Transparency in Brazil: More Progress than Meets the Eye

By Vanessa Rodrigues de Macedo*

Photo Credit: Antonio Thomás Koenigkam Oliveira / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Antonio Thomás Koenigkam Oliveira / Flickr / Creative Commons

Amid all the corruption scandals shaking Brazil in recent months, positive signs about future prospects for accountability – in a country where it has historically been lacking – are easy to overlook.

  • The judicial system is improving and – since the historic conviction of 25 of 37 defendants in the notorious mensalão bribery case in 2012 – has shown commitment to meaningful outcomes in corruption cases.  Prominent offenders who in the past would have been untouchable today face a significantly higher probability of conviction and imprisonment.  In March, the Supreme Court authorized investigations into more than 50 high-ranking officials, including the leaders of both legislative houses.  In July-August, prosecutors launched investigations into former President Lula da Silva (as an informant) and senior Petrobras officials.
  • Important transparency initiatives are also taking hold. On paper, these are some of the most demanding standards in the world.  The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) enacted in 2011 ranks among the top 20 FOIA laws in the world, according to the Global Right to Information Rating.  Since 2012, more than 300,000 FOIA requests have been made through the online request system (e-sic) created by the law. No fewer than 98.34 percent of these requests have been replied to, with an average response time of 14 days.
  • Brazil has been at the forefront of promoting transparency globally.  Together with the United States, it was the founding co-chair of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multi-stakeholder partnership that now involves more than 60 countries.

The impact of such initiatives has been limited, however, because they were launched as a result of the mobilization of a handful of NGOs, journalists and international actors, rather than broad societal pressure.  Street protests against government policies have had massive turnouts over the past couple years, but mobilizations in favor of concrete transparency measures and similar reforms have not involved wide swaths of citizens.  Cultural change at the popular level has been slow, reflecting a lack of social maturity to accept responsibility to monitor public policy and demand transparency.  Nonetheless, some important initiatives, such as joint government-citizen policy conferences to discuss public policies, are attracting significant citizen participation. Between 2003 and 2010, 70 such conferences drew 6.5 percent of the Brazilian population, according to academic tallies, and from 2010 to 2014 there were 26 more conferences.

That these achievements haven’t ended corruption is not a sign that they’re useless. Rather, the consolidation of transparency norms and institutions; the continued assertiveness of Brazilian prosecutors and judges; and the expanding opportunities for citizen engagement suggest that the prospects for inculcating a culture of accountability in Brazil are not as bleak as might appear in the almost-daily headlines about endemic corruption in politics and big business. Having transparency initiatives in place has the potential over time to make corruption less frequent, and the more engaged that Brazilian society becomes in the implementation of transparency norms the more likely it is that massive scandals such as those around Petrobras and Lava Jato will become the exception rather than the rule.

*Vanessa Macedo is a CLALS research fellow and political science PhD candidate at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (IESP/Uerj).

Haiti and Dominican Republic: No Détente in Sight

By Emma Fawcett*

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Resettlement camp at Corail Cesselesse, Haiti Photo Credit: Oxfam International / Flickr / Creative Commons

Tensions stemming from the Dominican Republic’s forced repatriation of Haitians are spilling over into other aspects of the traditionally problematic relations between the two countries, with little prospect of resolution.  Over the summer, the Dominican Republic began a forced repatriation process for Haitians who did not comply with its 2014 National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners.  After a temporary suspension prompted by international outrage, deportations resumed on August 15 at a rate of 50 to 100 per day, and the International Organization for Migration reports that many more Haitians are “spontaneously returning.”  Of the half million previously found to be without residency permits, about 288,000 people registered for the regularization process –180,000 of whom were rejected and are likely to be repatriated.  According to Amnesty International, 27 percent of those who have left voluntarily say they were born in the Dominican Republic, but they fear arrest or harassment because they lack proper documentation.  At least four camps filled with recent deportees have sprung up on the Haitian side of the border, and the United Nations Human Rights Council has warned that conditions are abysmal and sanitation facilities inadequate.  The Haitian government has promised to assist in resettlement efforts, but there has been no coordinated response.  At the Tête à l’Eau camp, the government initially provided $30 in assistance to deportees, but ran out of funds.

