Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?

By Cynthia McClintock*

Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment.  Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.

Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?

Why are Peruvians So Angry?

The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.

The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.

But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.

Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.

As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.

What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?

Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.

Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.

A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.

Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?

The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor.  Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)

As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.

Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”

Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.

*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

Rodrigo Paz is sworn in as president of Bolivia, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Centrist Rodrigo Paz’s victory in October’s runoff election signals a dramatic change of direction for Bolivian politics. The era of dominance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, led by ex-president Evo Morales, is definitively over. For only the second time since 2006 the MAS will not control the presidency. As a result of the recent election, it now has a mere two representatives in the legislature’s lower house, and no one in the upper house. Though it does not hold an outright majority, Paz’s Christian Democratic Party is now the single largest presence in both legislative chambers. How did Bolivia get here?

Twenty years ago, the leftist-populist MAS swept into power, as a new and energetic grassroots alternative to the elite-run traditional parties that had traded off governing Bolivia since the end of dictatorship in 1982, or one could even argue, since the 1952 Revolution. The MAS’s popularity sprung largely from the dynamism of Morales, himself, then a coca grower union leader adept at organizing and leading large-scale protests in opposition to prevailing Washington Consensus policies and government efforts to sell off Bolivia’s non-renewable resources to transnational corporate interests. The MAS styled itself a bottom-up social movement and not a party. Its participatory “lead by following” approach to governance appealed to a great majority of indigenous voters and working-class people of indigenous descent.

Morales and the MAS proved historically consequential in undertaking a contentious but innovative rewrite of the country’s Constitution, which went into force in 2009. It fully embraced Bolivia’s “plurinational” identity and incorporated an unprecedented variety of collective indigenous rights of consultation, to their traditional territories, and perhaps most controversially, of judicial autonomy. The Morales administration also used a large surplus from the country’s extractive boom to finance a wide range of new social safety net provisions that halved the number of people living in poverty, including cash transfers to families, a pension program, minimum wage increase, as well as public investments in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, his presidency raised the public visibility of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, no longer as second class citizens but as political protagonists of their own present and future.

Morales and the MAS were immensely popular. But then cracks began to appear. In 2011 a plan to build a controversial highway through a protected indigenous reserve brought the MAS government into direct conflict with the reserve’s residents, damaging its support among some indigenous groups. When the extractive boom ended around 2014, Bolivia’s economy slowed considerably, and the MAS fiscal policies that had lifted so many out of poverty became increasingly unsustainable. Part of the problem was Morales, who served two presidential terms and aspired to another, without any thought to a succession plan. Constitutionally limited to two terms, in 2016 he soundly lost a national referendum in a bid for a third and then ignored the result, further alienating many former supporters.

The upheaval around the contested 2019 election, which eventuated in Morales going into exile in Mexico and the persecution of MAS loyalists by a rightwing caretaker government, set the stage for the party’s eventual fall from grace. The 2020 election restored the MAS to power. But soon Morales and the new president, his ex-finance minister Luis Arce, were in a pitched battle for control over the party, a bitter and increasingly personal rivalry that fatally fragmented the MAS into opposed camps. Their protracted feud, which paralyzed congress, strayed into surreal territory, with accusations of a staged coup and mutual assassination attempts. The credibility of the MAS was so fundamentally damaged that the incumbent Arce, with his poll numbers plummeting, suspended his campaign. Morales, meanwhile, remains holed up in his coca grower redoubt to avoid criminal charges.

The MAS-led government’s political fragmentation, and its ineffectual response to Bolivia’s increasingly disastrous economy, have left the party deeply unpopular. The country is currently floundering amid its worst economic crisis in 40 years. Its natural gas production is half of what it was in 2014, with nothing to replace it. Bolivia has failed to develop its large reserves of lithium. Depleted currency reserves and a scarcity of US dollars have driven up inflation, creating severe shortages of fuel and basic goods. Over the past year, ordinary Bolivians have angrily expressed their discontent with the country’s economic collapse through repeated strikes and protest actions.

Emerging from this bleak political and economic state-of-affairs is the surprise election winner, Rodrigo Paz. Son of onetime leftist president Jaime Paz Zamora, former mayor of Tarija, and recently a senator, Paz’s campaign focused on restoring Bolivia’s economy, but gradually rather than by instituting sweeping fiscal austerity measures as his rival in the run-off proposed. Non-indigenous, pro-business, and ideology averse, Paz successfully positioned himself as a pragmatic reformer. He has delivered a strong anti-corruption message, pledged to restore relations with the US and bring back foreign investment. His populist call for a “capitalism for all” hopes to thread the needle by mixing decentralization, lower taxes, support for small businesses, and greater fiscal discipline, with continued spending on popular MAS-era social programs.

Paz’s critics argue that what he proposes is an impossible fiscal balancing act. Desperate and impatient Bolivians will expect immediate results. But it remains far from clear whether Paz will be able to overcome likely regional opposition to at least some of his policies. And if he does not stabilize the country’s dysfunctional economy quickly, Paz’s political honeymoon might be brief.

The Rise, Decline, and Crisis of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement

By Dr. Pablo Andrade Andrade

October 17 Demonstrations (Manifestaciones del 17 de Octubre)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Just six years ago, in 2019, the three major organizations of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement were on the rise. CONAIE (the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) led the charge against Lenin Moreno’s government. For eleven days their widespread demonstrations posed a serious threat to the government’s stability. The “Paro Nacional” (Nationwide Strike) not only facilitated CONAIE’s alliances with the other two indigenous organizations (FENOCIN, the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras, and FEINE, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos) but also broadened its coalition with a diverse range of civil society organizations, marking a significant shift in Ecuadorian politics. The impact of the indigenous movement on Ecuadorian politics was profound, as Moreno´s government was seriously weakened. Two years later, in 2021, CONAIE’s political party, Pachakutik, won substantial representation in the National Assembly and placed third in the Presidential elections.

In 2022 CONAIE’s president, Leonidas Iza, led a successful national strike against Guillermo Lasso’s right-wing government. His leadership, bolstered by unity among indigenous communities and their allies, made it the most powerful leftist organization. Newfound solidarity among indigenous communities and stronger ties with student, feminist, and environmental movements, enhanced Iza’s national and international reputation. Less than a year later, President Lasso had to end his term and called for early general elections. However, at that moment Iza´s radical wing of CONAIE also attempted to impose its agenda over Pachakutik and the Amazonian federation CONFENIAE, which proved to be a high-cost strategy. The internal conflicts that followed led, in 2025, to the most serious electoral defeats that both organizations had suffered in decades.

The 2023 general elections were marred by prison massacres and political assassinations, including that of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio and the mayor of Manta, among numerous other government officials. Amid this unprecedented turmoil, a young center-right candidate, Daniel Noboa, emerged victorious as interim president. His win signaled yet another shift in Ecuador’s political landscape, with the country’s fragile democracy once again at the mercy of a personalist, plebiscitarian president.

