By Marina Lambrinou

On June 24, 2024, President Biden signed a flurry of executive orders providing renewed hope to the immigrant community and its allies. The highlight of these was providing a pathway, also known as “parole in place” to legalized status for the undocumented spouses and children of U.S. citizens, opening the door for around 500,000 mixed-status families to sponsor their undocumented family members without having to leave the country for a protracted period of time. Additionally, the administration moved to facilitate the work permit acquisition process for DACA recipients and other Dreamers who earned a degree at an accredited higher education institution in the United States and received an offer of employment in their field of study. 

These measures have been promoted as a strategy to “keep families together” amid longstanding policies resulting in migrant family separations. However, even though these developments should be applauded and celebrated, concerns remain for segments of the non-citizen population left out of these status relief granting actions, notably, the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens. 

As mixed-status families composed of undocumented parents and U.S. born children continue to proliferate across the United States, the policy generated dichotomies of citizen/non-citizen and undocumented/documented, which also give rise to binary premised discourses of deservingness, are rendered not only morally bankrupt, but also completely misaligned with the realities of people’s lives. People as young as adolescents and children born in the United States are subjected to the ripple effects of illegality experienced by their parents as a result of non-status. In most U.S. states, undocumented people are banned from driving, accessing Medicaid, CHIP benefits, and other forms of public assistance. Moreover, a multitude of U.S. states block undocumented students from accessing in-state tuition and financial aid at public universities, severely impeding their upward social mobility and ensuring that they remain trapped in low-wage, low-skill, and physically arduous jobs that offer no benefits or health coverage. 

All of these issues do not only impact undocumented individuals themselves; they profoundly affect their families, including U.S. born children who experience these challenges alongside their parents and have to live with the looming fear and trauma of parental loss due to deportation. For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Trump Administration proposed a ruleprohibiting access to public and subsidized housing for mixed-status families. While the rule was subsequently rescinded by the Biden administration, it is an illustration of some of the ways in which federal, state, and local governments routinely discriminate against mixed-status families. Additionally, during the pandemic, which has had more adverse impacts on communities of color and minoritized people, mixed-status families were excluded from federal pandemic stimulus checks designed to provide relief under the Congressional CARES Act. 

Given that mixed-status families will continue to increase, immigrant community activists and policy advocates need to spotlight these families’ experiences and particular challenges to illustrate the arbitrary distinction between citizenship status. Focusing on immigration status to judge the worth of a person is not only morally wrong but also no longer a pragmatic notion. Additionally, these reductionist frameworks give rise to hierarchies. Zeroing in on the distinctions between citizens and the undocumented makes invisible mixed-status households.

Thus, it is paramount that allies to the immigrant community shift the migrant policy discourse to focus more on mixed-status households. Shifting the focus to these families will help combat one-sided discourses praising young people demonstrating high-achieving academic ability while vilifying their parents, siblings, or other members of their communities. Highlighting the existence of mixed-status households demonstrates that young people do not exist in isolation from their parents, siblings, or other family members and that their experiences and challenges are organically interconnected in ways that current policy does not reflect. If rhetorically pro-immigrant politicians and the majority of the American public truly wish for these young people to become integrated into U.S. society as recent polls suggest, then we cannot, as a country, allow for family separation to be the price to pay for segmented integration. We also cannot allow the status quo, where these policies continue to affect a score of children who are U.S. citizens with deported parents.

The first and only time that status relief for the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents was addressed was in 2014 when the Obama administration designed the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents Act (DAPA) policy, a policy that was fought by the courts and buried by the Trump administration. If we are to truly uphold this administration’s promise to keep families together, then we need to do more, and we need to do better for immigrant families. A DAPA-type policy would extend the kinds of protections afforded under President Biden’s recent executive order to many more immigrant families and further shield immigrant communities from deportation and secure their future so that they can keep contributing to American society.

Marina Lambrinou, Ph.D. 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Center for Equity, Leadership, and Social Justice in Education (CELSJE)
School of Education 
Loyola University Maryland

mlambrinou@loyola.edu
Twitter/X | LinkedIn

By Ernesto Castañeda

The Executive Order announced on June 18, 2024, is another action taken due to Congress’s lack of legislative action. Several proposals were on the table, but Republicans did not want to support any bill. The new program is political in the sense that it helps Biden fulfill campaign promises not to separate migrant families and to find ways to regularize people without papers. It is not a universal amnesty, but rather a particular regularization for very established people and part of our communities. It could help up to 500,000 adults and 50,000 children.

