A Major Gig for Buena Vista

By Ana Serra* 

Photo Credit: OtherDrK / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: OtherDrK / Flickr / Creative Commons

The Buena Vista Social Club Orchestra’s performance at the White House last week was a celebration of the ongoing normalization process between the United States and Cuba and of the musical collaboration – considered illegal at the time – that made this group possible.  Playing in commemoration of Hispanic Heritage month and the Educational Excellence of Hispanics, it was the first visit to the executive mansion by a Cuban band in more than 50 years, and part of its Adiós World Farewell Tour including a number of U.S. states before traveling to Puerto Rico and Latin America.  Buena Vista Social Club (BVSC) is a brand, starting as a 1940s club in Havana and revived by a 1997 album produced by Ry Cooder with Cuban and US musicians, a 1999 documentary film directed by Wim Wenders (chronicling concerts in Amsterdam and New York), and decades of fame-garnering recognition of Grammies and film awards.  At a time that the U.S. administration is taking steps to relax the terms of the embargo, the invitation auspiciously recognized Ry Cooder’s inaugural ice-breaker, which was investigated as a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.  While tied to the commercial success of the band, the concert inadvertently has progressive implications in a racial context.

The invitation to play at the White House amounts to a diplomatic gesture, and as such it was both cautious and optimistic.  The event resonated with many other people-to-people exchanges that have made thaw a reality, and highlighted the prominence of Americans of Cuban descent among Hispanics in the U.S.  The band is tried and true – if fully predictable – in its powerful evocations of a memorable past.  Its traditional musicians evoke the Havana music scene of the 1940s, a time of intense exchange and collaboration between Cuban and U.S. musicians.  In addition, it may cause for some a nostalgia for a supposedly harmonic relationship between the two countries, despite decades of strong U.S. intervention in political and economic affairs during the two administrations of Fulgencio Batista.  The album’s son, bolero, guajira, and danzón rhythms do not challenge expectations and the lyrics talk about love, beautiful women, and tropical landscapes.  Ry Cooder’s role in forming the original band – he apparently brought piano virtuoso Rubén González away from a shoe-shining job – represents the current dream of many art representatives hoping to go down to Cuba and “discover” or “bring to light” hidden talent.

Fans of Cuban music may be disappointed that far more interesting Cuban musicians – in terms of novel song styles or political messages – were not invited.  BVSC’s tunes have become so familiar as to make the minds of listeners numb: they have been played to exhaustion in tourist sites in Havana, and added to the ambiance of many a foreign venue aiming to evoke the irresistible rhythms of Latin American music.  A silver lining, however, are the progressive implications of what the band represents in a racial context.  The original Buena Vista Social Club was a so-called “club de negros” in the 1940s, in which the 1997 BVSC performer Compay Segundo had played.  These clubs were closed down after the 1959 revolution, since their emphasis on black identity was deemed divisive.  At the time of #blacklivesmatter in the United States, it is fitting that the first African-American president hosted this historic band in the White House.  Beyond the problematic background of a beautiful diplomatic gesture the event establishes a bridge between some of the common struggles in the U.S. and Cuba.

October 22, 2015

* Ana Serra is an Associate Professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies in the Department of World Languages and Cultures at American University.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 21, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Cuba, United States
Tagged ,

Posted by clalsstaff on October 21, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/21/a-major-gig-for-buena-vista/

Mexico’s Petroleum Sector: Not Yet Out of the Woods

By Thomas Andrew O’Keefe*

Photo Credits: Ian Burt and Alex / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credits: Ian Burt and Alex / Flickr / Creative Commons

The September 30 awarding of three contracts on five oil production blocks that the Mexican government opened for bidding has raised hopes that the Peña Nieto administration’s efforts to reform the country’s energy sector are back on track, but many challenges remain.  In contrast, an auction of leases on 14 blocks in July was a huge disappointment as contracts could only be issued for two of them.  The auctions are part of Mexico’s effort to reverse years of declining petroleum output by permitting private sector and foreign participation in an industry monopolized for decades by the state oil company, PEMEX.  Foreign and private sector firms are now allowed to enter into both profit- as well as production-sharing agreements with PEMEX and thereby retain a percentage of the gains on the oil they extract.  In some cases, outright concessions – termed “licenses” so as not to run afoul of the Mexican Constitution – are permitted.

A careful examination of the successful bids last month, however, leaves doubts as to whether the auction marks a change of fortune.  To entice a better response, the Mexican entity responsible for the auctions, the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH), relaxed many rules in a way that may be difficult to repeat and can be challenged politically.  Noticeably absent from the list of winning bidders are the major multinational oil giants.

