All posts tagged Economy

Understanding Deportation for Children, Teens, and Their Parents

By Ernesto Castañeda

If you are a young student in the United States and you are worried that you, a classmate, or a loved one could be deported by ICE agents, as you have seen on social media, TV, or in your neighborhood, this short text is for you.

School dance. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

Why are people in pseudo-military clothes and vests with the initials ICE, HSI, CBP,* and others patrolling the streets and aggressively arresting people in public? It all starts with the popular but dangerous idea that a country must have closed borders, allowing only invited people to pass through. This makes sense for private houses, schools, and other large private institutions, but cities and countries do not work like that. Think about it most people born in the United States can move in their cities, towns, as well as to other cities or towns in the 50 states without having to ask permission from any political authority. They can even move to Guam, the Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico.

*ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement], HSI [Homeland Security Investigations], CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection, agency that houses the Border Patrol which has now also being mobilized to both coast and Chicago] are all immigration enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the current administration other federal and local agencies have also been assigned to help carry out raids and aid in deportation efforts.

People in Any Country Are Not All the Same

Another dangerous myth is that all the people in a country must share a language, culture, and even look the same, as if related by blood. But countries are not big extended families, so this is a fable. But many adults believe this was true in the past and want it to happen soon in the places where they live. As you know, not everyone is the same. Even within the same family, a student club, or sports team, people have differences that make them who they are.

People in some large cities complain about a few people around them speaking a different language in the streets or having a different religion. This is not new; some people have always done so in any booming city.

Even While Most People Stay Put Most of the Time, Mobility is Normal

Many people go to other countries to travel, study, work, or visit family members and friends. Most people get visas, which are permits from a country’s government to visit or move in with permission. People from the United States and Europe rarely need visas to visit other countries, but it is not the same the other way around. People from most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America need vetted visas to visit Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, or Australia.

In some exceptional cases, people have to leave the countries where they were born because of war or persecution because of their religion, ethnicity, or political views. It may be hard for them to get immigration visas after that. Other countries are supposed to provide refuge, a safe place to stay for groups facing persecution. But many countries’ governments like to look the other way or play hot potato with people.

Work Abroad is Often More Available than Working Papers

Other people may have informal verbal (spoken) job offers from restaurants, farms, and small businesses in the United States, but they cannot get visas because the people in charge of approving visas in U.S. consulates abroad think those people would stay in the country, and they think they do not have the savings and education to make them “desirable” to come to the United States. These are not necessarily the views of the people approving visas, but the informal instructions they are told to follow by their bosses.

Nonetheless, some people from towns with a long history of long-distance migration from point A to B have the contacts, paths, and know-how to go to other countries without the U.S. government’s permission. This is what people refer to as “illegal immigration.”

Remember, we should not use the term illegal to name a person, because a living human being cannot be “illegal,” but people can commit acts that go against the law, in this case, entering another country without getting their passport inspected and stamped.

“No Human Being is Illegal.” Elie Wiesel

People without a legal immigration status, who we can call undocumented, are not automatically bad people. They are just caught in a hard and vulnerable situation. Some adults say they should respect the law of a country and “get in line,” but for many of them there is no line to wait in. And for some of the people with close family members legally in the U.S., the wait in line to reunite can be ten years of longer. Therefore, some people live for over a decade away from their parents or minor children. As we recount in the book, Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration.

Middle schoolers playing soccer. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

For most of U.S. history, lawyers have not labeled this a crime but more a “civil” infraction, something like a minor driving infraction, such as driving without insurance, or watching a movie without paying a ticket. But in those examples, people are getting something without paying or putting others at potential financial risk. Immigrants come to the U.S. to work, to pay for all of their expenses, those of their family members, and to send money to loved ones who stayed in the places they came from. Preventing people from moving to a country, and more appropriately to a particular city or neighborhood, even if they can pay for their housing, is like public parks or libraries not allowing only certain people in.

The problem with the label of “illegal” (rude name-calling) is that it conjures or brings together the idea of coming as a family without a visa, along with generalizations and stereotypes that only people who are poor and of different races are “illegal.” That “illegals” are inferior, potentially dangerous criminals, a threat to the homogeneity (looking or being similar) of a country. These all false.

In recent U.S. history, the label of “illegality” has been applied to people from Mexico and Central America with limited English and/or African and indigenous features working in sectors such as agriculture, construction, contracting, food preparation, etc. There are business owners who are undocumented as well as people from Canada and Europe, but it is easier for them “to pass.”

Immigrants who commit violent crimes are not immune (protected) from being stopped by police and imprisoned. But for many decades, people in the news have said that people without papers are dangerous and taking things from U.S. citizens. Many adults have come to believe this after hearing it so many times.

Some politicians run for office sometimes with as little as promising to “get rid of” all the undocumented people in a country. This has been the case of President Trump, and he has acted on this words. His team has set ambitious goals to find people without valid visas or immigration permits and to remove them from the country, which is what we call deportations. He and his team campaigned on closing the border to new arrivals, deporting people with criminal convictions, and with the signs and slogans of mass deportation.

How do you carry out mass deportations quickly in a country with over 350 million people, where less than 3% of the population is undocumented?

Unlike a classroom, there is no list of everyone living in the U.S. that includes everyone’s immigration status. So, this federal administration is trying to reach its goal is by deporting under any pretext some people who are renewing visas, trying to get papers to stay longer, become citizens, or get protection from deportation because they fear for their safety if they were sent back to dangerous places.

Another shortcut by ICE is to go to places where many stereotypical potentially undocumented immigrants gather and stop and ask for papers from people based only on their physical appearance, job, and accent. (Lawyers call this racial profiling).

Communities with many Latinos are specially afraid about deportations hitting close to home. Over 68,000 people are in immigration detention centers at the end, so of them will be let go after proving they are citizens or have valid permits. Many others will eventually be deported without their family members.

Because of this, families with undocumented members are afraid of spending time in public and may always fear it may be their last day together. So, it is important to be patient and supportive of people who could be in that situation. It is understandable if your classmates or even friends do not want to talk about this. Their parents may have told them not to share their immigration status or that of their parents, afraid that it could be used against them. Many live with the continuous fear that an enemy could call la migra (ICE) on them. The have lived with this fear sometimes for decades.

ICE Arrests from Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

People who are undocumented have to try to act perfectly

Afraid about her only daughter being caught by surprise, an interviewee we talked to confidentially, recounts that she told her 13-year-old daughter this year that she was “illegal,” and that she should be careful not to skip class, misbehave, or even think about experimenting with illegal drugs, alcohol, or marijuana because this could cause her deportation and that of her mother and maybe other family members too.

