles and the reality of criminal governance in El Salvador. The majority of those who interacted with MS-13 did so under threat, not allegiance.

There is no doubt that MS-13 committed acts of brutality. Their transnational reach and harm are undeniable. However, the blanket classification of the organization as a terrorist entity, combined with a rigid application of immigration law, fails to account for the nuance of civilian life under criminal regimes. Salvadorans who were extorted by gangs are not terrorist sympathizers or supporters; they are victims. Continuing to penalize them under blanket statutes undermines the humanitarian values the United States claims to uphold.  This United States policy punishes those who suffer, treating survivors of violence as security threats rather than individuals in need of protection.

United States policymakers must revise the implementation of immigration statutes, such as Section 1182, to recognize the lived experiences of those under criminal control. Anything less is a failure to distinguish oppressors from the oppressed. This includes incorporating mandatory exemptions for individuals who acted under duress and updating the waiver process to be transparent, accessible, and timely. Additionally, it means recognizing that people migrate not only to flee but to connect—to love, to celebrate, to live. Salvadorans deserve the chance to do so without being condemned for surviving a past they never chose.

What Does It Mean to Provide Sanctuary? 

by Ernesto Castañeda, PhD. Director of CLALS and the Immigration Lab, American University

Photo Credits to Jeff Haynes/AFP/ Getty Images in “Churches have a long history of being safe havens — for immigrants and others.”

The term “sanctuary” dates back to late-imperial Rome and pre-16th century Western Europe, when temples, monasteries, and churches were places where victims, run-away serfs, and fugitive criminals were provided protection from local or remote government authorities. Religious houses would provide temporary protection to walkers who wanted to protect themselves from crooks or lords based on the Christian traditions of intercession between persecuted individuals and political authorities, and the ability of religious authorities to provide penance and to rehabilitate people through faith, prayer, and sometimes communal labor or what we would call now “community service.” Churches and hostels along pilgrimage routes welcomed strangers, who were protected due to their participation in religious rituals en route to shrines and sacred places. Think of today’s walking pilgrimages on the road to Santiago de Compostela in Spain and the hostels and inns along the way. Authorities would then recognize this practice. Emperor Constantine, “guaranteed sanctuary in Christian churches in 324 C.E.” (Rabben 2011: 55). Pope Leo I also wrote about sanctuary and gave Bishops the role of intercessors and advocates in favor of fugitives (Rabben 2011: 56).  

The early practice of providing sanctuary in Europe is similar to how churches, along with religious and activist networks, were used to construct the Underground Railroad in the United States during slavery. This secret network helped enslaved people escape the South to free states, Canada, or Mexico. Harriet Tubman, a key figure in this movement, was deeply motivated by her religious faith and played a crucial role in freeing others. Her mission to help free enslaved people would not have succeeded without the support of White allies, who were less likely to raise suspicion. 

Starting in the 1980s, a group of U.S.-based religious activists, State Department workers, journalists, and human rights activists helped people fleeing political persecution in El Salvador and Guatemala. These individuals were escaping U.S.-backed dictatorial regimes and sought safety in American cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. James Cobert, an activist Quaker, would call it a “pro bono coyote operation … the activists would help Salvadorans cross into the U.S., then hide people’s homes and in churches until it was safe to interior of the country” (Blitzer 2024:60). Soon after immigration agents dragged a Salvadoran teenager from a Lutheran Church in LA after an outcry by parishioners, the local INS Director produced an order, “in essence, saying the church is a sanctuary, but it is not established in law” (Blitzer 2024:69). This marked the birth of the modern sanctuary movement in the United States. Individuals acted because the U.S. government was unwilling to accept people from these countries as refugees, all while helping the regimes that caused their migration.  

These actions partly merged with a nascent immigrant rights movement in the U.S., paralleling movements in France, where undocumented immigrants sought protection from deportation by living inside churches in Paris and other cities. With media coverage, public support, and pressure, some of them were able to legalize their status after months of living in sanctuary.  

At some point, larger jurisdictions, including cities, started declaring themselves “sanctuary cities.” However, this is largely a symbolic self-declaration. There is no federal legal definition because there is no federal ‘sanctuary’ law that specifies what this entails or what protection it guarantees. The practical meaning happens on a case-by-case basis. Though generally, these cities are places where there is tolerance for foreign-born, minority, and undocumented populations. 

After the end of the Obama administration, authorities in major cities such as New York and Los Angeles began adopting policies more friendly to undocumented migrants. One of the most important policies and practices is the type of collaboration they have with federal immigration agencies. When the local police arrest a person, their immigration status may come up, and with it the question of whether to notify federal immigration authorities, such as ICE, automatically or only in cases involving major crimes. When ICE finds that an undocumented person has been arrested, they may ask local authorities to hold them so that ICE can pick them up. Under agreements following Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, many jurisdictions, particularly in Republican-led Southern states, actively cooperate with ICE to seek the prosecution of undocumented people through federal agencies. In these areas, local police and sheriffs can become deputized to work as immigration law enforcement agents. Most sanctuary cities do not automatically cooperate in this way; what matters is whether they prioritize prosecuting actual crimes or primarily focus on identifying individuals who are circumventing immigration law, which is part of civil law, not criminal law. 

The key issue is whether local police wait for federal immigration authorities to intervene and sometimes initiate deportation proceedings, or release individuals who have not committed a serious crime. This is where local discretion is crucial and where being in a sanctuary city or not can make a significant difference. 

