By Carlos Monge*
An abandoned gold mining project in the Cajamarca region, Peru / Wikimedia / Creative Commons
The surprising emergence of the Frente Amplio (FA), a coalition of political parties, social organizations and independent activists, in Peru’s recent presidential and congressional elections signals the first significant support for the Peruvian Left since the collapse of the Izquierda Unida in the 1980s. The Left was not able to present its own alternatives in the ‘90s, the early 2000s, and again in 2011. In October 2015 barely 13 percent of Peruvians knew about FA’s internal election to select presidential candidates. Veronika Mendoza had the support of only 1 percent of intending voters, and over 60 percent of Peruvians did not even know who she was. Nevertheless, FA ended up receiving 18.74 percent of the vote in the first electoral round, coming in third and only a couple of points behind Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK), who secured 21.05 percent and ended up defeating the Fuerza Popular’s candidate, Keiko Fujimori, to become President for the 2016-2021 period.
FA’s “post-extractivist” program has been key. Breaking away from the nationalist redistributive programs of leftists in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina, FA espouses economic diversification and tax reform rather than more mineral or hydrocarbon exports to sustain economic growth and public incomes. FA also emphasizes the need to protect the environment and renewable natural resources for future generations and to recognize indigenous rights to territories, autonomy, direct political representation and effective consultations.
- These are not only electoral campaign ideas. Indeed, FA local activists and national leaders have maintained staunch opposition to emblematic mining projects such as the Conga project in the northern Cajamarca region and the Tía María project in southern Arequipa. In the same way, FA is denouncing that the new government is trying to lower air quality environmental standards to ease foreign investments in mineral smelters and has harshly criticized the new Minister of Production for abandoning the National Plan for Productive Diversification launched by the outgoing Ollanta Humala administration.
- Frente Amplio is grounded in social movements that have long confronted extractivist projects. Veronika Mendoza left President Humala’s Nationalist Party in 2012 in a dispute over his repressive response to socio-environmental protests around mining projects in the highlands of her native Cusco. Tierra y Libertad, FA’s largest party, has its roots in the Cajamarca rondas campesinas resistance against the Conga project. Another factor is that the end of the commodities “super cycle” has moved extractive rents off center stage. Even in Venezuela the official discourse is now moving in the direction of economic diversification.
Frente Amplio is not alone in Latin America in attempting to build a post–extractivist platform, but it seems to be the region’s most successful. Similar policies were at the heart of the presidential campaign of Alberto Acosta and a coalition of social and indigenous organizations in Ecuador. And in El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí government is also keeping extractivist temptations at bay. But Acosta did not manage to get significant support or to build a stable political alternative, and El Salvador is not a major commodity exporter. The importance of the FA experience is that it happens in a significant mineral and gas producer, that it has had immediate electoral success, and that it can become a permanent political player in Peruvian democracy. FA and PPK will probably agree on issues such as the fight against corruption, crime, and violence against women, but they will certainly disagree over macroeconomic and sector policies, such as taxes. Also, FA has denounced PPK for his call to lower air pollution standards and for his authorization to large fishing factories to operate up to 5 km off the coast, leaving very little for artisanal, small scale, internal market-oriented fishing activities. Where this ends up is anybody’s guess, but this is certainly a process worth keeping an eye on.
August 29, 2016
*Carlos Monge is Latin America regional director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute in Lima.
Posted by clalsstaff on August 29, 2016
By Cynthia McClintock*
Photo Credits: Venezualan Government / Public Domain and Diario La Primera / Wikimedia Commons
Peru’s National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) will not announce the final results of Sunday’s run-off presidential election until later this week, but the current statistical tie is already setting the stage for serious tensions. The ONPE’s official count, with about 93 percent of votes counted, puts Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Peruanos por el Kambio) at 50.32 percent and Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular) at 49.68 percent. Some local observers say that late-arriving vote tallies from rural areas could give Fujimori the edge, but others point out that recent quick counts have reliably predicted final results. The campaigns may have aggravated tensions on Sunday night, when Fujimori’s spokesperson proclaimed her victory, and Kuczynski called on loyalists to “defend the vote” and “to be vigilant that they not steal votes from us.”
