Deportaciones Masivas Podrían Crear una Recesión en EE.UU

Ernesto Castañeda

Entrevista de Diana Castrillón a Ernesto Castañeda publicada por Stornia 13 de agosto de 2024 editada y expandida por Castañeda.

Diana Castrillón: “La inmigración irregular es uno de los temas más importantes de las campañas presidenciales de los candidatos, el republicano Donald Trump y la demócrata Kamala Harris. Por un lado, la administración de Biden-Harris restringió el número de solicitantes de asilo que pueden ingresar al país. Por otro lado, los republicanos están prometiendo el “mayor programa de deportación masiva en la historia de Estados Unidos” si es que ganan la Casa Blanca este otoño.

El sentimiento antiinmigrante en Estados Unidos está en aumento. Este año, el 55% de los estadounidenses dijeron que les gustaría ver una disminución de la inmigración, una novedad desde el 2001. Esto se debe en parte a la creencia que los inmigrantes, en particular los indocumentados, son una carga para los recursos del gobierno y no contribuyen en nada.

Sin embargo, un nuevo estudio del Instituto de Política Fiscal y Económica muestra que es todo lo contrario. Según el informe, los inmigrantes indocumentados contribuyeron con casi $100 mil millones de dólares en impuestos durante 2022 y a su vez, no pudieron acceder a muchos de los programas que financiaron sus dólares de impuestos.

De esos casi $100 mil millones, $60 mil millones se destinaron al gobierno federal. Por cada millón de inmigrantes indocumentados, los servicios federales reciben $8.900 millones de dólares adicionales en ingresos fiscales. Más de un tercio de los impuestos que pagan estos inmigrantes se destinan a programas a los que no pueden acceder, como la Seguridad Social ($25,700 millones de dólares), salud Medicare ($6,400 millones de dólares) y el seguro de desempleo ($1,800 millones de dólares).

Los indocumentados suelen pagar tasas impositivas más altas que los ciudadanos estadounidenses. En 40 de los 50 estados del país, los inmigrantes irregulares pagan tasas de impuestos estatales y locales más altos que el 1% de los hogares con mayores ingresos. Además, no pueden recibir muchos créditos fiscales. No se dan cuenta que pueden reclamar reembolsos y tampoco tienen acceso a ayuda fiscal.

“En total, la contribución fiscal federal de los inmigrantes indocumentados ascendió a $59,400 millones de dólares en 2022, mientras que la contribución fiscal estatal y local se situó en 37,300 millones de dólares”, escribieron los autores del estudio. “Estas cifras dejan claro que las decisiones sobre política migratoria tienen implicaciones sustanciales para los ingresos públicos en todos los niveles de gobierno”, menciona el informe.”

En entrevista con Stornia, Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director del Laboratorio de la Inmigración y el Centro de Estudios Latino Americanos y Latinos de American University en Washington DC, aseguró que los inmigrantes son necesarios y esenciales para el crecimiento económico de Estados Unidos.

Diana Castrillón: ¿Cómo paga un inmigrante indocumentado impuestos, si como su nombre lo dice, son migrantes irregulares?

Ernesto Castañeda: Los indocumentados pagan impuestos cada vez que compran algo, está el impuesto a la compra, el porcentaje depende de cada localidad. Si compran casas, que lo pueden hacer, también pagan impuestos, si rentan o pagan renta, también hay un porcentaje que se debe pagar en impuestos al gobierno local y federal. La gente indocumentada que trabaja en compañías formales, que son muchos, pueden tener una identificación temporal para pagar impuestos (ITIN), que funciona de manera similar al número de Seguridad Social, entonces pagan impuestos a la nómina como cualquier otra persona trabajando en Estados Unidos. Hay gente que usa documentos de identidad falsos o que no les corresponden, pero alguien se los presta, y así pagan a las arcas de Seguro Social y programas de retiro y de salud, pero como el número es falso o no es de ellos, no tienen acceso a esos beneficios.

Entonces, no solo pagan a estos servicios, sino que muchos inmigrantes no piden ese apoyo. Por lo tanto, tienen una contribución mayor a los ciudadanos que pagan, pero quien luego si retiran esas ayudas. Es una ganancia que el Gobierno Federal y el Tesoro aceptan abiertamente que sucede.

¿Entonces los inmigrantes indocumentados están pagando más impuestos que los mismos ciudadanos americanos?

Si, la tasa de muchos indocumentados que pagan impuestos es más alta que las tasas que paga la gente más rica del país. Claro, los ingresos son diferentes pero la tasa es a veces mayor o muy similar, a la de los ciudadanos. Los ciudadanos llenan sus declaraciones de impuestos y muchas veces piden reembolsos, por ejemplo, por gastos de negocios o les dan un crédito por tener hijos, pero muchos de los indocumentados no hacen esos reclamos porque no quieren que más adelante se les niegue la ciudadanía por haber pedido ayudas o servicios. Por ese temor, tampoco piden programas de apoyo para sus hijos, que ya son ciudadanos y tienen derecho a esos servicios. Hemos comprobado en nuestras investigaciones en el Laboratorio de Inmigración que los inmigrantes usan menos servicios sociales que los nacionales (Castañeda y Cione, 2024).

Pareciera que los indocumentados están entre la espada y la pared ahora con la campaña electoral tanto por el lado de los republicanos como por el lado de los demócratas, ¿hay preocupación en la comunidad?

Algunos políticos usan a los inmigrantes indocumentados como chivos expiatorios en tiempos electorales. Por un lado, Trump hace esta amenaza de deportaciones masivas, pero es poco probable que lo haga, eso mismo lo había prometido anteriormente y cuando fue presidente no deportó a tanta gente. Eso no significa que la gente no tenga miedo ahora y si gana creará un terror real entre la población que ya de por sí vive con mucho miedo a que los encuentren como indocumentados a ellos o a alguien cercano.

En cuanto situaciones de asilo, en efecto, mucha gente está escapando de situaciones difíciles en Afganistán, Ucrania, Cuba, Venezuela, Haití o Nicaragua.  Muchos con pruebas de persecución, y ahora el gobierno ha cambiado cómo tramita buscar asilo.  La frontera está cerrada a muchas de esas peticiones de asilo como se hizo durante la pandemia. Por ende, estamos viendo menos cruces irregulares en la frontera. La administración Biden-Harris piensa que eso les puedes ayudar electoralmente para que los republicanos no les hagan la crítica de que la frontera está supuestamente abierta y los que indocumentados o quienes piden asilo están recibiendo comida y vivienda en algunas ciudades. Es un momento difícil, y no es sostenible. En algún momento van a tener que reabrir la frontera al asilo humanitario, porque a lo que llaman el derecho nacional e internacional es a recibir a la gente que está pidiendo asilo. Tras procesar sus aplicaciones, a unos los aceptarán a otros no.

