From Lima to Paris … and Beyond

By Evan Berry*


Photo Credit: Ron Mader / Flickr / Creative Commons

The “COP 21” Climate Conference beginning in Paris this week appears likely to produce meaningful results yet fall short of policymakers and civil society leaders’ high hopes for an international accord.  Strong action on climate change is of particular significance in Latin America – because of its environmental vulnerability and the key role it plays in helping establish a post-carbon global economy.  The coastal communities of the greater Caribbean Basin, the intensely biodiverse forests of the Amazonian region, and the glaciated peaks of the Andes are acutely threatened by climate change.  Concern about climate change is higher in Latin America than in any other region of the world, according to the Pew Research Center.  Several nations from the region have played key roles in putting the international community on a path toward a substantive agreement at COP 21, especially Peru, host of last year’s UN climate talks.

The negotiations in Paris are designed to develop an architecture for international cooperation on carbon mitigation and climate adaption that, while essentially voluntary, will catalyze bolder action in the future.  In anticipation that COP 21 will conclude an agreement signed by all the negotiating parties, the international community finds itself again trying to strike the right balance between critical pressure for stronger action and acceptance of an imperfect, but necessary, policy apparatus.  Although observers expect that more mitigation will be necessary, Paris will provide several powerful tools for states afflicted by climate change.  Most especially, through the vehicle of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), financing for large-scale adaptation projects is now starting to flow.  Because the mandates of the GCF prioritize low-carbon agriculture, climate-compatible cities, resilience in Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and financing for forests, the fund will have a special impact in Latin America, one of the world’s most urbanized and forested regions and home to more than 20 SIDS.  Indeed, the first round of CGF projects, announced this month, includes two in Latin America – an energy efficiency bond in eastern Mexico and an indigenous people’s forest management project in Peru.

While there is room to be optimistic that these talks will make important progress, many probably will be dissatisfied with the outcome.  According to independent evaluations, several Latin American countries have put forward robust plans to limit carbon emissions, including Costa Rica, Mexico, and Brazil.  But many stakeholders, particularly environmental NGOs and leftist governments like Bolivia and Ecuador, are likely to be skeptical about the outcome of the negotiations.  They will be right to point out that the sum total of emissions reductions being discussed at COP 21 is insufficient to keep warming below the consensus 2°C limit, and that the anticipated deal is almost certain not to be legally binding and may also have weak measures for verification.  The “Road to Paris” may not take interested countries as far as they’d like to go, but in Latin America as elsewhere, critics might be well advised temper their skepticism, embrace the incremental progress, and begin preparing for the next round of climate change politics. 

November 30, 2015

* Evan Berry is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion and Co-Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Global Affairs master’s program at American University.

El Salvador: Just Saying No to Gold Mining

By Rachel Nadelman*

El Salvador mining

Photo Credit: laura / Flickr / Creative Commons

El Salvador’s refusal to allow gold mining within its borders sets it apart from most other Latin American countries, but the mining suspension is far from permanent.  Since 2007, three successive presidents, from both the right-wing ARENA and left-wing FMLN parties, have maintained an administrative metals mining “industry freeze.”  This executive action has created a de-facto moratorium that prevents all mining firms – international and Salvadoran, public and private – from accessing El Salvador’s estimated 1.4 million ounces of gold deposits.  Some in the Salvadoran media trumpet this policy.  When former U.S. President Bill Clinton made a philanthropic visit to El Salvador earlier this month, a number of news stories fixated on one of his travel companions: Canadian mining magnate Frank Guistra.  Some media slammed Guistra as “persona non grata in El Salvador.”  They showcased his billion-dollar global mining investments, labeling him (incorrectly) a major shareholder in Oceana Gold, the Australian company suing El Salvador for $284 million for having denied the firm a license to mine.

The mining freeze represents a drastic break from El Salvador’s past economic strategy.  In the 1990s, after the civil war, El Salvador, encouraged by international donors and creditors, embraced mining as an opportunity for economic growth.  Environmental activists challenged the policy, emphasizing the country’s ecological vulnerability and worsening threats of water scarcity and deforestation.  Consecutive ARENA governments ignored these arguments and implemented legal and regulatory reforms to attract foreign mining firms.  But a community-based social movement changed that.

