By Ernesto Castañeda

Trump announced his candidacy in 2015 by viciously attacking immigrants, Mexicans, in particular. Many spectators and commentators waved it off, focusing on other aspects of his candidacy. Nonetheless, immigration restrictionism became the core of his campaign and an area of strong policy action during his presidency (the Zero Tolerance policy that led to forced family separations at the border, Muslim asylum bans, and Title 42, to name a few).

During the Presidential Debate on June 27, 2024, besides a coarse voice and low energy from Joe Biden, what stood out to me was Trump’s obsession with immigrants and his purposeful scapegoating of them in trying to create a wedge between the many voting subgroups.

Few analyses have underlined this, so I went back and analyzed the debate from two weeks ago, question by question, answer by answer. We have replicated the analyses, and it holds.

We found that 55% of the answers to all questions and follow-ups included mentions of immigration, even though there were only three explicit sections where the moderators brought up the topic. Trump was the main culprit, mentioning immigration in 42% of his interventions during the debate on June 27, 2024. See our tally below.

In terms of substance, some of the most dangerous statements include:

Trump stating confidently that, “As sure as you’re sitting there, the fact is that his big kill on the black people is the millions of people that he’s allowed to come in through the border. They’re taking black jobs now and it could be 18. It could be 19 and even 20 million people. They’re taking black jobs and they’re taking Hispanic jobs, and you haven’t seen it yet, but you’re going to see something that’s going to be the worst in our history. “

Factcheck: There are not 18, 19, nor 20 new million undocumented immigrants in the country since Biden took office. Contrary to stereotypes, immigrants create jobs by allowing restaurants and businesses to stay open and expand, they increase demand for goods and services, they start their own businesses and hire citizens and other migrants. There is no such a thing as a “black job” anymore, and black unemployment is at one of its lowest rates. Same with Hispanics. This answer is clearly trying to pit Blacks and Hispanics against recent arrivals and increase the optics of chaos created by the lack of overall housing and the busing of immigrants to certain cities.

TRUMP: “These millions and millions of people coming in, they’re trying to put them on Social Security. He will wipe out Social Security. He will wipe out Medicare.” 

Undocumented immigrants do not qualify for many of these programs, although many of them contribute to them with their paychecks. Immigrant families use fewer welfare programs than they are eligible for, as we discuss in detail in a chapter of “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”

TRUMP: “We have a border that’s the most dangerous place anywhere in the world – considered the most dangerous place anywhere in the world.” 

As we discuss in the book, the US southern border region is one of the safest places in the country for citizens.

Maybe one of the most obvious time Trump used immigration to deflect critiques was his answer to the political violence incited on January 6, “And let me tell you about January 6th, on January 6th, we had a great border, nobody coming through, very few. On January 6th, we were energy independent. On January 6th, we had the lowest taxes ever, we had the lowest regulations ever. On January 6th, we were respected all over the world.”

Immigration-Specific Questions and Answers

I. Initial Immigration Question

“President Biden, a record number of migrants have illegally crossed the southern border on your watch, overwhelming border states and overburdening cities such as New York and Chicago, and in some cases causing real safety and security concerns. Given that, why should voters trust you to solve this crisis?”

Biden: 

Discussed his administration’s efforts to manage the border crisis. Biden highlighted:

· Efforts to get a bipartisan agreement to change the situation, which -among other things- would have funded an increase in the number of border police and asylum officers.

o These efforts were explicitly blocked by Trump for electoral concerns. 

· A reduction of 40% in the number of people arriving between ports of entry.

o True, largely due to creating new avenues for legal immigration, processing asylum seekers differently, and increasing dependence on Mexico to settle, manage, and deport migrants. Now, some put it at 50%.

· Criticism of Trump’s family separation policy, referring to babies being separated from their mothers and put in cages.

Trump:

Criticized Biden’s handling of the border, claiming:

· The border was the safest in history during his administration.

o Untrue. The border was closed to asylum seekers and others towards the end of the Trump administration because of the pandemic and the related Title 42.

· Biden opened the borders, allowing dangerous individuals, including those from prisons, mental institutions, and terrorists, to enter the country.

o False. The U.S. does not have an open border. Many now need appointments to even apply for asylum through the CBPOne App. Others need to prove they can afford to live in the U.S. or have established family members who can support and be responsible for them. The number of deportations under Biden is largerin many months than during the Trump administration.

· Biden’s policies have led to increased chaos and danger.

o That is a common perception, but it is not backed by the facts. There have been logistic issues for emergency housing and support, which is new for non-refugees but has become the de facto way to manage unaccompanied minors who are not from Mexico and asylum-seekers without established family members in the U.S. This is a short-term budgetary issue for some cities but will lead to an economic boom in coming years.

