In the War for the Soul of Peru, a Battle Is Won

By Cynthia McClintock*

Protest in Lima, Peru – November 2020/ Samantha Hare/ Flickr/ Creative Commons License

The political battles that have seized Peru this month have been intense because the prospects for a democratic, ethical Peru are at stake. On November 9, Peru’s Congress impeached President Martín Vizcarra, a champion of the war against corruption in the country. He was succeeded by the Congress’s Speaker, Manuel Merino, who – after six days of massive protests from all social classes and all regions of the country – resigned. Legislators then came together around a respected centrist, Francisco Sagasti, as Peru’s new president. Sagasti promises to continue the reform effort.

  • The most important cause of the impeachment was elites’ pushback against anti-corruption efforts, particularly the prosecution of under-the-table payments by companies to politicians, an entrenched practice in Peru for centuries. By the estimate of the historian Alfonso Quiroz, under no administration since Peru’s independence was the cost of corruption less than one percent of its GDP. Amid the kickbacks, sub-par companies won bids for state contracts, leading to huge cost overruns and outright project failures. All four presidents elected since 2001 and scores of additional authorities have been prosecuted for this reason. Approximately half the legislators feared an end to their own immunity from prosecution. Legislators of two of the nine political parties in Congress have personal stakes in for-profit universities, which were threatened by newly introduced higher standards for universities.
  • Political interests were also at stake. One political party was pursuing amnesty for its imprisoned leader. Many legislators were dismayed by the brevity of their term (March 2020-July 2021), an upshot from the previous Congress’s confrontation with Vizcarra in late 2019. They hoped to postpone the legislative and presidential elections due in April 2021 and tilt the playing field for the elections in their favor.

The crisis challenges some long-held observations about Peru.

  • The argument of many political scientists that the cause of Peru’s democratic deficits has been the fragmentation among weakly institutionalized parties is questionable. In recent years, Fuerza Popular, led by Keiko Fujimori, was strongly institutionalized; in 2011 and 2016, Keiko was the runner-up for the presidency and, in 2016, the party gained an absolute majority of legislative seats. Merino hails from Acción Popular, a historic party that had recently rebounded. The impeachment vote in the legislature was overwhelming: 105 of 130 legislators in favor. Neither strongly nor weakly institutionalized parties were putting the interests of Peru first.
  • The argument that the cause was the “permanent moral incapacity” clause in Peru’s Constitution per se is also questionable. The clause is vague, but it had also been used to impeach Alberto Fujimori and threaten the impeachment of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. Although the allegations against Vizcarra – of kickbacks for public-works contracts during his governorship of Moquegua – were made by suspects in criminal cases aspiring to plea bargains, they are worrisome.

For Peruvians, especially young Peruvians, the fear that their country would remain in the throes of the “traditional corrupt political class” was immense. The protests were the largest in Peru since the 1970s. As Merino enabled repression resulting in at least two deaths and hundreds of injuries, the outcry grew ever stronger.

  • Vizcarra was enjoying an approval rating near 60 percent – in the stratosphere for presidents in Peru. Some 90 percent of Peruvians opposed his impeachment. Despite the allegations of corruption against Vizcarra, what mattered to Peruvians was that he was fighting corruption now.
  • In his six days in the presidency, Merino was disastrous. A three-term Acción Popular legislator from Peru’s north without any known achievements, he was perceived as the embodiment of the term “political hack.” His cabinet appointments were far to the right of most Peruvians. Merino and his ministers dismissed protestors’ concerns, refusing even to acknowledge the police repression.

The challenges in Peru are immense. Elections are to be held in five months even though the pandemic has hit Peru exceptionally hard. Its mortality rate is the worst in Latin America, and the expected contraction of GDP for 2020 is the second worst after Venezuela. But Sagasti is off to an excellent start and seems poised to continue Peru’s move in an ethical, democratic direction.

  • A policy analyst and professor with a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, Sagasti was serving for the first time as a legislator with the centrist Partido Morado. Like him, most of the new cabinet members have advanced degrees and considerable experience in the public sector; ministers in the interior and justice portfolios are sympathetic to human rights concerns. In his inauguration speech, he promised to continue the war against corruption and respect democratic principles. He spoke movingly of the youths who had lost their lives in the protests. He ended with a poem – setting a tone that the country desperately needs.

November 20, 2020

*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Peru: Final Showdown at the Congress Corral

By Carlos Monge*

President Vizcarra speaking to Foreign Press in meeting

Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra meeting with Foreign Press/ Flickr/ Creative Commons/ https://bit.ly/2noHE1m

Peruvian President Vizcarra’s proposals to move up general elections from 2021 to 2020 and reform the election of new members of the highest court in the country – and Congress’s rejection of them – have sparked a crisis that has led him to dissolve Congress and call for new elections to replace it. The Congressional majority, led by the followers of Keiko Fujimori (in pre-trial “preventive prison” on corruption charges) and Alan García (who committed suicide in April to avoid arrest on similar charges), had rejected a series of reform proposals, although polls have consistently shown massive support for them and rejection of the Congress’s obstructionism. Events of the following 48 hours resemble a comedy script as the two sides faced off.

