All posts by clalsstaff

Haiti: The Danger of Foreign Military Intervention

By Scott Freeman*

A police precinct in Cite Soleil, where gang violence and protests have surged in recent months / James Emery / Flickr / Creative Commons License

Though Haiti’s security, economic, and political crises have thrust the country into the most dire situation in recent memory, the Prime Minister’s call for foreign military intervention, if the UN complies, will continue a cycle of failed international meddling. The UN is discussing proposals backed by the United States and Mexico that would impose financial sanctions and an arms embargo on criminal actors in Haiti and authorize “a non-UN international security assistance mission to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of desperately needed humanitarian aid.” The mission would be led by an unspecified “partner country” with experience in Haiti.

Prime Minister Ariel Henry, serving as head of government with international support since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, pleaded for assistance amid a precipitous rise in gang power in Haiti and unwavering calls for his resignation.

  • Gangs control much of the country, in particular Port-au-Prince, and affect everything from the safety of children attending school to the movement of food. Several weeks ago, they seized the terminal where fuel enters the country, paralyzing transportation, the functioning of hospitals, and other essential services. Working towards both political and criminal ends, gangs came to power as political tools, used notably by the ruling PHTK party to squash opposition. Now they operate throughout the country. Human rights groups estimate that 90 gangs operate in the capital and have killed hundreds of citizens and terrified tens of thousands of others. UN specialized agencies reported last week that 4.7 million Haitians (about 40 percent of the national population) face acute hunger, including 19,000 who are in “Phase Five” famine conditions for the first time.

However, Henry’s call for an international security presence is deeply problematic.

  • Named Prime Minister two days before Moïse’s assassination, Henry lacks a popular and constitutional mandate. Moïse blocked elections for mayors and national legislators and gutted the judiciary, consolidating power in his own hands. Henry is now the de facto leader of a country void of democratic checks and balances. During his year in power, Henry has done almost nothing to address the issue of gang violence. Protests have been occurring in the street regularly calling for his departure. The peyi lok (country lockdown) protests that started in late September ramped up in response to Henry’s removal of fuel subsidies – levying essentially a regressive tax perceived by Haitians across the country as a direct assault on the poor.
  • Despite consistent and popular calls for his removal, the United States, Canada, and other countries’ support for Henry and the PHTK has endured, choosing “stability” over calls for a transitional government and democratic elections. Washington has largely ignored the Montana Accord, the product of a broad coalition of some 70 civil society actors across religious and political divides who proposed two years of coalition government followed by free and fair elections. In Washington, support for Henry has been challenged by 13 members of the Democratic Party in the Senate and House who wrote a letter to President Biden that points out Henry’s disinterest in democracy and stability, and urged the Administration to change its strategy, heed the Montana Accord, and move away from support for Henry.

Protesters have forcefully rejected Henry’s call – bolstered by UN Secretary-General Guterres – for a foreign security force “to stand with us and help us fight this humanitarian crisis.” The request has met stiff resistance in Haiti by groups that portray it as a blatant effort to keep himself and the PHTK in power. Others call the invitation to foreign troops treason and argue a foreign force would repeat the mistakes of the previous UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH, 2004‑17), which introduced cholera into the country, committed widespread acts of sexual assault and violence, and was widely seen as an occupier. A statue in southwest Haiti, for example, was erected to depict Haiti’s triumph over both cholera and the UN force.

  • The strong rejection of this option from civil society groups like the Montana Accord and advocacy groups like Nou Pap Domi (We Won’t Sleep) bodes poorly for international actors that might think that yet another military deployment in Haiti would lead to a different result than the past catastrophic operations. As long as the “core group” of the international community keeps its thumb on the scale and gives free reign to leaders like Henry and predecessors who lack democratic legitimacy, democratic change will not occur. Truly breaking the cycle of interventions and the longstanding support of kleptocratic regimes would mean supporting the work of groups like the Montana Accord – which the United States and others have rejected. Henry’s request for a foreign military presence is therefore not a solution, but instead sows the seeds of another set of problems.

* Scott Freeman is an anthropologist and professor in the School of International Service.

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by clalsstaff on October 19, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 19, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/10/19/haiti-the-danger-of-foreign-military-intervention/

Colombia: LGBTQ+ Youth Faces Discrimination, Bullying, and Institutional Harassment 

by Juliana Martínez* 

Group of demonstrators in Colombia for LGBTQ+ rights / Erick Morales / Sentiido / Creative Commons License

Despite significant progress in laws advancing their rights, Colombia’s LGBTQ+ youths face systemic hostility and receive little support from the institutions that are supposed to help them, leading to higher mental health issues and reduced academic achievement. Surveys by the Colombian Sentiido Foundation – receiving 1,555 and 3,246 responses from LGBTQ+ youth in August-September 2021 – provide a comprehensive picture of their lives, experiences, needs, and support networks. 

Despite the most progressive legal protections in Latin America, the public record and various comprehensive studies show that LGBTQ+ people in Colombia continue to experience widespread discrimination and violence – including bullying, verbal harassment, mean rumors, and physical assault – that make them feel unsafe. Ninety-eight LGBTQ+ people were murdered in Colombia in 202021. 

