All posts tagged Regional Relations

Understanding Deportation for Children, Teens, and Their Parents

By Ernesto Castañeda

If you are a young student in the United States and you are worried that you, a classmate, or a loved one could be deported by ICE agents, as you have seen on social media, TV, or in your neighborhood, this short text is for you.

School dance. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

Why are people in pseudo-military clothes and vests with the initials ICE, HSI, CBP,* and others patrolling the streets and aggressively arresting people in public? It all starts with the popular but dangerous idea that a country must have closed borders, allowing only invited people to pass through. This makes sense for private houses, schools, and other large private institutions, but cities and countries do not work like that. Think about it most people born in the United States can move in their cities, towns, as well as to other cities or towns in the 50 states without having to ask permission from any political authority. They can even move to Guam, the Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico.

*ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement], HSI [Homeland Security Investigations], CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection, agency that houses the Border Patrol which has now also being mobilized to both coast and Chicago] are all immigration enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the current administration other federal and local agencies have also been assigned to help carry out raids and aid in deportation efforts.

People in Any Country Are Not All the Same  

Another dangerous myth is that all the people in a country must share a language, culture, and even look the same, as if related by blood. But countries are not big extended families, so this is a fable. But many adults believe this was true in the past and want it to happen soon in the places where they live. As you know, not everyone is the same. Even within the same family, a student club, or sports team, people have differences that make them who they are.

People in some large cities complain about a few people around them speaking a different language in the streets or having a different religion. This is not new; some people have always done so in any booming city. 

Even While Most People Stay Put Most of the Time, Mobility is Normal 

Many people go to other countries to travel, study, work, or visit family members and friends. Most people get visas, which are permits from a country’s government to visit or move in with permission. People from the United States and Europe rarely need visas to visit other countries, but it is not the same the other way around. People from most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America need vetted visas to visit Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, or Australia. 

In some exceptional cases, people have to leave the countries where they were born because of war or persecution because of their religion, ethnicity, or political views. It may be hard for them to get immigration visas after that. Other countries are supposed to provide refuge, a safe place to stay for groups facing persecution. But many countries’ governments like to look the other way or play hot potato with people.

Work Abroad is Often More Available than Working Papers 

Other people may have informal verbal (spoken) job offers from restaurants, farms, and small businesses in the United States, but they cannot get visas because the people in charge of approving visas in U.S. consulates abroad think those people would stay in the country, and they think they do not have the savings and education to make them “desirable” to come to the United States. These are not necessarily the views of the people approving visas, but the informal instructions they are told to follow by their bosses.  

Nonetheless, some people from towns with a long history of long-distance migration from point A to B have the contacts, paths, and know-how to go to other countries without the U.S. government’s permission. This is what people refer to as “illegal immigration.” 

Remember, we should not use the term illegal to name a person, because a living human being cannot be “illegal,” but people can commit acts that go against the law, in this case, entering another country without getting their passport inspected and stamped. 

“No Human Being is Illegal.”  Elie Wiesel

People without a legal immigration status, who we can call undocumented, are not automatically bad people. They are just caught in a hard and vulnerable situation. Some adults say they should respect the law of a country and “get in line,” but for many of them there is no line to wait in. And for some of the people with close family members legally in the U.S., the wait in line to reunite can be ten years of longer. Therefore, some people live for over a decade away from their parents or minor children. As we recount in the book, Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration.

Middle schoolers playing soccer. Photo by Ernesto Castañeda.

For most of U.S. history, lawyers have not labeled this a crime but more a “civil” infraction, something like a minor driving infraction, such as driving without insurance, or watching a movie without paying a ticket. But in those examples, people are getting something without paying or putting others at potential financial risk. Immigrants come to the U.S. to work, to pay for all of their expenses, those of their family members, and to send money to loved ones who stayed in the places they came from. Preventing people from moving to a country, and more appropriately to a particular city or neighborhood, even if they can pay for their housing, is like public parks or libraries not allowing only certain people in. 

The problem with the label of “illegal” (rude name-calling) is that it conjures or brings together the idea of coming as a family without a visa, along with generalizations and stereotypes that only people who are poor and of different races are “illegal.” That “illegals” are inferior, potentially dangerous criminals, a threat to the homogeneity (looking or being similar) of a country. These all false.

In recent U.S. history, the label of “illegality” has been applied to people from Mexico and Central America with limited English and/or African and indigenous features working in sectors such as agriculture, construction, contracting, food preparation, etc. There are business owners who are undocumented as well as people from Canada and Europe, but it is easier for them “to pass.” 

Immigrants who commit violent crimes are not immune (protected) from being stopped by police and imprisoned. But for many decades, people in the news have said that people without papers are dangerous and taking things from U.S. citizens. Many adults have come to believe this after hearing it so many times. 

Some politicians run for office sometimes with as little as promising to “get rid of” all the undocumented people in a country. This has been the case of President Trump, and he has acted on this words. His team has set ambitious goals to find people without valid visas or immigration permits and to remove them from the country, which is what we call deportations. He and his team campaigned on closing the border to new arrivals, deporting people with criminal convictions, and with the signs and slogans of mass deportation. 

How do you carry out mass deportations quickly in a country with over 350 million people, where less than 3% of the population is undocumented? 

Unlike a classroom, there is no list of everyone living in the U.S. that includes everyone’s immigration status. So, this federal administration is trying to reach its goal is by deporting under any pretext some people who are renewing visas, trying to get papers to stay longer, become citizens, or get protection from deportation because they fear for their safety if they were sent back to dangerous places. 

Another shortcut by ICE is to go to places where many stereotypical potentially undocumented immigrants gather and stop and ask for papers from people based only on their physical appearance, job, and accent. (Lawyers call this racial profiling).

Communities with many Latinos are specially afraid about deportations hitting close to home. Over 68,000 people are in immigration detention centers at the end, so of them will be let go after proving they are citizens or have valid permits. Many others will eventually be deported without their family members. 

Because of this, families with undocumented members are afraid of spending time in public and may always fear it may be their last day together. So, it is important to be patient and supportive of people who could be in that situation. It is understandable if your classmates or even friends do not want to talk about this. Their parents may have told them not to share their immigration status or that of their parents, afraid that it could be used against them. Many live with the continuous fear that an enemy could call la migra (ICE) on them. The have lived with this fear sometimes for decades.

ICE Arrests from Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

People who are undocumented have to try to act perfectly

Afraid about her only daughter being caught by surprise, an interviewee we talked to confidentially, recounts that she told her 13-year-old daughter this year that she was “illegal,” and that she should be careful not to skip class, misbehave, or even think about experimenting with illegal drugs, alcohol, or marijuana because this could cause her deportation and that of her mother and maybe other family members too. 