  • On September 30, the Congress rejected Vizcarra’s push for improvement of procedures for the election of new members of the Constitutional Tribunal – proceeding to elect a new member to its liking – and rejected his request for a Confidence Vote. In response, based on the constitutional prerogative the President has if a Confidence Vote is denied two times (his predecessor, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, PPK, had also been denied one), Vizcarra dissolved the Congress and called for new elections to replace it. At the same exact time, Congress granted the Confidence Vote, but with new rules to be put in place afterwards. In the evening it “temporarily” removed Vizcarra from office, swearing in Vice President Mercedes Aráoz as “temporary” President.
  • On October 1, Aráoz – who the previous evening said she “accepted the [temporary presidency] with fortitude” – explained that she was not really President, said that her appointment was merely political symbolism, and declined the appointment. In the meantime, Vizcarra received the support of the Armed Forces and the associations of Regional Governors and Municipal Mayors, swore in a new Cabinet, and formally called for new elections in January 2020.

The confrontation is more than just a short-term political dispute between a President and opposition parties. It reflects the resistance of liberal and leftist politicians, journalists, church sectors, honest public officials, and social and citizen platforms to the total takeover of the state by a coalition of corrupt politicians, illegal economies, conservative religious groups, and corrupt businessmen. These latter groups have long had representatives in different parliamentary benches, ministries, and regional and local governments. But they did not have the direct total control that, according to many observers, they would have had if Keiko Fujimori, daughter of disgraced President Alberto Fujimori, won the 2016 elections.

  • Keiko lost the very tight race to PPK but never accepted her defeat. Her party devoted itself to bringing the PPK government down by compiling evidence of his involvement in corrupt practices in previous stints as minister and prime minister. But the same corruption scandal that helped them remove PPK in March 2018 became a threat for both Keiko and former President García – and emboldened Vizcarra to move away from initial conciliatory policies. The President embraced a strong anti-corruption agenda, confronted the Congress, and won enormous popular support.
  • The straw that broke the camel’s back was the Congressional attempt to capture the court through an internal election method in which parties presented their candidates in a 30-minute meeting and scheduled a vote for a few days later, with no public scrutiny of the candidates, no public hearings, or actions that could define the process as transparent and accountable.

Vizcarra has survived last week’s showdown, but the constitutional crisis and its underlying tensions are far from over. Leaders of the dissolved Congress insist that the new member of the court they elected last Monday be sworn in, so that a more conservative Constitutional Tribunal decides on the fate of Vizcarra´s move. But it could take months for the Tribunal to reach a decision. Until a new Congress is elected, Vizcarra will legislate via Urgency Decrees, without knowing the composition of the new Congress and his relationship with it.

  • The dispute over the narrative of events is raging. For some, paradoxically aligned with the Fujimori heirs leading the Congress, Vizcarra has staged a coup similar to that of Alberto Fujimori in 1992 and thus become a dictator. For others, he has proceeded according to the Constitution and in defense of democracy. The best hope now is that the country can deliver a new, democratically elected Congress that will collaborate in completing the pending judicial and political reforms and in supporting the ongoing anti-corruption investigations. If it succeeds, Peru will be a better country and have something to celebrate during the July 2021 Bicentenary of its Independence.

October 8, 2019

* Carlos Monge is an Advisor at the Natural Resource Governance Institute in Lima.

South America: Regional Integration or Presidential Posturing?

By Stefano Palestini Céspedes*

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South American Presidents waving to the cameras in Santiago, Chile / Flickr / Creative Commons

Seven South American presidents’ launch of brand-new regional grouping called PROSUR last week was intended to give a boost to their personal agendas rather than take a serious step toward regional integration. The announcement was made on March 22 at a summit organized by Chilean President Piñera and attended by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay. The declared goal of the summit was to overcome what Piñera called the “paralysis” of the decade-old UNASUR.  Its final declaration emphasized the need “more than ever to work together to update and strengthen the South American countries’ process of integration” in the face of current and future challenges, including “inserting ourselves in an efficient way into the fourth industrial revolution and society based on knowledge and information.”

  • The creation of the Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR), however, delivered very little in terms of regional integration. The Santiago Declaration does not tackle the obstacles that hampered UNASUR, such as its decision-making procedure based on consensus. On the contrary, the declaration envisions PROSUR as a forum exclusively based on presidential diplomacy, in which all decisions by definition must be taken by consensus.
  • The Presidents said the new organization will focus on infrastructure, energy, health, defense, and dealing with natural disasters – the same areas where UNASUR had shown some progress. The declaration did not mention any particular ongoing crisis, such as Venezuela, but it made clear that it would work for full respect for democracy, constitutional order, and human rights. Again, this is not a departure from UNASUR, which also had a democracy clause adopted and ratified by the national parliaments.

