All posts by clalsstaff

Asylum Seekers Encounter a New Digital Border: Their Smartphones

by Austin Kocher*

Two U.S. Border Patrol agents using equipment to take a photo of a person near Sasabe, Arizona on March 22, 2020 / Jerry Glaser / Picryl / Creative Commons License

Migrants around the world who are seeking asylum in North America and Europe are finding pathways to safety increasingly blocked—not only by physical borders but also by digital borders. The most recent example of this technological obstruction in the U.S. context is the introduction of a smartphone app known as CBP One, which the government has been using since January to manage the flow of asylum seekers at or near the U.S.-Mexico border.

Beginning in January 2023, asylum seekers faced new harsher consequences for seeking asylum directly at ports of entry or crossing unlawfully between ports of entry. CBP required migrants to download the CBP One app onto their smartphones, register their information, and schedule an appointment at a port of entry. 

CBP representatives claimed that this would streamline border processing, and for many migrants it did. But for others, the app introduced new digital barriers that reflected old ones: migrants with darker skin reported trouble with the facial liveness test, many migrants did not own newer (and more expensive) smartphones that could run the app well, or access to electricity and the Internet connection. The app disadvantaged migrants who were living at community shelters and camps on the outskirts of border towns in which the Internet was inaccessible.

My recent article on CBP One titled “Glitches in the Digitization of Asylum: How CBP One Turns Migrants’ Smartphones into Mobile Borders,” unpacks the various types of technological hurdles that migrants have faced when trying to use the app, and further attempts to analyze how this app fits within the broader landscape of borders, migration, and technology. But in this blog, I want to expand on those aspects of the digitization of asylum that represent a real concern for the right to ask for asylum going forward.

Specifically, we must think about the larger and longer-term consequences of CBP One for the asylum system writ large. Although CBP One and the current policies surrounding it may be an improvement for many migrants seeking asylum now, the question we should ask ourselves is, how might this app be used in restrictive, dangerous, or capricious ways that could undermine, rather than expand, the United States’ commitment to human rights? 

A recent example of this provides some early clues about the fragility of CBP One as a tool.

In June 2023, Customs and Border Protection suspended access to CBP One appointments at the Laredo port of entry in South Texas, effectively (though indirectly) suspending access to asylum itself in that spot. CBP’s rationale appeared to be tied to concerns about migrant safety in Nuevo Laredo, the city on the Mexican side of the border that is among the more dangerous border cities. Immigrant rights advocates reported at the time that migrants who were coming to Nuevo Laredo to seek asylum were being targeted for extortion and kidnapping. That is those presumed to try to present themselves to the appointments they had secured through CBPOne were being asked for money along the route in order to make it to the U.S. border. As a result of CBP’s decision to halt CBP One appointments, migrants would have to travel many miles on perilous roads to the nearest ports of entry that did accept CBP One appointments, such as those in Eagle Pass and Hidalgo, Texas. 

A closer look at CBP’s website reveals that Laredo was removed as an official CBP One location late in the day on June 8, although CBP’s website did not make any public announcements related to their decision to suspend access. The lack of public announcement or justification for this decision raises some questions and concerns. While the intentions may have been good ones, could canceling asylum appointments at precisely the moment that migrants were facing increased targeting put them at greater risk for violence? Is it lawful or ethical to essentially switch asylum off and on through an app in this manner? 

Immigrant rights advocates appear to share these concerns. Human Rights First published a scathing report that called the Biden administration’s new asylum policy a “travesty,” and pointed out the various additional hurdles that asylum seekers face including challenges to using the CBP One app and the additional risk that migrants face while waiting in Mexico. Amnesty International claims that as part of the new, broader asylum policy, CBP One likely violates migrants’ right to seek asylum. Additionally, a new lawsuit by a number of immigrant rights groups, including the ACLU, allege in their complaint that the challenges migrants face when using CBP One frustrate their attempts to lawfully seek asylum. And yet another lawsuit filed by the immigrant rights group Al Otro Lado at the end of July specifically alleges that CBP One created a “turnback” policy that violates the United States’ asylum obligations.

Indeed, the suspension of CBP One appointments in Laredo in June were an important red flag that reinforce immigrant rights groups’ concerns and presents us with a real-time example of these concerns. Thankfully, CBP reopened access to asylum by the end of June—although, once again, no announcement of justification was provided, leaving the public in the dark about what criteria the agency is using to make these decisions. It is entirely possible that CBP had good reason to suspend the use of CBP One. The app may well present the agency with novel security risks. However, without providing justification for this move or another pathway for migrants to seek asylum, this specific example may foreshadow a new era of on-again/off-again access to asylum that is likely to generate ongoing criticism and possibly even more lawsuits. 

None of this should be construed to suggest that the U.S. has been unwavering in its commitment to migrants’ rights prior to CBP One. Rather, the mandatory use of an asylum smartphone app has the potential to both accelerate and further invisibilize the life-and-death authority to decide who gets access to migrant protection (and when and where).

It is not all bad news for CBP One. At the end of June, CBP expanded the number of daily CBP One appointments to 1,450, up from 1,000 in early May, a significant increase. The agency also improved how the app functions, both by issuing a series of software updates and by reconfiguring the way that migrants schedule appointments. Instead of a first-come, first-serve basis, migrants have a full day to enter their information into the system, then the backend system slots migrants into available appointments overnight. These improvements are not trivial and the responsiveness within the agency stands out in a positive way. However, as I say in my article on CBP One, when the question of who has access to the fundamental human right of seeking asylum is answered with successive rounds of glitches and software updates, we have, to quote Alison Mountz, “lost the moral compass of what is at stake.”