  • Colombia’s highest judicial body, the Constitutional Court, has established strong precedents that explicitly protect sexual orientation and gender identity from discrimination. Gay couples can get married and enjoy the rights of straight couples. While the country does not have a comprehensive gender identity law, trans people can change their name and sex marker on all official documents freely. The Court has shown a strong anti-discrimination stance with a series of rulings protecting students as well. 
  • Despite this, LGBTQ+ youth suffers on many levels. Sentiido’s surveys confirmed that young LGBTQ+ Colombians experience harassment, bias, and discrimination in school and other aspects of their lives. Ironically, the Sentiido study found that, rather than being the solution, adults are often part of the problem – failing LGBTQ+ youths in school, home, and even churches. Teachers, parents, and other adults in positions of responsibility often press youths into therapies and treatments to make them conform to traditional models rather than prosper as they are. Eighty-seven percent of LGBTQ+ youths have heard homophobic or transphobic comments from family members, and almost one in five reports having been physically punished by parents for their sexual orientation or gender identity. 

Regarding school climate, more than half report they feel unsafe in school and were cyber-bullied at home, causing more than a third of them to miss at least one day of class a month. More than 90 percent hear homophobic remarks at school, and 75 percent report being verbally harassed based on sexual orientation, gender, gender expression, and race or ethnicity. Thirty percent have been physically harassed (e.g., shoved or pushed). Some 87 percent feel deliberately excluded by other students. 

  • Most students (65.5 percent) reported hearing homophobic remarks from school staff. Teachers’ and administrators’ unwillingness to create a safe environment, such as by discouraging peer meanness, create an impression of condoning the abuse. Almost 15 percent of youths taking the survey reported facing disciplinary processes for being LGBTQ+ despite laws explicitly prohibiting it. 
  • When students reported incidents, moreover, staff usually did not help. Less than a fifth reported that school personnel intervened most of the time or always. (Peers were much more reliable in assisting.) As a result, almost seven in 10 students never reported incidents to staff. 

Youths facing such challenges without reliable support networks, affirming resources, and safe spaces endure stresses that negatively impact their mental health and academic achievement – consequences that are visible in rates of attempted suicide and school absences. These data, however, can help responsible people make institutions more responsive. Almost 70 percent of LGBTQ+ youth think things will be better in the future, apparently because they see the obvious solutions that adults can adopt. 

  • The same questionnaires that paint vivid pictures of the problem also show the way ahead to improvements, starting with adherence to the law. The surveys show that youths who receive positive info about LGBTQ+ people, history, and events – although a minority – have the best outcomes in terms of mental health, a feeling of belonging, and school attendance. Schools with explicitly inclusive policies have more successful staff intervention when problems arise.  
  • Online materials and activities can help as sources of information, but they’re not a substitute for person-to-person interaction. The unsupervised way in which youths navigate online spaces can put them at risk or confuse them. The Sentiido surveys show that inclusion, acceptance, and personal contact are the elements, denied to most LGBTQ+ youths today, that will most help all Colombian youth, including LGBTQ+ youth, thrive. 

*Juliana Martínez  is the Research Director of Sentiido and an Associate Professor at the Department of World Languages and Literatures at American University. Her recent book, Haunting Without Ghosts, Spectral Realism in Colombian Film, Literature and Art, is the winner of the William M. LeoGrande Award for the best scholarly book or article on Latin American or Latino Studies published by a member of the American University community in 2020–2021. 

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by clalsstaff on October 11, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 11, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/10/11/colombia-lgbtq-youth-faces-discrimination-bullying-and-institutional-harassment/

Colombia: Will New Drug Policies Damage U.S. Ties?

By Pedro Arenas*

Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Vice President Francia Márquez meeting with United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken / U.S. Department of State / Flickr / Creative Commons License

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s push for a major overhaul of the “war on drugs” is likely to cause tensions with Washington, but both sides appear to be proceeding with caution. Like its predecessors, the Biden Administration is reluctant to acknowledge the failure of the old tactics, but the burden will be on Petro to make the case that new approaches will work better.

  • Colombia has agreed with the United States on drug policies since the 1970s, with a focus on the Colombian Police and, later, the National Army. In 1996, the U.S. State Department said that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were directly engaged in narco-trafficking, which opened the door for deeper cooperation. With “Plan Colombia” in the 2000s, Bogotá made the war on drugs a central element of its counterinsurgency – and Washington became deeply involved despite the implications for human rights in affected regions.
  • The two countries put aerial eradication of coca crops and extradition of traffickers at the center of the relationship, even though the initiatives did not significantly reduce the production or flows of the narcotic into the United States. The cartels fragmented and grew more violent as they fought for control of the trade.

President Petro’s proposed reform is not the first challenge to the decades-old approach. A peace agreement between President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in 2016 challenged the nature and depth of cooperation. The accord included commitments in four areas: incentivizing coca growers to change crops (through agrarian reform and secure access to markets); stopping the traffic (through interdiction); eliminating money-laundering; and getting transit and consumer countries to do more to reduce demand. The goal was to reduce the trade and demand more than to criminalize the production of raw material.

  • Little progress was made before President Iván Duque (2018-2022) put the emphasis back onto classic supply reduction. (The Constitutional Court would not allow the resumption of aerial spraying for environmental and health reasons, but ground-based operations increased.) The United States continued to demand increased eradication of coca, while continuing to reinforce police and military bases and cooperating in narco arrests.
  • Petro argues that peace in Colombia should start with the reform of these policies. (Colombia has suffered a conflict with 9 million victims.) He has proposed a permanent end to aerial spraying and an emphasis on crop substitution in coca-producing communities; expanded interdiction in the air, at sea, and on rivers; and greater efforts to bring all illegal armed groups, including narco-traffickers, into the national judicial system with assurances that they will not be extradited if they cooperate, compensate victims, and do not repeat their crimes.