The first warning sign of the current political turn to populist rule came with the 2025 regular election. The President’s party (Alianza Democrática Nacional, ADN) and the opposition party (Revolución Ciudadana, RC) totalled over 80 percent of National Assembly representatives. Noboa won his first five-year mandate. Pachakutik saw its representation shrink to five members, who the government rapidly coopted. Free from legislative checks, Noboa advanced his economic adjustment program. In addition, amid the ongoing public security crisis, Noboa expanded the military’s role in maintaining domestic order. Although assassinations have risen since 2023, militarization has strengthened Noboa’s control over organized violence, boosting political support for his government.

As part of its economic program, in September 2025, the Noboa administration raised diesel prices, a decision that in 2021 and 2022 sparked the wrath of CONAIE. But the leaders misjudged the lasting strength gained in 2021 and 2022, failing to account for damage from the 2023 and 2025 leadership races. As a result, they  rushed to emulate the apparent successes of the past. This time, however, CONAIE was at its lowest point. Unable to coordinate a nationwide strike, organizations in the northern province of Imbabura were left to their fate. The indigenous peoples of Cotacachi, Ilumán, Peguche, and Otavalo sustained demonstrations for a month. Still, they paid a high price in lost lives, injured people, and detainees due to systematic and brutal repression at the hands of the Armed Forces and the Police. This time, the government did not back down; the solidarity of  allied urban groups was, in this case, mostly symbolic and ineffective.

If CONAIE’s crisis should not be seen as the end of the indigenous movement, its significance cannot be overlooked. While grassroots mobilization once seemed effective, Noboa’s strong appeal and military support present new challenges. The aftermath of the national strike has called into question CONAIE’s representativeness and capacity to organize. An emboldened Noboa is now proposing a national plebiscite, in which he will likely be victorious, while Ecuador’s civil society appears weaker than ever. The challenges ahead are complex. The failed challenge to Noboa´s government could herald a new era of competitive authoritarianism, a scenario made even more likely by renewed international tolerance of hybrid forms of democracy. The lost battle left the indigenous organizations of Imbabura with wounds that could be challenging to heal, and racism lurks underneath the surface of Ecuador’s still young experiment with intercultural co-governance.

Pablo Andrade Andrade is Professor and Chair of the Germánico Salgado Lectures, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

On the U.S. – Argentina Currency Swap

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

In October of this year, the United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent ratified the signing of a US$20 billion currency swap with the Central Bank of Argentina as part of an “economic stabilization agreement” (Buenos Aires Herald, 2025). Moreover, the U.S. Treasury announced it is working on a complementary US$20 billion credit line that would be provided by private-sector banks and sovereign wealth funds (La Nación, 2025).

According to the Argentine banking institution, this agreement seeks to contribute to the country’s macroeconomic stability, emphasizing the need to preserve price stability and promote sustainable economic growth. The swap operations will enable the Central Bank of Argentina “to expand its set of monetary and exchange rate policy instruments, including the liquidity of its international reserves”, in line with the regulatory functions outlined in its statutes. The agreement is an important factor of a far-reaching approach that aims to strengthen the country’s monetary policy and improve the Bank’s ability to cope with events of volatility in the foreign exchange and capital market (Central Bank of Argentina, 2025).

Why is Argentina interested in this agreement?

Peterson Institute Professor Maurice Obstfeld (2025) highlights Milei’s remarkable success in lowering inflation, achieving a federal budget surplus, and relaxing regulations. Prior to the present crisis, the IMF predicted that Argentina’s GDP would expand by 5.5 percent in 2025, after shrinking 1.3 percent in 2024. At the same time, the IMF’s initial assessment of April 2025 concluded that, with one exception, important objectives were met. Indeed, the country’s net foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily in US dollars, fell well short of their target level.

Harvard Professor Ricardo Hausmann (2025) explains that Argentina is trapped in a multiple equilibrium, that is, a situation in which given the same set of conditions, an economy can achieve two or more distinct and stable equilibrium outcomes. If investors are willing to lend money when they feel optimistic, this lowers interest rates helping the economy grow and keeping debt service low, thus confirming the initial expectations. Conversely, if investors become pessimistic, they demand high risk premiums, which causes interest rates to skyrocket, harming investment and making public debt more expensive, thus justifying their fear of a crisis.

For his part, the former Secretary of Finance of Argentina Daniel Marx (2025) underscores that the pre-election portfolio adjustment has been less complicated than in the past, which shows more credibility with banks and institutions. In this regard, financial support from the U.S. Treasury can be useful in creating a sequence that enables its orderly implementation. Hence, the funds obtained to cope with the ongoing problems could be used to address important unresolved issues rather than being used for other instances in which funds are being depleted in the short-term.

Why is the U.S. interested in this agreement?

As Brad Setser (2025), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues, Washington has an interest in Milei’s success, not only because of his emphasis on stabilizing the Argentine economy, but also because his commitment to the free-market approach could serve as an important example for the rest of the continent.

However, U.S. interest in the swap agreement should also be understood in terms of the momentous change that the architecture of international financial relations has been experiencing in recent times. Indeed, following various decades of growing global economic integration, the planet is now confronting the threat of policy-driven geo-economic fragmentation.

In this context, Argentina matters for the strategic interest of the United States. Scott Bessent (2025) has emphatically stressed that the country is “a systemically important U.S. ally and that the U.S. Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina.” In other words, the Trump administration’s bailout resembles Mario Draghi’s support for European stability in 2012 with his “whatever it takes” approach, applied to the Argentine case in 2025.

Vera Bergengruen (2025), a journalist for The Wall Street Journal, believes that Washington’s security policy is a sort of revival of the Monroe doctrine. While the prior doctrine sought to keep European powers out of the region, the current one is primarily focused throughout the Americas with an aim to reward loyalty and to root out enemies. In this respect, Argentinian political analyst Juan Landaburu (2025) points out that in the context of a North American withdrawal from other regions, the so-called “backyard” of the United States is gaining greater importance, but this time not because of European ambitions but because of China’s advances.

  • With the results of Argentina’s midterm elections, the government has gained public support for its pro-market approach, while also gaining ground in the international financial community.
  • For its part, the United States government welcomes this result, which reaffirms its political preferences and allows it to make projections about its strategic interests in Latin America.
  • That said, the swap agreement between the U.S. and Argentina, while not without risks, constitutes an opportunity to renew ties of cooperation in the context of the current complex architecture of international relations. The coin is in the air.