In retaliation, Haiti on October 1 began enforcing a ban on the overland importation of 23 Dominican goods, including wheat flour, cooking oil, and soap.  These products must now enter by boat or plane to Port-au-Prince or Cap Haïtien.  Smugglers found in violation of the new regulation will have their goods confiscated.  Originally announced a year ago as a way of increasing customs revenue and reducing smuggling, the measure is expected to cause prices for staples to increase by up to 40 percent in Haiti and will cost the Dominican Republic $500 million in trade revenue.  A Dominican Chamber of Commerce official noted that the measure “violates norms of free bilateral commerce and international agreements.”  Market women who run much of Haiti’s informal economy by acquiring goods across the border and bringing them home to sell have already faced difficulties since the Dominican immigration crackdown began, and the trade ban poses a further threat to their livelihoods and those of their customers.  The Association of Haitian Industry (ADIH) hopes that the measure will improve demand for domestic products.  The Dominican government and businesses have argued that trade and migration issues should remain separate matters.

The new, slower pace of deportations has allowed the Dominican government to continue with their original strategy while avoiding further media attention and threats to their tourism industry.  Ongoing presidential campaigns in both countries – with Haiti’s elections on October 25 and Dominican President Medina seeking reelection next May – have made the antagonism politically useful for both.  However, the heaviest costs, including deportations, resettlement in makeshift camps, and potentially dramatic increases in food prices, are, as usual, borne by Haiti’s poorest.  A recent World Bank report on Haiti noted that “a social contract is missing between the State and its citizens,” and the Haitian government’s inability to provide for returnees and short-sighted trade policy is clear evidence of that.  The international community – the OAS in particular – has made serious missteps in its efforts to encourage bilateral talks, including a call for dialogue by OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro that was misinterpreted as a call for the unification of Hispaniola.  In response, the Dominican press has doubled down on its inflammatory rhetoric.  Neither side sees advantage to ending the stalemate, at least until after the Haitian electoral process has concluded. 

October 6, 2015

*Emma Fawcett is a PhD candidate in International Relations at American University.  Her doctoral thesis focuses on the political economy of tourism and development in four Caribbean case studies: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Mexican Caribbean.


Colombia’s National Policing Model: Real Success?

By Kenneth Sebastian Leon*

Photo Credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos / Flickr / Creatives Commons

Photo Credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos / Flickr / Creatives Commons

Colombia’s new policing model – called the National Quadrant Surveillance Model, or MNVCC – has been implemented for almost five years, but assessments of its impact vary widely. Commonly referred to as “Plan Cuadrantes” or “Modelo Cuadrantes,” it was introduced in 2010 as a law enforcement operational strategy for the Colombian National Police (CNP) combining elements of the “hot spots” and community policing models.  The MNVCC emphasizes modern technological and data-driven methods for deploying patrol officers according to locale-specific needs, while also prioritizing community-citizen relations.  The model applies spatial geographic informations system (GIS) technology to public safety-related data to define geographic quadrants for allocating personnel and resources .  In areas of high crime density, for example, the quadrants are smaller to allow for a higher concentration of deployed officers.  Community policing aims to improve relations and collaboration between police officers and the citizens they serve.  On the street, the MNVCC model specifies that six officers be assigned per quadrant, and that all officers be visible, approachable, and recognizable to the residents and commercial establishments.

There is no consensus on how well the model is working.  Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz (FiP), a research and policy institution contracted by the CNP, in 2012 released an evaluation of the first eight cities (including Bogotá and Medellín) that found an 18 percent decrease in homicides, 11 percent in personal assaults, and 22 percent in vehicle thefts.  Another research organization specializing in measuring and monitoring quality of life indicators in major cities in Colombia and abroad, Cómo Vamos, assessed in 2013 that Bogotá ranks second to last nationwide in perception of safety – with only 21 percent of residents feeling safe in the city.  A survey conducted last year by El Centro de Estudio y Análisis en Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana found that 71 percent of respondents in the capital are either “very dissatisfied” or “dissatisfied” with the police service.  It also calculated that both total number and population rates of homicide increased between 2013 and 2014.  CNP officials privately maintain that the MNVCC is successful and that these contradictory reports are a matter of perception.  Indeed, a CNP general told El Tiempo newspaper that the perception is caused by “increases in reporting to the police, and that shows increased trust in the police.”

While the data on MNVCC effectiveness obviously need further research, anecdotal information does yield some positive lessons from a community policing perspective.  Smartphone apps and the CNP website provide users with a “find your quadrant” feature, linking them to local-level officers and patrol stations, and WhatsApp messaging allows citizens to connect directly with “quadrant officers.”  Additionally, a Puerta-a-puerta initiative provides information that helps the citizen more effectively reach out to law enforcement.  Call boxes at strategic points in neighborhoods, and a Frente a la Comunidad  neighborhood watch-style program distributes radios to contact local police.  Despite discrepancies in crime statistics and perception surveys, the sixth year of the MNVCC model appears to be creating an infrastructure and a culture in targeted communities that could – with further investments and adjustments – mark a strategic watershed in Colombian policing. 