Trump necesitaría mucho dinero y mucha policía, casi tendría que crear un estado totalitario para poder deportar a toda la gente que está aquí sin papeles migratorios en regla. Muchas de estas personas tienen más de 10 años aquí, tienen hijos ciudadanos, trabajan, contribuyen, por lo cual, deportar masivamente o dejar de recibir inmigrantes es un gran ataque a Estados Unidos. La economía se podría contraer. Se podría crear una recesión porque como mencionamos anteriormente, los migrantes pagan miles de millones en impuestos, pero los impuestos son un porcentaje pequeño de lo que la gente gana. La mayoría de los inmigrantes ganan, lo gastan en las ciudades donde viven, y con el trabajo que hacen generan crecimiento económico, servicios, entretenimiento y hacen que la economía crezca.

Hace algunos días JD Vance, la fórmula vicepresidencial de Donald Trump justificaba el plan de deportación masiva y decía que los indocumentados le están robando plazas de trabajo a los ciudadanos americanos. ¿Existe esa fila de estadounidenses esperando a que deporten inmigrantes para tomar sus puestos de trabajo?

Esto no funciona así. Trump y Vance están equivocados sobre que los inmigrantes les quitan trabajos a los afroamericanos o a otros ciudadanos. Es un estereotipo fácil de vender, algún votante pudo haber tenido una experiencia donde pareciera que pudo ser el caso, sin embargo, si vemos a la economía en general, la inmigración genera nuevos empleos.

En Florida, está en efecto la ley anti-inmigrante más estricta del país. De hecho, han salido muchos indocumentados del estado, y hoy no hay suficiente mano de obra para la construcción, para servicios como hoteles, para la agricultura en los cultivos de naranjas. Entonces los negocios que necesitaban esa mano de obra para generar riqueza ahora no pueden tener su negocio al 100%. Propietarios de granjas han tenido que cerrar porque les falta mano de obra para trabajar, algunos negocios pequeños han tenido que limitar sus horas de servicios. Si no hay construcción no hay viviendas, seguirá habiendo inflación por las viviendas existentes. Los inmigrantes llegan y necesitan un lugar donde vivir, quien les corte el pelo, quien les venda comida, entonces generan trabajo e ingreso para los comerciantes.

Los migrantes emprenden con más negocios (desde pequeños negocios hasta las grandes empresas) que los nacidos en Estados Unidos. También sabemos que los inmigrantes emplean más gente que los dueños de negocios del país. No es que haya un pastel que esté limitado y se lo reparta el número de gente que llega, entre más personas lleguen, incrementa el tamaño del pastel entonces hay más pastel para todos. No es una competencia desleal y eso se ve en las tasas de desempleo.

Ahora bajo la administración Biden-Harris tenemos una tasa de desempleo para afroamericanos históricamente baja, una tasa de desempleo de latinos muy baja y no hay muchos ciudadanos de origen europeo que están desempleados porque algún migrante esté tomando su trabajo, si noq que usualmente no encuentran trabajo porque no los estudios o capacitación suficiente para tomar un empleo bien pagado, o por el contrario, porque tienen demasiada educación y no hay un empleo con alto ingreso que les convenga tomar. O porque se rehúsan a mudarse dentro del país para buscar trabajo. Las tasas de desempleo son bajas en general y de lo que se quejan los empresarios es que no tienen suficiente personal para expandir sus negocios. Esto también afecta a los ciudadanos buscando servicios, teniendo que esperar más en restaurantes porque no hay suficientes meseros o cocineros.

¿Cuál es la respuesta para el manejo de inmigración, más visas temporales de empleos, legalizar a los indocumentados o hacer más muro en la frontera?

La solución a los casos de inmigración irregular a largo plazo es aumentar las visas temporales de empleo para que la gente venga de manera legal. Existen programas como la Visa H2A, H2B son ejemplos de visas que funciona muy bien, la gente viene, trabaja y se regresa a su país, porque ya ganaron ingresos en dólares pudieron ahorrar suficiente y ahora quieren estar con su familia.

El problema es que hay límites, hay cuotas para esas visas, son para cierto tipo de empleos, y hay más demanda de esa gente trabajadora temporal de lo que la que la ley permite. Para que aumenten los topes, los números de esas visas, el Congreso tiene que actuar. Tiene que actuar la Cámara de Representantes y el Senado, y tienen que estar de acuerdo los demócratas, de que es lo que harían, y un número suficiente de republicanos. Pero ellos se niegan a hacerlo, porque parece que no quieren solucionar el tema, solo lo quieren usar de manera electoral.

Para las personas que ya están aquí, la solución es legalizarlos. Al darle papeles o permisos laborales a quienes están aquí, de esa manera muchos ganarían más dinero, tendrían más confianza de invertir, pagarían más impuestos. Esto sería una inyección a la economía americana, y podrían traer a sus familiares de manera legal y expandir la base trabajadora un poco más.

Y eso es algo que ni Trump ni Vance entienden, nunca lo harán. A diferencia del presidente Ronald Reagan, quien sí firmó una ley como esa, aunque a regañadientes. Tampoco es algo sobre lo que han querido hablar mucho Kamala Harris ni Tim Walz en la campaña porque la gente lo usa como un ataque muy simple con ellos, pero los dos tienen un historial político de apoyar este tipo de medidas.

¿Y con esta legalización de indocumentados en Estados Unidos ganan países de América Latina o pierden?

Las remesas representan solo el 4% de lo que los inmigrantes generan en Estados Unidos. Un migrante que está más establecido o es profesional, manda remesas menos seguido, entonces son ayudas a familias en pobreza. Las remesas representan separaciones familiares por años hasta que el migrante termina regresando o trata de traer a la familia entera. Es una ayuda a corto plazo, pero pone a las familias que se dividen en dificultad emocional y cualquier país que pierde migrantes, desde agricultores hasta científicos, médicos, como en Cuba que ha perdido un par de millones de migrantes profesionales durante el último par de años debilita cada vez más su economía. También pasa en la economía venezolana, que ha sido debilitada entre otras muchas cosas por la emigración. Las remesas son ayudas de corto plazo, pero la verdadera ayuda económica se da en donde llegan los migrantes, en este caso Estados Unidos.

De acuerdo con el estudio de Instituto de Política Fiscal y Económica, la autorización de trabajo sería beneficiosa para todos, pues otorgar a los inmigrantes indocumentados una autorización de trabajo resultaría en un aumento de sus contribuciones fiscales de $40,000 millones de dólares a $137,000 millones de dólares por año, ya que la autorización de trabajo aumentaría los salarios.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director del Laboratorio de Inmigración y el Centro de Estudios Latino Americanos y Latinos, American University en Washington DC.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

The English version of this text is available at the following link: https://aulablog.net/2024/08/26/mass-deportations-could-create-a-us-recession/

Mass Deportations Could Create a US Recession

By Ernesto Castañeda

Interview by Diana Castrillon with Ernesto Castañeda published in Stornia August 13, 2024. Edited and expanded by Castañeda. Original in Spanish. Translated by Castañeda.

