Honduras: A Renewed MACCIH with Teeth?

By Eric L. Olson*

President of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernandez, January 16,

Juan Orlando Hernández, President of Honduras, January 19, 2016/ Flickr/Creative Commons/ https://www.flickr.com/photos/oasoea/24115247729/in/photostream/

As the January 19 deadline for renewing the Support Mission to Combat Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) approaches, the Honduran government — never enamored of it — has a chance to demonstrate a commitment to root out one of the principal problems that undermine the nation’s democratic institutions and the opportunities citizens yearn for.

  • The Organization of American States has been engaged for months in low-profile discussions with Tegucigalpa on the future of MACCIH, created by an agreement between Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández and OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro on January 19, 2016. Despite concerns that MACCIH lacked the independence and capacity to conduct investigations that its UN-based counterpart in Guatemala (CICIG) once had, it has demonstrated that Honduras can indeed conduct independent, non-partisan investigations into systemic corruption, and begin to prosecute and hold accountable senior officials.

Working with its partner in the Public Ministry, a special anti-corruption prosecutor’s unit (UFECIC), MACCIH has had a key role in 13 major cases involving 124 individuals, including 80 government officials and 44 private citizens. Several cases involve networks of corruption in the Honduran legislature as well as the former first lady (now sentenced to 58 years in prison), and graft and corruption in the country’s public health system (IHSS). The official evaluation of MACCIH’s first four years by the Mesa de Evaluación, a process established by agreement between the Honduran government and OAS, has recommended full renewal.

The brave work of the UFECIC prosecutors, who formalize the investigations that MACCIH first develops, has been crucial. MACCIH screens and recommends the prosecutors and investigators that make up UFECIC, but its mission is to support, not conduct, prosecutions. This distance is intended to strengthen capacity within Honduras’s justice system.

  • Honduran civil society, previously skeptical that MACCIH would work, is now largely on board. The Coalition for the Renewal of MACCIH has issued statements calling for the mandate to be extended — proclaiming ¡Renovación Ya! — as have the National Anti-Corruption Council, the Association for a More Just Society, the Catholic Bishops Conference and its Evangelical counterpart, and others. Even members of the business community, long leery of anti-corruption initiatives, support renewal.
  • At least rhetorically, the United States supports MACCIH renewal. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak and other State Department officials have endorsed it, and Democrats in the U.S. Congress have been strong advocates. Washington’s implicit approval of the Guatemalan government’s dismantling of CICIG, however, remains a concern for MACCIH supporters.

President Hernández’s foot-dragging on renewal has fueled worries. Renewal could be done simply with an exchange of letters in which the government signals its desire to renew the mandate as is; unless the agreement is to be amended, no congressional action or further steps are needed. The delay has given rise to fears that the government is seeking to limit the length of the new mandate (from the current four years to two or even one). There is further concern that the government, with pressure from Congress, seeks to limit the MACCIH mission to citizen oversight functions, prevention efforts, and technical training. These are all important elements of the mission, but the heart and soul of the MACCIH’s success has been its support for the UFECIC and its investigations. To undermine or limit investigations would likely lead to the demise of UFECIC and render the MACCIH toothless.

Renewal of MACCIH — with the investigative elements of its mandate intact — gives President Hernández, who labors under a cloud of allegations about involvement in narcotics trafficking and other illicit practices, an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, and building judicial and democratic institutions. If the mandate is changed, not simply renewed, it will have to be approved again by the Honduran Congress, where odds are long. The Congress has already recommended MACCIH not be renewed and, as the official Mesa de Evaluación documented, it has already attempted to reverse anti-corruption legislation, such as by lowering penalties for misuse of government funds.

  • Hernández has the clout to direct his supporters in Congress, many of whom fear MACCIH’s investigations into their activities, to abandon their obstructionist tactics, while reaching out to opposition legislators who support MACCIH. Alternatively, he could ignore Congress altogether and simply reach an executive agreement with the OAS, something that would carry less legal weight but may preserve MACCIH’s essential elements.
  • The President’s inaction hurts MACCIH and broader anti-corruption efforts as well as Honduras. Failure to push renewal — with teeth — will not only damage his reputation and further erode his legitimacy in the eyes of Hondurans and the international community; it will send a message of hopelessness and despair to Hondurans seeking to build a better future for their country.

January 13, 2020

* Eric L. Olson is Director of Policy, Seattle International Foundation, and a global fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

 

Central America: Hybrid Anti-Corruption Commissions Can Work

By Chuck Call*

Map of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, with Guatemala and Honduras territory being covered by photos of well-known politicians being arrested.