Six Colombian think tanks (including the one I cofounded) have given the President recommendations on how to implement his priorities. The recommendations stress the need for internal Colombian reforms, most of which can be made without the permission of the United States. Important ones include ending the excessive use of criminal law in non-violent drug cases; suspending the use of force against communities in coca-producing areas; implementing the Peace Accord (including promised investments to fund alternative crops); permitting a regulated cannabis market; and opening markets of food products, with appropriate protection for users, derived from coca leaf.

Despite his progressive international discourse on the need to end the war on drugs, Petro’s opponents say that his proposals would make Colombia a narco-state, and peasant organizations are concerned that land eradication by the military and police forces will continue. The State Department’s top drug official initially said publicly that he saw “a problem” in Petro’s proposals, but Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with Petro on Monday said he “strongly supports the holistic approach that President Petro’s administration is taking,” and that the two administrations are “largely in sync” on drugs policy. They did not publicly address the thorny issue of extradition.

  • Washington will probably have difficulty making deep changes to policy, particularly as U.S. mid-term elections approach. In addition to competing perspectives on how to deal with crime, there are political sectors, bureaucracies, and powerful business interests that have benefited greatly from the past policy emphasis on criminalizing peasant production of coca leaf – even if the results have been questionable. Their justification is that the drug problem “would be worse if we didn’t do it.”
  • Petro surely knows he will have to be creative and patient with Washington. For instance, recently the Colombian Police chief received two U.S. helicopters, the first of 12, for protecting the forests in Colombia, suggesting the new President will seek common ground with the United States. He wants to avoid provoking Washington to use its anachronistic “decertification” process to punish him for showing insufficient commitment.

The six think tanks believe that Petro can thread the needle in the U.S. relationship and that, if implemented correctly, the reforms of drug policies will bring Colombia in line with international norms, including the protection of human rights, and win broad international support. A frank conversation among Latin America, Africa, Oceania, and Europe within the OAS or UN would benefit all.

* Pedro Arenas is cofounder of Corporación Viso Mutop, a Bogotá-based organization that facilities dialogue on sensitive issues among diverse social, political, and institutional actors.

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by clalsstaff on October 5, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on October 5, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/10/05/colombia-will-new-drug-policies-damage-u-s-ties/

Ecuador: Weak Government Faces Growing Challenges

By Pablo Andrade Andrade*

Ecuadorians rallying during the paro nacional / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso has tried to overcome the economic mess and political divisions he inherited from predecessors with neoliberal policies that, along with other missteps, have fueled growing opposition to him and undermined his agenda during the final two years of his term. Even if, unlike most of his predecessors in the past 30 years, he serves out his term, his record will be marred by policies that had failed when first attempted in the 1980s. According to Perfiles de Opinión, a respected poll, 66 percent of the population say that Lasso’s performance is either “bad” or “very bad,” and only 2.06 percent evaluate his government as “very good.” 

  • Lasso’s immediate predecessors – Rafael Correa and Lenín Moreno – left a country shaken by corruption, debt, a bungled strategy for dealing with COVID, and paralyzed public health and education services. He did not have a working majority in the National Assembly, and his CREO Movement failed to win control of key municipal and provincial governments. 
  • From the beginning, Lasso’s approach to the economic crisis was orthodox, borrowing heavily from the neoliberal fixes attempted in Ecuador in the 1980-90s. Although his administration managed to tap into the relative openness of the IMF and other IFIs, and successfully negotiated its massive debt with China, the Ministry of Economy and Finance adopted a tight budget, cutting state investments. Recovery from the pandemic slowed. Public employment – staple of the middle class – shrank, and inflation rose. 

Opposition to Lasso’s policies started weak but has grown steadily. The Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas (CONAIE), which had flexed its muscles during the Moreno government, was slow to mobilize at first, creating a situation that looked very much like the early wave of neoliberal politics in the 1980s, when a center-right government was able to bypass legislative opposition and weak civil society organizations. Last June, however, a new coalition of the three major rural organizations – CONAIE, Federación de Indígenas Evangélicos (FEINE), and Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN) – held a national strike (paro nacional) that effectively paralyzed the country for 18 days.  

  • The government backpedaled on its decisions to keep domestic fuel prices at international levels; to maintain low state expenditures for health and education; and to deny indigenous organizations a significant role in decision-making. Lasso reshuffled his cabinet, replacing a half dozen ministers. He opened negotiations with the rural organizations on a range of issues – spanning economic matters (i.e., fuel and food staples prices) and political ones (i.e., the designation of a new Secretario de Pueblos y Nacionalidades to replace the founding secretary Luis Pachala, who resigned in the wake of the national strike).  
  • Although the negotiations relieved some of the stress on the government, the core issues remain highly contentious, and so far, no agreement has emerged. Indigenous leaders say they are not happy with the process, and the few things agreed upon remain provisional. The Catholic Church tried to mediate but failed to progress beyond peripheral issues. In what looks like a desperate move, the government initiated a referendum process that most observers believe is intended to wrestle back the initiative on its own terms. 

The road ahead for the Lasso government is a difficult one – having essentially lame-duck status in the face of steadily mounting woes and opposition. His opponents are as strong and angry now as in June. Despite an improved fiscal stance, the government does not have the will or the capacity to expand public expenditures, so economic growth seems likely to continue at a snail’s pace, and employment will stay depressed in both urban and rural areas. The government’s unwillingness to adopt price controls will continue to fuel popular grievances. 