She had never before realized she was undocumented; she thought she was like anyone else in her class, and she is and so she is at risk of deportation. She cannot help but be worried, but how worried should her best friends be? Well, there were around 11 million individuals who were undocumented when Trump became president again on January 20, 2025. Because of changes to immigration laws, procedures, and programs, there may be 14 million people out of status a the end of 2026.

In 2025, the Trump admin, with its aggressive policing, raiding, and detaining, forcibly deported between 200k and 600k people. Self-deportation is a luxury that many immigrants do not have. The official estimates for this are not credible.

So, let’s do some simple math for the probability of being forcible deported by DHS by dividing the maximum estimate for 2025 deportation by a medium-high estimate for the number of undocumented: 600,000/14,000,000=.04 or 4%. This is the probability that an undocumented person is deported each year that these mass deportation goals continue along with large federal agent deployments and police collaboration in some localities [287(g) agreements]. The probability of being detained while attending an immigration court appointment is also low. So, while it is possible this may happen to you, your mom, or your friend, most immigrants won’t be deported. Clearly, the likelihood varies by location. In some places, other certain groups are targeted, like Somalis in the Twin Cities recently. But detaining people and deporting them in this way is very expensive, damaging for the U.S. economy and society, and currently very unpopular. Over 60% percent of U.S. adults oppose these policies. Tell the people you know in this situation not to despair or give up.

Deportation by City. Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

Despite sad cases about children receiving cancer treatment, nurses and care worker women being deported, the numbers show that, because of profiling, most of the people deported are working-age men from Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras. Over 70% of them have no criminal record whatsoever, and only a very small percentage have a violent crime conviction. Meaning most people are innocent hard workers, fathers, sons, but they have been deported because they look like the stereotype. There are good and bad people everywhere. This may remind you of why some teachers and adults may tell you the importance of not generalizing, not falling for common stereotypes and prejudices, and of getting to know people from all backgrounds and with origins in all parts of the world. Learning how to put yourself in their shoes is the best way to understand them, comfort them, and protect them, in the future, by changing the way we aim to deal with undocumented immigration, not by mass deportations or having people afraid of deportation, but by giving them a way to become documented through new laws voted in Congress. Your care and your voice matter.

Ernesto Castañeda is a Professor at American University, where he leads the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. He has been studying immigration scientifically for over 20 years and has written many books on the subject, among them “Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration” and “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on December 29, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Civil Society, Democratic Governance, donald-trump, Economy, Elections, Immigration, Immigration (U.S.), news, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on December 29, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/29/understanding-deportation-for-children-teens-and-their-parents/

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

By Ernesto Castañeda

Regarding the question of what is happening between the United States and Venezuela, the answer is that this is a partially unintended, unanticipated international focus at the end of the first year of Trump’s second term. While the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela have not been close for a while, this path opened up as other areas of intervention, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, got stuck at a standstill.

The potential intervention in Venezuela is not a popular option. There is little support among experts about its merits. Likewise, Venezuelans are not eager to go to war.

This was not a priority for Trump in the past. But three key members of his cabinet and White House staff have zeroed in on Venezuela in the last few months.

As an article in the Washington Post on December 18, 2025, explains convincingly by drawing from inside sources and visible actions, Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, and the main engine behind the aggressive anti-immigrant agenda, wanted to conduct military attacks in Mexico as another way to curb immigration, his long obsession. But as undocumented and asylum-seeker arrivals at the border have approached zero —in part thanks to Mexico’s role—, Miller looked further south.

Trump campaigned in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 elections, bashing MS-13 and Salvadoran immigration. But this time around, he found an ally in Salvadoran President Bukele. Other Central American governments have also collaborated, so he zoomed in on Venezuela through Tren de Aragua (TdA) as an excuse to expedite deportations. Tren de Aragua-related deportations to CECOT in El Salvador became a fiasco and highly unpopular, not to say unlawful. So, the administration moved to declaring the so-called Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as its supposed head. After targeting small boats off the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean, then the excuse became fighting drug trafficking and then to old claims on permits to exploit Venezuelan oil by Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies, without discarding the ideas of regime change as the support for Machado grew internationally, and as the Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, told Chris Whipple to get rid of Maduro, to put pressure on Venezuela until Maduro would give up or “call uncle.”

On the other hand, Marco Rubio—both National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, which in other countries would be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs—has long had an obsession with the regime in Cuba, which he sees as related to Venezuela. This is partly because of the financial and oil support that Venezuela gave to Cuba for many years, which, although it continues—it seems that the first oil tanker that was seized was going from Venezuela to Cuba—though the Venezuela support is no longer the support it once was, and it’s not enough to help the Cuban regime, which is in deep economic trouble. Officials in Cuba see this as a move with them ultimately in mind.

Marco Rubio is especially interested in attacking the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, and there is nobody left in the White House to contradict him, not Susie Wiles, as John Kelly would have done in the first Trump administration, to stop such a bad idea.

According to the Washington Post article mentioned before, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was happy to jump into the frenzy to protect his job following Signalgate. He was eager to prove himself, show “leadership,” and get more attention in the spotlight and ingratiate himself with Miller. So, he found the idea of bombing the small boats appealing, and he would probably like to lead a small incursion into Venezuela.

The objective is not truly drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine that reaches the United States doesn’t come from Venezuela. There are a few shipments that pass through Venezuela and then to the Caribbean; these drug shipments were going to other islands in the region, and perhaps some of that cocaine would eventually reach Europe, but very little reaches the United States. The Coast Guard has been in charge of seizing these vessels for many years, and the DEA could be conducting more formal investigations, so this idea of the drugs as the rationale to threaten Venezuela is not believable. The American people don’t believe it, and this new pseudo-label of “narco-terrorists” isn’t logically convincing either legally or at the logical or expert levels. Indeed, it seems that the administration is already giving up on that; also, with the pardon for the president of Honduras, the drug angle is less convincing. The contradiction remains, and they are rightly not going to attack Mexico or Colombia over the drug issue in the near future.

Things changed a bit with Maria Corina Machado’s visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize regarding democracy in Venezuela and regime change. And lately, there have been a few statements from Trump about the interests of U.S. oil companies in Venezuela. The U.S. oil lobby has been a key factor in Trump’s re-election. So, another goal is for U.S. oil companies to regain access to Venezuela, although there is already an American company doing business there: Chevron. So, this is not something of a priority. All this to say, there is no master strategy behind it.

It is partly a personal animosity between Trump and Maduro, evident in public declarations and supposed ideological differences, but the two governments have also had occasions when they handled structured negotiations very well. There have been instances of negotiations resulting in detained individuals returning from Venezuela to the United States, deportations with permission of Venezuelans from the United States, and then from El Salvador. So, it’s not that there has been a terrible personal relationship between Trump and Maduro or their intermediaries.