Diana Castrillon: “Irregular immigration is one of the most important issues in the presidential campaigns of the candidates, Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris. On the one hand, the Biden administration, of which Vice President Harris is part, restricted the number of asylum seekers entering the country, and on the other hand, Republicans are promising the “largest mass deportation program in US history” if they win the White House this fall.

Anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States is on the rise, with more than half (55%) of Americans this year saying they would like to see a decrease in immigration, a first since 2001. This is partly due to the belief that immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, are a burden on government resources and contribute nothing to the economy.

However, a new study from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy shows that the opposite is true. According to the report, undocumented immigrants contributed nearly $100 billion in taxes during 2022, while being unable to access many of the programs their tax dollars funded. Of that nearly $100 billion, $60 billion went to the federal government. For every million undocumented immigrants, federal services receive an additional $8.9 billion in tax revenue. More than a third of the taxes paid by these immigrants go to programs they cannot access, such as Social Security ($25.7 billion), Medicare ($6.4 billion), and unemployment insurance ($1.8 billion).

In addition, undocumented immigrants often pay higher tax rates than American citizens: in 40 of the 50 U.S. states, illegal immigrants pay higher state and local tax rates than the 1% of households with the highest incomes. In addition, they cannot receive many tax credits and often do not realize that they can claim refunds or prefer not to. “In total, the federal tax contribution of undocumented immigrants amounted to $59.4 billion in 2022, while the state and local tax contribution stood at $37.3 billion,” the authors of the study wrote. “These figures make it clear that decisions on immigration policy have substantial implications for public revenues at all levels of government,” the report says.

In an interview with Stornia, Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University in Washington DC, said that immigrants are necessary and essential for the economic growth of the United States.

Diana Castrillon: How does an undocumented immigrant pay taxes, if as their name suggests, they are irregular migrants?

Ernesto Castañeda: Undocumented immigrants pay taxes every time they buy something; there is a sales tax, and the percentage depends on each locality. If they buy houses, they also pay taxes, or if they rent, there is a percentage that must be paid in taxes to the local and federal governments. Undocumented people who work in formal companies, which are many, can have a temporary identification to pay taxes (ITIN), which works in a similar way to a Social Security number, so they pay payroll taxes like any other person working in the United States. There are some undocumented people who use false or incorrect identification documents, but someone lends them one, and so they pay into the Social Security and retirement and health programs. However, since the number is false or does not belong to them, they do not have access to those benefits when they retire. So, not only do they pay for these services, but many immigrants do not ask for these benefits. Therefore, they have a net or even greater contribution than the citizens who pay, but then they withdraw those benefits such as social security after retirement. It is a gain that the federal government and the Treasury openly accept that happens.

So, are undocumented immigrants paying more taxes than American citizens themselves?

Yes—the rate of many undocumented people who pay taxes is higher than the rates paid by the richest people in the country. Of course, their incomes are different, but the rate is sometimes higher or very similar to that of citizens. Citizens fill out their tax returns and often ask for tax returns and reimbursements, for example, they get a credit for having children, but many undocumented taxpayers do not make these claims because they do not want to be denied citizenship in the future for having asked for aid. Nor do they ask for support programs for their children, who are already citizens and have the right to those services, out of fear. We have documented that, indeed, immigrants use fewer social services than U.S.-born citizens (Castañeda and Cione, 2024).

It seems that undocumented immigrants are between a rock and a hard place now with the electoral campaign on both the Republican and Democratic sides. Is there concern in the community?

Some politicians use undocumented immigrants as scapegoats. On the one hand, Trump makes this threat of mass deportations, but it is unlikely that he will do it. He had promised that before, and when he was president, he did not deport as many people. That doesn’t mean that people aren’t scared now, and if he wins, he’s going to create real terror among the people who already live in fear of themselves or their family members being found. That’s a reality that undocumented immigrants have been living with for many years.

As for asylum, in fact, many people are fleeing Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti, many with proof of persecution, and now the government has changed how it processes these asylum cases. The border is closed to many of these asylum requests as it was during the pandemic, so we’re seeing fewer people let in through the wall in between ports of entry. The Biden-Harris administration thinks that this can help them electorally so that Republicans don’t criticize them about the border supposedly being open or about undocumented individuals or those seeking asylum temporarily receiving food and housing in some cities. At some point, they will have to reopen the border to asylum seekers because national and international law calls to receive people who are asking for asylum. Some will be accepted, others will not after processing their applications.

Trump would need a lot of money and policing. He would have to create a totalitarian state to be able to deport all the people who are here. Many of these people have been here for more than 10 years. Their children are citizens. They work, and they contribute. So, deporting in massive numbers or stopping receiving immigrants and asylum seekers is a great attack on the United States and the economy could contract. Massive deportations from the interior could create a recession because, as we indicated, migrants pay billions in taxes. However, taxes are a small percentage of what people earn, and most of what immigrants earn is spent in the cities where they live. With the work they do, they generate economic growth, services, and entertainment.

A few days ago, JD Vance, Donald Trump’s vice-presidential candidate, justified the mass deportation plan and said that undocumented immigrants are stealing jobs from American citizens. Is there a line of Americans waiting for immigrants to be deported to take their jobs?

It doesn’t work like that. Trump and Vance are wrong about immigrants taking jobs from citizens or African Americans. It’s an easy stereotype to sell. Some voters may have had an experience where it seemed that could be the case. However, if we look at the economy in general, immigration generates new jobs. In Florida, the strictest anti-immigrant law in the country is in effect. In fact, many undocumented immigrants have left the state, and today, there is not enough labor for construction, services such as hotels, or even to pick oranges. So, the businesses that needed that labor to generate wealth now do not have their business functioning 100%. Middle-sized farm owners have had to close because they lack the labor, and some small businesses have had to limit their service hours. If there is no construction, there is no housing, and there is more inflation for existing housing. Immigrants arrive and need a place to live, someone to cut their hair, and someone to sell them food, so they generate work and income for merchants. Immigrants start more service businesses, as well as large companies, than those born in the United States. We also know that in general, immigrants employ more people than business owners who are from the country.

It is not like there is an economic pie that is shared by the number of people who are here plus those who arrive. Indeed, the more people arrive, the bigger the pie becomes, so there will be more pie for everyone to share. It is not unfair competition, and that is seen in the unemployment rates. Under the Biden-Harris administration, we have a historically low unemployment rate for African Americans and for Latinos. There are very few citizens of European origin who are unemployed because some immigrants are taking their jobs. They usually do not find work because they do not have enough education to take a job or, on the contrary, because they have too much education and there is no high-income job that they can take. Or because they refuse to move to look for work. Unemployment rates are low and what business owners complain about is that they do not have enough staff in organizations to expand their businesses. This also affects citizens looking for services and having to wait longer in restaurants because there are not enough waiters or cooks.