  • The leadership of CONAIE and others have already threatened a new nationwide mobilization and declared their opposition to the referendum initiative. Whatever support the executive was able to extract from the legislature has faded. Additionally, local government elections in 2023 are stimulating the parties to concentrate their efforts on their political fortunes.  
  • The Ecuadorian military, which played a major role in the abrupt departures of several Presidents over the past three decades, has so far avoided joining the partisan factionalism and appears united in the view that Lasso should stay. The President’s health may be as reliable an indicator as any of his fate. He recently traveled to Houston for treatment of melanoma, specifically a lesion in his right eyelid. In Quito’s churning rumor mill, convincing the population that he has been fully cured is nearly impossible. His efforts to assert his credibility as President will continue to be similarly challenged. 

* Pablo Andrade Andrade is the Germánico Salgado Chair on Andean Integration and Professor at the Department of Global and Social Studies, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador. He works on comparative political economy and Latin American politics. 

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by clalsstaff on September 29, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 29, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/09/29/ecuador-weak-government-faces-growing-challenges/

Brazil: Military Looking out for Its Own Interests, Not Bolsonaro’s

By Matheus de Oliveira Pereira*

An Ordem e Progresso badge on a Brazilian soldier / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License

Despite President Bolsonaro’s bluster about rejecting the results of Brazil’s national elections on October 2nd, the military does not appear likely to intervene on his behalf – preferring instead to use its power with whoever wins the election to avoid accountability, reduce civilian oversight, and protect its own institutional interests.  

Bolsonaro worked hard during his term to curry favor with the military, giving it significant policy positions and influence.  

  • Based on data from the government’s Tribunal de Contas de União, William Nozaki estimates that more than 6,000 active military personnel took government positions during Bolsonaro’s presidency, including six critical Ministers of State. An intelligence task force created by interim President Temer in 2018 is now dominated by the military. Another 8,540 benefit from public contracts. Retired officers figure prominently in public debate with the government’s endorsement. 
  • This level of participation also reflects the military’s support – at least implicit – for Bolsonaro’s political project. General Eduardo Pazzuelo, who was in charge of the government’s disastrous response to COVID-19, is running for Congress as a member of his party. In São Paulo, General Tarcísio de Freitas is running for governor as an ally as well. Bolsonaro, a retired officer himself, is seeking the presidency again with a general officer as his running mate. 
  • Some officers claim that they have been a moderating force on the President’s impulses. Like the party’s Centrão group, they say they’re pushing for a more “presidential,” less divisive style by the Executive. The divisions in the party, however, are mostly for image rather than reflective of real cleavages, as are the claims of military officers, who frequently embrace Bolsonaro’s conspiratorial allegations about electronic voting machines and other matters.  

Most officers believe it is crucial to keep feeding the narrative that the security forces have not compromised their non-partisan, non-political role. They are also undoubtedly aware that a coup to keep Bolsonaro in power would face significant international resistance, particularly in the Americas. Also, backing a coup led by Bolsonaro would further deepen their role in the government in a context of tough times, mainly in the economy. 

  • Disinterest in a Bolsonaro coup project does not mean that they welcome Lula da Silva’s return as President. He still faces significant resistance in the barracks. The Army Commander, claiming he is not involved in electoral matters, has avoided contact with emissaries of Lula’s campaign. Figures close to the former president, however, have repeatedly stated that they trust the Armed Forces to respect the outcome of the polls. 

The mere speculation that the military would support Bolsonaro’s claims of fraud so seriously and allow him to remain in power is compelling evidence of how damaged Brazilian democracy and military adherence to democratic principles are. Even if the high command does not support Bolsonaro’s schemes, it seems headed to a different, and perhaps more destructive, approach to using its power – bargaining with whoever wins in October by trading military promises of non-intervention in return for civilian promises to pull back from investigations into its behavior and from future oversight. The officers will probably demand a commitment that the new government would grant an amnesty for mismanagement and corruption during the Bolsonaro years, and would not take steps to restrain their autonomy in budgetary matters. 

  • Some members of Lula’s entourage appear aware of the dangers of this scenario and are reportedly looking for creative solutions to it, especially if Bolsonaro’s base mobilizes and causes serious instability, which Lula would need security forces’ help controlling. However much Lula would want to reject a deal with the military, he may be boxed in by a lack of political support for confrontation and his own conciliatory tendencies during the campaign.  
  • If Brazil repeats the mistake it made 37 years ago – when the main political forces did not face the country’s authoritarian past nor establish mechanisms to effectively limit the military’s political autonomy – the country will again be missing a crucial opportunity to impose civilian control over the military and build a better, more robust democracy. 

* Matheus de Oliveira Pereira is a professor of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo and at the University of Ribeirão Preto, and a researcher at the INCT-INEU and GEDES. He is a former CLALS fellow. 

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by clalsstaff on September 23, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 23, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/09/23/brazil-military-looking-out-for-its-own-interests-not-bolsonaros/

Latin America: Empowering Young Women to Overcome Violence, Poverty, and Discrimination

By Fulton Armstrong*

Study participants take part in group discussion in Cali, Colombia / Universidad del Valle / FLACSO-Costa Rica / Creative Commons license

In addition to documenting the often-overwhelming challenges facing young women in Latin America, the Vidas Sitiadas (Besieged Lives) project coordinated by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) of Costa Rica analyzed promising approaches for empowering women to improve their lives. The solutions are not one-size-fits-all, but they address similar underlying drivers – gender inequality, systemic violence, and the chronic lack of social inclusion and economic opportunities – in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.