* Austin Kocher is a Research Assistant Professor with the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University and a Research Fellow at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.

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by clalsstaff on September 13, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 13, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/09/13/asylum-seekers-encounter-a-new-digital-border-their-smartphones/

Changing Aid Conference: Rethinking Aid and Migration

By Nancy Kim, American University

The inaugural Changing Aid Conference, hosted by the Changing Aid Signature Research Initiative (SRI) at the School of International Service at American University, brought together scholars and practitioners in the field. The three panels were 1) Aid and Conflict, 2) Aid and Migration, and 3) Careers in Aid. There have been large shifts in who gives, how much, where, and in which manner. As demonstrated in Figure 1, official development assistance (ODA) has been on an upward trend since the 1960s. Although this might seem “positive” for the aid industry and those in need of aid, there is a need to critique this trend as the definition of ODA changes constantly. For example, ODA has expanded to include the money spent within donor countries to host and house refugees where the same amount might not stretch as far due to higher cost of living.

Figure 1. Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$)

Within this context, highlighted by Panel 1, Panel 2 delved into the nexus between aid, especially ODA, humanitarian aid, and migration. The second panel on Aid and Migration was moderated by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a faculty of SRI. Panelists were from diverse backgrounds including academia, funding entities, policy research organizations, and direct service providers (Lauren Carruth, American University; Ian Proctor, Catholic Relief Services; Tazreena Sajjad, American University; Yael Schacher, Refugees International; Daniela Villacres, USAID)[1].

From left to right: Ernesto Castañeda, Lauren Carruth, Ian Proctor, Tazreena Sajjad, Yael Schacher, Daniela Villacres

            The panelists focused on the perception and work around aid, development, and migration. To start, Dr. Schacher explained the shift that led to an explicit link between aid and migration: “During the Cold War era, aid was used to win the hearts of people. Now, aid is used to deter migration.” In the earlier days of international aid, it was seen as a way to elevate the view of the global north and to fight against communist ideologies. More and more, however, aid, especially development aid, is considered by donor countries as a way to deter migration from the global south despite evidence showing that development can lead to increased mobility.

Such aid practices based on the belief that aid will deter migration can harm the wellbeing and best-interest of the migrants themselves. Dr. Carruth shared her experience working in the Horn of Africa and brought up the question of the work of many migration and humanitarian aid organizations. In particular, she critiqued the notion of “voluntary return” where migrants fleeing devastating situations through the desert find themselves at help centers or refugee camps coerced to consent to return to where they came from to receive much-needed treatment or food and water. In such a case, aid actors were directly inhibiting the ability of migrants to move even when their lives depended on leaving their place of origin.

Dr. Sajjad also critiqued the basis of aid with regards to deterring migration. Most often aid is seen as something done “over there”, and increasingly, refugee and asylum assistance in the global north is undermined and even externalized as seen in the case of Australia offshoring refugees to the island of Nauru. Mr. Proctor built upon this theme of mobility and said, “What we need is a program, a way for someone to survive and flourish where they want to. If that means the end of the asylum system as we know it, that’s ok.” The panelists reacted to this, emphasizing that the legal figures of the asylum and the refugee cannot provide legal relief to everybody; broader categories and programs of sanctioned migration are needed to include migration due to mixed motives including climate change. But indeed, the goal is to increase protection of people on the move and to save lives.

In closing, Dr. Sajjad asked the audience to consider who is given the right to move. The movement of humanitarian and development aid professionals is seen as acceptable and even necessary while the same right to move is denied to the very people whose lives are supposed to be improved by aid.

* Nancy Kim is a doctoral student in the School of international Service at American University, researcher with Changing Aid and Project Coordinator at the Immigration Lab.

[1] The views expressed during the panel belong to each panelist as individuals and may not reflect the views and/or opinion of the entity where they work.

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by clalsstaff on August 31, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 31, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/08/31/changing-aid-conference-rethinking-aid-and-migration/

Caribbean: Addressing Climate Change Through Global Finance Reform

by Thomas Andrew O’Keefe*

IMF-World Bank Seminar: Toward a More Integrated Caribbean with panelists OECS’ Didacus Jules, Guyana’s Winston Jordan, Barbados’ Mia Amor Mottley, Jamaica’s Nigel Clarke, and the CDB’s Warren Smith Flickr/Creative Commons License

Initiatives launched by Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley to reschedule the debt of Caribbean countries hit especially hard by climate change and to reform international lender practices are gaining momentum.

  • In 2021 Mottley called for the suspension of debt and interest payments owed to multilateral financial institutions by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) while they respond to natural disasters exacerbated by climate change. (Half of the 39 UN-recognized SIDS countries are in the Caribbean.) Among the world’s most indebted countries per capita because of their tiny domestic capital markets and low tax bases, SIDS countries cannot pay their debt while also devoting scarce resources to rebuild critical infrastructure.

The government of Barbados also proposed important reforms to the multilateral lending system in preparation for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP 27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, last November. Labeled the “Bridgetown Initiative,” the package included bold proposals:

– Redirecting up to $100 billion in unused IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for SIDS, allowing member governments to exchange their SDRs to borrow from one another’s central bank reserves at very low interest rates in response to an economic crisis.

– Operationalizing a $45 billion IMF-administered Resilience and Sustainability Trust.

– Having multilateral development banks make $1 trillion in multilateral loans at concessional rates to fund climate change adaptation and resiliency in the developing world.