Because each state or local authority has its own laws, policies, and practices, local police departments, even those within the same metropolitan area, may or may not collaborate with federal immigration agencies. 

While living in a sanctuary city may offer some protection, there is no guarantee that local or federal authorities will not verify immigration status. Most immigrants understand this reality, so they try to limit their activities to home and work as much as possible, keep a low profile, and are extra careful not to commit crimes or violate any laws. This is partly why crime rates are significantly lower for immigrants than for U.S.-born people. Many immigrants distrust the police, so they avoid standing out and may refrain from driving or leaving home unnecessarily. 

But the Trump administration, like other Republican administrations in the past, is seeking maximum possible coordination and collaboration. The number of 287(g) agreements has increased, and Florida is the state with the most of these agreements.  

Zoom in and see more details on the ILRC’s interactive map here

In the contemporary United States, there has not been a true ‘sanctuary’ city, where federal agencies like ICE cannot arrest and initiate deportation proceedings. It is not true that an undocumented person can simply arrive in a sanctuary city, request asylum, and be protected from deportation. 

ICE agents have the authority to conduct raids in factories, stores, restaurants, as well as in public places and private residences, with certain limitations. ICE can do so with or without court orders, and they often do not inform local authorities in sanctuary cities ahead of time. 

Nevertheless, Trump and other Republican politicians have verbally targeted sanctuary cities and accused them of “protecting” undocumented people. They also say that sanctuary means immigrants abusing social programs. In reality, this is rarely the case as immigrants use welfare programs at lower rates than other groups. They pay more taxes and receive retirement benefits than others, even after retirement, because they cannot access Social Security payments, despite having contributed to the system. Immigrants often don’t ask for tax returns for overpaid, and many do not access assistance programs that they have the right to, so as not to be seen as a public charge. 

The refusal of sanctuary cities to cooperate with federal immigration agencies does not render these cities more dangerous or unlawful. Nonetheless, the federal government has threatened to withhold resources from sanctuary cities. 

The White House is currently trying to favor state and local authorities that align with its immigration policies. Republican administrations, such as those of George W. Bush and Donald Trump, have attempted to incentivize local authorities with resources to perform federal tasks, including reviewing immigration status and signing 287(g) agreements. 

On his first day in office, President Trump signed a series of executive orders on immigration that permitted federal agents to search for undocumented people in churches, schools, and hospitals—places that were previously considered “sensitive” and that should be exempt from immigration enforcement and raids. Even a church stopped offering masses in Spanish in fear that Latino migrants would be targeted. 

“Border czar,” Tom Homan openly spoke of targeting Chicago because of its sanctuary policies. Chicago and the state of Illinois are both governed by Democrats. Mayor Brandon Johnson and Gov. JB Pritzker have defended their support for sanctuary city laws known as “Welcoming City” ordinances. Tom Homan, along with the Secretary of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, occasionally accompany immigration enforcement agents in field operations—often for media coverage and to put pressure on local authorities to collaborate with federal authorities.  

Even with sanctuary status, there is not much a mayor can do to prevent ICE from conducting raids or apprehensions. In addition to Chicago, other cities that have recorded raids or operations by federal agents include Denver, Houston, San Antonio, Miami, and Atlanta, and increasingly around the country

A college campus that calls itself a sanctuary campus does not provide any legal protection from deportation to people within its community. The important thing is that administrators, faculty, and university members treat everyone with respect and good intentions. Undocumented people have the right to attend public schools and attend college as well as graduate and professional schools, but unless they are under DACA, they are not protected from deportation under current laws. Something that is long overdue for Congress to fix. 

Mass deportations happened during the Biden and Obama administrations, but there was less day-to-day media follow-up of these deportations. Now, there is much more attention from the public to what is happening and how it is being done. 

This is partly because of the central role that Trump has given to mass deportations in his political agenda. Along with Homans, Noem, and Stephen Miller, Trump wants to conduct deportations on a larger scale, at a faster rate, and more aggressively than ever before in the United States. While doing so, they are violating many rules, including immigration law procedures, due process, and other constitutional rights. 

Going back to the beginning of the tradition of sanctuary, if citizens want to protect undocumented members of their communities from deportation, asking their city, town, or campus to declare themselves a sanctuary is not enough. They must call for amnesty in the mid- and long-term, and in the short term, they would have to take matters into their own hands, as monks and priests have done in the past. They have to revive underground railroads and do what the families hiding Anne Frank and others did to protect them from Nazi roundups, as depicted in the powerful series “A Small Light.”   

Edited by Katheryn Olmos. This piece builds on a piece published in Spanish on BBC News World, 28 January 2025, based on an interview with Castañeda by Darío Brooks. 

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Immigration Policies Harm Families’ Economic Wellbeing and Mental Health

by Ernesto Castañeda, PhD. Director of the Immigration Lab, American University

Policy brief presented at the Dirksen Senate Building on May 21, 2025.

It bears repeating that immigrants are an integral part of America’s past, present, and future. They are members of local communities. Immigrants are parents and grandparents of many U.S. citizens. Most have been here for years and are part of mixed-status families, where one or more members may be out of immigration status. Immigrants, including undocumented ones, are crucial to the U.S. economy. Most of what immigrants earn is spent on rent, groceries, services, and transportation.