  • Governments have largely failed to address young women’s rights to political and economic inclusion, to protection from community violence, and to progress in reducing and ending gender-based violence. Many of the women feel like prisoners in social and cultural constructs that ignore their needs, undermine their sense of self-worth, and deprive them of the skills and self-confidence necessary to build a better life. Women who want to improve their lot in life often can’t afford the necessary education, and are held back by being from stigmatized neighborhoods, lack of basic social services and transportation, and limited access to employment.

The challenges have deep roots and defy quick fixes, but the Vidas Sitiadas studies revealed that projects addressing their underlying causes can enable progress in individuals’ lives, especially when government steps up in coordination with private companies and NGOs. The programs examined have been in place for several years, so their long-term impact is difficult to gauge, but participants’ feedback shows they are based on sound analysis and point to practical, sustainable solutions.

  • The Girasoles (“Sunflowers”) programs designed and implemented by the Paniamor Foundation in Costa Rica emphasize close collaboration among civil society and government at the national and municipal level. Located in a municipality of San José, the initiative is supported by the Ministry of Justice and Peace, the semi-autonomous National Institute for Learning (INA), and the “Civic Centers for Peace” of the area. Girasoles works with young women to overcome their sense of vulnerability through developing skills, rethinking identities, and rebuilding relationships.
  • The Primer Trabajo (“First Job”) initiative by the Arbusta Company, which specializes in information technology, and Santiago-based Espacio Público demonstrated that getting a first job is a woman’s best means to increase social and economic inclusion in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Medellín. In addition to providing on-the-job training, the company empowers women through personal development classes in areas such as listening and speaking skills, problem-solving, and dealing with violent situations. The experience has enabled some women to change homes, drop old relationships and make new ones, and feel agency over their lives for the first time.
  • The Club de Niñas (“Girls’ Club”) by Glasswing International in El Salvador has demonstrated the value of women creating social bonds while in detention facilities and after their release. The program focuses on the roots of problems that contributed to their involvement in criminal activities – poverty, exclusion, gender discrimination, and lack of opportunity. It improves young women’s ability to protect themselves from gender-specific threats and provides opportunities to replace old friendships and reduce economic dependencies that contributed to their past troubles. Interviews show the program increases their self-confidence to make and carry out decisions.
  • The Jardines Maternales (Nursery Schools), run by the Buenos Aires Municipalidad de Avellaneda, have demonstrated the value of childcare to young women who are employed, receiving assistance, or otherwise engaged in positive social interaction, according to a report by FLACSO Argentina. The program enables young women to work and develop important social capital, which also positions their children for greater stability and progress.
  • An Economic Opportunities study, carried out by the Universidad del Valle (Colombia) with young women who live in high-violence neighborhoods in Cali validated two important recommendations to support women striving to liberate themselves from the traps of inequality and exclusion. Based on in-depth interviews, the study called on governments to guarantee higher education – to build skills and enable social contacts – for women who finish secondary education and to provide early-childhood care so they can work full-time.

The problems of young women are the problems of all of society – economic, security, political, cultural – and long-term solutions therefore need the support of broad swaths of society. The Vidas Sitiadas project shows that equipping girls and young women with tools to navigate unequal and struggling economies, systemic violence, and suffocating gender roles is important – and feasible. It has provided the proof of concept and identified some concrete steps forward that alleviate the suffering and fear of at least some young women. That incremental progress is important, but macro solutions reducing or eliminating the many obstacles women face will take political will and time.

  • Government collaboration in some of the projects has already been key, and that success could provide the foundation for persuading political, economic, and security elites to broaden and deepen it. Increasing social inclusion and reducing violence in society and in the home will benefit everyone. Long-term progress will require serious reflection into deeply entrenched aspects of each country’s attitudes and practices toward women, but Vidas Sitiadas has shown that concerted action can make a difference.

This is the final of three AULABLOG articles on the Vidas Sitiadas project. The first two discussed the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on women and programs for women under detention. For additional information about the project, undertaken by FLACSO-Costa Rica and its partners with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, please consult the Vidas Sitiadas website.

September 12, 2022

*Fulton Armstrong is a Research Fellow at CLALS and Director of the AULABLOG.

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by clalsstaff on September 12, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 12, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/09/12/latin-america-empowering-young-women-to-overcome-violence-poverty-and-discrimination/

Argentina: Joining the BRICS?

By Andrés Serbin*

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, U.S. President Joe Biden, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, France’s President Emmanuel Macron, and Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi pose for a G7 leaders’ photograph during a NATO summit at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels on March 24, 2022 / Michael Kappaler / Flickr / Creative Commons license

The BRICS countries’ efforts to expand the group’s influence in the Global South is giving momentum to Argentina’s bid for membership, but the timeline and outcome of the admission process is far from certain. During a virtual summit hosted by Beijing in June, the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – continued efforts to revitalize the group and follow up on expansion proposals initially agreed to in 2017.

  • Conceived as an alternative to the G7 when launched in 2009, the BRICS represent 42 percent of the planet’s population, 24 percent of world GDP, and more than 16 percent of global growth, according to 2019 World Bank estimates. Each member plays a significantly different role in international affairs, but the group is moving in a unified fashion to position themselves as a decisive factor in the global governance architecture and as a voice of the “Global South” that advocates an economic and political alternative for emerging economies. Brazilian analyst Oliver Stuenkel notes that the five “share a profound skepticism of the U.S. international liberal order and perceived danger that unipolarity represents to their interests.”
  • The June summit reviewed initiatives to increase economic cooperation and development, promote multilateralism and world peace, and create a vaccine research and development center. As a reaction to Western economic sanctions, Russia proposed the development of a “de-dollarized” financial space for trade between the group’s economies – a proposal already introduced in the discussions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the main Eurasian cooperation institution. The group also took up China’s 2017 proposal for a “BRICS Plus” – expansion to incorporate new members of the Global South, including Argentina.