What is the answer to immigration management, more temporary employment visas, legalizing undocumented immigrants, or building more walls on the border?

The solution to long-term cases of irregular immigration is to increase temporary employment visas so that people can migrate legally. There are programs such as the H2A and H2B visas, which are examples of visas that work very well. People come, work, and return to their country because they have already earned income in dollars and want to be with their families. The problem is that there are limits, there are quotas for these visas, they are for certain types of jobs, and there is more demand for these temporary workers than the law allows. Congress has to pass legislation to increase the number of these visas. Thus, the House of Representatives and the Senate, along with enough members from both parties, have to agree. Many Republicans refuse to reform immigration because they want to use it for electoral purposes rather than solve the issue.

For the people who are already here, the solution is to legalize them. By giving papers or work permits to those who are here, many would earn more money, have more confidence to invest, and pay more taxes. This would be an injection into the American economy, and they could bring their relatives legally and expand the worker base a little more. That is something that neither Trump nor Vance understands, and they would never do it. Unlike President Ronald Reagan, who did sign a law like that, although reluctantly. It is not something that Kamala Harris or Tim Walz have wanted to talk about much in the campaign either because people use it as a very simple attack, but they have a political history of supporting these types of measures.

And with this legalization of undocumented immigrants in the United States, do Latin American countries win or lose?

Remittances represent only 4% of the wealth that immigrants generate in the United States, and a migrant who is more established sends remittances less often. Remittances help support families in economic need, but they represent long family separations until the migrant ends up returning or tries to bring the entire family. So, it is short-term help, but it puts families that are divided in emotional difficulty. In any country that loses migrants, from farmers to scientists, from teachers to doctors —like Cuba which loses a couple of million professional migrants every year for the last couple of years— and increasingly weakens its economy. The same is true of the Venezuelan economy, which, among other things, has been weakened by emigration.

Remittances are short-term aid, but the real economic growth happens where the migrants live, in this case, the United States.

According to the study by the Institute for Fiscal and Economic Policy, work authorization would be beneficial for everyone since granting undocumented immigrants a work authorization would result in an increase in their tax contributions from $40 billion to $137 billion per year since the work authorization would increase salaries.

Ernesto Castañeda PhD, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University in Washington DC.

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

The Spanish version of this text is available at the following link: https://aulablog.net/2024/08/26/deportaciones-masivas-podrian-crear-una-recesion-en-ee-uu/

United States: DACA Challenges Continue to Threaten Vulnerable Migrants

By Andréia Fressatti Cardoso*

Rally by the Supreme Court as the DACA cases are heard inside on November 12, 2019 / https://www.flickr.com/photos/vpickering/49057840887
Rally by the Supreme Court as the DACA cases are heard inside on November 12, 2019 / Victoria Pickering / Flickr / Creative Commons License

A looming U.S. Supreme Court decision on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program threatens to strip over 830,000 undocumented migrants of protection from arrest and deportation as well as any sense of belonging in the country where they have lived for most of their lives. The court is poised to throw these individuals, who have long lived in legal limbo, into the excruciating dilemma of whether to be forcibly or voluntarily “returned” to countries where they were born but have no roots, few job prospects, and often limited ability to speak the language.

  • The Obama Administration’s executive order establishing DACA in 2012 made undocumented non-citizens who entered the United States as children and met certain criteria eligible for a liminal (or temporary) legalization of their status. The benefits included being able to have a social security number, a work permit, and, depending on the state, even a driver’s license and pay in-state tuition.
  • DACA enabled these youths to come out of the shadows and pursue some of the activities of adult life. It also defined the terms of their social belonging, as access to public education cannot be denied based on immigration status since Plyler v. Doe (1982). As a place of socialization, school is usually where children start understanding the terms of their participation in society, at an age that they do not need documents for many of their pursuits.

The Obama Administration did not intend DACA to be a permanent solution for undocumented youths, but several challenges – including one led by Texas with the support of eight other states – have sought to declare Obama’s action a violation of U.S. law. In response to State of Texas v. United States (2015), the Biden Administration last August issued a final rule that used rulemaking procedures that, in its view, protected DACA from further legal challenges. But Texas objected, and the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed – leaving the Administration no recourse but to ask the Supreme Court to reverse the decision. The legal maneuvering highlights the temporary aspect of DACA for its beneficiaries.

DACA was an administration’s effort to compensate for the lack of congressional action. A decade later, this fix – a resource of paramount importance to many of the undocumented population – remains fragile and limited. DACA opponents’ legal challenges have been relentless, underscoring how easily DACA can be taken away.

  • The unraveling of DACA in the absence of legislation would be devastating for its over 830,000 beneficiaries. The status of liminal legality under DACA provides access to benefits rather than rights; legal presence rather than membership. While they were children, very few know that they do not have documents; they hardly need them for everyday activities, and some parents try to hide their status from them. As they get older and need documents for daily living, such as having a driver’s license, they face a potential shock of having no ties to the only country they have known. They discover that they can’t have the same life as their peers. The feeling of belonging shrinks and disappears.
  • Many DACA recipients would face even greater stress than the other 10 million undocumented migrants in the United States. The federal government has complete data on their identities, whereabouts, schools, and employers, making targeting them for potential detention and deportation easy. Many of their friends and family are likely to be targeted too.

The Supreme Court in 2020 blocked an effort by the Trump Administration to cancel DACA in September 2017, but the legal decision was based on procedural rather than substantive arguments – i.e., that the Trump action was “arbitrary and capricious,” not on determination that the policy behind it was unconstitutional.

  • The current U.S. Congress appears loath to institutionalize DACA. Moreover, the Administration appears reluctant to try again to use executive authority to ensure both the potential and limitations of the policy – much less a solution for membership of a population that has been present and socially and culturally belongs in the United States. If nothing is done, we could see mass detentions, family separation, and deportations – as well as resistance and protests from people who no longer want to live in the shadows and have claims to belonging.

March 9, 2023

* Andréia Fressatti Cardoso is a research fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of São Paulo.

U.S. Immigration Debate Skewed by Bad Statistics

By Ernesto Castañeda*

Sign demarcating US and Mexico territory on the southern US border in El Paso, Texas / Ernesto Castañeda / Creative Commons License

Immigration figures have long driven heated political debate in U.S. politics – even worse in recent years – but the data often exaggerate the problem because the responsible government agencies are double-counting and media reports are analyzing the numbers incorrectly. Opponents of President Joe Biden claim that over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered the United States each year since he became President. The numbers reported by relevant agencies should not drive headlines or be interpreted as stock tickers about whether immigration is up and down, but the data become political footballs serving generally anti-immigration political interests.

Border encounters involving people without immigration papers are just a small subset of all immigrants, emigrants, visitors, and border crossing commercial and tourist activity – almost 300 million over the past 12 months. Analysis of the numbers about border crossers reported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires clarification of what it considers “encounters.”

