The United States is where migrants come for that golden opportunity. To live a better life. To work, to be safe, to get an education. But once one leaves “La Jaula de Oro,” (“The Golden Cage”) they can’t return. All they have might be a green or red card, or maybe no card at all.
The U.S. has a visa program for temporary workers in “specialty occupations” called the H1-B visas. During Trump’s first term, he claimed the H1-B visa program was “very, very, bad for workers” and Suspended the H1-B visa program in 2020. Trump has switched his stance on H1-B visas, claiming “it’s a great program.” After Elon Musk showed his support for H-1B visas, nothing has happened to support H-1B Visas meaning we might still see the reform that was outlined in Project 2025 to make the program ‘better.’
Other types of visa programs might be affected within the next couple of months, student visas, and visas for survivors of human trafficking and other crimes. Another program that is getting attacked is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). All visas get a card and DACA gets a work permit card. Just another card to keep ahold of.
A migrant factory worker from Chicago said, “I have been waiting for my daughter to turn 21 so I can get my green card.” This working migrant applied to the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV) 15 years ago and is still waiting for a Green Card. The DV program is a lottery. In 2023, the DV program had nearly 9.6 million qualified entries and only 50 thousand recipients.
The cost of green cards is already so high, that the filing cost for a family-based green card is approximately 3 thousand dollars for an applicant applying from within the United States. Other categories of green cards may have different costs depending on which one the person is aiming for, not including legal service fees. For DACA it costs $555 to renew online. The most expenses being EB-5 visas, which are for foreign investors that has made investments within the United States around one million dollars and created 10 permanent full-time jobs. For these pathways are not accessible to everyone due to the cost. While some immigrants may not have green cards, visas, or DACA, one thing that they might have are Red Cards ━which can make a difference in whether a person stays in the U.S. or gets deported. Red Cards were made back in 2007 by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. Red cards are used to protect undocumented immigrants from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). They can come in 19 different languages, including Ukrainian, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, and Tagalog.
Photo of the front and back of a Red Card by Anthony Sandoval
Trump’s “Border Czar,” Tom Homan stated, “For instance, Chicago—very well-educated, they’ve been educated on how to defy ICE, how to hide from ICE.”
On February 25th, President Trump talked about a new type of pathway to citizenship, he calls it a Gold Card. For years, many groups have been asking for an improved way for citizenship or an easier way to come into the United States. The answer was simple: a card that’s worth five million dollars. Ask your friends and family to help cover the cost. It’s that simple… but few people have that type of money. This new card is for investors. The gold card would just replace the EB-5 program.
We don’t need this. Not a 5 million dollar pathway that very few people can pay for. We need another way for citizenship, another way to come into the United States, a faster program that allows people to get green cards and not wait for years. We must remember these people are not “aliens;” they are people. One action that can help is supporting the Dream & Promise Act of 2025 that offers some DACA recipients, immigrant youth, Temporary Protected Status holders, and Deferred Enforced Departure holders a pathway to citizenship.
Anthony Sandoval is a research assistant with the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab at American University in Washington, DC.
Edited by Katheryn Olmos, Ana Gaston, and Ernesto Castañeda,
Gas flaring at oil drilling site on the Napo river, Amazone, Ecuador (image: flicker)
In 2007, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, named after the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini oil fields located within Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. Correa novel proposal was to leave the approximately 846 million barrels of oil in these fields unexploited in exchange for $3.6 billion in international compensation—half the projected revenue from these reserves. This plan aimed to preserve one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and respect indigenous territories while addressing Ecuador’s economic needs. However, contradictions in Correa’s governance—marked by ambitious social spending funded by extractive industries—highlighted the difficulty of reconciling economic development with long-term environmental commitments.
During Correa’s tenure, Ecuador saw a significant increase in public spending, rising from 20 percent of GDP in 2004 to 43 percent in 2014. This expansion was largely financed through renegotiated oil contracts and an increased state share of oil revenues. Social investments, such as doubling government health expenditures from 2006 to 2016, led to substantial improvements in poverty reduction and infrastructure development.
However, this economic model deepened Ecuador’s reliance on oil, which highlighted the problem of directly linking social progress goals to environmentally destructive practices. While Correa promoted the Yasuní-ITT Initiative internationally, Ecuador simultaneously expanded oil exploration elsewhere, such as in the Amazonian blocks outside Yasuní. Oil concessions in the Amazon in 2007 covered 5 million hectares; 4.3 million of them conceded to foreign companies. In 2011 these numbers doubled with the incorporation of 20 more oil blocks. This inconsistency weakened the credibility of the initiative, making it difficult to secure international funding.
From the outset, the initiative faced skepticism. Donor countries were reluctant to provide funds without enforceable guarantees that future Ecuadorian administrations would uphold the agreement. Additionally, the initiative lacked a clear legal framework to ensure that the pledged conservation funds would lead to sustained economic diversification. Consequently, by 2013 the initiative had secured only $116 million in pledges, with a mere $13 million received, falling significantly short of the $3.6 billion target. The global oil market likely also played a role. In 2014 a sharp decline in oil prices significantly impacted Ecuador’s revenues, further reducing the feasibility of keeping Yasuní’s reserves untapped. With mounting fiscal deficits, Correa’s administration abandoned the initiative in 2013, citing insufficient international contributions.
As Yasuní ITT illustrates, Correa’s government struggled to maintain a coherent environmental policy, oscillating between conservation rhetoric and extractive expansion. This eroded trust among both domestic and international stakeholders. While his administration positioned itself as a defender of indigenous rights and nature, its policies often prioritized oil revenues over sustainability.