The summit promised political gains for several participants. For President Piñera, it was an opportunity to project himself as a regional leader able to convene and coordinate South American heads of states, at a time that his domestic popularity is decreasing. Ecuadorean President Moreno – the only central-left president attending the summit – had yet a new opportunity to signal his willingness to coexist with pro-market governments in the region. For Brazilian President Bolsonaro, a well-known skeptic of South American integration, the summit was a platform to show a more palatable image closer to his liberal peers.

President Piñera and his guests blamed UNASUR’s bureaucracy for its lack of effectiveness, opting instead for a lean mechanism based on presidential diplomacy. Most long-time observers believe, however, that UNASUR’s effectiveness was undermined by its very weak organizational capacity, with a powerless Secretary General and personnel made up of low-ranking national diplomats instead of qualified international civil servants. Presidential diplomacy, unburdened by a bureaucracy of specialists who analyze problems and possible solutions, works well when Presidents get along in ideological terms, but precedent shows it is vulnerable to collapse when governments have divergent preferences or when states must agree on complex transnational issues such as migration, drug-trafficking, or deep economic integration.

  • PROSUR will work exclusively as a forum (not as a regional organization) and its decisions and initiatives will have to be executed and monitored by the national bureaucracies of the member states, which by definition look after national interests rather than regional interests. The Santiago Summit has demonstrated that when it comes to regional integration, leftist and right-wing heads of government look and act alike. No matter which ideology they claim, South American presidents fear collective institutions, cherish presidential diplomacy, and prefer to create new initiatives with pompous names from scratch, rather than make necessary reforms to existing ones. As Uruguayan President Vázquez – who did not attend the summit – put it, South America has a long history of integration initiatives that have not brought about integration. The region would be better served by reinforcing and overhauling existing mechanisms such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, or the Pacific Alliance, and try to make them convergent in any possible way, rather than adding yet another acronym.

March 29, 2019

* Stefano Palestini Céspedes is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Catholic University of Chile.

Peru: President Vizcarra Surprisingly Paves the Way for Liberal Project

By Carlos Monge*

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Prime Minister Salvador del Solar and President Martin Vizcarra / canaln.pe / Creative Commons

One year in office, Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra has made significant strides toward strengthening neoliberal economic policies and opening the way for a liberal project in Peru – while maintaining 50 percent popular support.  Prime Minister César Villanueva took the hit for a fall in the polls last week, setting the stage for Vizcarra to name a new cabinet this week to give a push to his agenda.  The new Prime Minister – lawyer, actor, and film director Salvador del Solar – espouses a market economy with strong state regulations against corruption, tax evasion, and monopolies, while defending human, women’s, and LGTIBQ+ rights.

  • His opponents have been weakened. Former President Alberto Fujimori is back in jail, his presidential pardon revoked.  His older daughter, Keiko, is in prison, while awaiting trial on corruption charges, and his younger son, Kenji, is under investigation for links to drug trafficking.  Fujimori family long-time confidant Jaime Yoshiyama returned from the United States directly to prison for violations of campaign finance laws.

None of this seemed remotely possible only a year ago when Vizcarra, a Vice President, returned to Peru from his posting as Ambassador to Canada and, on March 23, was sworn in as President, after President Kuczynski resigned amid serious corruption charges.  Indeed, Vizcarra appeared destined to be a weak president facing a strong and ruthless parliamentary opposition.  The question then was if he would last or, rather, when he would fall.  Vizcarra initially seemed to follow his predecessor’s appeasement policies, attempting to govern without the permanent obstruction of a Congress dominated by Keiko Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular and its close ally, APRA.  He even consulted with Keiko about potential cabinet members and important policy matters.  Keiko, on the other hand, remained convinced that she should have won the 2016 elections and sought to govern the country through her control of the Congress, even hoping to generate a political crisis leading to new national elections that she was sure she would win.

  • Vizcarra soon grasped Keiko’s intentions and sided with citizens’ widespread indignation caused by the leak of audio recordings that confirmed enormous levels of corruption in the judiciary and its connections to political parties such as Keiko’s Fuerza Popular and APRA. Despite desperate efforts by these parties and their allies in both the judiciary and the General Attorney’s office to block ongoing investigations, both Keiko and Alán García, the APRA leader and former national president, were in serious trouble.  Vizcarra embraced the anti-corruption platform and confronted head-on the same leaders and parties he had initially tried to appease.
  • Bypassing the Fuerza Popular and APRA’s domination in Congress, Vizcarra succeeded in organizing a referendum last December that approved a package of reforms he proposed to reduce corruption. (He even convinced citizens to vote NO on one of his four reform proposals – the return to a two-chamber parliament – after Fuerza Popular and APRA introduced a provision that would open the way for parliamentary re-election in 2021, which another reform prohibited.)  With an average of 80 percent of voters supporting his position on all four measures, Vizcarra scored a huge victory– clearing the way for him to move forthrightly on his political and economic agenda.