These new measures also help several DACA recipients who are married to U.S. citizens. Part of the measures announced concern the individuals known as “dreamers,” minors who arrive to the U.S. undocumented. It would even make it easier for some who could not apply for the DACA program to obtain a work permit if they have higher education, and it would finally open a path to citizenship after holding a green card for some years. Twelve years ago, President Obama launched the DACA program to protect these young people from deportation. The DACA program has been a great success and is quite popular with the American population. With these measures, the Biden-Harris administration marks a clear contrast with their electoral rival, Donald Trump, who has promised mass deportations if he becomes president again.

Trump’s base is quite anti-immigrant, but not Biden’s base, nor are most independent voters who will be key to winning the election in November. The Latino vote is also key. Latinos, especially Mexican and Central Americans would mostly benefit from these programs. In addition, people from Asia, Africa, Canada, and Europe, as well as their citizen families, will benefit from the measure. To clarify, the direct beneficiaries will NOT be able to vote this November, but their family members, employers, customers, and neighbors will. As anti-immigrant as Biden has become (e.g., numerical limits on asylum applications between ports of entry at the border), he will not take away Trump’s hard vote. This is a better route. The Immigration Lab’s analysis of elections since 2018 shows that being anti-immigrant does not help win elections in competitive elections and swing states.

The Executive Order on numerical caps to asylum-seeking in between ports of entry establishes a negative practical precedent where a President tries to unilaterally limit the asylum-seeking process in a situation not related to public health concerns (as was the supposed rationale for the use of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic). It gives tacit bipartisan support to Trump’s campaign threat of completely ending asylum in the U.S. if elected. This executive order does not help the Biden-Harris campaign to differentiate itself from Trump on migration. Agreeing with MAGA Republicans about border arrivals being a top issue helps Republican candidates––not Democrats. It also alienates voters with undocumented family members and those who are sympathetic to those in need of asylum because they are escaping war, armed conflict, or religious or political persecution. The Executive Order on spouses and Dreamers does the opposite because it positively connects the government with many members of society.

The Border Executive Order will affect future asylum-seekers including those who are already on their way to the U.S. southern border. The public tends to equate asylum seekers arriving between ports of entry at the wall or river with people trying to enter undetected. Asylum seekers look for Border Patrol and other officials to be processed and start their legal process to request asylum. The government, therefore, knows who they are and where they are located. Some of them will be allowed in, others will be returned quickly or later deported to their countries, or asked to leave if they are refused asylum. Hopefully, they can find safety in Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, or other countries in the region. 

Some pundits argued that this move on limiting asylum would silence the criticisms that Biden was ‘weak’ on border security. The executive action limiting asylum-seekers was supposed to convince independent and conservative voters to vote for Biden. However, those criticisms have not ended––nor will they partly because they are political and not based on facts. Even if some conservative voters in, Montana, for example, were happy with this partial ‘border closure,’ they would probably disagree with Biden on contraception and reproductive health, taxes for billionaires, climate change, etc. Most people are not single-issue voters. Their values and position on the ‘culture wars’ framed by Republicans and the media tend to cluster into particular groups. Independents are unlikely to vote solely on perceptions about border security. Many of the people who are worried about immigration are worried about a hypothetical fear around the great replacement conspiracy theory. They may be worried about demographic changes in the short term, forgetting that immigrants in the past became integrated into the U.S. majority culture; they are doing so now and will continue in the future. The main issues on the ballot are about policy and protecting democratic institutions, not the less than 3.3 percent of residents in the country who are currently undocumented. 

Ernesto Castañeda is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, the Immigration Lab, and the Masters in Sociology, Research, and Practice at American University in Washington, D.C. 

This piece can be reproduced completely or partially with proper attribution to its author.

Climate Change Threatens Indigenous Communities in Panama and Mexico

Forest fire photo by Bertknot.