The abandonment of the initiative’s conservation goals sparked resistance from environmental and indigenous groups, leading to the formation of YASunidos, a coalition of youth activists, environmentalists, and indigenous advocates. Their activism sought to hold the government accountable, culminating in a push for a national referendum. Although the Ecuadorian government initially obstructed these efforts, the movement continued to pressure policymakers for conservation-oriented reforms.
In an August 2023 national referendum, 60 percent of voters supported the cessation of oil drilling in Yasuní National Park. In response to the vote, the government initiated plans to shut down oil operations in the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini fields. The Energy Ministry announced the closure of the Ishpingo B-56 well, with the full decommissioning process expected to take over five years and cost more than $1.3 billion. However, concerns have been raised regarding government compliance, since the court mandated that the oil industry infrastructure be dismantled within a year.
The failure of the initiative led to the expansion of oil drilling in Yasuní National Park. Oil extraction has contributed to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and contamination of water sources, threatening endemic species and fragile ecosystems. Indigenous communities have faced territorial encroachment, social displacement, and health crises linked to pollution.
The Yasuní-ITT project illustrates the complexities of balancing economic development with environmental sustainability. Ecuador’s experience highlights the contradictions within populist environmental policies and discourse—where ambitious social programs depend on extractive revenues, ultimately undermining conservation efforts. While the 2023 referendum offers a renewed opportunity for environmental protection, long-term success will depend on sustained public pressure, policy consistency, and international cooperation.
To increase the likelihood of success 1) governments must credibly align environmental with economic policies. Contradictory approaches undermine long-term policy effectiveness. 2) Future conservation-based economic models should incorporate strong institutional safeguards, cross-administration continuity, and financial incentives for long-term compliance. 3) Reducing dependence on oil requires long-term investment in alternative sectors such as renewable energy, ecotourism, and technology.
Edgar Aguilar is a Researcher at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student in International Economics at American University
Edited by Rob Albro, Associate Director, Research, at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies
*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.
Image of Welcome to Florida: The Sunshine State sign retrieved from Flikr
The atmosphere is so thick in Florida, you could cut it with a knife. Immigrants feel like they cannot catch a breath. As one immigrant told me, “every day there is something new.” Imagine having to check a map of zones to avoid every time you want to go outside, commuting further away from home to shop for groceries, having to refrain from speaking your native language in public, or avoiding going out to get coffee with a friend to lower the risk of encountering ICE raids or deportation. Living in constant fear, paranoia, and mistrust is no way to live.
State patrols will sit along highways to spot white working vans. In one case, a construction worker was pulled over in his working white van one evening at the end of January because his headlights were “too opaque.” The police officer asked him, “How long have you been in the U.S.?” to which the worker replied, “Over 20 years.” Then the officer gives him a ticket for driving without a license and tells him to go on with his day.
Shortly after the incident, Florida Governor Ron Desantis announced that he would enforce Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Therefore, the Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (FLHSMV) will join forces with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through this partnership, ICE authorizes the Florida Highway Patrol to arrest and detain undocumented immigrants. State troopers will now ask individuals about their immigration status on day-to-day traffic stops. Additionally, state troopers are authorized to detain those suspected to be undocumented, regardless of their actual immigration status. This would completely dismiss the notion of “innocent until proven guilty,” leading to racial profiling of Latino drivers and causing fear among Florida residents. Florida residents have seen an increase in law enforcement. Latinos are more frequently reporting seeing people they know stopped and detained by law enforcement. It feels that this policy is only targeting the brown and immigrant community in Florida.
As Florida faces various problems, including the housing crisis, high home and auto insurance premiums, environmental crisis, and idle hurricane impacts, Desantis believes the so-called “immigration crisis” is the biggest issue at hand. On February 13, Desantis signed the “toughest immigration law in the country.” With this legislation, Desantis will allocate $298 million for detaining and deporting immigrants and increase the penalty for crimes committed by immigrants, including requiring the death penalty for undocumented immigrants who commit capital crimes. Additionally, Desantis is creating a new crime of entering the state of Florida as an undocumented person on top of the already existing federal crime of entering the U.S. through an irregular pathway.
There has been an increase in people moving in from out-of-state, including former residents of New York, California, and New Jersey. Many of them are moving to a state where their out-of-state wages for remote work or social security payments get them further, and the politics better align with their conservative beliefs. The changing demographics and anti-immigrant politics in Florida have also been creating a hostile environment for immigrant Floridians.
While Florida is experiencing an increase in residents from out of state, there is also an increase in immigrant residents moving to safer places out of state. Fleeing persecution is a recurring theme for immigrants; they often find themselves in a state of movement and fear while hoping to one day achieve the American Dream. Those who have lived in Florida for many years, even decades, face significant challenges when it comes to leaving their homes. Many immigrants who have established homes, businesses, children, and pets would prefer to remain in Florida. Immigrants who have built lives in Florida or lack the financial resources to leave are modifying their social and economic behaviors out of fear of deportation.
Florida is already witnessing the impact of migrants no longer participating in their social and economic atmosphere. Businesses that rely on Latino consumers are feeling this impact. Restaurants and other franchises that tend to be busy on weekend nights are empty. Rosy, a frequenter of Jacksonville, Florida’s Latino nightlife, says local Latino bar and club events are practically empty. She states that Latino clubs that always had long wait times to enter now have no lines.
Construction work is down due to high interest rates, weather conditions, and labor shortages. Despite Desantis’ push for mass deportations to solve the housing crisis in Florida, we need immigrants to solve the housing crisis in Florida. On February 20, 6 Mexican workers were detained at a gas station on Southside Blvd. in Jacksonville, Florida. Every day more and more innocent Latinos are detained by ICE. Instilling fear against our most vulnerable yet essential members of the community is not the solution to any of the state’s problems
Katheryn Olmos is a Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student at the Sociology Research and Practice program at American University.