  • Led by a decade-old Salvadoran coalition “roundtable” (with some international support) against mining, this movement strategically promoted a campaign that is pro-water rather than anti-industry, based on rigorously collected and analyzed scientific evidence.
  • The Salvadoran Catholic Church, citing doctrine as prioritizing water and land over economic gain, has provided the movement a level of non-partisan, moral legitimacy.
  • Individual government officials from across elected, appointed, and civil servant ranks have ensured that El Salvador’s weak but existent administrative mechanisms resist pressure from powerful multinational business to reverse policy.
  • A number of Salvadoran companies relying on water and land resources, such as agrobusiness, ranchers, and producers of juices and soft drinks, have largely stayed out of the debate, eliminating a potentially huge obstacle to the movement’s agenda.

The media’s zeal – strong enough for them to mistakenly connect Frank Guistra to Oceana Gold and the ongoing lawsuit – reflects strong popular support for the administrative freeze on mining.  My field research and earlier studies indicate that most Salvadorans do not see the environmental threat from mining as imagined.  Nonetheless, the suspension is precarious – based only on executive action and not legislation that would permanently prohibit mining.  Many in the anti-mining movement believe that a suspension is inadequate over the long term because a change in government could lead to its reversal.  New mining technology, which purportedly would ward against environmental damage, could give political leaders a pretext for lifting the moratorium.  Yet others who support the freeze under current environmental conditions want to have the option of opening the country to mining available in the future.  For those who advocate that total prohibition is the only solution, the fight to stop mining permanently for El Salvador will be a long one.

November 23, 2015

* Rachel Nadelman is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the School of International Service, whose dissertation research focuses on the unique aspects of El Salvador’s mining policies.

Correction: November 23, 2015

The original photo accompanying this blog was incorrectly labeled as being from a Salvadoran mining town.  The photo was actually taken in a town named El Salvador, Chile, and is unrelated to the content of this post.

Argentine-U.S. Relations: Things Can Only Get Better

By Federico Merke*

Argentina elections

Argentine presidential candidate Mauricio Macri. Photo Credit: Nico Bovio and Guillermo Viana GCBA / Flickr / Creative Commons

Foreign policy remains largely uncharted territory as Mauricio Macri (Cambiemos) and Daniel Scioli (incumbent Peronist Frente para la Victoria) head into the presidential runoff on November 22, but they both are likely eager to get over Argentina’s rough patch with the United States.  Foreign policy has rarely been a big campaign issue, and this time there are probably reasons behind the silence.  The mainstream Argentine media portray the candidates as representing two different political and economic stances on domestic policies, with only nuanced differences on foreign policy.  Macri is seen as more friendly to the outside world in general and to the U.S. in particular, but he has been reluctant to play up his “anti-Bolivarian” views.  Scioli has the same incentives as Macri to restart a dialogue with Washington, but he has not wanted to highlight this difference between himself and his party’s standard bearer, outgoing President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK).

Argentina’s relations with the U.S. are at a low point in which nothing really good or really bad takes place.

  • The impasse started early in CFK’s administration. Just two days after her inauguration on December 10, 2007, U.S. federal prosecutors claimed that five foreign nationals in the so-called “suitcase scandal” were attempting to deliver funds to CFK’s presidential campaign.  The President maintained that the United States manufactured the scandal to punish her for maintaining close relations with then-President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.
  • Washington was clearly irritated again in 2011 when Argentine authorities seized the cargo of a U.S. Air Force plane that was delivering supplies for an authorized police training program. Argentina’s foreign minister accused the United States of smuggling weapons and “drugs” into the country.  In 2013, CFK reached an agreement with Iran to set up a truth commission (which was never established) to investigate the bombings of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994 – alienating Jews in the U.S. and Argentina, but giving her a boost among her domestic constituency.
  • Terrorism, human rights, and nuclear proliferation have brought the two countries together, albeit with little publicity. But Venezuela, Cuba (the U.S. embargo), trade (tough license and import restrictions on both sides), and Iran have been divisive issues.