  • The Italian state oil company, ENI International, won the block that attracted the most bids, while an Argentine-led consortium headed by Pan American Energy won a second block. They are well-known players in several South American countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – where the rules of the game are constantly changing and lack of transparency is a major issue.  The third block had only one bidder, a consortium made up of the U.S.-based Fieldwood Energy and Mexican Petrobal (whose director is PEMEX’s former director of exploration and production, Carlos Morales Gil).
  • The blocks awarded on September 30 are for already discovered shallow water fields, meaning lower geological risks for private operators. In order to make the auction attractive, the CNH lowered the fees required to bid and added the right to explore for new oil as well as pumping oil from existing reserves.

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto came to office in 2012 with an ambitious reform plan to revitalize the Mexican economy by focusing on structural reforms, including education, finance, telecommunication, transportation infrastructure, and energy.  While there have been noticeable changes in all five areas, the results have not yet led to significant improvements in Mexico’s economic performance.  The optimistic reform scenarios of three years ago are further clouded by corruption scandals – including one touching the President, his wife, and a finance minister who had houses built by prominent contractors who had won lucrative government contracts – the lack of progress investigating the Iguala Massacre (involving 43 students who disappeared), and high levels of citizen insecurity.  The real test for the Mexican energy reform – and the credibility of President Peña Nieto’s reform policies – will come next year when offshore deep water blocks in the Gulf of Mexico and extra-heavy oil fields are put up for auction.

October 19, 2015

* Thomas Andrew O’Keefe is President of San Francisco-based Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 19, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Mexico
Tagged ,

Posted by clalsstaff on October 19, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/19/mexicos-petroleum-sector-not-yet-out-of-the-woods/

Honduras: No Solution in Sight

Photo Credit: OAS / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: OAS / Flickr / Creative Commons

CLALS and the Inter-American Dialogue this week hosted a conversation on the crisis in Honduras with experts Hugo Noé Pino, of the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, and Carlos Ponce, of Freedom House, and about a dozen of some 80 participants spoke up.  The following are key analytical points that were broadly accepted during the 90-minute session.

Honduras is experiencing a multi-faceted crisis – economic, political, judicial, and security– that has grown steadily worse since the 2009 coup and shows no sign of abating.

  • Economic growth (1.5 percent per capita) is too low to alleviate the country’s severe employment problem (affecting half of the working-age population) and poverty (62 percent). Recent polls indicate that some 63 percent of all Hondurans would leave the country if they could.

Violence, corruption scandals, and the steady weakening of institutions dim prospects for a turnaround.

  • The over-concentration of power in the Executive, the remilitarization of law-enforcement and other security services, and the politicization of the judiciary have undermined what democratic foundation Honduras had built since the last military government stepped down in 1980. The economic and political elites, as well as the media they control, have further stifled political discourse.
  • The Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Tribunal have been stacked to tightly control preparations for elections scheduled for November 2017, apparently with the intention of ensuring the reelection of President Juan Orlando Hernández.

The Honduran political class lacks the will to root out corruption, and is united in resisting developing the capacity and programs to do so.

  • The embezzlement of more than $300 million from the Social Security Institute – funneling part of these funds to the ruling National Party and a variety of fronts – led to the flight of the investigating fiscal (who left the country because of death threats to himself and his family) but little else. Indeed, the most significant law-enforcement actions, such as the indictment of members of the Rosenthal family on money-laundering charges, have come from the United States. Some 80 percent of crimes in Honduras go uninvestigated and unpunished; some reports put the figure as high as 96-98 percent.
  • A Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Honduras (CICIH), adapted from the successful CICIG model in Guatemala, would be a healthy way of addressing ongoing impunity while building investigative and prosecutorial institutions. The economic and political elites solidly oppose it.  Even if Honduras accepted a CICIH, alone it probably would not be a silver bullet.
  • The OAS’s planned “Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras” (MACCIH) – announced in late September jointly with Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez – shows little promise of success. Its mandate will be to diagnose problems and write reports, not take action or facilitate a serious, inclusive national dialogue.

Opposition to the current Honduran government is strong and growing, but it has not yet institutionalized.

  • Peaceful marches organized by the Indignados and other organizations have mobilized tens of thousands of citizens outraged by government corruption and its inability to provide even basic citizen security. Among the masses have been an unprecedented number of middle-class and upper-middle-class persons – not seen during previous crises.
  • Opposition groups are still struggling, however, to coalesce into a viable, institutionalized political force. Sustaining effective leadership and overcoming pressure from the government and Honduras’s two traditional parties are difficult challenges for them.