– Leveraging an additional $650 billion held by the IMF to set up a Climate Mitigation Trust that would attract much larger private-sector capital to invest directly in carbon-free energy projects, for example, and avoid governments incurring more debt.

These initiatives are starting to have an impact. The Inter-American Development Bank has announced plans to include a “hurricane clause” in its loan agreements with Central American and Caribbean member states, deferring principal payments for up to two years. Advocates hope the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and others take steps as well. They also want commercial banks and other private lenders – which hold much of the SIDS’ foreign debt – to adopt payment suspension clauses.

  • International political support is growing for the proposed lending flexibility. Key elements have been endorsed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who has prioritized discussion on them at the June 22‑23 Summit on a New Global Financing Pact in Paris. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva and U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry have also expressed their approval. The World Bank Group launched an Evolution Roadmap in January to better address cross-border challenges such as climate change that affect its ability to promote economic growth, poverty reduction, and human development. An internal Bank committee completed an initial report on proposed reforms in time for the World Bank Group’s meeting in Washington in mid-April.

The SIDS nations have contributed least to the climate crisis but are most impacted by more frequent and ferocious hurricanes and typhoons, rising sea levels, unpredictable rainfall, and increasingly acidic oceans that wipe out critical food resources. In the Caribbean, the vital tourism industry is also suffering as piles of rotting sargassum seaweed, which is driven in part by climate change, arrive on its beaches.

  • An important reason the Barbadian proposals for reforming the global financial architecture may succeed is that they are not pleas for no-strings-attached compensation or reparations. Instead, they are focused on making the existing multilateral lending system more flexible to better meet the needs of governments to respond to the climate crisis and create incentives for increased private-sector investment – which will improve the countries’ ability to pay their existing debts. In contrast, an additional recommendation put forward by Barbados and other developing countries at COP 27 to tax fossil fuel companies based on their carbon emissions or impose an international carbon border tax to fund so-called “loss and damage” grants for climate vulnerable developing nations has yet to get more traction.

* Thomas Andrew O’Keefe is the President of Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd. and currently serves as Chief of Party of the Caribbean Business Enabling Environment Reform (CBEE‑R) project based in Barbados.

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by clalsstaff on June 14, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on June 14, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/06/14/caribbean-addressing-climate-change-through-global-finance-reform/

Chile: New Constitution Gives Conservative Right a Chance to Lead

by Jaime Baeza Freer*

La Moneda (Presidential Palace), Constitution Plaza in Santiago, Chile / Dennis Jarvis / Flickr / Creative Commons License

Chilean voters on May 7 handed right-wing parties a massive victory in the elections for the second Constitutional Convention– reaffirming popular rejection of the first draft and showing frustration with the sagging economy and soaring crime rates – but the extreme-right Republicans will have to deliver a balanced Constitution that reflects the country’s democratic values or get the boot in the referendum on it in December.

  • The Republicans and several more moderate right-wing parties won three-fifths of the seats in the country’s second Constitutional Convention – in stark contrast with the previous convention’s wide range of socialists, leftists, indigenous leaders, environmentalists, and former social activists. The election outcome was in tune with last year’s referendum, when 62 percent of the electorate rejected the previous convention’s draft Constitution.

The electorate’s sharp U-turn suggests a rejection of the former convention and current administration of President Gabriel Boric more than an embrace of the Republicans, some of whom are conspiracy theorists, far right extremists, and loners. Conservative Luis Silva, the most-voted candidate in the country, has caused outrage by stating his “admiration” for dictator Augusto Pinochet (whom he called “a statesman”), and he has adamantly proclaimed that issues like abortion, gay marriage, and migration are simply off the table and should be expressly banned in the draft Constitutional. Mr. Silva is a numerary of the Opus Dei. Press reports also allege that many candidates were nominated to fill vacated lists with no hope of winning. Some newly elected Republicans are unfit for office; one resigned his seat due to an indictment (still in trial) for domestic violence.

  • Most voters who cast their ballot for the Republicans, however, are not extremists. Indeed, party leader José Antonio Kast – who placed second in the 2021 presidential election (with 44 percent of the second-round vote) – is not an extreme right-wing supremacist or anything closely related as some of his opponents have alleged. Indeed, polls show a correlation of voters’ discontent with the Boric administration and support for Kast. According to Decide Chile pollster Cristóbal Huneeus, 16 out of the 35 percent of the votes the Republicans received were “circumstantial” and from persons who usually vote for the left.
  • The outcome has created the appearance that voters have swung to the other extreme of the political spectrum, but people are not against liberal values like marriage equality, women’s rights, or LGBTQIA+ rights. According to Bicentennial Polls by the Pontifical Catholic University, less than half of Chileans regard themselves as Catholics.

The main lesson of the election is that voters are annoyed with the patronizing attitudes from some quarters of the liberal elites, who went too far and too quickly to the left in the first draft of the new Constitution while the economy could not recover its pre-2019 levels. Most of the population is still trying to fulfill basic needs like housing, jobs, lowering crime rates, and dealing with an impoverished economy after the pandemic and uncontrolled immigration.