The Argentina proposal faces obstacles within the BRICS even though Russia, China, and India (whose foreign minister visited Buenos Aires last week) support it and Celso Amorim, former and likely future foreign minister if Brazilian President Lula da Silva is reelected, has said Brazil will support as well.

  • Political and geopolitical challenges within the group include differences in how members relate to the international liberal order. Ties to the West vary from Russia’s more belligerent position to China’s more cautious one and India’s ambiguity. There are marked differences in their foreign policies that potential new members could aggravate.
  • Members also have different viewpoints on whether to incorporate regional integration blocs such MERCOSUR, whose own heterogeneities, tensions, and conflicts can hinder the expansion process and bloc effectiveness. At a MERCOSUR Summit in July, key leaders’ absences and a divisive debate about the signing of an FTA between Uruguay and China revealed differences. While Paraguay keeps diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the other three full members of the group have close diplomatic and economic ties with the PRC.

Argentina’s application has also given rise to divided views and opinions in the country itself. Despite the fact that all sectors of the ruling coalition can be considered “Peronists,” the current government has pursued an erratic and at times contradictory foreign policy, including conflicting positions regarding international relations, alignments, and alliances. Argentine sinologists disagree on the feasibility of membership, and many more Argentines object because it would hurt relations with the United States, Europe, and the IMF, which has recently helped the country avoid defaulting on $44 billion the Fund previously loaned it. A simultaneous application by Iran – some of whose government officials Argentine justice blames for several terrorist acts in Argentina, including the bombing of Israel’s Embassy and the Jewish local organization AMIA – doesn’t help to build consensus on the issue.

Notwithstanding the divergent opinions in Argentina and among the BRICS, interest on both sides has been persistent and shows signs of growing – even if not necessarily resulting in admission in the near future. Argentina’s interest in pursuing a relationship with the BRICS has continued through governments of different political persuasions since 2014. The need to maintain good relations with traditional partners is key, and the agreement with the IMF presents another reason for caution. It is not clear if Argentina’s incorporation could complicate its geopolitical position without yielding tangible benefits.

  • For the BRICS, the shared interest – a desire to curtail U.S. and Western influence and create a counterweight to it – helps them overcome their differences and seems unlikely to change soon, but obstacles to the evolution of the global transition they seek will also remain in the short term. However, in the context of the current debate in Latin America, BRICS expansion fits the increasing regional aspiration to promote active non-alignment amid an increasingly turbulent international order.

September 7, 2022

*Andrés Serbin is an international analyst and president of the Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research (CRIES), a regional think tank and network focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. He is also co-chair of the Asia and the Americas section of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and author of Guerra y transición global (War and Global Transition), recently published.

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by clalsstaff on September 7, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on September 7, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/09/07/argentina-joining-the-brics/

Latin America: Will WTO Agreement on Fishing Rein in China’s Illicit Practices?

by Mateus Ribeiro da Silva*

Chinese squid jiggers docked in Montevideo’s harbor / A. Davey / Flickr / Creative Commons license

China’s distant water fishing (DWF) fleet is the worst of various engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing along South American coasts, but Beijing may be shifting toward supporting a new World Trade Organization agreement that would limit such practices.

  • China has acknowledged having 3,000 ships in its DWF fleet, but studies by various experts, including the Stimson Center and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), estimate the number to be between 10,000 and 16,000. China’s fleet accounts for about 38 percent of all fishing on the high seas and in other countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Ships from Taiwan are responsible for another 21.5 percent, and Japan, South Korea, and Spain each represent about 10 percent of DWF efforts. DWF ships usually hover outside EEZs but frequently turn off location devices to enter them undetected.
  • Although China’s most egregious IUU practices are around Africa and Southeast Asia, experts say the impact in Latin America is significant – an estimated $2.3 billion a year (see July 21 AULABLOG). Hundreds of Chinese fishing ships operate off the coasts of Central America, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina practically year-round. DWF vessels fish for varieties of squid, tuna, shark, rays, and other species. Oceana, an ocean conservation NGO, says they fish along Argentina’s EEZ for the indigenous shortfin squid, a catch worth almost $600 million USD annually. In addition to turning off their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to operate clandestinely in EEZs, the vessels fish close to protected areas, such as near the Galapagos Islands, and capture – on purpose or in bycatch – endangered species, such as certain sharks, dolphins, sea turtles, and billfish. In 2020, a large Chinese fishing armada just off the Galapagos clocked a combined 70,000 hours of fishing in one month.

Because implementation of existing agreements has been chronically weak, the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiated an innovative trade-based agreement to reduce subsidies to DWF fleets that are causing such economic and environmental harm. Approved in June after 20 years of effort, the Agreement on Fisheries prohibits certain subsidies to IUU fishing, further depletion of current overfished stocks, and fishing outside a member’s regional fisheries organization jurisdiction.

  • Critics are concerned about loopholes that could allow developed nations (including China) to continue current practices, but environmental NGOs hailed the arrangement as a significant first step towards a more sustainable blue economy. It will enter into force when two-thirds of WTO members deposit their instruments of acceptance.
  • In addition to attacking subsidies, the agreement bars fishers from operating outside their own EEZ or in areas overseen by a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO) in which their port state or flag state is not a member. For their vessels to operate in South American waters, for example, national governments would need either local-access agreements, in the case of national EEZs, or to be members of regional RFMOs. This may encourage countries to join more RFMOs and could, optimistically, contribute to more consensual, negotiated regulation of fishing on the high seas. Governments will have recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures when harmed by IUU practices.

