El Salvador: End of TPS Will Challenge Government and Society

By Jayesh Rathod and Dennis Stinchcomb

People wade through knee-deep water

Flooding in Jiquilisco, El Salvador / Global Water Partnership / Flickr / Creative Commons

The Trump Administration’s end of Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans in the United States next year potentially will drop some 200,000 people into an environment in which basic needs, including personal security, cannot be met.  TPS for Salvadorans was first granted in 2001 after earthquakes caused “environmental disaster and substantial disruption of living conditions,” but subsequent 18-month extensions have been based on a broad range of factors.  On 11 occasions over the past 16 years, Washington has cited the lack of infrastructure, food, housing, and health care and slow economic growth as reasons for continuing TPS for Salvadorans.  Violence, corruption, and impunity as well as limited state capacity to combat them were also key reasons.  Statements by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announcing the policy change this week make limited mention of these factors, but numerous experts, including those contributing to a recent joint report by CLALS, The Washington College of Law, and the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI), concluded that El Salvador remains unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals.

  • Despite a decline in its national homicide rate, El Salvador remains the most violent country in the hemisphere. While the government espouses a narrative of progress, other indicators make clear that improvement on the security front has been limited, if not altogether absent.  Extraordinary security measures have coincided with increased allegations of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by both security officers and civilian self-defense groups.  Citizens’ pursuit of safety has made El Salvador the second-ranking country in the world of new displacements relative to population size.  Widespread corruption and weak rule of law contribute to impunity and abuse.
  • El Salvador remains extremely vulnerable to natural disasters – experiencing three major earthquakes since July 2016 and deadly torrential rains throughout 2017. El Salvador consistently remains Central America’s slowest growing economy, and under-employment affects more than one quarter of the labor force.  (That percentage will increase to roughly a third if TPS beneficiaries return to their homeland.)  The country has the highest deficit in adequate drinking water in the region.  Six out of 10 families who live there lack adequate housing.

The Salvadoran government is trying to put the best possible face on decision to terminate TPS, which it had previously lobbied against forcefully.  On January 8, the Foreign Ministry expressed “thanks to the government of the United States” for “postponing” the end of TPS for 18 months because it acknowledged the contribution of Salvadorans to the U.S. economy, culture, and society.  The government also thanked various non-governmental actors for supporting the “renewal” of TPS.  In closing, however, the government reiterated its commitment to push “alternatives” in the U.S. Congress that would promote Salvadorans’ “migratory stability” in the United States.

  • Think tanks and humanitarian organizations in Washington have condemned the Trump measure. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) said ending TPS is a “senseless and inhumane policy.”  The Inter-American Dialogue notes that the Salvadoran MS-13 gang – one of President Trump’s most-stated enemies – will be a “primary beneficiary.”  Some fear that returnees, because of their perceived wealth, will be targets for extortion and other criminal activity at the hands of gangs.  A number of observers say that the resulting increase in instability in El Salvador will trigger more illegal migration into the United States.

Ending TPS for Salvadorans casts a shadow of uncertainty over the lives of 200,000 law-abiding, tax-paying migrants – half of whom have lived in the United States for more than 20 years and a third of whom have homes with mortgages, according to estimates.  That same uncertainty extends to TPS beneficiaries’ families, which include 192,000 U.S. citizen children. The Salvadoran government’s statement dodges the key issues of whether it can accommodate the influx of returnees and the loss of a significant portion of the roughly $4.5 billion (equivalent to 17 percent of El Salvador’s GDP) they send home each year.  There is no evidence that it can provide even basic protection for the returnees.  The Foreign Ministry’s unctuous thanks for Washington’s “extension” of TPS until the Salvadorans lose their status in 18 months suggests a mysterious confidence that the U.S. Congress will carve out exceptions for its compatriots in the United States.  However desirable that scenario might be, there’s precious little evidence that the U.S. legislature’s current leaders, who have shown support for most of Trump’s anti-migrant agenda, will help avoid the train wreck that Trump has now set in motion.

Click here for an in-depth review published by CLALS, The Washington College of Law, and ICEFI on the rationale behind TPS since 2001 and continuing need for protection.