She had never before realized she was undocumented; she thought she was like anyone else in her class, and she is and so she is at risk of deportation. She cannot help but be worried, but how worried should her best friends be? Well, there were around 11 million individuals who were undocumented when Trump became president again on January 20, 2025. Because of changes to immigration laws, procedures, and programs, there may be 14 million people out of status a the end of 2026. 

In 2025, the Trump admin, with its aggressive policing, raiding, and detaining, forcibly deported between 200k and 600k people. Self-deportation is a luxury that many immigrants do not have. The official estimates for this are not credible. 

So, let’s do some simple math for the probability of being forcible deported by DHS by dividing the maximum estimate for 2025 deportation by a medium-high estimate for the number of undocumented: 600,000/14,000,000=.04 or 4%. This is the probability that an undocumented person is deported each year that these mass deportation goals continue along with large federal agent deployments and police collaboration in some localities [287(g) agreements]. The probability of being detained while attending an immigration court appointment is also low. So, while it is possible this may happen to you, your mom, or your friend, most immigrants won’t be deported. Clearly, the likelihood varies by location. In some places, other certain groups are targeted, like Somalis in the Twin Cities recently. But detaining people and deporting them in this way is very expensive, damaging for the U.S. economy and society, and currently very unpopular. Over 60% percent of U.S. adults oppose these policies. Tell the people you know in this situation not to despair or give up.

Deportation by City. Immigration Enforcement Dashboard

Despite sad cases about children receiving cancer treatment, nurses and care worker women being deported, the numbers show that, because of profiling, most of the people deported are working-age men from Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras. Over 70% of them have no criminal record whatsoever, and only a very small percentage have a violent crime conviction. Meaning most people are innocent hard workers, fathers, sons, but they have been deported because they look like the stereotype. There are good and bad people everywhere. This may remind you of why some teachers and adults may tell you the importance of not generalizing, not falling for common stereotypes and prejudices, and of getting to know people from all backgrounds and with origins in all parts of the world. Learning how to put yourself in their shoes is the best way to understand them, comfort them, and protect them, in the future, by changing the way we aim to deal with undocumented immigration, not by mass deportations or having people afraid of deportation, but by giving them a way to become documented through new laws voted in Congress. Your care and your voice matter.

Ernesto Castañeda is a Professor at American University, where he leads the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. He has been studying immigration scientifically for over 20 years and has written many books on the subject, among them “Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration” and “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.”

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by clalsstaff on December 29, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on December 29, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/29/understanding-deportation-for-children-teens-and-their-parents/

What is behind the US Escalation of Threats against Venezuela?

By Ernesto Castañeda

Regarding the question of what is happening between the United States and Venezuela, the answer is that this is a partially unintended, unanticipated international focus at the end of the first year of Trump’s second term. While the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela have not been close for a while, this path opened up as other areas of intervention, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, got stuck at a standstill. 

The potential intervention in Venezuela is not a popular option. There is little support among experts about its merits. Likewise, Venezuelans are not eager to go to war.

This was not a priority for Trump in the past. But three key members of his cabinet and White House staff have zeroed in on Venezuela in the last few months.

As an article in the Washington Post on December 18, 2025, explains convincingly by drawing from inside sources and visible actions, Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, and the main engine behind the aggressive anti-immigrant agenda, wanted to conduct military attacks in Mexico as another way to curb immigration, his long obsession. But as undocumented and asylum-seeker arrivals at the border have approached zero —in part thanks to Mexico’s role—, Miller looked further south. 

Trump campaigned in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 elections, bashing MS-13 and Salvadoran immigration. But this time around, he found an ally in Salvadoran President Bukele. Other Central American governments have also collaborated, so he zoomed in on Venezuela through Tren de Aragua (TdA) as an excuse to expedite deportations. Tren de Aragua-related deportations to CECOT in El Salvador became a fiasco and highly unpopular, not to say unlawful. So, the administration moved to declaring the so-called Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as its supposed head. After targeting small boats off the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean, then the excuse became fighting drug trafficking and then to old claims on permits to exploit Venezuelan oil by Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies, without discarding the ideas of regime change as the support for Machado grew internationally, and as the Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, told Chris Whipple to get rid of Maduro, to put pressure on Venezuela until Maduro would give up or “call uncle.”

On the other hand, Marco Rubio—both National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, which in other countries would be called Secretary of Foreign Affairs—has long had an obsession with the regime in Cuba, which he sees as related to Venezuela. This is partly because of the financial and oil support that Venezuela gave to Cuba for many years, which, although it continues—it seems that the first oil tanker that was seized was going from Venezuela to Cuba—though the Venezuela support is no longer the support it once was, and it’s not enough to help the Cuban regime, which is in deep economic trouble. Officials in Cuba see this as a move with them ultimately in mind. 

Marco Rubio is especially interested in attacking the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, and there is nobody left in the White House to contradict him, not Susie Wiles, as John Kelly would have done in the first Trump administration, to stop such a bad idea.

According to the Washington Post article mentioned before, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was happy to jump into the frenzy to protect his job following Signalgate. He was eager to prove himself, show “leadership,” and get more attention in the spotlight and ingratiate himself with Miller. So, he found the idea of bombing the small boats appealing, and he would probably like to lead a small incursion into Venezuela.

The objective is not truly drug trafficking. Most of the cocaine that reaches the United States doesn’t come from Venezuela. There are a few shipments that pass through Venezuela and then to the Caribbean; these drug shipments were going to other islands in the region, and perhaps some of that cocaine would eventually reach Europe, but very little reaches the United States. The Coast Guard has been in charge of seizing these vessels for many years, and the DEA could be conducting more formal investigations, so this idea of ​​the drugs as the rationale to threaten Venezuela is not believable. The American people don’t believe it, and this new pseudo-label of “narco-terrorists” isn’t logically convincing either legally or at the logical or expert levels. Indeed, it seems that the administration is already giving up on that; also, with the pardon for the president of Honduras, the drug angle is less convincing. The contradiction remains, and they are rightly not going to attack Mexico or Colombia over the drug issue in the near future.

Things changed a bit with Maria Corina Machado’s visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize regarding democracy in Venezuela and regime change. And lately, there have been a few statements from Trump about the interests of U.S. oil companies in Venezuela. The U.S. oil lobby has been a key factor in Trump’s re-election. So, another goal is for U.S. oil companies to regain access to Venezuela, although there is already an American company doing business there: Chevron. So, this is not something of a priority. All this to say, there is no master strategy behind it.