I. Follow-up Immigration Question

“President Trump, staying on the topic of immigration, you’ve said that you’re going to carry out, quote, ‘the largest domestic deportation operation in American history.’ Does that mean that you will deport every undocumented immigrant in America, including those who have jobs, including those whose spouses are citizens, and including those who have lived here for decades? And if so, how will you do it?”

Trump: 

Detailed his plans for immigration enforcement, stating:

· His administration will deport undocumented immigrants, especially those who are criminals or dangerous.

· Accusations of Biden of allowing criminals into the country.

· Emphasized the need to remove dangerous individuals to protect American citizens.

Biden: 

Responded to Trump’s accusations, stating: 

· Every claim made by Trump was a lie.

· Defense for the Biden administration’s handling of immigration and border security.

· Emphasis on efforts to reduce illegal crossings and improve the system.

Donald Trump

· Trump’s Statement: “The only jobs he created are for illegal immigrants and bounce-back jobs; they’re bounced back from the COVID.”

· Context: Biden was bragging about creating a large amount of jobs. Yes, many of the jobs created are those lost during the pandemic and could be called “bounce-back” jobs, but the number of jobs in June 2024 is higher than before the pandemic. The employment rate of the native-born is back to pre-pandemic levels. The labor force and, therefore, the economy have grown because of new immigrants.

· Statement: “We’re like a Third World nation. Between weaponization of his election, trying to go after his political opponent, all of the things he’s done, we’ve become like a Third World nation. And it’s a shame the damage he’s done to our country. And I’d love to ask him, and will, why he allowed millions of people to come in here from prisons, jails and mental institutions to come into our country and destroy our country.”

· Context: When answering a question about the deficit, Trump pivoted to criticize Biden’s policies, including those on immigration, that have led to the deterioration of the country while likening it to a third-world country. He specifically accused Biden of allowing large numbers of dangerous individuals into the country. The mention of prisons and mental institutions is likely a reference to people who came largely to Miami through the port of Mariel, Cuba, as described in works of fiction like Scarface. Those coming were less wealthy Cubans than in the first waves and included a few that may have been political prisoners or LGTBQ. A few could have engaged in crime, but the minority did not, and most of them have become part of middle-class families. 

· Statement: “He has killed so many people at our border by allowing… all of these people to come in.”

· Context: Trump made this statement while discussing Biden’s immigration policies. Yes, some immigrants have committed heinous crimes, but they are closer to the exception; undocumented immigrants’ crime rates are around half of those of U.S. citizens, so it is unfair to highlight crimes just from this group. 

Joe Biden

· Biden’s statement: “We found ourselves in a situation where, when he was president, he was taking – separating babies from their mothers, putting them in cages, making sure the families were separated. That’s not the right way to go.”

· Context: Biden said this when asked about immigration and border security. It was criticism of Trump’s zero-tolerance policy that separated families arriving between ports of entry at the US-Mexico border. 

· Statement: “Every single thing he said is a lie, every single one. For example, veterans are a hell of a lot better off since I passed the PACT Act. One million of them now have insurance, and their families have it – and their families have it. Because what happened, whether was Agent Orange or burn pits, they’re all being covered now. And he opposed – his group opposed that.”

· Context: Biden was responding to Trump’s critique of the administration’s handling of many issues, among them immigration. Biden was fact-checking Trump and later bragged about his administration’s achievements. While not directly about immigration, it was part of a defense against Trump’s allegations, which included criticisms of Biden’s immigration policies leading to some veterans being homeless, a sad issue and policy concern that predates Biden’s presidency and is not directly related to immigration. I have conducted research on the subject.

Glossary of Immigration-Related Terms Used by Candidates

Biden:

· Immigrant

· Migrants

· Border

· Illegally crossed

· Border police

· Asylum officers

· Separating babies

· Putting them in cages

· Families separated

· Illegal crossings

Trump: 

· Illegal immigrants

· Migrants

· Border

· Mental institutions

· Prisons

· Criminals

· Domestic deportation

· Undocumented immigrant

· Illegal crossings

· Immigration enforcement

· Open borders

· Criminals

· Dangerous individuals

Terms used solely by Biden: 

· Immigrant

· Asylum officers

· Separating babies

· Putting them in cages

· Families separated

Terms used solely by Trump:

· Illegal immigrants

· Mental institutions

· Prisons

· Criminals

· Domestic deportation

· Undocumented immigrant

· Immigration enforcement

· Open borders

· Dangerous individuals

As this glossary of terms used shows, the way that Trump discusses immigration is incendiary and aims to create a sense of fear of immigrants.