The campaign underscored the country’s enduring polarization over Fujimori’s imprisoned father, Alberto. Although Alberto Fujimori was convicted on charges of human rights violations and corruption, and although his 1990s government became increasingly authoritarian, he is still perceived by many Peruvians as the savior who restored order and broke the back of the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. Primarily for this reason, Keiko Fujimori won almost 40 percent of the votes in the first round on April 10; Kuczynski was the runner-up with 21 percent, narrowly defeating leftist candidate Verónika Mendoza (Frente Amplio), with 19 percent.
- The last two weeks were a roller coaster. At the time of the first round, Kuczynski had held a slight lead over Fujimori, but only a week ago was trailing her by about five points. An international economist and banker who had lived for long periods in the United States, Kuczynski lost support in part because, after the first round, he spent eight days in the U.S., exacerbating perceptions that he was more gringo than Peruvian, while Fujimori traveled to remote areas of Peru. She claimed that, whereas her opponent favored big business, she favored small and medium business. Also, in the first debate, Kuczynski, who is 77, appeared at a loss to counter Fujimori’s attacks.
- In the last week, however, it was Kuczynski with the momentum. He effectively communicated integrity and a commitment to democracy just as memories of the corruption and authoritarianism during the government of Fujimori’s father were revived. A scandal implicating the head of her party, Joaquín Ramírez, in money laundering gradually took a toll, especially when her vice-presidential candidate was believed to have orchestrated the broadcast of a doctored audiotape in an effort to clear Ramírez’s name. Fujimori appeared to believe that “the best defense is a good offense,” but her increasingly confrontational style and dismissive tone may have been a factor in the decision by third-place Mendoza to strongly endorse Kuczynski. In the second debate a week ago Sunday, Kuczynski emphasized that Fujimori could not be trusted to keep her key pledge to fight crime when Ramírez and other leaders of her party were under criminal investigation.
The presidential campaign has reflected deep polarization and tensions since at least March, when electoral authorities disqualified two important candidates – Julio Guzmán and César Acuña – for violations of party and electoral regulations. Guzmán’s party had not kept to the letter of its internal party statutes and Acuña handed out cash at a campaign rally. The disqualifications prompted OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro to label Peru only “semi-democratic.” A key problem was that the laws were not consistently enforced; most saliently, Fujimori, captured on video passing out prizes at a campaign event, was not disqualified. Strains are likely to remain high this week, and could grow worse after ONPE’s final announced tally at the end of the week. Fujimori’s followers, embracing the polls showing her lead prior to election day, may cry foul if a Kuczyinski victory is declared. Many of Kuczyinski’s and Mendoza’s followers, for their part, intensely fear a return to Fujimorismo. In this context, it is not impossible that disqualified candidates Guzmán and Acuña and their supporters could call for a total do-over. Although serious, sustained instability remains unlikely, Peru’s 2016 election is by far its most problematic since the country’s return to democracy in 2001.
(Previous analyses on the Peruvian election are available here and here.)
June 6, 2016
* Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.
Posted by clalsstaff on June 6, 2016
By Jo-Marie Burt*
Photo Credits: Huhsunqu, Alex Albornoz, Alianza para el Progreso, Fuerza 2011, and Peruanos por el Kambio (modified) / Wikimedia / Creative Commons
Peruvian electoral authorities’ decision last month to disqualify two candidates in this weekend’s first-round presidential election has conjured up the ghosts of one of the most disputed elections in recent Latin American history: the “re-re-election” of Alberto Fujimori in 2000. Large demonstrations this week against the candidacy of the strongman’s daughter, Keiko Fujimori, were a rejection of the corruption and authoritarianism of the past – as well as the electoral fraud that kept him in power. The two candidates were disqualified for technical violations of campaign laws. Newcomer Julio Guzmán, who polls indicated commanded around 20 percent of the vote, was punished because his party failed to follow certain registration norms, and the other, César Acuña, was accused of giving away gifts above newly set limits. Local observers point out, however, that other leading parties are guilty of similar missteps but have faced no penalties. Video and testimonials show, for example, Keiko Fujimori attended events where cash “prizes” were handed out.