Early posturing for the 2021 elections shows that Vizcarra may have opened a previously nonexistent space for liberal politics in the country.  In fact, his new Prime Minister has presidential aspirations and Julio Guzmán and his Partido Morado have recently registered, and they are –as Vizcarra is – – a “liberal” or “sort of liberal” politician.  The traditional right, including Fuerza Popular, APRA, the CONFIEP business guild, and others, have strongly criticized the values and economic views of the new Prime Minister, but the days that the only face of the right was a mix of state capture by large economic groups and conservative values and policies – a mix Alán García and Keiko Fujimori represent so well– seem to be over.  The emergence of a liberal project also represents a challenge for the left, traditional champion of liberal values.  If those liberal values now find liberal champions, the left will have to remain true to them while – at the same time – displaying its total opposition to the continuity of neoliberal economic policies and pushing for a set of distinctly leftist policies in the social, environmental and cultural realms.

March 15, 2019

* Carlos Monge is Latin America Director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute in Lima.

Peru: Wildlife Trafficking Poses Complex Challenges

By Ana Marrugo*

A large parrot shows its multi-colored wings

A red and green macaw takes flight in Manú National Park, Peru. / Bill Bouton / Wikimedia Commons

Peru – the fifth most “megadiverse” country in the world – is losing precious wildlife because of weak trafficking laws and even weaker enforcement of them.  Home to 10 percent of existing species of flora, Peru ranks between second and fifth worldwide in the number of species of birds, mammals, amphibians, and reptiles within its borders.  The illegal trafficking of wildlife, however, is threatening Peru’s biodiversity.  It now places second in the hemisphere in volume of trafficked wildlife, trailing only Mexico.

  • Growing threats are pushing species into endangered status at a rapid rate. In 2004-14, according to Peruvian government estimates, the percentage of endangered species increased rapidly: from 14.1 to 24.5 percent of mammals; 9.2 to 35.2 percent of amphibians; and up by 50 percent of reptiles.
  • Trafficking is one source of pressure on dwindling wildlife populations. The most-trafficked species in Peru are birds, especially the white-winged parakeet and the red and green macaw, and some small primates sold as pets or to illegal zoos.  Bigger animals, such as the Andean bear, vicuñas, monkeys, and various cats, are sold for their meat.  Animal parts and reptiles and amphibians are sold for medicinal or reputedly magic uses, and reptile skins for the fashion and leather industries.  Cattle ranching, agriculture, logging, and infrastructure construction also put major pressures on animal life.
  • Peru’s National Forest and Wildlife Service (SERFOR) estimates that three quarters of the country’s most frequently trafficked species are for domestic rather than international markets. Indigenous people and peasants in the Amazon region – seeking profits far above those that can be generated from agriculture – capture animals and sell them to middlemen who then sell them to retailers in local markets or to international collectors.

Investigations of traffickers are rare, and prosecutions almost nonexistent.  The director of Neotropical Primate Conservation told reporters that “few” of the 150 cases she reported to SERFOR, prosecutors, and regional authorities – including a trafficker caught carrying thousands of parakeets – have been investigated, and “almost all cases” are retired without ever reaching a judge.  The first conviction (and one of the few known), finalized in 2016, resulted when police caught two brothers red-handed driving a car carrying an ocelot to a local market.  Offenders are usually released after paying a minor fine.

  • Getting good information is a challenge. Most estimates come from seizures of exported animals, leaving unaccounted the large portion of illegal wildlife sold in local markets, and most research focuses only on particular species.  The flow to local markets of Titicaca frog juice (thought to have extraordinary health benefits), monkey meat (for traditional cuisine), and Andean bear parts (thought to have magical properties) has been impossible to track.  Internationally, owl monkeys are sent clandestinely to Colombia for malaria research, and Chinese markets sell dried seahorse powder and an array of other substances for medicine – without leaving a trace in Peru.
  • Corruption is a perennial problem. Low-paid officers take bribes to provide protection and forged documentation permitting the transport of illegally sourced animals.  Forestry and Wildlife Law 29763 delegates virtually all responsibility for environmental crimes to local governments with poor resources and serious conflicts of interest, including officials’ collusion in the trade and local inhabitants’ dependence on it for income.

International attention in wildlife trafficking has been limited.  Unlike the illegal timber trade, this trade does not involve hundreds of millions of dollars, nor does it harm the commercial interests of the nation or its trading partners.  Major industries have not been linked to this criminal enterprise as they have in the trafficking of narcotics and timber.  Thus, international support to tackle the demand side of the market appears likely to remain feeble.  At the local level authorities rely on educational programs to teach people about the environmental impacts of wildlife trafficking, ecosystem protection and the importance of denouncing environmental crimes.  Nevertheless, wildlife trade continues to be an important source of income for impoverished communities, as well as for traffickers who frequently count on ties to corrupt officials to ensure that they can evade prosecution.