There are no magic or quick solutions to the crisis.

  • Any solution would have many moving parts, including recognition by elites that their own assets are threatened by the deepening chaos. The government will have to be held accountable for corruption.  The judiciary will have to be strengthened and made independent.  The military will have to return to the barracks.  The media will have to be professionalized.  Civil society will have to be empowered.
  • The U.S.-sponsored “Alliance for Prosperity” is unlikely to help Honduras – and could make things worse if it doesn’t challenge the status quo. Honduran observers believe that the $250-plus million dollars from the program should focus on deep change – the product of a broad national dialogue – and should be conditioned on deep reforms, rather than working with just the sitting government, which has shown no willingness to reform.
  • U.S. cooperation in counternarcotics and other security operations might in some cases expose partnered services to U.S. respect for human rights and democratic institutions, but the resources transferred in the process also serve to strengthen them and make them more independent of civilian authority.

October 15, 2015

* Correction: The first sentence of the article originally stated “CLALS and the Inter-American Dialogue this week hosted a conversation on the crisis in Honduras with experts Hugo Noé Pino, of the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, and Carlos Ponce, of Freedom House, and a dozen speakers from among over 80 participants.” It was edited to clarify that “about a dozen of some 80 participants spoke up.”

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 15, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Honduras
Tagged , , , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on October 15, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/15/honduras-no-solution-in-sight/

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Early Reactions Mixed

By Luciano Melo*

Photo Credit: Bob Nichols, U.S. Department of Agriculture / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Bob Nichols (U.S. Department of Agriculture) / Flickr / Creative Commons

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreed to on October 5 is drawing both praise and criticism, but approval by legislatures in some signatory nations – particularly the United States – is not a foregone conclusion.  Negotiators representing the 12 Pacific-rim countries involved – including Mexico, Chile, and Peru – hailed the agreement as historic.  It is a far-reaching agreement that will expand countries’ access to a combined market that represents about 40 percent of global GDP, with 800 million consumers.  It seeks to reduce tariffs – including 18,000 on U.S. goods alone – and lower non-tariff trade barriers as well.  The negotiators claim the accord also creates a fair compromise framework for protecting intellectual property rights; adopts the strongest-ever labor and environmental protections; and in a novel feature, establishes assistance for small- and medium-sized businesses to navigate the complex regulations and red tape involved in trade.  Communist Vietnam is a party to the agreement.

Reactions in Latin America have been mixed:

  • El Comercio (Peru) wrote that the TPP will help companies to establish better partnerships with the U.S. and Canada, and to create value chains in which Peru will buy commodities from one country, process them, and sell the resulting product to another. How that long-sought and developmentally imperative objective would be achieved through TPP remains vague, however.
  • El Financiero (Mexico) similarly portrayed the agreement as a means to increase production and foster the specialization of economies. Other Mexican commentators, however, reminded readers that NAFTA and other agreements have not brought the expected results; previous accords have undoubtedly boosted Mexican integration into global and regional manufacturing networks but have actually hurt the agricultural sector – accelerating decades-long migration from the countryside to cities and to the U.S.
  • Mexican and Chilean experts on the pharmaceutical industry, along with Australian and Asian counterparts, claim that TPP provisions on intellectual property will hinder the generic medications sector. They are concerned the accord will allow large U.S. multinationals to expand into markets with products that cannot be replicated for extended periods time.  Chile had negotiated aggressively against Washington’s efforts to transplant its laws providing 12-year monopolies to manufacturers of biologic drugs – compromising on a five‑year period extendable under some conditions to eight.  The Fundacion Equidad Chile warned that the agreement could cost its health sector about $540 million year more due to such provisions.

Details of the agreement will be made public in coming weeks.  While criticism of the secrecy surrounding the accord will naturally fade, substantive debate on its provisions will almost certainly increase amid expensive campaigns by policy advocates on both sides pointing out flaws both real and imagined.  But opposition seems relatively weak in the three signatory countries in Latin America, and ratification there appears likely.  Chile has long been the region’s champion of free trade, and Mexican technocrats appear convinced that trade is key to the country’s eventual graduation to high-income status.  With the commodity boom waning, Peru is counting on TPP to open avenues into a broader array of industries.  In the U.S., however, the path seems rockier.  Congress gave Obama “fast-track” authority, which will allow him to submit the agreement to an up or down vote without congressional amendments that would rip it apart, but criticism of TPP persists.  Some argue that it strengthens ties with Asian countries with bad records in environment, human rights, and labor laws.  An odd twist to the domestic landscape came from presidential aspirant Hillary Clinton, who added her voice to the opposition – putting her on the same side, albeit for different reasons, with Republican opponents who have called TPP a “bad deal.”  President Obama will have to work hard to sell this new trade agreement to Capitol Hill and the nation. 

