Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?

By Cynthia McClintock*

Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment.  Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.

Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?

Why are Peruvians So Angry?

The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.

The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.

But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.

Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.

As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.

What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?

Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.

Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.

A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.

Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?

The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor.  Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)

As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.

Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”

Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.

*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory

By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS

Rodrigo Paz is sworn in as president of Bolivia, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Centrist Rodrigo Paz’s victory in October’s runoff election signals a dramatic change of direction for Bolivian politics. The era of dominance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, led by ex-president Evo Morales, is definitively over. For only the second time since 2006 the MAS will not control the presidency. As a result of the recent election, it now has a mere two representatives in the legislature’s lower house, and no one in the upper house. Though it does not hold an outright majority, Paz’s Christian Democratic Party is now the single largest presence in both legislative chambers. How did Bolivia get here?

Twenty years ago, the leftist-populist MAS swept into power, as a new and energetic grassroots alternative to the elite-run traditional parties that had traded off governing Bolivia since the end of dictatorship in 1982, or one could even argue, since the 1952 Revolution. The MAS’s popularity sprung largely from the dynamism of Morales, himself, then a coca grower union leader adept at organizing and leading large-scale protests in opposition to prevailing Washington Consensus policies and government efforts to sell off Bolivia’s non-renewable resources to transnational corporate interests. The MAS styled itself a bottom-up social movement and not a party. Its participatory “lead by following” approach to governance appealed to a great majority of indigenous voters and working-class people of indigenous descent.

Morales and the MAS proved historically consequential in undertaking a contentious but innovative rewrite of the country’s Constitution, which went into force in 2009. It fully embraced Bolivia’s “plurinational” identity and incorporated an unprecedented variety of collective indigenous rights of consultation, to their traditional territories, and perhaps most controversially, of judicial autonomy. The Morales administration also used a large surplus from the country’s extractive boom to finance a wide range of new social safety net provisions that halved the number of people living in poverty, including cash transfers to families, a pension program, minimum wage increase, as well as public investments in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, his presidency raised the public visibility of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, no longer as second class citizens but as political protagonists of their own present and future.

Morales and the MAS were immensely popular. But then cracks began to appear. In 2011 a plan to build a controversial highway through a protected indigenous reserve brought the MAS government into direct conflict with the reserve’s residents, damaging its support among some indigenous groups. When the extractive boom ended around 2014, Bolivia’s economy slowed considerably, and the MAS fiscal policies that had lifted so many out of poverty became increasingly unsustainable. Part of the problem was Morales, who served two presidential terms and aspired to another, without any thought to a succession plan. Constitutionally limited to two terms, in 2016 he soundly lost a national referendum in a bid for a third and then ignored the result, further alienating many former supporters.

The upheaval around the contested 2019 election, which eventuated in Morales going into exile in Mexico and the persecution of MAS loyalists by a rightwing caretaker government, set the stage for the party’s eventual fall from grace. The 2020 election restored the MAS to power. But soon Morales and the new president, his ex-finance minister Luis Arce, were in a pitched battle for control over the party, a bitter and increasingly personal rivalry that fatally fragmented the MAS into opposed camps. Their protracted feud, which paralyzed congress, strayed into surreal territory, with accusations of a staged coup and mutual assassination attempts. The credibility of the MAS was so fundamentally damaged that the incumbent Arce, with his poll numbers plummeting, suspended his campaign. Morales, meanwhile, remains holed up in his coca grower redoubt to avoid criminal charges.

The MAS-led government’s political fragmentation, and its ineffectual response to Bolivia’s increasingly disastrous economy, have left the party deeply unpopular. The country is currently floundering amid its worst economic crisis in 40 years. Its natural gas production is half of what it was in 2014, with nothing to replace it. Bolivia has failed to develop its large reserves of lithium. Depleted currency reserves and a scarcity of US dollars have driven up inflation, creating severe shortages of fuel and basic goods. Over the past year, ordinary Bolivians have angrily expressed their discontent with the country’s economic collapse through repeated strikes and protest actions.