  • On the new Constitution, the message of the population is a wish for one that stands on the idea of order and economic freedom as the most precious assets without rejecting individual freedoms – a position that some Republicans are unable to accept, as they want to go all the way to extreme conservative positions. Kast gained enormous credit from this election, and he’s hoping to take power in two years in the general election. As poised as the Republicans appear, however, reality can change anytime. A lack of moderation, including expressions of admiration for Pinochet, can lead to their defeat when the new draft is put to a referendum in December.
  • The defeat of the leftist coalition is a major setback for President Boric. His coalition, in power for over a year, had hoped to use the previous draft Constitution to enact several progressive reforms. Now they are stuck in a process that does not belong to them anymore. Even if the new draft is more conservative than middle Chile wants and is rejected December – near the halfway mark of term – Boric will have difficulty regaining the momentum to get his presidency off the launchpad.

* Jaime Baeza Freer is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chile.

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by clalsstaff on June 1, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on June 1, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/06/01/chile-new-constitution-gives-conservative-right-a-chance-to-lead/

Takeaways from the North American Leaders Summit and Biden’s Visit to Canada

Editorial

By Ernesto Castañeda*

North American leaders, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Justin Trudeau and Joe Biden, met in Mexico for the 10th North American Leaders’ Summit /Eneas De Troya /Flickr/ Creative Commons License

President Joe Biden conducted his first trip to Mexico in the context of the North American Leaders’ Summit on January 10, 2023. These summits started with George W. Bush in 2005 and did not take place at all while Trump was President. The 2021 and 2023 meetings signal a return to thinking of and valuing the North American region as such. The discussions were best when they decoupled local political considerations, common challenges, and regional opportunities. Three points toward integration are described here.

  1. President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) discussed the advantages of further integrating supply chains within the region. Labor costs in China have gone up, and the pandemic showed that relying on long-distance shipping can delay things during crises, epidemics, and international disputes. There was a push for nearshoring, meaning having an increasing proportion of essential and high-value products manufactured in Canada, Mexico, and Central America rather than Asia. Concrete efforts were mentioned to increase manufacturing in the region within the context of the regional trade agreement USMCA, which includes regulations, respects local preferences, and supports specific sectors and products. Thus, during the summit, Biden and Trudeau were able to look past Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s protection of PEMEX, Mexico’s oil company, and specific controversies about car manufacturing. Furthermore, Biden, Trudeau, and López Obrador discussed the desire for further integration beyond trade. The Mexican President mentioned in his closing speech that Mexico will be represented in planned regional integration meetings by Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, Finance Minister of Mexico Rogelio Ramírez de la O, Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro Sánchez, and independent businessman who represents the business community, Alfonso Romo Garza. During the meetings, Prime Minister Trudeau was accompanied by his wife, Sophie Gregoire Trudeau, Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly, Minister of International Trade Mary Ng, and the Minister of Public Safety Marco Mendicino. President Biden was accompanied by the First Lady Dr. Jill Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ken Salazar, U.S. Ambassador to Canada David Cohen, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodd, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez. The size and high profile of the entourage show the seriousness of these talks and the intentions to communicate further and coordinate around shared challenges and regional integration.
  2. The three leaders emphasized that migration is a regional process requiring a regional approach. Biden and Trudeau recognized their history and reality as countries of immigration. Canada emphasized its desire to welcome new people to keep growing its population and economy. Biden recognized the history of the United States as a country built largely by immigrants. The Mexican President missed an opportunity to acknowledge that in the last hundred years, a substantial number of people moved to Mexico from places like Spain, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Lebanon, Guatemala, and the United States. There were mentions about the need for Mexico to become the place where some of the people from the hemisphere should receive asylum and be allowed to settle legally long-term. The three heads of government also stressed a safe, humane, and legal entry for migrants through more legal pathways and shared responsibility as advocated for in the Los Angeles Declaration. Additionally, Biden announced the monthly legal entry of 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela with appropriate sponsors, background checks, and airplane flights. Generally, they recognized that the people who emigrate do it as an option of last resort. They expressed the humanitarian need to help create ways to migrate more safely than is currently possible for many.
  3. Prime Minister Trudeau and Presidents López Obrador and Biden committed to collaborating on climate change and promoting racial equity, diversity, and inclusion, including collaborating with marginalized populations to fight violence against Native women and girls and expand the protection of LGBTQI+ people. Regarding climate change, the three nations promised to reduce methane emissions by 15% by the end of 2030, develop a plan to cut food loss and waste in half by 2030, and create trilateral infrastructure for EV chargers. The three leaders also spoke about their support for democratic practice and condemned the events on January 8 in Brazil. Biden and Trudeau spoke about how a feature and strength of their democracies is their diversity. Overall, most of the meetings were about strengthening ties and facing shared challenges pragmatically and collectively. The demeanor was friendly, forward-looking, and about partnership. As Justin Trudeau said, “We are stronger together.”

Where are we two and a half months later, when Biden visited Canada?

Biden spoke about the interconnectedness of the U.S. and Canadian economies, sports leagues, and people. Saying that “the U.S. and Canada share one heart.” Both spoke about green jobs and more regional manufacturing with unionized jobs.

Nevertheless, the attention was focused on asylum seekers. President Biden referred to the Los Angeles Declaration and the importance of helping migrants as a region. Canada announced the orderly welcoming of 15,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. However, the discussion about the official announcement underlines “irregular migration” while mainly talking about people seeking prompt and secure asylum. Cable media commentary often referred to an agreement to address “illegal arrivals” to Canada by people asking for asylum. Nonetheless, asking for asylum is a right that people have under U.S., Canadian, and international law. The issue is that some have arrived away from official ports of entry and then approached authorities to announce themselves and exercise their right to ask for asylum proactively. Under the new agreement, Canada can send migrants back to the United States if they have not applied for asylum in-country first and vice versa. This agreement further weakens the right to asylum in North America and criminalizes those seeking it. The often-mentioned record numbers are probably inaccurate regarding legal and undocumented migrants as a proportion of the population. Still, an increasing number of asylum seekers from Ukraine, Afghanistan, Haiti, Cuba, and the Americas are arriving at land borders. The announcement of this agreement with so much fanfare constitutes a narrowing of asylum avenues and conceding to the Canadian opposition’s framing of immigrants and asylum seekers as “burdens.” It contradicts the speeches of Biden and Trudeau at the North American Leaders Summit in Mexico City on January 10 and Biden’s speech at the Canadian parliament, which recognized the many contributions immigrants make and have made to both countries.