  • The impact of wildlife trafficking is not as immediately obvious as logging, and it is therefore harder to marshal political pressure for comprehensive solutions. SERFOR is expanding port controls, but piecemeal efforts have had little impact.  Since most of the trafficked animals remain in Peru and neighboring countries, efforts to discourage local demand and increase cross border cooperation would seem to offer hope – if governments get serious about addressing the problem.

June 29, 2018

* Ana Marrugo is pursuing an M.A. in Public Anthropology at American University.  She is on the team dedicated to new two-year project by CLALS and InSight Crime investigating the clandestine wildlife trafficking and logging industries throughout the region.

Peru: Challenges to the Summit of the Americas

By Fulton Armstrong

Men and women standing in Peruvian congressional chamber

Martín Vizarra’s inauguration as President of Peru on March 23, 2018. / Twitter: @prensapalacio / Creative Commons

The resignation of Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) last weekend marks not only a deepening of the crisis of governance in that country; it also signals the greatest threat yet to the credibility of the Summit of the Americas process begun in 1994.

  • The 2016 election of PPK, a technocrat with international experience, business acumen, and a stated commitment to attacking corruption, appeared at the time to reaffirm Peru’s preference for competent, if unglamorous, government. Allegations of inappropriate dealings with the Brazilian construction giant, Odebrecht, when he was a government minister in the 2000s and as a consultant prior to the last election – which he blamed on business partners – were his undoing.  He dodged charges, fought back, made deals (including releasing former President Fujimori from prison), and reportedly deployed his allies to buy votes to oppose his impeachment – all to no avail.  Vice President Martín Vizcarra, sworn in last Friday to succeed him, had been spirited off to Canada to be Peru’s ambassador last September when allegations of malfeasance as Transportation Minister led to calls for his impeachment.  But last week he pledged to make anticorruption and transparency top priorities.
  • PPK is not the only tainted politician, or even the worst, in this drama. Two of his predecessors – Alejandro Toledo (2001-06) and Ollanta Humala (2011-16) – have been indicted for offenses involving Odebrecht.  The Congress that hounded PPK out of office is itself reportedly riddled with corruption.  Odebrecht officials have testified that PPK’s congressional nemesis, Keiko Fujimori, took $1.2 million from them in the 2011 presidential race.  The respected GFK poll indicates that, at 82 percent, Congress has a worse disapproval rating (by 1 percent) than PPK did last week – with the body’s corruption being a major factor.

The crisis comes just weeks before the eighth Summit of the Americas scheduled to be held in Lima on April 13‑14, with the overarching theme of “Democratic Governance against Corruption.”  Vizcarra has directed the Peruvian foreign ministry to proceed with preparations.  The event’s anticorruption focus could produce deeply embarrassing moments for a number of hemispheric heads of state in addition to the Peruvian hosts.  Odebrecht and the Lava Jato investigations loom large over Brazilian President Michel Temer (who, despite support in the single digits, last week announced his intention to run for reelection in October).  U.S. President Trump is engaged in warfare against the Department of Justice, FBI, and special prosecutor looking into allegations that he or his campaign colluded with Russians suspected of intervening in U.S. elections.  Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has stumbled from scandal to scandal.  Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández remains under a cloud because of persistent questions about the vote count in his reelection in November.  Venezuelan President Maduro would be an obvious outcast – for both his corruption and poor governance – but his peers’ own baggage would force some restraint on their condemnations.

Other than newly inaugurated President Vizcarra’s anticorruption pledge, the conditions for a successful summit around the theme of corruption and democratic governance are obviously absent, and going ahead with it risks rendering the event a laughing stock.  Changing the theme would undermine its credibility and raise the troubling questions of what meaningful topics – trade, democracy, inequality, infrastructure investment, or counternarcotics – could replace it.  There are also tempting reasons to postpone the event, including the fact that several countries – Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia among them – will be electing new presidents this year and could bring fresh, validated ideas to a meeting next year or beyond.  Postponing the event, however, would risk braking what little momentum the Summit process has and would leave open when, if ever, the perfect summit could be held.  Crises driven by corruption (and, in the case of Venezuela, the collapse of decency) have a tendency to go on for years.  Either way, Summit organizers are going to have to scale back their expectations – with a protocolary event that sacrifices substance in April, or create a pretext for postponement and hope for a more propitious moment in the future.  The Ibero-American Summit, which includes Spain but excludes the United States and Canada, is scheduled to meet in Guatemala in November under the theme of “A Prosperous, Inclusive, and Sustainable Ibero-America.”  Perhaps that event’s timing and theme will help get regional discussions back on track.

March 26, 2018

Lima Group: Committed to Democratic Principles?