Prospects for an International Commission against Impunity and Corruption in El Salvador: Lessons from Neighboring Countries in Central America logo / CLALS / https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/Prospects-for-an-International-Commission-against-Impunity-and-Corruption-in-El-Salvador-Lessons-from-Neighboring-Countries-in-Central-America.cfm

If newly inaugurated Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele pursues his campaign calls for the creation of a hybrid international commission to fight corruption and strengthen judicial institutions, he will face tough challenges from entrenched interests. However, the experiences of Guatemala’s CICIG and Honduras’s MACCIH show that a strong investigative mandate, close partnership with vetted national prosecutors, strong international backing, and transparent accountability will increase the chances of success of any such mission. (Full text of the study is here and aquí.) CICIG and MACCIH were born of political crises, but they were given different authorities, faced different expectations, and delivered different results.

  • Both missions have had historic investigative and prosecutorial achievements – bringing former and current senior officials to account as never before and putting powerful elites on notice that impunity will not be tolerated. CICIG has dismantled corrupt networks, exposing their reach into the Congress and the Cabinet, indicting hundreds. MACCIH has helped indict dozens of legislators and a former First Lady. Working with special units of prosecutors, they have also contributed to local institutional capacity to root out corruption.

Both CICIG and MACCIH have struggled against the pressure tactics of the many corrupt officials, legislators, and economic interests who most feel threatened by them. In contrast to Guatemala, where CICIG was key to the adoption of several laws that served as a foundation for effective investigation of organized crime, the Honduran Congress has refused to pass such laws. Legislatures in both countries have changed laws specifically to vitiate prosecutions (including of themselves) advanced by the missions. Corruption among judges, especially in Honduras, has made winning convictions extremely difficult. After CICIG shifted its sights beyond politicians to powerful businessmen a few years ago, Guatemalan elites launched a campaign to smear CICIG as an incursion on sovereignty and a socialist plot. Both missions have confronted constitutional challenges.

Key lessons from CICIG and MACCIH’s experience include:

  • Realistic expectations are important. The legal and diplomatic negotiations and logistics necessary to set up “hybrid” units combining domestic and international investigators slowed both entities’ starts. It took over two years for CICIG to secure its first convictions, and MACCIH’s investigations have led to only 12 cases, although these are major corrupt networks. The focus of many Hondurans on ousting President Juan Orlando Hernández has obscured some of the important cases advanced by the mission and its Honduran partners.
  • Anti-impunity missions can threaten systems of political and economic power in ways that go beyond judicial processes. Despite the technical and juridical character of both the missions, they have exposed in detail how criminal enterprises interact with political parties, elected, and appointed officials, and current and former security officials. The missions have also detailed how legislators receive illicit campaign funds and how they fraudulently spend public monies, forcing changes to these decades-old corrupt practices. In Guatemala, the prosecutions have dismantled corrupt networks involving cabinet ministers, generals, top business leaders and the former president and vice president, altering the political profile of parties and undermining the ability of prominent and corrupt elite structures of power to operate.
  • Strong partnerships with national prosecutorial units and with civil society are crucial for success and sustainability. CICIG and MACCIH could not have achieved what they did without close cooperation with carefully selected and vetted prosecutorial units. Those units, especially the UFECIC in Honduras, carried out much of the investigation and led the prosecution in both countries. The legacy of the hybrid missions rests in the future of these empowered professionals and society’s raised expectations of clean behavior from their public officials. Both missions have generated a greater sense that high-level politicians, officials and elites can be imprisoned for corruption and organized crime. Yet these missions have not heeded or informed civil society as much as they might have. Moreover, these experiences and the likely end to both missions in the coming months show that civil society is vital to educating society on the importance and possibility of accountable governance, and for demanding it from politicians and the justice system.
  • International sponsorship brings both advantages and challenges. The association with the UN (for CICIG) and the OAS (for MACCIH) has brought valuable political legitimacy, professional capacity, and needed resources. But it has also brought complications. In the case of MACCIH, slow and politicized appointments, questionable allocation of resources, and excessive day-to-day oversight from Washington, not to mention personal spats and undue interference by specific member states, have undermined performance and credibility. CICIG’s status as a non-UN body gave its commissioner the independence needed to take on tough cases and ignore political considerations. However, that lack of accountability is seen as having contributed to the alienation of many sectors in ways that left it politically vulnerable. Wavering U.S. support for CICIG since 2017 has emboldened the missions’ critics.