October 14, 2015

* Luciano Melo is a PhD candidate at American University’s School of Public Affairs specializing in comparative politics.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 14, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Chile, Mexico, Peru
Tagged

Posted by clalsstaff on October 14, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/14/the-trans-pacific-partnership-early-reactions-mixed/

Transparency in Brazil: More Progress than Meets the Eye

By Vanessa Rodrigues de Macedo*

Photo Credit: Antonio Thomás Koenigkam Oliveira / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Antonio Thomás Koenigkam Oliveira / Flickr / Creative Commons

Amid all the corruption scandals shaking Brazil in recent months, positive signs about future prospects for accountability – in a country where it has historically been lacking – are easy to overlook.

  • The judicial system is improving and – since the historic conviction of 25 of 37 defendants in the notorious mensalão bribery case in 2012 – has shown commitment to meaningful outcomes in corruption cases.  Prominent offenders who in the past would have been untouchable today face a significantly higher probability of conviction and imprisonment.  In March, the Supreme Court authorized investigations into more than 50 high-ranking officials, including the leaders of both legislative houses.  In July-August, prosecutors launched investigations into former President Lula da Silva (as an informant) and senior Petrobras officials.
  • Important transparency initiatives are also taking hold. On paper, these are some of the most demanding standards in the world.  The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) enacted in 2011 ranks among the top 20 FOIA laws in the world, according to the Global Right to Information Rating.  Since 2012, more than 300,000 FOIA requests have been made through the online request system (e-sic) created by the law. No fewer than 98.34 percent of these requests have been replied to, with an average response time of 14 days.
  • Brazil has been at the forefront of promoting transparency globally.  Together with the United States, it was the founding co-chair of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multi-stakeholder partnership that now involves more than 60 countries.

The impact of such initiatives has been limited, however, because they were launched as a result of the mobilization of a handful of NGOs, journalists and international actors, rather than broad societal pressure.  Street protests against government policies have had massive turnouts over the past couple years, but mobilizations in favor of concrete transparency measures and similar reforms have not involved wide swaths of citizens.  Cultural change at the popular level has been slow, reflecting a lack of social maturity to accept responsibility to monitor public policy and demand transparency.  Nonetheless, some important initiatives, such as joint government-citizen policy conferences to discuss public policies, are attracting significant citizen participation. Between 2003 and 2010, 70 such conferences drew 6.5 percent of the Brazilian population, according to academic tallies, and from 2010 to 2014 there were 26 more conferences.

That these achievements haven’t ended corruption is not a sign that they’re useless. Rather, the consolidation of transparency norms and institutions; the continued assertiveness of Brazilian prosecutors and judges; and the expanding opportunities for citizen engagement suggest that the prospects for inculcating a culture of accountability in Brazil are not as bleak as might appear in the almost-daily headlines about endemic corruption in politics and big business. Having transparency initiatives in place has the potential over time to make corruption less frequent, and the more engaged that Brazilian society becomes in the implementation of transparency norms the more likely it is that massive scandals such as those around Petrobras and Lava Jato will become the exception rather than the rule.

*Vanessa Macedo is a CLALS research fellow and political science PhD candidate at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (IESP/Uerj).

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 8, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Brazil
Tagged

Posted by clalsstaff on October 8, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/08/transparency-in-brazil-more-progress-than-meets-the-eye/

Haiti and Dominican Republic: No Détente in Sight

By Emma Fawcett*

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Tensions stemming from the Dominican Republic’s forced repatriation of Haitians are spilling over into other aspects of the traditionally problematic relations between the two countries, with little prospect of resolution.  Over the summer, the Dominican Republic began a forced repatriation process for Haitians who did not comply with its 2014 National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners.  After a temporary suspension prompted by international outrage, deportations resumed on August 15 at a rate of 50 to 100 per day, and the International Organization for Migration reports that many more Haitians are “spontaneously returning.”  Of the half million previously found to be without residency permits, about 288,000 people registered for the regularization process –180,000 of whom were rejected and are likely to be repatriated.  According to Amnesty International, 27 percent of those who have left voluntarily say they were born in the Dominican Republic, but they fear arrest or harassment because they lack proper documentation.  At least four camps filled with recent deportees have sprung up on the Haitian side of the border, and the United Nations Human Rights Council has warned that conditions are abysmal and sanitation facilities inadequate.  The Haitian government has promised to assist in resettlement efforts, but there has been no coordinated response.  At the Tête à l’Eau camp, the government initially provided $30 in assistance to deportees, but ran out of funds.