For more context on family separation read Reunited. For the truth behind immigration processes pre-order Immigration Realities. 

Parts or the whole of this piece can be republished with acknowledgment of the author.
I acknowledge the help of Pablo Landsmanas Gary and Alexander Castañeda to conduct this analysis. Isabel Leong helped with copy-editing.

The debate transcript can be found at: https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/27/politics/read-biden-trump-debate-rush-transcript/index.html 

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

On June 26th, recently fired Bolivian general Juan José Zúñiga attempted an ill-conceived coup supposedly in the name of “restoring democracy.” If coups were once a fact of life in Latin America, that is no longer the case. Yet, this short-lived failed attempt highlights a brewing institutional crisis in Bolivia: growing improvisation and confusion around the institutionalized transfer of power through elections, and declining public confidence in the results. The origins of this crisis can be traced to efforts by Evo Morales, head of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party and long-time president, to remain in power, and the perceived illegitimacy of the judiciary, as it has been caught up in the politics of these efforts. 

Zúñiga’s attempted coup consisted of ramming the door of the traditional presidential palace, located in the historic Plaza Murillo in the capital city of La Paz, with an armored vehicle. The poorly executed coup attempt lasted all of three hours, appeared to have no political support, and ended when Bolivia’s president Luis Arce personally confronted Zúñiga inside the palace and ordered him to withdraw. Soon thereafter, Zúñiga was under arrest, and Arce thanked Bolivians for helping to thwart the coup amid cheering supporters while insisting that “democracy must be respected.” In the days following dozens of identified “coup plotters” have also been arrested.

The coup attempt received broad international condemnation. And initially Bolivian politicians across the spectrum rejected the attempted mutiny. This included Morales, ex-president turned bitter rival of Arce, who decried any attempt by the armed forces to “violate democracy.” It also included members of Bolivia’s fragmented opposition, such as imprisoned caretaker president Jeanine Añez, who tweeted that Bolivians will “defend democracy.” The attempt was likewise immediately condemned by the country’s powerful union movements, with the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) declaring a strike in opposition. 

However, evident unity regarding the need to defend Bolivian democracy quickly gave way to a much stranger fog of contradictory accounts. Once in custody, Zúñiga – previously known as a stalwart Arce loyalist – insisted that Arce had ordered the coup attempt as a ruse to bolster his flagging popularity. The beleaguered president’s approval ratings have gone into freefall amid a worsening economic crisis caused by dwindling foreign reserves, declining gas exports, fuel and dollar shortages, and the specter of inflation, provoking rounds of protests and strikes. 

Morales amplified the “self-coup” theory on his radio program, a claim that the ex-president’s supporters have seized on and perpetuated. Argentina’s president Javier Milei echoed the charge. The fact that Bolivian political analysts have taken Zúñiga’s story seriously points to a deeper distrust, shared by many ordinary Bolivians, of the country’s political and military authorities. Such distrust is partly a result of the unresolved circumstances and resulting enmities around Morales’s ouster in 2019, under military pressure, and ongoing heated national and international debate about whether those events constituted electoral fraud or a coup. Scholars still can’t agree. 

The question of whether a coup – a sudden, overt, unlawful, and often violent seizure of power – has occurred is seldom a source of confusion. But both in 2019 and in 2024 in Bolivia, whether a “coup,” “self-coup,” or something else, took place have been questions of ongoing fierce and partisan debate and wellsprings for conspiracy theories. The mystery around Zúñiga’s actions led Bolivia’s minister of government to hold a press conference to take reporters through the failed coup step by step, with diagrams. And yet, many ordinary Bolivians don’t know who or what to believe.

Growing doubt around transitions of power can be traced at least to 2016, when Morales ignored the result of a national referendum he himself had called that rejected his intention to stand for a third term, despite being constitutionally limited to two. Then followed the confusion and conflicting narratives around 2019’s election results, Morales’s exit, and subsequent partisan violence and security crackdown. Añez’s caretaker government then compounded a perception of illegitimacy by repeatedly delaying new elections while going after MAS opponents. 

If Arce’s 2020 election was without major controversy, last month’s failed coup – if that is what it was – has become additional fuel in a rancorous and personalistic rivalry between Arce and Morales for control over the MAS. The lead-up to 2025 has seen MAS loyalists divided into hostile camps that threaten to fracture the once dominant party. Perhaps more importantly, who gets to claim party leadership has become a legal squabble, with Morales attempting to throw the president out of the party, competing party congresses, and courts weighing in to determine the legitimate leader. It is increasingly likely that whoever runs for president on the MAS ticket will also be an internally contested candidate. 

