In 2022 American University’s Immigration Lab began conducting interviews in the DMV (D.C., Maryland, and Virginia) area to better understand the experience of migrants and refugees. All migrants and refugees have vastly different experiences due to their place of origin, economic status, and or racial identity. However, there are common threads within these experiences.
Many participants found employment outside of their educational training because there were more opportunities to earn a higher income elsewhere. This does not deviate from what many people must do to support themselves, but the reasoning differed. A Colombian woman shared that she went into sales rather than film, her field of study, because she knows that one day she will have to support her mother and siblings. Many noted remittances as the reason why they had to seek a higher-paying job and depart from their original discipline.
On the other hand, some participants were unable to use their degrees to seek employment because they were obtained outside of the United States. This circumstance almost always resulted in that individual having to accept a lower-paying job and having to learn a new set of skills. Participants who have yet to work toward higher education tend to pursue employment in the informal labor market, which is defined as work that is not taxed or recorded by the government.
Many participants in the study reported that they do not have the opportunity to use their first language in the workplace. When there is opportunity to speak their native language, interviewees disclosed feeling uncomfortable. A Salvadoran woman in her late twenties mentioned that she chose not to work in a regionally specific office where Spanish was spoken due to feeling, “pigeonhole(d) into doing this role.”
Almost all participants who have yet to achieve a higher education plan to return to school at some point. Time and money are the most frequently cited hinderances of achieving this goal. Many migrants feel that they are overqualified for the profession they are in but are stuck until they can obtain a degree from an accredited institution in the United States. However, many find themselves in a catch 22: it is almost impossible to dedicate oneself to work, school and family full time. As an Afghan male in his mid-twenties noted, “Life is all about work.”
The main earning priorities indicated by participants were rent, bills, and family. This is strikingly different to the financial goals of U.S. citizens recorded from 2020 to 2021, which revealed the main priorities as increasing emergency savings and paying down debt. The primary financial concerns among immigrants and refugees are dealt with day to day. Many immigrants and refugees do not have the luxury to pay off debt or accrue savings when they are worried about whether their income will cover basic living needs, bills, and sending remittances to their family in a country that may be in a state of unrest.
A Colombian woman in her mid-twenties expressed that discrimination has grown to be an expected part of the workplace experience, and she has had to file complaints with Human Resources to create a paper trail. This should not be part of the workplace environment, and she should not have to keep a paper trail in case of something more severe than verbal discrimination. Attaining a U.S. education and being a member of the workforce is challenging, but those challenges are escalated for immigrants and refugees traveling to the DMV region due to racial, social, and economic divisions.
* Lily Tierney- student in the School of Communications ’24 at American University.
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A graph depicting the total number of new Afghan cases and percent of new Afghan cases out of all nationalities throughout the years. / Creative Commons License
The number of Afghan immigrants facing deportation in immigration court spiked in fiscal year 2023 to a total so far of 5,434 up from just 610 in FY 2022. The growing numbers of Afghans in immigration court mirrors the overall upward trend in new deportation cases which grew from about 820,000 in FY 2022 to 1.27 million in FY 2023 based on data through the end of August that was analyzed and published by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University. However, whereas the number of deportation cases for all nationalities grew 1.5 times over the previous year, the number of Afghan nationals in immigration court grew nearly 9 times the previous year. Afghan nationals still make up only a small percentage of all new deportation cases at less than one percent, but even this small fraction grew from negligible to almost half a percent in 2023. See Figure 1.
This remarkable growth comes at a time when many Afghan refugees living in the United States are uncertain about their future. Many Afghans arrived in the United States in the past few years, both before and after the U.S. military withdraw from Afghanistan. The Biden administration created a humanitarian pathway into the United States for these refugees under Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) and granted many Afghans Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that typically safeguards them from deportation. Among those Afghan migrants that lack permanent status, immigrants with pending deportation cases represent people who are most vulnerable to deportation. Without permanent legal status, Afghan refugees could remain at higher risk of deportation if they lose temporary status or if they commit certain crimes that make them deportable. Most Afghans remain without permanent immigration status or a clear pathway to citizenship.
Understanding the characteristics of Afghan, and other migrants facing deportation is important for the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) at American University, which has an ongoing research project that examines the demographics, experiences, and challenges of recently-arrived refugees now living in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. This report examines the 5,434 Afghan deportation cases filed in court in the first 11 months of FY 2023 to inform the public, policy makers, and researchers about the growth of Afghans facing deportation.
About Deportation Cases in Immigration Court
The U.S. immigration court system is responsible for adjudicating cases brought against migrants by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Deportation (aka removal) hearings begin when an immigration enforcement agency files a document known as a Notice to Appear (NTA) with the court, placing an immigrant in removal proceedings. Once an NTA is filed, immigrants are required to attend a series of hearings with an immigration judge, including routine status hearings and individual hearings for immigrants who are requesting asylum. A case typically concludes with an immigration judge issuing a deportation order or granting the immigrant permission to remain in the United States on a temporary or permanent basis. In some cases, the government may also elect to close a case before it reaches a final decision to prioritize limited agency resources. Due to the complexity of U.S. immigration law and variations in judicial disposition, obtaining a positive outcome often depends not only on the quality of an immigrants’ case but also on the ability of the immigrant to obtain legal representation, be assigned to a favorable judge, and access additional social services that enables them to follow through on the various demands that the immigration system places on them. Given the political conditions in Afghanistan, it is expected that many Afghan migrants who are in immigration court would be eligible to apply for asylum as a form of relief.
Immigration Court Location
Understanding which immigration courts Afghans facing deportation are assigned to helps illuminate where legal services are needed and what kinds of favorable or unfavorable judges these potential asylum seekers may face. The 5,434 new Afghans in court this fiscal year were assigned to a variety of courts, with no one court dominating over another. The Sacramento immigration court saw the largest number, with 601 new Afghan cases filed this year. This was followed in second place by San Francisco with 485 and San Diego (in fourth place) with 299 cases. The immigration court in Arlington, Virginia, came in third with 329, but the California courts combined indicate that the largest numbers of Afghans facing deportation are in California. The table below shows the total number of Afghan migrants facing deportation in courts with at least 100 Afghan cases.
Gender, Language, and Age
Of Afghans facing deportation whose gender was recorded in the immigration court’s data, 69.6 percent are listed as male while 30.4 percent are listed female. Nearly a quarter (25.4 percent or 1,267) of all new Afghan cases in court this year where age was recorded were children under the age of 18. Another 16.6 percent were young adults between the ages of 18 and 24, while the largest group (38.3 percent or 1,911) were between ages 25 and 34. Under 20 percent (19.6 percent) were 35 years old and up.