In the current text of the “One Big, Beautiful Bill Act,” there is a provision to tax remittances by 3.5%. Remittances are the money that immigrants, with or without authorization, send to their families in their place of origin. Remittances are most likely to come from the wages that immigrants earn through their hard work, for which the great majority have already paid taxes. Beyond the issue of double taxation, a tax on remittances may not generate enough revenue to make it worthwhile to administer the program and enforce it. Many would simply avoid this taxation by sending the money through informal means or traveling themselves. Furthermore, taxing remittances would not be enough to change people’s decisions about immigrating or returning. Immigrants already pay between 6 and 3% of what they send in fees to (mostly U.S.-based) businesses such as Western Union that help facilitate these transfers.

Remittances are direct evidence of the many contributions that immigrants make to the U.S. economy. Remittances come from wages, and wages come from producing ideas, art, goods, and services. Thus, I calculate that in 2023, those who sent remittances contributed over 2.7 trillion, which is 10% of the U.S. GDP.  Therefore, remittances represent only 3.5% of all the wealth immigrant workers create in the U.S.

Economic contributions of immigrant workers who remitted in 2023. Source Castañeda 2025.

Most importantly, remittances come at the cost of long-term family separation. Many working-age adults come to the U.S. without documents to work and send money to their spouses and children back in their hometowns, who cannot come to the U.S. due to restrictive immigration laws and heavily patrolled borders. This produces decades-long family separation: parents working in the United States and their children living in developing countries. The mental health implications for minors left behind include feelings of abandonment, separation anxiety, and continued grief for an ambiguous loss.

Children grow with more financial resources but without cohabiting with their parents. Many stay behind under the care of grandparents. Still, once their caregivers pass, we may witness unaccompanied minors heading north, as we have seen since 2014, coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. As we document in our book “Reunited,” the reasons why youth migrated were violence, extortion, and recruitment by gangs, higher educational and economic goals, but primarily the desire and possibility of family reunification with their biological parents.

Beyond the separation experienced by “transnational families,” families divided by borders, we increasingly see cases of family units traveling together that are sometimes separated at the border, as well as settled mixed-status families who suffer from family separations due to deportations. The arrest and debasement of parents by authorities in front of children can create a sense of insecurity. Children feel parental separation as abandonment, resulting in reduced self-esteem and self-efficacy. When legal avenues for asylum and low-skilled workers are reduced, international migration becomes more expensive, dangerous, stigmatized, criminalized, and possibly traumatic. This reduces worker productivity and the emotional resources immigrants can deploy to raise the next generations of Americans.

Immigration is an investment in the form of human capital and economic resources. In 2023, the USA received over $7.2 billion in remittances, largely from immigrant family members. Immigrant-initiated family separations produce remittance flows, but they also produce negative health outcomes for the children of immigrants abroad. State-initiated family separations due to deportations weaken the economy by removing breadwinners and leaving U.S.-family members more vulnerable to economic and psychological stressors. Deportations impact international and U.S. families; they also impact foreign economies in the short term but weaken the U.S. economy in the short and longer terms by reducing the size of the workforce and the overall population. A sign of this is that for every working-age person deported to Mexico (who earns the minimum wage in both countries), Mexico loses around US$4,200 in remittances but could gain around $22,613 yearly in wealth by adding another much-needed worker. If the U.S. deports 5 million Mexican citizens and some of their adult U.S.-citizen or third-country family members, Mexico could gain US$113 billion, almost double the US$63 billion remitted to Mexico in 2023. This would also cause family reunifications and population growth in Mexico.

What can Congress do? Taxing remittances is counterproductive. Many immigrants could have faced significant trauma in their countries of origin, and on their way, and immigration law enforcement creates new stressors that exacerbate depression, anxiety, and PTSD. Amnesty programs and creating new pathways to citizenship to ease family reunification and immigrant integration would result in higher taxes, better security, and physical and mental health for all US residents.

Thanks to Tanya Golash-Boza and the staff of the University of California DC Center and the Scholar Strategy Network for co-organizing the policy briefing with CLALS.

Published May 23, 2025.

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The U.S. Helped Destroy El Salvador—Now It’s Supporting Its Authoritarianism

By Valeria Chacon

El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele speaks during a press conference before casting his vote in a parliamentary election in San Salvador, on February 28, 2021 (REUTERS / Jose Cabezas)

El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele speaks during a press conference before casting his vote in a parliamentary election in San Salvador, on February 28, 2021 (REUTERS / Jose Cabezas)

When President Ronald Regan distributed billions of dollars in economic and military aid to El Salvador during its civil war in the 1980s, it fueled the displacement of roughly one million Salvadorans and the slaughter of thousands. Years later, many Americans forgot this chapter in U.S. history, as American politicians smeared the image of this small Central American country.  Senator Marco Rubio once described El Salvador’s suffering as “the result of bad leaders, rampant crime and natural disasters.” However, many Salvadorans—myself included—have not forgotten.

President Nayib Bukele was reelected in February of last year and has been credited with transforming El Salvador from one of the most dangerous countries in the world into the safest—despite growing concerns regarding human rights violations. Now, the U.S. government and President Trump bear responsibility for the current crisis of criminalized migration, as evidenced by the agreement between the U.S. and El Salvador to imprison migrants from multiple countries in the mega-prison CECOT. This development echoes the violence the U.S. once supported during El Salvador’s civil war, as the country now becomes the face of U.S. immigration hell.