Finally, during the second half of his presidency, and not entirely without justification, Morales was accused by opponents of stacking the judiciary. This appeared to pay off in 2017 when the country’s electoral court ruled that, despite term limits, Morales could run in 2019 because doing so was a “human right.” In turn, this decision was overturned in late 2023 by the same court, a ruling Morales has rejected while he continues to run. But that tribunal is viewed by many as illegitimate, since its members previously delayed constitutionally mandated judicial elections and reappointed themselves indefinitely, before issuing a string of rulings in the Arce government’s favor. Both rivals are perceived as trying to manipulate the courts to decide the outcome of their personal political contest to control the MAS and emerge as the party’s anointed presidential candidate. 

As the 2025 elections loom, Bolivia seems to be playing out its own post-truth political drama, characterized by increasingly frequent disruptions of, confusion around, and conflicts over, the institutionalized transfer of power through elections, which is not good news for public confidence in the country’s political and electoral institutions.

By Marina Lambrinou

On June 24, 2024, President Biden signed a flurry of executive orders providing renewed hope to the immigrant community and its allies. The highlight of these was providing a pathway, also known as “parole in place” to legalized status for the undocumented spouses and children of U.S. citizens, opening the door for around 500,000 mixed-status families to sponsor their undocumented family members without having to leave the country for a protracted period of time. Additionally, the administration moved to facilitate the work permit acquisition process for DACA recipients and other Dreamers who earned a degree at an accredited higher education institution in the United States and received an offer of employment in their field of study. 

These measures have been promoted as a strategy to “keep families together” amid longstanding policies resulting in migrant family separations. However, even though these developments should be applauded and celebrated, concerns remain for segments of the non-citizen population left out of these status relief granting actions, notably, the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens. 

As mixed-status families composed of undocumented parents and U.S. born children continue to proliferate across the United States, the policy generated dichotomies of citizen/non-citizen and undocumented/documented, which also give rise to binary premised discourses of deservingness, are rendered not only morally bankrupt, but also completely misaligned with the realities of people’s lives. People as young as adolescents and children born in the United States are subjected to the ripple effects of illegality experienced by their parents as a result of non-status. In most U.S. states, undocumented people are banned from driving, accessing Medicaid, CHIP benefits, and other forms of public assistance. Moreover, a multitude of U.S. states block undocumented students from accessing in-state tuition and financial aid at public universities, severely impeding their upward social mobility and ensuring that they remain trapped in low-wage, low-skill, and physically arduous jobs that offer no benefits or health coverage. 

All of these issues do not only impact undocumented individuals themselves; they profoundly affect their families, including U.S. born children who experience these challenges alongside their parents and have to live with the looming fear and trauma of parental loss due to deportation. For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Trump Administration proposed a ruleprohibiting access to public and subsidized housing for mixed-status families. While the rule was subsequently rescinded by the Biden administration, it is an illustration of some of the ways in which federal, state, and local governments routinely discriminate against mixed-status families. Additionally, during the pandemic, which has had more adverse impacts on communities of color and minoritized people, mixed-status families were excluded from federal pandemic stimulus checks designed to provide relief under the Congressional CARES Act. 

Given that mixed-status families will continue to increase, immigrant community activists and policy advocates need to spotlight these families’ experiences and particular challenges to illustrate the arbitrary distinction between citizenship status. Focusing on immigration status to judge the worth of a person is not only morally wrong but also no longer a pragmatic notion. Additionally, these reductionist frameworks give rise to hierarchies. Zeroing in on the distinctions between citizens and the undocumented makes invisible mixed-status households.

Thus, it is paramount that allies to the immigrant community shift the migrant policy discourse to focus more on mixed-status households. Shifting the focus to these families will help combat one-sided discourses praising young people demonstrating high-achieving academic ability while vilifying their parents, siblings, or other members of their communities. Highlighting the existence of mixed-status households demonstrates that young people do not exist in isolation from their parents, siblings, or other family members and that their experiences and challenges are organically interconnected in ways that current policy does not reflect. If rhetorically pro-immigrant politicians and the majority of the American public truly wish for these young people to become integrated into U.S. society as recent polls suggest, then we cannot, as a country, allow for family separation to be the price to pay for segmented integration. We also cannot allow the status quo, where these policies continue to affect a score of children who are U.S. citizens with deported parents.