By Nicolás Comini*

Group of men and women stand at a podium

Government officials from different Latin American countries met in August 2017 to sign the “Lima Declaration,” establishing the Lima Group. / Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Perú / Flickr / Creative Commons

The “Lima Group” – an informal alliance of 12 Latin American countries created to observe the sensitive situation in Venezuela – has shown that its defense of democracy in the hemisphere is inconsistent.  Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru have on at least a handful of occasions condemned Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro for stoking political violence, holding political prisoners, committing electoral fraud, and engaging in other abuses, justifying their positions as based on ethics, morals, and good practices.

The reactions of the Lima Group and its leading members to the situation in Honduras since that country’s presidential election in November, however, suggests that the values they espouse do not have universal application.  After OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro declared that the election lacked credibility and called for new elections, some countries’ pro-democracy fervor faded.

  • Argentine President Mauricio Macri’s administration quickly recognized Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández’s victory and officially declared its “disposition to continue working for the development of closer ties of friendship and more cooperation between the two nations.” The Brazilian foreign ministry expressed its “commitment to maintain and strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation that traditionally have united both countries.”  In Mexico, President Enrique Peña Nieto’s government quickly recognized Hernández as well, calling on “Honduran society to support dialogue in order to preserve peace and democratic stability in that sister nation.”

The discrepancies between the group’s rhetoric and actions appear to be rooted in various reasons.

  • Political alignments take precedence over values. Honduran President Hernández has been active in the group’s (and indirectly the OAS’) efforts on Venezuela.  Honduras is a member of the Lima Group, and Hernández is perceived by conservative governments as an ally to contain the spread of the left.  The risk of massive Venezuelan population displacement, with profound potential consequences for neighboring countries, contrasts with the situation in Honduras.  With the region entering a new election cycle, moreover, incumbents’ lack of support for Almagro’s position signals that they do not want the OAS messing around in their own electoral processes.
  • These governments also see Hernández as a strategic United States ally in Central America in combating drug trafficking, transnational criminal networks, money laundering, and irregular migration. Many of the governments may also refrain from criticizing the belief that Tegucigalpa benefits from the presence of 1 million Hondurans in the United States (more than half of whom the State Department says “are believed to be undocumented”).  In addition, Honduras was one of the eight countries that supported President Donald Trump’s rejection of the UN General Assembly Resolution asking nations not to locate diplomatic missions in Jerusalem.

The crises in Venezuela and Honduras are indeed different, and the international community’s interests in them are naturally different.  Maduro’s and Hernández’s failings affect other countries’ political and economic equities in different ways.  Maduro’s undemocratic actions increase unpredictability in the management of oil and other sectors of foreign interest, whereas Hernández’s represent predictability, if not stability, in areas that Washington cares about and Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and the rest of Latin America do not.  But the high-sounding values at stake – democracy, institutionality, and rule of law – are the same in both countries.  While Venezuela’s population is three times the size of Honduras’ and its political crisis arguably three times more advanced, the moral responsibility – and moral authority – of the Lima Group or its member nations is many times greater in a small, vulnerable, poor country like Honduras.  Security forces have gunned down some three dozen oppositionists and protestors since the November election, and allegations of human rights violations have soared, but Latin America’s major democracies have been silent.

  • The failure to support the OAS’ call for new elections was not just a stab in the back of Secretary General Almagro; it revealed that their rhetoric about the OAS Democracy Charter – embodiment of democratic values they demand be respected in Venezuela – are not as universal as they say. When the Lima Group last Tuesday (with considerable justification) rejected the Venezuelan National Assembly’s call for an early presidential election, the Hernández government’s signature was there alongside the others.  If universal democratic values and principles are not for universal application – if even an informal grouping will not criticize a small actor with whom they do not have major equities at stake – their value is much diminished.

January 30, 2018

* Nicolás Comini is Director of the Bachelor and Master Programs in International Relations at the Universidad del Salvador (Buenos Aires) and Professor at the New York University-Buenos Aires.  He was Research Fellow at CLALS.

Peru: PPK Survives, But Political Crisis Deepens

By Carlos Monge*

Man holds up red and white flag

A protester in Lima holds a Peruvian flag with and image of Alberto Fujimori in prison garb with the phrase “Indulto Es Insulto… Asesino” (“The Pardon is an Insult… Murderer”). / Alan / Flickr / Creative Commons

Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s commutation of former President Alberto Fujimori’s prison sentence – in exchange for some fujimorista support against his impeachment by Congress on corruption charges – has thrown the country’s politics into a tailspin and increased the prospects of prolonged national crisis.

  • PPK was accused of involvement in corrupt deals with Peruvian and Brazilian construction companies – part of the massive Brazil-based Lava Jato scandal – while he was Minister of Economy and Prime Minister under President Alejandro Toledo (2001-06). By ordering Fujimori’s release, he rewarded Kenji Fujimori and dissident Fuerza Popular MPs, who’d already split with party leader and sister Keiko over her wavering commitment to get their father out of jail at all cost, for their votes against the impeachment.  After emphatically denying he would do so, PPK granted Fujimori a humanitarian pardon on medical grounds, after which the former President experienced a recovery robust enough to resume political activism just days later.