U.S. Involvement in the Civil War

Between 1980 and 1990, during the brutal 12-year Salvadoran civil war, the United States provided over $1 billion in military assistance to El Salvador—including approximately $996 million for military education and training. That training was later used to terrorize and kill Salvadoran civilians.

One female participant interviewed by The Immigration Lab, from El Gavilàn, El Salvador, describes the horrors she witnessed during the war:

“Sometimes the guerrilla would pass by and force us to give them food, and the armed forces would realize what had happened. The problem was that if they [the guerrillas] passed by and forced us to give them food, we had to. My two uncles were killed that way—because they came to us asking to give them food, and when the armed forces realized that, they kidnapped and murdered them.”

It was U.S.-trained Salvadoran military, such as the Atlacatl Battalion, that were responsible for the El Mozote Massacre—one of the worst massacres in Latin American history. On December 11, 1981, residents of El Mozote were rounded up to be killed, dismembered, and raped. Nearly half of the victims were under 10 years old.

But why would the US government support such horrific acts of mass murder? During the Cold War, the left-wing militia Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), was at war with the Atlacatl Battalion. The guerrillas, influenced by left-wing politics and Catholicism, were one of the country’s most prominent political forces. President Ronald Reagan’s fear that El Salvador’s authoritarian government might fall to communism led the U.S. to excuse and cover up atrocities in the service of anticommunism and defeating the guerrillas.

A mother from Ayutuxepeque told us her reason for migrating to the U.S. was her fear that the Salvadoran armed forces would target civilians for their political beliefs.

“The fear was overwhelming, just because you had an affinity towards a certain group. The armed forces would come and murder you. That’s why people mainly fled.”

Misinformation about the massacre and its aftermath spread, as the U.S.-trained Salvadoran military denied responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of civilians, claiming that the massacre was “totally false.” However, the Truth Commission for El Salvador issued a report documenting human rights violations from 1980 to 1991. It found that 85% of the cases reported to the Truth Commission involved state agents or death squads allied with Salvadoran armed forces.

Another female participant from La Union, El Salvador, described her immense fear of the Salvadoran armed forces:

“One had so much fear. There was no sense of security at all. Dead people would appear in alleyways. I couldn’t even sleep because I was scared they [armed forces] would knock on my door. I suffered a lot.”

           

Aftermath

Due to the civil war, more than a million Salvadorans were displaced, and half a million fled to the United States during the 1980s. However, just 2% of asylum applications filed by Salvadorans were approved, making it incredibly hard to legally stay and work in the U.S. This stemmed from U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government—extending protection would have contradicted its own foreign policy. However, in 1990, Congress created a program and legal immigration status called Temporary Protected Status (TPS), providing temporary permission to reside in the U.S., a work permit, and protection from deportation for foreign nationals of designated countries that are facing an ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary conditions.

The growing Salvadoran Population in Los Angeles during the early 1980s led to the formation of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a Salvadoran street gang formed to navigate life in impoverished neighborhoods and defend its community members from other gangs. However, mass deportations of young Salvadorans involved with MS-13 led to the further destabilization of El Salvador, contributing to the gang’s expansion.

By 2005, Salvadoran authorities estimated the gang population at 40,000, with MS-13 having significant control of the country, and Salvadorans were living in fear, once again. The gang recruited older children and teenagers, many of whom were vulnerable targets as they lacked the means to survive in a country suffering from economic turmoil and educational limitations.

By 2015, El Salvador had become the most dangerous country in the world, with 103 murders per 100,000 residents—many linked to MS-13 or its rival, the 18th Street gang. The brutality of MS-13 is often characterized by not just killing but also by torturing, maiming, and dismembering victims. This gang funded itself through extortion, and in 2019, MS-13’s estimated revenue was $31.2 million.

Salvadorans saw a glimmer of hope in February 2019 when Nayib Bukele won the presidency, as he pledged to combat the gangs in El Salvador. He began addressing the country’s high crime rate by increasing police and military presence in gang-dominated areas to diminish their control, declared a state of emergency in prisons, and placed them on lockdown to prohibit visitors in order to block out communication with the outside world. By 2022, El Salvador’s homicide rate dropped to 7.8 per 100,000 residents—due in part to the imprisonment of more than 50,000 gang members.

It’s no surprise that President Nayib Bukele’s actions have caused him to be highly popular. You can even walk through parts of the Washington metropolitan area with Salvadoran populations, such as Columbia Heights or Hyattsville, and see merchandise with Bukele’s face. But with many discrepancies in detainees dying and rampant due process violations, it is clear that the improvement on El Salvador’s gang problem came at the expense of massive human rights violations.

El Salvador now surpasses the U.S. as having the world’s highest incarceration rate. In 2022, as many as 3,000 children have been arrested without any connection to criminal activity—many imprisoned solely based on their appearance or anonymous tips. These detainees are being sent to CECOT, which held Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia, and holds many Venezuelan and Salvadorian immigrants sent by the United States government. But beyond its most notorious facility, El Salvador has 25 prisons across the country, where people have been vanished to and have not been heard of again.