March 7, 2024

By Valeria Chacon

Climate change is adversely contributing to humanitarian emergencies such as heatwaves, wildfires, floods, tropical storms, and hurricanes. Unfortunately, these crises are only increasing in frequency and magnitude. For example, Indigenous communities in Panama and Mexico find themselves displaced from their ancestral lands as climate change intensifies.

Gardi Sugdub is an island situated off the coast of Panama, home to over 1,453 Guna people. It is vulnerable to rising sea levels. Life on this tiny, crowded island becomes increasingly challenging as residents experience frequent floods and storms, impacting crucial aspects of their everyday living such as housing, water, health, and education. Naila, who lives on Gardi Subdug,  describes the deteriorating conditions of her school due to flooding. The walls of her school display extensive water damage, with noticeable cracks and crumbling. These relentless challenges have forced the people of Gardi Sugdub to leave behind their ancestral homeland and onto mainland Panama.

With the support of NGOs and after many years of community-led advocacy, in 2017 the Panamanian government made the decision to construct new homes for the Gardi Sugdub community in mainland Panama. There’s just one problem: the people of Gardi Sugdub have yet to receive the keys to their new homes. As of now, no one has moved into the new relocation site. The construction timeline has been delayed three times, with the original completion date set for September 25, 2023, and then pushed back to February 29, 2023. The latest update posted on March 3, 2024, states that the construction is in its final stages, but there is doubt regarding when the new relocation site will be complete.

Much like the people of Gardi Sugdub, the indigenous people of Oaxaca, Mexico are grappling with the devastating effects of climate change as wildfires engulf acres of their ancestral land. The wildfire, which started burning on February 26, 2024, quickly spread throughout the region. Despite early warnings, the government’s response was slow, exacerbating the crisis. Emergency assistance was only dispatched after casualties were reported, two days after the initial notice. The fire has tragically claimed the lives of five individuals so far, with many more displaced.

Hindered by dry conditions and limited water resources, efforts to contain the fire remain challenging. It is reported that in 2024 alone, Oaxaca has witnessed 35 forest fires, impacting over 1,500 acres of ancestral land. Adding to the devastation, Mexican officials announced on March 4, 2024, that areas affected by the wildfires pose a risk for flash floods.

The fires in Oaxaca and floods in Gardi Sugdub reiterate the urgent need for action to address the impacts of climate change on indigenous communities. These communities will continue to face immense challenges that will leave them vulnerable and displaced if their governments continue to turn a blind eye and do not provide adequate support. Governments, NGOs, and communities need to work together to implement proactive measures to address climate change issues by planning the relocation of communities facing serious environmental degradation and prioritizing the safety and well-being of indigenous peoples.

Valeria Chacon is a Research Assistant at the Immigration Lab and studying Justice Law and Criminology at American University

Food Insecurity among Latinx Populations in Washington D.C. 

by Lia Sullivan*

In Washington, D.C., a culturally diverse and celebrated city, a less-discussed reality exists for minority populations. Food insecurity is at the forefront of issues for many minority communities in D.C. It is imperative to understand the unique needs and cultural characteristics of a group to ensure food insecurity issues are addressed efficiently.  

Many supplemental government assistance programs created during the COVID-19 pandemic were shut down with little warning to benefit recipients. Because of this, there was a surge in food insecurity in the district, especially amongst Hispanic and other minority populations. The economic fallout of the pandemic extended beyond food assistance programs, with the loss of full-time jobs and work hours shortened.  

The USDA defines food insecurity as “a lack of consistent access to enough food for an active, healthy lifestyle.” Extensive research by the Capital Area Food Bank revealed that 32% of metropolitan area residents experienced food insecurity between 2022 and 2023, with 27% identifying as Hispanic. These statistics compare to only 18% of food insecure residents identifying as White. Numerous factors contribute to this disparity, including cultural and language barriers and lack of access to cultural foods. 

Programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and WIC (Women, Infants & Children) exist to alleviate grocery costs for low-income families by providing monthly stipends for certain grocery items. However, these programs often exclude traditional foods and staples. Broadening the benefits for SNAP and WIC would allow for already acculturating Latinx community members to keep a piece of their home within them.  

Community organizations and city-wide initiatives play a large role in battling food insecurity for all populations. Organizations such as D.C. Hunger Solutions, Martha’s Table, DCGreens, and more exist to combat the effects of food insecurity through educational programs, outreach events, and expanding food access. However, these programs and educational materials are often offered solely in English, excluding many affected populations. Offering Spanish and other non-English options for programs, hotlines, and flyers is imperative to assisting minorities.  