Marco Rubio’s obsession is the main driver. He has made recent public statements presenting new arguments and rationales, but they have seemed improvised and unconvincing. Even an overt, public declaration of a return to the Monroe Doctrine is not enough to justify this; it is mainly good news for Russia and China.

To justify an attack on Venezuela and the boats around the coasts, members of the Trump administration have claimed that they wanted to combat terrorism, foreign enemies in the American war on terror, to accelerate deportations, but they still haven’t been able to win that mediatic battle or the legal or logical argument, but they have not done so not even in the local or federal courts. Although the Supreme Court hasn’t stopped them either.

Steven Miller is mainly interested in the idea of a war with Venezuela or with someone else, as a pretext to push through certain laws, such as the Alien Enemies Act and the Insurrection Act, both of which require the U.S. to be at war to be invoked. But this is not even necessary to continue with the mass deportations as they have been. They are deporting many people. Detaining people, they are practically at war with immigrant-based communities, though they are violating human rights and constitutional protections within the country. A declaration of war would not change that reality or make it any more appealing to citizens.

It is very clear that the majority of the American public opinion, even part of the MAGA base, is against the U.S. getting directly involved in any new war. They would be against an invasion or bombing of Venezuela, whether prolonged or even for a short period. It would be more difficult to stop something like an Iran-type one-targeted bombing situation, but removing Maduro probably wouldn’t be as quick or simple.

So, the American people are quite against an intervention in Venezuela. Furthermore, as we see with the debates surrounding the small fishing boats, critics, including legislators in the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans, see these bombings of ships off the Latin American coasts as extralegal. They are putting a lot of pressure on the Pentagon to release the videos showing the killing of two survivors, and to either stop this type of operation, to explain what is happening, and if the intention is to engage in war, then, to make the case to Congress of why the U.S. needs to wage a war, on what basis, and with what objective.

All indicates it would not be something Congress would easily approve. Trying to get the Republicans in Congress to do that could cost some of them their seats in 2026. So, it’s a war, a strategy without rhyme or reason, hence the clear disorder. Venezuela is very worried about Trump’s pronouncements, but their aimlessness is nothing new. So, no one knows what’s going to happen, not even the Pentagon, which has deployed elements that are not sufficient for sustained ground intervention, though they are spending a lot of money bringing the ships there.

They thought military mobilization would be enough to intimidate Maduro, but it obviously hasn’t been. The Nobel Prize hype around Machado has already passed, and it hasn’t changed anything on the ground. The Venezuelan diaspora is asking for military intervention, but that is not enough. Understandably, from their point of view and personal experiences, they are asking Trump to do something. Those who are more established, have money, and have been here for a while, are still upset they were forced to leave. But the more recent Venezuelan migrants who came here seeking asylum after the pandemic are being denied asylum, their work permits revoked, and deported. So that is also a contradiction about Venezuela supposedly being a narco-state. So, the whole armed intimidation of Venezuela is bullying to the extreme, but it is incoherent as foreign policy.

The majority in the United States are against this war in Venezuela and the attacks on the small boats, oil tankers, and the possibility of bombings or military action. Contrary to what some in the White House bubble seem to believe, a war with Venezuela would not be enough to distract from the economic and political situation in the U.S. It would not totally change the narrative, help speed deportations to what would become a war zone, and the attempts to further concentrate power on the executive could be more directly opposed by the legislative branch which is the one supposed to declare and fund wars. The oil tanker confiscations and chases are just the latest in a series of policies in which the administration’s words, threats, and actions are not enough to scare Maduro or convince the public of the righteousness of these actions.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed are his alone.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, donald-trump, Economy, Elections, news, Politics, Regional Relations, trump, Venezuela

Posted by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/23/what-is-behind-the-us-escalation-of-threats-against-venezuela/

Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks

By Jake Johnston

Research Associate, Center for Economic and Policy Research

It’s been nearly a decade since Haitians last went to the polls to elect a president. Even then, barely one in five participated. In a country with a majority of the population under 25 years of age, this means that, for most Haitians, voting for one’s leaders is a privilege never before experienced.

Haiti’s transition, precipitated by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, is ongoing. For the better part of four years, progress toward elections has remained elusive. But that all appeared to change this fall.

“The Haitians need to come to an election and elect a president,” the US Charge d’Affaires, Henry Wooster said in September. Security and other challenges must not be a “red herring for taking action,” he continued. Speaking directly to Haiti’s de facto authorities, he warned: “In other words, you can’t stay in those jobs for life.”

The reaction, in a country where the political class remains more responsive to Washington than the population in Haiti, was swift. Two months later, a new electoral law has been established and a vote scheduled for next August. But does this present Haitians with a path out of the multiple, overlaid crises affecting the country? More than half the country is facing food insecurity, the economy is about to wrap up its seventh consecutive year of negative growth, and insecurity continues to dominate daily life.

In 2023, when asked if they had trust in the electoral process, fewer than one in four Haitians responded yes. It is hard to imagine that number is higher today. Though few would be sorry to see the much-loathed leaders atop the transition fall, a vote is not a path out of the current crisis.

The quick response to Wooster’s threats was not so much about elections. It was about a date much closer on the horizon: February 7, 2026. That is when the mandate of the nine-member presidential council — which was put in place with a strong push from the Biden administration, CARICOM, UN, and the OAS 18 months ago — formally ends. For months, debate has raged over what should come next. The political class is auditioning, not with the ten-plus million citizens of Haiti, but with the foreign diplomats and multilateral entities they see as key to their own survival.

And if there was any doubt about who would ultimately decide, it was put to rest in mid-November. Amid an effort from some on the transitional presidential council to, once again, replace the prime minister, the US embassy stepped into the fight.

“If you and your family value your relationship with the United States, I urge you in the strongest terms to desist from initiatives to oust the PM and to instead publish the electoral decree … This is not the time to test U.S. resolve,” Wooster texted Fritz Jean, one of the councilors. Days later, Jean’s US visa was revoked and the State Department publicly accused him, without providing evidence, of supporting armed gangs. The effort to replace the PM was stopped — at least for now. The next week, the electoral decree was published.

The “plan” is coming into focus, and it is a familiar one: stability at all costs, no matter how rotten the foundation. To enforce this notion of stability and allow for elections, the US has been quick to assure that more security support is on the way.

In September, the UN Security Council approved a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Authorized for up to 5,500 soldiers, it is currently little more than a rebranding of the Kenyan-led Multinational Support Mission (MSS) that the UN authorized in 2024. No new troops have arrived and, while this new mission will have some level of UN support, operationalizing any of it is expected to take the better part of a year.

The main difference then, for the 1,000 or so mostly Kenyan police on the ground in Haiti is that the rules of engagement have changed. The GSF, as its name suggests, is intended to be more “muscular,” by which its architects mean lethal. The newly drafted Concept of Operations outlines a mission with a simple goal: kill the bandits.