January 10, 2018

Mexico: Racing Against Trump’s Immigration Crackdown

By Carlos Díaz Barriga*

Border crossing Mex-US

Southwest border crossing. / U.S. Customs and Border Protection / Flickr / Creative Commons

U.S. President Donald Trump’s failure in his first 100 days to fulfill his most aggressive campaign promises affecting bilateral relations may have calmed nerves in Mexico, but the Peña Nieto Administration is moving ahead with efforts to mitigate the impact of thousands of returning immigrants.  Trump apparently has given up on making Mexico pay for his proposed border wall, and the U.S. Congress doesn’t want to foot the bill either.  He has also toned down his threats to pull out of NAFTA – “the worst trade deal ever” – and seems to be edging toward a more modest renegotiation.  But one pledge the Administration seems eager to meet is ramping up deportations of undocumented immigrants from Mexico.  Trump is not immediately deporting the millions of “bad hombres,” as he initially promised, but he is steadily deporting thousands, including many who do not have criminal records in the U.S.  There are even stories of Trump supporters shocked at the deportation of law-abiding and tax-paying business owners.  Moreover, while he assured Dreamers – youths brought to the United States as children – to “rest easy,” there are reports of U.S. immigration detaining some of these working and tax-paying youth.

The threat of mass deportations involving millions still looms large, and Trump’s unpredictability to settle on a course of action is increasing pressure on Mexican officials to act fast to mitigate the impact of the returning immigrants.

  • At its consulates in the United States, the government is actively helping those at risk of being deported, providing legal services to ensure due process in locales as far-ranging as Indianapolis and New Orleans. Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray continues to confidently declare that Mexico will fight for immigrants and stand up to U.S. immigration authorities.  (He has also cast it as a human rights issue, spurring accusations of hypocrisy from critics concerned about Mexico’s treatment of Central American migrants.)
  • President Peña Nieto has enacted a reform to the General Law of Public Education facilitating Dreamers’ entry into Mexico’s education system, accrediting their U.S. education and helping those without proper Mexican documentation. Critics have called his public appearance with deportees opportunistic, a ploy to get much-needed positive media coverage, but the measures like those in education have real benefit for returnees.
  • Specific industries in Mexico are looking for specialized workers in the returning immigrants. The Mexican Association of Armored Vehicles (AMBA) estimated the availability of 50,000 thousand jobs for deportees in the areas of private security, armored car manufacturing, and transportation of valuables.  As violent crimes have risen again in Mexico, this industry is in need of workers.  Call centers are also actively recruiting.  Their only requisite is fluency in English; no other experience is necessary.

Many Mexicans’ perception of Trump as unpredictable and erratic tempers any optimism about bilateral relations even though Foreign Minister Videgaray seems to have established a viable dialogue with Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.  The return of the deported immigrants is an area in which the government is being given a second opportunity to show compassion for citizens.  The migrants left Mexico for concrete reasons, however, and some are questioning whether Peña Nieto’s administration will be able to address them.  Providing legal assistance to those at risk of deportation and facilitating education for Dreamers are important gestures, but they do not offer a viable long-term strategy.  The bigger picture is still suddenly having millions of Mexicans back in the country with no job prospects.  Trump’s delays on the border wall and mass deportations give the Mexican government time to come up with effective solutions, but such a massive disruption, especially coupled with the uncertainty over the future of NAFTA and the Mexican economy, is probably too much for any government to handle.

May 12, 2017

* Carlos Díaz Barriga is a CLALS Graduate Fellow.

The Cataclysm that the Latino Vote Couldn’t Stop

By Eric Hershberg

ft_16-11-09_exitpolls_race_ethnicity

Presidential candidate preference, by race or ethnicity / Pew Research Center

In unprecedented numbers, Latino voters flexed their muscles in the bitter and destructive U.S. presidential campaign, but that wasn’t enough to elect a competent but mistrusted centrist and block an erratic TV showman espousing policies anathema to their interests.  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lost in the electoral college, which in the American system is what actually matters, but she won the popular vote by a slim margin – little consolation to Latinos.  Donald Trump and the forces that will accompany him into the Executive branch have pledged to begin efforts to deport millions of undocumented immigrants, build walls to keep Latin Americans out of the country, and reverse decades of policies meant to strengthen ties among the Americas.  The election highlighted deep cleavages in U.S. democracy:

  • An inclusive coalition of the well-educated, urban dwellers, youth, and racial and ethnic minorities lost to a bloc of angry white working-class, rural, and small-town voters rallied by a man whose behavior and rhetoric were called repugnant by leaders of even his own party. The outcome testifies to the degree to which vast segments of the American population feel ignored and denigrated by political and cultural elites and alienated by profound social changes that accelerated during the Obama administration, including shifts regarding such issues as gender and sexual identity and, particularly, racial diversity and empowerment.
  • The Trump-led “whitelash” has been largely rhetorical up to this point, but it will soon be manifested in public policies with life-changing consequences for immigrants, minority populations, and impoverished citizens. There’s a possibility that, once charged with running the country, the Trump faction will moderate on some issues, but it’s frightening to recall that no fewer than 37 percent of German voters mobilized behind an analogous cocktail of racial resentment and violent impulses in 1932.  In 2016, nearly half of the American electorate did just that, with profound implications for civil discourse, tolerance, and respect for sometimes marginalized sectors of the country’s population. If Trump’s exclusionary rhetoric becomes translated into concrete policies that diminish the country’s diversity, the U.S. will lose its status as among the most dynamic and creative places in the world.

The Latino vote was expected to be among the decisive factors that would sweep Clinton into the White House and swing the Senate back to Democratic control, albeit by the slimmest of margins.  But while it was influential, diminishing Trump’s margin of victory in reliable Republican strongholds such as Arizona and Texas, and enabling the Democrats to eke out victories in states such as Nevada, New Mexico, and Colorado, the Latino vote was insufficient to rescue Clinton’s fortunes in the pivotal states of Florida and North Carolina.  Whereas in 2012 Obama had an estimated 71-27 percent advantage among Latinos against his opponent, Clinton failed to match that total – exit polls indicate roughly a 65-29 percent split – even against a candidate explicitly targeting Latino interests.  Trump called for mass deportations of the country’s 10 million undocumented Latino residents and a rollback of the Obama administration’s efforts to provide safe haven and legal status for at least half of this vulnerable segment of American communities.  Whatever the reasons for their low participation, these communities now confront existential threats.

  • If Trump follows through on his promises, the impact will be manifested in numerous domains beyond immigration and related human rights that have profound implications for the welfare of U.S. Latinos, including the composition of the Supreme Court and its commitment to voting rights; protection against discrimination in employment, housing, and financial services; access to health care for 20 million people who for the first time gained coverage through the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”); opportunities for pre-school and tertiary education; and environmental regulations needed to protect public safety and health.

Political scientists and informed citizens must now revisit their assumptions about the impact that a growing Latino population may have on the outcome of presidential elections.  The gap separating the two parties in terms of Latino preferences is vast and increasingly consolidated, suggesting an enormous and enduring disadvantage for the Republicans.  But whether the Latino vote can become a decisive, rather than merely influential, component of the electorate is much less certain.  The anger among white voters – at least this time around – carried the day.  This “whitelash” may or may not be a transitory phenomenon, but the prospects for efforts to make the United States a force for good in the world, and to make government an agent for social and economic justice for all, will depend in large part on the future mobilization of the Latino community.  Arguably, the future of the United States – and by extension the world’s – hinges on the capacity of Latino voters to make America great again.

November 10, 2016

Tim Kaine: Boon for Latin America Policy?

By Tom Long*

Tim Kaine

Photo Credit: Disney | ABC Television Group / Flickr / Creative Commons

U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s vice-presidential nominee, Virginia Senator Tim Kaine, may help her politically in the November election, and his potential influence on U.S. policy toward Latin America could be extremely important over the long haul.  Though Kaine’s Latin American experience likely was a secondary consideration in his selection, it is consistent with the role of the office of the vice president that has emerged during the Obama Administration as a center for serious policy initiatives in the Americas.

  • Kaine spent nine months in El Progreso, Honduras, as a young man working at a high school founded by Jesuit missionaries; he learned Spanish there and frequently mentions the period as formative. His approach to the region and immigration seems anchored in a focus on human dignity and belies an understanding of the difficult circumstances many there face.  El Progreso is close to San Pedro Sula, which has been a center of the country’s staggering violence and emigration.  In the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Kaine wrote that when unaccompanied minors arrived to the U.S. border in unprecedented numbers, “I felt as if I knew them.”
  • As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kaine has developed a rare policy focus on Honduras. He has pressed the U.S. and Honduran governments on issues of human rights in the wake of the 2009 coup.  In 2013, Kaine urged Secretary of State John Kerry for stronger U.S. support for elections.  Just two weeks ago, he called on Honduran President Hernández for greater effort on justice in the killing of environmental activist Berta Cáceres.
  • Kaine has placed immigration policy at the confluence of foreign and domestic policy. He has pressed President Obama to halt “deportation raids targeting families and unaccompanied minors who have fled the rampant violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle.”
  • Kaine’s political rhetoric often reflects his Jesuit background, and his Catholicism-inspired references to social justice – and his warm welcome for Pope Francis – are likely to earn him an empathetic ear among many throughout Latin America.