To effectively address and combat food insecurity, policy changes are needed to ensure equal access to food for all. In 2020, the USDA reported that 3,600 of 3,700 WIC-eligible Hispanic/Latino reporting DC residents were enrolled in the program. This data shows how integral the program is for food-insecure Hispanic groups. On January 3rd, 2024, Mayor Muriel Bowser announced plans to expand SNAP benefits for D.C. residents, passing the Give Snap a Raise Amendment Act. This $40 million expansion will allow recipients to receive an extra 10% of monthly benefits from February 17th through the end of September 2024.  

Access to plentiful and nutritious food is a fundamental human right, and approaching it requires a multifaceted approach. Washington’s residents, including minority populations, should not have to worry where their next meal will be coming from. Through involvement from community members, culturally aware programs, and effective policy, we can make significant progress in ensuring everyone has access to the food they need to learn, grow, and thrive. 

*Lia Sullivan is a student in the Sociology, Research, and Practice MA program at American University in Washington, DC. She works for a non-profit working on food insecurity issues.

by Esteban Caballero*

As Paraguay prepares for general elections next year, the opposition is running on a platform condemning the corruption of the incumbent Colorado Party, but candidates so far have not articulated credible policies to weed out what is a deeply systemic problem.

• President Mario Abdo Benítez, whose five-year mandate (with no possibility of reelection per the Constitution of 1992) ends next August, has faced several challenges. His Colorado Party has had to manage the COVID pandemic and a series of climatic and economic headwinds that impeded the performance of the agro-exporting sector, the backbone of Paraguay’s economy. Although the country’s fiscal health is better than others in the region, public debt has risen, and pension subsidies have taken resources away from meaningful public investment projects.
• In July and August, the United States designated former President Horacio Cartes and Vice President Hugo Velázquez – also from the Colorado Party – as “significantly corrupt.” The news sent shockwaves through the body politic and fueled nationwide angst about corruption and, more seriously, the ability of organized crime to permeate government institutions.

Combatting corruption and organized crime has become the central theme of the opposition’s efforts to contest the governing party’s hold on power in the April 2023 elections for president and vice president, deputies, senators, and departmental governors and councilors. Preparing for primaries on December 18, a group of opposition leaders has created a coalition called Concertación Nacional 2023. Early polls indicate that Efraín Alegre from the Liberal Radical Authentic Party will win the primary. He shares the ticket with Soledad Núñez, an independent candidate for vice president.

• The opposition says that giving the boot to the Colorado Party and rebuilding government institutions will solve the problem. Still, analysis of the more prominent opposition leaders’ discourse signals the need to generate more substantive, programmatic proposals to counter corruption and narco threats. Whether this weakness is because they have no policy think tanks or an indicator of disregard for the policy debate in Paraguayan politics remains to be seen. In any case, the opposition appears poorly prepared to deal with the problems.
• The challenge is that the country faces two intertwined phenomena – the more traditional corruption linked to government procurement and personnel recruitment and the growing threat of sliding toward being a “narco-state.” Washington’s allegation against former President Cartes is that he “obstructed a major international investigation into transnational crime to protect himself and his criminal associate.” Narcos have killed several well-known local politicians. When model and influencer Cristina Aranda died in an accident in a shoot-out, it shocked public opinion. Nonetheless, the opposition is having difficulty harnessing that revulsion and delineating policies to stop Paraguay’s various forms of corruption.

The opposition’s promise to strengthen government institutions, preserve the rule of law, increase the proper functioning of the police, and reform the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary are laudable goals that will win support among its base and some fence-sitters. Undoubtedly, the Colorado Party is the party most at fault when it comes to condoning corruption and opening the gates to organized crime’s influence. Nevertheless, the opposition cannot only run on a negative campaign, and should ask itself how credible its discourse can be without specifics, especially if it comes from professional politicians who belong to parties, such as the Liberal Radical Authentic Party, that have also had corrupt elements among them when in office.