Edited byErnesto Castañeda, Director, and Emma Wyler, Wilfredo Flores, intern at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.
Are MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua terrorist organizations? The short answer is no, they are not. They are transnational criminal organizations. El Salvador’s President Bukele and Donald Trump have officially labeled these groups as terrorist organizations, citing their extreme violence and control over some territories. However, these classifications have sparked debate, as their activities are more aligned with organized crime than political terrorism. Making this distinction is crucial given that mislabeling them can lead to misguided policies that fail at curbing their violence.
The 1980s civil wars in Central America forced nearly a million people to flee the U.S. Some immigrants are still forced to leave their countries because of organized crime and gang recruitment. Today most often, some displaced people are victims of gangs, not members or representatives abroad. However, upon originally arriving in Los Angeles, many Central American migrants faced marginalization and sought protection from the gangs present in the areas where they lived and worked. These challenges ultimately contributed to the formation of the present-day MS-13 and M-18 gangs. Many of the members of these new local gangs were incarcerated in Los Angeles prisons alongside members of other gangs, which allowed them to regroup and learn from their rivals. Shortly after the wars, mass deportations from prisons and streets sent MS-13 and M-18 members back to a weakened Central America, where they expanded their networks and influence.
Similarly, El Tren de Aragua (TdR), which originated in the early 2000s in Venezuelan prisons—particularly the Tocorón prison—has expanded across South America. Originally, a prison gang, Tren de Aragua, expanded beyond prison walls to exploit weak governance, connecting criminal networks across South and North America. Furthermore, like MS-13 and M-18, Tren de Aragua is driven by criminal enterprising rather than political ideology. That is, neither group aims to take over state power or remake society in their own image. Rather, they are hyper-focused on generating maximum profits through illicit means while avoiding state interference. They are criminal syndicates with some capacity—though quite limited—to carry out their rackets across borders. They are certainly NOT terrorist entities.
What separates a terrorist organization from a criminal syndicate? While both engage in illicit activities and use violence as a means to an end, it is crucial to distinguish their goals and methods to dismantle them effectively. The primary difference lies in their objectives: terrorist organizations seek political, religious, or ideological change by influencing government policies or societal structures, whereas transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operate across borders solely for financial gain, without political or ideological motives beyond sowing conditions to maximize profit.
For example, the U.S. government has classified groups like Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) and ISIS as terrorist organizations due to their political objectives. FARCS’s history dates back to 1964 when it emerged as a communist insurgency that employed terrorist tactics. Initially formed as a guerilla movement from campesino self-defense groups, whose primary objective was to overthrow the Colombian government. Over the next five decades, FARC waged guerilla warfare by carrying out illicit activities—such as bombing, kidnappings, and assassinations–all in an effort to challenge state authority. Colombia, the U.S., and the European Union designated FARC as a terrorist organization due to their use of political violence.
However, the 2016 peace accords between FARC and the Colombian government led to the successful disarmament. This agreement allowed the group to transition into a political party known as Comunes. Even though some dissident factions still operate, FARC’s official transformation has been a key factor in maintaining long-term stability in Colombia. Recognizing this shift has been crucial in fostering peace and ensuring that former combatants can engage in democratic processes rather than armed conflict.
The contrast between ISIS and FARC highlights the importance of proper classification. FARC has abandoned the characteristics that once classified it as a terrorist organization and instead has evolved into a political entity. ISIS, on the other hand, remains committed to its extremist and political ideology, seeking to overthrow governments through guerrilla warfare and establish a global Islamic caliphate through territorial control and sectarian violence. Addressing the causes behind these organizations is equally crucial. FARC’s transition has allowed Colombia to tackle the drivers that led to its rise in the first place, providing the foundation for long-term stability. When governments misdiagnose the factors driving their emergence, violence continues.
Despite claims that Tren de Aragua serves the Maduro regime, evidence suggests otherwise. The group arose from Venezuela’s weak governance and not from direct state sponsorship. According to Insight Crime, in September 2023, Venezuelan law enforcement raided the Tocorón prison in Aragua state, aiming to “dismantle and put an end to organized crime gangs and other criminal networks operating from the Tocorón Penitentiary.” This operation demonstrates that Tren de Aragua is not a state-sponsored group, nor is it a tool being used by the Venezuelan state to destabilize the region. Its rise—like that of MS-13 and M-18—can be traced back to systemic failures, including poverty, corruption, and forced population displacement. These factors have allowed transnational criminal organizations to flourish across Latin America.
MS-13 and M-18 expanded by exploiting political corruption and institutional weakness in their home countries. Similarly, Tren de Aragua has taken advantage of Venezuela’s economic crises and large emigration to expand into new territories, such as the Darién Gap. Unlike terrorist organizations, these gangs did not emerge to push a political ideology; rather, they have thrived by leveraging corruption and weak law enforcement. In many ways, they are products of the environments that fostered them, growing out of instability rather than ideological ambition. These transnational criminal groups do not engage in violent attacks abroad, targeting governments or aiming to take political power in the United States. That is beyond their purview and capabilities.
Why does the distinction between organized crime and terrorist organizations matter? Although all of these organizations engage in violence and illicit activities, their end goals set them apart: MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua operate for profit, whereas ISIS and others seek to reshape the political landscape of their regions. Properly distinguishing between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations like MS-13, M-18, and Tren de Aragua is crucial for drafting effective policies and responses to their violence. Mislabeling these groups can lead to inappropriate responses. Applying counterterrorism measures to profit-driven gangs fails to address the root causes for their expansion in the first place. Failing to properly distinguish organized crime from political terrorists leads to failed policies. The misclassification of these groups could destabilize the region by shifting U.S. foreign policy and resources away from where it is truly needed—addressing the drivers of gang-related violence, corruption, and weak governance—toward counterterrorism efforts.