President Biden noted the continued interest of the U.S. and Canada in supporting democracy in the Western Hemisphere.

In the meantime, the Mexican President did not appreciate messages of alarm from the north about the proposed changes to the independent Mexican electoral agency (INE) and other signs of de-democratization. In turn, AMLO spoke about the possible criminal charges against Trump being politically motivated. He also wrongly stated that Mexico is safer than the U.S. after the killing and disappearances of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents in Mexico.

Therefore, a few months after the North American Leaders Summit, we see how some leaders are more concerned with national politics, popularity polls, and elections than working with other countries to face common problems. At the same time, working meetings about regional cooperation also serve as a reminder that despite nationalistic and isolationist presidents (like Trump was), civil servants continue working with their counterparts to make sure that regional trade, tourism, migration, consular relations, and educational and cultural exchanges continue.

March 28, 2023

*Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, Immigration Lab, and the MA in Sociology Research & Practice.

Fact-checking and editing by Karen Perez-Torres. Copy-editing by Mackenzie Cox.

CC BY-ND: This license allows reusers to copy and distribute the material in any medium or format in unadapted form only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator. The license allows for commercial use by news sites. 

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by clalsstaff on March 28, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on March 28, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/03/28/editorial-takeaways-from-the-north-american-leaders-summit-and-bidens-visit-to-canada/

United States: DACA Challenges Continue to Threaten Vulnerable Migrants

By Andréia Fressatti Cardoso*

Rally by the Supreme Court as the DACA cases are heard inside on November 12, 2019 / https://www.flickr.com/photos/vpickering/49057840887
Rally by the Supreme Court as the DACA cases are heard inside on November 12, 2019 / Victoria Pickering / Flickr / Creative Commons License

A looming U.S. Supreme Court decision on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program threatens to strip over 830,000 undocumented migrants of protection from arrest and deportation as well as any sense of belonging in the country where they have lived for most of their lives. The court is poised to throw these individuals, who have long lived in legal limbo, into the excruciating dilemma of whether to be forcibly or voluntarily “returned” to countries where they were born but have no roots, few job prospects, and often limited ability to speak the language.

  • The Obama Administration’s executive order establishing DACA in 2012 made undocumented non-citizens who entered the United States as children and met certain criteria eligible for a liminal (or temporary) legalization of their status. The benefits included being able to have a social security number, a work permit, and, depending on the state, even a driver’s license and pay in-state tuition.
  • DACA enabled these youths to come out of the shadows and pursue some of the activities of adult life. It also defined the terms of their social belonging, as access to public education cannot be denied based on immigration status since Plyler v. Doe (1982). As a place of socialization, school is usually where children start understanding the terms of their participation in society, at an age that they do not need documents for many of their pursuits.

The Obama Administration did not intend DACA to be a permanent solution for undocumented youths, but several challenges – including one led by Texas with the support of eight other states – have sought to declare Obama’s action a violation of U.S. law. In response to State of Texas v. United States (2015), the Biden Administration last August issued a final rule that used rulemaking procedures that, in its view, protected DACA from further legal challenges. But Texas objected, and the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed – leaving the Administration no recourse but to ask the Supreme Court to reverse the decision. The legal maneuvering highlights the temporary aspect of DACA for its beneficiaries.

DACA was an administration’s effort to compensate for the lack of congressional action. A decade later, this fix – a resource of paramount importance to many of the undocumented population – remains fragile and limited. DACA opponents’ legal challenges have been relentless, underscoring how easily DACA can be taken away.

  • The unraveling of DACA in the absence of legislation would be devastating for its over 830,000 beneficiaries. The status of liminal legality under DACA provides access to benefits rather than rights; legal presence rather than membership. While they were children, very few know that they do not have documents; they hardly need them for everyday activities, and some parents try to hide their status from them. As they get older and need documents for daily living, such as having a driver’s license, they face a potential shock of having no ties to the only country they have known. They discover that they can’t have the same life as their peers. The feeling of belonging shrinks and disappears.
  • Many DACA recipients would face even greater stress than the other 10 million undocumented migrants in the United States. The federal government has complete data on their identities, whereabouts, schools, and employers, making targeting them for potential detention and deportation easy. Many of their friends and family are likely to be targeted too.

The Supreme Court in 2020 blocked an effort by the Trump Administration to cancel DACA in September 2017, but the legal decision was based on procedural rather than substantive arguments – i.e., that the Trump action was “arbitrary and capricious,” not on determination that the policy behind it was unconstitutional.

  • The current U.S. Congress appears loath to institutionalize DACA. Moreover, the Administration appears reluctant to try again to use executive authority to ensure both the potential and limitations of the policy – much less a solution for membership of a population that has been present and socially and culturally belongs in the United States. If nothing is done, we could see mass detentions, family separation, and deportations – as well as resistance and protests from people who no longer want to live in the shadows and have claims to belonging.