• Polls and media reports show that a significant contingent of the electorate continues to support the Colorado Party even if they agree on the need to stop corruption and organized crime. The opposition’s messaging in that context has to draw a fine line between holding the Colorado Party accountable and avoiding broad sweeps that may alienate many of those potential voters and that risks pushing them to consider change as a menace more than a form of deliverance.

* Esteban Caballero is a columnist and political analyst. He is the academic coordinator of the FLACSO Program in Paraguay and former regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the UN Fund for Population.

By Scott Freeman*

Though Haiti’s security, economic, and political crises have thrust the country into the most dire situation in recent memory, the Prime Minister’s call for foreign military intervention, if the UN complies, will continue a cycle of failed international meddling. The UN is discussing proposals backed by the United States and Mexico that would impose financial sanctions and an arms embargo on criminal actors in Haiti and authorize “a non-UN international security assistance mission to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of desperately needed humanitarian aid.” The mission would be led by an unspecified “partner country” with experience in Haiti.

Prime Minister Ariel Henry, serving as head of government with international support since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, pleaded for assistance amid a precipitous rise in gang power in Haiti and unwavering calls for his resignation.

• Gangs control much of the country, in particular Port-au-Prince, and affect everything from the safety of children attending school to the movement of food. Several weeks ago, they seized the terminal where fuel enters the country, paralyzing transportation, the functioning of hospitals, and other essential services. Working towards both political and criminal ends, gangs came to power as political tools, used notably by the ruling PHTK party to squash opposition. Now they operate throughout the country. Human rights groups estimate that 90 gangs operate in the capital and have killed hundreds of citizens and terrified tens of thousands of others. UN specialized agencies reported last week that 4.7 million Haitians (about 40 percent of the national population) face acute hunger, including 19,000 who are in “Phase Five” famine conditions for the first time.

However, Henry’s call for an international security presence is deeply problematic.

• Named Prime Minister two days before Moïse’s assassination, Henry lacks a popular and constitutional mandate. Moïse blocked elections for mayors and national legislators and gutted the judiciary, consolidating power in his own hands. Henry is now the de facto leader of a country void of democratic checks and balances. During his year in power, Henry has done almost nothing to address the issue of gang violence. Protests have been occurring in the street regularly calling for his departure. The peyi lok (country lockdown) protests that started in late September ramped up in response to Henry’s removal of fuel subsidies – levying essentially a regressive tax perceived by Haitians across the country as a direct assault on the poor.
• Despite consistent and popular calls for his removal, the United States, Canada, and other countries’ support for Henry and the PHTK has endured, choosing “stability” over calls for a transitional government and democratic elections. Washington has largely ignored the Montana Accord, the product of a broad coalition of some 70 civil society actors across religious and political divides who proposed two years of coalition government followed by free and fair elections. In Washington, support for Henry has been challenged by 13 members of the Democratic Party in the Senate and House who wrote a letter to President Biden that points out Henry’s disinterest in democracy and stability, and urged the Administration to change its strategy, heed the Montana Accord, and move away from support for Henry.

Protesters have forcefully rejected Henry’s call – bolstered by UN Secretary-General Guterres – for a foreign security force “to stand with us and help us fight this humanitarian crisis.” The request has met stiff resistance in Haiti by groups that portray it as a blatant effort to keep himself and the PHTK in power. Others call the invitation to foreign troops treason and argue a foreign force would repeat the mistakes of the previous UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH, 2004‑17), which introduced cholera into the country, committed widespread acts of sexual assault and violence, and was widely seen as an occupier. A statue in southwest Haiti, for example, was erected to depict Haiti’s triumph over both cholera and the UN force.

• The strong rejection of this option from civil society groups like the Montana Accord and advocacy groups like Nou Pap Domi (We Won’t Sleep) bodes poorly for international actors that might think that yet another military deployment in Haiti would lead to a different result than the past catastrophic operations. As long as the “core group” of the international community keeps its thumb on the scale and gives free reign to leaders like Henry and predecessors who lack democratic legitimacy, democratic change will not occur. Truly breaking the cycle of interventions and the longstanding support of kleptocratic regimes would mean supporting the work of groups like the Montana Accord – which the United States and others have rejected. Henry’s request for a foreign military presence is therefore not a solution, but instead sows the seeds of another set of problems.

* Scott Freeman is an anthropologist and professor in the School of International Service.