While transnational criminal organizations are heavily involved in drug trafficking, and their violence may create fear among civilians and impact governance, this does not qualify them as terrorist organizations. Their primary objective is financial gain, not advancing an ideological or political agenda. This distinction matters because government responses shape outcomes. If the goal is to curb migration, drug trafficking, or violence, then we need to stop treating criminal organizations like terrorist groups and start addressing the real issues driving their expansion. If the U.S. truly wants to curb migration and secure the southern border, then it must ensure that its classification of these organizations is accurate and aligned with its actual objectives.
Melissa Vasquez is a Graduate Student in the International Affairs and Policy Analysis program at American University and an Intern at the Immigrant Lab.
Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a Professor at American University
Anthony Fontes is an Associate Professor and ethnographer at American University’s School of International Service.
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Days after federal corruption charges against him were dropped, Mayor Eric Adams appears poised to open New York City to President Trump’s mass deportation agenda in what Manhattan’s federal attorney described as a “quid pro quo”. Mr. Adams’ posturing has hinted at this for some time: the mayor has framed the recent influx of asylum-seeking migrants as an economic burden that “will destroy New York City.” “The long-term consequences have yet to materialize of what this crisis will do to our cities,” he told Tucker Carlson on January 22nd.
After crunching the numbers, we agree with Mr. Adams: New York City is just beginning to reap the benefits of this influx of hardworking people. We conservatively estimate that, if their earnings and employment rates are similar to the current undocumented population, the 316,000 asylum seekers who have come here since 2022 will contribute $8.62 billion annually to the city’s economy, a figure greater than the GDP of forty countries. Much of this economic activity will flow to public coffers: the asylum seeker population is projected to pay $942 million more in taxes than they receive in benefits each year. If ICE is allowed to wreak havoc on New York City, all these benefits will be lost.
This is not particularly surprising. Previous waves of immigrants have similarly fled desperate situations, arrived with limited resources, faced nativist backlash, and still become vital contributors to the city’s economy and culture. There’s no reason to believe today’s newcomers should be any different. With New York’s US-born population declining and demand for workers growing fastest in the industries most reliant on immigrant labor, they are arriving at an opportune time.
It’s true that New York City has spent substantial amounts on services for asylum seekers: a combined $5.2 billion in fiscal years 2023 and 2024, with another $4.5 billion budgeted for FY2025. These costs doubtless been have been inflated by Adams’ “emergency” decision to suspend background checks and competitive bidding requirements for contractors providing such services. The Comptroller’s investigation found several egregious examples of overpayment. One contractor received $117/hour for security guards and $201/hour for off-site managers. Despite this waste, spending on asylum seekers made up just 4.2% of the FY2025 budget.
Most importantly, these costs are not the product of an “open border.” Immigrants have been coming to New York City via the border for decades. In fact, the city’s undocumented population was 611,000 in 2012 and fell to 412,000 by 2022. Nor is the scale of the current influx unusual in recent times–during the 1990s, the city’s foreign-born population grew at a higher annual rate than it has during the 2020s.
Each wave of immigration to New York City has been beneficial to both the immigrants themselves and their adopted city. The only difference today is that arcane policies have forced both sides to make major upfront investments before they begin to enjoy those mutual benefits.
Before claiming asylum, people must physically come to the US. For nearly all the asylum seekers we spoke with as part of our ongoing study, this involved taking on substantial debt to finance a deadly, months-long overland journey. This debt can be a major obstacle as people try to establish themselves in New York.
In 2023, John borrowed nearly $30,000 to bring his family of five from Ecuador to the US border. A mechanic by trade, he quickly found work repairing e-bikes at a workshop in Queens, earning $1,200 a week. Yet over half of each paycheck goes to repaying his creditors back home (who have threatened to kill his parents should he miss a payment), leaving him unable to afford rent and trapping his family in the shelter system. He says he’ll have paid off enough debt to move to an apartment in New Jersey in three months.
Lacking a sponsor in the US, crossing the border was John’s only way to come here. Leave aside, for a moment, your beliefs about whether doing so was morally correct. The fact is, he’s here and contributing to our economy. Had he been able to come directly from Quito to New York, his spending power would be going to New York businesses instead of human smugglers.
Another problem: after applying for asylum, people must wait 180 days before receiving a work permit. Unless they have connections to support them, this effectively forces people to live off the state for six months. In practice, our conversations have made clear, it’s often much longer. In 2023, New York City began limiting stays in any one shelter to 60 days, forcing people to shuffle between different facilities. Many migrants are not informed that failing to report this change of address to USCIS within 10 days is a misdemeanor and can delay or derail their ability to get documents.
The experience of Carlos, who we spoke to outside a Manhattan shelter, exemplifies the bureaucratic absurdities that hold migrants back. Bused to NYC in late 2023 as part of Operation Lone Star, he immediately applied for asylum, citing political persecution in Venezuela. While waiting for his work permit, he has bounced between different shelters and worked temporary construction and moving gigs. He says his lack of documentation allowed these employers to exploit him, frequently not paying him in full.
Carlos told us a relative in Oklahoma has found him a job in trucking, his original profession. “The moment my papers arrive, I’m going to Oklahoma,” he says. “They’re waiting on me.” He was supposed to get his work permit months ago but had to restart the process when his address changed. He was most recently told his papers should arrive in 90 days.