REFERENCES

Bergengruen Vera, 2025, Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’ Aims to Dominate the Americas, The Wall Street Journal, October 22, available at https://archive.is/20251023231723/https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trumps-donroe-doctrine-aims-to-dominate-the-americas-b31208dd

Bessent Scott, 2025, Argentina is a systemically important U.S. ally in Latin America, and the @US Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina, available at https://x.com/SecScottBessent/status/1970107351912075454

Buenos Aires Herald, 2025, Scott Bessent confirms Argentina-US currency swap has been signed, available at https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/scott-bessent-confirms-argentina-us-currency-swap-has-been-signed

Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina), 2025, The BCRA and the U.S. Department of the Treasury sign a USD 20 billion agreement for exchange rate stabilization, available at https://www.bcra.gob.ar/Pdfs/Noticias/acuerdo-bcra-tesoro-estados-unidos-EN.pdf

Hausmann Ricardo, 2025, Trump Alone Can`t Save Argentina, New York Times, October 15, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/opinion/argentina-milei-trump-bailout.html

La Nación, 2025, Estados Unidos prepara otra ayuda para la Argentina con el sector privado por US 20000 millones, October 16, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/estados-unidos/eeuu-prepara-otra-ayuda-para-la-argentina-con-sector-privado-por-us20000-millones-nid16102025/

Landaburu Juan, 2025, Por qué Trump mira a América Latina más que nunca? La Nación, October 25, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/por-que-trump-mira-a-america-latina-mas-que-nunca-y-cuales-son-los-riesgos-detras-de-su-estrategia-nid25102025/

Marx Daniel, 2025, De pesos a dólares: esta vez es algo diferente, El Cronista Comercial, October 21, available at https://www.cronista.com/suscripciones/?limit=false&continue=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Fcolumnistas%2Fde-pesos-a-dolares-esta-vez-es-algo-diferente%2F&kicker=Opini%C3%B3nExclusivo%20Members&title=De%20pesos%20a%20d%C3%B3lares%3A%20esta%20vez%20es%20algo%20diferente&summary=&image=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Ffiles%2Fimage%2F1272%2F1272625%2F68f969cdb980d_600_315!.jpg%3Fs%3D0eec9030d86ead2043d767eb59f61bac%26d%3D1761176231

Obstfeld Maurice, 2025, Argentina’s Credibility Trap, Brookings Institution, available at https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/argentinas-credibility-trap

Setser Brad, 2025, Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes, available at https://www.cfr.org/article/will-trumps-20-billion-backing-help-milei-change-argentinas-fortunes


Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

Vicissitudes of Global Inequality

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Global map of high inequality countries, 2022 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Global inequality is composed of two components: between-country inequality and within-country inequality. The between-country component assesses disparities in per capita gross domestic product between countries, either as an unweighted measure where each country counts equally, or as a weighted measure in which each country is weighted by its population, the latter being the methodology applied by most empirical studies. The within-country component adds up to the calculation of the disparities within countries (Neckerman and Torche, 2007).

Today, global inequality is greater than it was 200 years ago, but at the same time, it has stopped increasing for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. This downward trend has been driven by a reduction in inequality between countries—the main driving force of global income disparities—and should not be surprising, as growth rates in low-income Asian countries, especially China, significantly outpaced the global average. However, within countries, inequality has tended to increase. The pandemic led to a rise in global inequality, while for the following years, the data show a return to the downward trend, albeit at a slow pace and with differences across countries (Milanovic, 2019; World Inequality Report, 2022).

In particular, global inequality in the final quarter of the 20th century shows substantial changes. A rising global middle class in Asian countries — mainly China—, the establishment of a real plutocratic elite, and the steady income levels of the lower middle classes in wealthier countries are changing global economic, social, and political dynamics. In relative terms, the emerging global middle class has emerged as the primary “winner” of globalization; however, in absolute terms, the wealthiest and ultra-wealthy individuals have reaped the biggest rewards, while the poorest groups have received only a minimal share of the global wealth.

Regarding within-country inequality, three primary factors have influenced its development: technology, globalization, and politics. As a result, inequality in the most advanced Western economies, particularly the United States, includes the growing share of capital in the national pie, the high concentration of capital ownership, the higher return on assets of the richest, the rising correlation of high capital and labor incomes in the same people,  the rising mating among people of similar incomes, the greater intergenerational transmission of disparities and the strong control of the political process by those at the top who wield increasing power in a move towards plutocracy (Milanovic, 2019).

In this framework, the traditional political economy inquiry regarding the division between capital and labor in global income reveals a decline for the latter (Piketty, 2014), which has also been influenced by the race between technology and education (Goldin and Katz, 2008).

In China, the share of private capital earnings has increased in the context of a growing privatization process led by capitalist-business sectors and the professionals of the new middle class, who also, through their savings, significantly enhanced their status. The political structure in terms of bureaucratic effectiveness, absence of the rule of law, and state autonomy has, in contrast with Western experience, overshadowed the influence of the emerging capitalist class pandemic (Milanovic, 2019).

Regarding between-country inequality, the population-weighted measure indicates a decline since the late 1970s. Given that this measure represents the bulk of global inequality, changes in between-country inequality allow us to capture changes in the total quite accurately. Nevertheless, income gaps between countries persist today (World Inequality Lab, 2024).

China’s growth performance, and to a lesser degree India’s, has been a crucial equalizing element in driving this decline. Curiously, the swift economic expansion of this country is related to its idiosyncratic policymaking that clearly reveals a rejection of the principles of neoliberalism in its domestic policies, combined with its acceptance in its international economic interactions. And that sets China apart from numerous other developed and developing countries that adopted both the domestic and international aspects of globalization with great seriousness (Maddison, 2006; Hung and Kucinskas, 2011).

While the pandemic caused the most significant rise in global income inequality in over thirty years, the trajectory of global inequality largely depends on the growth of incomes in different regions worldwide. If the trends of the past thirty years persist, inequality could rise as the growth in those countries that helped reduce inequality now leads to greater inequality, as they occupy the higher tiers of the global income distribution. However, if less affluent countries today expand more rapidly than their wealthier counterparts, worldwide inequality might keep declining (García Rojas et al., 2025).

  • Summing up, global inequality is higher than at the dawn of capitalism, but it stopped increasing and even started a downward trend in recent decades.
  • Since 1800, within-country inequality has decreased its share in global inequality, thus narrowing class divisions in societies, but has recently shown an upward trend.
  • Since 1800, between-country inequality has increased its share in the total, and while it has registered a downward trend since the late 1970s, it still accounts for the majority of global inequality, so the location where we are born undoubtedly influences our future. Furthermore, existing disparities between countries still reflect inequality of income and opportunity.

References

Garcia Rojas Diana C., Nishant Yonzan and Christoph Lakner, 2025, Global Inequality and Economic Growth The Three Decades before Covid-19 and Three Decades After, Policy Research Working Paper 11093, World Bank Group.  

Goldin Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz, 2008, The Race between Education and Technology. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Hung, Ho-F. and Jaime Kucinskas, 2011, Globalization and Global Inequality: Assessing the Impact of the Rise of China and India, 1980-2005, American Journal of Sociology, 116 (5).

Milanovic Branko 2019, Capitalism Alone, The Belknap Press of Harvard University.

Neckerman, Kathryn M. and Florencia Torche, 2007, Inequality: Causes and Consequences, Annual Review of Sociology, 33.

Piketty Thomas, 2014, Capital in the Twenty First Century, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

World Inequality Lab Activity Report, 2024, World Inequality Lab, available at https://wid.world/www-site/uploads/2025/03/WIL-Activity-Report-2024.pdf


Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

Migrants’ Mental Health Matters Too

By Maria De Jesus and Ernesto Castañeda, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Immigration Lab, American University

Image of holding hands. Retrieved from Public Domain Pictures.

Every 10th of October, we celebrate World Mental Health Day. The overall objective of this day is to raise awareness of mental health issues around the world and to mobilize efforts in support of mental health. It reminds us that mental well-being is a universal human right. Yet for millions of migrants across the globe, this right remains elusive. Migration often involves trauma, uncertainty, and systemic exclusion, which can erode mental health while simultaneously making care harder to access. If we are serious about “mental health for all,” we must recognize that migrants’ mental health matters too.