Vice-presidential leadership for the Americas offers an important opportunity – and one that Tim Kaine, if elected, is likely to use wisely.  He has complained that Washington usually pays attention to Latin America only in moments of crisis, and has argued the region should get similar priority as China, Russia, or the Middle East.  He would build on efforts initiated by Vice President Joe Biden, who has chaired a “High Level Economic Dialogue” with Mexico and pushed for the $750 million “Alliance for Prosperity” in Central America.  Kaine would be an asset in relationships that often fuse international and domestic policy, slicing across the domains of myriad departments and agencies.  While Kaine’s personal interest and positive relationships don’t guarantee policy successes on migration, drug policy, citizen security, and development assistance as vice president, his language skills and reputation for treating colleagues with respect all but guarantee a warm reception from leaders of countries long aggrieved by U.S. highhandedness. 

August 2, 2016

*Tom Long is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (UK) and an Affiliated Professor at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City.  He is the author of Latin America Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence, published last year by Cambridge University Press.

U.S. Immigration: In Need of Procedural Reform Too

By Maya Barak*

Photo Credit: Victoria Pickering / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Victoria Pickering / Flickr / Creative Commons

Migrants appear unlikely to get relief soon from President Obama’s appeal to the Supreme Court to overturn the November decision of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans to continue blocking his 2014 executive actions on immigration.  With the injunction still in place, the President cannot go ahead with expansion of the President’s programs for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the creation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).  Assuming that the court will grant the case a writ of certiorari (which is not certain), it is unlikely to hear it before June 2016 – at the height of the U.S. presidential campaign.  Furthermore, as AULABLOG has reported, even if the Supreme Court upholds the President’s authorities on DACA and DAPA, it would also be confirming his successor’s power to reverse them.  The next President could easily terminate these actions, leaving many DACA and DAPA recipients in a precarious legal state.  Immigrants, activists, and scholars alike are following the Democratic and Republican primaries with baited breath.

While the uncertainty demoralizes immigrants and their attorneys, so too do the many procedural problems they face.  In 45 in-depth interviews I have conducted over the past two years with Central American immigrants and their lawyers, the need for procedural reform ranked high among the concerns of attorneys.

  • The processes of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or “immigration court,” are the subject of strident complaints. Good and affordable legal representation and guidance are lacking.  Cultural and linguistic barriers preclude adequate communication between immigrants and judges in the courtroom, as well as between immigrants and asylum officers.  Videoteleconferences during removal (deportation) hearings, wherein the immigrant – and in some cases the judge – appear in a “virtual” courtroom via a two-way video, are often characterized by poor sound quality and shoddy images.
  • Detention during removal proceedings pose particularly serious difficulties for migrants and their attorneys. Accessing legal representation, case information, and necessary documents such as passports or birth certificates is extremely difficult.  Detention centers are often in distant rural areas, far from attorneys.
  • Immigration court backlogs have skyrocketed in recent years, with many courts scheduling hearings as far out as 2020 – forcing immigrants to put their lives “on hold,” unable to obtain a driver’s license or permission to work.

Despite these problems, immigrants say they feel listened to and respected by interpreters, judges, and government attorneys, which increases their belief in the legitimacy of the immigration system.  As problematic as the procedural issues are, immigrants’ greatest concern is that U.S. law as it currently stands does not afford the vast majority pathways to legalization.  Immigrants who truly want to be law-abiding – attracted to the U.S. because it is a country where the “rule of law” exists – regret that they must violate the law to escape the violent and unstable countries from which they come.  Immigration reform and procedural reform are complementary objectives and should go hand-in-hand.  While attorneys’ fixation with due process is understandable, so are immigrants’ desires for a chance to fully (and legally) participate in American society.  Just as U.S. political infighting has prevented comprehensive immigration reform and delayed – and could kill – implementation of DAPA and DACA, so too do the prospects for procedural reforms look bleak as the country enters an extremely political year.