The largest group of Afghans—38 percent—spoke what the court classifies as “Farsi – Afgani – Dari”, while a sizeable percentage—27 percent—are listed as speaking English with Pushtu coming in third at 21 percent. All other languages were less represented, but included Arabic (283), Farsi-Iranian-Persian (169), Spanish (93), Dargwa (67), Russian (35), and Turkish (25).
Legal Representation
Representation is a crucial factor for immigrants seeking a favorable outcome allowing them to stay in the United States instead of being deported. Most new Afghan deportation cases filed in 2023 are not represented by an attorney. Just 1,227 of these new cases, or 22.6 percent of the total, have representation while the majority of 4,207, or 77.4 percent of the total, have no attorneys. It is not unusual for more recently filed cases to show lower rates of legal representation, since it requires time to find an immigration attorney, and requires additional time for the attorney to file their attorney paperwork with the court. These rates of representation are in fact higher than the national rates for new cases. Out of all new cases from 2023, just 12.6 percent have attorneys by the end of August 2023 while 87.4 percent do not. In this regard, Afghan nationals are faring better in court (22.6 percent compared to just 12.6 percent).
Asylum
Given the country conditions in Afghanistan, Afghans in court are likely to be eligible for asylum, a humanitarian form of relief that prevents a person from being deported to a country where they are likely to face persecution. Nonetheless, only 137 asylum cases involving Afghan nationals have been decided by judges so far this fiscal year. Of those, just 22 in total (16 percent) were denied while the rest were approved for either asylum or another form of relief. This is much lower than the 51 percent denial rate among all nationalities in FY 2023, which means that asylum could be an option for Afghan immigrant courts. However, barriers to applying for asylum in the first place—such as having access to legal representation and having sufficient time to prepare a strong case—may limit the availability of this option. include finding an attorney,
Conclusion
While most of the U.S. public is sympathetic to Afghan arrivals, many were warned that their legal status in the U.S. was temporary, liminal, and would lead many to live in limbo. Thus, we are already starting to see Afghans in the U.S. facing deportation. Is the government truly prepared to deport people to Afghanistan under Taliban control? What do we owe the translators, contractors, and soldiers that partnered with the U.S. and ally governments for years? Will the U.S. government’s delays in providing a permanent pathway to legal status and citizenship lead to even more Afghans ending up in immigration court? It is important that the public is not only informed about the policies and programs affecting Afghan refugees but is also informed about the use of limited government resources to deport Afghans to potentially dangerous living conditions.
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* Austin Kocher is a Research Assistant Professor with the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University and a Research Fellow at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.
In the Immigration Lab’s project on recently arrived immigrants to the United States and the Washington Metropolitan Area, we find that Afghans have unique medical and healthcare needs.
Among the 22 Afghans in our research study, more than half of the participants (68%) had medical insurance through Medicaid while another 23% had medical insurance through other providers. These findings speak to the effectiveness of Operation Allies Welcome in providing healthcare services to Afghan arrivals.
On access to Medicaid, Noor, a 34-year-old male, shared: “The good thing is that they’re providing Medicaid, or medical assistance to those families that are coming from Afghanistan with a specific legal status, like for special immigrant visa holders there is that medical assistance, and through that, you can access medical services.”
While Afghan migrants’ access to Medicaid indicates the benefits of OAW, many participants communicated some issues with the efficiency of Medicaid. Rahman, 44 years old, shared his experience with a delay in Medicaid care that ultimately negatively impacted his family:
“The problem was when we came here for the first three months we had no Medicaid, I think…the problem was with the agency. They had lots of clients, so we had to wait for more than three months to receive Medicaid. A couple of times my kids were sick and not feeling well. It was not a good experience. But it was not because of [immigration] status. It was because of the process, it took a longer time, it took about three months, which is not common, I think. But anyhow, we had to wait, and our kids suffered because of that.”
Some participants emphasized that while they had access to Medicaid, their coverage did not support all of their medical expenses. It is possible that people are not being adequately informed about what their insurance will cover in the United States upon arrival, especially because health insurance is less common in Afghanistan:
“The hospital sent me a bill up to $1200. I showed my Medicaid—why should I pay from my pocket, you know? There are these kinds of problems we have…they say Medicaid is not covering this [so] I can’t afford it at this time,” Hamza, male, 34-years-old.
Other participants who did not relay their insurance provider or who have an unknown insurance provider also described difficulty paying for medical services that were not covered. Farjaad, age 25, described unanticipated expenses when visiting an ophthalmologist whose services were not covered by health insurance. Upon finding out that his appointment would not be covered by insurance, he canceled it and opted for eye drops. Farjaad’s experience reflects the issue of unaffordable health care in the United States despite having access to government insurance.
There is an underwhelming number of responses in the data that speak to the health problems of Afghan migrants and refugees that they are aware of or are receiving treatment for. Most participants reported that they either do not have any health problems or are unaware of any health problems they may have. There was one affirmative response for each of the following health problems: 1) High Cholesterol, depression, anxiety, 2) Asthma, anemia, 3) TB, 4) Diabetes, PTSD, ulcer, 5) Anxiety, PTSD, Thyroid, and 6) High blood pressure, high cholesterol, hypertension.
However, some participants indicated that they had health problems in Afghanistan. Participants mentioned having conditions such as diabetes, hemorrhoids, heart problems, and kidney stones, to name a few.
The findings were also limited in identifying disability. Most interviewees reported that they either do not have a disability or are unaware of any disability they may have. Only one participant reported having an undiagnosed disability but did not specify which. Nonetheless, qualitative data from the research reveals that though disabilities may not be diagnosed, participants are aware that they have one. For example, one interviewee noted they have lower back pain and fibromyalgia, which they believe are indications of an undiagnosed disability.
Only 23% of respondents answered the question, “When was the last time you went to the dentist?”, three individuals in the affirmative responding in 2022 and two in 2023. The survey asks two reproductive health care questions, both of which were only answered by three [male] participants. In the first reproductive health question participants responded that they have never received reproductive health care, and two out of three responded that they have not been adequately informed about reproductive health care services in the United States. The final respondent affirmed that they have been informed about reproductive health care. However, the data indicates that there is a general lack of awareness surrounding reproductive health care and how to access it in the United States.