The absurdity is infuriating. Due to decades-old laws, people itching to work linger in shelters against their wishes and at great financial cost, while crucial jobs across the country remain unfilled. The Independent Budget Office estimates the cost of missed work authorizations for asylum seekers at up to $1 billion in 2024 alone.
Even so, with US-born workers rapidly aging, rising immigration has done much to ease post-pandemic labor shortages, helping reduce inflation while maintaining economic growth. And asylum seekers are quietly integrating into the city’s economy. Of the 225,000 migrants who have passed through the shelter system, over 170,000 (77%) have moved out, and the number remaining in city care continues to dwindle.
Many interviewees, having recently gotten their work permits and found jobs after a long ordeal, expressed excitement to begin living independently and working towards the various dreams that kept them going through sweltering jungles and deserts. As asylum seekers increasingly fill the jobs that keep New York’s service-based economy moving, the investments made by both sides finally appear to be paying off. For deportations to derail asylum seekers’ budding lives as New Yorkers would be a human tragedy and an economic catastrophe
Marshall Plane is a Research Assistant at The Immigration Lab.
Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a Professor at American University.
Luis Alberto Castillo Rivera graduating from high school in Venezuela (Photo courtesy of his family; Source: Migrant Insider)
The story of Luis Alberto Castillo Rivera, a Venezuelan asylum seeker, has gone viral on TikTok and gained media coverage. Castillo is a man without any criminal history or gang affiliation who entered the United States through a legal pathway. In 2024, this Venezuelan asylum seeker flew to Mexico and awaited his court date. Once he received his appointment date on the CBPOne app on January 19th, 2025, he presented himself at the U.S.-Mexico border in El Paso, where he was processed by immigration authorities and held in detention for no given reason. At the ICE detention center in El Paso, authorities started to question his tattoos, specifically one he had of Michael Jordan. Authorities claimed his Jordan tattoo was affiliated with the Venezuelan gang Tren De Aragua. Many of the tattoos identified by a law enforcement list as used by Tren de Aragua, including stars, roses, tigers, and jaguars, are common among Americans. These so-called identifiers may just be a flimsy pretense for criminalizing the average, non-criminal migrant.
Castillo in a photo released by the Department of Homeland Security of the first flight of migrants preparing to takeoff for Guantanamo Bay, Feb. 4, 2025. DHS
On February 3rd, Castillo told his family that he would be deported to Venezuela, even without a hearing. The next day, he lost contact with his family and was sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on February 4th. President Trump stated he is sending those who have committed crimes in the U.S. to Guantanamo Bay, but Castillo had no criminal history nor gang affiliation and never even had the chance to freely step foot in the U.S.
Castillo’s family was not notified that he would be held at the “longest-running war prison.” His family members only found out about this after seeing pictures online of migrants arriving in Guantanamo Bay. When his family searched for him on the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement website, it appeared he was still in the processing center in El Paso, Texas. Attorneys are calling Guantanamo Bay a “legal black hole,” a place where typical legal protections do not exist for some of the detainees. Some are being held without due process indefinitely without trial or conviction, including thousands of Haitian refugees in the 1990s and almost 800 Muslim men, including minors, over the past two decades. Some of these prisoners have endured incredible physical and psychological abuse and torture in this extralegal space.
Now, the first group sent to Guantanamo Bay, including low-risk migrants and migrants with no criminal record, such as Castillo, were detained in the “counterterrorism suspect” part of the prison – rather than the Migrant Operations Center used in the past to process migrants. The conditions these individuals are facing at this maximum-security prison are inhumane, including mold, undrinkable water, and a lack of adequate medical care. Guantanamo Bay does not even meet the minimum safety standards for detention facilities as set by the U.S. government. Furthermore, the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are subject to permanent physical and psychological trauma.
A less-known but recent story close to home is one where five migrants in North Florida went into a gas station to grab breakfast on the way to their construction job on January 27th and were detained by ICE. Four of them remain detained in Florida. One of them, a Mexican man name Jose Angel Juarez, was sent to Guantanamo Bay; the rumors go that he would be held there for two years. He has no criminal record beyond being caught multiple times crossing the border. He is simply a worker who has been entering and leaving the U.S. every year to work and go home. The idea that Guantanamo Bay was ever for the “worst of the worst” is an illusion. These are just two among many cases of immigrants being detained, held, deported, or sent indefinitely to Guantanamo Bay without due process after being profiled racially or for having tattoos.
Katheryn Olmos is a Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a graduate student at the Sociology Research and Practice program at American University.
Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director, and Emma Wyler, intern at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.
One surprising trend that emerged from the 2024 elections was New York City’s subtle shift to the right. Although the overall results of how each of the five boroughs that make up the city did not change, Trump gained 30% of the overall votes in the 2024 election as opposed to 19% in 2016. There were significant shifts in working-class neighborhoods in the Bronx and Queens. One reason for this may have been the high cost of living in New York and believing that Trump would bring prices down. Nonetheless, we must consider xenophobic messaging on both sides of the political aisle to get the full picture.
Since the initial arrival to of busses with immigrants and asylum seekers from Texas and Arizona to New York City, harmful rhetoric about them has had real-life implications. For instance, in late January 2024 reporting began surrounding an altercation which took place in Times Square between NYPD and a group of migrants. Former Police Commissioner Edward Caban responded to the incident with, “a wave of migrant crime has washed over our city.” Mayor Eric Adams described the incident as “an attack on the foundation of our symbol of safety.” Despite body cam footage released just a few days after the initial reporting, both the media and residents alike repeated the messaging purported by Eric Adams and the NYPD Residents sharing the Eric Adams administration’s belief that migrants’ presence is correlated to an increase in crime in the city is reflected in the results of May 2024 poll. Of the 974 eligible New York City voters surveyed, “over 70 percent blamed migrants in the city for the current crime rate, with 41 percent saying immigration is having a ‘significant’ impact and 31 percent saying a ‘fair amount’ of impact.”