Because the twists and turns in the bilateral relationship have revolved around scandals, rhetoric, and domestic political maneuvering – not driven by either deep ideological differences or substantive material interests – CFK’s successor will be free to shift gears.  Thus, in a sense, it does not matter who wins on November 22; a new chapter will begin in Argentina-U.S. relations.  Macri no doubt will be more enthusiastic than Scioli in declaring a new beginning, but the latter exhibits a pragmatic tone and intention to attract investment and promote trade, including by resolving the confrontation over “holdout debt” plaguing ties with the U.S. financial community.  Both candidates are aware that the ongoing litigation in New York complicates access to international credit.  Both also understand that the memorandum with Iran represented a major step backwards and thus will probably change course on this matter.  Scioli and Macri exhibit contrasting styles and might look at the world through different lenses, but they both will have the opportunity – and probably the desire – to develop a more constructive relationship with the U.S. 

November 19, 2015

*Federico Merke directs the Political Science and International Relations Programs at the Universidad de San Andrés in Buenos Aires.

Belize: The UDP Wins Again

By Victor Bulmer-Thomas*

Dean Barrow, now elected for his third term as Prime Minister of Belize. Photo Credit: The Commonwealth / Flickr / Creative Commons

Dean Barrow, now elected for his third term as Prime Minister of Belize. Photo Credit: The Commonwealth / Flickr / Creative Commons

Belize’s national elections on November 4 gave the ruling United Democratic Party (UDP) an unprecedented third term in office.  The opposition People’s United Party (PUP) had expected to return to power, for the first time since 2008, in view of the country’s lackluster economic performance (except for a tourist boom), a wave of corruption scandals, and falling prices for Belize’s leading commodity exports.  A new third party, the Belize Progressive Party, also participated, representing a coalition of smaller parties.  The UDP won an increased majority (19 out of 31 seats, the rest going to the PUP).  Dean Barrow has therefore started his third, and last, term as Prime Minister.

Public spending on infrastructure, education, and health funded by borrowing from Petrocaribe was a key factor in the election.

  • The concessional loans from Venezuela had a major impact on the government’s popularity. The possibility that they may be cut in future was one reason why the Prime Minister called the elections 18 months earlier than necessary.  (This privilege, known as the “Westminster convention,” is no longer available in the United Kingdom, where elections are now subject to fixed terms.)
  • Many voters in Belize have also become accustomed to receiving party support in cash or kind in the last 20 years in return for their votes. The PUP, reliant in the past on cash from Michael Ashcroft (a British billionaire with Belizean citizenship), was strapped for cash this time because Ashcroft reached an agreement on most of his outstanding disputes with the government and no longer had much incentive to support the opposition.
  • The PUP also suffered from a weak – albeit honest – leader in Francis Fonseca, who had performed badly in municipal elections earlier in the year and who had failed to impose discipline on the party. He has now resigned, although he will stay as leader until a new one is elected.  The PUP, the dominant force in Belizean politics since its formation in 1950 and the party that took the country to independence in 1981, is now in danger of disintegrating.

The UDP government faces a number of challenges.  The sugar market in the European Union is being opened to unrestricted competition, which could lower prices further.  Concessional funding from Petrocaribe could be reduced or even ended as the economic situation in Venezuela deteriorates.  And Belize continues to face considerable pressure from the U.S. government both with regard to its offshore financial center and as a result of sanctions against various individuals under the “kingpin” anti-drug legislation.  Last but not least, Belize will have to pay compensation to Michael Ashcroft for nationalization of the telecommunications company at a rate to be determined by arbitration over which the government will have no control.  The biggest threat to Belize, however, comes from Guatemala.  The disputed western frontier is porous and Guatemalan poachers have become bolder in recent years, even panning for gold in the mountains.  Both governments had previously agreed to take their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice, but they must first put it to voters in a referendum – a prospect in which Guatemalan President-elect Jimmy Morales has so far shown no interest.  With a population of only 350,000 (compared with 16 million in Guatemala), the new government of Belize may face an uphill struggle.

