Latin America’s Challenges and Opportunities

By Dr. Susana Nudelsman

Image of wind mills and solar panels. Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Latin America is a region of great contrasts that currently faces serious challenges and also great opportunities. At the global level, the current outlook is uncertain. Forecasts for 2025 suggest that the world economy will experience moderate growth. In particular, the pace of growth shows signs of slowing in both the United States and China, and a slight increase in Europe (International Monetary Fund, 2025).

Emerging economies are likely to continue contributing to global growth, but they are also vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and increased financial selectivity (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025). Escalating trade tensions, uncertainty surrounding global interest rates, and the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related incidents increase long-term risks. Moreover, persistent geopolitical tensions and protectionist policies are making supply chains highly volatile (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

At the domestic level, Latin American countries face a mixed panorama. While the dramatic changes in socioeconomic conditions have significantly impacted the post-pandemic recovery, it has also presented opportunities for resource mobilization. However, current regional records indicate that the balance of payments will continue to be impacted by external vulnerability. Domestic demand is expected to remain weak, and employment growth is anticipated to be lower than in previous years, although informality and unemployment are expected to show slight improvements (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025).

Inflation is expected to remain stable in 2025 and 2026 and close to target levels, but an upward trend cannot be ruled out. Although monetary policy does not necessarily have to be restrictive, ambiguous capital inflows, exchange rate volatility, and global uncertainty are impacting central banks’ policies, which must preserve stability without decelerating economic activity.

Economic growth, interest and exchange rates, as well as commodity prices, all affect fiscal sustainability. Therefore, fiscal space will remain limited, as many countries face upward pressure on spending and high borrowing costs. Similarly, in this case, one of the biggest issues facing the region’s governments is the need to take into account various restrictions without compromising economic growth.

Productivity growth remains sluggish, hindering advancements in poverty alleviation and impeding significant enhancements in living conditions. Despite a recent decrease, inequality in Latin America is higher not only in comparison with advanced countries but also with other countries of a similar level of development (Inter-American Development Bank, 2025).

Additionally, growth models in the region have struggled to foster technical advancement, which has contributed to low per capita research rates. A marginal position in global innovation, insufficient investment in innovation ecosystems, and persistent problems related to infrastructure and digital skills have prevented the region from achieving a competitive technological position.

Overall, persistent structural challenges continue to hinder long-term economic growth. Although the future is clearly complicated, the region’s ability to seize new opportunities will depend on the policy decisions taken now. Increased regional integration, pro-growth structural reforms, and stronger institutional frameworks are necessary to transition from just stable to inclusive and sustainable growth.

In particular, the global economy is experiencing sluggish growth but also abrupt changes. This scenario creates tensions and new imbalances, while also presenting significant opportunities for Latin American economies. Certainly, they have the potential to increase their integration into global markets, which in turn would lead to greater economic growth, thereby enhancing regional prosperity and diversification.

Although changing economic relationships and supply chains are not precisely good for everyone, Latin America may benefit from them in the current global environment. Thus, exploring the development of renewable energies presents a significant opportunity for the region in the context of an increasingly divided world, which is seeking greener and more sustainable growth strategies (O’Neil, 2024).

Latin America has extensive sustainable energy resources, with one-third coming from clean sources, which exceeds the global average of 20%. Additionally, 60% of its electricity already derives from renewable energy. The region is backed by abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, helping businesses meet climate goals and explore green hydrogen, which results in very low or zero carbon emissions. It also produces a third of global lithium and possesses significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, nickel, and rare earth elements crucial for electric vehicles, solar energy, and wind turbines.

Image of renewable energy examples. Retrieved from Science Notes.

In this respect, factors related to political economy might represent obstacles despite strict environmental policies, suggesting that to advance towards a greener economy, countries need to integrate environmental policy with an overall enhancement of institutional quality, take into account the government’s political stance on environmental policies, and assess the impact of large energy-intensive sectors within the economy.

Furthermore, the shift to “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring” benefits Latin America since many nations in the region maintain enduring diplomatic, commercial, and cultural connections with the United States. Although some Latin American governments face challenges due to democratic erosion, the region continues to offer the best platform for balancing democratic governance and economic growth, as it has been the most peaceful region in terms of wars (Latinometrics, 2025).