New Yorker’s shift to the right is not limited to the presidential election. Another election result that may appear surprising to some is Republican Stephan Chan’s New York State Senate District 17 win, beating incumbent Iwen Chu. In 2020, New York State underwent a redistricting cycle, and Iwen Chu was the first representative of the newly formed district and served as representation for the growing Asian population in the area. Reporter Michael Lange described Chu’s loss as the solidification of “the Chinese Republican realignment in Southern Brooklyn.” On his campaign website, Stephan Chan emphasized being an immigrant from Hong Kong, a long time Bensonhurst resident, his law enforcement background, and his strong family ties. He also emphasizes his opposition of “wasteful spending of our tax dollars” juxtaposed to photo of himself at a protest opposing the building of a homeless shelter in Gravesend. Unsurprisingly, Chan’s opposition is not limited to homeless shelters. In a campaign ad, a supporter states, “he won’t hand out freebies to migrants while we pay the price.” This reflects not only Chan’s stance on spending on resources for migrants, but of some New Yorkers who often feel like New York City provides recently arrived migrants with services that long-time New Yorkers do not have access to.
On the national level, the growing anti-immigrant sentiment can be seen in how New York’s Congresspeople voted on the Lanken-Riley Act. This bill will allow the Department of Homeland security to detain undocumented immigrants who have been accused of burglary, theft, larceny or shoplifting. It also allows for states to sue the federal government for “decisions or alleged failures related to immigration enforcement.” Opponents of the bill are concerned about the erosion of due process for those accused of crimes and the lack of funding that is required to implement it. On January 23, 2025, the bill passed 263 to 156, with 6 out of 17 New York House members representing Downstate New York voting “Yea.” The bill was signed by President Trump on January 29, 2025.
These election results amongst other things have already caused great concern around the upcoming mayoral and gubernatorial races. Ironically, despite Adam’s law and order campaign, he is in legal trouble. Likewise, since fall 2024, New Yorkers have been left many questions. During a November 6, 2024, news conference, Eric Adams was asked about his administration’s plans to cooperate with Donald Trump’s mass deportation efforts. In reply, Adams stated “We cannot add to the anxiety and fear that people are experiencing.” The following week, Adams affirmed New York City’s sanctuary city status but stated that he believed that laws surrounding local law enforcement’s cooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement should be changed. Adams was also present as Trump’s inauguration and cancelled his attendance at various Martin Luther King Day celebrations to many New Yorker’s dismay. His reluctance to outright denounce Trump’s stance on immigration and recent ICE raids has caused uneasiness for immigrant advocacy groups within the city and causes further speculation that Adam’s refusal to publicly critique Trump is for his own personal gain. Democrats have long relied on New York City to keep New York State blue but shifts to the right in New York City may lead to the party losing its stronghold in the country.
Caryalyn Jean, Sociology Research and Practice MA (SORP) Student at American University
ORLANDO, Florida.- La política migratoria en Estados Unidos se encuentra en el foco de la atención tras las recientes órdenes ejecutivas firmadas por el presidente Donald Trump en los primeros días de su mandato. Entre las medidas, se encuentran restricciones temporales para refugiados, la limitación de solicitudes de asilo en la frontera y la polémica orden para negar certificados de nacimiento a hijos de padres sin estatus migratorio regular.
Estos movimientos han generado demandas en 18 estados, argumentando que violan el derecho de ciudadanía por nacimiento, protegido por la 14.ª Enmienda de la Constitución.
1. Migrante
Un migrante es cualquier persona que se traslada lejos de su lugar de origen, ya sea dentro de su país o al extranjero. Algunos se ven forzados a moverse por violencia o desastres naturales, mientras que otros migran por razones económicas o familiares. Este término incluye tanto a quienes cruzan fronteras de manera documentada como no documentada.
2. Inmigrante
El inmigrante es un migrante que se establece en un país diferente al de su nacimiento. En Estados Unidos, los inmigrantes pueden tener diferentes estatus legales, desde la residencia permanente (Green Card) hasta visas temporales, como las de trabajo (H-1B) o estudio (F-1). También hay visas humanitarias, como la T para víctimas de tráfico humano y la U para víctimas de crímenes graves.
3. Inmigrante indocumentado o irregular
Este término engloba a personas que ingresan o permanecen en un país sin autorización legal. Algunos llegaron con visas que vencieron, mientras que otros cruzaron sin documentos. En Estados Unidos muchos indocumentados trabajan y pagan impuestos, aunque no reciben beneficios de seguridad social.
4. Solicitante de asilo
Es alguien que pide protección al llegar a un puerto de entrada o dentro del país, alegando peligro en su nación de origen por persecución política, religiosa, étnica o de otro tipo. El proceso puede tomar años y requiere pruebas contundentes.
5. Refugiado
Un refugiado solicita protección desde el extranjero antes de ingresar a Estados Unidos, generalmente escapando de conflictos armados o persecución. Una vez en el país, pueden trabajar legalmente y, al cabo de un año, solicitar la residencia permanente.
6. Niños no acompañados
Se refiere a menores que cruzan la frontera sin un tutor legal. Según las leyes estadounidenses, pueden permanecer en el país y buscar estatus legal, generalmente bajo el cuidado de familiares ya residentes.
7. Separación familiar
Esta práctica polémica, intensificada durante el primer mandato de Trump, consiste en separar a padres migrantes de sus hijos al cruzar la frontera. Aunque la administración Biden intentó reunificar familias, cientos de niños aún están separados de sus padres.