It is important to note that income level does not appear to have a significant impact on qualifying for Medicaid. Most participants who are insured by Medicaid disclosed their income level, ranging from a yearly salary of $80,000-100,000 to less than $30,000. In comparison to their lives in Afghanistan, where health insurance is not as common, the data demonstrates that Afghan arrivals are able to securely access federally funded medical coverage in the United States.
Overall, health is certainly considered to be a priority for Afghans settling in the United States, though total medical coverage seems to be a rare occasion. Many Afghans do use Medicaid but convey their dissatisfaction with the process of receiving care upon arrival. This data points to discrepancies in the efficacy of the Operation Allies Welcome program.
Some consistent qualitative patterns in the responses to the health care questions are 1) participants being unaware of the extent to which Medicaid/other insurance providers cover their medical expenses, 2) lack of reproductive health care knowledge, and 3) preliminary health problems in Afghanistan that are rarely being assessed in the U.S.
About the Study
This report is part of a larger research project titled Recent-Arrivals to the DMV from Conflict Affected Areas. The project relies on a mixed-methods research project conducted by faculty and students from the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) at American University. Researchers solicited information about migrants’ identities and experiences using a survey form that collected quantitative data and asked open-ended follow-up questions to collect narrative-rich qualitative data. This project was supported by the Mellon Foundation through the College of Arts and Sciences and the Faculty-Student Scholarly Collaboration Grant from the Office of the Deputy Provost and Dean of Faculty at American University. The larger team includes Ernesto Castañeda, Bashir Mobasher, Tazreena Sajjad, Mubbashir Rizvi, Lauren Carruth, Daniel Jenks, Makenna Lindsay, Diana Flores Garay, Sofia Guerra, Joseph Fournier, Montse Hernandez, and over 30 students working at the Immigration Lab. We aim to interview more Afghans and compare them to other immigrant and asylum-seeking groups.
* Makenna Lindsay is Program Coordinator at American University’s Immigration Lab and Master’s Candidate in American University’s Sociology Research and Practice program.
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by Austin Kocher, Bashir Mobasher, Sofía Guerra, Makenna Lindsay, Diana Garay Flores, and Ernesto Castañeda*
A graph depicting the inter-generational educational achievement of Afghan interviewees and their parents / Creative Commons License
Although tens of thousands of Afghans were brought to the United States before and after the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, many remain in legal limbo, and some are still struggling to resettle in this country. We still know little about the lives of Afghans in the United States, even two years after the military final withdrawal.
Washington, D.C. is an area with one of the largest Afghan communities in the country. In order to fill in the gap in knowledge about recently arrived Afghans in the United States, researchers at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University interviewed Afghan immigrants through the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia (DMV) region and beyond about their experiences. We use pseudonyms rather than names to keep confidentiality.
This first report from the project presents the preliminary results of interviews with 21 Afghans to discuss their educational and work experiences in Afghanistan and after arriving in the United States. Most Afghan migrants in our study had a high educational attainment. Most of our interviewees—87% of the total—had at least a bachelor’s degree, while nearly half (10) also had a master’s degree.
Our interviewees often situated their own educational attainment relative to their parents’ educational attainment as a way to demonstrate the value of intergenerational progress and social mobility. One 32-year-old male refugee, Abdul, who, like his father, had completed a master’s degree, described the impacts of years of war on Afghanistan and child-rearing duties as placing limits on his mother’s education. His mother completed the equivalent of high school but could not pursue additional education “because Afghanistan has struggled with four wars,” and she had to “take care of five to six children.” At the time of the interview, Abdul was working in the food service industry, which he reported enjoying, although he also aspired to join the army and pursue further education once his immigration status is resolved.
Most participants reported higher educational attainment than their parents, either by studying abroad or in Afghanistan. The above image shows the educational attainment of interviewees and their parents. Only the 12 participants where full data was available are shown in the graph; the remaining nine included only partial data.
Despite high educational attainment, many of our research participants worked jobs that did not appear to capture their full employment potential. Three participants were unemployed. Two worked in the gig economy as Uber or DoorDash drivers, while others worked part-time or in customer service shifts. Nearly all expressed an interest in pursuing higher education and more competitive careers in government service, journalism, or business. Others reported more stable professional positions, including security guards, senior project coordinators, customer service specialists, and human resources.
Even if they aspired to have more competitive jobs later in life, many of the Afghans we spoke with described their determination to work jobs that were available to them as a function of their ongoing responsibility to their families both in the United States and in Afghanistan. As with many other immigrants, the Afghans we spoke with felt a responsibility to provide for their family as they settled into the DMV and often reported sending money to support family members who could not leave as they had been able to.
A 35-year-old male refugee, Sayed, described the responsibility he and many other Afghans felt towards their families still in Afghanistan. Sayed had only been in the United States since 2021 and, like many of the people we interviewed, had received his education abroad rather than in Afghanistan. He completed his master’s degree in India and hoped to pursue a Ph.D. However, his current situation demanded more practical considerations. When asked about his work schedule, he described “working hard” with lots of “overtime that only left him just one day free each week. When asked if he felt he was working hard enough, he replied, “No, it is not enough. But we are in a tough position right now. We have problems. You know, the situation in Afghanistan is not normal. We have to be hard working; we have to help our families in Afghanistan. I am working here to support my family, my friends, and my colleagues in Afghanistan.”
Similarly, Ahmad arrived in the United States in 2021 and settled immediately in the D.C. area. When asked if he sent remittances to Afghanistan, he said, “Yeah, sure. Why not? The situation is still terrible. No jobs, no work, no money. So, I have to support my family, my mom, even my brothers. They need healthcare, they need food, they need a lot of things. But there is none. So, I have to support my family.” Ahmad went on to describe the responsibility he felt for family members in the United States as well as abroad. “And I have to provide financial support right here in America, as well as to my sons, my daughter, my wife, and my mom.” Ahmad works as a customer support specialist and as an interpreter for a furniture company.
Although educational attainment is typically thought of as a resource for immigrants who are joining the U.S. labor market, educational and work-related background may also be in the list of factors that forced immigrants to leave their country in the first place. A 32-year-old Afghan woman, Zahra, represented an important segment of our interviewees who had parents with relatively high education.Zahra’s mother possessed a master’s degree in criminology, and her father possessed a bachelor’s degree, while Zahra had completed a master’s degree in the United States. Under the Taliban regime, highly-educated women are seen with distrust and may be targeted.
Although from Afghanistan, Zahra reported spending much of her early childhood in Pakistan. Interestingly, the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan prompted her family to return to the country. “After the U.S. captured Kabul,” she said, “we thought it was our time to go back to Kabul.” Her family’s education and careers shaped how they experienced Afghanistan before and after the withdrawal.