In retaliation, Haiti on October 1 began enforcing a ban on the overland importation of 23 Dominican goods, including wheat flour, cooking oil, and soap.  These products must now enter by boat or plane to Port-au-Prince or Cap Haïtien.  Smugglers found in violation of the new regulation will have their goods confiscated.  Originally announced a year ago as a way of increasing customs revenue and reducing smuggling, the measure is expected to cause prices for staples to increase by up to 40 percent in Haiti and will cost the Dominican Republic $500 million in trade revenue.  A Dominican Chamber of Commerce official noted that the measure “violates norms of free bilateral commerce and international agreements.”  Market women who run much of Haiti’s informal economy by acquiring goods across the border and bringing them home to sell have already faced difficulties since the Dominican immigration crackdown began, and the trade ban poses a further threat to their livelihoods and those of their customers.  The Association of Haitian Industry (ADIH) hopes that the measure will improve demand for domestic products.  The Dominican government and businesses have argued that trade and migration issues should remain separate matters.

The new, slower pace of deportations has allowed the Dominican government to continue with their original strategy while avoiding further media attention and threats to their tourism industry.  Ongoing presidential campaigns in both countries – with Haiti’s elections on October 25 and Dominican President Medina seeking reelection next May – have made the antagonism politically useful for both.  However, the heaviest costs, including deportations, resettlement in makeshift camps, and potentially dramatic increases in food prices, are, as usual, borne by Haiti’s poorest.  A recent World Bank report on Haiti noted that “a social contract is missing between the State and its citizens,” and the Haitian government’s inability to provide for returnees and short-sighted trade policy is clear evidence of that.  The international community – the OAS in particular – has made serious missteps in its efforts to encourage bilateral talks, including a call for dialogue by OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro that was misinterpreted as a call for the unification of Hispaniola.  In response, the Dominican press has doubled down on its inflammatory rhetoric.  Neither side sees advantage to ending the stalemate, at least until after the Haitian electoral process has concluded. 

October 6, 2015

*Emma Fawcett is a PhD candidate in International Relations at American University.  Her doctoral thesis focuses on the political economy of tourism and development in four Caribbean case studies: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Mexican Caribbean.

 

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 6, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Dominican Republic, Haiti
Tagged ,

Posted by clalsstaff on October 6, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/06/haiti-and-dominican-republic-no-detente-in-sight/

Colombia’s National Policing Model: Real Success?

By Kenneth Sebastian Leon*

Photo Credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos / Flickr / Creatives Commons

Photo Credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos / Flickr / Creatives Commons

Colombia’s new policing model – called the National Quadrant Surveillance Model, or MNVCC – has been implemented for almost five years, but assessments of its impact vary widely. Commonly referred to as “Plan Cuadrantes” or “Modelo Cuadrantes,” it was introduced in 2010 as a law enforcement operational strategy for the Colombian National Police (CNP) combining elements of the “hot spots” and community policing models.  The MNVCC emphasizes modern technological and data-driven methods for deploying patrol officers according to locale-specific needs, while also prioritizing community-citizen relations.  The model applies spatial geographic informations system (GIS) technology to public safety-related data to define geographic quadrants for allocating personnel and resources .  In areas of high crime density, for example, the quadrants are smaller to allow for a higher concentration of deployed officers.  Community policing aims to improve relations and collaboration between police officers and the citizens they serve.  On the street, the MNVCC model specifies that six officers be assigned per quadrant, and that all officers be visible, approachable, and recognizable to the residents and commercial establishments.

There is no consensus on how well the model is working.  Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz (FiP), a research and policy institution contracted by the CNP, in 2012 released an evaluation of the first eight cities (including Bogotá and Medellín) that found an 18 percent decrease in homicides, 11 percent in personal assaults, and 22 percent in vehicle thefts.  Another research organization specializing in measuring and monitoring quality of life indicators in major cities in Colombia and abroad, Cómo Vamos, assessed in 2013 that Bogotá ranks second to last nationwide in perception of safety – with only 21 percent of residents feeling safe in the city.  A survey conducted last year by El Centro de Estudio y Análisis en Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana found that 71 percent of respondents in the capital are either “very dissatisfied” or “dissatisfied” with the police service.  It also calculated that both total number and population rates of homicide increased between 2013 and 2014.  CNP officials privately maintain that the MNVCC is successful and that these contradictory reports are a matter of perception.  Indeed, a CNP general told El Tiempo newspaper that the perception is caused by “increases in reporting to the police, and that shows increased trust in the police.”