8. Detención migratoria
Es la detención de inmigrantes en centros similares a cárceles, gestionados por el gobierno o empresas privadas, mientras esperan audiencias o deportaciones. Estas condiciones han sido criticadas por su dureza, incluyendo el uso de “hieleras” con temperaturas extremadamente bajas.
9. Coyote
Es el término utilizado para describir a los guías que, a cambio de dinero, ayudan a migrantes a cruzar fronteras de manera clandestina. Esta actividad se ha vuelto más costosa y peligrosa debido al endurecimiento de las políticas fronterizas.
10. Jugadores clave del gobierno
La política migratoria en EE. UU. involucra varias agencias: el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DHS), la Patrulla Fronteriza (CBP), Inmigración y Control de Aduanas (ICE) y el Departamento de Salud y Servicios Humanos (HHS), que asiste a menores no acompañados. Entender estos términos humaniza a las personas detrás de las estadísticas. En tiempos de políticas migratorias restrictivas, la empatía y el conocimiento son herramientas esenciales para abordar este tema con sensibilidad.
President Donald Trump aims to upend the immigration system in the United States in his first few days in office. On Jan. 20, 2025, Trump signedvarious executive ordersthat temporarily prevent refugees from coming to the U.S. and block immigrants from applying for asylum at a U.S. border, among other measures.
We arescholarsofimmigrationwho closely followpublic discussionsabout immigrationpolicy, trends and terminology. Understanding the many different immigration terms – some technical, some not – can help people better understand immigration news. While not an exhaustive list, here are 10 important terms to know:
1. Migrant
A migrant is a person who moves from their place of birth to another location relatively far away. There are different words used to describe migrants and their particular circumstances. Internally displaced people, for example, means people who are forced to move within their own country because of violence, natural disasters and other reasons.
International migrants move from one country to another, sometimes without the legal authorization to enter or stay in another country. There are also seasonal or circular migrants, who often move back and forth between different places.
Between 30% and 60% of all migrants eventually return to their birth countries.
There is not much difference in why people decide to migrate within their own country or internationally, with or without the legal permission to do so. But it is easier for people from certain countries to move than from others.
2. Immigrants
The terms immigrants and migrants are often used interchangeably. Migration indicates movement in general. Immigration is the word used to describe the process of a non-citizen settling in another country. Immigrants have a wide range of legal statuses.
An immigrant in the U.S. might have a green card or a permanent resident card – a legal authorization that gives the person the legal right to stay and work in the U.S. and to apply for citizenship after a few years.
An immigrant with a T visa is a foreigner who is allowed to stay in the U.S. for up to four years because they are victims of human or sex trafficking. Similarly, an immigrant with a U visa is the victim of serious crimes and can stay in the U.S. for up to four years, and then apply for a Green Card.
Many international students in higher education have an F-1 visa. They must return to their country of birth soon after they graduate, unless they are sponsored by a U.S. employer, enroll in another educational program, or marry a U.S. citizen. The stay can be extended for one or two years, depending on the field of study.
Photo cerdits to Brandon Bell/Getty Images
3. Undocumented Immigrants, Unauthorized Immigrants and Illegal Immigrants
These three charged political terms refer to the same situation: migrants who enter or remain in the country without the proper legal paperwork. People in this category also include those who come to the U.S. with a visa and overstay its permitted duration.
Some of these immigrants work for cash that is not taxed. Most work with fake Social Security numbers, pay taxes and contribute to Social Security funds without receiving money after retirement.
Immigrants without legal authorization to be in the U.S. spent more than US$254 billion in 2022.
4. Asylum Seekers
An asylum seeker is a person who arrives at a U.S. port of entry – via an airport or a border crossing – and asks for protection because they fear returning to their home country. An immigrant living in the U.S. for up to one year can also apply for asylum.
Asylum seekers can legally stay temporarily in the U.S. while they wait to bring their case to an immigration judge. The process typically takes years.
Someone is eligible for asylum if they can show proof of persecution because of their political affiliation, religion, ethnic group, minority status, or belonging to a targeted group. Many others feel they need to leave their countries because of threats of violence or abusive relationships, among other dangerous circumstances.
A judge will eventually decide whether a person’s fear is with merit and can stay in the country.
Photo cerdits to Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images
5. Refugees
Refugees are similar to asylum seekers, but they apply to resettle in the U.S. while they remain abroad. Refugees are often escaping conflict.
The Biden administration had a cap of admitting up to 125,000 refugees a year.
Refugees can legally work in the U.S. as soon as they arrive and can apply for a green card one year later. Research shows that refugees become self-sufficient soon after they settle in the country and are net-positive for the country’s economy through the federal taxes they pay.
6. Unaccompanied Children
This is a U.S. government classification for migrant children who enter the U.S. without a parent or guardian, and without proper documentation or the legal status to be in the country. Because they are minors, they are allowed to enter the country and apply for the right to stay. Most often, they have relatives already in the country, who assume the role of financial and legal sponsors.
7. Family Separation
This refers to a government policy of separating detained migrant parents or guardians from the children they are responsible for an traveling with as a family unit. The first Trump administration separated families arriving at the border as part of an attempt to reduce immigration.
Legal migration systems that lack avenues for immigrants who work in manual labor to move with their families, and deportations, both also create family separations.
8. Immigration Detention
Immigration detention refers to the U.S. government apprehending immigrants who are in the U.S. without authorization and holding them in centers that are run similar to prisons. Some of these centers are run by the government, and others are outsourced to private companies.
When a U.S. Customs and Border Protection official apprehends an immigrant, they are often first brought to a building where they are placed in what many call a hielera, which means icebox or freezer in Spanish. This refers to cells, cages or rooms where the government keeps immigrants at very low temperatures with foil blankets and without warm clothing.