The disqualifications have put the spotlight on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), which disqualified candidate Julio Guzmán asked to investigate the decisions. Postponing the election would be extremely disruptive, particularly because other political groups in Peru, which have benefited from Guzmán’s exclusion, have seized on the immediate political advantage. The possibility that uneven application of the electoral rules might taint the credibility of the eventual winner is not their immediate concern.
- The two immediate beneficiaries are Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (known by his initials PPK, which also identify his party, Peruanos por el Kambio), and Verónica Mendoza of the left-wing Frente Amplio. At 15-20 percent each, they are jockeying for second and third place behind Fujimori (30-35 percent), but the real race is in the runoff on June 5 that will take place in the likely event that no candidate wins 50 percent of the vote. In the 2011 elections, Fujimori won the first round, but lost in the runoff vote to Ollanta Humala. Fujimorismo has a hard-core following of 25-30 percent of the voting public, but a majority of the population also has a negative opinion of her.
Peruvian elections had come a long way since Alberto Fujimori fled office in 2000. (In 2009, he was sentenced to prison for 25 years for human rights violations, corruption, and abuse of authority.) Free and fair elections were held in 2001, 2006, and 2011 – marking the first time in Peruvian history that two democratically elected presidents consecutively handed the presidential sash over to successors. Whether politically motivated or merely the result of incompetence, electoral authorities’ apparently one-sided handling of this year’s campaign has created an appearance of favoritism discrediting the electoral process itself. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, has already referred to these elections as “semi-democratic.” Others speak openly of fraud. The potential damage is compounded by popular concerns that Keiko Fujimori represents a return to the authoritarian and corrupt tactics that characterized her father’s decade in power. Her detractors say that she is not simply her father’s daughter; she served as his First Lady and benefited from the corruption of his regime (for example, she testified before Congress that she accepted cash from intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos to pay for her college education). Keiko has acknowledged “errors” (but not “crimes) were committed during her father’s government, and she continues to say her father’s regime was the “best” Peru has ever had. These were bound to be contentious elections due to the divisive legacy Keiko Fujimori represents, as the massive nationwide demonstrations marking the April 5 “self-coup” on Tuesday made clear. But the uneven application of the law by electoral authorities raises even more serious questions about Peru’s democratic institutions.
April 7, 2016
*Jo-Marie Burt is Director of Latin American Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
Posted by clalsstaff on April 7, 2016
By Aaron Bell
Frente Amplio Uruguay / Flickr / CC BY-NC 2.0
The Frente Amplio (FA) emerged from Sunday’s general elections in Uruguay looking stronger than observers had forecast – and signaling Latin Americans’ confidence in the center-left. Despite a rough campaign season, which included polls showing the FA’s support stuck in the low 40s, and public sniping between the party’s leaders – candidate Tabaré Vázquez and current president José Mujica – just days before the election, the FA gained last-minute momentum in the polls and won 47.9 percent of the vote. As expected, Vázquez received less than the outright majority needed to avoid a second round of voting on November 30 against the candidate of the Partido Nacional (PN), Luis Lacalle Pou, who won 31 percent of the vote. But the FA preserved its majority in the lower chamber of parliament, and it can have the edge in the senate if Vázquez wins in November, as his vice president, Raúl Séndic, would hold the deciding vote. The Partido Colorado (PC) candidate, Pedro Bordaberry, won only 12.9 percent of the vote and placed third in every department.
The elections revolved around Vázquez and Lacalle Pou’s leadership identity and policies; neither candidate argued for substantial structural changes. In exit interviews, those who voted for the FA credited it with positive changes in its decade at the helm. The 41-year-old Lacalle Pou has run as a youthful leadership alternative to the 74-year-old former president Vázquez, and he promised fresh ideas for taking on crime and education, considered leading concerns for Uruguayan voters. While exit interviews suggest that this message appealed to his party’s voters, it did not translate into substantial youth support. Polling by Factum prior to the election showed that 51 percent of voters aged 18-37 preferred the FA. Public security has been the leading concern for Uruguayan voters, and both traditional center-right parties, the PN and PC, supported a referendum (also held on Sunday) that would have lowered the age of criminal responsibility for major crimes from 18 to 16. But long-term polling trends have shown a decrease in the number of Uruguayans prioritizing security from its peak last year, and indeed the referendum failed with 47 percent of the vote; almost the entirety of undecided voters ultimately chose to oppose it.