While the data on MNVCC effectiveness obviously need further research, anecdotal information does yield some positive lessons from a community policing perspective.  Smartphone apps and the CNP website provide users with a “find your quadrant” feature, linking them to local-level officers and patrol stations, and WhatsApp messaging allows citizens to connect directly with “quadrant officers.”  Additionally, a Puerta-a-puerta initiative provides information that helps the citizen more effectively reach out to law enforcement.  Call boxes at strategic points in neighborhoods, and a Frente a la Comunidad  neighborhood watch-style program distributes radios to contact local police.  Despite discrepancies in crime statistics and perception surveys, the sixth year of the MNVCC model appears to be creating an infrastructure and a culture in targeted communities that could – with further investments and adjustments – mark a strategic watershed in Colombian policing. 

October 2, 2015

*Kenneth Sebastian Leon is a PhD student in American University’s Department of Justice, Law, and Criminology with a dual emphasis in sociolegal studies and criminology.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on October 2, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Colombia
Tagged

Posted by clalsstaff on October 2, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/10/02/colombias-national-policing-model-real-success/

Colombia: Historic Progress, Historic Challenges

By Fulton Armstrong

Colombia Peace

The leadership shown by Colombian President Santos and FARC Commander “Timochenko” – encouraged by the Vatican and the governments of Cuba, Norway, and the United States – will be tested as challenges to completion and implementation of a final accord are certain to be intense.  The President and FARC leader announced last week that they’d resolved the thorny issue of justice for guerrilla and government commanders accused of serious crimes and set a deadline of 23 March 2016 to sign a peace agreement.  The most important – and controversial – provision covers “transitional justice” for a range of offenses, including crimes against humanity.  Most of the estimated 6,000 rank-and-file FARC combatants will get amnesty, while commanders will choose between confessing their crimes and serving five- to eight-year terms performing labor in institutions other than prisons, or refusing to cooperate at the risk of much longer terms in prison.  (The same procedures will be established for government military officers accused of atrocities and those guilty of financing the paramilitary fighters who ravaged the countryside through the mid-2000s.)  The FARC also agreed that guerrillas would begin handing in their weapons when the final accord is signed.  Negotiators had previously agreed on rural development strategies, political participation, and counterdrug policies.

Almost universally, the agreement has been hailed as an historic achievement.  The announcement in Havana capped three years of talks facilitated by “guarantors” Cuba and Norway and later supported by the United States, represented by former Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson.  During a mass in Cuba several days earlier, Pope Francis had implored the two sides to strike a deal, noting that “we do not have the right to allow ourselves yet another failure on this path of peace and reconciliation.”  U.S. Secretary of State Kerry called the Havana accord a “major breakthrough” and pledged that Aronson would stay closely engaged.

Latin American peace accords – most ending wars much shorter than the five decades of Colombia’s – provide ample evidence that the road ahead, however historic, will not be without difficult challenges.   

  • The accord will require a constitutional amendment, and President Santos will have to submit it for congressional approval and a national referendum. Former President Uribe, who leads Centro Democrático, has already declared war on it, calling it “a coup against democracy” that will lead to a “new dictatorship backed by guns and explosives.”  (Uribe also attacked Kerry’s statement as “deplorable.”)  Public discussion of details of guerrilla abuses, including forced youth recruitment and sexual violence, will play into opponents’ hand.
  • Colombian Prosecutor General Alejandro Ordóñez, an Uribe ally, said last week that any accord that does not entail prison terms for FARC commanders guilty of crimes would be “legally and politically untenable.” He claimed that it would violate victims’ rights and international law, which requires that punishment for war crimes be “proportional to the crimes committed.”  Human Rights Watch also condemned the provision and predicted the International Criminal Court would do so as well. 
  • Fulfilling commitments in the agreement to address the longstanding lack of government infrastructure in huge expanses of the country, help even modestly the resettlement of the more than 5 million persons displaced by violence, and expand programs to alleviate poverty and income inequality will have price tag beyond Colombia’s current ability to pay. Informal estimates of the 10-year cost are $30 billion.  The willingness of Colombian elites, who only grudgingly paid a war tax, to help foot the bill is far from certain.
  • The FARC’s ability to enforce discipline among its rank and file is also untested. There are reports that some commanders oppose any agreement.  Moreover, like demobilized paramilitary combatants, many combatants know no life other than rural combat and will be tempted to keep their weapons and join criminal networks that continue to terrorize rural communities.
  • The outstanding U.S. warrants for the extradition on drug-trafficking charges of reportedly dozens of FARC commanders may require some finessing, but Colombia’s peace commissioner, Sergio Jaramillo, suggested confidence that Washington will not demand extraditions if, as is almost certain, they would be a deal-breaker.