Inmates dying under suspicious and unexplained circumstances being buried in mass graves, mirrors the events from the Civil War. Ramón Abraham Vargas Ávila died in Santa Ana on April 14 and Lorena Abigail Escobar Mejía died in Apanteos prison on April 18. The lack of coverage surrounding their deaths speaks volumes about the unimaginable things occurring inside Salvadoran prisons. Many of the detainees come from impoverished communities, highlighting policies rooted in eugenic ideologies aimed at eliminating the country’s poor through mass incarceration, gentrification, and the expedited naturalization of white tourists. President Bukele offers free visas under the guise of boosting the country’s economy, yet fails to address the needs of Salvadorans living in impoverished neighborhoods with limited access to employment or educational opportunities.

It is nauseating to see other Americans visit and revel in the beauty of the land I’ll never fully know because of the atrocities of the 1980s and the need for my family to flee. It pains me to hear elder Salvadorans fall victim to the propaganda and misinformation about what El Salvador has become. History has conditioned Salvadorans to favor strong, authoritarian leaders, and the country has never truly been given a chance to heal from the Civil war.

The U.S. has made a $15 million deal with El Salvador to imprison deportees. Some 278 men deported by the Trump administration to El Salvador have been accused of being members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Agua or Salvadorans allegedly affiliated with MS-13—often on baseless connections such as simply having tattoos. The current U.S. administration sees El Salvador as nothing more than a remote place to detain people in what is essentially a concentration camp, where people sit without being found guilty or provided due process. What Bukele is doing to these kidnapped men is what he has been doing to Salvadorans for years—and only now is the Salvadoran diaspora beginning to wake up.

Valeria Chacon is a former research assistant and recent graduate of American University.

Advancing Equity for the Latino Community in DC

Press release

CARECEN, CLALS, and many partner community organizations have been working to bring Latino residents together to ensure their voices are heard in shaping policy decisions.

The DC Latino Community Forum Coalition (FCLDC) gathered invaluable insights from residents on their challenges in fully integrating into this city.

We are pleased to share our policy brief, Advancing Equity for the Latino Community in Washington, DC. This report not only identifies key barriers Latino residents face but also presents actionable policy solutions that ensure their full inclusion in the city’s long-term prosperity.

📢 Let’s urge elected officials to prioritize policies that advance equity for Latino residents in Washington, DC.


Read the policy brief here

CARECEN was in charge of data gathering and preparation. Community members and partnering organizations participated in information-gathering meetings and shared top concerns. Ernesto Castañeda, Rob Albro, and Katheryn Olmos of CLALS, AU, wrote the report with the inputs provided.

Migration policies of the current US administration

By Ernesto Castañeda

Although the xenophobic discourse has not changed much, Trump’s second administration has been much more aggressive in its goal of reducing the number of immigrants arriving at the U.S./Mexico border and within the United States. New executive orders eliminate some of the modest practical achievements of the Biden administration, put in place to handle the search for asylum, safety, and stability in a more orderly and humane way. The new administration is planning to end many of the humanitarian “paroles” and temporary protected status (TPS) for people from many countries, including Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other places in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Afghanistan and Ukraine. So, more than reducing the number of undocumented immigrants, Trump is creating hundreds of thousands of new undocumented immigrants in the interior of the country with his executive orders. An amnesty would do the reverse. Which reminds us that immigration status is the result of legislative decisions and that with the signing of an official law or document by the legislative and executive powers, this status can be changed for millions of people almost immediately.

Unfortunately, Trump is not interested in negotiating with Democrats for a comprehensive immigration reform that includes regularizations, as well as more border security measures and pathways to immigrate legally in the future. On the contrary, Trump’s second administration is in the process of hindering and making legal migration much harder, and foreigners’ ability to stay, more tenuous.

Trump is obsessed with carrying out mass deportations. So, Trump’s DHS is being much more aggressive not only by deporting newly arrived people at the border, where the numbers are very low due to changes made during the last months of the Biden administration, and because Mexico is preventing more foreigners from reaching the US border through internal enforcement and the US military being deployed at the border — but deporting people from large cities, especially democratic-majority ones. Against precedent, authorities have entered churches and universities a few times looking for people to deport. Faith helps many to lower their anxiety and the fear of being deported, but does not give them a foolproof sanctuary, not even in their churches.

Studying, having a visa, DACA, or even a Green Card, are no longer as much of a protection from deportation as before. It is false that Trump 2.0 focuses on deporting violent criminals; the vast majority of deportees have no criminal record. Many men have been deported, but also women and children. If closed borders and mass deportations continue, the U.S. will surely enter a recession because of a decrease in workers.

Another development is how much Trump is pressing other countries to stop the arrival of migrants and asylum petitioners to the US and to receive national deportees from other countries. Venezuela and Colombia are sending their own airplanes to transport them back. Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, among others, are collaborating with the Trump government to divert migratory flows. This opens opportunities for the cities and countries of the region that actively receive and allow people who have to flee their homes for major reasons to settle down and work legally. Local growth due to an immigration population bonus can easily exceed revenue from remittances in large economies (Mexico, Brazil, Colombia). The smallest countries, where remittances are a significant part of GDP, will have to make more adjustments and sacrifices to look for organic economic growth alternatives. In both cases, the returning human resources could compensate or even exceed the portion of their salaries (less than 20%) of what they earned and spent abroad. Comprehensive research and public education are required to dispel anecdotes that portray immigrants as a threat. Legislation like that in France or Germany could be passed to disincentivize opportunistic politicians from weaponizing immigration, increasing xenophobia, and anti-immigrant animus for short-term political gain. The richest countries in the world have over ten percent of their population born abroad. This is an opportunity for Latin America to do so in a way that increases opportunities for everyone.