It is partly a personal animosity between Trump and Maduro, evident in public declarations and supposed ideological differences, but the two governments have also had occasions when they handled structured negotiations very well. There have been instances of negotiations resulting in detained individuals returning from Venezuela to the United States, deportations with permission of Venezuelans from the United States, and then from El Salvador. So, it’s not that there has been a terrible personal relationship between Trump and Maduro or their intermediaries.

Marco Rubio’s obsession is the main driver. He has made recent public statements presenting new arguments and rationales, but they have seemed improvised and unconvincing. Even an overt, public declaration of a return to the Monroe Doctrine is not enough to justify this; it is mainly good news for Russia and China. 

To justify an attack on Venezuela and the boats around the coasts, members of the Trump administration have claimed that they wanted to combat terrorism, foreign enemies in the American war on terror, to accelerate deportations, but they still haven’t been able to win that mediatic battle or the legal or logical argument, but they have not done so not even in the local or federal courts. Although the Supreme Court hasn’t stopped them either.

Steven Miller is mainly interested in the idea of a war with Venezuela or with someone else, as a pretext to push through certain laws, such as the Alien Enemies Act and the Insurrection Act, both of which require the U.S. to be at war to be invoked. But this is not even necessary to continue with the mass deportations as they have been. They are deporting many people. Detaining people, they are practically at war with immigrant-based communities, though they are violating human rights and constitutional protections within the country. A declaration of war would not change that reality or make it any more appealing to citizens.

It is very clear that the majority of the American public opinion, even part of the MAGA base, is against the U.S. getting directly involved in any new war. They would be against an invasion or bombing of Venezuela, whether prolonged or even for a short period. It would be more difficult to stop something like an Iran-type one-targeted bombing situation, but removing Maduro probably wouldn’t be as quick or simple.

So, the American people are quite against an intervention in Venezuela. Furthermore, as we see with the debates surrounding the small fishing boats, critics, including legislators in the Senate and House, Democrats and Republicans, see these bombings of ships off the Latin American coasts as extralegal. They are putting a lot of pressure on the Pentagon to release the videos showing the killing of two survivors, and to either stop this type of operation, to explain what is happening, and if the intention is to engage in war, then, to make the case to Congress of why the U.S. needs to wage a war, on what basis, and with what objective.

All indicates it would not be something Congress would easily approve. Trying to get the Republicans in Congress to do that could cost some of them their seats in 2026. So, it’s a war, a strategy without rhyme or reason, hence the clear disorder. Venezuela is very worried about Trump’s pronouncements, but their aimlessness is nothing new. So, no one knows what’s going to happen, not even the Pentagon, which has deployed elements that are not sufficient for sustained ground intervention, though they are spending a lot of money bringing the ships there.

They thought military mobilization would be enough to intimidate Maduro, but it obviously hasn’t been. The Nobel Prize hype around Machado has already passed, and it hasn’t changed anything on the ground. The Venezuelan diaspora is asking for military intervention, but that is not enough. Understandably, from their point of view and personal experiences, they are asking Trump to do something. Those who are more established, have money, and have been here for a while, are still upset they were forced to leave. But the more recent Venezuelan migrants who came here seeking asylum after the pandemic are being denied asylum, their work permits revoked, and deported. So that is also a contradiction about Venezuela supposedly being a narco-state. So, the whole armed intimidation of Venezuela is bullying to the extreme, but it is incoherent as foreign policy.

The majority in the United States are against this war in Venezuela and the attacks on the small boats, oil tankers, and the possibility of bombings or military action. Contrary to what some in the White House bubble seem to believe, a war with Venezuela would not be enough to distract from the economic and political situation in the U.S. It would not totally change the narrative, help speed deportations to what would become a war zone, and the attempts to further concentrate power on the executive could be more directly opposed by the legislative branch which is the one supposed to declare and fund wars. The oil tanker confiscations and chases are just the latest in a series of policies in which the administration’s words, threats, and actions are not enough to scare Maduro or convince the public of the righteousness of these actions. 

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed are his alone.

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by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on December 23, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/23/what-is-behind-the-us-escalation-of-threats-against-venezuela/

Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks

By Jake Johnston

Research Associate, Center for Economic and Policy Research

It’s been nearly a decade since Haitians last went to the polls to elect a president. Even then, barely one in five participated. In a country with a majority of the population under 25 years of age, this means that, for most Haitians, voting for one’s leaders is a privilege never before experienced.

Haiti’s transition, precipitated by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, is ongoing. For the better part of four years, progress toward elections has remained elusive. But that all appeared to change this fall.

“The Haitians need to come to an election and elect a president,” the US Charge d’Affaires, Henry Wooster said in September. Security and other challenges must not be a “red herring for taking action,” he continued. Speaking directly to Haiti’s de facto authorities, he warned: “In other words, you can’t stay in those jobs for life.”

The reaction, in a country where the political class remains more responsive to Washington than the population in Haiti, was swift. Two months later, a new electoral law has been established and a vote scheduled for next August. But does this present Haitians with a path out of the multiple, overlaid crises affecting the country? More than half the country is facing food insecurity, the economy is about to wrap up its seventh consecutive year of negative growth, and insecurity continues to dominate daily life.

In 2023, when asked if they had trust in the electoral process, fewer than one in four Haitians responded yes. It is hard to imagine that number is higher today. Though few would be sorry to see the much-loathed leaders atop the transition fall, a vote is not a path out of the current crisis.

The quick response to Wooster’s threats was not so much about elections. It was about a date much closer on the horizon: February 7, 2026. That is when the mandate of the nine-member presidential council — which was put in place with a strong push from the Biden administration, CARICOM, UN, and the OAS 18 months ago — formally ends. For months, debate has raged over what should come next. The political class is auditioning, not with the ten-plus million citizens of Haiti, but with the foreign diplomats and multilateral entities they see as key to their own survival.

And if there was any doubt about who would ultimately decide, it was put to rest in mid-November. Amid an effort from some on the transitional presidential council to, once again, replace the prime minister, the US embassy stepped into the fight.

“If you and your family value your relationship with the United States, I urge you in the strongest terms to desist from initiatives to oust the PM and to instead publish the electoral decree … This is not the time to test U.S. resolve,” Wooster texted Fritz Jean, one of the councilors. Days later, Jean’s US visa was revoked and the State Department publicly accused him, without providing evidence, of supporting armed gangs. The effort to replace the PM was stopped — at least for now. The next week, the electoral decree was published.

The “plan” is coming into focus, and it is a familiar one: stability at all costs, no matter how rotten the foundation. To enforce this notion of stability and allow for elections, the US has been quick to assure that more security support is on the way.

In September, the UN Security Council approved a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Authorized for up to 5,500 soldiers, it is currently little more than a rebranding of the Kenyan-led Multinational Support Mission (MSS) that the UN authorized in 2024. No new troops have arrived and, while this new mission will have some level of UN support, operationalizing any of it is expected to take the better part of a year. 