Our research at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and the Immigration Lab at American University in Washington, D.C., focuses on migration and health. In our recently published edited volume, “Migration and Migration Status: Key Determinants of Health and Well-Being”, we underscore the double bind migrants face. For example, research by Andrews et al. on Latinx communities in the U.S. Midwest shows that immigration-related stress and discrimination increase symptoms of depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). These symptoms should, in principle, push people to seek help. But the same stressors also fuel avoidance of care out of fear of deportation, mistrust of institutions, or experiences of bias in healthcare settings. In other words, the very forces that intensify the need for care also erect barriers to accessing it. Migrants are left caught in what scholars call a “double-edged sword” of immigration-related stress and health access challenges.

Complementary research in California and Connecticut by Espinoza-Kulick and Cerdeña sheds light on the structural barriers behind these struggles. Latinx (im)migrants, especially women, often endure migration-related trauma, family separation, and gender-based violence. Once in the United States, they encounter linguistic barriers, a lack of insurance, restrictive policies, and discrimination in healthcare. These overlapping vulnerabilities produce high rates of anxiety and depression, yet leave communities underserved. The main takeaway from this research: we need a comprehensive model of care that expands insurance access, ensures Indigenous and non-English language services, trains providers in structural competency, and empowers community health workers.

The COVID-19 pandemic further exposed and deepened these inequities. De Jesus’ study of migrants in France found that asylum seekers and undocumented individuals endured what researchers called a “compounded crisis”: a health crisis, a protection crisis, and a socio-economic crisis all at once. Lockdowns disrupted mental health services, worsened already precarious living conditions, and stripped migrants of informal work opportunities. Migrants described feeling “stopped in time,” trapped by overlapping vulnerabilities with no clear path forward. Their experiences are not anomalies but emblematic of how crises magnify pre-existing inequities in migrant health.

Taken together, these studies deliver a clear message: migrant mental health is not an afterthought but central to public health and social justice. It reveals how systems of exclusion—from immigration enforcement to healthcare discrimination—translate directly into suffering, anxiety, and trauma. Ignoring this reality undermines not only individual well-being but also the broader goal of resilient, healthy societies.

On World Mental Health Day, we must resist the temptation to celebrate progress without confronting gaps. Yes, awareness has grown, but awareness alone cannot heal wounds inflicted by deportation fears, language exclusion, or confinement policies. If mental health is truly for all, migrants cannot be left outside the circle of care. Protecting and promoting their mental health is not charity, it is recognition of shared humanity and mutual flourishing.

World Mental Health Day asks us to imagine a future where no one is denied care because of who they are or where they come from. For migrants navigating borders and barriers, that future remains distant. But it is within reach—if we commit to policies and practices that affirm that their mental health matters too.


Maria de Jesus is the Senior Associate Director of Community-Based Research and Engagement of the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University.

Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University.

“Se me ha hecho misión imposible”

“Se me ha hecho misión imposible”: How U.S. Immigration Policy Dehumanizes Migrants of Color

By Iran Pacheco Martinez

Image of a stethoscope and paperwork. Retrieved from Cutler Integrative Medicine.

“(a) In General.–Subject to subsection (b), an individual may be entitled to, or enrolled for, benefits under this title only if the individual is–

“(1) a citizen or national of the United States;

“(2) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act;


This segment, part of Sec. 112103 of the Trump administration’s Big Beautiful Bill, restricts Medicaid benefits for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. Policies like these, that value legal status over human need, convey the message that undocumented individuals are less deserving of safety, dignity, and support—reducing complex human lives to a legal category that erases their struggles and humanity.

Divisive immigration policies are often written in rooms that exclude individuals with experience or knowledge about immigration. As a result, these laws further criminalize immigrants and enable the mistreatment of immigrants, including in detention facilities, where conditions are often life-threatening, marked by freezing temperatures, inadequate nutrition, and a profound lack of regard for immigrants’ humanity.

Twenty-six interviews with migrants from Venezuela and El Salvador provided valuable insights into their journeys to the United States and their experiences with integration. The findings indicate that many migrate to the United States in pursuit of safety and stability due to limited academic and employment opportunities, gang violence, government corruption, poverty, and hyperinflation in their home countries.

Throughout the interviews, participants shared their experiences accessing medical care, seeking employment, and navigating the U.S. systems—experiences that revealed a broader unwillingness to accommodate their unique circumstances.

Neglecting migrants’ basic needs often begins early in their journey, particularly as they’re taken to and held at detention facilities in the United States. Venezuelan and Salvadoran migrants recall conditions in detention facilities so extreme that the detention experience alone might have dissuaded their journey to the U.S. One migrant shares their experience in detention:

“…si yo hubiera sabido de que cuando me entregaran me iban a poner a pasar tanto frío y esas cosas créeme que no fuera viajado para acá, ¿me entiendes? Porque allí se sobrepasan, como te he dicho, se sobrepasan con el frío, me entiende, con alimentación, cómo te van a dar galletas y papitas, y jugo, comida de mala calidad, sabe, que por lo menos te den comida que te tengan fuerte…


“…if I knew that when they handed me over, they were going to make me go through all that cold and those things, believe me, that I wouldn’t have traveled here, you know? Because there they go overboard, like I told you, they go overboard with the cold, you know, with food, how are they going to give you cookies and chips, and juice, poor quality food, you know, at least they should give you food that keeps you strong…”

—Ruben, Venezuelan Man, 26 years old

One participant expressed concern for the impact that extreme facility conditions may have on young children:

…lo único, como digamos, incómodo, eh, en el caso de que uno tiene niños es que, eh, la migración de aquí, bueno le dicen la hielera, ellos le dicen haci, entonces es como un sitio bastante como extremo para los niños no, que son tan chiquitos, y hace frío allí.”


“…the only thing, let’s say, uncomfortable, eh, in the case that someone has children is that, eh, immigration [officers] from here, well they call it the icebox, they call it that, so it’s like- like a pretty extreme place for children, they’re so little, and it’s cold there.”

—Andrea, Venezuelan Woman, 26 years old

Reducing people to negligible subjects–held in freezing, inhumane detention facilities– simply for pursuing better living conditions.

The challenges faced by migrants do not end upon their entry into the United States. Limited access to resources for migrants is a looming and prevailing barrier to their financial stability and success.

Many migrants reported that language barriers make obtaining employment in the United States especially difficult. In instances where employment opportunities are available, workers encounter exploitative conditions or discriminatory treatment. As one Venezuelan migrant recalled:

…aquí trabajé, fue construcción… Entonces tampoco me gustó porque esa me pagan demasiado poquito, trabajaba en el sol y por lo que yo estaba haciendo sentía que no me pagaban bien…


…I worked here, it was construction… So I didn’t like it either because they paid me too little. I worked in the sun, and because of what I was doing, I felt like they weren’t paying me well…”

—Mauricio, Venezuelan Man, 23 years old

Another Venezuelan migrant recalls an encounter in which an English-speaking desk worker yelled at him as he delivered a mobile app order:

“…te voy a decir algo; me sentí humillado, a veces cuando voy, conserje o gente de seguridad a un edificio que no sé, si algún número en inglés y me maltratan, y siento que… porque me gritan, y yo por respeto me quedo callado…


“ …I’m going to tell you something, I felt humiliated, sometimes when I go, a janitor or security personnel to a building that I don’t know, if a number in English, and they mistreat me, and I feel that… because they yell at me, and out of respect I stay quiet…”

—Ruben, Venezuelan Man, 26 years old

While many claim that, as “guests” in this country, migrants have a responsibility to learn English, the resources to do so are not always widely available or even accessible.