Poverty, violence, and organized crime will continue to force some people to move internally and across borders, but migration will be increasingly within the same country or region and not so much to the United States or Europe. In the medium term, this exogenous shock can produce a more local, sustainable economic growth with less family separation across borders.

Ernesto Castañeda, Director, Center for Latin American and Latin Studies, and The Immigration Lab, American University, Washington, D.C.

From Hope to Harm: Asylum Restrictions and Violence Facing Migrants in Mexico

By Veronica Gomez & Katheryn Olmos

Image of Mexican Flag with a cloudy sky in the background. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

The current Trump administration has exacerbated the challenges faced by immigrants and asylum seekers. The administration signed Executive Order 14159, which effectively banned people from requesting asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border. This EO narrows legal pathways and exposes migrants and asylum seekers to potential violence and fear.

The Immigration Lab has conducted interviews with migrants and asylum seekers who have recently arrived in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Our research has highlighted a series of commonalities in their experiences, both in their home country and on their migration journey.

Mexican Migration

From our interviews, we find that Mexicans migrate primarily for economic and safety reasons. Mexicans migrate to the U.S. in order to access economic mobility that they did not have access to in their home country, or to escape organized crime and the war on drug trafficking.

“Veracruz es muy violento ahora, ajá. Yo salí para rehacer una nueva vida, para hacer un futuro, para darle algo a mi hijo o mi familia, mi mamá y papá… Por esa es la razón de hacerle una casa a mi mamá, mi papá, porque vivíamos en una casa abandonada. Pobre cada que llovía, cada que nevaba, siempre el agua caía en la cama. Nos mojábamos y yo dije ‘algún día yo voy a hacer una casa’… Aunque sea de lunes a viernes o fin de semana, pero trabajar 5 días, lo que sea, [un trabajo] es lo más importante para mí.”


“Yes, Veracruz is very violent right now. I left to rebuild a new life to make a future, to give something to my son or my family, my mom, and dad…. Yes, that’s what I want. Make a house for my mom, my dad because we lived in an abandoned house. Every time it rained, every time it snowed, the water would always fall on our bed. We would get wet, and I said, ‘one day I will build a house’… Even if it is from Monday to Friday or the weekend, whatever. A job is the most important thing for me.

— Mateo, Mexican man, 39

Through our analysis, we were able to identify and describe the journey of people migrating through parts of Mexico on their way to the United States. For many individuals, migrating to the U.S. is not the first option. We have also analyzed interviews where Mexican people have gone through up to 7 different states in Mexico just trying to find employment before deciding their best chance at finding work is coming to the U.S.

A participant from Veracruz, Mexico, named Mateo, who is now living in New York City hoping to find a good job to give back to his family in Mexico, recounted one of his experiences:

“Yo crucé. Salí del DF, agarré un autobús, me vine para Chihuahua, salí para Sonora, cruce la Frontera y llegué a Tucson y de ahí seguí hasta Phoenix, Arizona.”


“I crossed. I left from Mexico City, I took a bus, I came to Chihuahua, it left for Sonora, I crossed the border, and I arrived in Tucson and from there I stayed traveling until Phoenix, Arizona.”

— Mateo, Mexican man 39

Map of Mateo’s Journey. Map retrieved from Google Maps, edited by Katheryn Olmos.

Mexico as a Place of Transit

Many of our participants across different nationalities mentioned Mexico as part of their migration journey, and they noted the dangers faced while traversing the country, even after migrating through the Darien Gap, where they encounter deadly terrain and the remnants of the diseased. Participants shared that that Mexico is the worst part of their journey.

“Porque la selva para nosotros fue– caminar, caminar, caminar. Nos veíamos, por lo menos por donde nosotros pasamos. No vimos ningún peligro de que nos hicieran daño ni de eso. Sino que fue caminar arriesgar la vida en cuanto a los ríos y eso nada más. Pero cuando llegamos a México eran ya las personas que nos querían hacer daño.”


“Because the jungle, for us, was just walking––walking, walking…it was more about risking our lives with the rivers and all that. But when we got to Mexico, that’s when there were people who wanted to harm us.”

— Alison, Venezuelan woman, 32

When travelling through Mexico, our participants encountered cartel activity, including trafficking and extortion. Sofia, a Venezuelan woman who migrated through Mexico, recalled the fear of being kidnapped or killed by organized crime members.

“Lo que pasa es que en México hay muchos–cómo le llaman, narcotraficantes? Algo así. Así que ellos se creen dueños de como que decir del pueblo, entonces si, si tú te arriesgabas o equis y cosas o ellos te agarraban, pues tú, este, te podrían matar, te podrían lastimar incluso cortar una parte del cuerpo, cosas así.”


“The thing is that in Mexico, there are many–what do they call it, drug traffickers? Something like that. They think they own the town, so if… they grabbed you, then you could be killed. They could even cut off a part of your body–things like that.”

— Sofia, Venezuelan woman, 32

These cartels serve as informal gatekeepers. When migrants are moving through Mexico, they will likely go through several checkpoints and encounters with cartel members who typically request a fee from migrants so that they can keep moving.