January 14, 2016

* Maya Barak is a PhD candidate at American University’s School of Public Affairs specializing in Justice, Law and Criminology.

Judicial Activism Prolongs Immigrants’ Angst

By Maya Barak*

Photo Credit: Justin Valas and David Schexnaydre / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Justin Valas and David Schexnaydre / Flickr / Creative Commons

Legal maneuvering to block President Obama’s executive actions on immigration is keeping up to 4 million undocumented immigrants in limbo and, with the U.S. election campaign gaining momentum, dims prospects for them to participate in society more fully and openly anytime soon.  Texas and 25 other states filed suit in February hoping to overturn Obama’s expansion of his 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and creation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).  A panel of three judges for the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (New Orleans), one of the most conservative courts in the country, heard the case in July, but the case is still pending – and the court’s temporary injunction remains in place.  Observers call their behavior judicial activism because the panel has deliberately eschewed its normal practice of 60-day decisions in order to prevent a rapid appeal by the Obama administration from reaching the Supreme Court during the Court’s current term.  The deadline for appeals to the Supreme Court was October 23.

If the courts – the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (unlikely) or the Supreme Court (unknown), ultimately decide in favor of the Obama orders, DACA and DAPA would permit undocumented immigrants who entered the U.S. prior to 16 years of age and have lived in the U.S. continuously since 2010, along with eligible parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, to apply for temporary relief from removal (deportation) and a work permit for three years.  In any case, the next President, who takes office in January 2017, could terminate the actions, throwing applicants for DACA and DAPA protections back into a precarious legal state – with their identities and whereabouts registered with immigration authorities and lacking relief from deportability.  A Central American asylee told me his immigration process, if all goes well, will have taken him 21 years.  “That’s a lifetime,” he said.  “To really feel like a citizen, like this is my home, that they can’t kick me out … So that’s where the system is failing me, is failing us.”

The delay for President Obama’s executive actions to take effect is just one of many lengthy waits individuals, both with and without legal status, experience while caught up in the U.S. immigration system.  Wait times for visa applicants can extend into the double digits – more than 20 years for family-sponsored visas for Filipinos, for example.  Not only are the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the State Department, which are primarily responsible for visa processing, backed up; the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the nation’s immigration court system, is experiencing multi-year delays as well.  Fifty-nine immigration courts handle an average of 300,000-400,000 cases per year.  Detained immigrants spend months in detention waiting for hearing continuances and final hearings, while non-detained immigrants spend years awaiting their final case outcomes.  These individuals are forced to put their lives on hold, not sure if they will be allowed to stay or forced to leave, many unable to obtain work permits or driver’s licenses.  The expansion of DACA and creation of DAPA would alleviate some of the tension on America’s overburdened immigration system while individuals around the country and the world await meaningful and comprehensive immigration reform.  In the meantime, agencies managing U.S. immigration have little incentive and too few resources to speed up processing.  Like millions of immigrants, they are simply biding time.

October 29, 2015

* Maya Barak is  PhD candidate at American University’s School of Public Affairs specializing in Justice, Law and Criminology.

Haiti and Dominican Republic: No Détente in Sight

By Emma Fawcett*

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Tensions stemming from the Dominican Republic’s forced repatriation of Haitians are spilling over into other aspects of the traditionally problematic relations between the two countries, with little prospect of resolution.  Over the summer, the Dominican Republic began a forced repatriation process for Haitians who did not comply with its 2014 National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners.  After a temporary suspension prompted by international outrage, deportations resumed on August 15 at a rate of 50 to 100 per day, and the International Organization for Migration reports that many more Haitians are “spontaneously returning.”  Of the half million previously found to be without residency permits, about 288,000 people registered for the regularization process –180,000 of whom were rejected and are likely to be repatriated.  According to Amnesty International, 27 percent of those who have left voluntarily say they were born in the Dominican Republic, but they fear arrest or harassment because they lack proper documentation.  At least four camps filled with recent deportees have sprung up on the Haitian side of the border, and the United Nations Human Rights Council has warned that conditions are abysmal and sanitation facilities inadequate.  The Haitian government has promised to assist in resettlement efforts, but there has been no coordinated response.  At the Tête à l’Eau camp, the government initially provided $30 in assistance to deportees, but ran out of funds.