The main difference then, for the 1,000 or so mostly Kenyan police on the ground in Haiti is that the rules of engagement have changed. The GSF, as its name suggests, is intended to be more “muscular,” by which its architects mean lethal. The newly drafted Concept of Operations outlines a mission with a simple goal: kill the bandits.

But while few have taken note, that has been the de facto authorities’ strategy for some time. So far this year, police forces have been responsible for well over half of the 4,500-plus killings in Haiti. Hundreds of civilians have been caught in the crossfire as police battle armed groups that exert influence over much of Port-au-Prince and have traumatized a nation. Drone attacks, led by a secretive police unit operating with Blackwater CEO Erik Prince’s private mercenaries, are also racking up civilian casualties and drawing growing condemnation.

The outspoken leaders of Haiti’s armed groups, however, only seem to continue to accumulate more power, political influence, and heavy weaponry. While some areas of the capital have seen tension ease, violence in the provinces is expanding by the day. Armed groups still control all the major arteries of the nation. More people are displaced today than at the height of the post-earthquake recovery.

The US has expressed its goal in Haiti as saving the state from imminent collapse, thereby avoiding mass migration or the further entrenchment of transnational criminal organizations. But while precious oxygen is consumed by raging debates over electoral timelines, transitional governance structures, and how quickly foreign soldiers can arrive, nobody has stopped to ask a basic question: is the current state worth saving?

The root of the tension that has paralyzed the country for much of the last decade is not a fight between violent gangs and the state. Simplistic narratives of good versus evil miss the mark. Rather, it is a fight over putting the train back on the tracks to save a rump state in the name of stability or to lay new tracks to create the foundations for a more representative state to rise from the ashes. It is not elections nor a foreign military force that will resolve this fundamental tension. In fact, history shows those two responses are more likely to consolidate the status quo.

The Haitian people need an opportunity to vote freely. They need to feel safe and secure in their communities. But what is missing is a plan to bring it all together, to begin restoring faith in a state that long ago lost the trust of the population; a plan to achieve peace, which is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of opportunity. What is missing is a vision that can inspire the population and bring the nation together around a common path forward.

A peace process can fill that gap. Such an endeavor does not mean legitimizing armed actors, condoning violence, or accepting impunity; rather, what it should mean is treating the situation holistically while centering the population and in particular victims of both state and non-state violence. A foreign military force and low-turnout elections are tracks Haiti has been down many times before. A peace process offers a chance at laying new ones. But first, what Haiti needs are political leaders responsive to the needs of the people and not simply to foreign embassies.

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by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on December 12, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/12/12/haiti-needs-to-lay-new-tracks/

The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis

By Lívia Peres Milani

Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)

National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)

President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction  of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted  coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.  

The imposition of tariffs  

The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.  

Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort. 

Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.  

Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners. 

Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations 

However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products. 

These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis. 

Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.  

On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.   

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by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on December 9, 2025

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Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?

By Cynthia McClintock*

Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment.  Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.

Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?

Why are Peruvians So Angry?

The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.

The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.

But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.

Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.

As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.

What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?

Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.

Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.

A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.

Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?

The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor.  Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)

As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.

Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”

Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.

*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

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by clalsstaff on November 12, 2025  •  Permalink
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Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

Rodrigo Paz is sworn in as president of Bolivia, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Centrist Rodrigo Paz’s victory in October’s runoff election signals a dramatic change of direction for Bolivian politics. The era of dominance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, led by ex-president Evo Morales, is definitively over. For only the second time since 2006 the MAS will not control the presidency. As a result of the recent election, it now has a mere two representatives in the legislature’s lower house, and no one in the upper house. Though it does not hold an outright majority, Paz’s Christian Democratic Party is now the single largest presence in both legislative chambers. How did Bolivia get here?

Twenty years ago, the leftist-populist MAS swept into power, as a new and energetic grassroots alternative to the elite-run traditional parties that had traded off governing Bolivia since the end of dictatorship in 1982, or one could even argue, since the 1952 Revolution. The MAS’s popularity sprung largely from the dynamism of Morales, himself, then a coca grower union leader adept at organizing and leading large-scale protests in opposition to prevailing Washington Consensus policies and government efforts to sell off Bolivia’s non-renewable resources to transnational corporate interests. The MAS styled itself a bottom-up social movement and not a party. Its participatory “lead by following” approach to governance appealed to a great majority of indigenous voters and working-class people of indigenous descent.

Morales and the MAS proved historically consequential in undertaking a contentious but innovative rewrite of the country’s Constitution, which went into force in 2009. It fully embraced Bolivia’s “plurinational” identity and incorporated an unprecedented variety of collective indigenous rights of consultation, to their traditional territories, and perhaps most controversially, of judicial autonomy. The Morales administration also used a large surplus from the country’s extractive boom to finance a wide range of new social safety net provisions that halved the number of people living in poverty, including cash transfers to families, a pension program, minimum wage increase, as well as public investments in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, his presidency raised the public visibility of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, no longer as second class citizens but as political protagonists of their own present and future.

Morales and the MAS were immensely popular. But then cracks began to appear. In 2011 a plan to build a controversial highway through a protected indigenous reserve brought the MAS government into direct conflict with the reserve’s residents, damaging its support among some indigenous groups. When the extractive boom ended around 2014, Bolivia’s economy slowed considerably, and the MAS fiscal policies that had lifted so many out of poverty became increasingly unsustainable. Part of the problem was Morales, who served two presidential terms and aspired to another, without any thought to a succession plan. Constitutionally limited to two terms, in 2016 he soundly lost a national referendum in a bid for a third and then ignored the result, further alienating many former supporters.

The upheaval around the contested 2019 election, which eventuated in Morales going into exile in Mexico and the persecution of MAS loyalists by a rightwing caretaker government, set the stage for the party’s eventual fall from grace. The 2020 election restored the MAS to power. But soon Morales and the new president, his ex-finance minister Luis Arce, were in a pitched battle for control over the party, a bitter and increasingly personal rivalry that fatally fragmented the MAS into opposed camps. Their protracted feud, which paralyzed congress, strayed into surreal territory, with accusations of a staged coup and mutual assassination attempts. The credibility of the MAS was so fundamentally damaged that the incumbent Arce, with his poll numbers plummeting, suspended his campaign. Morales, meanwhile, remains holed up in his coca grower redoubt to avoid criminal charges.