Emerging from this bleak political and economic state-of-affairs is the surprise election winner, Rodrigo Paz. Son of onetime leftist president Jaime Paz Zamora, former mayor of Tarija, and recently a senator, Paz’s campaign focused on restoring Bolivia’s economy, but gradually rather than by instituting sweeping fiscal austerity measures as his rival in the run-off proposed. Non-indigenous, pro-business, and ideology averse, Paz successfully positioned himself as a pragmatic reformer. He has delivered a strong anti-corruption message, pledged to restore relations with the US and bring back foreign investment. His populist call for a “capitalism for all” hopes to thread the needle by mixing decentralization, lower taxes, support for small businesses, and greater fiscal discipline, with continued spending on popular MAS-era social programs.

Paz’s critics argue that what he proposes is an impossible fiscal balancing act. Desperate and impatient Bolivians will expect immediate results. But it remains far from clear whether Paz will be able to overcome likely regional opposition to at least some of his policies. And if he does not stabilize the country’s dysfunctional economy quickly, Paz’s political honeymoon might be brief.

The Rise, Decline, and Crisis of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement

By Dr. Pablo Andrade Andrade

October 17 Demonstrations (Manifestaciones del 17 de Octubre)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Just six years ago, in 2019, the three major organizations of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement were on the rise. CONAIE (the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) led the charge against Lenin Moreno’s government. For eleven days their widespread demonstrations posed a serious threat to the government’s stability. The “Paro Nacional” (Nationwide Strike) not only facilitated CONAIE’s alliances with the other two indigenous organizations (FENOCIN, the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras, and FEINE, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos) but also broadened its coalition with a diverse range of civil society organizations, marking a significant shift in Ecuadorian politics. The impact of the indigenous movement on Ecuadorian politics was profound, as Moreno´s government was seriously weakened. Two years later, in 2021, CONAIE’s political party, Pachakutik, won substantial representation in the National Assembly and placed third in the Presidential elections.

In 2022 CONAIE’s president, Leonidas Iza, led a successful national strike against Guillermo Lasso’s right-wing government. His leadership, bolstered by unity among indigenous communities and their allies, made it the most powerful leftist organization. Newfound solidarity among indigenous communities and stronger ties with student, feminist, and environmental movements, enhanced Iza’s national and international reputation. Less than a year later, President Lasso had to end his term and called for early general elections. However, at that moment Iza´s radical wing of CONAIE also attempted to impose its agenda over Pachakutik and the Amazonian federation CONFENIAE, which proved to be a high-cost strategy. The internal conflicts that followed led, in 2025, to the most serious electoral defeats that both organizations had suffered in decades.

The 2023 general elections were marred by prison massacres and political assassinations, including that of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio and the mayor of Manta, among numerous other government officials. Amid this unprecedented turmoil, a young center-right candidate, Daniel Noboa, emerged victorious as interim president. His win signaled yet another shift in Ecuador’s political landscape, with the country’s fragile democracy once again at the mercy of a personalist, plebiscitarian president.

The first warning sign of the current political turn to populist rule came with the 2025 regular election. The President’s party (Alianza Democrática Nacional, ADN) and the opposition party (Revolución Ciudadana, RC) totalled over 80 percent of National Assembly representatives. Noboa won his first five-year mandate. Pachakutik saw its representation shrink to five members, who the government rapidly coopted. Free from legislative checks, Noboa advanced his economic adjustment program. In addition, amid the ongoing public security crisis, Noboa expanded the military’s role in maintaining domestic order. Although assassinations have risen since 2023, militarization has strengthened Noboa’s control over organized violence, boosting political support for his government.

As part of its economic program, in September 2025, the Noboa administration raised diesel prices, a decision that in 2021 and 2022 sparked the wrath of CONAIE. But the leaders misjudged the lasting strength gained in 2021 and 2022, failing to account for damage from the 2023 and 2025 leadership races. As a result, they  rushed to emulate the apparent successes of the past. This time, however, CONAIE was at its lowest point. Unable to coordinate a nationwide strike, organizations in the northern province of Imbabura were left to their fate. The indigenous peoples of Cotacachi, Ilumán, Peguche, and Otavalo sustained demonstrations for a month. Still, they paid a high price in lost lives, injured people, and detainees due to systematic and brutal repression at the hands of the Armed Forces and the Police. This time, the government did not back down; the solidarity of  allied urban groups was, in this case, mostly symbolic and ineffective.