March 9, 2023

* Andréia Fressatti Cardoso is a research fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of São Paulo.

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by clalsstaff on March 9, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on March 9, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/03/09/united-states-daca-challenges-continue-to-threaten-vulnerable-migrants/

Brazil: Lula Trying to Exert Civilian Control over Security Forces

By Luiza Duarte*

Property damage in the National Congress Building in Brasilia caused by pro-Bolsonaro insurrectionists on January 8, 2023 / Agência Senado / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

The attack on the Three Powers Plaza in Brasilia on January 8 exposed a civil-military crisis that threatens to hinder President “Lula” da Silva’s efforts to put Brazilian democracy back on track and pursue the agenda for which he was elected. The direct participation of current and former members of the military, the military police, and their family members in the invasion of the country’s Congress, Presidential Palace, and Supreme Court is evidence that the relationship of the new government with the security forces is at the center of its struggle to protect Latin America’s largest democracy.

  • The security forces not only failed to block a coup attempt about which threats were made repeatedly; they protected pro-coup demonstrators for weeks in front of military installations in different states. They also chose not to publicly condemn the unprecedented anti-democratic riots, nor to dismiss baseless claims of electoral fraud. Videos show military police dismantling a barrier in Congress, facilitating the invasion. Evidence suggests that some had been collaborating with the attackers. A recent survey shows that four in 10 public security agents see the January 8 rioters’ demands as “legitimate.”
  • The politicization of the security forces deepened under former President Jair Bolsonaro, when the number of military personnel in civilian leadership positions in the Federal Administration more than doubled – reaching the highest figure since re-democratization in the late 1980s. A retired captain himself, Bolsonaro had a general as his vice president and had 10 state ministers from the uniformed armed forces. His reelection bid in October mobilized support in the defense sector.
  • Before the second round of elections, retired General Maynard Santa Rosa, Bolsonaro’s Secretary for Strategic Affairs for nine months, told the press that police forces may be insufficient to contain possible conflicts in the event of a Bolsonaro defeat. Rather than discourage protests, he suggested that the armed forces could establish order through a Law and Order Guarantee (GLO) decree.

Security threats and signs of security forces’ dissatisfaction with the election results mounted during the transition period to the point that Lula moved to change the military command even before his inauguration. Radical Bolsonaro supporters burned eight vehicles in the capital one day after Lula’s victory was confirmed by the Electoral Court in mid-December. One week before his swearing-in on New Year’s Day, police arrested a suspect in a failed bomb attack – a man who had camped out with other radicals in front of the Brazilian Army’s general headquarters and planned to force a declaration of “state of siege” that would pave the way for a coup.

  • The need to reduce the number of non-civilians in the government was recognized by the new administration before January 8, but the coup attempt made it urgent to move quickly. In the aftermath of the attacks, Lula sacked the country’s Army chief, Júlio Cesar de Arruda (in the position for less than one month); changed the command of Federal Police in 18 states; and dismissed 26 commanders of the Federal Highway Police. The latter was involved in widespread allegations of illegal roadblocks on election day, raising fears of voter suppression in pro-Lula regions.
  • The day after the January 8 attack, the Federal District governor was suspended for 90 days. One week after, Brazilian police searched the residence of Anderson Torres, Bolsonaro’s Justice Minister and in charge of Brasilia’s public security at the time, and found a draft decree to overturn the election results. Torres was arrested on suspicion of “omission” and “connivance.” In all, Lula so far has removed more than 140 troops assigned to different bodies linked to the Presidency, including some in charge of his security, for which the Federal Police is now responsible.

The political capital garnered by the new government after January 8 opens a window of opportunity for long-needed reform to address the military’s institutional hold on power. Less than two months into his presidency, Lula has announced changes in the Brazilian public security structure, including the restructuring of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) to remove the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (BIN) from military control. At the same time, the new administration is defending the creation of a permanent National Guard to replace the federal district military police in the protection of federal institutions in the capital. The new force would also act in indigenous lands and border areas and support state security, as the National Force currently does.

  • The security forces grew once again into a non-legitimate political actor, reversing progress made over the past 37 years. Brazil now has a fragile combination of political will and conditions to press for accountability and civilian control over the armed services.

*Luiza Duarte is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and at the Wilson Center, Brazil Institute. Duarte holds a PhD in Political Science from Sorbonne Nouvelle University’s Institute of Latin American Studies.

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by clalsstaff on February 17, 2023  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 17, 2023

https://aulablog.net/2023/02/17/brazil-lula-trying-to-exert-civilian-control-over-security-forces/

Chile: Dim Prospects for New Constitutional Assembly Soon

By Carlos Cruz Infante and Miguel Zlosilo*

The Constitutional Convention, shown here during a moment of silence at its inauguration, started amid optimism that a new Constitution would help heal the country’s deep splits / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Chile does not appear likely to restart efforts to write a new Constitution soon. The failure of the first draft – rejected by 62 percent of Chilean voters – has significantly weakened political leaders’ ability and resolve to try a second draft. Pollsters predicted that Rechazo (rejection) would win on September 4, and the result would fit within the left-right pendular swings of Chilean votes, but the devastating 16‑point advantage surprised all major observers.

Popular support for Constitutional reform has dissipated, even though many of the underlying issues that sparked the upheavals in 2019 and drove 78 percent of Chileans to vote for the Constituyente process remain formidable. Popular frustration with the political class and unhappiness with the first draft has bred apathy and probably disgust. 