But while few have taken note, that has been the de facto authorities’ strategy for some time. So far this year, police forces have been responsible for well over half of the 4,500-plus killings in Haiti. Hundreds of civilians have been caught in the crossfire as police battle armed groups that exert influence over much of Port-au-Prince and have traumatized a nation. Drone attacks, led by a secretive police unit operating with Blackwater CEO Erik Prince’s private mercenaries, are also racking up civilian casualties and drawing growing condemnation.

The outspoken leaders of Haiti’s armed groups, however, only seem to continue to accumulate more power, political influence, and heavy weaponry. While some areas of the capital have seen tension ease, violence in the provinces is expanding by the day. Armed groups still control all the major arteries of the nation. More people are displaced today than at the height of the post-earthquake recovery.

The US has expressed its goal in Haiti as saving the state from imminent collapse, thereby avoiding mass migration or the further entrenchment of transnational criminal organizations. But while precious oxygen is consumed by raging debates over electoral timelines, transitional governance structures, and how quickly foreign soldiers can arrive, nobody has stopped to ask a basic question: is the current state worth saving?

The root of the tension that has paralyzed the country for much of the last decade is not a fight between violent gangs and the state. Simplistic narratives of good versus evil miss the mark. Rather, it is a fight over putting the train back on the tracks to save a rump state in the name of stability or to lay new tracks to create the foundations for a more representative state to rise from the ashes. It is not elections nor a foreign military force that will resolve this fundamental tension. In fact, history shows those two responses are more likely to consolidate the status quo.

The Haitian people need an opportunity to vote freely. They need to feel safe and secure in their communities. But what is missing is a plan to bring it all together, to begin restoring faith in a state that long ago lost the trust of the population; a plan to achieve peace, which is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of opportunity. What is missing is a vision that can inspire the population and bring the nation together around a common path forward.

A peace process can fill that gap. Such an endeavor does not mean legitimizing armed actors, condoning violence, or accepting impunity; rather, what it should mean is treating the situation holistically while centering the population and in particular victims of both state and non-state violence. A foreign military force and low-turnout elections are tracks Haiti has been down many times before. A peace process offers a chance at laying new ones. But first, what Haiti needs are political leaders responsive to the needs of the people and not simply to foreign embassies.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, Haiti, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/12/haiti-needs-to-lay-new-tracks/

The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

By Lívia Peres Milani

Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)

National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)

President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30^th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.

The imposition of tariffs

The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.

Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort.

Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.

Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners.

Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations

However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products.

These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis.

Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.

On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Brazil, Democratic Governance, Diplomacy, Economy, Elections, Politics, Regional Relations, United States

Posted by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/09/the-multiple-dimensions-of-the-us-brazil-relations-crisis/

Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?

By Cynthia McClintock*

Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment. Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.

Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?

Why are Peruvians So Angry?

The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.

The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.

But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.

Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.

As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.

What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?

Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.

Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.

A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.

Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?

The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor. Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)

As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.

Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”

Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.

*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on November 12, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Civil Society, Crime & Violence, Democratic Governance, economics, Economy, Elections, finance, global-inequality, history, indigenous, inequality, news, Peru, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on November 12, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/11/12/can-perus-democracy-recover/

Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

Rodrigo Paz is sworn in as president of Bolivia, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Centrist Rodrigo Paz’s victory in October’s runoff election signals a dramatic change of direction for Bolivian politics. The era of dominance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, led by ex-president Evo Morales, is definitively over. For only the second time since 2006 the MAS will not control the presidency. As a result of the recent election, it now has a mere two representatives in the legislature’s lower house, and no one in the upper house. Though it does not hold an outright majority, Paz’s Christian Democratic Party is now the single largest presence in both legislative chambers. How did Bolivia get here?

Twenty years ago, the leftist-populist MAS swept into power, as a new and energetic grassroots alternative to the elite-run traditional parties that had traded off governing Bolivia since the end of dictatorship in 1982, or one could even argue, since the 1952 Revolution. The MAS’s popularity sprung largely from the dynamism of Morales, himself, then a coca grower union leader adept at organizing and leading large-scale protests in opposition to prevailing Washington Consensus policies and government efforts to sell off Bolivia’s non-renewable resources to transnational corporate interests. The MAS styled itself a bottom-up social movement and not a party. Its participatory “lead by following” approach to governance appealed to a great majority of indigenous voters and working-class people of indigenous descent.

Morales and the MAS proved historically consequential in undertaking a contentious but innovative rewrite of the country’s Constitution, which went into force in 2009. It fully embraced Bolivia’s “plurinational” identity and incorporated an unprecedented variety of collective indigenous rights of consultation, to their traditional territories, and perhaps most controversially, of judicial autonomy. The Morales administration also used a large surplus from the country’s extractive boom to finance a wide range of new social safety net provisions that halved the number of people living in poverty, including cash transfers to families, a pension program, minimum wage increase, as well as public investments in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, his presidency raised the public visibility of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, no longer as second class citizens but as political protagonists of their own present and future.

Morales and the MAS were immensely popular. But then cracks began to appear. In 2011 a plan to build a controversial highway through a protected indigenous reserve brought the MAS government into direct conflict with the reserve’s residents, damaging its support among some indigenous groups. When the extractive boom ended around 2014, Bolivia’s economy slowed considerably, and the MAS fiscal policies that had lifted so many out of poverty became increasingly unsustainable. Part of the problem was Morales, who served two presidential terms and aspired to another, without any thought to a succession plan. Constitutionally limited to two terms, in 2016 he soundly lost a national referendum in a bid for a third and then ignored the result, further alienating many former supporters.

The upheaval around the contested 2019 election, which eventuated in Morales going into exile in Mexico and the persecution of MAS loyalists by a rightwing caretaker government, set the stage for the party’s eventual fall from grace. The 2020 election restored the MAS to power. But soon Morales and the new president, his ex-finance minister Luis Arce, were in a pitched battle for control over the party, a bitter and increasingly personal rivalry that fatally fragmented the MAS into opposed camps. Their protracted feud, which paralyzed congress, strayed into surreal territory, with accusations of a staged coup and mutual assassination attempts. The credibility of the MAS was so fundamentally damaged that the incumbent Arce, with his poll numbers plummeting, suspended his campaign. Morales, meanwhile, remains holed up in his coca grower redoubt to avoid criminal charges.

The MAS-led government’s political fragmentation, and its ineffectual response to Bolivia’s increasingly disastrous economy, have left the party deeply unpopular. The country is currently floundering amid its worst economic crisis in 40 years. Its natural gas production is half of what it was in 2014, with nothing to replace it. Bolivia has failed to develop its large reserves of lithium. Depleted currency reserves and a scarcity of US dollars have driven up inflation, creating severe shortages of fuel and basic goods. Over the past year, ordinary Bolivians have angrily expressed their discontent with the country’s economic collapse through repeated strikes and protest actions.