In retaliation, Haiti on October 1 began enforcing a ban on the overland importation of 23 Dominican goods, including wheat flour, cooking oil, and soap.  These products must now enter by boat or plane to Port-au-Prince or Cap Haïtien.  Smugglers found in violation of the new regulation will have their goods confiscated.  Originally announced a year ago as a way of increasing customs revenue and reducing smuggling, the measure is expected to cause prices for staples to increase by up to 40 percent in Haiti and will cost the Dominican Republic $500 million in trade revenue.  A Dominican Chamber of Commerce official noted that the measure “violates norms of free bilateral commerce and international agreements.”  Market women who run much of Haiti’s informal economy by acquiring goods across the border and bringing them home to sell have already faced difficulties since the Dominican immigration crackdown began, and the trade ban poses a further threat to their livelihoods and those of their customers.  The Association of Haitian Industry (ADIH) hopes that the measure will improve demand for domestic products.  The Dominican government and businesses have argued that trade and migration issues should remain separate matters.

The new, slower pace of deportations has allowed the Dominican government to continue with their original strategy while avoiding further media attention and threats to their tourism industry.  Ongoing presidential campaigns in both countries – with Haiti’s elections on October 25 and Dominican President Medina seeking reelection next May – have made the antagonism politically useful for both.  However, the heaviest costs, including deportations, resettlement in makeshift camps, and potentially dramatic increases in food prices, are, as usual, borne by Haiti’s poorest.  A recent World Bank report on Haiti noted that “a social contract is missing between the State and its citizens,” and the Haitian government’s inability to provide for returnees and short-sighted trade policy is clear evidence of that.  The international community – the OAS in particular – has made serious missteps in its efforts to encourage bilateral talks, including a call for dialogue by OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro that was misinterpreted as a call for the unification of Hispaniola.  In response, the Dominican press has doubled down on its inflammatory rhetoric.  Neither side sees advantage to ending the stalemate, at least until after the Haitian electoral process has concluded. 

October 6, 2015

*Emma Fawcett is a PhD candidate in International Relations at American University.  Her doctoral thesis focuses on the political economy of tourism and development in four Caribbean case studies: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Mexican Caribbean.

 

U.S. Government Abuse of Apprehended Migrants

By Michael S. Danielson*

Photo Credits: Larry Hanelin, Kino  Border Initiative, 2015.  All Rights Reserved.

Photo Credits: Larry Hanelin, Kino Border Initiative, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is not fulfilling its obligation to protect the civil and human rights of migrants apprehended, detained and deported back to Mexico.  A study released this week entitled “Our Values on the Line: Migrant Abuse and Family Separation at the Border” (full text) found that more than one-third of deported migrants experienced some type of abuse or mistreatment at the hands of U.S. immigration authorities.  The abuses included theft, physical abuse, verbal abuse, and inhumane detention conditions.  In violation of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy, these conditions include but are not limited to being held for over 12 hours in facilities without beds, overcrowding, excessively low temperatures, lack of adequate food, and denial of medical treatment.  Commissioned by the Jesuit Conference of Canada and the United States and the Kino Border Initiative (KBI), the report details the results of an in-depth survey of 358 Mexican migrants deported from the United States to the border city of Nogales, Mexico, from July 2014 to March 2015 – and corroborated by short-form surveys of 7,507 other migrants in the same area.

  • Since 2005 CBP has sought to deter Mexican migrants from attempting to enter the U.S. through a policy of “enforcement with consequences.” Formally launched in 2011 as the “Consequence Delivery System,” this package consists of measures against individual migrants that are so harsh as to be obviously intended to cause hardship and suffering.  In so doing, Border Patrol has abrogated its previous commitment, undertaken in 2004, to use its authorities to preserve family unity and ensure humane treatment of apprehended migrants.  Making things worse, Border Patrol agents often incorrectly enter names into computer databases, deny access to phone calls, and deny access to the individual’s consulate.
  • Two out of three migrants surveyed who crossed into the U.S. with immediate family members and apprehended together by the Border Patrol were separated from each other and deported to different ports of entry days, weeks, or months apart.
  • Twenty-eight percent of migrants surveyed were deported at night – to Nogales and other destinations with high levels of violence – making them particularly vulnerable to abuse by criminals and corrupt police and other public officials. One of every seven women was placed in this vulnerable position.
  • Migrants alleging abuse were unlikely to file a formal complaint. Less than one out of every 12 deported migrants in the survey claiming some type of abuse filed a complaint with U.S. immigration authorities.  Reasons for not filing a complaint include being unaware of the right to do so, fear of retaliation, and a belief that it would not make any difference.
  • The abuses were not carried out by “a few bad apples,” but rather reflected policies across Border Patrol and poor oversight of their implementation. The patterns of abuses are too extensive to argue otherwise.