  • The warning signs were clear before the referendum on September 4 rejected the draft. Its architects squandered their opportunity to craft a magna carta that transcended political agendas and instead they loaded the draft up with agenda items that would have best been resolved through normal political processes. Constituyente leaders’ efforts to expand people’s rights without a broader national debate turned out to be counterproductive – alienating even some crucial center-left players – and the lack of fiscal responsibility for some proposals gave right-leaning forces an issue with which to rally opposition. On top of that, investors feared that several regulatory changes would impact economic growth and unemployment.

Since the rejection, the nation’s political leaders have remained too wrapped up in their political agendas to develop a vision that could unify them and win popular support.

  • The center-left argues that a second (and successful attempt) is necessary to institutionalize Chile’s legacy since the end of the dictatorship in the 1990. Its narrative, however, is plagued with unrealistic expectations for them to provide leadership because they missed important opportunities to do so in the early 2000s.
  • President Gabriel Boric’s Frente Amplio and the left-leaning factions aligned with his government have so far failed to develop a political project. They admitted that a new Constitution is essential to their planned policies but did not inspire support. Boric has reached out to the center-left and, after the referendum failure, made a leader of the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Carolina Tohá Morales, Minister of the Interior. But polls, including Plaza Pública by Cadem and Activa Research, indicate that Boric’s approval rating is steadily diminishing, and his disapproval is rising. Critics say that he has been overly focused on Chile’s international image, not the political crisis caused by the Constituyente’s failure, but his recent moves on pension reform may help on that.
  • The center-right, which led the Rechazo efforts against the draft, has not yet shown a compelling need for a new Constitution and simply does not see the citizens’ urgency to push for one. Indeed, center-right leaders are enjoying the failures of the left and center-left during and since the Constituyente. The hard right has never wanted to abandon the Pinochet-era Constitution that was to be replaced.

A centrist coalition comprising some elements of the center-left and center-right has expressed conditional interest in getting a second try off the ground, but fear of “convention disaster 2.0” has stymied any progress. The centrists have separately indicated that they would support another convention if the two hard factions (left and right) accepted conditions that, they say, would pave the way forward. Regarding the substance of a new assembly, they want it built on social issues that already enjoy support – not a long wish list of one political sector or other. They also want constitutional and policy experts to be incorporated into the process as referees and observers empowered to rein in ideologues and partisans on both sides.  Neither the left nor right has so far accepted the conditions.

No clear way to get the constitutional redraft back on track has emerged yet, but the problems that led to popular demands for one have not gone away and could put a fire under the political class. The Amarillos por Chile, a broad-based group of moderates with experience and expertise (at first non-partisan but now its own party), have offered ideas for breaking the impasse – even though, like the political centrists, they so far have not figured out how to hold a successful second convention will help. Moreover, they do not have any elected congress member for political influence. They are former politicians and current business leaders who first emerged during the Constituyente, calling for moderation and rejection of sweeping changes that they called “refoundational.” Their backgrounds and relative lack of political agendas may give them the steady hand Chile needs to launch a second try. Until popular demands for change force the political parties to get serious, however, the Amarillos and other supporters of a new, better modulated Constituyente are in a waiting game.

*Carlos Cruz Infante is a sociologist and has served in several senior strategic planning positions in the Chilean government. Miguel Zlosilo is a sociologist and former chief of research of the Secretary of Communications in the second Sebastián Piñera government (2018-21).

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by clalsstaff on November 11, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on November 11, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/11/11/chile-dim-prospects-for-new-constitutional-assembly-soon/

U.S. Immigration Debate Skewed by Bad Statistics

By Ernesto Castañeda*

Sign demarcating US and Mexico territory on the southern US border in El Paso, Texas / Ernesto Castañeda / Creative Commons License

Immigration figures have long driven heated political debate in U.S. politics – even worse in recent years – but the data often exaggerate the problem because the responsible government agencies are double-counting and media reports are analyzing the numbers incorrectly. Opponents of President Joe Biden claim that over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered the United States each year since he became President. The numbers reported by relevant agencies should not drive headlines or be interpreted as stock tickers about whether immigration is up and down, but the data become political footballs serving generally anti-immigration political interests.

Border encounters involving people without immigration papers are just a small subset of all immigrants, emigrants, visitors, and border crossing commercial and tourist activity – almost 300 million over the past 12 months. Analysis of the numbers about border crossers reported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires clarification of what it considers “encounters.”

  • Because many people enter multiple times, the figures also reflect double-counting of many of the same individuals – sometimes more than five times each. Those of certain nationalities can be quickly removed and returned to Mexico for various reasons without adequate recording of their names and other details, making it impossible to know how many people are counted multiple times. Even those repatriated after a judge determines they do not qualify for asylum, humanitarian parole, or other special visa often try again and count as another “encounter.”
  • “Encounters” do not equal unique individuals but rather interactions between asylum-seekers or migrants and DHS personnel anywhere along the border. The U.S. Government reports, for example, that 1 million-1.3 million migrants were removed from the United States under Title 42 provisions intended to protect U.S. health in the context of the COVID pandemic – almost half of the total reported “encounters.” So “encounters” do not equal individuals entering the U.S. either.
  • The numbers include individuals whom the United States normally welcomes, including 140,000 unaccompanied minors looking to reunite with family members in the country, and over 20,000 Ukrainians. Russians and Afghans are in a similar situation. Cubans no longer are fast-tracked for permanent residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act, but the U.S. government cannot deport them because neither Mexico nor Cuba will take them back. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans, Haitians, and others are fleeing situations that most U.S. observers consider intolerable.
  • Comparing year-on-year figures is also deceptive. During 2020, the acceptance of asylum-seekers came almost to a halt. The pandemic, Title 42, and the “Remain in Mexico” program (under which individuals who pass a “credible fear” screening are forced to stay in Mexico while awaiting a hearing) created a backlog and bottleneck for the normal mobility that had occurred in previous years. Shifts in DHS accounting between years have also exaggerated the impression of a surge.