October 2, 2015

*Kenneth Sebastian Leon is a PhD student in American University’s Department of Justice, Law, and Criminology with a dual emphasis in sociolegal studies and criminology.

Colombia: Historic Progress, Historic Challenges

By Fulton Armstrong

Colombia Peace

The leadership shown by Colombian President Santos and FARC Commander “Timochenko” – encouraged by the Vatican and the governments of Cuba, Norway, and the United States – will be tested as challenges to completion and implementation of a final accord are certain to be intense.  The President and FARC leader announced last week that they’d resolved the thorny issue of justice for guerrilla and government commanders accused of serious crimes and set a deadline of 23 March 2016 to sign a peace agreement.  The most important – and controversial – provision covers “transitional justice” for a range of offenses, including crimes against humanity.  Most of the estimated 6,000 rank-and-file FARC combatants will get amnesty, while commanders will choose between confessing their crimes and serving five- to eight-year terms performing labor in institutions other than prisons, or refusing to cooperate at the risk of much longer terms in prison.  (The same procedures will be established for government military officers accused of atrocities and those guilty of financing the paramilitary fighters who ravaged the countryside through the mid-2000s.)  The FARC also agreed that guerrillas would begin handing in their weapons when the final accord is signed.  Negotiators had previously agreed on rural development strategies, political participation, and counterdrug policies.

Almost universally, the agreement has been hailed as an historic achievement.  The announcement in Havana capped three years of talks facilitated by “guarantors” Cuba and Norway and later supported by the United States, represented by former Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson.  During a mass in Cuba several days earlier, Pope Francis had implored the two sides to strike a deal, noting that “we do not have the right to allow ourselves yet another failure on this path of peace and reconciliation.”  U.S. Secretary of State Kerry called the Havana accord a “major breakthrough” and pledged that Aronson would stay closely engaged.

Latin American peace accords – most ending wars much shorter than the five decades of Colombia’s – provide ample evidence that the road ahead, however historic, will not be without difficult challenges.   

  • The accord will require a constitutional amendment, and President Santos will have to submit it for congressional approval and a national referendum. Former President Uribe, who leads Centro Democrático, has already declared war on it, calling it “a coup against democracy” that will lead to a “new dictatorship backed by guns and explosives.”  (Uribe also attacked Kerry’s statement as “deplorable.”)  Public discussion of details of guerrilla abuses, including forced youth recruitment and sexual violence, will play into opponents’ hand.
  • Colombian Prosecutor General Alejandro Ordóñez, an Uribe ally, said last week that any accord that does not entail prison terms for FARC commanders guilty of crimes would be “legally and politically untenable.” He claimed that it would violate victims’ rights and international law, which requires that punishment for war crimes be “proportional to the crimes committed.”  Human Rights Watch also condemned the provision and predicted the International Criminal Court would do so as well. 
  • Fulfilling commitments in the agreement to address the longstanding lack of government infrastructure in huge expanses of the country, help even modestly the resettlement of the more than 5 million persons displaced by violence, and expand programs to alleviate poverty and income inequality will have price tag beyond Colombia’s current ability to pay. Informal estimates of the 10-year cost are $30 billion.  The willingness of Colombian elites, who only grudgingly paid a war tax, to help foot the bill is far from certain.
  • The FARC’s ability to enforce discipline among its rank and file is also untested. There are reports that some commanders oppose any agreement.  Moreover, like demobilized paramilitary combatants, many combatants know no life other than rural combat and will be tempted to keep their weapons and join criminal networks that continue to terrorize rural communities.
  • The outstanding U.S. warrants for the extradition on drug-trafficking charges of reportedly dozens of FARC commanders may require some finessing, but Colombia’s peace commissioner, Sergio Jaramillo, suggested confidence that Washington will not demand extraditions if, as is almost certain, they would be a deal-breaker.