Emerging from this bleak political and economic state-of-affairs is the surprise election winner, Rodrigo Paz. Son of onetime leftist president Jaime Paz Zamora, former mayor of Tarija, and recently a senator, Paz’s campaign focused on restoring Bolivia’s economy, but gradually rather than by instituting sweeping fiscal austerity measures as his rival in the run-off proposed. Non-indigenous, pro-business, and ideology averse, Paz successfully positioned himself as a pragmatic reformer. He has delivered a strong anti-corruption message, pledged to restore relations with the US and bring back foreign investment. His populist call for a “capitalism for all” hopes to thread the needle by mixing decentralization, lower taxes, support for small businesses, and greater fiscal discipline, with continued spending on popular MAS-era social programs.

Paz’s critics argue that what he proposes is an impossible fiscal balancing act. Desperate and impatient Bolivians will expect immediate results. But it remains far from clear whether Paz will be able to overcome likely regional opposition to at least some of his policies. And if he does not stabilize the country’s dysfunctional economy quickly, Paz’s political honeymoon might be brief.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on November 11, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Bolivia, Civil Society, Democratic Governance, economics, Economy, Elections, finance, global-inequality, history, indigenous, inequality, news, Politics, Regional Relations

Posted by clalsstaff on November 11, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/11/11/bolivia-decisively-enters-new-if-unknown-political-territory/

The Rise, Decline, and Crisis of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement

By Dr. Pablo Andrade Andrade

October 17 Demonstrations (Manifestaciones del 17 de Octubre)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Just six years ago, in 2019, the three major organizations of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement were on the rise. CONAIE (the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) led the charge against Lenin Moreno’s government. For eleven days their widespread demonstrations posed a serious threat to the government’s stability. The “Paro Nacional” (Nationwide Strike) not only facilitated CONAIE’s alliances with the other two indigenous organizations (FENOCIN, the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras, and FEINE, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos) but also broadened its coalition with a diverse range of civil society organizations, marking a significant shift in Ecuadorian politics. The impact of the indigenous movement on Ecuadorian politics was profound, as Moreno´s government was seriously weakened. Two years later, in 2021, CONAIE’s political party, Pachakutik, won substantial representation in the National Assembly and placed third in the Presidential elections.

In 2022 CONAIE’s president, Leonidas Iza, led a successful national strike against Guillermo Lasso’s right-wing government. His leadership, bolstered by unity among indigenous communities and their allies, made it the most powerful leftist organization. Newfound solidarity among indigenous communities and stronger ties with student, feminist, and environmental movements, enhanced Iza’s national and international reputation. Less than a year later, President Lasso had to end his term and called for early general elections. However, at that moment Iza´s radical wing of CONAIE also attempted to impose its agenda over Pachakutik and the Amazonian federation CONFENIAE, which proved to be a high-cost strategy. The internal conflicts that followed led, in 2025, to the most serious electoral defeats that both organizations had suffered in decades.

The 2023 general elections were marred by prison massacres and political assassinations, including that of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio and the mayor of Manta, among numerous other government officials. Amid this unprecedented turmoil, a young center-right candidate, Daniel Noboa, emerged victorious as interim president. His win signaled yet another shift in Ecuador’s political landscape, with the country’s fragile democracy once again at the mercy of a personalist, plebiscitarian president.

The first warning sign of the current political turn to populist rule came with the 2025 regular election. The President’s party (Alianza Democrática Nacional, ADN) and the opposition party (Revolución Ciudadana, RC) totalled over 80 percent of National Assembly representatives. Noboa won his first five-year mandate. Pachakutik saw its representation shrink to five members, who the government rapidly coopted. Free from legislative checks, Noboa advanced his economic adjustment program. In addition, amid the ongoing public security crisis, Noboa expanded the military’s role in maintaining domestic order. Although assassinations have risen since 2023, militarization has strengthened Noboa’s control over organized violence, boosting political support for his government.

As part of its economic program, in September 2025, the Noboa administration raised diesel prices, a decision that in 2021 and 2022 sparked the wrath of CONAIE. But the leaders misjudged the lasting strength gained in 2021 and 2022, failing to account for damage from the 2023 and 2025 leadership races. As a result, they rushed to emulate the apparent successes of the past. This time, however, CONAIE was at its lowest point. Unable to coordinate a nationwide strike, organizations in the northern province of Imbabura were left to their fate. The indigenous peoples of Cotacachi, Ilumán, Peguche, and Otavalo sustained demonstrations for a month. Still, they paid a high price in lost lives, injured people, and detainees due to systematic and brutal repression at the hands of the Armed Forces and the Police. This time, the government did not back down; the solidarity of allied urban groups was, in this case, mostly symbolic and ineffective.

If CONAIE’s crisis should not be seen as the end of the indigenous movement, its significance cannot be overlooked. While grassroots mobilization once seemed effective, Noboa’s strong appeal and military support present new challenges. The aftermath of the national strike has called into question CONAIE’s representativeness and capacity to organize. An emboldened Noboa is now proposing a national plebiscite, in which he will likely be victorious, while Ecuador’s civil society appears weaker than ever. The challenges ahead are complex. The failed challenge to Noboa´s government could herald a new era of competitive authoritarianism, a scenario made even more likely by renewed international tolerance of hybrid forms of democracy. The lost battle left the indigenous organizations of Imbabura with wounds that could be challenging to heal, and racism lurks underneath the surface of Ecuador’s still young experiment with intercultural co-governance.

Pablo Andrade Andrade is Professor and Chair of the Germánico Salgado Lectures, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on November 6, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Accountability & Corruption, Civil Society, economics, Economy, Ecuador, finance, global-inequality, history, indigenous, inequality, news, Politics

Posted by clalsstaff on November 6, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/11/06/the-rise-decline-and-crisis-of-ecuadors-indigenous-movement/

On the U.S. – Argentina Currency Swap

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

In October of this year, the United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent ratified the signing of a US$20 billion currency swap with the Central Bank of Argentina as part of an “economic stabilization agreement” (Buenos Aires Herald, 2025). Moreover, the U.S. Treasury announced it is working on a complementary US$20 billion credit line that would be provided by private-sector banks and sovereign wealth funds (La Nación, 2025).

According to the Argentine banking institution, this agreement seeks to contribute to the country’s macroeconomic stability, emphasizing the need to preserve price stability and promote sustainable economic growth. The swap operations will enable the Central Bank of Argentina “to expand its set of monetary and exchange rate policy instruments, including the liquidity of its international reserves”, in line with the regulatory functions outlined in its statutes. The agreement is an important factor of a far-reaching approach that aims to strengthen the country’s monetary policy and improve the Bank’s ability to cope with events of volatility in the foreign exchange and capital market (Central Bank of Argentina, 2025).