The MAS-led government’s political fragmentation, and its ineffectual response to Bolivia’s increasingly disastrous economy, have left the party deeply unpopular. The country is currently floundering amid its worst economic crisis in 40 years. Its natural gas production is half of what it was in 2014, with nothing to replace it. Bolivia has failed to develop its large reserves of lithium. Depleted currency reserves and a scarcity of US dollars have driven up inflation, creating severe shortages of fuel and basic goods. Over the past year, ordinary Bolivians have angrily expressed their discontent with the country’s economic collapse through repeated strikes and protest actions.

Emerging from this bleak political and economic state-of-affairs is the surprise election winner, Rodrigo Paz. Son of onetime leftist president Jaime Paz Zamora, former mayor of Tarija, and recently a senator, Paz’s campaign focused on restoring Bolivia’s economy, but gradually rather than by instituting sweeping fiscal austerity measures as his rival in the run-off proposed. Non-indigenous, pro-business, and ideology averse, Paz successfully positioned himself as a pragmatic reformer. He has delivered a strong anti-corruption message, pledged to restore relations with the US and bring back foreign investment. His populist call for a “capitalism for all” hopes to thread the needle by mixing decentralization, lower taxes, support for small businesses, and greater fiscal discipline, with continued spending on popular MAS-era social programs.

Paz’s critics argue that what he proposes is an impossible fiscal balancing act. Desperate and impatient Bolivians will expect immediate results. But it remains far from clear whether Paz will be able to overcome likely regional opposition to at least some of his policies. And if he does not stabilize the country’s dysfunctional economy quickly, Paz’s political honeymoon might be brief.

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by clalsstaff on November 11, 2025  •  Permalink
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Why MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua Are Not Terrorist Groups

by Melissa Vasquez, Ernesto Castañeda, and Anthony Fontes

Image of President Trump of the United States and President Bukele of El Salvador meeting, White House, Sep 25 2019, Fliker

Are MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua terrorist organizations? The short answer is no, they are not. They are transnational criminal organizations. El Salvador’s President Bukele and Donald Trump have officially labeled these groups as terrorist organizations, citing their extreme violence and control over some territories. However, these classifications have sparked debate, as their activities are more aligned with organized crime than political terrorism. Making this distinction is crucial given that mislabeling them can lead to misguided policies that fail at curbing their violence.

The 1980s civil wars in Central America forced nearly a million people to flee the U.S. Some immigrants are still forced to leave their countries because of organized crime and gang recruitment. Today most often, some displaced people are victims of gangs, not members or representatives abroad. However, upon originally arriving in Los Angeles, many Central American migrants faced marginalization and sought protection from the gangs present in the areas where they lived and worked. These challenges ultimately contributed to the formation of the present-day MS-13 and M-18 gangs. Many of the members of these new local gangs were incarcerated in Los Angeles prisons alongside members of other gangs, which allowed them to regroup and learn from their rivals. Shortly after the wars, mass deportations from prisons and streets sent MS-13 and M-18 members back to a weakened Central America, where they expanded their networks and influence. 

Similarly, El Tren de Aragua (TdR), which originated in the early 2000s in Venezuelan prisons—particularly the Tocorón prison—has expanded across South America. Originally, a prison gang, Tren de Aragua, expanded beyond prison walls to exploit weak governance, connecting criminal networks across South and North America. Furthermore, like MS-13 and M-18, Tren de Aragua is driven by criminal enterprising rather than political ideology. That is, neither group aims to take over state power or remake society in their own image. Rather, they are hyper-focused on generating maximum profits through illicit means while avoiding state interference. They are criminal syndicates with some capacity—though quite limited—to carry out their rackets across borders. They are certainly NOT terrorist entities. 

What separates a terrorist organization from a criminal syndicate? While both engage in illicit activities and use violence as a means to an end, it is crucial to distinguish their goals and methods to dismantle them effectively. The primary difference lies in their objectives: terrorist organizations seek political, religious, or ideological change by influencing government policies or societal structures, whereas transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operate across borders solely for financial gain, without political or ideological motives beyond sowing conditions to maximize profit. 

For example, the U.S. government has classified groups like Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ISIS as terrorist organizations due to their political objectives. FARCS’s history dates back to 1964 when it emerged as a communist insurgency that employed terrorist tactics. Initially formed as a guerilla movement from campesino self-defense groups, whose primary objective was to overthrow the Colombian government. Over the next five decades, FARC waged guerilla warfare by carrying out illicit activities—such as bombing, kidnappings, and assassinations–all in an effort to challenge state authority. Colombia, the U.S., and the European Union designated FARC as a terrorist organization due to their use of political violence.

However, the 2016 peace accords between FARC and the Colombian government led to the successful disarmament. This agreement allowed the group to transition into a political party known as Comunes. Even though some dissident factions still operate, FARC’s official transformation has been a key factor in maintaining long-term stability in Colombia. Recognizing this shift has been crucial in fostering peace and ensuring that former combatants can engage in democratic processes rather than armed conflict.

The contrast between ISIS and FARC highlights the importance of proper classification. FARC has abandoned the characteristics that once classified it as a terrorist organization and instead has evolved into a political entity. ISIS, on the other hand, remains committed to its extremist and political ideology, seeking to overthrow governments through guerrilla warfare and establish a global Islamic caliphate through territorial control and sectarian violence. Addressing the causes behind these organizations is equally crucial. FARC’s transition has allowed Colombia to tackle the drivers that led to its rise in the first place, providing the foundation for long-term stability. When governments misdiagnose the factors driving their emergence, violence continues.

Despite claims that Tren de Aragua serves the Maduro regime, evidence suggests otherwise. The group arose from Venezuela’s weak governance and not from direct state sponsorship. According to Insight Crime, in September 2023, Venezuelan law enforcement raided the Tocorón prison in Aragua state, aiming to “dismantle and put an end to organized crime gangs and other criminal networks operating from the Tocorón Penitentiary.” This operation demonstrates that Tren de Aragua is not a state-sponsored group, nor is it a tool being used by the Venezuelan state to destabilize the region. Its rise—like that of MS-13 and M-18—can be traced back to systemic failures, including poverty, corruption, and forced population displacement. These factors have allowed transnational criminal organizations to flourish across Latin America. 

MS-13 and M-18 expanded by exploiting political corruption and institutional weakness in their home countries. Similarly, Tren de Aragua has taken advantage of Venezuela’s economic crises and large emigration to expand into new territories, such as the Darién Gap. Unlike terrorist organizations, these gangs did not emerge to push a political ideology; rather, they have thrived by leveraging corruption and weak law enforcement. In many ways, they are products of the environments that fostered them, growing out of instability rather than ideological ambition.  These transnational criminal groups do not engage in violent attacks abroad, targeting governments or aiming to take political power in the United States. That is beyond their purview and capabilities. 