November 16, 2015

*Dr. Bulmer-Thomas is a professor at the University College London Institute of the Americas, fellow (and former director) at Chatham House, and author of numerous books, including The Economic History of the Caribbean Since the Napoleonic Wars (2012).

Tax Reform or Governance Revolution?

By Andrew Wainer*

Photo Credit: Reuniones Anuales GBM / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Reuniones Anuales GBM / Flickr / Creative Commons

Taxation to fund development is becoming central to U.S. foreign assistance policy, but it would be a mistake for USAID and other foreign assistance agencies to view tax reform solely through the technical lens of financing for development.  In September, USAID Assistant Administrator Alex Thier penned an article subtitled, “Why Taxes Are Better than Aid.”  This follows the announcement in July of the Addis Tax Initiative at the UN Financing for Development Conference, where the United States and other donors pledged to double the amount of technical assistance for taxation in developing nations.  By most accounts, the potential fiscal benefit of increasing taxation –“domestic resource mobilization” (DRM) in development parlance – is huge.  The World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimate that in 2012 DRM in emerging and developing nations generated a combined $7.7 trillion.  This dwarfs average annual foreign assistance outlays, which in recent years have averaged about $135 billion.  One of many examples cited by USAID is El Salvador, where a $660 million increase in annual tax revenues has been channeled to health, education, and social services, as well as other development programs.

The issues of fair and transparent taxation are often a secondary component in discussions of DRM but – as events in Guatemala and elsewhere demonstrate – can also generate revolutionary transformations in governance.   Even as U.S. agencies emphasize the technical side of DRM assistance, organizations that monitor taxation are sparking historic citizen revolutions through revelations of governmental tax corruption.

  • The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was created in 2006 to strengthen the rule of law through “investigation of crimes committed by members of illegal security forces and clandestine security structures.” But it was CICIG’s revelations of a customs tax corruption network that brought 100,000 Guatemalans into the street in a single day.  The protests led to the forced resignation and jailing of President Pérez Molina as well as a surge in citizen engagement unseen in the country’s modern history.

The intimate link between taxation and governance should be a central factor in how the U.S. government and others think about DRM.  As the OECD states, “The payment of tax and the structure of the tax system can deeply influence the relationship between government and its citizens.”  DRM should place a high premium on the governance impact of tax reform, where appropriate.  Tax reform not only increases government revenues, but as the case of Guatemala demonstrates, it can also strike at the heart of ossified structures of governance and can spark revolutionary changes in the relationship between citizens and states.   

November 12, 2015

* Andrew Wainer is the Director of Policy Research in the Public Policy and Advocacy Department of Save the Children USA.

Venezuelan Elections: Economic Crisis Turns Up the Heat on Chavismo

By Michael M. McCarthy*

A faded legacy. Photo Credit: Julio César Mesa / Flickr / Creative Commons

A faded legacy for Chavismo? Photo Credit: Julio César Mesa / Flickr / Creative Commons

Twenty-four long months since their country’s last national election, Venezuelans head back to the polls to elect a new National Assembly on December 6 in a tense political climate – with no promise that the government will respect the opposition’s near-certain victory.  All 167 seats in the unicameral body will be up for grabs in a race polarized between Chavismo’s pro government coalition and the Mesa de Unidad Democrática opposition coalition.  Thanks largely to a rapidly deteriorating economy, the government’s approval rating decreased from 50 percent in 2013 to 20 percent in September, according to the national Venebarómetro poll.  A range of polls in September indicated the MUD is poised to win either a simple or “qualified” (60 percent) majority.  Observers generally agree that the main measure of success for Chavismo is preventing the MUD from obtaining a two-thirds majority, and that blocking a qualified majority would be a major triumph.

For ordinary Venezuelans the campaign is overshadowed by the massive economic crisis.  Skyrocketing inflation, severe shortages of basic goods and services, and reduced social assistance programs are contributing to tensions on the street, where the campaign is not as present as in years past.  Nevertheless, heavy turnout is still expected – 66 percent of eligible voters participated in the last National Assembly elections in 2010, and pollsters report a strong intention to vote.