Why is Argentina interested in this agreement?

Peterson Institute Professor Maurice Obstfeld (2025) highlights Milei’s remarkable success in lowering inflation, achieving a federal budget surplus, and relaxing regulations. Prior to the present crisis, the IMF predicted that Argentina’s GDP would expand by 5.5 percent in 2025, after shrinking 1.3 percent in 2024. At the same time, the IMF’s initial assessment of April 2025 concluded that, with one exception, important objectives were met. Indeed, the country’s net foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily in US dollars, fell well short of their target level.

Harvard Professor Ricardo Hausmann (2025) explains that Argentina is trapped in a multiple equilibrium, that is, a situation in which given the same set of conditions, an economy can achieve two or more distinct and stable equilibrium outcomes. If investors are willing to lend money when they feel optimistic, this lowers interest rates helping the economy grow and keeping debt service low, thus confirming the initial expectations. Conversely, if investors become pessimistic, they demand high risk premiums, which causes interest rates to skyrocket, harming investment and making public debt more expensive, thus justifying their fear of a crisis.

For his part, the former Secretary of Finance of Argentina Daniel Marx (2025) underscores that the pre-election portfolio adjustment has been less complicated than in the past, which shows more credibility with banks and institutions. In this regard, financial support from the U.S. Treasury can be useful in creating a sequence that enables its orderly implementation. Hence, the funds obtained to cope with the ongoing problems could be used to address important unresolved issues rather than being used for other instances in which funds are being depleted in the short-term.

Why is the U.S. interested in this agreement?

As Brad Setser (2025), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues, Washington has an interest in Milei’s success, not only because of his emphasis on stabilizing the Argentine economy, but also because his commitment to the free-market approach could serve as an important example for the rest of the continent.

However, U.S. interest in the swap agreement should also be understood in terms of the momentous change that the architecture of international financial relations has been experiencing in recent times. Indeed, following various decades of growing global economic integration, the planet is now confronting the threat of policy-driven geo-economic fragmentation.

In this context, Argentina matters for the strategic interest of the United States. Scott Bessent (2025) has emphatically stressed that the country is “a systemically important U.S. ally and that the U.S. Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina.” In other words, the Trump administration’s bailout resembles Mario Draghi’s support for European stability in 2012 with his “whatever it takes” approach, applied to the Argentine case in 2025.

Vera Bergengruen (2025), a journalist for The Wall Street Journal, believes that Washington’s security policy is a sort of revival of the Monroe doctrine. While the prior doctrine sought to keep European powers out of the region, the current one is primarily focused throughout the Americas with an aim to reward loyalty and to root out enemies. In this respect, Argentinian political analyst Juan Landaburu (2025) points out that in the context of a North American withdrawal from other regions, the so-called “backyard” of the United States is gaining greater importance, but this time not because of European ambitions but because of China’s advances.

With the results of Argentina’s midterm elections, the government has gained public support for its pro-market approach, while also gaining ground in the international financial community.
For its part, the United States government welcomes this result, which reaffirms its political preferences and allows it to make projections about its strategic interests in Latin America.
That said, the swap agreement between the U.S. and Argentina, while not without risks, constitutes an opportunity to renew ties of cooperation in the context of the current complex architecture of international relations. The coin is in the air.

REFERENCES

Bergengruen Vera, 2025, Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’ Aims to Dominate the Americas, The Wall Street Journal, October 22, available at https://archive.is/20251023231723/https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trumps-donroe-doctrine-aims-to-dominate-the-americas-b31208dd

Bessent Scott, 2025, Argentina is a systemically important U.S. ally in Latin America, and the @US Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina, available at https://x.com/SecScottBessent/status/1970107351912075454

Buenos Aires Herald, 2025, Scott Bessent confirms Argentina-US currency swap has been signed, available at https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/scott-bessent-confirms-argentina-us-currency-swap-has-been-signed

Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina), 2025, The BCRA and the U.S. Department of the Treasury sign a USD 20 billion agreement for exchange rate stabilization, available at https://www.bcra.gob.ar/Pdfs/Noticias/acuerdo-bcra-tesoro-estados-unidos-EN.pdf

Hausmann Ricardo, 2025, Trump Alone Can`t Save Argentina, New York Times, October 15, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/opinion/argentina-milei-trump-bailout.html

La Nación, 2025, Estados Unidos prepara otra ayuda para la Argentina con el sector privado por US 20000 millones, October 16, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/estados-unidos/eeuu-prepara-otra-ayuda-para-la-argentina-con-sector-privado-por-us20000-millones-nid16102025/

Landaburu Juan, 2025, Por qué Trump mira a América Latina más que nunca? La Nación, October 25, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/por-que-trump-mira-a-america-latina-mas-que-nunca-y-cuales-son-los-riesgos-detras-de-su-estrategia-nid25102025/

Marx Daniel, 2025, De pesos a dólares: esta vez es algo diferente, El Cronista Comercial, October 21, available at https://www.cronista.com/suscripciones/?limit=false&continue=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Fcolumnistas%2Fde-pesos-a-dolares-esta-vez-es-algo-diferente%2F&kicker=Opini%C3%B3nExclusivo%20Members&title=De%20pesos%20a%20d%C3%B3lares%3A%20esta%20vez%20es%20algo%20diferente&summary=&image=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Ffiles%2Fimage%2F1272%2F1272625%2F68f969cdb980d_600_315!.jpg%3Fs%3D0eec9030d86ead2043d767eb59f61bac%26d%3D1761176231

Obstfeld Maurice, 2025, Argentina’s Credibility Trap, Brookings Institution, available at https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/argentinas-credibility-trap

Setser Brad, 2025, Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes, available at https://www.cfr.org/article/will-trumps-20-billion-backing-help-milei-change-argentinas-fortunes

Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on October 28, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Uncategorized

Tagged Argentina, economics, Economy, finance, global-inequality, inequality, Politics

Posted by clalsstaff on October 28, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/10/28/on-the-u-s-argentina-currency-swap/

Trapped by Debt? China’s Role in Ecuador Oil Dilemma

Photo credit: Xinhua, https://images.app.goo.gl/rBnL1kuwMixrzmCh7

Ecuador’s struggle to move beyond oil is deeply tied to its financial obligations—especially to China. Over the past 15 years, oil revenues have not only funded public spending but also serviced billions in external debt, locking the country into a path of continued extraction. This tension was already visible when the Yasuní-ITT Initiative collapsed in 2013: efforts to protect the rainforest were ultimately sidelined as social spending and budgetary needs remained—if not deepened—the country’s dependence on oil income. A decade later, Ecuadorians voted to halt drilling in the same region, but implementation has slowed. While officials have cited fiscal pressures and legal complexities, it is also clear that a significant portion of Ecuador’s oil production remains tied up in long-term prepayment arrangements—including those linked to past oil-for-loan agreements with Chinese lenders.