Chinese support for the WTO agreement and faithful implementation would be major steps toward reducing IUU fishing and providing relief to Latin American coastal countries. Beijing provides its DWF fleets with the greatest subsidies – estimated by Oceana in 2018 to reach $5.9 billion a year (amounting to 38 percent of subsidies provided by the “big ten” subsidizing countries).

  • After years of reservations with the agreement – insisting that it should enjoy the benefits available to developing countries – Beijing now seems to be supporting it. Shortly before WTO approval in June, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao said, “China has taken a constructive part in fisheries subsidies negotiations and supports an early agreement so as to implement the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
  • If China does sign, confidence that it will comply with the agreement will be initially weak. Observers are concerned that the opaque web of relationships between government and business in China will make detecting subsidies difficult. Practices that China has relied on in the past, such as fuel tax supports, are still permissible under the agreement. Shedding its scofflaw image will take time. In early July, just weeks after the WTO agreement was announced, Uruguayan authorities seized a Chinese vessel carrying more than 11 tons of hidden squid, a clear indication of IUU fishing. Although probably not fished after the accord was announced, the squid illustrate that it is still an open question whether China will break old habits and curb the predatory practices of its voracious DWF fleet.

August 30, 2022

*Mateus Ribeiro da Silva recently completed his Master’s in Global Governance, Politics, and Security in the School of International Service. This article draws on research he performed as a Research Assistant for a CLALS project on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in nine Latin American and Caribbean countries.

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by clalsstaff on August 30, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 30, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/08/30/latin-america-will-wto-agreement-on-fishing-rein-in-chinas-illicit-practices/

El Salvador: Young Women and Mothers Lack Opportunities after Incarceration

By Carina Cione*

Volunteers from Glasswing International and the U.S. Embassy paint a local library / U.S. Embassy in El Salvador / Flickr / Creative Commons license

Incarcerated young women in El Salvador face immense obstacles to creating new lives for themselves after release from detention, but programs to empower them offer a glimmer of hope. Interviews conducted as part of the CLALS-FLACSO Vidas Sitiadas (Besieged Lives) project have documented the challenges facing young Salvadoran women and provide strong evidence that others throughout Latin America face similar situations.

  • The stigma of a criminal past compounds the systemic exclusion young Salvadoran women often face before arrest just for being from high-crime neighborhoods. Previous offenders who lack support face dismal job prospects. The Vidas Sitiadas reports, which also examined conditions in four other countries, indicate that access to the formal job market is extremely limited; employers turn down job applicants with criminal records. Becoming a student can be just as difficult since universities have the right to refuse admission based on criminal histories. The period of “re-entry” is stressful and lonely as women strive to re-build healthy relationships, establish and maintain financial independence, secure healthcare, and recover from their potentially traumatic incarceration experiences.
  • The problem has surged over the last two decades, as rates of imprisonment in Latin America have risen dramatically, with mass incarceration increasingly impacting women. In El Salvador, since President Nayib Bukele launched a crackdown on gangs in 2019, the number of inmates has since skyrocketed (50,000 just since late March), according to UN experts, human rights agencies, and press reports. The government provides free tattoo removal services for former gang members seeking to break ties with their past, but attention to reintegration programs and post-release services to equip previous offenders with coping skills has been negligible. 

Nonetheless, Vidas Sitiadas and other studies have identified programs for released prisoners that, while still in relatively early phases, appear promising. Two examples in El Salvador:

  • Glasswing International runs the Club de Niñas, in collaboration with prison authorities in San Salvador, for young women in detention facilities or those who are recently released who want to overcome sociocultural barriers to independence. The three-year-old program teaches strategies for surviving traditional gender roles and expectations, healing trauma in a safe space, and breaking out of the conditions and mindsets that led them to criminality. Researchers working with Glasswing found that all of the women serving criminal sentences had suffered repeated episodes of violence beginning in childhood – neglect, abuse, sexual violence, exposure to community violence, parental alcohol abuse, and parental fighting. Many had fled their dangerous home environments at a young age and joined gangs, which provided them with basic necessities, a steady income, and protection – but also subjected them to physical and psychological abuse. The Club encourages them to feel a frisson of optimism for the first time in their young adulthood.
  • Yo Cambio, a four-year-old program run at various Salvadoran prisons, teaches craftsmanship skills to hundreds of inmates that they can use to secure a job upon release. It builds “peaceful co-living” in prison and offers free tattoo removal services for former gang members seeking to break ties with their past. To join the initiative, the inmates have to demonstrate that they practice “positive mindsets” and exhibit wanting to change before joining. 

Programs like these can point to preliminary indicators of success in at least some facilities. Young women interviewed by Vidas Sitiadas valued the safe place that Club de Niñas gave them for honest conversation and building stronger senses of community and self-worth. They underwent skills training to strengthen their likelihood of securing employment post-release, which in turn also helps secure their safety from past abusers. The interviews also show that participants are embarking on a process of developing new prosocial identities, reflecting a desire to engage in positive relationships, and trying to break with past attitudes of rebellion. Mothers promised to try to be better for their children.