The Fujimori indulto has aggravated deep and longstanding tensions within and among the country’s parties and civil society.  After the impeachment proceedings collapsed, three of PPK`s MPs and three of his ministers resigned in protest, and even the lawyer who defended him against impeachment has denounced his actions as a political scam.  PPK’s popular approval has sunk to 20 percent, and reliable polls show that more than half of the population rejects the indulto.  Protests are growing.  Some 30,000 to 40,000 people marched through Lima on January 11, condemning the collusion of corrupt elites to protect each other, and more demonstrations are planned.

  • Longtime observers in Lima say that the pro-Fujimori Fuerza Popular remains deeply divided as siblings Kenji and Keiko are at each other’s throats over the control of the party and relations with the PPK administration. Even if Alberto and Kenji Fujimori continue to support PPK for a while, open wounds from the close presidential race between PPK and Keiko in 2016 complicate cooperation and in fact may deepen the riff as Keiko’s close collaborators now accuse the PPK camp causing the Fuerza Popular crisis, even denouncing that fujimorista votes were paid for.  Informed speculation is that Keiko will fan the flames of scandal enveloping PPK (even though she reportedly has her own liabilities in Lava Jato) pushing for his fall in hopes of securing early elections rather than waiting until 2021.
  • The left, centrist sectors, and even some conservatives such as Nobel Prize novelist Mario Vargas Llosa have given up any pretense of coexisting with PPK. Human rights organizations and trade unions are demanding Alberto Fujimori be sent back to prison; denouncing the “corrupt alliance” between PPK, the Fujimoris, and the business elites; and insisting that ongoing investigations be pursued no matter who they bring down.  In some sectors, the leftist call for a new Constitution breaking the bond between the state and big business is gaining support.

PPK is a lame duck president with general elections still four years away.  In Congress, which is presided over by a forceful opponent – Luis Galarreta – his base has shrunk to 15 MPs, and he depends heavily on the support of fair-weather friends like Alberto and Kenji Fujimori.  The economy grew 2.7 percent last year, according to the Central Bank, but fell short of targets.  Lava Jato – which has already landed former President Ollanta Humala in jail and prompted extradition proceedings against former President Toledo (living in the United States) – is not going away, with new information expected soon from Brazil.  Popular rejection of the political class, which is seen as corrupt and cynical, will deepen.  Talk in Lima isn’t about if PPK will go, but when.  His fate at this moment appears to depend less on his own cunning and more on the political calculations and unstable relations between the two Fujimori factions and the rest of the parties in Congress and on the strength of street protests.

January 23, 2018

* Carlos Monge is Latin America Director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute in Lima.

Laudato Si:  Support for the Indigenous of the Amazon Benefits Us All

By Birgit Weiler*

Group of men and women stand behind a banner

Members of the Awajún community mobilize in Peru. / Andina Archivo / Creative Commons

Issuing his Laudato Si encyclical in 2015, Pope Francis put himself on the side of Latin America’s original peoples in protecting the environment in their ancestral lands, in what will be a long struggle to counteract climate change and safeguard the earth.  Laudato Si emphasized that different religions, including the indigenous peoples’, can make “rich contributions … towards an integral ecology.”  Francis wrote:  “Given the complexity of the ecological crisis and its multiple causes, we need to realize that the solutions will not emerge from just one way of interpreting and transforming reality.  Respect must also be shown for the various cultural riches of different peoples … their interior life and spirituality.”   He spoke of their wisdom especially in dealing with the earth and all the living beings.

  • For the Awajún and Wampis in Amazonas Department in northern Peru, their cosmovisión (world view) and traditional religion are an important source of inspiration and endurance in their struggle for safeguarding their living space. In the integral vision of the world they share with other indigenous peoples, all living beings – not only human beings – are considered agents within a single big energy.  Everything is connected – similar to the “integral ecology” mentioned in Laudato Si.
  • Highlighting the urgent need of a “bold cultural revolution,” the encyclical implicitly embraces the indigenous people’s concept of “Buen Vivir,” an alternative way of life based on respect for the earth and on living in relationships of interconnectedness and interdependence. This demands a change in lifestyle reducing significantly our negative impact on our planet; caring for the integrity of the ecosystems and of human life; and a real change in our way of understanding and practicing economy, “progress,” and “development.”

Governments have been slow to respond to these calls – which threaten to disrupt longstanding arrangements between the extraction industry, regulators, and legislators – but there have been some significant public signs of progress.  Last March, for example, the Fourth Constitutional Court in Lima declared that the Awajún and Wampis have the right to approve oil exploration in their ancestral lands, particularly an area known as “Lot 116.”  The court ordered exploration activities to cease and withdraw from the region until full consultation with local indigenous groups was completed.  In another case, in the Iquitos–Pucallpa region, a court ordered that the state consult with respect the indigenous people’s right to a full consultation, forcing the government to step back and begin the process anew.