  • The MUD has shaped its campaign around leveraging the vote as a mechanism for punishing economic mismanagement and restoring some institutional balance to a political system that barely reflects opposition voices at the national level. Skepticism of the National Electoral Board, which rejected the MUD’s request for international electoral observation by the OAS, EU or UN, has increased.  Slashes to budgetary support for opposition governors and mayors, while the government channels funds to unelected parallel state and municipal authorities, make supporters wonder whether a victory will be fully respected.
  • The government refreshed its slate of candidates by promoting generational and gender diversity, but stalwarts, including current National Assembly leader Diosdado Cabello, remain prominent. The party is distributing last-minute pork to mobilize voters, and it’s working the system’s rural bias – each department is automatically allocated three deputies – where strong government presence gives it a strategic advantage.  Strikingly, the Chávez legacy has become a liability for President Maduro because the former President was much more charismatic and economic conditions were considerably better during his tenure.

The Maduro administration seems to have run out of diversionary moves after exaggerated external threats from Colombia and Guyana faded.  It is also on the defensive after the Rousseff administration, Maduro’s most powerful diplomatic partner, expressed unhappiness about Caracas’s opposition to its choice of a Brazilian political heavyweight to lead UNASUR’s “electoral accompaniment mission.”  The President has also been set on back on his heels by intensified international criticism of the trial and conviction of opposition leader Leopoldo López, who, according to a state attorney who worked the case, was sent to jail for 14 years on fraudulent charges.  Regardless of the outcome on December 6, the direction of the country is highly uncertain.  Maduro has said he’ll accept the results “whatever they are,” but he has also said “we have to win, by whatever means possible” (como sea and cualquier manera), and that if the opposition wins “I will not hand over the revolution” but rather “proceed to govern with the people in a civic-military union.”  In the next couple weeks, the government may still try to throw the opposition off course, but the MUD does not seem interested in renewing street protests – more violence is unlikely to advance its objectives. Neither do its leaders seem confident that a renewal of talks on rebuilding democratic institutions will help.

November 9, 2015

* Michael McCarthy is a Research Fellow with the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies.

Peru’s 2016 Elections: Will Old-timers Retain the Lead?

By Cynthia McClintock*

Photo Credit: A.Davey / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: A.Davey / Flickr / Creative Commons

The big surprise of Peru’s presidential campaign – for elections about four months from now – is that there have been no surprises.  All three frontrunners in the April 10 first round are old-timers, not newcomers or outsiders.  Although Peru’s political parties are among the weakest in Latin America, two of the three lead institutionalized parties.  Further, in a country where the winners since 2001 have been roughly at the center-left of the ideological spectrum, all three of the current leaders are at the right or center-right.

Two main explanations for this emerge:

  • One is that Peruvian voters are reacting against the administration of incumbent Ollanta Humala. A former military officer, Humala burst into Peru’s electoral arena as a fiery leftist outsider in 2006 and won a plurality in the first round but lost the runoff.  For the 2011 election, he moderated his positions considerably and prevailed.  But his political party has remained inchoate and, in part as a result, Humala is now perceived as opportunistic and weak.  Humala has delivered on promises of social inclusion to a degree, but economic growth has stalled – so Peruvians may now be reasoning that it is time to prioritize growth.
  • Probably more likely, however, is that it is yet early in Peru’s presidential campaign. Even as late as three months before elections, Peru’s opinion polls are often very wrong, almost always exaggerating the support for rightist candidates.  In January 1990, Mario Vargas Llosa was leading with 53 percent, compared to 15 percent for his nearest rival, but lost the runoff in a landslide.  Lourdes Flores was leading in January 2006, and Alejandro Toledo in January 2011, but neither even reached the runoff.

The current three front-runners have strengths, but also liabilities.