September 29, 2015

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on September 29, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Colombia
Tagged , ,

Posted by clalsstaff on September 29, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/09/29/colombia-historic-progress-historic-challenges/

U.S.-Cuba: Must “Democracy Promotion” Obstruct Normalization?*

By Fulton Armstrong

Photo Credit: Martin Burns / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Martin Burns / Flickr / Creative Commons

“Democracy promotion” has been one of the most contentious aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba – and one of the most counterproductive – but it doesn’t have to be either.  The concept of democracy promotion is ingrained in U.S. policy culture, and the bureaucracies and programs they’ve been charged with conducting over the years are as bullet-proof as any in Washington.  Democracy promotion in different forms has been a main element of U.S. policy toward Cuba for decades. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. Interests Section conducted an array of outreach programs, engaging with Cuban academics, journalists, and officials – people tolerant if not deeply supportive of the Cuban government – as well as human rights activists and others “outside the system.”  These activities informed and nurtured the aspirations of Cubans in and outside the system who were eager to find Cuban solutions to their country’s mounting problems.  The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 moved democracy promotion into a more aggressive mode, explicitly linking it to regime change.  President Clinton spent token amounts on initiatives related to Cuba’s future transition, but the Bush Administration launched an expansion that has since cost U.S. taxpayers more than $250 million.  The arrest, conviction, and five-year imprisonment of USAID sub-contractor Alan Gross shed light on one such operation.  He smuggled sophisticated communication equipment onto the island to set up secret networks.  Associated Press investigative reporter Desmond Butler uncovered other programs involving communications and political operations against the Cuban government.

The investment has yielded some operational successes, but the impact toward promoting democracy has been negligible and, in important ways, counterproductive.  The program has delivered food, medicines, and other support to the families of imprisoned dissidents (many of whom have been released since Presidents Obama and Castro announced reestablishment of relations last December), but more provocative operations have arguably led only to arrests.  The amateurish clandestine tradecraft of the contractors and program activists, moreover, made it easy for Cuban counterintelligence to penetrate and manipulate their ranks.  The “private libraries” that U.S. taxpayers have paid for do not exist, and communications systems involving expensive satellite gear and satellite access fees have been compromised.  The secretive modus operandi of the operations has given credibility to draconian Cuban government measures, like Law 88 for “Protection of Cuba’s National Independence and Economy,” imposing prison terms for certain contact with foreigners “aimed at subverting the internal order of the nation and destroying its political, economic, and social system.”  Authentic people-to-people exchanges have been tainted as Cubans in the government and on the street are wary that any contact could be part of Washington’s regime-change efforts.

The democracy promotion ideology and bureaucracy seem unstoppable, but Presidents Obama and Castro can take the edge off this irritant with a little effort and flexibility, and even make it mutually beneficial.  The State Department and USAID have pledged to continue the Cuba democracy promotion programs and are asking Congress for $20 million to fund them again this year, but the President’s statement that “it is time for us to try something new” suggests acknowledgment that they need not be so ineffective and counterproductive.  For starters, the Administration could stop citing Helms-Burton authorities, which are explicitly for regime change, and establish criteria for operations in Cuba similar to those in other countries with whom the U.S. has diplomatic relations and is trying to improve bilateral ties.  It could restore and expand what worked in the past, such as the distribution of books and clippings; support for exchange visits; promotion of academic and cultural events; and other non-political activities that include people with government affiliation.  Perhaps most importantly, to decontaminate the programs, the organizations that have already spent millions trying to drive regime change should step aside and let a new generation – based on real people-to-people interests – try something different with the funds.  Both Presidents can trust their citizens to develop the historic roadmap that will define the relationship into the future.  Both the United States and Cuba stand to benefit.

September 25, 2015

*This article is excerpted from the second in a series of policy briefs from the CLALS Cuba Initiative, supported by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation. To read the full brief, please click here.