Adjustment back into society for previously imprisoned people is anything but simple. The UN General Assembly in 2010 approved a resolution on the treatment of women who are in prison and have been released – called “The Bangkok Rules” – that specifies that they must be provided comprehensive re-entry support by social welfare services, local organizations, and probation authorities. Adherence to such guidelines has not been the norm in El Salvador. The systemic barriers to former prisoners becoming successful members of society remain.

  • Efforts like those identified by Vidas Sitiadas are premised on the hope that progress is possible even if locally and incrementally, but society-level outcomes will change only after broader obstacles to successful reintegration, such as geographic exclusion, are resolved. Studies show that, when re-entering into unchanged social and economic conditions, most previous offenders resort to familiar criminal behavior and fall back into dangerous social circles to meet their basic needs. They also lack accessible mental healthcare to help them grapple with trauma experienced before and during incarceration. But, while programs like Club de Niñas and Yo Cambio alone can’t solve such deep-rooted problems for everyone, they improve individual lives and are proof of concept that, if embraced by political leaders, could have a broader impact. 

August 25, 2022

*Carina Cione is Program Coordinator at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. For additional information about the project undertaken by FLACSO-Costa Rica and its partners, please consult the Vidas Sitiadas website.

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by clalsstaff on August 25, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 25, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/08/25/el-salvador-young-women-and-mothers-lack-opportunities-after-incarceration/

OAS Continues to Dodge Accountability for Actions in the 2019 Bolivian Election

By Francisco Rodríguez and Jake Johnston*

A march in favor of Evo Morales / Santiago Sito / Flickr / Creative Commons license

The failure of the Organization of American States (OAS) to explain false claims of fraud it made during the Bolivian elections in 2019 – allegations that played a key role in the military ouster of President Evo Morales – continues to fuel doubts about its ability to monitor elections fairly and objectively.

  • Shortly after Bolivian electoral authorities announced preliminary first-round results showing that Morales had surpassed the 10 percentage point margin of victory necessary to avoid a runoff, an OAS electoral observation mission released a statement expressing “deep concern and surprise at the drastic and hard-to-explain change in trend.” It said the updated vote count “drastically modifies the fate of the election and generates a loss of confidence in the electoral process.” An audit report later published by the OAS claimed to uncover evidence of “a massive and unexplainable surge in the final 5 percent of the vote count” without which Morales would not have crossed the 10 percent margin. 
  • OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro publicly supported the Bolivian Army’s decision, after three weeks of civil protests, to coerce Morales and much of his government into resigning, paving the way for a caretaker government of questionable legitimacy. Almagro stated that “Yes, there was a coup d’état in Bolivia; it occurred on the 20th of October when electoral fraud was committed.” He said, “The Army must act in accordance with its mandate. No one has exceeded their power so far.” 

The OAS has not responded to requests for information about its analysis. Academic and media studies, however, have shown that the OAS analysis was marred by incorrect methods, coding errors, and misrepresentation of results. In a peer-reviewed paper forthcoming in the Journal of Politics, Nicolás Idrobo, Dorothy Kronick, and Francisco Rodríguez (a co-author of this post) show that, rather than “inexplicable” as the OAS alleged, the final results were predictable. They identified mistakes that, if corrected, would have erased the alleged “surge in the final 5 percent of the vote count.”

  • The “change in trend” the OAS claimed to have identified was essentially a matter of votes from certain geographic areas being processed and counted before votes from other areas that were more favorable to Morales. The OAS finding was due to a statistical method that misrepresents data at the “breakpoint” at which fraud is tested for. 
  • When it released its final audit a month after the election, the OAS claimed it confirmed evidence of fraud, but it did not reveal that its calculation excluded the last 4 percent of tallies. These votes were presumably the most likely to be tampered with, but they were among the less pro-Morales. If included, there is no “break in trend” as alleged.
  • Research by David Rosnick of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) shows that a coding error caused the OAS to incorrectly sort time stamps by alphabetical instead of chronological order. An earlier CEPR study showed that the OAS audit withheld information from its comparison of physical vote tallies with those in the online database that did not support the allegations of fraud. 

These mistakes would have likely been identified rapidly by experts had the OAS followed basic standards of transparency. The OAS’s lead researcher has acknowledged at least some of these mistakes, but the flawed analysis remains on the OAS website, and the OAS has not issued a retraction nor amended the sections of the report that present the incorrect results. Mexico and Argentina have tried to discuss the issue within the organization, but Almagro’s office has refused to address the rebuttals. 

  • In March, the U.S. Congress, which provides the majority of the OAS’s budget, passed language in an omnibus spending package that requires the State Department to consult with independent experts and produce a report on the “legitimacy and transparency” of the 2019 Bolivian election within 120 days. The report, due last month, is expected to address the role of the OAS in that election.

OAS technical experts and political leaders’ role in what amounted to a military coup against a democratically elected president has raised questions about their competence and commitment to the democratic values the organization espouses. Errors in coding and calculations may have been merely technical, but political interference cannot be ruled out without a proper investigation. The Secretary General’s explicit support for the removal of Morales was clearly a political decision. 

  • With threats against democratic processes intensifying in many countries, the need for truly independent and neutral observer missions has never been greater. The lack of OAS accountability in Bolivia opens the door for others in the region to levy false allegations of electoral fraud in hopes of receiving international support.  

August 18, 2022

*Francisco Rodríguez is a visiting senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC, and Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver. Jake Johnston is a Senior Research Associate at CEPR. 

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by clalsstaff on August 18, 2022  •  Permalink
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Posted by clalsstaff on August 18, 2022

https://aulablog.net/2022/08/18/oas-continues-to-dodge-accountability-for-actions-in-the-2019-bolivian-election/

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