  • Because many people enter multiple times, the figures also reflect double-counting of many of the same individuals – sometimes more than five times each. Those of certain nationalities can be quickly removed and returned to Mexico for various reasons without adequate recording of their names and other details, making it impossible to know how many people are counted multiple times. Even those repatriated after a judge determines they do not qualify for asylum, humanitarian parole, or other special visa often try again and count as another “encounter.”
  • “Encounters” do not equal unique individuals but rather interactions between asylum-seekers or migrants and DHS personnel anywhere along the border. The U.S. Government reports, for example, that 1 million-1.3 million migrants were removed from the United States under Title 42 provisions intended to protect U.S. health in the context of the COVID pandemic – almost half of the total reported “encounters.” So “encounters” do not equal individuals entering the U.S. either.
  • The numbers include individuals whom the United States normally welcomes, including 140,000 unaccompanied minors looking to reunite with family members in the country, and over 20,000 Ukrainians. Russians and Afghans are in a similar situation. Cubans no longer are fast-tracked for permanent residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act, but the U.S. government cannot deport them because neither Mexico nor Cuba will take them back. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans, Haitians, and others are fleeing situations that most U.S. observers consider intolerable.
  • Comparing year-on-year figures is also deceptive. During 2020, the acceptance of asylum-seekers came almost to a halt. The pandemic, Title 42, and the “Remain in Mexico” program (under which individuals who pass a “credible fear” screening are forced to stay in Mexico while awaiting a hearing) created a backlog and bottleneck for the normal mobility that had occurred in previous years. Shifts in DHS accounting between years have also exaggerated the impression of a surge.

Other observers have confirmed migration specialists’ concerns about the over-counting. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), which monitors the staffing, spending, and enforcement activities of the federal government, reported in September that detention data released by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “is, once again, riddled with errors.” TRAC found “egregious” mistakes in several data categories that led the agency to seriously misrepresent conditions in its public statements.

While the U.S. government’s bad information makes precise calculations of migrant flows impossible, what is sure is that the total number of distinct individuals entering the United States without documentation is much less than 2 million a year. More credible estimates are that –after accounting for thousands of deportations – probably less than half a million people have been allowed in.

  • Among them, some were granted asylum – a right under U.S. and international law. Many others are welcome refugees and asylum-seekers like those from Ukraine and Afghanistan. Many others are waiting their turn in immigration court. Therefore, most of those included in this estimated half-million are in the United States legally, and the government knows who they are and where they live. By definition, they are not “illegal” or hiding. Allegations by a Texas senator and others that “4.2 million illegal immigrants have streamed across the border” since Biden took office are simply not true.

* Ernesto Castañeda teaches in the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences.

U.S.-Cuba: Putting the “Sonic Attacks” Myth behind Us?

by Fulton Armstrong and Philip Brenner*

The U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba / Ajay Suresh / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons license

The Biden Administration’s recent announcement that it is resuming “limited” consular functions at the U.S. Embassy in Havana suggests that it’s prepared to put the “sonic attacks” meme – President Donald Trump’s stated rationale for closing the Consulate in 2017 – behind it, but Washington still appears unlikely to restart the normalization process. U.S. and Cuban officials met last month for the first time in four years to discuss implementation of a migration accord signed in 1995. Orderly migration is only one among several interests the United States could advance if it were willing to resume discussions with Cuba. But the Biden administration has placed electoral politics ahead of U.S. interests and appears unlikely to do more.

  • A State Department official told reporters that consular officers will process applications from only the Cuban parents of U.S. citizens, and that persons in all other non-emergency categories will still have to go to Guyana or another third country to apply. A few of the vice-consuls reportedly will fill previously permanent slots, but others will be assigned to the Embassy on a temporary basis.
  • When it ceased consular services in 2017, the State Department unilaterally abrogated a bilateral agreement, which enjoyed bipartisan support for two and a half decades, to process visas in a manner that would keep migration legal and safe. Renewing limited services, officials cited the surge in “irregular Cuban migrants” to the United States “via land and maritime routes.” Cubans are the second largest group arriving on the Southwest border – 16,531 in February alone, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted more than 1,000 Cubans in the Florida Strait since October.

The State Department has not publicly reconciled its consular decision with its repeated allegations of a Cuban role in, or at least failure to prevent, the “sonic attacks” that the Trump Administration cited, after months of inaction, as reason for reducing the Embassy. Now referred to as “Havana Syndrome” and “unexplained health incidents” by the Biden Administration, those allegations have never been substantiated.

  • Various reports have seriously challenged the official claims, but the U.S. Government has continued efforts to find scientists who will corroborate them. As early as November 2018, scientists of the prestigious JASON advisory group concluded that the reported sounds “most likely” were caused by Caribbean short-tailed crickets; it found they were “highly unlikely” from ultrasound or microwave equipment as alleged. A half-dozen investigations later, CIA officials last January said that all but two dozen of the 1,000 reported cases could be explained by environmental conditions, undiagnosed medical conditions, or stress rather than a global campaign by a foreign power. (Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and CIA Director William Burns soon came forward to stress that “while we have reached some significant interim findings, we are not done.”)

The “sonic attacks” in Havana initially took place in late 2016, but the Trump Administration did not mention them in announcing its first round of measures in June 2017 to slow and eventually reverse President Obama’s normalization policies – perhaps because it too didn’t take the allegations seriously. Public complaints by self-identified victims in August 2017 found a receptive audience on Capitol Hill, however, and legislators pressed the Trump Administration to use it as pretext to reduce the U.S. Embassy in Havana (and to force Cuba to cut back its Embassy staff in Washington). The Biden Administration embraced the same rationale three and a half years later, despite overwhelming evidence that the blame on Cuba was misplaced, with literally hundreds of victims from around the world (even in Washington, DC) coming forward with similar claims of unexplained head injuries. The Biden Administration seems now to seek a quiet way back to addressing a migration crisis for which it, like the Trump Administration, has been complicit.

  • The Administration seems to think its policies will help it win hearts and minds in Florida, but its failure to provide leadership on issues like “sonic attacks” is further narrowing its political space. Now it faces challenges not only from the usual characters in Congress who oppose normalization, but also moderates such as Democratic Senators Jeanne Shaheen (New Hampshire) and Mark Warner (Virginia), who cosponsored the “HAVANA Act.” In addition to permanently linking the issue to Havana, the legislation, which Biden signed into law last October, has contributed to a surge in alleged cases of anomalous symptoms by offering compensation to “victims.”
  • Neither does the Administration seem concerned about the implications of its Cuba policies for U.S. interests throughout Latin America – one of the main drivers of President Obama’s pivot on the island in 2014. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s statement this week that he will not attend the Summit of the Americas that Biden is hosting in Los Angeles next month if Cuba is not invited is a blow. Similarly, Ambassador Ronald Sanders of Antigua & Barbuda, widely seen as “dean” of the Caribbean diplomatic corps, declared that Biden’s continued embrace of Trump policies on Cuba and Venezuela “has continued to haunt US‑Caribbean relations.”