 Despite this halting progress, the environment and cultures that Laudato Si reveres are under constant and, in some cases, worsening threat.  Illegal deforestation of precious tropical lumber is reaching alarming levels.  An explosion in new oil palm farms, the construction of hydroelectric power stations, and the expansion of roads and other infrastructure to facilitate extractive industries are all inflicting permanent damage.  Scientists have repeatedly pointed out that the ecosystems of the Amazon won’t be able to bear much longer the devastating impact of these activities.  As the Pope wrote, loss of the region’s tropical forests – the biggest lung of our world – and the vanquishing of peoples like the Awajún and Wampis would be a tragic loss for us all.

October 11, 2017

* Birgit Weiler is Director of the Area of Research at the University Antonio Ruiz de Montoya in Lima; collaborates closely with the Vicariate of Jaén (Catholic Church) and with the Awajún and Wampis; and contributes to CLALS’s project on religion and climate change.

Peru’s “New” Drug Strategy: Déjà Vu?

By Paul Gootenberg*

Eradicacion de la coca

“Peru’s national drug control agency just released a four-year counter-drug strategy in April that warns of the urgency to reverse the ongoing surge in cocaine production.” / Editora Perú / Creative Commons

Peru, with a capacity to produce about 350-450 tons of cocaine a year, has been approaching Colombia as the world’s top exporter since around 2011, but its new drug strategy is not likely to reverse that trend.  Most Peruvian coca now comes from the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), and most cocaine flows towards Brazil not the United States.  Peru’s national drug control agency, DEVIDA (National Commission for Development and Life Without Drugs), just released a four-year counter-drug strategy in April that warns – again – of the urgency to reverse the ongoing surge in cocaine production but offers few compelling or new ideas on what to do.  The report notes the “high risk for Peru that our country will repeat the cases of Colombia and Mexico” in violence, corruption, and other costs of a massive illicit narcotics trade.  The strategy has some serious flaws, however.

  • Although the report touts itself as a “Plan Integral,” military spending and eradication far outstrip “alternative development.” Coca “supply control” is the core of the program, though development efforts (mainly with cacao) are offered. Peru’s plan is mechanically sequenced – Pacification, Eradication, Services, and Development – and its rigid militaristic strategy draws criticism.  The latter seems basically directly against VRAEM peasants.  In 2014, a similar plan was announced to eradicate “50 percent” of the VRAEM coca in just one year, but nothing occurred because of the risky security environment.
  • The sources of some key data are unclear. The report cites UN information but apparently without taking into account the substantial flow of cocaleros and cocaine traffickers deeper into Amazonia, near the Brazilian and Colombian borders.  It generally treats the VRAEM, Peru’s main producing area, as an isolated containable “world apart” – poised for national “recuperation.”  Security threats in the area, including guerrillas, actually made holding off eradication since 2014 a wise move – it would have pushed cocaleros into the arms of guerrillas – but the new report fails to consider any blowback from its plan.
  • It glosses over the shortcomings of Peru’s security services to carry out what remains a heavily security-based strategy. It makes the startling admission that only 1.5-2.0 percent of VRAEM cocaine and 3-8 percent of cocaine nationally is seized – one of the lowest interdiction rates in the world.  (Colombia’s improved intelligence enables it to grab about half of cocaine in-country, and even weak Bolivia does better policing illicit cocaine.)  The ease of smuggling in Peru is directly related to the open corruptibility of Peru’s police, military, and politicians.  But except for money laundering, DEVIDA’s report barely addresses the corruption problem.
  • Peru, unlike Colombia and Bolivia, has never questioned the UN/U.S. international drug regime, nor does this report. But Peru should expect little overseas eradication aid in the Trump era, raising big doubts about the sustainability of a long-term program.

As Colombians learned after decades of drug war against coca growers, including Plan Colombia, forced eradication is one of the most inefficient and futile ways to combat drugs. Studies by Colombian economist Daniel Mejía show that the marginal cost of eliminating a kilo of cocaine from markets by aerial spraying is a whopping $247,000 – far more than a kilo’s price on the street.  Eradication also provokes violent conflict and propels growers to new areas, and Peru has many tropical basins ripe for raising coca.  Effective intelligence to hit labs and intermediary layers of cocaine trades pays bigger dividends.  So does enlisting cocalero unions on the side of the state – to self-police as in Bolivia (now with the region’s least illicit cocaine) and Colombia (where the 2017 peace accord now recognizes cocalero rights).  Peru marginalizes cocaleros, precluding the sort of socio-political strategy needed for success.  All in all, DEVIDA’s strategy makes it interesting to see whose plan will produce the best results by 2021 – Peru’s, Colombia’s, or Bolivia’s?

June 13, 2017

* Paul Gootenberg is Chair of the Department of History at Stony Brook University and author of Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug (University of North Carolina Press, 2008).