“My mom was a governmental official, and I used to work with the U.S. embassy, and my brother was also working with the U.S. embassy. So when the Taliban captured the city, the first thing that came to my mind was that they would harm my family… During the evacuation, the U.S. government was trying to evacuate all of those people who were working with the U.S. government and their allies.”
She went on to describe how their jobs working with the United States government exacerbated their risks once the U.S. military left.
“We have been threatened. The night before coming to the Kabul airport, the Taliban came to our house. They were asking for my mother, and that was very scary. My mother has like the governmental vehicle and some laptops and stuff, but they actually came just to see if my mother was still in Kabul. But they just made an excuse that they were here to ask for the car, documents, and stuff. Then they also asked about us, about me and my brother.”
Zahra’s story illustrates the ways in which the educational attainment and careers of Afghan individuals create cycles of opportunity and precarity. In Zahra’s case, her family’s education created opportunities for work with the U.S. government, which then contributed to their vulnerability after the military withdrawal and may now help her resettle in the United States and join the labor market here. In a future report we will explore further whether their education fits the jobs they obtain in the U.S.
About the Study
This report is part of a larger research project titled Immigration to the DMV. The project relies on a mixed-methods research project conducted by faculty and students from the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) at American University. Researchers solicited information about migrants’ identities and experiences using a survey form that collected quantitative data and asked open-ended follow-up questions to collect narrative-rich qualitative data. This project was supported by the Mellon Foundation through the College of Arts and Sciences and the Faculty-Student Scholarly Collaboration Grant from the Office of the Deputy Provost and Dean of Faculty at American University. The larger team includes Tazreena Sajjad, Mubbashir Rizvi, Lauren Carruth, Daniel Jenks, Joseph Fournier, Montse Hernandez, and over 30 students working at the Immigration Lab. We aim to interview more Afghans and compare them to other immigrant and asylum-seeking groups.
Reproduction with full attribution is possible with modifications such as not including the “About the Study” section are permitted for non-for profit purposes by newsmedia and education purposes.
This joint effort by El Colegio de México in Mexico City, Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires, supported by the Ford Foundation, deserves to be celebrated. The report is the result of a series of meetings and scholarly works meant to contribute to the agenda coming from the Summit of the Americas by including the perspective of academia and civil society. Its main message is the need to strengthen multilateralism and Inter-American cooperation.
The weakening of intergovernmental dialogue, coordination, and action that we witness today goes hand in hand with the weakening of democracies at home. Democratic backsliding and the increase in authoritarianism in the world signal bad times for deliberative and participatory democracies at the national and international levels.
The report pays attention to the needs not just of intergovernmental politics, but also stresses the role of academia and civil society by incorporating experts from different backgrounds. It proposes an Inter-American strategic agenda: a roadmap for collective international action around three priority areas of inequality, migration, and climate change. I would like to focus on the first.
According to the World Inequality Report 2022, the richest 10% of the region’s population owns 75% of wealth, whereas the poorest 50% barely owns 2%. Inequality worsened with the pandemic. The share of the wealth captured by Latin American multimillionaires increased by 14% between 2019 and 2021.
Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean is rooted in a historical legacy and economic models based on the extraction and export of commodities, and an institutional structure that perpetuates it. This is what Roberto Gargarella (2010) calls “the legal foundations of inequality.” Political struggles between radicals, liberals, and conservatives in the early days of the new republics, he argues, ended up constitutionalizing an exclusionary political structure.
Unlike poverty, inequality is a disputed topic in public policy. This report makes the case for addressing it as a specific challenge to building cohesive societies capable of dealing with their needs and protecting political pluralism. The study shows that the economic and social gap increased after the COVID-19 pandemic, creating a worrisome social regression that feeds political discontent. “Regionally, the social agenda is a top priority,”—states the report—”Policies agreed at an inter-State and transnational level are needed to reduce entrenched socioeconomic inequalities, eradicate poverty, expand rights for everyone, and provide universal access to basic services.” The discussion of this topic ends with concrete recommendations:
Empowering sectors of the population that have been left behind. This includes narrowing the gap between formal and substantive equality and building more democratic and participatory institutions.
Promoting fiscal reform which is necessary for building an inclusive welfare state and improving wealth redistribution.
Reducing gaps between more dynamic and poorer regions.
Establishing a minimum basic income and more universally accessible public assets, including innovative connections between public, private, social, and community associations.
Gender equality policies, including caregiving, political representation (electoral gender parity), and measures to eradicate violence against women.
Improve multilateral cooperation programs.
Interdependence: Democracy and Equality
This work is based on decades of social research analyzing the tension between inequality and democracy. Inequality is inseparable from the current crisis of political representation and the failure of political parties to effectively channel social diversity. In Latin America, economic development built on inequality has been coupled with a constitutional structure that preserves the power of economic minorities (Gargarella 2021). Understanding and addressing inequality requires considering the conditions for both economic and political exclusion. Democracy, which is a promise of political equality, becomes meaningless in the face of wealth inequality and the absence of mechanisms to alleviate the material struggles of citizens.
Exclusion in the social and political spheres have recently triggered massive protests, as seen in Brazil (2015), Venezuela (2017), Nicaragua (2018), Ecuador and Chile (2019), Colombia, Paraguay, and Cuba (2021), Bolivia (2019, 2020), and Peru (2020 and 2022). In a recent work, Roberto Gargarella (2022) advocates for what he calls a “conversation among equals,” which leads to broadening popular participation and creating more inclusive deliberation to overcome this distrust in politics. In a similar vein, María Victoria Murillo (2021) argues that citizens with unsatisfied demands look for a democracy that listens, pays attention, and seats them at the table where decisions are made. For Murillo, this demand for democratic legitimacy is more important than the limits on public policy inherited from the previous military, which made scholars of transitions to democracy fearful of military regression (see also Garretón 2023).
While this diagnostic seems correct, I believe the legacies of dictatorship are deep and permeate current politics in ways that need further attention. The increased worldwide tolerance of and even support for authoritarianism should not be studied without reference to Latin America’s recent political history. To make the return to democracy possible, elites often negotiated impunity for state crimes, accepted military-imposed limitations over the political process, and suffered significant constraints on the authority of the incoming governments (Loveman and Davies 1997). After transitions, many democracies were weakened by severe restrictions on political participation and inclusion as well as on public contestation of political decisions. Restrictions on mass media, political opposition, the right to organize, labor unions, and the exercise of civil rights and liberties remained.
