By Arturo C. Porzecanski*

Photo Credit: Mauricio Macri / Flickr / Creative Commons

A recently concluded agreement in principle between Argentina and most of its holdout creditors is part of a 180-degree turn in economic policy that the new administration of Mauricio Macri is attempting to make in order to end five years of economic stagnation, 10 years of double-digit inflation, and 15 years of isolation from the international capital markets.  President Macri has to navigate very carefully, however.  First, he does not have a majority in either congressional chamber, so he has to work hard to persuade legislators to support his policy initiatives.  Second, the judiciary and the Executive branch are packed with political appointees from the Néstor and Cristina Kirchner administrations, and while some of them have been fired, Macri and his economic team must still tread cautiously.  Third, all the key economic institutions, such as the government’s commercial and development bank (BNA), the central bank (BCRA), and the social security administration (ANSES) have been stuffed to the gills with either risky or unprofitable assets (from bad loans to government IOUs), thereby compromising their effectiveness.  Last but not least, Macri must be mindful of his very fickle electorate: over the past seven decades, Argentines have periodically voted non-Peronists into office to clean up the mess left behind by the Peronists, but then they have soured and yanked their support.  It is a sobering fact that not a single non-Peronist government has ever made it to the end of its constitutional term in office.

This is why the Macri administration is going for some “quick wins” rather than for major structural reforms or the necessary dose of fiscal austerity and monetary restraint.  And this is the context within which his willingness to “bury the hatchet” with private and official creditors must be understood.  As a former businessman, Macri realizes that if one takes over a money-losing enterprise – in this case the public sector, which is running a deficit equivalent to more than five percent of GDP – one needs to cultivate sources of interim financing until the enterprise can be turned around.  After all, the prior government had been living hand-to-mouth on loans from the BNA, the BCRA, and ANSES, with increasingly inflationary consequences.  Having lost official international reserves and seen the currency depreciate rapidly after abolishing capital controls, the authorities are now under great pressure to obtain interim financing from abroad to help stabilize international reserves and support the weak currency.

President Macri faces a very difficult governance challenge in the months and years ahead.  His ability to mend fences with private creditors – Argentina has been in arrears to all its bondholders since mid-2014 – as well as with the IMF, multilateral development banks, and official creditors such as the Ex-Im banks – is crucial to the restoration of financing to the private and public sectors and the fostering of an investment-friendly climate.  Macri’s agreement in principle with most holdout creditors is a big step in the right direction, but he must now secure the requisite congressional approvals to dismantle Kirchner-era legislation inimical to a settlement and obtain interim financing at reasonable interest rates to clear all overdue debts.  These are early and relatively easy tests for a government that is yet to adopt most of the divisive and unpopular austerity measures that circumstances warrant.

March 10, 2016

*Dr. Porzecanski is Distinguished Economist in Residence at American University and Director of the International Economic Relations Program at the School of International Service.

By Leslie Elliott Armijo

Images Money / Flickr / Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Multiple economic and political challenges have called into question the future status of the U.S. dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency, but backlash from Argentina’s recent spat with the United States over defaulted bonds appears to be fueling interest in reforms that may have beneficial implications.  According to the IMF, some 61 percent of the world’s known foreign exchange reserves held by central banks around the world remain in low-yielding dollar-denominated assets, mainly U.S. Treasury bonds.  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China, and heavyweights in the Global South, including Brazil, are calling for international trade agreements that would give emerging economies “policy space” – allowing national governments to impose capital controls, fund exports, subsidize local industry, and keep financial services national.  Private U.S. banks, however, claim that continued U.S. dominance of world capital markets – a crucial pillar of continued reserve currency status – requires ever more open trade in financial services.  The BRICS complain about the U.S. government’s “exorbitant privilege” as the reserve currency country, with some of the sharpest complaints coming from joint statements by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Chinese officials, though, worried about their own large dollar investments and ambivalent about the implications of renminbi internationalization, more than once have pulled the group toward a softer tone.

Argentina’s ongoing sovereign debt negotiations provide a different window onto the dollar’s reserve currency status.  Like most countries, Argentina has held a large chunk of its government’s savings in the U.S. and hired private U.S. financial institutions as its international bankers.  Today it is trying to extricate itself from U.S. markets and do its saving and financial intermediation elsewhere. Iran and Russia are doing the same, but Argentina has no foreign policy quarrel with the Obama Administration – and is not subject to U.S. financial sanctions over nuclear or military adventurism.  Buenos Aires is among those who chafe at U.S. power through the dollar, but it is primarily motivated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in July to let stand a lower court judgment in favor of investors holding bonds from Argentina’s $82 billion sovereign debt default in December 2001.  Although 92 percent of the original bondholders accepted the Argentine government’s restructured (lower value) bonds in 2005 and 2010, New York Federal District Court Judge Thomas P. Griesa ruled that Argentina’s failure to settle with the holdouts means that any U.S. financial institutions, or their international affiliates, that intermediate funds enabling Argentina to stay current on payments to the majority will themselves be in contempt of court.  This has sent Argentina into “technical default.” Argentina is suing the U.S. in the International Court of Justice (whose jurisdiction the U.S. refuses to recognize) and in the court of global public opinion – pushing, for example, a recent proposal for global financial reform before the U.N. General Assembly. It has also welcomed an $11 billion currency swap agreement with China, and Chinese state banks have since pledged $6.8 billion in new infrastructure loans.  Some observers speculate that the very first loan of the New Development Bank, newly organized by the BRICS countries, could go to Argentina.

The Argentine bond case harms the perceived fairness and credibility of U.S. financial markets and, by extension, the strength of the U.S. dollar because the recent legal judgments seem capricious to many.  Senior figures at the IMF have long supported the routine inclusion in all international sovereign bond issues of a so-called “collective action clause,” which would make any restructuring accepted by two-thirds of bondholders binding on all.  The European Union already has ruled that sovereign bonds issued within the EU, including many for troubled Eastern or Southern European governments, must contain such clauses.  Moreover, the International Capital Markets Association, representing more than 400 of the world’s largest private investment institutions, has just issued a position paper endorsing obligatory collective action clauses, placing it on the same side of this issue as non-governmental organizations advocating financial architecture reform such as the New Rules for Global Finance and the Jubilee Debt Campaign.  This would give taxpayers in emerging economies – the ultimate backstop of the creditworthiness of their governments – the same bankruptcy rights as firms and households.  It is not in the interest of Latin American and other emerging economies for U.S. currency and financial dominance to end anytime soon – a tripolar reserve currency system based on the dollar, euro, and reniminbi does not yet appear able to sustain the worldwide growth and prosperity of recent decades and may in fact entail significant risks – but fairer rules for sovereign financing would benefit everyone.

* Leslie Elliott Armijo is a Visiting Scholar at Portland State University and a Research Fellow at CLALS.  She has just published The Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers: Shield and Sword in Asia and Latin America (London: Palgrave, 2014).

September 23, 2014