The FA now has momentum and is well positioned to win the second round and enjoy the support of a parliamentary majority. A likely PN-PC voting bloc in the second round once held a slight lead over the FA but now appears likely to fall short because of tensions between them. The PC’s underwhelming performance at the polls has been compounded by Bordaberry’s decision on Sunday night to support Lacalle Pou without consulting PC officials, and his offensive off-the-cuff verbal attack on the Vázquez camp during a conversation with a PN official that same night, for which he has since apologized. The left-leaning Partido Independiente, which came in fourth place with 3.1 percent of the vote, will make a decision on which candidate to support this week; their votes alone would be enough to push the FA over the top. As a result, barring a major turn of events, it appears as though the incumbent pink tide will prevail in Uruguay – with implications, perhaps, beyond. Indeed, a second-round FA victory will be the sixth this year for a left-leaning party, following the pattern set by Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Brazil. While the citizenry may be impatient with the pace of progress in Latin America following nearly a decade of left-leaning governance, voters seem to be eschewing the right and maintaining the modestly but consistently leftward tilt that has characterized the region’s politics for much of the 21st century.
October 30, 2014
Posted by clalsstaff on October 30, 2014
By Aaron T. Bell
Photo credit: Frente Amplio (FA) / Foter / CC BY-NC-SA
Uruguay’s elections on October 26 – once seen as a sure bet for the ruling Frente Amplio’s presidential candidate, former president Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) – have become a tight race, perhaps signaling challenges for other left-leaning Latin American governments as well. The FA’s slight slip in the polls since the beginning of 2014 has been matched by sustained growth by the Partido Nacional, led by Luis Lacalle Pou, the son of a former president. While Vázquez still holds a ten-point lead, he’s well below the absolute majority needed to avoid a run-off election, whose numbers look even bleaker for the ruling party. In February, Lacalle Pou was running twenty-five points behind Vázquez in a head-to-head matchup, but the latest polls now show him only two points back. Lacalle Pou will need the support of his party’s long-time rival, the Colorado Party, to win a second round against the FA, but Colorado candidate Pedro Bordaberry has thus far refused to concede the first round to the PN despite trailing them by 17 points. Nonetheless, Vázquez was defeated by just such a second-round alliance in 1999. Complicating things for him, polling strongly suggests that FA could lose control of both houses of the national legislature this fall.
The Lacalle Pou campaign has focused on public security and education. Uruguay’s homicide rate remains one of the lowest in the region, but a modest increase in crime in recent years has spurred both urban and rural Uruguayans to rank security as the principal problem facing the nation – well ahead of the second leading concern, education. The October elections will coincide with a referendum on lowering the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 for serious offensives, with polls showing Uruguayans closely divided but leaning toward approval. On the education front, the FA’s Plan Ceiba has helped provide laptops to every student, but 2012 assessment data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development still place Uruguay’s students well below the international average in math, science, and reading.
The FA’s political situation is paradoxical: it has presided over major socioeconomic improvements in the last decade and won international acclaim, but earned a more tepid response at home. Uruguay’s decision to legalize marijuana was widely celebrated abroad as a step toward a more progressive drug policy in the region, but polls continue to show that a majority of Uruguayans oppose legalization, and it has not won the FA much support even among proponents of cannabis, who have resisted the creation of a registry of buyers. (Vázquez recently suggested the registry would be used to develop rehabilitation programs.) The FA seems to have not yet figured out how to respond effectively to the perception of insecurity, nor has it overseen a decided improvement in education, which is central to long-term development prospects. With Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores facing an uncertain future, and political crises in Argentina and Venezuela simmering, the FA may be the first case of a larger regional rollback of the first wave of 21st century leftwing movements.
September 30, 2014
Posted by clalsstaff on September 30, 2014