Institutional Barriers to Change
It is true that deep institutional change took place in most countries (notable exceptions are Panama and Chile). The constitution-making in Latin America after transitions to democracy shows a tendency towards the expansion of social and political rights, but as Gargarella (2013) argues, the concentration of power in the executive remained. In recent years, political crises in Latin America have often been constitutional crises: ones that combine redistributive struggles with disagreement about which the basic political rules should be.
An important legacy of military dictatorships was the supposedly “apolitical” nature of their institutional arrangements: ones that, while claiming to be above party and ideological disputes, severely restricted the political scope of action of new democracies (Loveman and Davies 1997). This fed into the institutional crisis of highly unequal societies unable to build effective and legitimate mediating capacities. Attempts to overcome these difficulties have included new constitutions guaranteeing social rights, granting new group rights to indigenous peoples, and creating participatory and deliberative mechanisms. Unfortunately, the latter have often increased the capacity for unilateral decision-making by power holders rather than empowering citizens or civil society (Heiss 2022).
Victoria Murillo (2021) argues that this difficult coexistence between democracy and inequality has been exacerbated by the recent explosion of discontent in the context of economic and health crises, creating unstable political equilibria. Legitimacy is necessary to sustain democracy, but it must be associated with a hope for greater social well-being—a combination of inclusion and responsiveness.
The Chilean Example
This September 11 of 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the military coup that ultimately ended the life of Salvador Allende, a democratic leftist that sought to reduce inequality and include the people as a political subject in an unprecedented way. The anniversary finds the country more divided than a decade ago. Chile has a prosperous economy when compared to other countries in the region, but at the same time, the country is among the most unequal. Its economic model of a “subsidiary state” that gives primacy to the private provision of public needs has been protected from change by institutional authoritarian legacies. A dysfunctional political system, described as “uprooted but stable” (Luna and Altman 2011), has resulted in the inability to adequately channel social demands.
The rejection of institutions and political parties led to a search for “independents” in 2022 and for “experts” in 2023 to try to recompose political legitimacy. However, as Cristina Lafont (2020) has argued, there are no shortcuts to participatory deliberative democracy. Inequality is a fertile ground for left and right populists to capitalize on this discontent. It is sad that on the 50th anniversary of the coup in Chile, we see the appeal of right-wing authoritarianism threatening to come back.
International cooperation reflects the will of governments, dominated by their local priorities. Thus, we should not expect miracles from a forum like the Summit of the Americas. However, the recommendations for “(Co)building a strategic agenda for the Americas” contained in this report are an important contribution to building an international public discourse that works for increased democratization and against the pernicious trend created by economic and political inequality.
* Claudia Heiss is Head of Political Science at Universidad de Chile and Research Fellow at American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies.
Gargarella, Roberto (2010). The Legal Foundations of Inequality. Cambridge University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2013). Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810–2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution. Oxford University Press.
Gargarella, Roberto (2022). The Law as a Conversation Among Equals. Cambridge University Press.
Garretón, Manuel Antonio. (2003). Incomplete Democracy. University of North Carolina Press.
Heiss, Claudia (2022). “What Can a Constitution Do? Seeking to Deepen Democracy through Constitution-Making in Latin America“. LASA Forum 53:3, 10-15
Loveman, Brian, and Thomas M. Davies Jr., eds. (1997). The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
Lafont, Cristina (2020). Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford University Press.
Luna, Juna Pablo and David Altman (2011). “Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization”. Latin American Politics and Society, 53(2), 1-28.
Murillo, Ma. Victoria (2021). “Protestas, descontento y democracia en América Latina”. Nueva Sociedad 294, 4-13.
Two U.S. Border Patrol agents using equipment to take a photo of a person near Sasabe, Arizona on March 22, 2020 / Jerry Glaser / Picryl / Creative Commons License
Migrants around the world who are seeking asylum in North America and Europe are finding pathways to safety increasingly blocked—not only by physical borders but also by digital borders. The most recent example of this technological obstruction in the U.S. context is the introduction of a smartphone app known as CBP One, which the government has been using since January to manage the flow of asylum seekers at or near the U.S.-Mexico border.
Beginning in January 2023, asylum seekers faced new harsher consequences for seeking asylum directly at ports of entry or crossing unlawfully between ports of entry. CBP required migrants to download the CBP One app onto their smartphones, register their information, and schedule an appointment at a port of entry.
CBP representatives claimed that this would streamline border processing, and for many migrants it did. But for others, the app introduced new digital barriers that reflected old ones: migrants with darker skin reported trouble with the facial liveness test, many migrants did not own newer (and more expensive) smartphones that could run the app well, or access to electricity and the Internet connection. The app disadvantaged migrants who were living at community shelters and camps on the outskirts of border towns in which the Internet was inaccessible.
My recent article on CBP One titled “Glitches in the Digitization of Asylum: How CBP One Turns Migrants’ Smartphones into Mobile Borders,” unpacks the various types of technological hurdles that migrants have faced when trying to use the app, and further attempts to analyze how this app fits within the broader landscape of borders, migration, and technology. But in this blog, I want to expand on those aspects of the digitization of asylum that represent a real concern for the right to ask for asylum going forward.
Specifically, we must think about the larger and longer-term consequences of CBP One for the asylum system writ large. Although CBP One and the current policies surrounding it may be an improvement for many migrants seeking asylum now, the question we should ask ourselves is, how might this app be used in restrictive, dangerous, or capricious ways that could undermine, rather than expand, the United States’ commitment to human rights?
A recent example of this provides some early clues about the fragility of CBP One as a tool.
In June 2023, Customs and Border Protection suspended access to CBP One appointments at the Laredo port of entry in South Texas, effectively (though indirectly) suspending access to asylum itself in that spot. CBP’s rationale appeared to be tied to concerns about migrant safety in Nuevo Laredo, the city on the Mexican side of the border that is among the more dangerous border cities. Immigrant rights advocates reported at the time that migrants who were coming to Nuevo Laredo to seek asylum were being targeted for extortion and kidnapping. That is those presumed to try to present themselves to the appointments they had secured through CBPOne were being asked for money along the route in order to make it to the U.S. border. As a result of CBP’s decision to halt CBP One appointments, migrants would have to travel many miles on perilous roads to the nearest ports of entry that did accept CBP One appointments, such as those in Eagle Pass and Hidalgo, Texas.