“Cuando yo estuve en México–no me acuerdo el pueblo–yo caminé mucho, 3 días por una vía de tren, porque nos bajaron los carteles y nos dejaron sin nada.”


“When I was in Mexico–not sure what town–I walked for three days on train tracks because the cartels made us get off and left us with nothing.”

— David, Colombian/Venezuelan Man, 28

If migrants refuse to pay the fee or have no money, they risk “disappearing” or being killed. Sometimes, gang members will rob and kidnap migrants and ask for an outstanding amount of money. Cartel members will ask for an outstanding sum of money.

“Como que en un desierto y [los pandilleros] nos agarraron y ellos nos decían que nos iban a matar. Que querían 3,000 dólares por cabeza.


“It was like a desert, and [the gang members] grabbed us and told us they were gonna kill us. They wanted 3,000 dollars per capita.”

— David, Colombian/Venezuelan Man, 28

Paying organized crime to make the journey to the U.S. border is part of the immigration process, though it is unclear what the relationship is between the cartel and government authorities. Diego, a young Venezuelan man, recalls meeting and paying a cartel member to accompany him to the port of entry where his CBP One appointment was scheduled.

“Tuve que llegar donde otra gente como un mismo cartel, que uno le pagaba una plata para que ellos te dejaban pasar tranquilo y todo. Les pagué y nos estuvieron los dos días que volamos dos días antes y de allí ellos mismos nos trajeron. Nos soltaron allí en el puerto y cuando ya pasé ya pues la felicidad de uno estar aquí ya todo fue, pues mejor.”


“I had to go to some other people, like from a cartel, and I paid them some money because they would let you pass through calmly and all that. I paid them, and they stayed with us during the two days after we flew in, and from there, they themselves brought us. They dropped us off there at the port, and when I crossed, well, the happiness of being here, everything just felt, well, better.”

— Diego, Venezuelan man, 20

Mexico as a Place of Allyship

During the Biden administration, Venezuelans would remain in Mexico for months, even years, before attaining an appointment on the CBP One app. Despite the dangers in Mexico, many of our participants were able to persevere with the help of Mexican citizens. Some good Samaritans in Mexico provided shelter, work, and food to migrants passing through.

No conocía a nadie, nada, o sea mi vida era el trabajo y pues no todos los mexicanos, pero hay unos que sí son muy, muy malos pues con uno… [Una señora] nos propuso, que sí, trabajáramos de las 7 [de la mañana] hasta las 10 de la noche y le dijimos, o sea, le dijimos que sí. Empezamos a vivir allí en casa de pues ella no nos cobraba que si la comida ni nada de eso, o sea, dormíamos allí.  Gracias a Dios nos hicimos muy amigos de ella, y del hijo, y de la hija también. Este y allí no, pues nos hicimos panas del hijo … ya estábamos allí, pues, bien diría yo. Y allí duramos, bueno, allí dure yo todo… ese tiempo. Y trabajé hasta que me salió la cita [de CBP One].”


I didn’t know anyone, nothing—My life was just work. And not all Mexicans, but there are some who are really, really mean to you… [A lady] offered us [a job] from 7 in the morning to 10 at night…we told her yes. We started living at her house, and she didn’t charge us for food or anything like that, I mean, we like, we slept there. Thank God we became really good friends with her, and with her son, and daughter too. And there, well, we became friends with the son… So yeah, we were doing pretty well, I’d say. And I stayed there, well, I stayed there that whole time. And I worked until I got my [CBP One] appointment.”

— Diego, Venezuelan man, 20

David, a Venezuelan man, recalls his time on La Bestia–also known as “The Train of Death”– where passengers are vulnerable to starvation, cold nights, extortion, kidnapping, injuries, and even death.

“Gracias a Dios, mira, nos montamos en esa bestia de al día y medio, teníamos hambre de todo y en ese camino como teníamos como un día y medio en esa bestia montado y pasamos por un pueblo que en el pueblo tiraban cosas a la gente.

Mira eso fue como que, Dios mío, si, yo estaba acostada [un carril] así me cae así, pero en la cara… me cayó fue una bolsa de jamón. Y al ratico tirado, otra de pan, y yo entre mi, ¿Será que estoy soñando o qué? Yo estaba en eso me entiendes. Y pero yo digo ‘Dios mío, señor, yo no puedo creer, ¿será?’

Y me paro yo alegre y… empiezo [a comer], yo me atraganté y ahí mismito que viene mi amigo con una garrafa de agua de 5 litros y [dice], ‘Hermano mira lo que agarré: el agua!’ Y yo, ‘Amigo mira lo que yo tengo aquí!’

Mira eso fue lo yo digo que eso fue uno de los momentos más difíciles de mi vida. Esa hambre y esa sed que yo tenía mira ahí se me quitó todo.”


“Thank God, look, we got on La Bestia, and after a day and a half, we were starving and everything. And on that journey, since we had been on La Bestia for about a day and a half, we passed through a town where people were throwing stuff at folks.

Look, it was like, my God, I had been lying down on [a boxcar], it hit me right in the face… What hit me was a bag of ham. And a little while later, they threw a bag of bread, and I was like, ‘Am I dreaming or what?’ That’s how I felt, you know? And I said, ‘My God, Lord, I can’t believe this—is this real?’