Punitive border enforcement punishes people whose suffering in their home countries had already grown unbearable, and there is no evidence that these policies deter unauthorized immigration.  In fact, a recent report of the DHS Inspector General found that the CBP has failed to accurately measure the deterrent effect and the cost-effectiveness of the core policies of the Consequence Delivery System.  Evidence is much stronger of the negative and unintended consequences of these policies, both for migrants and border security.  In personal communication presented in the report, CBP’s former Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs James Tomsheck attests that an attempt to enhance the enforcement capacity of the agency through a hiring surge of some 12,000 new agents in just over two years was marred by a predictable deterioration of the vetting process and a sharp and consistent decline in “the quality and suitability of the Border Patrol applicant pool.”  This new report points to several key areas for reform to help limit abuse by Border Patrol agents, including stronger independent and internal oversight mechanisms to tackle misconduct and abuse; an accessible and accountable complaint process; an overhaul of CBP training; equipping CBP agents with body-worn cameras; and improving CBP short-term detention conditions.  The study also recommends that deportations to Mexican border towns occur only during daylight hours and that DHS, responsible for CBP, put in place a process to identify family relationships and preserve family unity upon deportation.  Such measures would begin to address the most pressing problems faced by migrants and their families – without triggering a spike in migrant traffic.

September 17, 2015

*Michael S. Danielson, a CLALS Research Fellow, was the principal researcher and drafter of the report.

Dominican Republic: Heavy-handed Migration Policies

By Emma Fawcett*

Haitian sugarcane collectors in Dominican Republic. Photo Credit: El Marto / Flickr / Creative Commons

Haitian sugarcane collectors in Dominican Republic. Photo Credit: El Marto / Flickr / Creative Commons

The government of the Dominican Republic has not yet begun massive forced repatriations of the potentially 200,000 Haitians who have failed to comply with its “National Plan for Regularization of Foreigners,” but its plans to conduct sweeps for undocumented persons and put them in processing centers are already causing fear.  Last Wednesday evening marked the ominous deadline for those without legal residency to register in a process that began following a 2013 Tribunal Constitucional decision that Haitian descendants born in the Dominican Republic after 1929 did not qualify for Dominican citizenship.  After a barrage of international outrage at the prospect that hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent risked statelessness, President Danilo Medina and the Dominican Congress took action to create a path to citizenship for some and offer regularized – but temporary – residency to those who can prove they lived in the country before October 2011.

The Regularization Plan affects an estimated 524,000 people, including some 460,000 that a survey by the Ministry of the Economy in 2012 found were in the country without residency permits.  An estimated 250,000 people have started registration processes, but local media report that only 10,000 of them have all the necessary documents – including Haitian passports that are slow and expensive to get – and only 300 have received their temporary residency permits.  Applicants cannot be deported while their cases are evaluated, but there have already been reported instances of indiscriminate deportations.  Long lines outside the Ministry of Interior – with waits of up to 15 days – have frustrated many who tried to register.  Those who have already registered have been asked to carry their documentation at all times, to avoid difficulties with Police and Army patrols targeting Haitian neighborhoods armed with clubs and Tasers.  Amnesty International and other observers have called on the government to respect human rights, but there is widespread fear that, once international attention diminishes, many thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent will be forcibly deported.  The fear is already driving hundreds of voluntary departures.