A closer look at CBP’s website reveals that Laredo was removed as an official CBP One location late in the day on June 8, although CBP’s website did not make any public announcements related to their decision to suspend access. The lack of public announcement or justification for this decision raises some questions and concerns. While the intentions may have been good ones, could canceling asylum appointments at precisely the moment that migrants were facing increased targeting put them at greater risk for violence? Is it lawful or ethical to essentially switch asylum off and on through an app in this manner?
Immigrant rights advocates appear to share these concerns. Human Rights First published a scathing report that called the Biden administration’s new asylum policy a “travesty,” and pointed out the various additional hurdles that asylum seekers face including challenges to using the CBP One app and the additional risk that migrants face while waiting in Mexico. Amnesty International claims that as part of the new, broader asylum policy, CBP One likely violates migrants’ right to seek asylum. Additionally, a new lawsuit by a number of immigrant rights groups, including the ACLU, allege in their complaint that the challenges migrants face when using CBP One frustrate their attempts to lawfully seek asylum. And yet another lawsuit filed by the immigrant rights group Al Otro Lado at the end of July specifically alleges that CBP One created a “turnback” policy that violates the United States’ asylum obligations.
Indeed, the suspension of CBP One appointments in Laredo in June were an important red flag that reinforce immigrant rights groups’ concerns and presents us with a real-time example of these concerns. Thankfully, CBP reopened access to asylum by the end of June—although, once again, no announcement of justification was provided, leaving the public in the dark about what criteria the agency is using to make these decisions. It is entirely possible that CBP had good reason to suspend the use of CBP One. The app may well present the agency with novel security risks. However, without providing justification for this move or another pathway for migrants to seek asylum, this specific example may foreshadow a new era of on-again/off-again access to asylum that is likely to generate ongoing criticism and possibly even more lawsuits.
None of this should be construed to suggest that the U.S. has been unwavering in its commitment to migrants’ rights prior to CBP One. Rather, the mandatory use of an asylum smartphone app has the potential to both accelerate and further invisibilize the life-and-death authority to decide who gets access to migrant protection (and when and where).
It is not all bad news for CBP One. At the end of June, CBP expanded the number of daily CBP One appointments to 1,450, up from 1,000 in early May, a significant increase. The agency also improved how the app functions, both by issuing a series of software updates and by reconfiguring the way that migrants schedule appointments. Instead of a first-come, first-serve basis, migrants have a full day to enter their information into the system, then the backend system slots migrants into available appointments overnight. These improvements are not trivial and the responsiveness within the agency stands out in a positive way. However, as I say in my article on CBP One, when the question of who has access to the fundamental human right of seeking asylum is answered with successive rounds of glitches and software updates, we have, to quote Alison Mountz, “lost the moral compass of what is at stake.”
* Austin Kocher is a Research Assistant Professor with the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University and a Research Fellow at the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University.
The inaugural Changing Aid Conference, hosted by the Changing Aid Signature Research Initiative (SRI) at the School of International Service at American University, brought together scholars and practitioners in the field. The three panels were 1) Aid and Conflict, 2) Aid and Migration, and 3) Careers in Aid. There have been large shifts in who gives, how much, where, and in which manner. As demonstrated in Figure 1, official development assistance (ODA) has been on an upward trend since the 1960s. Although this might seem “positive” for the aid industry and those in need of aid, there is a need to critique this trend as the definition of ODA changes constantly. For example, ODA has expanded to include the money spent within donor countries to host and house refugees where the same amount might not stretch as far due to higher cost of living.
Figure 1. Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$)
Within this context, highlighted by Panel 1, Panel 2 delved into the nexus between aid, especially ODA, humanitarian aid, and migration. The second panel on Aid and Migration was moderated by Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Immigration Lab and the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and a faculty of SRI. Panelists were from diverse backgrounds including academia, funding entities, policy research organizations, and direct service providers (Lauren Carruth, American University; Ian Proctor, Catholic Relief Services; Tazreena Sajjad, American University; Yael Schacher, Refugees International; Daniela Villacres, USAID)[1].
From left to right: Ernesto Castañeda, Lauren Carruth, Ian Proctor, Tazreena Sajjad, Yael Schacher, Daniela Villacres
The panelists focused on the perception and work around aid, development, and migration. To start, Dr. Schacher explained the shift that led to an explicit link between aid and migration: “During the Cold War era, aid was used to win the hearts of people. Now, aid is used to deter migration.” In the earlier days of international aid, it was seen as a way to elevate the view of the global north and to fight against communist ideologies. More and more, however, aid, especially development aid, is considered by donor countries as a way to deter migration from the global south despite evidence showing that development can lead to increased mobility.
Such aid practices based on the belief that aid will deter migration can harm the wellbeing and best-interest of the migrants themselves. Dr. Carruth shared her experience working in the Horn of Africa and brought up the question of the work of many migration and humanitarian aid organizations. In particular, she critiqued the notion of “voluntary return” where migrants fleeing devastating situations through the desert find themselves at help centers or refugee camps coerced to consent to return to where they came from to receive much-needed treatment or food and water. In such a case, aid actors were directly inhibiting the ability of migrants to move even when their lives depended on leaving their place of origin.
Dr. Sajjad also critiqued the basis of aid with regards to deterring migration. Most often aid is seen as something done “over there”, and increasingly, refugee and asylum assistance in the global north is undermined and even externalized as seen in the case of Australia offshoring refugees to the island of Nauru. Mr. Proctor built upon this theme of mobility and said, “What we need is a program, a way for someone to survive and flourish where they want to. If that means the end of the asylum system as we know it, that’s ok.” The panelists reacted to this, emphasizing that the legal figures of the asylum and the refugee cannot provide legal relief to everybody; broader categories and programs of sanctioned migration are needed to include migration due to mixed motives including climate change. But indeed, the goal is to increase protection of people on the move and to save lives.
In closing, Dr. Sajjad asked the audience to consider who is given the right to move. The movement of humanitarian and development aid professionals is seen as acceptable and even necessary while the same right to move is denied to the very people whose lives are supposed to be improved by aid.
* Nancy Kim is a doctoral student in the School of international Service at American University, researcher with Changing Aid and Project Coordinator at the Immigration Lab.
[1] The views expressed during the panel belong to each panelist as individuals and may not reflect the views and/or opinion of the entity where they work.
IMF-World Bank Seminar: Toward a More Integrated Caribbean with panelists OECS’ Didacus Jules, Guyana’s Winston Jordan, Barbados’ Mia Amor Mottley, Jamaica’s Nigel Clarke, and the CDB’s Warren Smith Flickr/Creative Commons License
Initiatives launched by Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley to reschedule the debt of Caribbean countries hit especially hard by climate change and to reform international lender practices are gaining momentum.