  • The candidate who has topped the opinion polls for more than a year is Keiko Fujimori. She is the daughter of Alberto Fujimori who, despite conviction on charges of human rights violations and corruption, retains support as the president who presided over the decimation of the Shining Path insurgency.  Her “Fujimorista Party” has a fervent base in both urban and rural areas.  Keiko was the runner-up in Peru’s 2011 election, but she struggled to achieve a balance between respect for her father and distance from his abuses.  She is likely to have the same challenge in 2016.
  • Currently second in the polls with roughly 22 percent is Pedro Pablo Kucznyski. He can take credit for excellent economic growth during the Toledo administration (2001-2006), when he was economics minister and prime minister, and there are no corruption charges against him despite many years in government.  In 2011, he ran an excellent campaign and finished third.  But he will be 77 next year, and he has many U.S. business connections (and until now a U.S. passport), which could hurt him.
  • Running third with about 10 percent is Alan García, the long-standing leader of Peru’s most-institutionalized party, APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance). García is a brilliant campaign strategist, and he can cite superb economic growth during his 2006-2011 presidential term.  However, he is also widely perceived as Peru’s most corrupt political leader.

Surprises are inherently impossible to predict – but not impossible to imagine.  Peru’s left is divided and poorly financed, and its heyday has probably passed, but the candidate nominated a few weeks ago by the Broad Front, Verónika Mendoza, a congresswoman from Cusco and psychologist who studied in France, has the potential to appeal to diverse sectors of Peruvians.  As in many Latin American countries, corruption scandals are at the forefront in Peru, and a candidate who has participated in successful anti-corruption efforts – but whose name doesn’t occupy headlines – could emerge and turn the race upside down.

November 5, 2015

* Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Haiti: Elections Better than Expected?

By Emma Fawcett*

Photo Credit: Haiti Innovation / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Haiti Innovation / Flickr / Creative Commons

Security and logistics for Haiti’s October 25 elections went much better than expected, but the results – preliminarily announced this week but likely to face challenges – will probably leave many Haitians disappointed.  With 54 presidential candidates and 6,000 other candidates for legislative and local positions, party monitors outnumbered voters at some polling stations.  The Observatory for Institutionalizing Democracy estimates that turnout was about 30 percent.  Despite sporadic demonstrations leading to the arrests of 234 people, the process was fairly peaceful.  Allegations of ballot stuffing persist but remain unsubstantiated – perhaps because the fraud has been better organized this time, according to some observers.

  • These elections were in sharp contrast to the long-overdue August 9 elections – the first round for legislative seats – which were disastrous. In August, 13 percent of voting centers were forced to close because of shootings, vandalism, and voter intimidation, while the Haitian National Police stood by.  Dozens of police officers failed to report to work or guard candidates (for which they were later suspended).  Voter turnout was a dismal 18 percent, as the chaos discouraged Haitians from voting.  Twenty-five of 119 first-round deputy races had to be repeated on October 25 because too many votes were thrown out due to violence and fraud.  Only eight deputies (out of 119) and only two senators (of 20 open seats) won races outright.

Electoral results are released more slowly in Haiti than practically anywhere else in the world because the ballots must be trucked to Port-au-Prince to be counted, and then the Provisional Electoral Council must process requests for re-tallies from 166 political parties.  Preliminary results won’t be known for several more days, and final results, which will reveal the names of the two candidates in the December 27 runoff, are expected in late November.  But the international community wants to declare the October elections a success, apparently eager to end the country’s stagnation since the parliament was dissolved earlier this year.  The newly arrived U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Peter Mulrean, said in an interview that Haiti “really can’t afford to have that kind of stalemate” and expressed approval for the electoral process within the first few hours of voting.

Polls going into the October election showed, however, support divided among many candidates, and the results are likely to upset many Haitians.  Tough talk by four main candidates suggests difficult scenarios ahead:

  • If President Michel Martelly’s chosen successor, banana exporter Jovenel Moïse, wins, widespread protests are possible from Haitians angered by the current administration’s corruption. They will continue to claim U.S. interference. 
  • Jude Célestin, former head of the government’s construction ministry who was bumped from the 2010 runoff by an OAS recount, has vowed to ensure he makes it to the final round this time. Mid-October polls showed him with a considerable lead, commanding at least 30% of the vote.
  • Another major contender, former Senator Moïse Jean-Charles, has alleged that ballots with his name on them have been destroyed, and called for “either elections or revolution” at a rally with his supporters.
  • Fanmi Lavalas candidate, Maryse Narcisse, received a boost from former President Aristide in the final days before the vote when he joined her to campaign in downtown Port-au-Prince. Although Narcisse has struggled in the polls, her party was barred from the ballot in the 2010 elections, and so it remains unclear how they will fare this time.