Following Ecuador’s 2008 debt default, China quickly emerged as the country’s primary financier. According to the China-Latin America Finance Database, since 2010 Chinese policy banks—primarily China Development Bank and Eximbank—provided over $18 billion in loans to Ecuador. Many of these were backed by future oil shipments. The structure followed a two-track model: financial agreements with policy banks, and parallel supply contracts with PetroChina or Unipec. In practice, this meant that while Chinese banks lent Ecuador billions in cash, PetroEcuador committed to deliver oil to Chinese traders as repayment—regardless of market prices at the time of shipment. This arrangement locked in large volumes of crude in exchange for upfront cash. By 2013, nearly 90% of Ecuador’s oil exports were committed under term contracts with Chinese buyers, giving Beijing outsized leverage over the country’s oil trade.

These deals have had long-lasting implications. By committing barrels years in advance, they reduced Ecuador’s ability to adjust production in response to new priorities—such as conservation mandates or global price shifts. Pricing terms further undercut the country’s earnings. Although contracts referenced international benchmarks like West Texas Intermediate (WTI) or Brent, additional fees, quality discounts, and opaque delivery terms often meant Ecuador received significantly less than market value. In fact, in 2017 Petroecuador sought to renegotiate oil-for-loan contracts with Chinese firms precisely to secure better pricing and reduce the volume of barrels exported under onerous terms. A 2022 audit cited by Infobae estimated that Ecuador lost nearly $5 billion in revenue due to oil sold at below-market prices under those contracts; up to 87% of crude exports were tied to formulas that paid less than the spot market could have yielded.

Independent investigations by journalists have also found that Chinese firms profited by reselling Ecuadorian crude at higher prices, while Petroecuador captured only a portion of the potential revenue. Contractual provisions—such as repayment accounts held abroad and sovereign immunity waivers—further limited Ecuador’s flexibility to renegotiate terms without risking legal or financial penalties.

In this context, many of the barrels extracted today are already earmarked through older pre-sale deals. This complicates efforts to curb drilling, even when doing so in response to a clear public mandate. Contractual rigidity—not just fiscal reliance—has narrowed the government’s policy space. Reversing course isn’t just a matter of political will; it requires untangling years of embedded financial commitments.

The 2022 debt restructuring with China offered a glimpse of what greater flexibility can unlock. By renegotiating loan maturities and rescheduling oil deliveries, Ecuador freed up dozens of cargoes that had been tied to repayment. Instead of shipping them under discounted terms, the government was able to sell them on the open market—during a favorable price window—generating millions in additional revenue. The volume of oil remained the same. What changed was when and how it could be sold. This shift in marketing autonomy directly expanded Ecuador’s fiscal space, without requiring increased production or new drilling.

While extractive arrangements remain deeply entangled with prior commitments, recent developments suggest Ecuador is gaining modest room to pursue a different path. In mid-2025, the country secured $400 million from China’s PowerChina—part of a broader $1 billion renewable energy package that also included Spanish financing—to support solar and energy storage projects. This marks a shift in Chinese engagement away from fossil-backed infrastructure toward cleaner investments. At the same time, Ecuador has turned to debt-for-nature swaps to ease financial pressures without expanding oil production. Although these were led primarily by multilateral lenders and NGOs, they reflect a broader shift. The 2023 Galápagos blue bond refinanced $1.6 billion in debt to fund long-term marine conservation, while a second swap in 2024 unlocked $460 million for Amazon protection. Together, these efforts point to the possibility of more climate-aligned partnerships—offering early glimpses of how Ecuador, with support from external actors, including China, might gradually move beyond extractive dependence.

Three lessons stand out. First, oil-for-loan deals may offer quick liquidity, but they impose long-term constraints that complicate democratic and environmental decision-making. Second, transparent and flexible oil sales consistently outperform opaque pre-sale contracts weighed down by discounts and delivery restrictions. And third, while China’s engagement has historically centered on extractive finance, recent shifts—such as investment in renewable infrastructure—suggest there is room for more climate-aligned and cooperative models. Deepening this kind of engagement, alongside support for flexible financing tools like debt-for-nature swaps, in line with its constitutional commitments, could help Ecuador reduce oil dependence.

There is no easy path out of an oil-dependent economy for Ecuador. Oil still plays a major role in the country’s budget. But the choice is no longer between drilling or defaulting. The 2022 restructuring showed that smarter financing—focused on freeing future production from rigid terms—can create space to act on social and environmental goals. Greater control over the extractive model would not mean extending Ecuador’s reliance on oil, but rather using what production remains in a more strategic and limited way. This includes regaining flexibility over how and when oil is sold and ensuring that any revenues are used to actively support, rather than delay, the transition toward a more diversified and sustainable economy. The 2023 vote to halt oil drilling in the Yasuní reserve signaled a shift in public priorities. Whether Ecuador—and its partners—can align financing with that vision will determine whether Yasuní becomes a turning point or just another deferred promise.

Edgar Aguilar is a Researcher at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student in International Economics at American University

Edited by Rob Albro, Associate Director, Research, at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on August 6, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in Ecuador, Uncategorized

Tagged China, Economy, finance, Politics

Posted by clalsstaff on August 6, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/08/06/trapped-by-debt-chinas-role-in-ecuador-oil-dilemma/

Community Development Financial Institutions as Underappreciated Bridging Institutions for Latino Small Business Success

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

March 26, 2025

Latina-owned business in Columbia Heights, Washington DC. Credit: Elizabeth Albro

Building upon its previous research on Latino entrepreneurship, with the generous support of the Wells Fargo Foundation, AU’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies recently launched a project to assess the effectiveness of community development financial institutions (CDFIs) for Latino small businesses in the DC-metro region. CDFIs provide bespoke financial services and investment capital to underserved communities, and the economic crisis caused by the pandemic highlighted their crucial role as bridging institutions connecting minority small businesses with the resources they needed to stay afloat. But how have CDFIs gone about their work since the pandemic?

Together with our community partner, the Greater Washington Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, we surveyed representatives of CDFIs throughout our region to better understand how they interact with Latino business owners, but also post-pandemic challenges in doing so, as they seek to support this increasingly important community for our region’s economy. Here we report on preliminary results that show how the effectiveness of CDFIs depends upon their greater attention not just to the specific needs of Latino small business owners but also to the social and cultural circumstances, and communities, within which these small businesses operate.