Other observers have confirmed migration specialists’ concerns about the over-counting. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), which monitors the staffing, spending, and enforcement activities of the federal government, reported in September that detention data released by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “is, once again, riddled with errors.” TRAC found “egregious” mistakes in several data categories that led the agency to seriously misrepresent conditions in its public statements.

While the U.S. government’s bad information makes precise calculations of migrant flows impossible, what is sure is that the total number of distinct individuals entering the United States without documentation is much less than 2 million a year. More credible estimates are that –after accounting for thousands of deportations – probably less than half a million people have been allowed in.

  • Among them, some were granted asylum – a right under U.S. and international law. Many others are welcome refugees and asylum-seekers like those from Ukraine and Afghanistan. Many others are waiting their turn in immigration court. Therefore, most of those included in this estimated half-million are in the United States legally, and the government knows who they are and where they live. By definition, they are not “illegal” or hiding. Allegations by a Texas senator and others that “4.2 million illegal immigrants have streamed across the border” since Biden took office are simply not true.

* Ernesto Castañeda teaches in the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences.

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by clalsstaff on November 3, 2022  •  Permalink
Posted in Mexico, United States
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Posted by clalsstaff on November 3, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/11/03/u-s-immigration-debate-skewed-by-bad-statistics/

Paraguay: Is Being Against Corruption and Organized Crime Enough?

by Esteban Caballero*

The Gran Palacio Nacional in the capital of Paraguay, Asunción / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

As Paraguay prepares for general elections next year, the opposition is running on a platform condemning the corruption of the incumbent Colorado Party, but candidates so far have not articulated credible policies to weed out what is a deeply systemic problem.

  • President Mario Abdo Benítez, whose five-year mandate (with no possibility of reelection per the Constitution of 1992) ends next August, has faced several challenges. His Colorado Party has had to manage the COVID pandemic and a series of climatic and economic headwinds that impeded the performance of the agro-exporting sector, the backbone of Paraguay’s economy. Although the country’s fiscal health is better than others in the region, public debt has risen, and pension subsidies have taken resources away from meaningful public investment projects.
  • In July and August, the United States designated former President Horacio Cartes and Vice President Hugo Velázquez – also from the Colorado Party – as “significantly corrupt.” The news sent shockwaves through the body politic and fueled nationwide angst about corruption and, more seriously, the ability of organized crime to permeate government institutions.

Combatting corruption and organized crime has become the central theme of the opposition’s efforts to contest the governing party’s hold on power in the April 2023 elections for president and vice president, deputies, senators, and departmental governors and councilors. Preparing for primaries on December 18, a group of opposition leaders has created a coalition called Concertación Nacional 2023. Early polls indicate that Efraín Alegre from the Liberal Radical Authentic Party will win the primary. He shares the ticket with Soledad Núñez, an independent candidate for vice president.

  • The opposition says that giving the boot to the Colorado Party and rebuilding government institutions will solve the problem. Still, analysis of the more prominent opposition leaders’ discourse signals the need to generate more substantive, programmatic proposals to counter corruption and narco threats. Whether this weakness is because they have no policy think tanks or an indicator of disregard for the policy debate in Paraguayan politics remains to be seen. In any case, the opposition appears poorly prepared to deal with the problems.
  • The challenge is that the country faces two intertwined phenomena – the more traditional corruption linked to government procurement and personnel recruitment and the growing threat of sliding toward being a “narco-state.” Washington’s allegation against former President Cartes is that he “obstructed a major international investigation into transnational crime to protect himself and his criminal associate.” Narcos have killed several well-known local politicians. When model and influencer Cristina Aranda died in an accident in a shoot-out, it shocked public opinion. Nonetheless, the opposition is having difficulty harnessing that revulsion and delineating policies to stop Paraguay’s various forms of corruption.

The opposition’s promise to strengthen government institutions, preserve the rule of law, increase the proper functioning of the police, and reform the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary are laudable goals that will win support among its base and some fence-sitters. Undoubtedly, the Colorado Party is the party most at fault when it comes to condoning corruption and opening the gates to organized crime’s influence. Nevertheless, the opposition cannot only run on a negative campaign, and should ask itself how credible its discourse can be without specifics, especially if it comes from professional politicians who belong to parties, such as the Liberal Radical Authentic Party, that have also had corrupt elements among them when in office.

  • Polls and media reports show that a significant contingent of the electorate continues to support the Colorado Party even if they agree on the need to stop corruption and organized crime. The opposition’s messaging in that context has to draw a fine line between holding the Colorado Party accountable and avoiding broad sweeps that may alienate many of those potential voters and that risks pushing them to consider change as a menace more than a form of deliverance.

* Esteban Caballero is a columnist and political analyst. He is the academic coordinator of the FLACSO Program in Paraguay and former regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the UN Fund for Population.

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by clalsstaff on October 27, 2022  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized

Posted by clalsstaff on October 27, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/10/27/paraguay-is-being-against-corruption-and-organized-crime-enough/

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