September 29, 2015

U.S.-Cuba: Must “Democracy Promotion” Obstruct Normalization?*

By Fulton Armstrong

Photo Credit: Martin Burns / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Martin Burns / Flickr / Creative Commons

“Democracy promotion” has been one of the most contentious aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba – and one of the most counterproductive – but it doesn’t have to be either.  The concept of democracy promotion is ingrained in U.S. policy culture, and the bureaucracies and programs they’ve been charged with conducting over the years are as bullet-proof as any in Washington.  Democracy promotion in different forms has been a main element of U.S. policy toward Cuba for decades. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. Interests Section conducted an array of outreach programs, engaging with Cuban academics, journalists, and officials – people tolerant if not deeply supportive of the Cuban government – as well as human rights activists and others “outside the system.”  These activities informed and nurtured the aspirations of Cubans in and outside the system who were eager to find Cuban solutions to their country’s mounting problems.  The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 moved democracy promotion into a more aggressive mode, explicitly linking it to regime change.  President Clinton spent token amounts on initiatives related to Cuba’s future transition, but the Bush Administration launched an expansion that has since cost U.S. taxpayers more than $250 million.  The arrest, conviction, and five-year imprisonment of USAID sub-contractor Alan Gross shed light on one such operation.  He smuggled sophisticated communication equipment onto the island to set up secret networks.  Associated Press investigative reporter Desmond Butler uncovered other programs involving communications and political operations against the Cuban government.

The investment has yielded some operational successes, but the impact toward promoting democracy has been negligible and, in important ways, counterproductive.  The program has delivered food, medicines, and other support to the families of imprisoned dissidents (many of whom have been released since Presidents Obama and Castro announced reestablishment of relations last December), but more provocative operations have arguably led only to arrests.  The amateurish clandestine tradecraft of the contractors and program activists, moreover, made it easy for Cuban counterintelligence to penetrate and manipulate their ranks.  The “private libraries” that U.S. taxpayers have paid for do not exist, and communications systems involving expensive satellite gear and satellite access fees have been compromised.  The secretive modus operandi of the operations has given credibility to draconian Cuban government measures, like Law 88 for “Protection of Cuba’s National Independence and Economy,” imposing prison terms for certain contact with foreigners “aimed at subverting the internal order of the nation and destroying its political, economic, and social system.”  Authentic people-to-people exchanges have been tainted as Cubans in the government and on the street are wary that any contact could be part of Washington’s regime-change efforts.

The democracy promotion ideology and bureaucracy seem unstoppable, but Presidents Obama and Castro can take the edge off this irritant with a little effort and flexibility, and even make it mutually beneficial.  The State Department and USAID have pledged to continue the Cuba democracy promotion programs and are asking Congress for $20 million to fund them again this year, but the President’s statement that “it is time for us to try something new” suggests acknowledgment that they need not be so ineffective and counterproductive.  For starters, the Administration could stop citing Helms-Burton authorities, which are explicitly for regime change, and establish criteria for operations in Cuba similar to those in other countries with whom the U.S. has diplomatic relations and is trying to improve bilateral ties.  It could restore and expand what worked in the past, such as the distribution of books and clippings; support for exchange visits; promotion of academic and cultural events; and other non-political activities that include people with government affiliation.  Perhaps most importantly, to decontaminate the programs, the organizations that have already spent millions trying to drive regime change should step aside and let a new generation – based on real people-to-people interests – try something different with the funds.  Both Presidents can trust their citizens to develop the historic roadmap that will define the relationship into the future.  Both the United States and Cuba stand to benefit.

September 25, 2015

*This article is excerpted from the second in a series of policy briefs from the CLALS Cuba Initiative, supported by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation. To read the full brief, please click here.

Puerto Ricans in Florida: Swing Constituency in a Swing State

By Fulton Armstrong and Eric Hershberg

A surge in the number of Puerto Ricans moving to Florida suggests a major shift in the impact of Latino issues in next year’s U.S. elections. As the island’s economic crisis deepens and severe austerity looms large, thousands of Puerto Ricans are arriving in Florida monthly, according to estimates, with the single biggest destination being Central Florida. The director of the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration office in Central Florida has estimated a 15 to 20 percent increase in the number of new arrivals in recent months. The director of Hispanic Research at the Pew Research Center has called it “the biggest movement of people out of Puerto Rico since the great migration of the 1950s.” Anecdotal accounts follow trends first identified in the 2010 census and a 2013 Pew Research Center indicating an uptick in island-born Puerto Ricans arriving in the mainland. Puerto Ricans in Florida now number almost one million – only 200,000 short of the number of the state’s Cuban-Americans. The three counties around Orlando – seen by pundits as essential to any statewide or national campaign – were home to about 271,000 Puerto Ricans (representing about 14 percent of the total population of those three counties) in 2013, according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates. Many of the new residents are white-collar workers, in contrast to those in the last major wave of arrivals who came to work at Disney World in the 1980s.