May 13, 2022

* Fulton Armstrong directs AULABLOG. Philip Brenner is Emeritus Professor of International Relations and History at American University. His latest books are Cuba Libre: A 500-Year Quest for Independence and Cuba at the Crossroads.

Central American Youth Migrants Show Signs of PTSD and Stress

By Daniel Jenks and Ernesto Castañeda*

Central American migrants/ Peter Haden/ Flickr/ Creative Commons License

The trauma experienced by Central American minors before, during, and after their unaccompanied journeys to the United States puts them at high risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health problems, creating further obstacles to their success in school and broader integration into U.S. society. New research into results from the CLALS Pilot Project Household Contexts and School Integration of Resettled Migrant Youth, which included interviews and qualitative surveys (including a validated PHQ-9 Modified for Teens and the Child PTSD Symptom Scale, CPSS), revealed that about one-third of unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala show symptoms of moderate to severe PTSD — significantly higher than the general population.

  • The study team interviewed or administered surveys to more than 100 subjects, including youths who arrived in Maryland before 2017, their parents, and social service providers, teachers, and local officials. At least 20 percent of the youth respondents exhibited symptoms of mild or moderate depression, and 38 percent said that they felt sad or depressed most days during the last year.

Many of the youths suffered deeply from separation from parents who preceded them in traveling to the United States, sometimes blaming them for problems and abuses they suffered back home, but they generally fared better than those whose parents had not emigrated. Those most deeply harmed were forced from their homes by gang violence, police corruption, and other symptoms of low state capacity, and suffered trauma along the journey to the United States. They were able to come to the U.S. and escape those problems because they had family in the United States.

  • Carlos, who migrated when he was 15 years old, left El Salvador because he was facing death threats from local gangs because he refused to join. He was scared to go to home and school. Other youths experienced pre-migration trauma that included natural disasters, war, gang violence, victimization, witnessing a crime, physical and sexual abuse, or attacks based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. (Other studies document the particular abuses faced by girls and young women.)
  • Migrating from Honduras at 13 years old, Samantha was on a bus near the Guatemala-Mexico border when gangs barricaded its door and threatened to set it on fire if they were not given a hefty fee. For the rest of the trip through Mexico, the coyotes gave her and others enough to eat only once a day. Indeed, the increased risk of undernutrition, dehydration, assault, kidnapping, and other forms of violence was common for unaccompanied youths.

Inside the United States, many face the stresses of family reunification and issues of acculturation, although our research indicates that the resulting anxiety is less severe than from the in-country and en-route traumas they experience. One mitigating factor is having access and feeling welcome to use supportive social services, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities.

  • Resentment toward parents who “abandoned” them in Central America — even those parents who were loving, reliable providers — is often deep. School challenges, language struggles, and stress related to their own legal status or that of their family further tax mental health. Complex, intimidating legal proceedings, threats of deportation, and prolonged forced separation from family get many youths off to a stressful start. Many also experience discrimination and hate crimes, becoming more aware of them as they learn English. Real or perceived lack of access to social services exacerbates stresses, and fear of dealing with authorities means that many problems go unreported.
  • Some learn to prosper. Diana, a 16-year-old from El Salvador, was scared and apprehensive when she started school in Maryland, but she found friends whom she could trust and could help her in school, and her mood improved drastically for the better.

We found that the psychological distress and disorders experienced by Central American youths in a troubling number of cases can exacerbate existing obstacles to integration, family reunification, and success in school. These obstacles, in turn, can create new stressors that exacerbate PTSD, depression, and anxiety.

  • Dealing with the traumas that plague youths in Central America is a massive undertaking that, rhetorically at least, the United States and Central American governments are addressing. Inside the United States, successful cases show that the cycle of further trauma exposure, depression, and PTSD can be overcome by making migrant processing more humane, increasing access to mental health services and education, and providing guarantees of protection to those who seek help – reforms that will be very challenging. The underlying problems are deep-rooted, and even when the Executive or Legislative branch pushes particular elements of reform, change will be hard to implement because of institutional and cultural barriers.

August 26, 2021

* Ernesto Castañeda directs the Immigration Lab and teaches sociology at American University, and Daniel Jenks is the Lab’s deputy director. This article is adapted from their full study published in Trauma Care journal.

Temporary Protected Status: Prospects Under the Biden Administration

By Hannah Bossert and Jayesh Rathod*

National TPS Alliance holding a press conference and vigil in Washington, DC/ uusc4all/ Flickr/ Creative Commons License

In the swell of immigration reform discussions in Washington, Temporary Protected Status (TPS), one form of humanitarian protection, has received significant attention from policymakers and advocates, but the Administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has yet to signal its intended action for significant TPS decisions arising later this year and next.

  • Codified in U.S. immigration law, TPS provides relief from removal and work authorization for nationals of designated countries affected by ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions. The Secretary of Homeland Security makes TPS designations for anywhere from six to 18 months, with no legal limit to the number of renewals. When conditions allow for a safe return, the federal government may choose to terminate the designations.
  • As part of its agenda set on restricting immigration, the Trump Administration attempted to end TPS for six countries (including four in Latin America), prompting litigation that has extended the designations while courts review the legality of the terminations.

The Biden Administration has only begun to formulate its policies regarding TPS, which will have a major political and economic impact on immigrant communities in the United States and on the region as a whole. Twelve countries worldwide have been TPS-designated, protecting approximately 320,000 individuals, for a number of years. In March, the Administration extended protection to an estimated 323,000 eligible Venezuelans, and designated Burma in May. But pending decisions include the following:

  • Today nearly 200,000 nationals of El Salvador are protected by a designation made in 2001. Designations in 1999 for Honduras and Nicaragua currently protect around 60,350 and 3,200 persons, respectively. Thanks to federal court injunctions, these work permits and protections from removal remain valid through October 4. The Biden Administration recently agreed to participate in settlement discussions to resolve the pending litigation. The White House might find a way to extend work authorization for the existing beneficiaries; alternatively, it might re-designate these countries for TPS, which would offer protection to tens of thousands who arrived after the initial designation dates. Given the roadblocks that many Central American migrants face in advancing asylum claims, re-designation could be the more attractive option as it would alleviate immigration court backlogs and would not require Congressional authorization.
  • Re-designation was the Biden Administration’s preferred course of action for Haiti, which was also subject to a Trump-era termination effort. On May 22, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas re-designated Haiti for 18 months, expanding coverage to 100,000-150,000 new arrivals and providing an opportunity for those nearly 41,000 Haitians deriving status from the earlier designation to re-apply. The devastating effects of COVID‑19 and the instability surrounding the recent assassination of President Moïse both complicate return for Haitian nationals.
  • Members of Congress recently penned a bicameral letter urging the Administration to consider TPS designations or redesignation for 17 countries, including El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as the Bahamas and Guatemala. A Guatemala designation, recently re-requested by the country’s government in the wake of severe hurricane damage, would change its decades-long outlier status when compared to its Central American neighbors.