These interviews reveal the many forms of dehumanization that many migrants endure. They are met with detention in harsh conditions, are denied access to language resources essential for employment, and are subjected to mistreatment in the workplace. Rather than being welcomed with dignity, they are met with indifference, exploitation, and disrespect.

Additionally, access to medical care poses another urgent challenge, especially for recently arrived migrants. This has become increasingly concerning, particularly in light of the recent passage of the “Big Beautiful Bill.” One mother from El Salvador explains that she has struggled greatly to obtain medical attention because she lacks a Social Security Number:

…no he podido obtener un seguro de salud porque no tengo el social… se me ha hecho misión imposible, he buscado en unos lugares, eh, me mandaron a un lugar después no hay cita, después me mandaron a otro lugar ‘tiene social, no? No hay cita,’ después otro lugar ‘¿tiene social, no? No hay cita,’ entonces así he estado durante como dos meses aproximadamente, y entonces se me ha hecho imposible, sí.


“…I have not been able to get health insurance because I don’t have a social [security number]… It’s become an impossible mission. I’ve looked in some places, they sent me to one place, then there was no appointment, then they sent me to another place, ‘Do you have a social [security number]? No? There’s no appointment,’ then another place, ‘Do you have a social [security number]? No? There’s no appointment,’ so I’ve been like that for about two months, and so it’s become impossible for me, yes.”

—Andrea, Venezuelan Woman, 26 years old

Using legal status as a measure for determining access to essential support reinforces harmful hierarchies. This perpetuates narratives of “illegal” or “criminal,” which dehumanize immigrants and may limit efforts to create viable pathways to citizenship.

Many people in influential positions are themselves descendants of immigrants who once sought a better life or fled catastrophic conditions in search of safety. Yet some of these same individuals now work to deny others that very opportunity, advancing policies to exclude others. They may have “forgotten” the immigrant experience—the fear and uncertainty, the exclusion, and the forced assimilation. Instead, they write immigration laws driven by biases and the desire to preserve power.

Some lawmakers want a white, English-speaking, and wealthy America, even if achieving it comes at the expense of others. Meanwhile, these same lawmakers refuse to create attainable pathways to citizenship for migrant workers who pay billions in taxes every year. Instead, they dismantle existing authorization processes and shift their focus toward excluding people of color, casting them as dangerous, undeserving, and less than human.

Migration to the United States in pursuit of safety and stability should not be criminalized, nor should it be used to strip people of their dignity and humanity. Can we not imagine their desires and actions as our own if we were in a similar situation? Would we not also relocate to safety if our livelihoods were threatened? And, would we not want others to approach us with respect and empathy?


Iran Pacheco Martinez is a Research Assistant at The Immigration Lab and a Government and Legal Studies double major with Latin American, Caribbean, and Latinx Studies at Bowdoin College.

Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director, Katheryn Olmos, Lab Coordinator, and Nadia Issah, Research Intern at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.

Latin America’s Challenges and Opportunities

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Image of wind mills and solar panels. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Latin America is a region of great contrasts that currently faces serious challenges and also great opportunities. At the global level, the current outlook is uncertain. Forecasts for 2025 suggest that the world economy will experience moderate growth. In particular, the pace of growth shows signs of slowing in both the United States and China, and a slight increase in Europe (International Monetary Fund, 2025).

Emerging economies are likely to continue contributing to global growth, but they are also vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and increased financial selectivity (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025). Escalating trade tensions, uncertainty surrounding global interest rates, and the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related incidents increase long-term risks. Moreover, persistent geopolitical tensions and protectionist policies are making supply chains highly volatile (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

At the domestic level, Latin American countries face a mixed panorama. While the dramatic changes in socioeconomic conditions have significantly impacted the post-pandemic recovery, it has also presented opportunities for resource mobilization. However, current regional records indicate that the balance of payments will continue to be impacted by external vulnerability. Domestic demand is expected to remain weak, and employment growth is anticipated to be lower than in previous years, although informality and unemployment are expected to show slight improvements (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025).

Inflation is expected to remain stable in 2025 and 2026 and close to target levels, but an upward trend cannot be ruled out. Although monetary policy does not necessarily have to be restrictive, ambiguous capital inflows, exchange rate volatility, and global uncertainty are impacting central banks’ policies, which must preserve stability without decelerating economic activity.

Economic growth, interest and exchange rates, as well as commodity prices, all affect fiscal sustainability. Therefore, fiscal space will remain limited, as many countries face upward pressure on spending and high borrowing costs. Similarly, in this case, one of the biggest issues facing the region’s governments is the need to take into account various restrictions without compromising economic growth.

Productivity growth remains sluggish, hindering advancements in poverty alleviation and impeding significant enhancements in living conditions. Despite a recent decrease, inequality in Latin America is higher not only in comparison with advanced countries but also with other countries of a similar level of development (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

Additionally, growth models in the region have struggled to foster technical advancement, which has contributed to low per capita research rates. A marginal position in global innovation, insufficient investment in innovation ecosystems, and persistent problems related to infrastructure and digital skills have prevented the region from achieving a competitive technological position.

Overall, persistent structural challenges continue to hinder long-term economic growth. Although the future is clearly complicated, the region’s ability to seize new opportunities will depend on the policy decisions taken now. Increased regional integration, pro-growth structural reforms, and stronger institutional frameworks are necessary to transition from just stable to inclusive and sustainable growth.

In particular, the global economy is experiencing sluggish growth but also abrupt changes. This scenario creates tensions and new imbalances, while also presenting significant opportunities for Latin American economies. Certainly, they have the potential to increase their integration into global markets, which in turn would lead to greater economic growth, thereby enhancing regional prosperity and diversification.

Although changing economic relationships and supply chains are not precisely good for everyone, Latin America may benefit from them in the current global environment. Thus, exploring the development of renewable energies presents a significant opportunity for the region in the context of an increasingly divided world, which is seeking greener and more sustainable growth strategies (O’Neil, 2024).

Latin America has extensive sustainable energy resources, with one-third coming from clean sources, which exceeds the global average of 20%. Additionally, 60% of its electricity already derives from renewable energy. The region is backed by abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, helping businesses meet climate goals and explore green hydrogen, which results in very low or zero carbon emissions. It also produces a third of global lithium and possesses significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, nickel, and rare earth elements crucial for electric vehicles, solar energy, and wind turbines.

Image of renewable energy examples. Retrieved from Science Notes.

In this respect, factors related to political economy might represent obstacles despite strict environmental policies, suggesting that to advance towards a greener economy, countries need to integrate environmental policy with an overall enhancement of institutional quality, take into account the government’s political stance on environmental policies, and assess the impact of large energy-intensive sectors within the economy.