Because Puerto Ricans residing on the island are citizens but do not have the right to vote in presidential elections, an influx of hundreds of thousands onto the mainland introduces a substantial expansion of the 2016 electorate, which could be of particular relevance in the hotly contested election in Florida. Although polls show that Puerto Ricans tend to vote Democratic, their support for the party’s candidate at the presidential level is not a foregone conclusion. The director of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College of the City University of New York has said that among the new arrivals “there is a large number of independents … and party affiliations mean less to them” than among mainland-born Puerto Ricans. Of the six members of the Florida State Legislature of Puerto Rican descent, three are Democrats and three Republican. (Orlando-area State Senator Darren Soto – born in New Jersey but strongly identifying with the island of his father’s birth – is running as a Democrat.) Democratic strategists privately claim confidence that the new diaspora will be in their column. They note deep dissatisfaction among on-island Puerto Ricans and the new arrivals toward the Republicans’ opposition to legislation that would allow the island the right to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy, as well as polls showing significant support for Hillary Clinton. The Orlando Sentinel reported recently that Democrats had taken the lead in voter registration in Osceola County and won control of the County Commission. A deputy director for strategic initiatives at the Republican National Committee, however, told the Washington Post that she sees the Puerto Rican vote in Florida as “up for grabs.”

A decade and a half after the trauma of the Bush-Gore presidential vote in 2000, neither U.S. party dares to take Florida’s 29 electoral votes for granted. The Pew Research Center estimates that some 800,000 Latinos are turning 18 each year –about 2,200 per day – nationwide, making them the biggest source of new voters in each election cycle. It’s hard to see, however, what the Republican Party is doing to win the hearts and minds of Puerto Rican voters in Florida and elsewhere. As American citizens, Puerto Ricans do not have a direct stake in U.S. immigration reform – an issue that galvanizes other Latino constituencies – but the tone and policy prescriptions of that debate may well influence their perceptions of the two parties. The claims and counterclaims of optimistic partisan operatives aside, some Republican candidates’ rhetoric about immigration, Latin America, and U.S. Hispanics in general – including Donald Trump’s colorful admonition of Jeb Bush for speaking Spanish in public – has got to alienate many Puerto Ricans. Perhaps, as AULABLOG previously stated, one or two of the Republicans are likely strike a moderate-sounding approach to immigration in the coming months. Indeed, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush yesterday endorsed immigration reform, including a path to citizenship for “DREAM Act” children, and said, “We don’t need to build a wall. We don’t need to deport every person that’s in this country.” But particularly if the eventual GOP nominee proves reluctant to call for federal legislative or financial assistance for a bankrupt Puerto Rico, the party may face an uphill struggle trying to appeal to Florida Puerto Ricans – a rapidly growing swing constituency in a crucial swing state.

September 22, 2015

U.S. Government Abuse of Apprehended Migrants

By Michael S. Danielson*

Photo Credits: Larry Hanelin, Kino  Border Initiative, 2015.  All Rights Reserved.

Photo Credits: Larry Hanelin, Kino Border Initiative, 2015. All Rights Reserved.

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is not fulfilling its obligation to protect the civil and human rights of migrants apprehended, detained and deported back to Mexico.  A study released this week entitled “Our Values on the Line: Migrant Abuse and Family Separation at the Border” (full text) found that more than one-third of deported migrants experienced some type of abuse or mistreatment at the hands of U.S. immigration authorities.  The abuses included theft, physical abuse, verbal abuse, and inhumane detention conditions.  In violation of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy, these conditions include but are not limited to being held for over 12 hours in facilities without beds, overcrowding, excessively low temperatures, lack of adequate food, and denial of medical treatment.  Commissioned by the Jesuit Conference of Canada and the United States and the Kino Border Initiative (KBI), the report details the results of an in-depth survey of 358 Mexican migrants deported from the United States to the border city of Nogales, Mexico, from July 2014 to March 2015 – and corroborated by short-form surveys of 7,507 other migrants in the same area.

  • Since 2005 CBP has sought to deter Mexican migrants from attempting to enter the U.S. through a policy of “enforcement with consequences.” Formally launched in 2011 as the “Consequence Delivery System,” this package consists of measures against individual migrants that are so harsh as to be obviously intended to cause hardship and suffering.  In so doing, Border Patrol has abrogated its previous commitment, undertaken in 2004, to use its authorities to preserve family unity and ensure humane treatment of apprehended migrants.  Making things worse, Border Patrol agents often incorrectly enter names into computer databases, deny access to phone calls, and deny access to the individual’s consulate.
  • Two out of three migrants surveyed who crossed into the U.S. with immediate family members and apprehended together by the Border Patrol were separated from each other and deported to different ports of entry days, weeks, or months apart.
  • Twenty-eight percent of migrants surveyed were deported at night – to Nogales and other destinations with high levels of violence – making them particularly vulnerable to abuse by criminals and corrupt police and other public officials. One of every seven women was placed in this vulnerable position.
  • Migrants alleging abuse were unlikely to file a formal complaint. Less than one out of every 12 deported migrants in the survey claiming some type of abuse filed a complaint with U.S. immigration authorities.  Reasons for not filing a complaint include being unaware of the right to do so, fear of retaliation, and a belief that it would not make any difference.
  • The abuses were not carried out by “a few bad apples,” but rather reflected policies across Border Patrol and poor oversight of their implementation. The patterns of abuses are too extensive to argue otherwise.