In 2021 Mottley called for the suspension of debt and interest payments owed to multilateral financial institutions by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) while they respond to natural disasters exacerbated by climate change. (Half of the 39 UN-recognized SIDS countries are in the Caribbean.) Among the world’s most indebted countries per capita because of their tiny domestic capital markets and low tax bases, SIDS countries cannot pay their debt while also devoting scarce resources to rebuild critical infrastructure.
The government of Barbados also proposed important reforms to the multilateral lending system in preparation for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP 27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, last November. Labeled the “Bridgetown Initiative,” the package included bold proposals:
– Redirecting up to $100 billion in unused IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for SIDS, allowing member governments to exchange their SDRs to borrow from one another’s central bank reserves at very low interest rates in response to an economic crisis.
– Operationalizing a $45 billion IMF-administered Resilience and Sustainability Trust.
– Having multilateral development banks make $1 trillion in multilateral loans at concessional rates to fund climate change adaptation and resiliency in the developing world.
– Leveraging an additional $650 billion held by the IMF to set up a Climate Mitigation Trust that would attract much larger private-sector capital to invest directly in carbon-free energy projects, for example, and avoid governments incurring more debt.
These initiatives are starting to have an impact. The Inter-American Development Bank has announced plans to include a “hurricane clause” in its loan agreements with Central American and Caribbean member states, deferring principal payments for up to two years. Advocates hope the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and others take steps as well. They also want commercial banks and other private lenders – which hold much of the SIDS’ foreign debt – to adopt payment suspension clauses.
International political support is growing for the proposed lending flexibility. Key elements have been endorsed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who has prioritized discussion on them at the June 22‑23 Summit on a New Global Financing Pact in Paris. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva and U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry have also expressed their approval. The World Bank Group launched an Evolution Roadmap in January to better address cross-border challenges such as climate change that affect its ability to promote economic growth, poverty reduction, and human development. An internal Bank committee completed an initial report on proposed reforms in time for the World Bank Group’s meeting in Washington in mid-April.
The SIDS nations have contributed least to the climate crisis but are most impacted by more frequent and ferocious hurricanes and typhoons, rising sea levels, unpredictable rainfall, and increasingly acidic oceans that wipe out critical food resources. In the Caribbean, the vital tourism industry is also suffering as piles of rotting sargassum seaweed, which is driven in part by climate change, arrive on its beaches.
An important reason the Barbadian proposals for reforming the global financial architecture may succeed is that they are not pleas for no-strings-attached compensation or reparations. Instead, they are focused on making the existing multilateral lending system more flexible to better meet the needs of governments to respond to the climate crisis and create incentives for increased private-sector investment – which will improve the countries’ ability to pay their existing debts. In contrast, an additional recommendation put forward by Barbados and other developing countries at COP 27 to tax fossil fuel companies based on their carbon emissions or impose an international carbon border tax to fund so-called “loss and damage” grants for climate vulnerable developing nations has yet to get more traction.
* Thomas Andrew O’Keefe is the President of Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd. and currently serves as Chief of Party of the Caribbean Business Enabling Environment Reform (CBEE‑R) project based in Barbados.
La Moneda (Presidential Palace), Constitution Plaza in Santiago, Chile / Dennis Jarvis / Flickr / Creative Commons License
Chilean voters on May 7 handed right-wing parties a massive victory in the elections for the second Constitutional Convention– reaffirming popular rejection of the first draft and showing frustration with the sagging economy and soaring crime rates – but the extreme-right Republicans will have to deliver a balanced Constitution that reflects the country’s democratic values or get the boot in the referendum on it in December.
The Republicans and several more moderate right-wing parties won three-fifths of the seats in the country’s second Constitutional Convention – in stark contrast with the previous convention’s wide range of socialists, leftists, indigenous leaders, environmentalists, and former social activists. The election outcome was in tune with last year’s referendum, when 62 percent of the electorate rejected the previous convention’s draft Constitution.
The electorate’s sharp U-turn suggests a rejection of the former convention and current administration of President Gabriel Boric more than an embrace of the Republicans, some of whom are conspiracy theorists, far right extremists, and loners. Conservative Luis Silva, the most-voted candidate in the country, has caused outrage by stating his “admiration” for dictator Augusto Pinochet (whom he called “a statesman”), and he has adamantly proclaimed that issues like abortion, gay marriage, and migration are simply off the table and should be expressly banned in the draft Constitutional. Mr. Silva is a numerary of the Opus Dei. Press reports also allege that many candidates were nominated to fill vacated lists with no hope of winning. Some newly elected Republicans are unfit for office; one resigned his seat due to an indictment (still in trial) for domestic violence.
Most voters who cast their ballot for the Republicans, however, are not extremists. Indeed, party leader José Antonio Kast – who placed second in the 2021 presidential election (with 44 percent of the second-round vote) – is not an extreme right-wing supremacist or anything closely related as some of his opponents have alleged. Indeed, polls show a correlation of voters’ discontent with the Boric administration and support for Kast. According to Decide Chile pollster Cristóbal Huneeus, 16 out of the 35 percent of the votes the Republicans received were “circumstantial” and from persons who usually vote for the left.
The outcome has created the appearance that voters have swung to the other extreme of the political spectrum, but people are not against liberal values like marriage equality, women’s rights, or LGBTQIA+ rights. According to Bicentennial Polls by the Pontifical Catholic University, less than half of Chileans regard themselves as Catholics.
The main lesson of the election is that voters are annoyed with the patronizing attitudes from some quarters of the liberal elites, who went too far and too quickly to the left in the first draft of the new Constitution while the economy could not recover its pre-2019 levels. Most of the population is still trying to fulfill basic needs like housing, jobs, lowering crime rates, and dealing with an impoverished economy after the pandemic and uncontrolled immigration.
On the new Constitution, the message of the population is a wish for one that stands on the idea of order and economic freedom as the most precious assets without rejecting individual freedoms – a position that some Republicans are unable to accept, as they want to go all the way to extreme conservative positions. Kast gained enormous credit from this election, and he’s hoping to take power in two years in the general election. As poised as the Republicans appear, however, reality can change anytime. A lack of moderation, including expressions of admiration for Pinochet, can lead to their defeat when the new draft is put to a referendum in December.
The defeat of the leftist coalition is a major setback for President Boric. His coalition, in power for over a year, had hoped to use the previous draft Constitution to enact several progressive reforms. Now they are stuck in a process that does not belong to them anymore. Even if the new draft is more conservative than middle Chile wants and is rejected December – near the halfway mark of term – Boric will have difficulty regaining the momentum to get his presidency off the launchpad.