Furthermore, the shift to “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring” benefits Latin America since many nations in the region maintain enduring diplomatic, commercial, and cultural connections with the United States. Although some Latin American governments face challenges due to democratic erosion, the region continues to offer the best platform for balancing democratic governance and economic growth, as it has been the most peaceful region in terms of wars (Latinometrics, 2025).

Transitioning to clean energy poses difficulties but offers significant opportunities to generate employment, stimulate economic development, and improve energy security by decreasing dependence on fossil fuels and encouraging innovation in sustainable technologies. All in all, Latin America’s energy potential is enormous, and its leadership must act swiftly to attract stable trade and investment flows in response to evolving geopolitical and economic policies for future success.

References

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025, Resource mobilization to finance development, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, ECLAC, Santiago de Chile.

Inter-American Development Bank, 2025, Regional Opportunities amid Global Shifts, 2025 Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Report, IDB, Washington DC.

International Monetary Fund, 2025, Latin America in the Current Global Environment, Regional Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, DC.

Latinometrics, 2025, Sabías que América Latina no ha vivido una guerra territorial en más de 30 años? Latinometrics, available at https://www.linkedin.com/posts/latinometrics_sab%C3%ADas-que-am%C3%A9rica-latina-no-ha-vivido-activity-7338249978001207298-KNtw/?originalSubdomain=es

O’Neil Shannon K., 2024, Latin America’s Big Opportunity, Project Syndicate, June 10, available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/shannon-k-oneil

Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

A Mexican Indigenous Entrepreneur in New York

By Ernesto Castañeda

[see Spanish version below]

Book review and excerpt from. “Un nahual en el imperio: La lucha de un migrante por los derechos políticos de la diáspora [A nahual in the empire: The fight of a migrant for the political rights of the diaspora]” by Maurizio Guerrero. Ciudad de México: Grano de Sal. 2025.

This book, published by Grano de Sal Press, narrates the experience of migration to the United States through the biography of one migrant in particular, as well as his friends and colleagues. This group of Mixtecos was relatively among the first to arrive in New York to work hard and start businesses. The book combines life narratives with an analysis of the public policies and economic contexts of both countries. It demonstrates how the ingenuity and perseverance of migrants always overcome the agendas and plans of governments, which come and go. Meanwhile, immigrants continue in the struggle for survival, success, and rights. The numerous contributions by migrants continue to enrich both countries. Immigrant volunteers and organizations often do more than any politician to help immigrants in need raise their collective voice as civic and political actors. This book narrates the stories of Jaime Lucero, Casa Puebla, and Fuerza Migrante as a window into the experience of Mexican migration to New York. Through the interviews with Mr. Lucero, the book describes his wish to create a foundation for Mexican migrants to walk together in defending their rights in both the United States and Mexico.

Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center of Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Washington, DC

Portions of the book are displayed here with permission. Translated by Ernesto Castañeda and Diana Rojas Hernandez.

“Jaime Lucero says that he emigrated from the town of Independencia, Puebla, at night, ‘so that no one would see me cry.’ That detail encapsulates the drama of the separation that migrant families go through, although it conceals the true tragedy of this exile” (p.83).

“At 9 years old, a goat herder in a family headed by a widow with seven children, he was sent to work in the capital so that he could send money home. At 18 years old, he shared that he crossed el [Rio Grande] even though he did not know how to swim. In the stormy waters of that migrant-devouring river, he had received “a sign”: someone helped him cross, preventing him from drowning, and since then, he understood that those people, Mexicans, Central Americans, and Caribbeans, were his people: the migrants.

Like the millions before and after him, Lucero arrived in New York to work in kitchens, washing dishes. He had worked at a restaurant for six years when the owners decided to discontinue using the truck they used to transport provisions because it broke down too often. Jaime took this as a message: he had to buy the truck, quit the restaurant, and work for himself.

Lucero founded a business that eventually generated millions of dollars in revenue and then became a community leader. In 1978, he established the first-ever organization for Mexican migrants in New York, Club Azteca, which would later become Casa Puebla, the foundation upon which he built his assistance services … [Fueza Migrante years later].

In large part due to the work of Fuerza Migrante, the Mexican Congress already had deputies and a senator representing the Mexican diaspora around the world. He devoted many things to the cause: money and the time to help people who, like him, had arrived in the empire without resources, defenseless. He expressed: “It is what I would have wanted to give to young Jaime Lucero.”

Community aid from the hands of one migrant to another, aspired to improve lives: those of people who crossed the border without papers and never escaped from the worst paid jobs, remaining merely helpers. His intentions were to change the concrete reality from which the vast majority of Mexican migrants never even dream of liberating themselves from: that, “We are not what you believe we are… We are not poor migrants,” he emphasized.

He mentioned the alcoholism that plagued those forced out by their circumstances: “All of the young people searching for their path are our children,” he said. “Those who sometimes fall into alcoholism, into drugs, they are our children too.” I understood it as his way of alluding to his brother Julio and cousin Ricardo, who managed, with great effort, to recover from their addiction to alcohol. It was also in reference to his cousins, El Chivo and Román, and other paisanos who were deported multiple times and continued to drink beer in the Mixteca Poblana because there was nothing much more to do in that impoverished area.

He referred to the migrants dragged from their childhood to face discrimination, exploitation, loneliness, and longing, who found solace in alcohol. To all those who had been left behind. Lucero stressed that “We have to put a price on that suffering.” All of that sacrifice, all those lives swallowed up by the insides of these two countries, should be converted into power to alter this cycle.

The Mexican state was not interested, he noted, in stopping migration because each person who emigrated increases remittance flows; And to the United States, those people were simply “illegal.”

[In a recent speech at Harvard University,] Lucero told the anecdote of the old broken-down truck, that clunker that was constantly breaking down. This version, however, was different from the one I had heard. In the version I had heard, various people had managed to pull the truck to the curb, another truck had been sent to deliver the fabric that Lucero had to ship, and a tow truck had taken the piece of junk to a mechanic. Lucero’s story is yearning, an illusion, a dream. In this dream, Jaime does not have to walk on that snowy highway to find a payphone to inform the warehouse that he will not be able to deliver the fabric. The people helping push the truck made it possible for him to shift into second gear and get the truck started. The same truck that others had discarded because they thought it was junk. In his dream, the truck finally roars to life and, despite everything, advances through the snow. “That truck is the community,” Lucero said (p. 281-3).

Maurizio Guerrero is a journalist and PhD student in the Sociology doctoral program at the CUNY Graduate Center.