Why does the distinction between organized crime and terrorist organizations matter? Although all of these organizations engage in violence and illicit activities, their end goals set them apart: MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua operate for profit, whereas ISIS and others seek to reshape the political landscape of their regions. Properly distinguishing between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations like MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua is crucial for drafting effective policies and responses to their violence. Mislabeling these groups can lead to inappropriate responses. Applying counterterrorism measures to profit-driven gangs fails to address the root causes for their expansion in the first place. Failing to properly distinguish organized crime from political terrorists leads to failed policies. The misclassification of these groups could destabilize the region by shifting U.S. foreign policy and resources away from where it is truly needed—addressing the drivers of gang-related violence, corruption, and weak governance—toward counterterrorism efforts. 

While transnational criminal organizations are heavily involved in drug trafficking, and their violence may create fear among civilians and impact governance, this does not qualify them as terrorist organizations. Their primary objective is financial gain, not advancing an ideological or political agenda. This distinction matters because government responses shape outcomes. If the goal is to curb migration, drug trafficking, or violence, then we need to stop treating criminal organizations like terrorist groups and start addressing the real issues driving their expansion. If the U.S. truly wants to curb migration and secure the southern border, then it must ensure that its classification of these organizations is accurate and aligned with its actual objectives.

Melissa Vasquez is a Graduate Student in the International Affairs and Policy Analysis program at American University and an Intern at the Immigrant Lab.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a Professor at American University

Anthony Fontes is an Associate Professor and ethnographer at American University’s School of International Service.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

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by clalsstaff on February 20, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on February 20, 2025

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What is a migrant? What is ICE? 10 terms to help you understand

By Ernesto Castañeda, Daniel Jenks

President Donald Trump aims to upend the immigration system in the United States in his first few days in office. On Jan. 20, 2025, Trump signed various executive orders that temporarily prevent refugees from coming to the U.S. and block immigrants from applying for asylum at a U.S. border, among other measures.

Another executive order calls on federal agencies to not issue passports, birth certificates or Social Security numbers to babies born in the U.S. to parents not in the country legally, or with temporary permission. Eighteen states sued on Jan. 21 to block this executive order that challenges birthright citizenship, which is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

We are scholars of immigration who closely follow public discussions about immigration policy, trends and terminology. Understanding the many different immigration terms – some technical, some not – can help people better understand immigration news. While not an exhaustive list, here are 10 important terms to know:

1. Migrant

A migrant is a person who moves from their place of birth to another location relatively far away. There are different words used to describe migrants and their particular circumstances. Internally displaced people, for example, means people who are forced to move within their own country because of violence, natural disasters and other reasons.

International migrants move from one country to another, sometimes without the legal authorization to enter or stay in another country. There are also seasonal or circular migrants, who often move back and forth between different places.

Between 30% and 60% of all migrants eventually return to their birth countries.

There is not much difference in why people decide to migrate within their own country or internationally, with or without the legal permission to do so. But it is easier for people from certain countries to move than from others.

2. Immigrants

The terms immigrants and migrants are often used interchangeably. Migration indicates movement in general. Immigration is the word used to describe the process of a non-citizen settling in another country. Immigrants have a wide range of legal statuses.

An immigrant in the U.S. might have a green card or a permanent resident card – a legal authorization that gives the person the legal right to stay and work in the U.S. and to apply for citizenship after a few years.

An immigrant with a T visa is a foreigner who is allowed to stay in the U.S. for up to four years because they are victims of human or sex trafficking. Similarly, an immigrant with a U visa is the victim of serious crimes and can stay in the U.S. for up to four years, and then apply for a Green Card.

An immigrant with a H-1B visa is someone working for a U.S. company within the U.S.

Many international students in higher education have an F-1 visa. They must return to their country of birth soon after they graduate, unless they are sponsored by a U.S. employer, enroll in another educational program, or marry a U.S. citizen. The stay can be extended for one or two years, depending on the field of study.

Mexican migrants prepare to turn themselves in to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers after crossing the border into Ruby, Ariz., on Jan. 5, 2025. Brandon Bell/Getty Images
Photo cerdits to Brandon Bell/Getty Images

3. Undocumented Immigrants, Unauthorized Immigrants and Illegal Immigrants

These three charged political terms refer to the same situation: migrants who enter or remain in the country without the proper legal paperwork. People in this category also include those who come to the U.S. with a visa and overstay its permitted duration.

Some of these immigrants work for cash that is not taxed. Most work with fake Social Security numbers, pay taxes and contribute to Social Security funds without receiving money after retirement.

Immigrants without legal authorization to be in the U.S. spent more than US$254 billion in 2022.

4. Asylum Seekers

An asylum seeker is a person who arrives at a U.S. port of entry – via an airport or a border crossing – and asks for protection because they fear returning to their home country. An immigrant living in the U.S. for up to one year can also apply for asylum.

Asylum seekers can legally stay temporarily in the U.S. while they wait to bring their case to an immigration judge. The process typically takes years.

Someone is eligible for asylum if they can show proof of persecution because of their political affiliation, religion, ethnic group, minority status, or belonging to a targeted group. Many others feel they need to leave their countries because of threats of violence or abusive relationships, among other dangerous circumstances.

A judge will eventually decide whether a person’s fear is with merit and can stay in the country.

Ukrainian immigrants attend a job fair in New York City in February 2023. Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images
Photo cerdits to Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images

5. Refugees

Refugees are similar to asylum seekers, but they apply to resettle in the U.S. while they remain abroad. Refugees are often escaping conflict.

The Biden administration had a cap of admitting up to 125,000 refugees a year.

Refugees can legally work in the U.S. as soon as they arrive and can apply for a green card one year later. Research shows that refugees become self-sufficient soon after they settle in the country and are net-positive for the country’s economy through the federal taxes they pay.

6. Unaccompanied Children

This is a U.S. government classification for migrant children who enter the U.S. without a parent or guardian, and without proper documentation or the legal status to be in the country. Because they are minors, they are allowed to enter the country and apply for the right to stay. Most often, they have relatives already in the country, who assume the role of financial and legal sponsors.

7. Family Separation

This refers to a government policy of separating detained migrant parents or guardians from the children they are responsible for an traveling with as a family unit. The first Trump administration separated families arriving at the border as part of an attempt to reduce immigration.

At least 4,000 children were separated from their parents during the first Trump administration. The Biden administration tried to reunite these families, but as of May 2024, over 1,400 children separated during Trump’s first term still were not reunited with their families.

Legal migration systems that lack avenues for immigrants who work in manual labor to move with their families, and deportations, both also create family separations.

8. Immigration Detention

Immigration detention refers to the U.S. government apprehending immigrants who are in the U.S. without authorization and holding them in centers that are run similar to prisons. Some of these centers are run by the government, and others are outsourced to private companies.