If CONAIE’s crisis should not be seen as the end of the indigenous movement, its significance cannot be overlooked. While grassroots mobilization once seemed effective, Noboa’s strong appeal and military support present new challenges. The aftermath of the national strike has called into question CONAIE’s representativeness and capacity to organize. An emboldened Noboa is now proposing a national plebiscite, in which he will likely be victorious, while Ecuador’s civil society appears weaker than ever. The challenges ahead are complex. The failed challenge to Noboa´s government could herald a new era of competitive authoritarianism, a scenario made even more likely by renewed international tolerance of hybrid forms of democracy. The lost battle left the indigenous organizations of Imbabura with wounds that could be challenging to heal, and racism lurks underneath the surface of Ecuador’s still young experiment with intercultural co-governance.

Pablo Andrade Andrade is Professor and Chair of the Germánico Salgado Lectures, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar

*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.

A Mexican Indigenous Entrepreneur in New York

By Ernesto Castañeda

[see Spanish version below]

Book review and excerpt from. “Un nahual en el imperio: La lucha de un migrante por los derechos políticos de la diáspora [A nahual in the empire: The fight of a migrant for the political rights of the diaspora]” by Maurizio Guerrero. Ciudad de México: Grano de Sal. 2025.

This book, published by Grano de Sal Press, narrates the experience of migration to the United States through the biography of one migrant in particular, as well as his friends and colleagues. This group of Mixtecos was relatively among the first to arrive in New York to work hard and start businesses. The book combines life narratives with an analysis of the public policies and economic contexts of both countries. It demonstrates how the ingenuity and perseverance of migrants always overcome the agendas and plans of governments, which come and go. Meanwhile, immigrants continue in the struggle for survival, success, and rights. The numerous contributions by migrants continue to enrich both countries. Immigrant volunteers and organizations often do more than any politician to help immigrants in need raise their collective voice as civic and political actors. This book narrates the stories of Jaime Lucero, Casa Puebla, and Fuerza Migrante as a window into the experience of Mexican migration to New York. Through the interviews with Mr. Lucero, the book describes his wish to create a foundation for Mexican migrants to walk together in defending their rights in both the United States and Mexico.

Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center of Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Washington, DC

Portions of the book are displayed here with permission. Translated by Ernesto Castañeda and Diana Rojas Hernandez.

“Jaime Lucero says that he emigrated from the town of Independencia, Puebla, at night, ‘so that no one would see me cry.’ That detail encapsulates the drama of the separation that migrant families go through, although it conceals the true tragedy of this exile” (p.83).

“At 9 years old, a goat herder in a family headed by a widow with seven children, he was sent to work in the capital so that he could send money home. At 18 years old, he shared that he crossed el [Rio Grande] even though he did not know how to swim. In the stormy waters of that migrant-devouring river, he had received “a sign”: someone helped him cross, preventing him from drowning, and since then, he understood that those people, Mexicans, Central Americans, and Caribbeans, were his people: the migrants.

Like the millions before and after him, Lucero arrived in New York to work in kitchens, washing dishes. He had worked at a restaurant for six years when the owners decided to discontinue using the truck they used to transport provisions because it broke down too often. Jaime took this as a message: he had to buy the truck, quit the restaurant, and work for himself.

Lucero founded a business that eventually generated millions of dollars in revenue and then became a community leader. In 1978, he established the first-ever organization for Mexican migrants in New York, Club Azteca, which would later become Casa Puebla, the foundation upon which he built his assistance services … [Fueza Migrante years later].

In large part due to the work of Fuerza Migrante, the Mexican Congress already had deputies and a senator representing the Mexican diaspora around the world. He devoted many things to the cause: money and the time to help people who, like him, had arrived in the empire without resources, defenseless. He expressed: “It is what I would have wanted to give to young Jaime Lucero.”