Transitioning to clean energy poses difficulties but offers significant opportunities to generate employment, stimulate economic development, and improve energy security by decreasing dependence on fossil fuels and encouraging innovation in sustainable technologies. All in all, Latin America’s energy potential is enormous, and its leadership must act swiftly to attract stable trade and investment flows in response to evolving geopolitical and economic policies for future success.

References

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025, Resource mobilization to finance development, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, ECLAC, Santiago de Chile.

Inter-American Development Bank, 2025, Regional Opportunities amid Global Shifts, 2025 Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Report, IDB, Washington DC.

International Monetary Fund, 2025, Latin America in the Current Global Environment, Regional Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, DC.

Latinometrics, 2025, Sabías que América Latina no ha vivido una guerra territorial en más de 30 años? Latinometrics, available at https://www.linkedin.com/posts/latinometrics_sab%C3%ADas-que-am%C3%A9rica-latina-no-ha-vivido-activity-7338249978001207298-KNtw/?originalSubdomain=es

O’Neil Shannon K., 2024, Latin America’s Big Opportunity, Project Syndicate, June 10, available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/shannon-k-oneil

Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.

Immigrants Fuel the US Economy

Proof that immigrants fuel the US economy is found in the billions they send back home

Migrant workers pick strawberries during harvest south of San Francisco, Calif.
Visions of America/Joe Sohm/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Ernesto Castañeda, American University

Donald Trump has vowed to deport millions of immigrants if he is elected to a second term, claiming that, among other things, foreign-born workers take jobs from others. His running mate JD Vance has echoed those anti-immigrant views.

Researchers, however, generally agree that massive deportations would hurt the U.S. economy, perhaps even triggering a recession.

Social scientists and analysts tend to concur that immigration — both documented and undocumented — spurs economic growth. But it is almost impossible to calculate directly how much immigrants contribute to the economy. That’s because we don’t know the earnings of every immigrant worker in the United States.

We do, however, have a good idea of how much they send back to their home countries – more than US$81 billion in 2022, according to the World Bank. And we can use this figure to indirectly calculate the total economic value of immigrant labor in the U.S.

Economic contributions are likely underestimated

I conducted a study with researchers at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab at American University to quantify how much immigrants contribute to the U.S. economy based on their remittances, or money sent back home.

Several studies indicate that remittances constitute 17.5% of immigrants’ income.

Given that, we estimate that the immigrants who remitted in 2022 had take-home wages of over $466 billion. Assuming their take-home wages are around 21% of the economic value of what they produce for the businesses they work for – like workers in similar entry-level jobs in restaurants and construction – then immigrants added a total of $2.2 trillion to the U.S. economy yearly.

That is about 8% of the gross domestic product of the United States and close to the entire GDP of Canada in 2022 – the world’s ninth-largest economy.

Immigration strengthens the US

Beyond its sheer value, this figure tells us something important about immigrant labor: The main beneficiaries of immigrant labor are the U.S. economy and society.

The $81 billion that immigrants sent home in 2022 is a tiny fraction of their total economic value of $2.2 trillion. The vast majority of immigrant wages and productivity – 96% – stayed in the United States.

Remittances from the U.S. represent a substantial income source for the people who receive them. But they do not represent a siphoning of U.S. dollars, as Trump has implied when he called remittances “welfare” for people in other countries and suggested taxing them to pay for the construction of a border wall.

The economic contributions of U.S. immigrants are likely to be even more substantial than what we calculate.

For one thing, the World Bank’s estimate of immigrant remittances is probably an undercount, since many immigrants send money abroad with people traveling to their home countries.

In prior research, my colleagues and I have also found that some groups of immigrants are less likely to remit than others.

One is white-collar professionals – immigrants with careers in banking, science, technology and education, for example. Unlike many undocumented immigrants, white-collar professionals typically have visas that allow them to bring their families with them, so they do not need to send money abroad to cover their household expenses back home.

Immigrants who have been working in the country for decades and have more family in the country also tend to send remittances less often.