Even assuming the transfer of power is peaceful, Martelly’s successor will face a number of critical challenges in addition to Haiti’s perennial ills, including a deportation crisis with the Dominican Republic, a cholera outbreak, languishing earthquake recovery, and a drought which has increased hunger. 

November 2, 2015

*Emma Fawcett is a PhD candidate in International Relations at American University.   Her doctoral thesis focuses on the political economy of tourism and development in four Caribbean case studies: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Mexican Caribbean.

Judicial Activism Prolongs Immigrants’ Angst

By Maya Barak*

Photo Credit: Justin Valas and David Schexnaydre / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: Justin Valas and David Schexnaydre / Flickr / Creative Commons

Legal maneuvering to block President Obama’s executive actions on immigration is keeping up to 4 million undocumented immigrants in limbo and, with the U.S. election campaign gaining momentum, dims prospects for them to participate in society more fully and openly anytime soon.  Texas and 25 other states filed suit in February hoping to overturn Obama’s expansion of his 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and creation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).  A panel of three judges for the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (New Orleans), one of the most conservative courts in the country, heard the case in July, but the case is still pending – and the court’s temporary injunction remains in place.  Observers call their behavior judicial activism because the panel has deliberately eschewed its normal practice of 60-day decisions in order to prevent a rapid appeal by the Obama administration from reaching the Supreme Court during the Court’s current term.  The deadline for appeals to the Supreme Court was October 23.

If the courts – the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (unlikely) or the Supreme Court (unknown), ultimately decide in favor of the Obama orders, DACA and DAPA would permit undocumented immigrants who entered the U.S. prior to 16 years of age and have lived in the U.S. continuously since 2010, along with eligible parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, to apply for temporary relief from removal (deportation) and a work permit for three years.  In any case, the next President, who takes office in January 2017, could terminate the actions, throwing applicants for DACA and DAPA protections back into a precarious legal state – with their identities and whereabouts registered with immigration authorities and lacking relief from deportability.  A Central American asylee told me his immigration process, if all goes well, will have taken him 21 years.  “That’s a lifetime,” he said.  “To really feel like a citizen, like this is my home, that they can’t kick me out … So that’s where the system is failing me, is failing us.”

The delay for President Obama’s executive actions to take effect is just one of many lengthy waits individuals, both with and without legal status, experience while caught up in the U.S. immigration system.  Wait times for visa applicants can extend into the double digits – more than 20 years for family-sponsored visas for Filipinos, for example.  Not only are the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the State Department, which are primarily responsible for visa processing, backed up; the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the nation’s immigration court system, is experiencing multi-year delays as well.  Fifty-nine immigration courts handle an average of 300,000-400,000 cases per year.  Detained immigrants spend months in detention waiting for hearing continuances and final hearings, while non-detained immigrants spend years awaiting their final case outcomes.  These individuals are forced to put their lives on hold, not sure if they will be allowed to stay or forced to leave, many unable to obtain work permits or driver’s licenses.  The expansion of DACA and creation of DAPA would alleviate some of the tension on America’s overburdened immigration system while individuals around the country and the world await meaningful and comprehensive immigration reform.  In the meantime, agencies managing U.S. immigration have little incentive and too few resources to speed up processing.  Like millions of immigrants, they are simply biding time.

October 29, 2015

* Maya Barak is  PhD candidate at American University’s School of Public Affairs specializing in Justice, Law and Criminology.