So, I stood up all happy and… I started eating, and I started choking from eating too fast. And right then, my friend shows up with a 5-liter water jug and says, ‘Brother, look what I got—water!’ And I said, ‘Friend, look what I’ve got here!’

Look, I tell you, that was one of the hardest moments of my life. That hunger and thirst I had—man, it all went away right there.”
— David, Colombian/Venezuelan man, 28

Image of people giving migrants bags with food, drinks, and resources for migrants travelling on La Bestia. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Mexican strangers, yet friends and allies, save lives with their generosity. However, in order to resolve the violence against those who reside in Mexico, the government must take action.

Key Takeaways

It is important in understanding that Mexican migrants are not all the same ––and that Mexican migration is complex. For many, migration is more than a destination, it’s more than Point A and Point B. It is important to understand Mexico as a place of internal displacement and international passage.

The border Texas shares with Mexico is one of the most populated in the country, where both Mexicans and Americans use entry points to go to work, travel, transport commerce, and more. Now, the U.S.-Mexico border faces daily difficulties with the current administration’s immigration policies. Border security and enforcement have largely increased – the image above displays military security from the Mexican Government, with Border Patrol Agents on the other side.

Image of the US-Mexico Southern Border (The Reynosa-McAllen border). Retrieved from CLALS/Veronica Gomez.

The “Remain in Mexico” Policy was implemented by the first Trump Administration, where the Department of Homeland Security requires asylum seekers migrating to the United States by land to wait in Mexico while their cases are pending. This not only puts Mexican border cities, such as Reynosa, in a difficult spot being responsible for them, but most importantly, it puts all immigrants at risk. CBP One partly improved the situation. Now, CBP One no longer works, it is harder for international migrants to arrive at the border, and it is almost impossible to enter by asking for asylum between ports of entry or at ports of entry without passports and visas. Some international immigrants will settle in Mexico, some in a third country, and others will go back to the places they left.

Katheryn Olmos is a Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student at the Sociology Research and Practice program at American University. 

Veronica Gomez is a Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and an undergraduate at American University.

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director, and Noah Green, Joseph Fournier, intern at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.

HANDS OFF SANCTUARY CITIES

By Anthony Sandoval

April 25, 2025

Image from Save Chinatown Solidarity Network DC
Image from Save Chinatown Solidarity Network DC

On January 25th, 2017, President Trump signed an Executive Order, called Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, to attack sanctuary jurisdictions all over the U.S. Although this Executive Order was blocked by a judge, the side effects were seen. More cities became sanctuary jurisdictions, even colleges.

But what is a “Sanctuary Jurisdiction”? First, we have to understand that there isn’t one full definition of a “Sanctuary Jurisdiction,” nor does each one have the same laws. Generally, being a ‘Sanctuary Jurisdiction’ means to “have policies in place designed to limit cooperation with or involvement in federal immigration enforcement actions.” There is a range of how each policy works, but it keeps the immigrant communities safe. 

In 2017, Illinois became a sanctuary state through the TRUST Act, and on December 15th, 2020, the D.C. District Council voted on the Sanctuary Values Amendment Act of 2020, establishing Washington, D.C. as a Sanctuary jurisdiction. On the opposite end, some states banned Sanctuary Cities straight out during the first Trump administration, including Arkansas, Florida, and Texas

On the 1st day of the Biden-Harris Administration, President Biden signed an Executive Order called, Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities, which undid Trump’s 2017 Executive Order. Since then, the republican party has attacked Sanctuary Jurisdictions again and again. 

At a March 5th, 2025, hearing with the mayors of Boston, Chicago, Denver, and New York City, the Chair of the House Oversight Committee Rep. James Comer (R-KY-1) stated, “These reckless sanctuary policies also force federal immigration officers to go into local communities to apprehend criminal illegal aliens.” We keep hearing that sanctuary policies are bad for the United States, but that is not true.

The National Immigration Law Center (NILC) posted on the same day of the hearing that a study found a “decrease in crime in cities and states that prioritize welcoming instead of targeting immigrants.” Looking at my home city of Chicago, crime keeps going down, even at a time when immigration has increased.

Graph from Illinois Policy
Graph from Illinois Policy

In 2025, Trump’s first day in office signed an Executive Order, called “PROTECTING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AGAINST INVASION,” which, on its 17th section, calls for Sanctuary Jurisdictions to be punished until they get rid of the laws that make them sanctuary, or else they will not receive any federal funding. On April 24th, a judge ruled that it was unconstitutional

Other related bills to look out for include 1) HR. 32 No Bailout for Sanctuary Cities Act; 2) HR. 205 No Congressional Funds for Sanctuary Cities Act; 3) HR. 1879 No Tax Breaks for Sanctuary Cities Act; 4) HR. 2056 District of Columbia Federal Immigration Compliance Act.

UPDATE APRIL 29TH  

On April 28th, Trump signed a new Executive Order, called “Protecting American Communities from Criminal Aliens.” Under this order, any Sanctuary Jurisdictions will be stripped of any federal funding in 30 days. Additionally, this order will eliminate in-state tuition for undocumented and DACA students across the United States. Laws that help undocumented college students pay for college, for example, in Illinois, the Retention of Illinois Students & Equity (RISE) Act will be eliminated.

Anthony Sandoval is a research assistant with The Immigration Lab

Edited by Enresto Castañeda, Director of The Immigration Lab and Katheryn Olmos, Research Assistant