The first and only time that status relief for the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents was addressed was in 2014 when the Obama administration designed the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents Act (DAPA) policy, a policy that was fought by the courts and buried by the Trump administration. If we are to truly uphold this administration’s promise to keep families together, then we need to do more, and we need to do better for immigrant families. A DAPA-type policy would extend the kinds of protections afforded under President Biden’s recent executive order to many more immigrant families and further shield immigrant communities from deportation and secure their future so that they can keep contributing to American society.

Marina Lambrinou, Ph.D. 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Center for Equity, Leadership, and Social Justice in Education (CELSJE)
School of Education 
Loyola University Maryland

mlambrinou@loyola.edu
Twitter/X | LinkedIn

By Ernesto Castañeda

The Executive Order announced on June 18, 2024, is another action taken due to Congress’s lack of legislative action. Several proposals were on the table, but Republicans did not want to support any bill. The new program is political in the sense that it helps Biden fulfill campaign promises not to separate migrant families and to find ways to regularize people without papers. It is not a universal amnesty, but rather a particular regularization for very established people and part of our communities. It could help up to 500,000 adults and 50,000 children.

These new measures also help several DACA recipients who are married to U.S. citizens. Part of the measures announced concern the individuals known as “dreamers,” minors who arrive to the U.S. undocumented. It would even make it easier for some who could not apply for the DACA program to obtain a work permit if they have higher education, and it would finally open a path to citizenship after holding a green card for some years. Twelve years ago, President Obama launched the DACA program to protect these young people from deportation. The DACA program has been a great success and is quite popular with the American population. With these measures, the Biden-Harris administration marks a clear contrast with their electoral rival, Donald Trump, who has promised mass deportations if he becomes president again.

Trump’s base is quite anti-immigrant, but not Biden’s base, nor are most independent voters who will be key to winning the election in November. The Latino vote is also key. Latinos, especially Mexican and Central Americans would mostly benefit from these programs. In addition, people from Asia, Africa, Canada, and Europe, as well as their citizen families, will benefit from the measure. To clarify, the direct beneficiaries will NOT be able to vote this November, but their family members, employers, customers, and neighbors will. As anti-immigrant as Biden has become (e.g., numerical limits on asylum applications between ports of entry at the border), he will not take away Trump’s hard vote. This is a better route. The Immigration Lab’s analysis of elections since 2018 shows that being anti-immigrant does not help win elections in competitive elections and swing states.

The Executive Order on numerical caps to asylum-seeking in between ports of entry establishes a negative practical precedent where a President tries to unilaterally limit the asylum-seeking process in a situation not related to public health concerns (as was the supposed rationale for the use of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic). It gives tacit bipartisan support to Trump’s campaign threat of completely ending asylum in the U.S. if elected. This executive order does not help the Biden-Harris campaign to differentiate itself from Trump on migration. Agreeing with MAGA Republicans about border arrivals being a top issue helps Republican candidates––not Democrats. It also alienates voters with undocumented family members and those who are sympathetic to those in need of asylum because they are escaping war, armed conflict, or religious or political persecution. The Executive Order on spouses and Dreamers does the opposite because it positively connects the government with many members of society.

The Border Executive Order will affect future asylum-seekers including those who are already on their way to the U.S. southern border. The public tends to equate asylum seekers arriving between ports of entry at the wall or river with people trying to enter undetected. Asylum seekers look for Border Patrol and other officials to be processed and start their legal process to request asylum. The government, therefore, knows who they are and where they are located. Some of them will be allowed in, others will be returned quickly or later deported to their countries, or asked to leave if they are refused asylum. Hopefully, they can find safety in Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, or other countries in the region. 

Some pundits argued that this move on limiting asylum would silence the criticisms that Biden was ‘weak’ on border security. The executive action limiting asylum-seekers was supposed to convince independent and conservative voters to vote for Biden. However, those criticisms have not ended––nor will they partly because they are political and not based on facts. Even if some conservative voters in, Montana, for example, were happy with this partial ‘border closure,’ they would probably disagree with Biden on contraception and reproductive health, taxes for billionaires, climate change, etc. Most people are not single-issue voters. Their values and position on the ‘culture wars’ framed by Republicans and the media tend to cluster into particular groups. Independents are unlikely to vote solely on perceptions about border security. Many of the people who are worried about immigration are worried about a hypothetical fear around the great replacement conspiracy theory. They may be worried about demographic changes in the short term, forgetting that immigrants in the past became integrated into the U.S. majority culture; they are doing so now and will continue in the future. The main issues on the ballot are about policy and protecting democratic institutions, not the less than 3.3 percent of residents in the country who are currently undocumented. 

Ernesto Castañeda is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, the Immigration Lab, and the Masters in Sociology, Research, and Practice at American University in Washington, D.C. 

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