When a U.S. Customs and Border Protection official apprehends an immigrant, they are often first brought to a building where they are placed in what many call a hielera, which means icebox or freezer in Spanish. This refers to cells, cages or rooms where the government keeps immigrants at very low temperatures with foil blankets and without warm clothing.

Immigrants might then be quickly deported or otherwise released in the country while they await a court date for an asylum case. Other immigrants who are awaiting deportation or a court date will be placed in an immigration detention center. Some must post bond to be released while awaiting trial.

9. Coyote

A coyote is the Spanish word for a guide who is paid by migrants and asylum seekers to take them to their destination, undetected by law enforcement. Coyotes used to be trusted by the migrants they were helping cross into the country. As the U.S. has tried to make it harder to enter illegally, the business of taking people to and across the U.S.-Mexico border unseen has become more expensive and dangerous.

10. The Alphabet Soup of Government Players

The Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, is a law enforcement agency created after 9/11. It includes a number of agencies that focus on immigration.

These include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, an agency that is in charge of collecting import duties, passport and document controls at airports, ports, and official points of entry along the border.

The Border Patrol is a federal law enforcing agency under CBP in charge of patrolling and securing U.S. borders and ports.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is a branch of DHS that works within the U.S., within its borders, focusing on detaining and deporting immigrants.

The Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS, takes care of unaccompanied minors after they enter the country.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Professor at American University. 

Daniel Jenks is a Doctoral Student at the University of Pennsylvania,

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

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by clalsstaff on January 23, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on January 23, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/01/23/10immigrationterms/

Bolsonaro’s Long Shadow and Brazil’s Ongoing Democratic Crisis

by Fernando Medici, Mackenzie Presbyterian University

Photo Credit to Amauri Nehn/NurPhoto via AP

Few people outside of Brazil are likely aware that this South American country endured its own version of a Capitol attack. On January 8th, 2023 — two years after the infamous U.S. incident — a mob of supporters of former president Bolsonaro stormed government buildings, including Congress and the Supreme Court. This brazen assault on democratic institutions highlights the dangerous influence of right-wing radicalization and rampant social mediatized fake news, which continue to undermine the nation’s fragile democracy by amplifying a hate campaign against Brazil’s Supreme Court, and pleas for military intervention, while  celebrating the insurrection that ended with Bolsonaro’s followers storming the Supreme Court Building.

Like its American counterpart, the unrest was fueled by unsubstantiated claims of election fraud following Bolsonaro’s defeat at the polls. However, what set Brazil’s crisis apart was the additional troubling involvement and support of several high-profile military figures.

Subsequently many of the insurgents were indicted, but until recently little had been done regarding the still unknown leadership of the movement.

That changed this past November as former President Jair Bolsonaro and 36 others were indicted by Brazil’s Federal Police for crimes including an attempted coup d’état, violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, and involvement in an alleged attempt on the lives of President Lula, Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Minister Alexandre de Moraes.

Of course, despite the political weight of these charges, an indictment is not equivalent to a conviction and does not automatically lead to a trial. It only provides evidence for the Prosecutor General’s Office to decide whether to proceed with the case or not. This is not the first time Bolsonaro has been indicted. He was previously implicated in investigations for fraudulent vaccine records and for trying to conceal Saudi Jewelry he was gifted as president, which, according to Brazilian Law, belongs to the government. Both criminal proceedings are currently underway, and Bolsonaro is prohibited from leaving the country.

Regarding the coup d’état-related indictments, after an extensive investigation, the Brazilian Federal Police concluded that the alleged coup attempt was supposed take place in late 2022, after Bolsonaro’s election defeat and led by prominent military figures, including General and formal State-Secretary Mario Fernandes and General Braga Netto, Bolsonaro’s vice president candidate in the most recent election. According to the investigators, Bolsonaro was aware of and supported the coup efforts.

This case underscores the frail state of Brazilian Democracy after years of political radicalization and the unchecked spread of rampant fake news. In large part the proliferation of fake news has been fueled by Bolsonaro’s “Hate Cabinet”, a group led Bolsonaro’s sons Flávio and Eduardo and responsible for managing far-right social networks, the spread of misinformation, and promotion of hate campaigns against Bolsonaro’s political adversaries.  

Now, Brazilians await conclusion of the legal process. Expectations are that at the soonest a possible legal action could be filed next year, since the General Prosecutor’s Office will need months to go through the evidence.

Uncertainty surrounding the legal process and the timeline for potential action reflect the broader challenges facing Brazilian institutions and democracy. While the indictments represent a significant step toward accountability, the slow pace of the justice system underscores deeper institutional challenges, exacerbating political polarization and social mistrust. It also feeds narratives of persecution and bias, particularly among Bolsonaro’s far-right supporters, who often portray the judiciary as politically motivated. The credibility of the Brazilian Supreme Court, already eroded by its controversial role in the Lava Jato operation and its perceived partisanship during past political crises, now faces renewed scrutiny. In a country already deeply divided along ideological lines, its lack of perceived impartiality risks intensifying public skepticism, further destabilizing Brazil’s fragile democratic institutions.

It is not a surprise that Bolsonaro supporters have dismissed the allegations against him as political persecution and remain entrenched in their views, further deepening political rifts in Brazilian society. When large segments of the population operate under different understandings of reality, it becomes nearly impossible to foster the trust needed for a healthy democracy.

This scenario places Brazil’s democratic institutions under considerable strain. The 2023 storming of Congress and the Supreme Court demonstrated the vulnerability of these institutions when confronted with coordinated antidemocratic efforts. Now, with claims of military involvement, the alleged coup raises serious questions about how long Brazilian democracy can continue to withstand such blows.

The problem is made worse by Bolsonaro’s hate campaign against the Supreme Court, which has eroded trust in the institution, guaranteeing that any legal decision against him will be seen by a large subset of Brazilians as corrupt and politically motivated.

If Brazilian democracy is to survive, it will require more than just the prosecution of a few individuals, even if they are high-profile. A broader effort to rebuild trust in democratic institutions and to reduce the spread of misinformation will also be necessary. Without addressing the root causes of radicalization and polarization, Brazilian Democracy will continue to be vulnerable, whether to attacks by Bolsonaro’s followers or other political groups.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

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by clalsstaff on January 22, 2025  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on January 22, 2025

https://aulablog.net/2025/01/22/bolsonaros-long-shadow-and-brazils-ongoing-democratic-crisis/

Uncertainty: Migrant Self-classification of Immigration Statuses

By Mackenzie Hoekstra

October 3, 2024

Starting in 2022, the Immigration Lab at American University began interviewing recent migrant and refugee arrivals to the DMV. So far, we have interviewed 181 from a variety of origins. The interviews aim to understand the experiences of refugees and migrants before, during, and after their entrance into the United States. Interviewers asked participants to reflect on their immigration journey and classify their immigration status. Self-perception, specifically individual understanding of immigration status, varied depending on the respondents’ country of origin, with particular uncertainty for migrants coming from South and Central America. Out of the fifty-nine respondents who were asked to classify their immigration status, eight were uncertain, seven of these were from El Salvador and one from Venezuela.