Cuba’s Limited Absorptive Capacity Will Slow Normalization*

By Fulton Armstrong

Photo Credit: PBS NewsHour / Flickr / Creative Commons

Photo Credit: PBS NewsHour / Flickr / Creative Commons

As the U.S. embargo – the main obstacle to expanding U.S.-Cuban economic ties – is relaxed by presidential regulatory action and eventually lifted by Congress, limits on Cuba’s own willingness and ability to conduct trade, absorb investment, utilize information technology, and even accommodate tourists risk putting a brake on the normalization of economic relations.  Five decades of embargo and failed socialist models have rendered key sectors in Cuba ill-equipped to take advantage of the surge in U.S. business interest in the island.  In some areas, the political will to open up and reform is crucial.  These problems do not translate into a rejection of normalization but rather into a slower timeline than many on and off the island would hope for.

The advantages of economic engagement are well known.  Foreign investment will help provide the $8.7 billion Cuba wants for its “Portfolio of Foreign Investment Opportunities” – some 246 projects in energy, tourism, agriculture, and industry.  Havana also wants growth rates to rise to 4-5 percent per year (from an estimated 1.5 percent in 2014), fueled by at least $2 billion in annual foreign investment.  Trade, investment, and tourism are all potentially powerful engines for growth and employment in Cuba.  Private farmers have long out-produced their state competitors and many cooperatives, making them ideal for engagement under current U.S. regulations if the Cuban government facilitates it.  The small private sector, currently employing over a million people, could – with a more supportive infrastructure – provide many more vital goods, services, and employment that the Cuban government years ago admitted it could not provide.  Sectors utilizing Cuba’s specialized and skilled human capital, such as biotechnology, could also benefit quickly and generously from the new U.S. relationship.

Cuba has a lot going for it – such as its deep reserve of potential human capital – but it is also is held back by a variety of problems, many of which are prolonged by political caution.

  • Cuba is updating laws governing investments, property, and labor – a new foreign investment law in March 2014 and related regulations are steps in the new direction – but the multi-year, incremental process has been too slow to keep ahead of burgeoning opportunities. Regulations on how foreign firms select, pay and release Cuban employees are also antiquated.  Paperwork for approving foreign direct investment remains formidable and must pass through multiple levels.  The country lacks the basic institutions necessary to license import and export transactions for beneficiaries outside government ministries.  Much of the bureaucracy – chronically underpaid and, during periods of party dominance, neglected – has yet to grow into a new, more professional role.
  • Unifying Cuba’s two national currencies is absolutely essential but, despite the government’s repeated declarations of intent, it has still not been done. The existence of a different, lower exchange rate for state enterprises creates distortions that will worsen as demand for imports rises.  The financial system, moreover, is too over-burdened, secretive, and lacking in agility, and continued blocks to Cuba’s access to IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) funds deny it important breathing room to reform.
  • Cuba lacks an information and communications technology (ICT) framework capable of harnessing and nurturing its human capital and driving growth and efficiency – which will retard progress in a number of priority areas.
  • De-industrialization over the past 25 years has further reduced Cuba’s absorptive capacity. Many key sectors – including textiles, clothing, metals, machinery, transportation equipment, and more – have contracted between 50 and 100 percent.  Much of the infrastructure is dilapidated.  The transportation sector is in dire need of repair and modernization; and the construction industry is inefficient and poorly resourced.

Cuba’s challenges in taking advantage of new opportunities are not insurmountable – with political will and time.  The pace of reform and corresponding expansion of Cuba’s absorptive capacity may be maddeningly slow for many Cubans and Americans alike.  But insofar as the U.S.-Cuba normalization process is irreversible, so too is the conviction in Cuba on the need to “update” the system through reform in order to take advantage of the opportunities it brings.  Cuban national pride and the Communist Party’s fear of losing control could very well be assuaged as the island experiences the benefits of engagement.  Foreigners, especially the United States, who push too hard, too fast, and too haughtily could fail and even delay this aspect of normalization, just as Cubans who move too passively, too slowly, and too skeptically could stymie the process as well.

October 27, 2015

*This blog post is excerpted from the third in a series of policy briefs from the CLALS Cuba Initiative, supported by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.  Read the full brief here.


Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,747 other followers