By Eric Hershberg*

The results of the June 19 presidential election in Colombia will surely fuel claims about a putative shift to the left in Latin American politics, but as with the so-called “pink tide” that reached a crest during the 2000s, that is probably not the most significant takeaway from the triumphs of Gustavo Petro and other left-leaning candidates in Latin America. To be sure, over the course of the past year and a half the pandemic-plagued region has witnessed left victories at the polls in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, and now Colombia. But dig deeper and there’s much more to be said.

Scholars, journalists, and pundits are always inclined to think of political trends in Left-Right terms, reflecting the competing political options in Latin America over the past 30 years as elsewhere. When “neo-liberal” governments promoted market-oriented reforms in the 1990s, and were frequently re-elected after restoring macro-economic stability to economies buffeted by inflation and debt, it was seen as a rejection of the statist development models associated with the Latin American left and of “populism.” When the “pink tide” governments abandoned some neoliberal tenets and opted toward more redistributive policies in the 2000s, the notion was that the pendulum had swung in the opposite direction, and when inequality diminished modestly amidst a commodity boom, a number of presidents secured re-election. Then, briefly, one heard that a new phase carrying to office leaders such as Macri, Lacalle, Bolsonaro, Duque, Moreno/Lasso, Bukele, and others signaled the triumph of conservatism in the region.

These conclusions ignore, however, that Latin American public opinion has overall been remarkably stable on citizen self-placement along the left‑right divide, with only a modest, and non-linear, shift toward the left. More significantly, the driving logic of Latin American politics since the advance of democracy in the 1980s has been to punish leaders who have presided over a decline in wellbeing, and to reward presidents who are perceived to have delivered material or symbolic rewards to large segments of the population.

• That is what drove re-elections of leaders who a) conquered inflation during the 1990s (Cardoso, Menem, Fujimori), or b) increased incomes during the commodity boom of the early 21st century, including the Workers’ Party in Brazil, the Kirchners in Argentina, Chávez in Venezuela, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, Correa in Ecuador, and Morales in Bolivia. The dynamic has undercut both sides. Neoliberals suffered in the late ‘90s and early 2000s, but “pink tide” governments lost power a few years ago where economic stagnation combined with growing popular disgust at corruption. Countries such as Chile and Colombia were swept by protests prior to the pandemic, and alienation from those in power intensified with the impacts of the pandemic.
• Leaders and governments typically categorized as “left” are by no means a monolith. Max Cameron and I argued 15 years ago the “pink tide” was a series of “Left Turns,” plural. Chavismo shared little with Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, and the Bachelet governments in a highly institutionalized political system such as Chile’s were never plausibly going to resemble those of Rafael Correa in institutionally hollowed-out Ecuador. Today, the Castillo administration emerges from a fractured party system that makes Peruvian politics extraordinarily different than those of Argentina or Brazil, with their enduring Peronist and Workers’ Party institutions.

In the era of Trump and Bolsonaro, when many political actors across the ideological spectrum are running roughshod over basic norms of democratic governance, it is hugely important that failed rightwing candidates in Honduras, Chile, and Colombia have promptly recognized the victories of Xiomara Castro, Gabriel Boric, and now Gustavo Petro. It is encouraging to see instances where electoral counts were clean and even the most unlikely democrats behaved in ways consistent with democratic rule. This opens space for guarded optimism regarding prospects for Brazil, which is holding elections in November, and even conceivably could bolster the cause of electoral democracy in the United States two years later.

• In Honduras, Chile and Colombia, the margins were not as close as anticipated, in part because of high turnout (particularly among increasingly mobilized youth, who do seem often to tilt toward the left) and because of painstaking efforts by social justice advocates to mobilize their constituencies politically. Pressures from Latin America’s left, which borrowing political theorist Benjamin Arditti’s account can be understood to represent those sectors of the polity that aim to advance the ideals of the French Revolution –drove important cycles of political protest before the pandemic hit and were sustained over the course of the electoral campaigns of the past year. That poses both opportunities and a real challenge for governments in places like Honduras, Chile, and Colombia, which though vastly different in all sorts of ways find themselves with newly elected progressive leaders having to govern amidst tough economic times and restive populations.

June 21, 2022

*Eric Hershberg is Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and Professor of Government at American University.