Immigrants might then be quickly deported or otherwise released in the country while they await a court date for an asylum case. Other immigrants who are awaiting deportation or a court date will be placed in an immigration detention center. Some must post bond to be released while awaiting trial.
9. Coyote
A coyote is the Spanish word for a guide who is paid by migrants and asylum seekers to take them to their destination, undetected by law enforcement. Coyotes used to be trusted by the migrantsthey were helping cross into the country. As the U.S. has tried to make it harder to enter illegally, the business of taking people to and across the U.S.-Mexico border unseen has become more expensive and dangerous.
10. The Alphabet Soup of Government Players
The Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, is a law enforcement agency created after 9/11. It includes a number of agencies that focus on immigration.
These include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, an agency that is in charge of collecting import duties, passport and document controls at airports, ports, and official points of entry along the border.
The Border Patrol is a federal law enforcing agency under CBP in charge of patrolling and securing U.S. borders and ports.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is a branch of DHS that works within the U.S., within its borders, focusing on detaining and deporting immigrants.
by Fernando Medici, Mackenzie Presbyterian University
Photo Credit to Amauri Nehn/NurPhoto via AP
Few people outside of Brazil are likely aware that this South American country endured its own version of a Capitol attack. On January 8th, 2023 — two years after the infamous U.S. incident — a mob of supporters of former president Bolsonaro stormed government buildings, including Congress and the Supreme Court. This brazen assault on democratic institutions highlights the dangerous influence of right-wing radicalization and rampant social mediatized fake news, which continue to undermine the nation’s fragile democracy by amplifying a hate campaign against Brazil’s Supreme Court, and pleas for military intervention, while celebrating the insurrection that ended with Bolsonaro’s followers storming the Supreme Court Building.
Like its American counterpart, the unrest was fueled by unsubstantiated claims of election fraud following Bolsonaro’s defeat at the polls. However, what set Brazil’s crisis apart was the additional troubling involvement and support of several high-profile military figures.
Subsequently many of the insurgents were indicted, but until recently little had been done regarding the still unknown leadership of the movement.
That changed this past November as former President Jair Bolsonaro and 36 others were indicted by Brazil’s Federal Police for crimes including an attempted coup d’état, violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, and involvement in an alleged attempt on the lives of President Lula, Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Minister Alexandre de Moraes.
Of course, despite the political weight of these charges, an indictment is not equivalent to a conviction and does not automatically lead to a trial. It only provides evidence for the Prosecutor General’s Office to decide whether to proceed with the case or not. This is not the first time Bolsonaro has been indicted. He was previously implicated in investigations for fraudulent vaccine records and for trying to conceal Saudi Jewelry he was gifted as president, which, according to Brazilian Law, belongs to the government. Both criminal proceedings are currently underway, and Bolsonaro is prohibited from leaving the country.
Regarding the coup d’état-related indictments, after an extensive investigation, the Brazilian Federal Police concluded that the alleged coup attempt was supposed take place in late 2022, after Bolsonaro’s election defeat and led by prominent military figures, including General and formal State-Secretary Mario Fernandes and General Braga Netto, Bolsonaro’s vice president candidate in the most recent election. According to the investigators, Bolsonaro was aware of and supported the coup efforts.
This case underscores the frail state of Brazilian Democracy after years of political radicalization and the unchecked spread of rampant fake news. In large part the proliferation of fake news has been fueled by Bolsonaro’s “Hate Cabinet”, a group led Bolsonaro’s sons Flávio and Eduardo and responsible for managing far-right social networks, the spread of misinformation, and promotion of hate campaigns against Bolsonaro’s political adversaries.
Now, Brazilians await conclusion of the legal process. Expectations are that at the soonest a possible legal action could be filed next year, since the General Prosecutor’s Office will need months to go through the evidence.
Uncertainty surrounding the legal process and the timeline for potential action reflect the broader challenges facing Brazilian institutions and democracy. While the indictments represent a significant step toward accountability, the slow pace of the justice system underscores deeper institutional challenges, exacerbating political polarization and social mistrust. It also feeds narratives of persecution and bias, particularly among Bolsonaro’s far-right supporters, who often portray the judiciary as politically motivated. The credibility of the Brazilian Supreme Court, already eroded by its controversial role in the Lava Jato operation and its perceived partisanship during past political crises, now faces renewed scrutiny. In a country already deeply divided along ideological lines, its lack of perceived impartiality risks intensifying public skepticism, further destabilizing Brazil’s fragile democratic institutions.
It is not a surprise that Bolsonaro supporters have dismissed the allegations against him as political persecution and remain entrenched in their views, further deepening political rifts in Brazilian society. When large segments of the population operate under different understandings of reality, it becomes nearly impossible to foster the trust needed for a healthy democracy.
This scenario places Brazil’s democratic institutions under considerable strain. The 2023 storming of Congress and the Supreme Court demonstrated the vulnerability of these institutions when confronted with coordinated antidemocratic efforts. Now, with claims of military involvement, the alleged coup raises serious questions about how long Brazilian democracy can continue to withstand such blows.
The problem is made worse by Bolsonaro’s hate campaign against the Supreme Court, which has eroded trust in the institution, guaranteeing that any legal decision against him will be seen by a large subset of Brazilians as corrupt and politically motivated.
If Brazilian democracy is to survive, it will require more than just the prosecution of a few individuals, even if they are high-profile. A broader effort to rebuild trust in democratic institutions and to reduce the spread of misinformation will also be necessary. Without addressing the root causes of radicalization and polarization, Brazilian Democracy will continue to be vulnerable, whether to attacks by Bolsonaro’s followers or other political groups.
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