Un nahual en el imperio: La lucha de un migrante por los derechos políticos de la diáspora

Maurizio Guerrero

Este libro publicado por Grano de Sal narra la experiencia de la migración a EE.UU. desde la biografía de un migrante en especial, así como sus amigos y colegas. Este grupo de Mixtecos fue relativamente de entre los primeros en llegar a Nueva York a trabajar duro y comenzar negocios. El libro combina narrativas de vida con análisis de las políticas públicas y contextos económicos en ambos países. Demuestra cómo la ingenuidad y perseverancia de los migrantes siempre sobrepasan las agendas y planes de los gobiernos, que van y vienen, mientras que las contribuciones de los migrantes siguen enriqueciendo ambos países, haciendo más que ningún político para ayudar a inmigrantes en situación de necesidad a alzar su voz colectiva como actores cívicos y políticos. Este libro narra las historias de Jaime Lucero, Casa Puebla y Fuerza Migrante como ventana a la experiencia de la migración mexicana a la zona de Nueva York. A través de la entrevistas con el Señor Lucero también se describe su deseo por crear las bases para que los migrantes mexicanos puedan caminar juntos para defender sus derechos en México y Estados Unidos.

Ernesto Castañeda, Director del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos, American University, Washington, DC

Reproducimos aquí porciones del libro con permiso,

“Jaime Lucero cuenta que emigró del pueblo Independencia, Puebla de noche, ‘para que nadie me viera llorar.’ Ese detalle encapsula el drama de la separación de las familias migrantes, aunque oculta en buena medida la verdadera tragedia de ese exilio” (p.83).

“Pastor de cabras en una familia encabezada por una viuda con siete hijos, a los 9 años había sido mandado a trabajar a la capital a fin de que enviara dinero. A los 18 años, contó, había cruzado el Bravo aunque no sabía nadar. En las aguas procelosas de ese río devorador de migrantes, había tenido “una señal”: alguien lo ayudó a cruzar, impidiendo que se ahogara, y desde entonces comprendió que esas personas, mexicanos, centroamericanos y caribeños, eran su grupo: los migrantes.

Como millones de migrantes antes y después que él, Lucero arribó a Nueva York a trabajar en cocinas, lavando platos. Seis años había laborado en un restaurante cuando sus dueños decidieron deshacerse del camión en el que transportaban provisiones porque ya fallaba mucho. Jaime lo tomó como mensaje: debía comprar el camión, renunciar al restaurante y trabajar por su cuenta.

Lucero fundó una empresa que llegó a facturar millones de dólares y se convirtió en líder comunitario. En 1978 había fundado la primera organización para los migrantes mexicanos en Nueva York: el Club Azteca, que se convertiría en Casa Puebla, la base sobre la que había construido sus servicios de asistencia … [Fuerza Migrante años después].

En buena medida debido a las gestiones de Fuerza Migrante, el Congreso mexicano ya tenía diputados y una senadora que representaban a la diáspora mexicana en el mundo. Dedica muchas cosas a esa causa, dinero, el tiempo invertido para ayudar a las personas que, como él, habían llegado sin recursos, desvalidos, al imperio. Expresó: “Es lo que yo hubiera querido darle al joven Jaime Lucero.”

Esa ayuda comunitaria, de la mano de un migrante a otro migrante, aspiraba a mejorar destinos: los de aquellos que cruzan la frontera sin papeles y no escapan nunca de los empleos peor pagados, de ser simplemente ayudantes. Su intención era contribuir a cambiar una realidad concreta, de la que la vasta mayoría de los migrantes mexicanos jamás sueñan liberarse. “No somos lo que ustedes creen que somos”, destacó: “No somos pobres migrantes.”

Mencionó el alcoholismo que plagaba a aquellos expulsados por su entorno: “Todos los jóvenes que están buscando el camino son nuestros hijos —dijo—. Los que a veces caen por el alcoholismo, por las drogas, son nuestros hijos también.” Fue su modo, entendí, de aludir a su hermano Julio y a su primo Ricardo, que lograron con esfuerzo recuperarse de su adicción al alcohol, pero también a sus primos, el Chivo y Román, y a los otros paisanos varias veces deportados que seguían tomando cerveza en la Mixteca poblana porque no había nada más que hacer en esa zona empobrecida.

Se refería a los migrantes arrancados de su infancia para enfrentar discriminación, explotación, soledad, añoranza, que encuentran un consuelo en el alcohol. A todos los que se habían quedado atrás. “Tenemos que ponerle precio a ese sufrimiento”, expresó Lucero. Todo ese sacrificio, esas vidas deglutidas en las entrañas de los dos países, debía convertirse en poder para alterar ese ciclo.

Al Estado mexicano no le interesaba, señaló, detener la migración porque cada persona que emigra acrecentaba las remesas. Y para Estados Unidos, esas personas eran simplemente “ilegales”.

[En un discurso en un evento en una universidad americana] Lucero relató la anécdota del viejo camión descompuesto, ese armatoste que a cada rato fallaba. Su narración, sin embargo, fue diferente a la que yo había escuchado sobre cómo, entre varias personas, habían logrado orillar el vehículo a la cuneta, cómo otro camión había sido enviado para repartir las telas que debía entregar Lucero y cómo una grúa había remolcado el cacharro a un taller mecánico. Este desenlace es un anhelo, una ilusión, un sueño, y que en ese sueño Jaime no tiene que caminar en esa autopista nevada a fin de encontrar un teléfono público para informar a la bodega que no podrá entregar las telas. En su sueño, las personas que lo ayudan empujan para que él, metiendo segunda, logre prender el camión del que otros se habían deshecho porque creían que era una chatarra. En su sueño, el camión logra ponerse en marcha y, pese a todo, avanza bajo la nieve. “Ese camión es la comunidad,” dijo Lucero (pp. 381-383).

Maurizio Guerrero es periodista y estudiante de doctorado en el programa de sociología del CUNY Graduate Center.

Invisible Hierarchies

Invisible Hierarchies: How Co-ethnic and Generational Dynamics Affect Latinx Students in the Classroom

By Allison Finn Yemez

In their book, Reunited, about youth migrating to the US to reunite with parents in the Washington, DC area, Ernesto Castañeda and Daniel Jenks find that “youth tend to do better when they are around students with whom they can identify” (2024, p.181). This is absolutely true, and it is important for classroom teachers to note that finding “relatable others” for some students is more nuanced than we think. Externally sharing an ethnicity or even nationality is not enough. Dynamics in classrooms can be subtle, especially for monolingual teachers who can’t access the conversations happening in other languages. Social hierarchies rooted in cultures we don’t understand can undermine even our best efforts to create a safe space for learning, and that can lead to adverse effects we can’t control. In middle and high school classrooms, for example, students who struggle to learn English feel less respected and more discriminated against, which leads to them struggling more in school (Castañeda and Jenks, 2024, p. 175). This includes rejection from students with roots in the same country or region, but who were born in the U.S. or have been living in the U.S. for a longer time and have a better command of the English language.

I see this play out in my own classroom, especially at the beginning of the year, when students are hesitant to engage in conversation with one another. One of my Latinx students reflected that over the course of the year, she developed the ability to speak more loudly and clearly. She noted that at the start of the year, she would speak in a low, quiet voice, so that no one could hear her. This student does not clarify what exactly made her feel that she couldn’t speak, but the idea that “some second-generation students could bully new migrants in school” (Castañeda and Jenks, 2024, p. 174) makes me wonder if that was what was going on.