* Jaime Baeza Freer is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chile.
North American leaders, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Justin Trudeau and Joe Biden, met in Mexico for the 10th North American Leaders’ Summit /Eneas De Troya /Flickr/ Creative Commons License
President Joe Biden conducted his first trip to Mexico in the context of the North American Leaders’ Summit on January 10, 2023. These summits started with George W. Bush in 2005 and did not take place at all while Trump was President. The 2021 and 2023 meetings signal a return to thinking of and valuing the North American region as such. The discussions were best when they decoupled local political considerations, common challenges, and regional opportunities. Three points toward integration are described here.
President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) discussed the advantages of further integrating supply chains within the region. Labor costs in China have gone up, and the pandemic showed that relying on long-distance shipping can delay things during crises, epidemics, and international disputes. There was a push for nearshoring, meaning having an increasing proportion of essential and high-value products manufactured in Canada, Mexico, and Central America rather than Asia. Concrete efforts were mentioned to increase manufacturing in the region within the context of the regional trade agreement USMCA, which includes regulations, respects local preferences, and supports specific sectors and products. Thus, during the summit, Biden and Trudeau were able to look past Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s protection of PEMEX, Mexico’s oil company, and specific controversies about car manufacturing. Furthermore, Biden, Trudeau, and López Obrador discussed the desire for further integration beyond trade. The Mexican President mentioned in his closing speech that Mexico will be represented in planned regional integration meetings by Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, Finance Minister of Mexico Rogelio Ramírez de la O, Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro Sánchez, and independent businessman who represents the business community, Alfonso Romo Garza. During the meetings, Prime Minister Trudeau was accompanied by his wife, Sophie Gregoire Trudeau, Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly, Minister of International Trade Mary Ng, and the Minister of Public Safety Marco Mendicino. President Biden was accompanied by the First Lady Dr. Jill Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ken Salazar, U.S. Ambassador to Canada David Cohen, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodd, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez. The size and high profile of the entourage show the seriousness of these talks and the intentions to communicate further and coordinate around shared challenges and regional integration.
The three leaders emphasized that migration is a regional process requiring a regional approach. Biden and Trudeau recognized their history and reality as countries of immigration. Canada emphasized its desire to welcome new people to keep growing its population and economy. Biden recognized the history of the United States as a country built largely by immigrants. The Mexican President missed an opportunity to acknowledge that in the last hundred years, a substantial number of people moved to Mexico from places like Spain, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Lebanon, Guatemala, and the United States. There were mentions about the need for Mexico to become the place where some of the people from the hemisphere should receive asylum and be allowed to settle legally long-term. The three heads of government also stressed a safe, humane, and legal entry for migrants through more legal pathways and shared responsibility as advocated for in the Los Angeles Declaration. Additionally, Biden announced the monthly legal entry of 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela with appropriate sponsors, background checks, and airplane flights. Generally, they recognized that the people who emigrate do it as an option of last resort. They expressed the humanitarian need to help create ways to migrate more safely than is currently possible for many.
Prime Minister Trudeau and Presidents López Obrador and Biden committed to collaborating on climate change and promoting racial equity, diversity, and inclusion, including collaborating with marginalized populations to fight violence against Native women and girls and expand the protection of LGBTQI+ people. Regarding climate change, the three nations promised to reduce methane emissions by 15% by the end of 2030, develop a plan to cut food loss and waste in half by 2030, and create trilateral infrastructure for EV chargers. The three leaders also spoke about their support for democratic practice and condemned the events on January 8 in Brazil. Biden and Trudeau spoke about how a feature and strength of their democracies is their diversity. Overall, most of the meetings were about strengthening ties and facing shared challenges pragmatically and collectively. The demeanor was friendly, forward-looking, and about partnership. As Justin Trudeau said, “We are stronger together.”
Where are we two and a half months later, when Biden visited Canada?
Biden spoke about the interconnectedness of the U.S. and Canadian economies, sports leagues, and people. Saying that “the U.S. and Canada share one heart.” Both spoke about green jobs and more regional manufacturing with unionized jobs.
Nevertheless, the attention was focused on asylum seekers. President Biden referred to the Los Angeles Declaration and the importance of helping migrants as a region. Canada announced the orderly welcoming of 15,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. However, the discussion about the official announcement underlines “irregular migration” while mainly talking about people seeking prompt and secure asylum. Cable media commentary often referred to an agreement to address “illegal arrivals” to Canada by people asking for asylum. Nonetheless, asking for asylum is a right that people have under U.S., Canadian, and international law. The issue is that some have arrived away from official ports of entry and then approached authorities to announce themselves and exercise their right to ask for asylum proactively. Under the new agreement, Canada can send migrants back to the United States if they have not applied for asylum in-country first and vice versa. This agreement further weakens the right to asylum in North America and criminalizes those seeking it. The often-mentioned record numbers are probably inaccurate regarding legal and undocumented migrants as a proportion of the population. Still, an increasing number of asylum seekers from Ukraine, Afghanistan, Haiti, Cuba, and the Americas are arriving at land borders. The announcement of this agreement with so much fanfare constitutes a narrowing of asylum avenues and conceding to the Canadian opposition’s framing of immigrants and asylum seekers as “burdens.” It contradicts the speeches of Biden and Trudeau at the North American Leaders Summit in Mexico City on January 10 and Biden’s speech at the Canadian parliament, which recognized the many contributions immigrants make and have made to both countries.
President Biden noted the continued interest of the U.S. and Canada in supporting democracy in the Western Hemisphere.
In the meantime, the Mexican President did not appreciate messages of alarm from the north about the proposed changes to the independent Mexican electoral agency (INE) and other signs of de-democratization. In turn, AMLO spoke about the possible criminal charges against Trump being politically motivated. He also wrongly stated that Mexico is safer than the U.S. after the killing and disappearances of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents in Mexico.
Therefore, a few months after the North American Leaders Summit, we see how some leaders are more concerned with national politics, popularity polls, and elections than working with other countries to face common problems. At the same time, working meetings about regional cooperation also serve as a reminder that despite nationalistic and isolationist presidents (like Trump was), civil servants continue working with their counterparts to make sure that regional trade, tourism, migration, consular relations, and educational and cultural exchanges continue.
March 28, 2023
*Ernesto Castañeda is the Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, Immigration Lab, and the MA in Sociology Research & Practice.
Fact-checking and editing by Karen Perez-Torres. Copy-editing by Mackenzie Cox.
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