Community aid from the hands of one migrant to another, aspired to improve lives: those of people who crossed the border without papers and never escaped from the worst paid jobs, remaining merely helpers. His intentions were to change the concrete reality from which the vast majority of Mexican migrants never even dream of liberating themselves from: that, “We are not what you believe we are… We are not poor migrants,” he emphasized.

He mentioned the alcoholism that plagued those forced out by their circumstances: “All of the young people searching for their path are our children,” he said. “Those who sometimes fall into alcoholism, into drugs, they are our children too.” I understood it as his way of alluding to his brother Julio and cousin Ricardo, who managed, with great effort, to recover from their addiction to alcohol. It was also in reference to his cousins, El Chivo and Román, and other paisanos who were deported multiple times and continued to drink beer in the Mixteca Poblana because there was nothing much more to do in that impoverished area.

He referred to the migrants dragged from their childhood to face discrimination, exploitation, loneliness, and longing, who found solace in alcohol. To all those who had been left behind. Lucero stressed that “We have to put a price on that suffering.” All of that sacrifice, all those lives swallowed up by the insides of these two countries, should be converted into power to alter this cycle.

The Mexican state was not interested, he noted, in stopping migration because each person who emigrated increases remittance flows; And to the United States, those people were simply “illegal.”

[In a recent speech at Harvard University,] Lucero told the anecdote of the old broken-down truck, that clunker that was constantly breaking down. This version, however, was different from the one I had heard. In the version I had heard, various people had managed to pull the truck to the curb, another truck had been sent to deliver the fabric that Lucero had to ship, and a tow truck had taken the piece of junk to a mechanic. Lucero’s story is yearning, an illusion, a dream. In this dream, Jaime does not have to walk on that snowy highway to find a payphone to inform the warehouse that he will not be able to deliver the fabric. The people helping push the truck made it possible for him to shift into second gear and get the truck started. The same truck that others had discarded because they thought it was junk. In his dream, the truck finally roars to life and, despite everything, advances through the snow. “That truck is the community,” Lucero said (p. 281-3).

Maurizio Guerrero is a journalist and PhD student in the Sociology doctoral program at the CUNY Graduate Center.


Un nahual en el imperio: La lucha de un migrante por los derechos políticos de la diáspora

Maurizio Guerrero

Este libro publicado por Grano de Sal narra la experiencia de la migración a EE.UU. desde la biografía de un migrante en especial, así como sus amigos y colegas. Este grupo de Mixtecos fue relativamente de entre los primeros en llegar a Nueva York a trabajar duro y comenzar negocios. El libro combina narrativas de vida con análisis de las políticas públicas y contextos económicos en ambos países. Demuestra cómo la ingenuidad y perseverancia de los migrantes siempre sobrepasan las agendas y planes de los gobiernos, que van y vienen, mientras que las contribuciones de los migrantes siguen enriqueciendo ambos países, haciendo más que ningún político para ayudar a inmigrantes en situación de necesidad a alzar su voz colectiva como actores cívicos y políticos. Este libro narra las historias de Jaime Lucero, Casa Puebla y Fuerza Migrante como ventana a la experiencia de la migración mexicana a la zona de Nueva York. A través de la entrevistas con el Señor Lucero también se describe su deseo por crear las bases para que los migrantes mexicanos puedan caminar juntos para defender sus derechos en México y Estados Unidos.

Ernesto Castañeda, Director del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Latinos, American University, Washington, DC

Reproducimos aquí porciones del libro con permiso,

“Jaime Lucero cuenta que emigró del pueblo Independencia, Puebla de noche, ‘para que nadie me viera llorar.’ Ese detalle encapsula el drama de la separación de las familias migrantes, aunque oculta en buena medida la verdadera tragedia de ese exilio” (p.83).

“Pastor de cabras en una familia encabezada por una viuda con siete hijos, a los 9 años había sido mandado a trabajar a la capital a fin de que enviara dinero. A los 18 años, contó, había cruzado el Bravo aunque no sabía nadar. En las aguas procelosas de ese río devorador de migrantes, había tenido “una señal”: alguien lo ayudó a cruzar, impidiendo que se ahogara, y desde entonces comprendió que esas personas, mexicanos, centroamericanos y caribeños, eran su grupo: los migrantes.