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on September 25, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Cuba, United States
Tagged

Posted by clalsstaff on September 25, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/09/25/u-s-cuba-must-democracy-promotion-obstruct-normalization/

Puerto Ricans in Florida: Swing Constituency in a Swing State

By Fulton Armstrong and Eric Hershberg

Embed from Getty Images

A surge in the number of Puerto Ricans moving to Florida suggests a major shift in the impact of Latino issues in next year’s U.S. elections. As the island’s economic crisis deepens and severe austerity looms large, thousands of Puerto Ricans are arriving in Florida monthly, according to estimates, with the single biggest destination being Central Florida. The director of the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration office in Central Florida has estimated a 15 to 20 percent increase in the number of new arrivals in recent months. The director of Hispanic Research at the Pew Research Center has called it “the biggest movement of people out of Puerto Rico since the great migration of the 1950s.” Anecdotal accounts follow trends first identified in the 2010 census and a 2013 Pew Research Center indicating an uptick in island-born Puerto Ricans arriving in the mainland. Puerto Ricans in Florida now number almost one million – only 200,000 short of the number of the state’s Cuban-Americans. The three counties around Orlando – seen by pundits as essential to any statewide or national campaign – were home to about 271,000 Puerto Ricans (representing about 14 percent of the total population of those three counties) in 2013, according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates. Many of the new residents are white-collar workers, in contrast to those in the last major wave of arrivals who came to work at Disney World in the 1980s.

Because Puerto Ricans residing on the island are citizens but do not have the right to vote in presidential elections, an influx of hundreds of thousands onto the mainland introduces a substantial expansion of the 2016 electorate, which could be of particular relevance in the hotly contested election in Florida. Although polls show that Puerto Ricans tend to vote Democratic, their support for the party’s candidate at the presidential level is not a foregone conclusion. The director of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College of the City University of New York has said that among the new arrivals “there is a large number of independents … and party affiliations mean less to them” than among mainland-born Puerto Ricans. Of the six members of the Florida State Legislature of Puerto Rican descent, three are Democrats and three Republican. (Orlando-area State Senator Darren Soto – born in New Jersey but strongly identifying with the island of his father’s birth – is running as a Democrat.) Democratic strategists privately claim confidence that the new diaspora will be in their column. They note deep dissatisfaction among on-island Puerto Ricans and the new arrivals toward the Republicans’ opposition to legislation that would allow the island the right to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy, as well as polls showing significant support for Hillary Clinton. The Orlando Sentinel reported recently that Democrats had taken the lead in voter registration in Osceola County and won control of the County Commission. A deputy director for strategic initiatives at the Republican National Committee, however, told the Washington Post that she sees the Puerto Rican vote in Florida as “up for grabs.”

A decade and a half after the trauma of the Bush-Gore presidential vote in 2000, neither U.S. party dares to take Florida’s 29 electoral votes for granted. The Pew Research Center estimates that some 800,000 Latinos are turning 18 each year –about 2,200 per day – nationwide, making them the biggest source of new voters in each election cycle. It’s hard to see, however, what the Republican Party is doing to win the hearts and minds of Puerto Rican voters in Florida and elsewhere. As American citizens, Puerto Ricans do not have a direct stake in U.S. immigration reform – an issue that galvanizes other Latino constituencies – but the tone and policy prescriptions of that debate may well influence their perceptions of the two parties. The claims and counterclaims of optimistic partisan operatives aside, some Republican candidates’ rhetoric about immigration, Latin America, and U.S. Hispanics in general – including Donald Trump’s colorful admonition of Jeb Bush for speaking Spanish in public – has got to alienate many Puerto Ricans. Perhaps, as AULABLOG previously stated, one or two of the Republicans are likely strike a moderate-sounding approach to immigration in the coming months. Indeed, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush yesterday endorsed immigration reform, including a path to citizenship for “DREAM Act” children, and said, “We don’t need to build a wall. We don’t need to deport every person that’s in this country.” But particularly if the eventual GOP nominee proves reluctant to call for federal legislative or financial assistance for a bankrupt Puerto Rico, the party may face an uphill struggle trying to appeal to Florida Puerto Ricans – a rapidly growing swing constituency in a crucial swing state.

September 22, 2015

Leave a comment
by clalsstaff on September 22, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Puerto Rico, United States
Tagged ,

Posted by clalsstaff on September 22, 2015

https://aulablog.net/2015/09/22/puerto-ricans-in-florida-swing-constituency-in-a-swing-state/

« Older Posts
Newer Posts »