This broad range of understanding can be partly attributed to the higher clarity in legal definitions for refugee status and recipients of asylum or humanitarian parole versus migrants who have come without papers or who are in the middle of requesting asylum or other humanitarian relief. Refugees and asylum seekers qualify for legal residence based on proving a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR). Refugees are vetted, approved, and brought to the U.S. through international refugee organizations and the U.S. government. They receive specific resettlement services and benefits through sponsoring resettlement agencies in the U.S. under the program known as Reception and Placement. These services are usually limited to the first 90 days after arrival and include necessities such as securing and setting up housing and rent assistance. Other services are provided by case managers, such as cash assistance, cultural orientations, school enrollment, benefit application assistance, employment support, and aid in navigating medical and legal services in their new communities. The goal of these services is for refugees to be economically self-sufficient as soon as possible. The number of refugees allowed in the U.S. is capped each year by the president and Congress. The current admissions cap for FY 2024 is 125,000 and 100,000 were resettled.

Asylum seekers must also prove they meet the conditions set by UNHCR but apply for asylum upon their arrival to the United States. They can apply affirmatively either at the point of entry or within a year of arriving in the U.S., or defensively once they receive notice of removal proceedings. Once granted asylum, they are known as asylees and gain access to government benefits and services similar to refugees like cash assistance and medical assistance, but do not have the same level of support as refugees do through case management. The are no numerical caps on how many asylum seekers can be granted that status but rather are decided on an individual case through immigration courts. This process can be lengthy and has a very significant backlog. According to TRAC, 1,101,819 asylum applicants currently have a pending case with U.S. immigration courts. This number translates into an average wait time of 1,424 days, a wait of almost four years for their case to be heard and decided.

For individuals who do not qualify for legal permanent residency as refugees or asylees, the definitions and processes become more complicated. Unlike for refugees and asylum seekers, there is no legal definition of a ‘migrant.’ A variety of programs/statuses exist for migrants including, but not limited to Humanitarian Parole (HP), Temporary Protected Status (TPS), work permits/visas, student visas, and green card applications, all of which have strict eligibility requirements and timelines.

Social services and benefits available to asylum seekers and migrants are limited. According to the National Immigration Forum, federal benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicare are not available for these immigrants. These benefits are only available to immigrants who have been granted asylum or become lawful permanent residents (LPR) and lived in the U.S. for a minimum of 5 years. Some states offer limited cash, food, and healthcare assistance, however, most of the services available are provided by local nonprofits which face similar barriers to resources and visibility. Accordingly, research shows that immigrants use less government services than the U.S.-born.

In addition to limited social benefits, legal status designations are complex to navigate, often requiring legal guidance and representation to get one’s status adjusted and obtain permanent residency. The interviews conducted by the Immigration Lab highlight this confusion and uncertainty and the need for better and more accessible resources and legal guidance for migrants.

Among respondents who did not classify themselves with a concrete immigration status in the interviews, two main groups emerged, those with some form of legal guidance and those without. Respondents without any form of legal guidance were quick to classify themselves originally as undocumented or express complete uncertainty as to their status. When prompted further during the interviews, many respondents clarified that they were uncertain about their status, not undocumented.

In other cases, individuals thought they may be out of status but in reality, they were pending a decision by migrant courts. In one instance, a respondent from a woman from Colombia stated, “Let’s say right now I don’t have status. I don’t have documentation. I am undocumented.” However, further discussion revealed that she had been processed and released by U.S. immigration and had been allowed to stay in the U.S. on legal grounds, which she did not fully understand. This response highlights how a self-classification as “undocumented” is used as a way to express initial uncertainty. While this response pattern emerged in a few cases, one example of complete uncertainty came from a Honduran male respondent. When we asked about his immigration status, he responded “What can you call it?” The interviewer then went on to explain different avenues of immigration: asylum, visa, and entry without inspection. In response, the man once again affirmed that “I don’t know…” The man explained that he was interested in getting a work permit but had no avenues through whichto obtain one. This shows that they do not know how the U.S. immigration system works, much less how to navigate it.

For those who expressed having legal guidance or representation, a theme of classifying as “in-process” was common. These respondents understood that there was a process that they were going through to get documentation but could not specifically articulate what that process was. For example, when asked to identify her immigration status, one El Salvadorian female explained that she and her family had found a lawyer to represent them. But never articulated what legal avenue was lawyer pursuing. Similarly, an El Salvadorian male expressed confusion over his next court date, not knowing when or what the court appearance was for.

In a working paper written by the American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies on Newcomer Central American Immigrants’ Access to Legal Services, researchers found that less than half of Central American immigrants have access to legal services because low-income and pro bono services are hard to find. Additionally, this affordable representation often only takes on limited cases, specifically focusing on the cases that are more likely to be won in court. This has resulted in more legal referrals to private firms, and despite these firms providing high-quality services, they are very expensive. Immigrants may be tempted to work with notary generals confusing them with notarios, who in Latin America are highly influential lawyers. This creates a higher degree of fraud risk. Therefore, these Central American immigrants either avoid, don’t have access to, or cannot afford legal services. This means that they must rely on their knowledge or the knowledge of family and friends. In the context of the complex and process-oriented immigration legal system, this information is often not enough and may lead to them losing their immigration case to remain in the U.S.

The analysis of these interviews uncovered the important reality that migrants are often uncertain about their immigration status in the U.S., even when they have access to legal representation or guidance. Volunteers, legal offices that do pro-bono immigration work, and non-profits that have this as their mission are overburdened by caseloads and don’t receive enough funding and donations to expand. People come to the United States for a variety of reasons and often must take timely action to secure their legal statuses. It is crucial that theyhave access to resources that can help guide and support them through the various processes available to them, both legal and non-legal. It is not enough to ensure basic access to these resources; efforts must be made to make information about immigration statuses accessible and understandable for migrants.

Mackenzie Hoekstra is a senior majoring in Sociology at American University and a member of the Immigration Lab.

Edited by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, CLALS, and Immigration Lab Director.

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by clalsstaff on October 3, 2024  •  Permalink
Posted in Immigration, Regional Snapshot, United States
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 3, 2024

https://aulablog.net/2024/10/03/uncertainty-migrant-self-classification-of-immigration-statuses/

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