Despite its name, TPS has enabled decades-long residency for hundreds of thousands of migrants, allowing them to build lives and families in the United States. TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras alone contribute roughly $4.5 billion to the U.S. economy, including an average yearly contribution of over $691 million to Medicare and Social Security. Despite past stagnation in considering longer-term relief for TPS holders, the reality of TPS has prompted new advocacy in Congress aimed at creating pathways to citizenship for beneficiaries via proposed legislation such as the American Dream and Promise Act of 2021 and U.S. Citizenship Act, as well as calls to enshrine these efforts within the budgetary process, as in Senator Bernie Sanders’s Budget Reconciliation Bill.

  • Congressional action has become even more critical given the Supreme Court’s recent unanimous decision in Sanchez v. Mayorkas, which cut off the primary pathway to lawful permanent residence for TPS holders who had entered the United States without permission. This decision, absent  Congressional action, leaves hundreds of thousands in a prolonged and uncertain status. Given the current political climate in Washington, the path forward remains unclear.

July 21, 2021

* Hannah Bossert is  a second-year law student at the Washington College of Law and Dean’s Fellow for the Immigrant Justice Clinic, and Jayesh Rathod is Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant Justice Clinic at the Washington College of Law.

United States: Is ICE on the Chopping Block?

By Brandon Hunter-Pazzara*

Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) in Chicago, IL/ Flickr/ Public Domain

Even if the Biden Administration does not heed the rallying slogan of hashtag #AbolishICE, the United States Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) could be put on a course that guts the agency’s mission and renders it a non-player in U.S. policy. The new administration’s push for immigration reform and reversal of many of its predecessor’s policies, including overhauling family processing procedures on the U.S.-Mexico border last weekend, signal significant change ahead for ICE – if not elimination of the agency itself.

The agency’s mixed performance on its two principal missions – enforcing immigration laws by removing unlawful migrants and combating transnational crime – has fueled pressure for reform.

Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), which account for $5 billion of the agency’s roughly $8.3 billion budget and 8,000 of its 22,000 employees, regularly fall short of ICE’s stated goals even as the mission has gotten easier. 2019 was the only year to date that it reported meeting removal targets. In 2021, the number of undocumented migrants in the United States is 10 million-11 million – the same as in 2003 – despite dramatic declines in new arrivals. According to a 2017 report by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), unauthorized border crossings were about 1 million in 2003 but had fallen below 500,000 by the time Donald Trump took office in 2017.

  • Significant changes to immigration law such as those contemplated by the Biden Administration could make ICE’s immigrant removal mission obsolete. For instance, its immigration bill creates several paths to legal status for the 11 million undocumented migrants, which if passed would shift the responsibility to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). ICE’s interior operations could very well be moved to CBP or eliminated altogether. 

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), with a budget of $2 billion and some 10,300 employees, is one of dozens of federal and state agencies tasked with combating transnational crime. Observers have long noted that it remains unclear why these tasks are not handled by more effective law enforcement agencies. 

  • ICE each year reports its arrests, convictions, and cash and narcotics seizures – metrics that usually represent a small fraction of the total amount of narcotics reaching the street. ICE claimed it seized 6,105 pounds of fentanyl in 2020 – a year in which opioid-related overdoses increased significantly over 2019.
  • In terms of convictions, ICE reported in 2019 that it arrested 37,547 people for various crimes and won 16,792 convictions, a conviction rate of less than 50 percent. By comparison, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) boasts a conviction rate in the high 80s. Policymakers may be tempted to break up HSI as ICE’s core missions decline and place its agents in other agencies.
  • While ICE claims in its yearly reports that it plays a pivotal role in terrorism prevention, it has yet to provide a public accounting of any successful operations and whether it has prevented an imminent attack during its 18 years of operations. 

ICE is not the only agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with problems. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found DHS employees have a 10-point lower Employee Engagement Index Score – a measure of employee enthusiasm and purpose – compared to the federal average. But ICE and its missions are arguably the most vulnerable.

  • Numerous observers report it suffers from a culture of regular misconduct. As the ACLU documented, between Jan 2017 and April 2020, 39 adults died in ICE custody. During the Trump Administration, none of ICE’s directors was confirmed by the Senate – a sign that legislators don’t hold the agency in high esteem – and leadership resignations were common, including the remarkably brief two-week tenure of Jonathan Fahey this January. These issues only add to the damage done by numerous reports of ICE’s underhanded tactics and abuse of migrants, resulting in one 2019 poll finding that Americans considered ICE the worst federal agency. (Even so, according to a 2018 Politico Morning Consult Poll, most voters also say they do not support abolishing ICE.)
  • These contradictions are likely explained by the inertia of government reform and the rise of party polarization. In the past, a federal agency defined by inefficiency, incompetence, and bloat would have generated sharp criticism from Republicans. Yet, statements of support for President Trump during his presidential campaign and Presidency by ICE officials and the union representing its rank and file seem to have bought them protection. While the #AbolishICE groups are still likely to be frustrated that the agency survives, ICE seems destined to take some serious hits and would be wise to accept a serious conversation about its role and performance rather than wait for Mr. Trump’s return.

March 8, 2021

* Brandon Hunter-Pazzara is a CLALS Fellow and PhD Candidate in Cultural Anthropology at Princeton University.

Biden’s North American Reset?

By Tom Long and Eric Hershberg*

Map of North America/ Public Domain/ Creative Commons License

A North American approach to regional cooperation could make a comeback under the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden. Though promoted with little enthusiasm by President Obama and derided by the Trump administration, the utility of North American cooperation is suggested by a combination of factors: the desire to turn the page on Trump’s transactional approach to neighbors, interest in “near-shoring” as a result of the pandemic and frictions with China, and the growing salience of shared transnational challenges.

  • Trump played on anti-NAFTA and anti-Mexican sentiments in his rise to power. He followed his divisive campaign with dramatic standoffs over the border wall, tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and nativist immigration and asylum policies. Policy statements from the Biden campaign, Democratic Party platform, and transition team suggest the new president will be eager to signal his rejection of such policies, making a pro-North American stance attractive in the broader context of a return to multilateralism. To be sure, elements of the Democratic Party long harbored skeptical views of North American cooperation (especially NAFTA), but the anti-North American stance is now thoroughly associated with Trump, and Democrats have found themselves defending the concept during the last four years.
  • The pandemic and rising tensions with China have raised questions about the desirability of far-flung supply chains, at least for sensitive products like medical and telecommunications equipment. Revelations about forced-labor practices in China have also put human rights back on the trade agenda. This is an issue for Canada, too, given its tensions with China over electronics giant Huawei. At the same time, it presents an opportunity for Mexico.
  • Transnational challenges including public health, migration, and security have long provided a rationale for greater policy coordination in North America. Many of these issues have grown from irritants to major problems given the neglect and perverse U.S. policies of the last four years.