Como millones de migrantes antes y después que él, Lucero arribó a Nueva York a trabajar en cocinas, lavando platos. Seis años había laborado en un restaurante cuando sus dueños decidieron deshacerse del camión en el que transportaban provisiones porque ya fallaba mucho. Jaime lo tomó como mensaje: debía comprar el camión, renunciar al restaurante y trabajar por su cuenta.

Lucero fundó una empresa que llegó a facturar millones de dólares y se convirtió en líder comunitario. En 1978 había fundado la primera organización para los migrantes mexicanos en Nueva York: el Club Azteca, que se convertiría en Casa Puebla, la base sobre la que había construido sus servicios de asistencia … [Fuerza Migrante años después].

En buena medida debido a las gestiones de Fuerza Migrante, el Congreso mexicano ya tenía diputados y una senadora que representaban a la diáspora mexicana en el mundo. Dedica muchas cosas a esa causa, dinero, el tiempo invertido para ayudar a las personas que, como él, habían llegado sin recursos, desvalidos, al imperio. Expresó: “Es lo que yo hubiera querido darle al joven Jaime Lucero.”

Esa ayuda comunitaria, de la mano de un migrante a otro migrante, aspiraba a mejorar destinos: los de aquellos que cruzan la frontera sin papeles y no escapan nunca de los empleos peor pagados, de ser simplemente ayudantes. Su intención era contribuir a cambiar una realidad concreta, de la que la vasta mayoría de los migrantes mexicanos jamás sueñan liberarse. “No somos lo que ustedes creen que somos”, destacó: “No somos pobres migrantes.”

Mencionó el alcoholismo que plagaba a aquellos expulsados por su entorno: “Todos los jóvenes que están buscando el camino son nuestros hijos —dijo—. Los que a veces caen por el alcoholismo, por las drogas, son nuestros hijos también.” Fue su modo, entendí, de aludir a su hermano Julio y a su primo Ricardo, que lograron con esfuerzo recuperarse de su adicción al alcohol, pero también a sus primos, el Chivo y Román, y a los otros paisanos varias veces deportados que seguían tomando cerveza en la Mixteca poblana porque no había nada más que hacer en esa zona empobrecida.

Se refería a los migrantes arrancados de su infancia para enfrentar discriminación, explotación, soledad, añoranza, que encuentran un consuelo en el alcohol. A todos los que se habían quedado atrás. “Tenemos que ponerle precio a ese sufrimiento”, expresó Lucero. Todo ese sacrificio, esas vidas deglutidas en las entrañas de los dos países, debía convertirse en poder para alterar ese ciclo.

Al Estado mexicano no le interesaba, señaló, detener la migración porque cada persona que emigra acrecentaba las remesas. Y para Estados Unidos, esas personas eran simplemente “ilegales”.

[En un discurso en un evento en una universidad americana] Lucero relató la anécdota del viejo camión descompuesto, ese armatoste que a cada rato fallaba. Su narración, sin embargo, fue diferente a la que yo había escuchado sobre cómo, entre varias personas, habían logrado orillar el vehículo a la cuneta, cómo otro camión había sido enviado para repartir las telas que debía entregar Lucero y cómo una grúa había remolcado el cacharro a un taller mecánico. Este desenlace es un anhelo, una ilusión, un sueño, y que en ese sueño Jaime no tiene que caminar en esa autopista nevada a fin de encontrar un teléfono público para informar a la bodega que no podrá entregar las telas. En su sueño, las personas que lo ayudan empujan para que él, metiendo segunda, logre prender el camión del que otros se habían deshecho porque creían que era una chatarra. En su sueño, el camión logra ponerse en marcha y, pese a todo, avanza bajo la nieve. “Ese camión es la comunidad,” dijo Lucero (pp. 381-383).

Maurizio Guerrero es periodista y estudiante de doctorado en el programa de sociología del CUNY Graduate Center.