Both of these groups have higher earnings, and their specialized contributions are not included in our $2.2 trillion estimate.

A business owner stocks her grocery store.
A Somali business owner stocks her store in Lewiston, Maine.
Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call

Additionally, our estimates do not account for the economic growth stimulated by immigrants when they spend money in the U.S., creating demand, generating jobs and starting businesses that hire immigrants and locals.

For example, we calculate the contributions of Salvadoran immigrants and their children alone added roughly $223 billion to the U.S. economy in 2023. That’s about 1% of the country’s entire GDP.

Considering that the U.S. economy grew by about 2% in 2022 and 2023, that’s a substantial sum.

These figures are a reminder that the financial success of the U.S. relies on immigrants and their labor.The Conversation

Ernesto Castañeda, Professor, American University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Invisible Deaths

The U.S. and Mexico’s Federal Strategic Plans against Migration and their Relation to Invisible Deaths

by Sofia Guerra*

March 8, 2024

A monument at the Tijuana-San Diego border for those who have died attempting to cross. Each coffin represents a year and the number of dead.
A monument at the Tijuana-San Diego border for those who have died attempting to cross. Each coffin represents a year and the number of dead. (Photo credit: © Tomas Castelazo, www.tomascastelazo.com / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The U.S. and Mexico have strategies to control migration that dehumanize migrants and sometimes lead to their deaths becoming invisible. The U.S. border infrastructure forces migrants to be exposed to extreme natural environments causing deaths while crossing. Some paths to the U.S. are controlled by criminal organizations making them experience violence. The lack of transparency, visibility, and care create invisible deaths.

The U.S./Mexico border has become a dangerous path for immigrants when crossing, creating thousands of deaths. An invisible death is when people die while migrating, later to be found without any form of identification and no information about who the person is and why they passed away.  Jason De Leon conducted a deep dive into invisible deaths within the U.S./Mexico border. He argues that the existing border infrastructure is the result of a federal strategic plan to deter migration that facilitates death but hides its strategy by redirecting blame to migrants.

The U.S. federal strategy pushes migrants into physically demanding natural environments like deserts, rivers, and extreme temperatures. This endangers the migrant’s lives and risks the possibility of death while crossing. USA’s federal strategy also involves developing infrastructure such as walls, militarization, ground sensors, checkpoints, and other measures to impede migrants’ passing.  These strategies cause migrants to face isolation and physiological strain,  making the migration process more challenging and leading to higher mortality rates.

Like the U.S., Mexico has an infrastructure of checkpoints and militarized immigration stations, but with increased anti-immigrant policies criminal organizations further interfere in the movement of people across “their” territories. Corruption has allowed the growth of criminal activities, affecting the safety of migrants passing through. Thus, Mexico has also developed a quiet strategic federal plan against migrants that consists of extreme violence. Mexican trials to get to the US have become a site of intense violence, exploitation, and profit-making among gang members. They encounter abuse, rape, kidnapping, dismemberment, and death. Their migrant journey is used to make a profit and form part of the strategic corruption in the criminal world. This makes the Mexican drug war members control some of the routes that immigrants take within Mexico, making migrant smuggling blend into criminal activity. Migrants’ lives are at risk when encountering the criminal world while crossing; those who die due to criminal activities are likely to have an invisible death. This is due to the lack of transparency that organized crime has with its victims. 

Although the USA and Mexico have different federal strategic plans to dissuade land migration, it becomes evident that their strategies do not favor life but instead create a systematic weapon against migrants. In the USA, migration is seen as a dangerous crisis, while in Mexico, migration is seen as an opportunity for profit. Migrants are dehumanized, and therefore, their lives are not protected, increasing the invisibility of their death.

Copyright Creative Commons. Reproduction with full attribution is possible by news media and for not-for-profit and educational purposes. Minor modifications, such as not including the “About the Study” section, are permitted. 

* Sofia Guerra is a sociology graduate student at American University. She is a research assistant at the Immigration Lab and Center of Latin American Studies at AU. She has conducted research on migration, gender studies, and the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States. She also has an interest in policy-making and expanding her research expertise.