CDFI’s have been a source of inspiration and innovation when it comes to engaging sometimes hard-to-reach minority small business owners. These include pioneering the use of cohort models when providing assistance, as a way to build peer relationships and support a more networked community of minority business owners. They also include the use of equity impact scorecards to help weigh disparities when evaluating eligibility for business loans. They further encompass a more strategic use of microloans and sustained efforts to rethink traditional risk evaluation systems, which have served as barriers to entrance for minority start-ups. But the role of CDFI’s as critical mediators between minority business owners and the formal financial system remains underappreciated.

Latinos are an increasingly important part of the U.S. economy, primarily through business ownership and job creation. They continue to start businesses at a faster rate than any other group, and are projected to be almost a third of business owners by 2050. But, despite comparable liquidity, credit risk and default rates, when compared with counterparts, Latino small businesses encounter more obstacles accessing capital for start-up, growth, and to survive downturns. They are, for example, 60 percent less likely than White-owned businesses to be approved for a bank loan. This disparity is a major contributor to the long-standing racial wealth gap among small business owners in the U.S.

Recent economic disruptions have also highlighted the greater vulnerability of Latino businesses. Less than half of Latino immigrants nationwide have a relationship with a bank. With less access to lending institutions, Latino business owners have relied disproportionately on personal funds, home equity, and informal social networks, leaving them more financially exposed in times of crisis. The Pew Research Center reported that Latino household wealth fell 66 percent as a result of the 2008 Great Recession, the largest decrease among any group.

During Covid-19, Latino business owners struggled to access capital to weather the pandemic. If more likely to seek funds, they were less likely to receive them from private lending sources. The Small Business Administration reported a success rate of 7 percent for Latino-owned businesses who applied to receive Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds provided by the federal CARES Act in 2020, compared to 83 percent for White-owned enterprises. In 2021 the Federal Reserve reported that Latino businesses were less than half as likely as White-owned businesses to receive a PPP loan. Such disparities highlight the urgency to understand the factors that continue to limit Latino asset building, and to identify successful alternatives for engaging Latino small businesses.

Overall, survey responses prioritized the bridging function of CDFIs. On the one hand, representatives of CDFIs emphasized the importance of not simply understanding the specific concerns of Latino business owners, but also the need to be actively present “in the community.” This included, as one respondent put it, “hyper local knowledge,” not just about specific industry sectors, socioeconomic status or tax rates, but about extra-financial social contexts impacting Latino business success, such as new immigration policies or incipient gentrification in a given neighborhood.

Being “in the community” encompassed the necessity of meeting business owners “where they are at.” Respondents emphasized strategies of direct personal contact, such as texting over email, the importance of “personal visits” to places of business, providing information in Spanish, access to bilingual financial professionals, use of social media platforms popular with Latinos, and outreach through Spanish-language media. This extended to attending family and other local celebrations, and was about “establishing trust” with a group, Latino small business owners, often suspicious of formal institutions. One takeaway is that CDFIs illustrate the need for lending institutions to adopt a more expansively encompassing approach to culturally informed “community engagement,” as a core competency of their work with minority small businesses.

On the other hand, respondents repeatedly emphasized that throughout the pandemic, and going forward, it has been challenging to make Latino business owners aware of their financial assistance options. For many, this boils down to a pervasive lack of “financial literacy.” Microenterprises and small businesses often do not keep adequate records and do not maintain basic financial management and accounting practices, which make it hard for them to provide the necessary documentation to qualify for grants or loans. Much of what CDFI staff spends their time doing is helping business owners “put their financial house in order.” Overcoming such informality remains a major challenge. If CDFIs are critical conduits connecting Latino small business owners to formal financial institutions, a second takeaway is the need to offer basic financial literacy assistance further upstream, prior to the business start-up phase, perhaps in coordination with immigrant-serving nonprofits and conceived as one among a set of core wraparound services.

This research project highlights the critical role played by CDFIs in connecting Latino small business owners with resources for success, but also bridging informal and formal dimensions of business practice, and often underserved minority communities with local and regional small business ecosystems. In our current environment, where federal funds supporting the work of CDFIs are under threat, it is increasingly important to bring attention to their value.

*The research for this post was made possible by a grant from the Wells Fargo Foundation. We thank Victor Burrola, who leads Wells Fargo’s philanthropy in the Greater Washington DC region, for his support throughout.

Leave a comment

by clalsstaff on March 27, 2025 • Permalink

Posted in United States

Tagged business, Economy, entrepreneurship, finance, grants, news

Posted by clalsstaff on March 27, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/03/27/community-development/

Search for:
Pages
- About
- Meet the Staff
Categories
Categories
Follow Blog via Email

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Email Address:

Join 10.1K other subscribers

Center for Latin American & Latino Studies Website
- Visit the CLALS Website
Visit the Clals Facebook Page

Visit the Clals Facebook Page
Follow Us on Twitter
Tweets by AU_CLALS
Related Links
Media Links
- Visit the CLALS Website
Other Latin American Studies Blogs
Tags
access Accountability & Corruption Armed groups asylum asylum-seekers borders Brazil Business & Finance China Civil Society Constitutions COVID-19 Crime & Violence Cuba Culture Democratic Governance Development Dictatorship Diplomacy donald-trump economics Economy Ecuador Education Elections Elites El Salvador Energy Environment & Climate espanol featured finance Gender global-inequality Health Care history Human Rights Illicit Drugs Immigration Immigration (U.S.) indigenous Indigenous Peoples inequality joe-biden Journalism Judicial System kamala-harris Labor latin-america Latinx legislation LGBTQ Mexico Migration Military news Northern Triangle Organization of American States Organized Crime Peace & Conflict Resolution policy politica Politics Poverty & Inequality refugees Regional Relations Religion Socialism Taxation Technology Tourism Trade trump United Nations workforce

	Reva Resstack on Faustian Bargain
	abdessamed gtumsila on Beyond the ITT Initiative: How…
	Michael - What is Re… on Growing Numbers of Afghan Migr…
	Michael - Writ of Ha… on What is a migrant? What is ICE…
	Matthew T Rader on Where Is Cuba’s Economic…

AULA Blog

All posts tagged Economy

Understanding Deportation for Children, Teens, and Their Parents

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks

The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?

Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory

The Rise, Decline, and Crisis of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement

On the U.S. – Argentina Currency Swap

Trapped by Debt? China’s Role in Ecuador Oil Dilemma

Community Development Financial Institutions as Underappreciated Bridging Institutions for Latino Small Business Success

Pages

Categories

Follow Blog via Email

Recent Comments

Center for Latin American & Latino Studies Website

Visit the Clals Facebook Page

Follow Us on Twitter

Related Links

Media Links

Other Latin American Studies Blogs

Tags