I was first introduced to these invisible identities when I taught in a Turkish public high school in İstanbul, Türkiye. When I arrived, I couldn’t “see” any differences in students: to me, they were all Turkish. And that is exactly what the founder of modern Türkiye, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, intended when he made the law that “we are all Turks” and that there should be no language or culture other than Turkish. For a long time, it was actually illegal in Türkiye to be anything but a secular Turk: my husband, who is ethnically and linguistically Zaza, was forced to hide his background when in the public sphere. My Kurdish and Zaza students, among others, were compelled to hide themselves among their peers in class. But this “hiding” is also relative: the invisibility of their ethnicity only extends to people who cannot see it because they are cultural outsiders (people like me). The markers of ethnic difference in Türkiye —naming, language and dialect, accented Turkish, skin tone, and facial features— things I knew nothing about. My students and Turkish colleagues were aware, and some distinctions were prevalent around them. They had been developing biases about these types of differences throughout their lives. Kurd, Alevi, Zaza, Uighur —there are over fifty ethnic minority groups integrated into the Turkish education system, and these students do their best to “hide” their identity by staying silent.

A similar phenomenon is occurring in U.S. classrooms. Co-ethnic and intergenerational tensions are high, and because the majority of teachers are white Americans, they are not part of the culture that would allow them to see. This is where my reading of Sin Padres, Ni Papeles, by Dr. Stephanie L. Canizales (2024), Reunited, by Ernesto Castañeda and Daniel Jenks (2024), The Latino Education Crisis, by Patricia Gandara and Frances Contreras (2009), The Chicana/o/x Dream by Gilberto Conchas and Nancy Acevedo (2020) and “They called me chanchi and it made me feel bad” by Eric Macias et al. converge and provided a strong starting point to better understand of my own current classroom contexts and provide foundations to begin building opportunities to also learn from my students in the classroom. More learning is necessary regarding the hierarchical dynamics at play within groups of Latin American students, which will impact how we create collaborations, design our space as a safe one, and how we might intervene when bullying occurs in our classroom.

Indigenous groups in Latin America, for example, have “historically been categorized ‘as dangerous, lazy, childlike, or mulish.’ Once Indigenous immigrants are in the United States, this illicit and stigmatizing generalization affects everyday social interactions within the Latin American immigrant community” (Canizales, 2024, p. 19). A paper from Macias et al. reports that “racialized discourses and slurs (i.e. chanchi)” used by some Central American students against others were used enough among high school students to make some students leave school (2025, p. 5). This intentional stigmatizing of peers —who are Indigenous, whose English proficiency is not as high as others, who struggle to learn English quickly, and who come from certain countries— creates tensions in classrooms that are difficult to alleviate for a teacher who is unaware of them. This is also exacerbated when bullying happens in a language that a teacher is unable to understand.

This past year, my co-teacher and I perceived a very supportive climate in one of our co-taught classes. In fact, we had several observers come in to see the students engaged in a Socratic discussion, and when they left, they both commented on how supportive the students were of each other. They even cited a few different interactions that they perceived to be caring ones. However, at the end of the year, the students were tasked with writing arguments that they would present to the class. One student was agonizing over whether he would share a few details of his migration story. In a conversation with him, I shared how powerful his story was and that using it or not was entirely his decision. I shared with him my perception of support in the class, and he just looked me in the eye and shook his head back and forth. I asked him if he didn’t feel supported by his peers, and he shook his head again. It was a surprise to me because of my own perceptions and because I was unaware of the hierarchical dynamics that existed between him and the Latinx students who had been in the US for longer, or who were second- or third-generation Americans.

In addition to all of this, it is imperative that teachers stop imposing their common assumption that all students should be motivated to excel in school and base their worth on individual achievements and accolades. Canizales’s book Sin Padres, Ni Papeles, which focuses on unaccompanied Central American migrant youth, many of whom came to the United States with dreams of going to school (or of completing school they were unable to complete in their home countries) allowed me to see that the forces at play in their lives, and the focus of their priorities, does not align with the Western capitalist narrative of individual success that pervades our classrooms and drives much of the motivation work we do in U.S. schools. For many of the youth in her study, “remembering one’s family and making sacrifices for them serve as currency in a moral economy” (Canizales, 2025, p. 227) and it is important for teachers to understand that the “moral economy” in which many of their Latinx students are living is as important —if not more— than the capitalist economy that we were indoctrinated into.

Teachers need to educate themselves about the changing classroom dynamics so that they can effectively create safe spaces for students to speak, write, and engage with one another. Teachers need to educate themselves also about the metas (goals) of students who exist outside our cultural norms, as for students who live outside the norms, “it is not enough to set goals and work hard to achieve them. Systems of power and opportunity structures must be aligned in one’s favor” (Canizales, 2025, p. 235). If we are to motivate all students to achieve their goals, we must first understand what those goals are, how the education we provide helps achieve those goals, and how we might align the structures of our classrooms to favor all students instead of just some.

Some exhortations for teachers:

  1. Get informed about the social dynamics at play in your classrooms and communities. A great place to start is with the books Reunited; and Sin Padres, Ni Papeles. The book The Latino Education Crisis is an older study, but it is great for building foundational knowledge.
  2. Get vulnerable with your students; share your awareness of your positionality through your own experience.
  3. Make learning symbiotic: commit to learning from your students as you hope they will learn from you. Also, teach them how they can learn from one another and how their differences contribute to deeper learning for the whole class.
  4. Examine your own motivations and the assumptions on which they rest; get curious and open up to accepting new knowledge lacunae; learn about other cultural frameworks, points of view, and social positions that might be driving your students’ motivations, behaviors, goals, and present priorities.

I truly believe that accepting these four invitations will make classroom relationship-building easier, and that subsequently it will make teaching more enjoyable and effective. That doesn’t mean it will be easy, though, especially for white teachers like me. We will first need to learn to see through other people’s eyes while simultaneously acknowledging our own presence in classroom spaces (and society) as a racial one.

My journey to seeing the need for this kind of learning has taken multiple years and multiple country contexts, and I hope that by sharing my learning with other teachers and administrators, it will come easier for them. As I continue to learn and build relationships with my students, I will share some more readings, strategies, and reflections about how it is going for me and my students as we move through this school year. I also invite any comments my colleagues might have as we embark on this journey together.

Allison Finn Yemez is a National Board Certified teacher currently serving as Head of the English department in a local public Middle School. While her background and past 25 years of experience have been teaching and leading in high schools in three different countries, she is enjoying the new challenge and the joy of bringing academic rigor to and working with middle-grade students. Allison is currently an Ed.D. student in the School of Education at American University.

Works Cited

Canizales, S. L. (2024). Sin Padres, Ni Papeles: Unaccompanied Migrant Youth Coming of Age in the United States. University of California Press.

Castaneda, E., & Jenks, D. (2024). Reunited: Family Separation and Central American Youth Migration. Russell Sage Foundation.

Conchas, Gilberto Q. & Acevedo, Nancy. (2020). The Chicana/o/x Dream: Hope, Resistance, and Educational Success. Harvard University Press.

Gandara, P., & Contreras, F. (2009). The Latino Education Crisis: The Consequences of Failed Social Policies. Harvard University Press.

Macias, E., Barrera Trivino, M., Dreyfus, R., & Pasion, D. (n.d.). “They called me chanchi and it made me feel bad”: Undocumented Youths’ Perception of Relational Racial Projects in School Settings.