Punitive border enforcement punishes people whose suffering in their home countries had already grown unbearable, and there is no evidence that these policies deter unauthorized immigration.  In fact, a recent report of the DHS Inspector General found that the CBP has failed to accurately measure the deterrent effect and the cost-effectiveness of the core policies of the Consequence Delivery System.  Evidence is much stronger of the negative and unintended consequences of these policies, both for migrants and border security.  In personal communication presented in the report, CBP’s former Assistant Commissioner of Internal Affairs James Tomsheck attests that an attempt to enhance the enforcement capacity of the agency through a hiring surge of some 12,000 new agents in just over two years was marred by a predictable deterioration of the vetting process and a sharp and consistent decline in “the quality and suitability of the Border Patrol applicant pool.”  This new report points to several key areas for reform to help limit abuse by Border Patrol agents, including stronger independent and internal oversight mechanisms to tackle misconduct and abuse; an accessible and accountable complaint process; an overhaul of CBP training; equipping CBP agents with body-worn cameras; and improving CBP short-term detention conditions.  The study also recommends that deportations to Mexican border towns occur only during daylight hours and that DHS, responsible for CBP, put in place a process to identify family relationships and preserve family unity upon deportation.  Such measures would begin to address the most pressing problems faced by migrants and their families – without triggering a spike in migrant traffic.

September 17, 2015

*Michael S. Danielson, a CLALS Research Fellow, was the principal researcher and drafter of the report.

Is a “CICIH” the answer to Honduras’ Crisis?

By Fulton Armstrong and Eric Hershberg

Photo Credit: US Embassy Guatemala / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: US Embassy Guatemala / Flickr / Creative Commons

The success of the Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) in driving anti-corruption efforts there – culminating in the resignation of President Pérez Molina – has stoked debate in neighboring Honduras on the wisdom of creating a “CICIH” with the same mission to root out the rot that permeates state institutions and perpetuates the misery of the citizenry.  President Juan Orlando Hernandez has stated categorically that no such entity is needed in Honduras given advances in the country’s own institutions and his own putative commitment to good governance.  Some civil society organizations are at least implicitly concurring by taking part in accountability initiatives involving collaboration with the government.  Other voices from civil society are objecting vociferously, however.  Most notable among them are the indignados, a largely youth-based movement that insists that the President himself and virtually the entire institutional system in Honduras is so rotten that only an international body can be trusted to root out endemic corruption.  The argument rages on, with the indignados staging regular demonstrations and the government – occupied simultaneously with promoting its credibility at home and abroad and maneuvering to secure authorization for presidential re-election – holding fast to its opposition to any such international role.  The debate will continue for the foreseeable future.  We sketch below our understanding of the competing arguments.

Arguments in favor of a CICIH:

By nearly all accounts, corruption has rendered the public and private sectors chronically ineffective – from the President (who admitted that millions from Social Security made it into his campaign coffers and who engaged in nepotism), through the government ministries and even the judicial bureaucracies (where political pressure, intimidation, and bribery are rampant), and companies large and small (for whom payoffs are merely an added budget item).  The country has topped the charts in non-war homicides, including targeted killings, and other violence for several years, further discouraging investigations and prosecutions.  The flood of narcotics and cash through Honduras has thrown fuel onto the flames.  Only an independent, UN-endorsed entity like a CICIH – with its unique ability to train, protect, and motivate judicial personnel, issue indictments, and put powerful people in jail, and shame local government into taking action – can help the country climb out of this deep hole, this argument goes.