Under President Biden, these factors may give North American cooperation a new lease on life. As a regional policy framework, “North America” could give renewed stimulus to North American economic integration, which had stagnated due to China’s rise, increased border controls after September 11, 2001, limited investment in coordination or infrastructure, and various migration and security crises along the U.S.-Mexico border. Trump’s rhetorical and policy barrage has awakened powerful interests to defend economic integration at the same time that it has motivated civil society organizations to defend North America’s integrated transnational communities.

Progress is likely even if the phrase “North America” is slow to return. NAFTA was officially replaced in July 2020 by a new pact that preserved most of its features but stripped “North America” from its name. (The three signatories have named the deal differently – USMCA in the U.S., TMEC in Mexico, and CUSMA/ACEUM in Canada – but none includes “North America.”) The separation of “North America” from the pact creates, counterintuitively, an opportunity to expand the understanding of the region and related policy frameworks.

  • Politically, “North America” could provide a useful space for Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who has shown little interest in Biden’s initiatives for bilateral cooperation and has provoked tensions with Washington through his handling of the Cienfuegos case, to provide leadership.
  • Practically, many deeply “North American” issues, particularly migration, suggest a wider understanding of the region to include parts of Central America and the Caribbean. Tensions about Central American migration will be high on the new administration’s agenda, but addressing these challenges through a North American lens offers a constructive contrast to Trump’s narrow nationalism.
  • Economically, given the contrast between countries of South America that have been more deeply reliant on exports to China versus those that are still most closely linked to the U.S. market, a broadened North America could provide a forum – larger and more diverse than NAFTA but smaller and more focused than the Summit of the Americas – to address regional policy challenges.

President Biden inherits an old trilateral region that seemingly has no name and a badly damaged economic partnership, but the gravitational pull of the U.S. market, new rhetoric and policies from Washington, and other underlying drivers should restore the economic and political importance of the region, offering an opportunity to rethink the boundaries and purpose of North America.

January 21, 2021

* Tom Long is Associate Professor at the University of Warwick and Chair of the Robert A. Pastor North American Research Initiative at American University. Eric Hershberg is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Professor of Government at American University.

United States: Biden Versus the Arc of Immigration Policy

By Dennis Stinchcomb and Jayesh Rathod*

Acting Deputy Commissioner Ronald D. Vitiello visits the Border Wall Construction Site near the Otay Mesa Port of Entry/ Photo Courtesy of U.S. Customs and Border Protection/ Yesica Uvina/ whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/ Creative Commons License

U.S. Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has pledged more than just a return to the Obama-era status quo on immigration, but the historical arc of immigration policy, the pandemic, entrenched agency cultures, and the limitations of executive lawmaking point to modest progress by a would-be Biden Administration. Absent from the Biden-Harris immigration platform are many of the more progressive proposals of Biden’s rivals for the Democratic nomination, including commitments to decriminalize border crossings, abolish or restructure Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), eliminate expedited removal proceedings, and temporarily halt deportations in hopes of compelling Congressional action. Even so, the Biden-Harris plan promises urgent action within their first 100 days to reverse President Trump’s sweeping changes to the immigration system, followed by novel reforms.

But the challenges faced by a Biden Administration would extend far beyond the mountain of executive formalities (and potential defensive litigation) needed to “undo Trump’s damage.” Since 1986 – the last time Congress passed comprehensive immigration legislation – two dominant trends embraced by administrations from both parties have constrained the potential for pro-immigration advances, leading to a one step forward, two steps backward dynamic from which a Biden Administration would have to break free.

  • Criminalization. In the runup to his 1996 re-election, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which laid the groundwork for the aggressive immigration enforcement regime of the Trump Administration. IIRIRA subjected legal immigrants to deportation for a range of non-violent offenses, limited the due-process rights of certain categories of immigrants facing deportation, and facilitated the recruitment of local law enforcement agencies to carry out immigration directives. Today, a remarkably broad swath of criminal activity triggers immigration consequences, and migration-related conduct (including unlawful entry) is increasingly subject to criminal sanction.
  • Securitization. The Bush Administration’s framing of immigration as a security issue after 9/11 and the reorganization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service within a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) put additional pressure on migrants. Intensive vetting of would-be migrants, including extra scrutiny of nationals from certain countries, often dovetail with the “criminal alien” narratives, particularly when migrant streams are portrayed as vectors for drug trafficking and organized crime.

President Obama gradually realigned enforcement priorities and promoted a culture of prosecutorial discretion, but the deeply entrenched notions of immigrants as lawbreakers with suspect intentions limited and undermined his pro-immigration policies. When faced with record numbers of arrivals at the southern border, the Obama Administration could not escape the enforcement paradigm, choosing to dramatically expand the practice of family detention and deport millions of noncitizens without criminal records.

  • This enforcement dragnet reinforced an agency culture within ICE and other components of DHS that equated increased apprehensions and removals with success. Obama’s timid reform policies and aggressive enforcement left enshrined criminalization and securitization as hallmarks that made it easy for Trump to implement unprecedented restrictionism. The President has infused his rhetoric with repeated references to immigrants as “bad hombres” and as threats, not just to public safety, but to American culture and identity.

If Mr. Biden takes office, we can expect a deluge of executive orders undoing many of the 400-plus actions taken by the Trump Administration that dramatically curtailed legal immigration, cut off temporary protections, and dismantled the asylum system. But an immigration counterrevolution is unlikely. Biden has acknowledged the missteps of the Obama-Biden Administration, but his middle-of-the-road approach – compared to the proposals advanced by other Democrats – fails to recognize that the ills of the immigration system predate President Trump.

  • Far-reaching reforms that break the decades-long trend to criminalize immigrants and view them through a security lens will require more than regulatory tinkering. Another wave of White House-mandated programs that grant temporary relief while subjecting immigrants to perpetual uncertainty is unlikely to satisfy immigrant communities and their advocates. The public health crisis caused by COVID-19, moreover, has provided renewed impetus for the securitization of immigration and may prove one of the greatest obstacles to Biden’s immigration agenda, which is silent on the pandemic.
  • Hope for groundbreaking reforms may only come in the form a Democratic-controlled Senate, where a legislative overhaul might embrace the decarceration and other less punitive approaches gaining traction in the criminal justice context. But even then, a Biden Administration would have to contend with thousands of existing DHS employees with a fundamentally different vision for migration management. These conditions, which align with the broader arc of immigration policy, forecast only incremental progress.

October 13, 2020

* Dennis Stinchcomb is the CLALS Assistant Director for Research, and Jayesh Rathod is Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant Justice Clinic at the Washington College of Law.