Dominicans have relied on Haitian migrant labor for generations, and many of those without documentation were born in the Dominican Republic, speak only Spanish, and have no ties to Haiti.  Pogroms against Haitian descendants are not unprecedented either – most infamously when Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1937 ordered attacks on Haitians living along the border, killing an estimated 35,000 in less than a week.  Dominican officials appear committed to preventing such gross violations now and claim that their immigration policies are more forgiving than elsewhere in the region.  While Haitian President Michel Martelly has said that the country “is ready to receive with dignity our sons, our brothers,” his government’s obvious inability to help the repatriates raises the prospect that a humanitarian crisis will result.  In a nationwide address the night that the Regularization Plan registration expired, Dominican President Medina spoke of his intention to run for a second term, not about the wrenching experience some half-million persons in the country were about to face.  Taking on Haitian immigration is a popular way for Dominican politicians to pander to the electorate, drumming up support from the working class and reminding voters that the country once suffered under Haitian rule, from 1822-1844.  With the world watching, a Trujillo-era ethnic cleansing seems unlikely, but the fate of hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent hangs in the balance.  

June 22, 2015

*Emma Fawcett is a PhD candidate in International Relations at American University.  Her doctoral thesis focuses on the political economy of tourism and development in four Caribbean case studies: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Mexican Caribbean.

U.S. Immigration Reform: Stuck Again

By Aaron T. Bell

Steve Rhodes / Flickr / Creative Commons

Steve Rhodes / Flickr / Creative Commons

Opponents of the Obama administration’s executive actions on immigration – measures the President announced last November – have successfully blocked their implementation, setting the stage for a renewed political battle over the issue during next year’s U.S. elections.  Citing frustration with congressional inaction on immigration, Obama had announced that he would use his authority to expand the age limit of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which temporarily defers deportation and allows undocumented immigrants to work, and to create a similar program for the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and permanent residents.  Twenty-six states, led by Texas, filed a lawsuit in response, claiming that Obama violated a constitutional requirement to enforce the law and that he committed a technical violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  On February 16, the day before DACA was set to expand, a federal judge in Texas issued an injunction on the executive action programs.  The administration filed for a temporary stay of the injunction, which would allow it to begin implementing the programs while the court weighed their legality, but two weeks ago a Court of Appeals panel turned it down.  A long legal process in the 5th Circuit Appeals Court (based in Louisiana) will follow.

Despite this setback, recent precedents suggest that the Administration may yet win its case.  Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, an outspoken opponent of reform, filed a lawsuit against the administration shortly after Obama announced his executive action, but a federal judge threw out the case in December on the grounds that Arpaio had not suffered direct injury from these actions and was thus ineligible to file suit.  Two months ago the 5th Circuit, which has a conservative reputation, unanimously dismissed a lawsuit filed by Mississippi and several Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers that challenged the original DACA program.  As in the Arpaio suit, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs lacked legal standing to bring the case, and – rejecting an argument also embraced by the Texas lawsuit that Obama’s executive action will cost taxpayers thousands of dollars in processing fees for driver’s licenses – the court recognized the economic benefits of the DACA program.  Fourteen states and the District of Columbia filed a brief in court in favor of the government’s case arguing that Texas and its co-plaintiffs have underestimated the fiscal benefits of the executive action programs.

Although the Courts may in the end reject the arguments of Obama’s opponents, they can claim at least short-term success.  Implementation has come to a complete halt, and immigration activists worry that the longer the legal process drags out, the less willing undocumented immigrants will be to apply to the programs and increase their risk of future deportation.  A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court may push the executive actions back to mid-2016, reinvigorating immigration reform as a campaign issue just as election season is heating up.  Pew Research announced last week that its most recent polling data show that 72 percent of Americans support a path to legal citizenship for undocumented workers in the country, including 56 percent of Republicans.  Presumptive Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton has already pledged her support for reforms that go further than what Obama has tried to accomplish.  Republican candidates have slammed the President’s executive actions as “overreach” but are divided on where to go from there.  Former Florida governor Jeb Bush and Senator Marco Rubio have expressed support for a legislative replacement for DACA, while Senators Ted Cruz and Rand Paul have said they would make reversing Obama’s executive actions on immigration one of their first acts as president.  Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker recently expressed a desire to limit legal immigration as well in order to protect American jobs. Delaying immigration reform may ultimately put the Republican Party’s candidates in a difficult position next year.  If Obama’s executive action benefits family and friends of tens of thousands of Latino immigrants in the months preceding the November elections, the weak Hispanic voter turnout for Democratic candidates in the 2014 midterms is likely to be replaced by enthusiastic and potentially decisive support for a Democratic presidency, particularly if the Republican candidate focuses on appealing to the party’s nativist faction.

June 6, 2015