Arguments against:

Steven Dudley of InSight Crime notes that the call for a CICIH comes at a time that the Attorney General’s office is showing some signs of life.  Its anti-corruption efforts have led to the indictment and arrest of the former head of the Social Security Institute on charges of embezzlement and illegally financing political parties (although some charges were dropped).  Combating crime, cheaper homemade solutions are showing results in Honduras in terms of training and cases resolved.  Organizations like the Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ) are doing groundbreaking work to keep homicide levels down in some of the worst neighborhoods at a fraction of the cost of a CICIH.  Expense is another important factor.  In Guatemala the CICIG costs between $12 million and $15 million annually, which even that country, far wealthier than Honduras, cannot afford.  CICIG has provided valuable assistance and training to Guatemala’s Attorney General’s Office, but its foreign investigators, who move around in armored vehicles with armed bodyguards, leech massive resources that might otherwise go to fortify local prosecutors’ offices.  Moreover, according to this argument, the investigators don’t need foreign prosecutors to tell them what they’re doing wrong.

Skeptics further contend that international donors and pro-reform Hondurans arguably will not get the quick fix and public relations victory they want from a CICIH.  It took over a decade for CICIG to set up in Guatemala and nearly eight years to get the right mix of cases.  Its greatest strategic goal – fortifying Guatemala’s justice system – remains a work in progress.  The Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office has not yet executed a complicated, forensic investigation leading to a high-level prosecution.  Honduras’s greater reliance on foreign assistance, according to this argument, suggests a CICIH would actually enable its dependency, rather than break it.

The weakness and rot within Honduran institutions and the venality of national leadership strongly suggest that neither approach – a foreign-backed entity like CICIH or a home-grown solution – could quickly reverse the tsunami of corruption and violence that the isthmus’s poorest country has been experiencing since the 2009 coup.  Ideally, the best of Honduras’s own efforts could be buttressed by a Honduran version of the CICIG model, but the knack of the country’s leaders for overwhelming even the best of intentions, as they did the “Truth Commission” charged with determining accountability for the coup and rights abuses carried out in its aftermath, argues for extreme caution in forming expectations.  The debate therefore may boil down to the moral argument of whether the international community, witnessing Honduras’s descent into utter lawlessness and destitution, can stand idly by or should at least offer its help in what form it can, such as a CICIH.  Even if a CICIH is not a panacea, it at least would send a powerful message to Honduran elites that the world is watching.

September 15, 2015

A Post-Correa Ecuador?

By Catherine Conaghan*

Photo Credit: Thierry Ehrmann / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Thierry Ehrmann / Flickr / Creative Commons

What seemed like a certainty less than a year ago – Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa as a shoo-in for reelection in 2017 – now has given way to competing scenarios as the country’s economic crisis deepens.  The game-changer has been the collapse in revenues from Ecuador’s principal export: petroleum.  With prices for Ecuadorian crude hovering 50 percent below their 2014 average, Correa has had little choice but to slash the abundant government spending that has been the hallmark of his presidency.  Ecuador’s use of the U.S. dollar greatly handicaps its capacity to adjust.  Further aggravating the recession is the economic downturn of Ecuador’s principal external lender, China.  Over $2 billion have been cut from the 2015 budget, and plans to shrink the size of the public bureaucracy are now under way.  His decision in April to suspend the central government’s obligatory payments to the national social security system stoked anxiety about the fund’s future, and an announcement in June of plans to hike taxes on inheritance and real estate transactions sparked street demonstrations around the country.  Indigenous and labor organizations mobilized in mid-August to protest these and other aspects of Correa’s style of governing.  An estimated crowd of 100,000 people marched in Quito.  Scores of protestors were detained and face charges related to the August mobilizations.

The months ahead will not be easy for a president accustomed to buoyant budgets and strong polls.  As one of Latin America’s left-turn leaders, he pushed a state-centric economic model under which poverty declined and the middle class grew.  His approval ratings since he took office in 2007 consistently scored among the highest of any Latin American president.  (They dipped below 50 percent – as low as 42 percent – for the first time in 2015.)  While Correa waxes and wanes on whether he really will pursue reelection, his party is pushing to amend the Constitution through legislation – without a referendum supported by over 80 percent of the public – to allow him a third term.  The opposition strenuously opposes the move.  The National Assembly appears headed toward a final vote on the matter in December.

From now until December, the reelection maneuvering and two possible outcomes will dominate conversations.  Under one scenario, Correa and Alianza País will push ahead with the amendment, ignoring negative public reaction and repressing protests if necessary, and Correa will decide on his candidacy depending on his view of the economy and the state of the opposition.  In a second and perhaps less likely scenario, Correa and his party may just abandon the reelection plan, concluding that the political costs are just too high.  This would set off power struggles within Alianza País over who would head the ticket.  Among the prospective frontrunners are former Vice President Lenín Moreno, current Vice President Jorge Glas, Production Minister (and former Ambassador to the United States) Nathalie Cely, and former Industry Minister-turned-critic Ramiro González.  In the process, Correa will be looking to anoint someone loyal and capable of governing the country until he can return as a candidate in 2021.  Under both of these scenarios, Ecuador is bracing for a volatile year ahead.  Natural disasters – a possible volcanic eruption of Mount Cotopaxi and El Niño – could also fuel uncertainty, giving Correa a chance to shine and rally, or to fail and deepen doubts about his leadership.  After eight years of relative political stability and economic good times, Ecuadorians are pondering whether a post-Correa era could be at hand and what it would mean.