The experiences of CICIG and MACCIH show that, despite ups and downs, hybrid international-national missions can help a society fight corruption. In Guatemala and Honduras, these commissions achieved more than most observers originally predicted by dint of the vision and discipline of their leaders and sponsors as well as the work of courageous national officials and civil society groups often risking their livelihoods and lives. Their performance also shows that getting the mission right and sustainable takes time, communication, and strong partnership with national prosecutors. The main challenge now is that corrupt officials and businesses have become proficient at blocking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.

  • Creating an International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES) may be harder now than before CICIG and MACCIH scored their victories. However, President Bukele may have a historic opportunity to press the country’s two main (but weakened) parties, ARENA and the FMLN, to approve a strong mandate that fits the country’s particular needs. Experts advising then-President Mauricio Funes (himself ironically now on the lam for alleged corruption) concluded in 2010 that the country’s Constitution provides the basis for an international mission with a sufficiently strong investigative powers to have impact. The Guatemalan and Honduran missions show that a strong mandate and significant national and international backing could improve help El Salvador’s justice system reduce corruption and impunity. Such efforts may also have comparable impact in exposing in dirty detail, and perhaps reforming, unaccountable and exclusionary systems of political representation.

* Chuck Call teaches International Peace and Conflict Resolution at American University, where he directs a Center for Latin American & Latino Studies project analyzing MACCIH and anti-corruption efforts in Honduras.

Honduras: MACCIH Still Trying

By Aída Romero Jiménez

MACCIH Feb.22.2019

Luiz Antonio Marrey, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Spokesperson of the MACCIH / Flickr / Creative Commons

MACCIH, the OAS-sponsored mission to support the fight against corruption and impunity in Honduras, continues to investigate cases but with a lower profile than one year ago– and under growing political pressure.

  • Without MACCIH, most observers believe, cases like La Caja Chica de la Dama – for which ex‑First Lady Lobo is awaiting trial in prison – would not have developed. MACCIH is also credited with shutting down the Red de Diputados, a network of Congressmen accused of misappropriating government funds; the Pacto de Impunidad o Fe de Erratas, legislation that effectively shielded Congressmen involved in the Red; the Pandora case, which accused 38 lawmakers of stealing funds from the Ministry of Agriculture; and serious charges against former President Lobo’s brother.
  • Although MACCIH provides important leads and analytical capacity to UFECIC, the special prosecutor unit created to investigate corruption cases, its most valuable support comes from the political cover it provides as an internationally sponsored entity. It is often the public face of anti-corruption efforts in the country, even though Luiz Antônio Guimarães Marrey, the spokesman since last June, and his deputy have significantly scaled back their use of social media since the previous spokesman, Juan Jiménez Mayor, irritated the government with his public profile.

MACCIH’s successes have provoked resistance and, at times, a strong backlash from powerful sectors that feel threatened by its work, not unlike what has occurred with the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).  When Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales banned the head of CICIG, Iván Velásquez, from returning to the country, several Honduran Congressmen were quick to state that the MACCIH mandate similarly had to be revised, and that its involvement in investigations had to be reigned in to ensure it was not overstepping its limits.  Echoing CICIG’s critics in Guatemala, they also alleged that MACCIH was violating the country’s sovereignty.

  • The Honduran Constitutional Court was already gunning for MACCIH when it ruled in May that UFECIC was unconstitutional. (UFECIC has continued its investigations without further interference, but local observers believe this could change at any moment.)  Congress has also redoubled efforts to reform Article 115 of the General Law of Public Administration to effectively shield itself from Public Ministry investigations into their handling of public funds.  Legislators want to transfer authority for such inquiries solely to the Supreme Auditing Tribunal, which civil society actors claim is sympathetic to the Congressional leadership.
  • The lack of judicial independence has remained a serious obstacle. In a high percentage of cases that go to trial, the charges have been reversed or downgraded, signaling just how fragile and corrupt the Honduran justice system is.

MACCIH’s progress in fulfilling its mission makes it vulnerable to attack and, possibly, non-renewal when its mandate expires in January 2020.  MACCIH spokesman Guimarães Marrey said in December that 11 new cases will soon be announced.  Many Hondurans hope that President Juan Orlando Hernández will be among the targets, on the assumption that he was aware of or involved in drug trafficking operations for which his brother, Tony, is under arrest in the United States.  Whether that happens or not, pressure on MACCIH is unlikely to abate.  Guimarães Marrey earlier this month re-released a draft “Effective Collaboration Law” – MACCIH’s main legislative priority – allowing plea-bargaining in return for accurate information leading to prosecutions.  Legislative opposition to the proposed legislation is strong, and its prospects – like MACCIH’s – remain uncertain.

February 22, 2019

*Aída Romero Jiménez is a team member of the CLALS project Monitoring MACCIH and Anti-Impunity Efforts in Honduras.