September 8, 2015

* Catherine Conaghan is the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Latin American Politics at Canada’s Queen’s University and a former CLALS Research Fellow.

Guatemala’s Crisis is Not Over

By Eric Hershberg*

Guatemala City, August 2015. Photo Courtesy of Eric Hershberg.

Guatemala City, August 2015. Photo Courtesy of Eric Hershberg.

With President Otto Pérez Molina’s resignation early this morning, Guatemala lurches into a new phase in its long-running political crisis, with little prospect that this weekend’s elections will resolve much.  The investigations into the Pérez Molina administration’s corruption, the national assembly’s unanimous vote to suspend his immunity, and the peaceful surge in popular protests demanding that he step down all suggest progress in the country’s efforts to build a functioning democracy.  The UN-sponsored Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) fulfilled its mandate, and its example and training were arguably important factors in the ability of judicial officials in Pérez Molina’s own government to support the processes that led to his downfall.  (Click here for an AULABLOG assessment of CICIG in May.)  The Congressional vote to strip him of immunity was unanimous, including even his most loyal supporters, who until then had rejected popular clamoring for the president’s ouster.  By the end of last week societal disgust with the political elite had reached the point that even the most recalcitrant of incumbents realized that their own survival required ditching the president.  The comptroller’s office called on him to resign “to avoid greater social unrest that could have unpredictable consequences” – a sentiment echoed by powerful business groups and the Catholic Bishops Council.

The Guatemalan Constitution and laws lay out the next steps.  The Congress has accepted the resignation, clearing the way for Vice President Alejandro Maldonado – who replaced Vice President Roxana Baldetti after she was jailed in connection with the same corruption scandal – to take office.  The first round of Presidential elections, with 15 candidates in the running, will proceed as scheduled this Sunday, despite calls from some civil society organizations to delay the balloting on grounds that the campaign regulations reflect the influence and interests of criminal elements.  In all likelihood, a runoff round will be necessary six weeks later (October 25).  The convulsions of recent months and deep distrust in government suggest that tensions will be high between now and then, but there’s no indication yet that civil unrest could threaten the electoral process, and military intervention appears to be a thing of the past.  There is every reason to expect that a new President will be inaugurated on January 14.

The elections are unlikely, however, to lead Guatemala into an era of less corruption and greater accountability, or to install leadership willing or able to spearhead economic and social policies to enable the majority of the population to live with dignity.  The slogans on the banners of the tens of thousands of protestors in Guatemala City’s central square lacked any message beyond a rejection of the status quo.  “Throw them all out” and “I have no president”are potent rallying cries but do not address the core challenges of a country where the elite pay no taxes, half of all children are malnourished and tens of thousands of young people desperately seek better lives anywhere other than Guatemala.  

The reputations of the leading candidates and their failure to articulate coherent governing platforms give little room for optimism.  Leading in the polls is a wealthy businessman, Manuel Baldizón, whose running mate is already being investigated for corruption and whose own closet is widely understood to contain plenty of skeletons.  Protestors have already singled out Baldizón as unacceptable, taunting him with chants of “it’s your turn next.”  In second place is a comedian named Jimmy Morales, who enjoys the support of the economic elites and media but has advanced no policy platform whatsoever.  Former first lady Sandra Torres appears to be running third.  She divorced President Álvaro Colom in 2011 to circumvent a court ruling that, as First Lady, she couldn’t run for office.  (The Constitutional Court put a final stop to her campaign a month before elections that year.) 

Electoral victory by any of these candidates would leave Guatemala with weak leadership at a time that most government institutions desperately need revitalization.  Corruption is too deep-rooted for CICIG and its few allies in government to face down alone, and these candidates won’t use the presidency to carry out the needed purge.  The organized criminal groups that traffic drugs and persons through the country and permeate governing institutions stand to grow only stronger, and the misery that plagues a population deprived of education, health care and jobs will continue unabated.  U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s billion-dollar aid package for Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, already in trouble in Washington, may have nowhere good to go.

September 3, 2015

*Eric Hershberg, director of the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University, witnessed the protests in Guatemala City last week.


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